(_a_) “This proposition, _the will is free_, may be understood in two
senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not
always necessitated, &c. The former sense, that the will is not
compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable.” I
never said the will is _compelled_, but do agree with the rest of the
world in granting that it is _not compelled_. It is an absurd speech to
say it is compelled, but not to say it is necessitated, or a necessary
effect of some cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compel heat; so
likewise when some cause maketh the will to anything, it doth not compel
it. Many things may compel a man to do an action, in producing the will;
but that is not a compelling of the _will_, but of the _man_. That which
I call necessitation, is the effecting and creating of that will which
was not before, not a compelling of a will already existent. The
necessitation or creation of the will, is the same thing with the
compulsion of the man, saving that we commonly use the word compulsion,
in those actions which proceed from terror. And therefore this
distinction is of no use; and that raving which followeth immediately
after it, is nothing to the question, _whether the will be free_, though
it be to the question, _whether the man be free_.
(_b_) “First he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from
fear are properly compulsory actions; which in truth are not only
voluntary, but free actions.” I never said nor doubted, but such actions
were both voluntary and free; for he that doth any thing for fear,
though he say truly he was compelled to it, yet we deny not that he had
election to do or not to do, and consequently that he was a voluntary
and free agent. But this hinders not, but that the terror might be a
necessary cause of his election of that which otherwise he would not
have elected, unless some other potent cause made it necessary he should
elect the contrary. And therefore, in the same ship, in the same storm,
one man may be necessitated to throw his goods overboard, and another
man to keep them within the ship; and the same man in a like storm be
otherwise advised, if all the causes be not like. But that the same
individual man, as the Bishop says, that chose to throw his goods
overboard, might chose not to throw his goods overboard, I cannot
conceive; unless a man can choose to throw overboard and not to throw
overboard, or be so advised and otherwise advised, all at once.
(_c_) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that ‘a man is
then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an
action.’ As if force were not more prevalent with a man than fear,” &c.
When I said _fear_, I think no man can doubt but the fear of force was
understood. I cannot see therefore what quarrel he could justly take, at
saying that a man is compelled by fear only; unless he think it may be
called compulsion when a man by force, seizing on another man’s limbs,
moveth them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth. But this is not
the meaning of compulsion: neither is the action so done, the action of
him that suffereth, but of him that useth the force. But this, as if it
were a question of the propriety of the English tongue, the Bishop
denies; and says when a man is moved by fear, it is _improperly_ said he
is compelled. But when a man is moved by an external cause, the will
resisting as much as it can, then he says, he is _properly_ said to be
compelled; as in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by
violence to the idol’s temple. Insomuch as by this distinction it were
very proper English to say, that a stone were compelled when it is
thrown, or a man when he is carried in a cart. For my part, I understand
compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures only, which are moved
only by their own animal motion, in such manner as they would not be
moved without the fear. But of this dispute the English and well-bred
reader is the proper judge.
(_d_) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be
free, but whether they be ordinarily free.” Is it impossible for the
Bishop to remember the question, which is _whether a man be free to
will?_ Did I ever say, that no actions of a man are free? On the
contrary, I say that all his voluntary actions are free, even those also
to which he is compelled by fear. But it does not therefore follow but
that the will, from whence those actions and their election proceed, may
have necessary causes, against which he hath never yet said anything.
That which followeth immediately, is not offered as a proof, but as
explication, how the passions of a man surprise him; therefore I let it
pass, noting only that he expoundeth _motus primo primi_, which I
understood not before, by the word _antipathy_.
(_e_) “A necessity of supposition is of two kinds; sometimes a thing
supposed, is in the power of the agent to do or not to do, &c.;
sometimes a thing supposed, is not in the power of the agent to do or
not to do,” &c.
When the necessity is of the former kind of supposition, then, he says,
freedom may consist with this necessity, in the latter sense that it
cannot. And to use his own instances, to vow continence in a Romish
priest, upon supposition that he is a Romish priest, is a necessary act,
because it was in his power to be a priest or not. On the other side,
supposing a man having a natural antipathy against a cat; because this
antipathy is not in the power of the party affected, therefore the
running away from the cat is no free act.
