[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Thirdly, they distinguish between liberty from compulsion, and
liberty from necessitation. The will, say they, is free from compulsion,
but not free from necessitation. And this they fortify with two reasons.
First, because it is granted by all divines, that hypothetical
necessity, or necessity upon a supposition, may consist with liberty.
Secondly, because God and the good angels do good necessarily, and yet
are more free than we. To the first reason, I confess that necessity
upon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty, as when it
signifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding in that
which it knows to be, or that it shall be. But if the supposition be not
in the agent’s power, nor depend upon anything that is in his power; if
there be an exterior antecedent cause which doth necessitate the effect;
to call this free, is to be mad with reason.
“To the second reason, I confess that God and the good angels are more
free than we are, that is, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not
extensively in the latitude of the object; according to a liberty of
exercise, but not of specification. A liberty of exercise, that is, to
do or not to do, may consist well with a necessity of specification, or
a determination to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise, and a
necessity of exercise, a liberty of specification, and a necessity of
specification, are not compatible, nor can consist together. He that is
antecedently necessitated to do evil, is not free to do good. So this
instance is nothing at all to the purpose.”
_T. H._ But the distinction of free, into free from compulsion, and free
from necessitation, I acknowledge. For to be free from compulsion, is to
do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it. For a man
is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it; as
when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or
submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do
anything from love, or revenge, or lust, are free from compulsion; and
yet their actions may be as necessary as those which are done upon
compulsion. For sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear; but
free from necessitation I say nothing can be. And it is that which he
undertook to disprove. This distinction, he says, useth to be fortified
by two reasons. But they are not mine. The first, he says, is, “that it
is granted by all divines, that an hypothetical necessity, or necessity
upon supposition, may stand with liberty”. That you may understand this,
I will give you an example of hypothetical necessity. _If I shall live,
I shall eat_; this is an hypothetical necessity. Indeed, it is a
necessary proposition; that is to say, it is necessary that that
proposition should be true, whensoever uttered; but it is not the
necessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary, that the man
shall live, or that the man shall eat. I do not use to fortify my
distinctions with such reasons. Let him confute them as he will, it
contents me. But I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an
easy and plain thing, but withal false, may be, with the grave usage of
such words as _hypothetical necessity_, and _necessity upon
supposition_, and such like terms of Schoolmen, obscured and made to
seem profound learning.
The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from
compulsion, and free from necessitation, he says, is that ‘God and good
angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we’. This reason,
though I had no need of it, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is
true that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are free. But
because I find not in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of
our Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good angels
to work by necessity, or in what sense they work freely, I suspend my
sentence in that point; and am content that there may be a freedom from
compulsion, and yet no freedom from necessitation, as hath been proved
in that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats
and without fear of danger. But how he can avoid the consisting together
of freedom and necessity, supposing God and good angels are freer than
men and yet do good necessarily, that we must now examine.
“I confess,” saith he, “that God and good angels are more free than we,
that is, intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the
latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, not of
specification.” Again we have here two distinctions that are no
distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented, by I know not whom,
to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader. For it
cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater than for a man to
do what he will, and to forbear what he will. One heat may be more
intensive than another, but not one liberty than another. He that can do
what he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none at
all. Also liberty (as he says the Schools call it) of exercise, which
is, as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be
without a liberty, which they call of specification; that is to say, a
liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man
conceive, that he has liberty to do any thing, that hath not liberty to
do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in
Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh,
how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he
that hath no license at all?
You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the
Schools; and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them by authority
of doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have
laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for,
nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over man’s
reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the
Scripture, but by pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of
other men.
_J. D._ “He who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the
grounds of learning, had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to
learn a new language (I dare not call it jargon or canting) lately
devised, not to set forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must
learn a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new
sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, a new kind
of election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and in conclusion, a new
nothing. (_a_) This proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood
in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will
is not always necessitated; for if it be ordinarily, or at any time free
from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from
necessity. The former sense, that the will is not compelled, is
acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable: _voluntas non
cogitur_. For if the will may be compelled, then it may both will and
not will the same thing at the same time, under the same notion; but
this implies a contradiction. Yet this author, like the good woman whom
her husband sought up the stream when she was drowned upon pretence that
when she was living she used to go contrary courses to all other people,
holds, that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he
doth not will, that is, in his sense may compel the will: “as when a man
willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to
his enemy for fear of being killed”. I answer, that T. H. mistakes
sundry ways in this discourse.
