[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Thirdly, the moral philosopher tells us how we are haled hither
and thither with outward objects. To this I answer, “First, that the
power which outward objects have over us, is for the most part by our
own default, because of those vicious habits which we have contracted.
Therefore though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them,
yet they were free and voluntary in their first originals. As a
paralytic man, to use Aristotle’s comparison, shedding the liquor
deserves to be punished, for though his act be unwilling, yet his
intemperance was willing, whereby he contracted this infirmity.
“Secondly I answer, that concupiscence, and custom, and bad company, and
outward objects do indeed make a proclivity, but not a necessity. By
prayers, tears, meditations, vows, watchings, fastings, humi-cubations,
a man may get a contrary habit, and gain the victory, not only over
outward objects, but also over his own corruptions, and become the king
of the little world of himself.
Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris irâ,
Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas
Interius leges. Tunc omnia jure tenebis,
Cum poteris rex esse tui.
“Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judiciously and
provides for all occurrences, is not so easily surprised with outward
objects. Only Ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife and son. I
would beat thee, said the philosopher, but that I am angry. One spake
lowest, when he was most moved. Another poured out the water, when he
was thirsty. Another made a covenant with his eyes. Neither opportunity
nor enticement could prevail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire,
with the three children. It is not the strength of the wind, but the
lightness of the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Outward
objects do not impose a moral, much less a physical necessity; they may
be dangerous, but cannot be destructive to true liberty.”
_T. H._ Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say,
external objects presented to men of such and such temperatures, do make
their actions necessary; and says, the power, that such objects have
over us, proceeds from our own fault. But that is nothing to the
purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own
power. And therefore that opinion may hold true, for all this answer.
Further, he saith, prayer, fasting, &c., may alter our habits. It is
true: but when they do so, they are causes of the contrary habit, and
make it necessary; as the former habit had been necessary, if prayer,
fasting, &c., had not been. Besides we are not moved, nor disposed to
prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company,
godly preachers, or something equivalent. In the next place he saith, a
resolved mind is not easily surprised. As the mind of Ulysses, who, when
others wept, he alone wept not. And of the philosopher that abstained
from striking, because he found himself angry. And of him that poured
out the water, when he was thirsty; and the like. Such things I confess
have, or may have been done; and do prove only that it was not necessary
for Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor for
that other man to drink: but it does not prove that it was not necessary
for Ulysses then to abstain, as he did, from weeping; nor the
philosopher to abstain, as he did, from striking; nor the other man to
forbear drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought to have proved.
Lastly, he confesseth that the disposition of objects may be dangerous
to liberty, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer, it is
impossible; for liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost.
And if it cannot be lost, which he confesseth, I may infer it can be in
no danger at all.
_J. D._ (_a_) “The third pretence was out of moral philosophy
misunderstood, that outward objects do necessitate the will. I shall not
need to repeat what he hath omitted, but only to satisfy his exceptions.
(_b_) The first is, that ‘it is not material, ’though the power of
outward objects do proceed from our own faults, if such faults of ours
proceed not from causes in our own power’. Well, but what if they do
proceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do? Then
his answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults proceed from causes that
are not, and were not in our own power, then they are not our faults at
all. It is not a fault in us, not to do those things which never were in
our power to do: but they are the faults of these causes from whence
they do proceed. (_c_) Next he confesseth, that it is in our power, by
good endeavours, to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted,
and to get the contrary habit. ‘True,’ saith he, ‘but then the contrary
habit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the former habit did the
other way.’ By which very consideration it appears, that that which he
calls a necessity, is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true
necessity, it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. The
truth is, acquired habits do help and assist the faculty; but they do
not necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to himself an habit of
temperance, may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act. And so on
the contrary. Acts are not opposed to habits, but other habits. (_d_) He
adds, ‘that we are not moved to prayer or any other action, but by
outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something
equivalent’. Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to make godly
preachers and pious company to be outward objects; which are outward
agents: secondly, to affirm that the will is not moved but by outward
objects. The will is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the
sensitive passions, by angels good and bad, by men; and most effectually
by acts or habits infused by God, whereby the will is excited
extraordinarily indeed, but efficaciously and determinately. This is
more than equivalent with outward objects.
“Another branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and prepared mind is
able to resist both the appetibility of objects, and the unruliness of
passions: as I showed by example. (_e_) He answers, that I prove Ulysses
was not necessitated to weep, nor the philosopher to strike; but I do
not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I
am not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove
that which I intend; that the rational will hath power, both to slight
the most appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions.
When he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have
produced, then it will be time for him to cry for more work.
“Lastly, whereas I say, that outward objects may be dangerous, but
cannot be destructive to true liberty; he catcheth at it, (_f_) and
objects, that ‘liberty is in no danger but to be lost; but I say it
cannot be lost, therefore’, he infers that, ‘it is in no danger at all.’
I answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be abused, than to be
lost. Many more men do abuse their wits, than lose them. Secondly,
liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished; as when it
is clogged by vicious habits contracted by ourselves, and yet it is not
totally lost. Thirdly, though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the
world, yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man, as to
the exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty; and though nothing be
more natural to a man than reason, yet many by excess of study, or by
continual gormandizing, or by some extravagant passion which they have
cherished in themselves, or by doting too much upon some affected
object, do become very sots, and deprive themselves of the use of
reason, and consequently of liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is
not thus universally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this or
that particular occasion. As he who makes choice of a bad wife, hath
lost his former liberty to choose a good one.”