I deny not but that it is a free act of the Romish priest to vow
continence, not upon the supposition that he was a Romish priest, but
because he had not done it unless he would; if he had not been a Romish
priest, it had been all one to the freedom of his act. Nor is his
priesthood anything to the necessity of his vow, saving that if he would
not have vowed he should not have been made a priest. There was an
antecedent necessity in the causes extrinsical; first, that he should
have the will to be a priest, and then consequently that he should have
the will to vow. Against this he allegeth nothing. Then for his cat, the
man’s running from it is a free act, as being voluntary, and arising
from a false apprehension (which nevertheless he cannot help) of some
hurt or other the cat may do him. And therefore the act is as free as
the act of him that throweth his goods into the sea. So likewise the act
of Jacob in blessing his sons, and the act of Balaam in blessing Israel,
are equally free and equally voluntary, yet equally determined by God,
who is the author of all blessings, and framed the will of both of them
to bless, and whose will, as St. Paul saith, cannot be resisted.
Therefore both their actions were necessitated equally; and, because
they were voluntary, equally free. As for Caiphas’ his prophecy, which
the text saith _he spake not of himself_, it was necessary; first,
because it was by the supernatural gift of God to the high-priests, as
sovereigns of the commonwealth of the Jews, to speak to the people as
from the mouth of God, that is to say, to prophecy; and secondly,
whensoever he did speak not as from God, but as from himself, it was
nevertheless necessary he should do so, not that he might not have been
silent if he would, but because his will to speak was antecedently
determined to what he should speak from all eternity, which he hath yet
brought no argument to contradict.
He approveth my modesty in suspending my judgment concerning the manner
how the good angels do work, necessarily or freely, because I find it
not set down in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our
Church. But he useth not the same modesty himself. For whereas he can
apprehend neither the nature of God nor of angels, nor conceive what
kind of thing it is which in them he calleth will, he nevertheless takes
upon him to attribute to them _liberty of exercise_, and to deny them _a
liberty of specification_; to grant them a _more intensive_ liberty than
we have, but not a _more extensive_; using, not incongruously, in the
incomprehensibility of the subject incomprehensible terms, as _liberty
of exercise_ and _liberty of specification_, and degrees of intension in
liberty; as if one liberty, like heat, might be more intensive than
another. It is true that there is greater liberty in a large than in a
straight prison, but one of those liberties is not more intense than the
other.
(_f_) “His second reason is, _he that can do what he will, hath all
liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no liberty_. If this
be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he
calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty.” It is one thing
to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, and another thing to say
he hath power to do what he will. A man that is bound, would say readily
he hath not the liberty to walk; but he will not say he wants the power.
But the sick man will say he wants the power to walk, but not the
liberty. This is, as I conceive, to speak the English tongue: and
consequently an Englishman will not say, the liberty to do what he will,
but the power to do what he will, is omnipotence. And therefore either I
or the Bishop understand not English. Whereas he adds that I mistake the
meaning of the words _liberty of specification_, I am sure that in that
way wherein I expound them, there is no absurdity. But if he say, I
understand not what the Schoolmen mean by it, I will not contend with
him; for I think they know not what they mean themselves.
(_g_) “And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and
scholastical expressions, and the doctors of the Church, who by this
means tyrannized over the understanding of other men. What a presumption
is this, for one private man,” &c. That he may know I am no enemy to
intelligible distinctions, I also will use a distinction in the defence
of myself against this his accusation. I say therefore that some
distinctions are _scholastical_ only, and some are _scholastical_ and
_sapiential_ also. Against those that are _scholastical_ only, I do and
may inveigh. But against those that are _scholastical_ and _sapiential_
also, I do not inveigh. Likewise some doctors of the Church, as Suarez,
Johannes à Duns, and their imitators, to breed in men such opinions as
the Church of Rome thought suitable to their interest, did write such
things as neither other men nor themselves understood. These I confess I
have a little slighted. Other doctors of the Church, as Martin Luther,
Philip Melancthon, John Calvin, William Perkins, and others, that did
write their sense clearly, I never slighted, but always very much
reverenced and admired. Wherein, then, lieth my presumption? If it be
because I am a private man, let the Bishop also take heed he contradict
not some of those whom the world worthily esteems, lest he also (for he
is a private man) be taxed of presumption.
(_h_) “What then, must the logicians lay aside their first and second
intentions, their abstracts and concretes &c.: must the moral
philosopher quit his means and extremes, his _principia congenita et
acquisita_, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity
absolute and hypothetical, &c.: must the natural philosopher give over
his intentional species, &c.: because they do not relish with T. H.’s
palate?” I confess that among the logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii,
Ferio, &c. are terms of art. But if the Bishop think that words of
_first and second intention_, that _abstract_ and _concrete_, that
_subjects_ and _predicates_, _moods_ and _figures_, _method synthetic_
and _analytic_, _fallacies_ of _composition_ and _division_, be terms of
art, I am not of his opinion. For these are no more terms of art in
logic, than _lines_, _figures_, _squares_, _triangles_, &c. in the
mathematics. Barbara, Celarent, and the rest that follow, are terms of
art, invented for the easier apprehension of young men, and are by young
men understood. But the terms of the School with which I have found
fault, have been invented to blind the understanding, and cannot be
understood by those that intend to learn divinity. And to his question
whether the moral philosopher must quit his means and extremes, I
answer, that though they are not terms of art, he ought to quit them
when they cannot be understood; and when they can, to use them rightly.