(_b_) “First, he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from
fear are properly compulsory actions: which in truth are not only
voluntary, but free actions; neither compelled, nor so much as
physically necessitated. Another man, at the same time, in the same
ship, in the same storm, may choose, and the same individual man
otherwise advised might choose not, to throw his goods overboard. It is
the man himself, who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It
is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed
from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose neither the
casting of his goods into the sea, nor the submitting to his enemy. But
considering the present exigence of his affairs, reason dictates to him,
that of two inconveniences the less is to be chosen, as a comparative
good. Neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of
his desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear doth in
these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c. may do in other cases; that is, may
occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end, which
otherwise he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven years more,
rather than not to enjoy his beloved Rachel. The merchant, to hazard
himself upon the rough seas in hope of profit. Passions may be so
violent, that they may necessitate the will, that is, when they prevent
deliberations; but this is rarely, and then the will is not free. But
they never properly compel it. That which is compelled, is against the
will; and that which is against the will, is not willed.
(_c_) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that ‘a man is
then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an
action’: as if force were not more prevalent with a man, than fear. We
must know therefore, that this word _compelled_ is taken two ways:
sometimes improperly, that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by
threats or fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have
done, if those threats or that passion had not been. Sometimes it is
taken properly; when we do any thing against our own inclination, moved
by an external cause, the will not consenting nor concurring, but
resisting as much as it can. As in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn
or carried by violence to the idol’s temple. Or as in the case of St.
Peter (John xxi. 18): _Another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither
thou wouldest not_. This is that compulsion, which is understood when we
say, the will may be letted, or changed, or necessitated, or that the
imperate actions of the will, that is the actions of the inferior
faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will, may be compelled: but
that the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, to choose,
cannot be compelled; because it is the nature of an action properly
compelled, to be done by an extrinsical cause, without the concurrence
of the will.
(_d_) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be
free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some passions are so
sudden and violent, that they surprise a man, and betray the succours of
the soul, and prevent deliberation; as we see in some _motus primo
primi_, or antipathies, how some men will run upon the most dangerous
objects, upon the first view of a loathed creature, without any power to
contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not ordinary, so
they are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election. But
where deliberation and election are, as when a man throws his goods
overboard to save the ship, or submits to his enemy to save his life,
there is always true liberty.
“Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I produce in favour of his
cause, yet they who urged them deserved not to be slighted, unless it
were because they were School-men. The former reason is thus framed: a
necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty. But that
necessity which flows from the natural and extrinsical determination of
the will, is a necessity of supposition. To this, my answer is in
effect, that (_e_) a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes
the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. As
for a Romish priest to vow continence, upon supposition that he be a
Romish priest, is necessary; but because it was in his power to be a
priest or not to be a priest, therefore his vow is a free act. So
supposing a man to have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at
home; yet because it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take
it, therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the thing
supposed is not in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. Supposing
a man to be extremely sick, it is necessary that he keep at home; or
supposing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a cat, he runs
necessarily away so soon as he sees her: because this antipathy, and
this sickness, are not in the power of the party affected, therefore
these acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons, Balaam blessed Israel;
these two acts being done, are both necessary upon supposition. But it
was in Jacob’s power, not to have blessed his sons; so was it not in
Balaam’s power, not to have blessed Israel (Numb. xxii. 38). Jacob’s
will was determined by himself; Balaam’s will was physically determined
by God. Therefore Jacob’s benediction proceeded from his own free
election; and Balaam’s from God’s determination. So was Caiphas’
prophecy (John xi. 51): therefore the text saith, _he spake not of
himself_. To this T. H. saith nothing; but only declareth by an
impertinent instance, what _hypothetical_ signifies; and then adviseth
your Lordship, to take notice how errors and ignorance may be cloaked
under grave scholastic terms. And I do likewise intreat your Lordship to
take notice, that the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under
the pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up their
sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing, before they begin to
play their tricks.
