The Bishop, supposing I had taken my opinion from the authority of the
Stoic philosophers, not from my own meditation, falleth into dispute
against the Stoics: whereof I might, if I pleased, take no notice, but
pass over to No. XIX. But that he may know I have considered their
doctrine concerning fate, I think fit to say thus much, that their error
consisteth not in the opinion of fate, but in feigning of a false God.
When therefore they say, _fatum est effatum Jovis_, they say no more but
that _fate is the word of Jupiter_. If they had said it had been the
word of the true God, I should not have perceived anything in it to
contradict; because I hold, as most Christians do, that the whole world
was made, and is now governed by the word of God, which bringeth a
necessity of all things and actions to depend upon the Divine
disposition. Nor do I see cause to find fault with that, as he does,
which is said by Lipsius, that (_a_) fate is a _series or order of
causes depending upon the Divine counsel_; though the divines thought he
came too near the rocks, as he thinks I do now. And the reason why he
was cautelous, was, because being a member of the Romish Church he had
little confidence in the judgment and lenity of the Romish clergy; and
not because he thought he had over-shot himself.
(_b_) “Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the
first cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes, though he will
not see that which it concerned him to answer, &c.”, “as, namely, that
the faculty of willing, &c.” I answer, that distinction he allegeth, not
to be mine, but the Stoics’; and therefore I had no reason to take
notice of it; for he disputeth not against me, but others. And whereas
he says, _it concerned me to make_ that answer which he hath set down in
the words following; I cannot conceive how it concerneth me (whatsoever
it may do somebody else) to speak absurdly.
I said that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that
are next and immediate to it; which cannot be doubted, and though he
deny it, he does not disprove it. For when he says, “those things which
God wills without himself, he wills freely and not necessarily”; he says
rashly, and untruly. Rashly, because there is nothing without God, who
is _infinite_, in whom _are all things_, and in whom _we live, move, and
have our being_; and untruly, because whatsoever God foreknew from
eternity, he willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily. But
against this he argueth thus: “Whatsoever cause acts or works
necessarily, doth work or act all that it can do, or all that is in its
power; but it is evident that God doth not all things which he can do,”
&c. In things inanimate, the action is always according to the extent of
its power; not taking in the power of willing, because they have it not.
But in those things that have will, the action is according to the whole
power, will and all. It is true, that God doth not all things that he
can do if he will; but that he can _will_ that which he hath not
_willed_ from all eternity, I deny; unless that he can not only _will a
change_, but also _change his will_, which all divines say is immutable;
and then they must needs be necessary effects, that proceed from God.
And his texts, _God could have raised up children unto Abraham_, &c.;
and _sent twelve legions of angels_, &c., make nothing against the
necessity of those actions, which from the first cause proceed
_immediately_.