And therefore, though _means_ and _extremes_ be terms intelligible, yet
I would have them quit the placing of virtue in the one, and of vice in
the other. But for his _liberty of contradiction_ and _contrariety_, his
_necessity absolute_ and _hypothetical_, if any moral philosopher ever
used them, then away with them; they serve for nothing but to seduce
young students. In like manner, let the natural philosopher no more
mention his _intentional species_, his _understanding agent and
patient_, his _receptive and eductive power of the matter_, his
_qualities infusæ_ or _influxæ_, _symbolæ_ or _dissymbolæ_, his
_temperament ad pondus_ and _ad justitiam_. He may keep his _parts
homogeneous_ and _heterogeneous_; but his _sympathies_ and
_antipathies_, his _antiperistasis_ and the like names of excuses rather
than of causes, I would have him fling away. And for the astrologer,
(unless he means astronomer), I would have him throw away his whole
trade. But if he mean astronomer, then the terms of _apogæum_ and
_perigæum_, artic, antartic, equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon,
zones, &c. are no more terms of art in astronomy, than a saw or a
hatchet in the art of a carpenter. He cites no terms of art for
geometry; I was afraid he would have put _lines_, or perhaps _equality_
or _inequality_, for terms of art. So that now I know not what be those
terms he thinks I would cast away in geometry. And lastly, for his
metaphysician, I would have him quit both his terms and his profession,
as being in truth (as Plutarch saith in the beginning of the life of
Alexander the Great) not at all profitable to learning, but made only
for an essay to the learner; and the divine to use no word in preaching
but such as his auditors, nor in writing but such as a common reader,
may understand. And all this, not for the pleasing of my palate, but for
the promotion of truth.
(_i_) “T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, _De Cive_, cap.
XII., that it is ‘a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of
good and evil belongs to private persons’: and cap. XVII, that ‘in
questions of faith the civil magistrates ought to consult with the
ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition
of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary truths,’ &c. There he
attributes too much to them, here he attributeth too little; both there
and here he takes too much upon him. _The spirits of the prophets are
subject to the prophets._” He thinks he hath a great advantage against
me from my own words in my book _De Cive_, which he would not have
thought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evil is
judicature, which in Latin is _cognitio causarum_, not _scientia_. Every
private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and
evil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in
others, belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power
appointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting,
that _cognoscere_ is to judge, as Adam did of God’s commandment, hath
cited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the
ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them, it is not that they
cannot be deceived, but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying
them when they are our lawfully constituted doctors. For the supreme
ecclesiastical doctor, is he that hath the supreme power: and in obeying
him no subject can be deceived, because they are by God himself
commanded to obey him. And what the ecclesiastical doctors, lawfully
constituted, do tell us to be necessary in point of religion, the same
is told us by the sovereign power. And therefore, though we may be
deceived by them in the belief of an opinion, we cannot be deceived by
them in the duty of our actions. And this is all that I ascribe to the
ecclesiastical doctors. If they think it too much, let them take upon
them less. Too little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, for
a burthen. And for them who seek it as a worldly preferment, it is too
much. I take, he says, too much upon me. Why so? Because _the spirits of
the prophets are subject to the prophets_. This is it that he finds
fault with in me, when he says that I am a private man, that is to say,
no prophet, that is to say, no bishop. By which it is manifest, that the
Bishop subjecteth not his spirit but to the Convocation of bishops. I
admit that every man ought to subject his spirit to the prophets. But a
prophet is he that speaketh unto us from God; which I acknowledge none
to do, but him that hath due authority so to do. And no man hath due
authority so to do immediately, but he that hath the supreme authority
of the commonwealth; nor mediately, but they that speak such things to
the people, as he that hath the supreme authority alloweth of. And as it
is true in this sense, that _the spirits of the prophets are subject to
the prophets_; so it is also true that _we ought not to believe every
spirit, but to try the spirits, whether they are of God; because many
false prophets are gone out into the world_ (1 John iv. 1). Therefore I
that am a private man, may examine the prophets; which to do, I have no
other means but to examine whether their doctrine be agreeable to the
law; which theirs is not, who divide the commonwealth into two
commonwealths, civil and ecclesiastical.