[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “But the patrons of necessity being driven out of the plain
field with reason, have certain retreats or distinctions which they fly
unto for refuge. First, they distinguish between Stoical necessity and
Christian necessity, between which they make a threefold difference.
“First, say they, the Stoics did subject Jupiter to destiny, but we
subject destiny to God. I answer, that the Stoical and Christian destiny
are one and the same; _Fatum, quasi effatum Jovis_. Hear Seneca:
_Destiny is the necessity of all things and actions depending upon the
disposition of Jupiter_, &c. I add, that the Stoics left a greater
liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these stoical Christians do to God
over his decrees, either for the beginnings of things, as Euripides, or
for the progress of them, as Chrysippus, or at least of the
circumstances of time and place, as all of them generally. So Virgil:
_Sed trahere et moras ducere_, &c. So Osyris in Apuleius, promiseth him
to prolong his life, _ultra fato constituta tempora_, beyond the times
set down by the destinies.
“Next, they say, that the Stoics did hold an eternal flux and necessary
connexion of causes; but they believed that God doth act _præter et
contra naturam_, _besides and against nature_. I answer, that it is not
much material whether they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars,
or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former
reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity, but
much more necessity itself upon what ground soever. Either they must run
into this absurdity, that the effect is determined, the cause remaining
undetermined; or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the
Stoics did.
“Lastly, they say, the Stoics did take away liberty and contingence, but
they admit it. I answer, what liberty or contingence was it they admit
but a titular liberty and an empty shadow of contingence, who do profess
stiffly that all actions and events, which either are or shall be,
cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any
other place, time, number, order, measure, nor to any other end, than
they are; and that in respect of God determining them to one. What a
poor ridiculous liberty or contingency is this!
“Secondly, they distinguish between the first cause, and the second
causes; they say, that in respect of the second causes many things are
free, but in respect of the first cause all things are necessary. This
answer may be taken away two ways.
“First, so contraries shall be true together; the same thing at the same
time shall be determined to one, and not determined to one; the same
thing at the same time must necessarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps
they will say, not in the same respect. But that which strikes at the
root of this question is this, if all the causes were only collateral,
this exception might have some colour: but where all the causes being
joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total
cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or
subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and
without doubt makes the effect necessary. Necessity or liberty is not to
be esteemed from one cause, but from all the causes joined together. If
one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.
“Secondly, I would have them tell me whether the second causes be
predetermined by the first cause, or not. If it be determined, then the
effect is necessary, even in respect of the second causes. If the second
cause be not determined, how is the effect determined, the second cause
remaining undetermined? Nothing can give that to another which it hath
not itself. But say they, nevertheless the power or faculty remaineth
free. True, but not in order to the act, if it be once determined. It is
free, _in sensu diviso_, but not _in sensu composito_. When a man holds
a bird fast in his hand, is she therefore free to fly where she will,
because she hath wings? Or a man imprisoned or fettered, is he therefore
free to walk where he will, because he hath feet and a locomotive
faculty? Judge without prejudice, what a miserable subterfuge is this
which many men confide so much in.
CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE SUPPOSING MAY BE BROUGHT TO HIS ARGUMENTS,
ARE BY HIM REMOVED.
_T. H._ He saith, “a man may perhaps answer, that the necessity of
things held by him is not a Stoical necessity, but a Christian
necessity,” &c., but this distinction I have not used, nor indeed have
ever heard before. Nor do I think any man could make Stoical and
Christian two kinds of necessities, though they may be two kinds of
doctrine. Nor have I drawn my answer to his arguments from the authority
of any sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.
But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place, as
making against his own tenet. “Where all the causes”, saith he, “being
joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total
cause, if any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series of
subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and
without doubt maketh the effect necessary.” For that which I call the
necessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all causes
subordinate to the first, into one total cause. If any one of those,
saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all
the rest are determined, and the effect also necessary. Now, it is
manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects
that are next and immediate to it; and therefore by his own reason, all
effects are necessary. Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect
of the first cause, and necessary in respect of second causes, mine; it
does, as he well noteth, imply a contradiction.