“Concerning the second argument drawn from the liberty of God and the
good angels; as I cannot but approve his modesty, in ‘suspending his
judgment concerning the manner how God and the good angels do work
necessarily or freely, because he finds it not set down in the Articles
of our faith, or the decrees of our Church’, especially in this age,
which is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter
prophesied of, (2 Pet. iii. 3), who neither believe that there is God or
angels, or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies
from putrifaction; so I can by no means assent unto him in that which
follows, that is to say, that he hath proved that liberty and necessity
of the same kind may consist together, that is, a liberty of exercise
with a necessity of exercise, or a liberty of specification with a
necessity of specification. Those actions which he saith are
necessitated by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason,
either truly or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself. But
it troubles him, that I say that God and the good angels are more free
than men, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not extensively in
the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not
of specification: which he saith are no distinctions, but terms invented
to cover ignorance. Good words. Doth he only see? Are all other men
stark blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary distinctions;
and if he alone do not conceive them, it is because distinctions, as all
other things, have their fates, according to the capacities or
prejudices of their readers. But he urgeth two reasons. ‘One heat,’
saith he, ‘may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than
another.’ Why not, I wonder? Nothing is more proper to a man than
reason; yet a man is more rational than a child, and one man more
rational than another, that is, in respect of the use and exercise of
reason. As there are degrees of understanding, so there are of liberty.
The good angels have clearer understandings than we, and they are not
hindered with passions as we, and by consequence they have more use of
liberty than we. (_f_) His second reason is: ‘he that can do what he
will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no
liberty’. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed.
But this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty
to do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot, or not to shoot,
although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We do good freely,
but with more difficulty and reluctance than the good spirits. The more
rational, and the less sensual the will is, the greater is the degree of
liberty. His other exception against liberty of exercise, and liberty of
specification, is a mere mistake, which grows merely from not rightly
understanding what liberty of specification, or contrariety is. A
liberty of specification, saith he, is a liberty to do or not to do this
or that in particular. Upon better advice he will find, that this which
he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and
not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do
this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so
likewise, to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil.
But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety,
which extends to contrary objects or to diverse kind of things. So his
reason to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty
of specification, falls flat to the ground: and he may lay aside his
lenten licence for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these
things, which are so evident that no man can question them who doth
understand them.
(_g_) “And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and
scholastical expressions, and the ‘doctors of the Church, who by this
means tyrannized over the understandings of other men.’ What a
presumption is this, for one private man, who will not allow human
liberty to others, to assume to himself such a licence to control so
magistrally, and to censure of gross ignorance and tyrannising over
men’s judgments, yea, as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in
the world, the doctors of the Church in general, who have flourished in
all ages and all places, only for a few necessary and innocent
distinctions. Truly, said Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the
light of the sun. (_h_) What then, must the logicians lay aside their
first and second intentions, their abstracts and concretes, their
subjects and predicates, their modes and figures, their method synthetic
and analytic, their fallacies of composition and division, &c.? Must the
moral philosopher quit his means and extremes, his _principia congenita
et acquisita_, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his
necessity absolute and hypothetical, &c.? Must the natural philosopher
give over his intentional species, his understanding agent and patient,
his receptive and eductive power of the matter, his qualities _infusæ_
or _influxæ_, _symbolæ_ or _dissymbolæ_, his temperament _ad pondus_ and
_ad justitiam_, his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous, his sympathies
and antipathies, his antiperistasis, &c.? Must the astrologer and the
geographer leave their _apogæum_ and _perigæum_, their artic and
antartic poles, their equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones,
&c.? Must the mathematician, the metaphysician, and the divine,
relinquish all their terms of art and proper idiotisms, because they do
not relish with T. H.’s palate? But he will say, they are obscure
expressions. What marvel is it, when the things themselves are more
obscure? Let him put them into as plain English as he can, and they
shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all
grounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration:
yet let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it, and he
will hold it to be as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain fustian or
jargon. Every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and
expressions, which are well known to the sons of art, not so to
strangers. Let him consult with military men, with physicians, with
navigators; and he shall find this true by experience. Let him go on
shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their _starboard_ and
_larboard_, because they please not him, or because he accounts it
gibberish. No, no: it is not the School divines, but innovators and
seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of
Europe. (_i_) T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_,
cap. XII.: ‘_that it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the knowledge
of good and evil belongs to private persons_’: and cap. XVII. ‘that in
questions of faith, the civil magistrates ought to consult with
ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition
of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, to whom our
Saviour hath promised infallibility.’ These are the very men whom he
traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to them; here he
accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too
much to them; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he
takes too much upon him; (1 Cor. xiv. 32): _The spirits of the prophets
are subject to the prophets_.”