_J. D._ “Because T. H. disavows these two distinctions, I have joined
them together in one paragraph. He likes not the distinction of
necessity, or destiny, into Stoical and Christian; no more do I. We
agree in the conclusion, but our motives are diverse. My reason is,
because I acknowledge no such necessity either as the one or as the
other; and because I conceive that those Christian writers, who do
justly detest the naked destiny of the Stoics, as fearing to fall into
those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from
thence, do yet privily, though perhaps unwittingly, under another form
of expression introduce it again at the back-door, after they had openly
cast it out at the fore-door. But T. H. rusheth boldly without
distinctions, which he accounts but jargon, and without foresight, upon
the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoics. He
confesseth, that “they may be two kinds of doctrine.” May be? Nay, they
are; without all peradventure. And he himself is the first who bears the
name of a Christian, that I have read, that hath raised this sleeping
ghost out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he
likes not the names of Stoical and Christian destiny. I do not blame
him, though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoic. To admit the
thing, and quarrel about the name, is to make ourselves ridiculous. Why
might not I first call that kind of destiny which is maintained by
Christians, Christian destiny: and that other maintained by Stoics,
Stoical destiny? But I am not the inventor of the term. If he had been
as careful in reading other men’s opinions, as he is confident in
setting down his own, he might have found not only the thing, but the
name itself often used. But if the name of _fatum Christianum_ do offend
him, let him call it with Lipsius, _fatum verum_; who divides destiny
into four kinds: 1. mathematical or astrological destiny: 2. natural
destiny: 3. Stoical or violent destiny: and 4. true destiny; which he
calls, ordinarily, _nostrum_, our destiny, that is, of Christians; and
_fatum pium_, that is, godly destiny; and defines it just as T. H. doth
his destiny, to be (_a_) a series or order of causes depending upon the
divine counsel (_De Constantia_, lib. 1. cap. xvii. xviii. xix). Though
he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others
have made shipwreck upon, yet the divines thought he came too near them;
as appears by his Epistle to the Reader in a later edition, and by that
note in the margin of his twentieth chapter, ‘Whatsoever I dispute here,
I submit to the judgment of the wise, and being admonished I will
convert it; one may convince me of error, but not of obstinacy.’ So
fearful was he to over-shoot himself; and yet he maintained both true
liberty and true contingency. T. H. saith, ‘he hath not sucked his
answer from any sect’; and I say, so much the worse. It is better to be
the disciple of an old sect, than the ring-leader of a new.
(_b_) “Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the
first cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes; though he will
not see that which it concerned him to answer, like those old _Lamiæ_,
which could put out their eyes when they list; as, namely, that the
faculty of willing, when it is determined in order to the act, (which is
all the freedom that he acknowledgeth), is but like the freedom of a
bird when she is first in a man’s hand, &c.: yet he hath espied another
thing wherein I contradict myself, because I affirm, that if any one
cause in the whole series of causes, much more the first cause, be
necessary, it determineth the rest. But, saith he, ‘it is manifest that
the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next’.
I am glad; yet it is not I who contradict myself, but it is some of his
_manifest truths_ which I contradict; that ‘the first cause is a
necessary cause of all effects’; which I say is a manifest falsehood.
Those things which God wills without himself, he wills freely, not
necessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, doth act or
work all that it can do, or all that is in its power. But it is evident
that God doth not all things without himself, which he can do, or which
he hath power to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of
the very stones which were upon the banks of Jordan (Luke iii. 8); but
he did not. He could have sent twelve legions of angels to the succour
of Christ, (Matth. xxvi. 53); but he did not. God can make T. H. live
the years of Methuselah; but it is not necessary that he shall do so,
nor probable that he will do so. The productive power of God is
infinite, but the whole created world is finite. And, therefore God
might still produce more, if it pleased him. But thus it is, when men go
on in a confused way, and will admit no distinctions. If T. H. had
considered the difference between a necessary being, and a necessary
cause, or between those actions of God which are immanent within
himself, and the transient works of God which are extrinsical without
himself; he would never have proposed such an evident error for a
manifest truth. _Qui pauca considerat, facile pronuntiat._”