Whereas he had in his first discourse made this consequence: “if you
take away liberty, you take away the very nature of evil, and the formal
reason of sin”: I denied that consequence. It is true, he who taketh
away the liberty of doing, according to the will, taketh away the nature
of sin; but he that denieth the liberty to will, does not so. But he
supposing I understood him not, will needs reduce his argument into
form, in this manner. (_a_) “That opinion which takes away the formal
reason of sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be approved.”
This is granted. “But the opinion of necessity doth this.” This I deny;
he proves it thus: “this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially, by
way of physical determination from the first cause. But whatsoever
proceeds essentially by way of physical determination from the first
cause, is good, and just, and lawful. Therefore this opinion of
necessity maketh sin to be very good, just, and lawful.” He might as
well have concluded, whatsoever man hath been made by God, is a good and
just man. He observeth not that sin is not a thing really made. Those
things which at first were actions, were not then sins, though actions
of the same nature with those which were afterwards sins; nor was then
the will to anything a sin, though it were a will to the same thing,
which in willing now, we should sin. Actions became sins then first,
when the commandment came; for, as St. Paul saith, _without the law sin
is dead_; and sin being but a _transgression of the law_, there can be
no action made sin but by the law. Therefore this opinion, though it
derive actions essentially from God, it derives not sins essentially
from him, but relatively and by the commandment. And consequently the
opinion of necessity taketh not away the nature of sin, but
necessitateth that action which the law hath made sin. And whereas I
said the nature of sin consisteth in this, that ‘it is an action
proceeding from our will and against the law’, he alloweth it for true;
and therefore he must allow also, that the formal reason of sin lieth
not in the liberty or necessity of willing, but in the will itself,
necessary or unnecessary, in relation to the law. And whereas he limits
this truth which he allowed, to this, that _the law be just_, and _the
will a free rational will_, it serves to no purpose; for I have shown
before, that no law can be unjust. And it seemeth to me that a rational
will, if it be not meant of a will after deliberation, whether he that
deliberateth reasoneth aright or not, signifieth nothing. A _rational
man_ is rightly said; but a _rational will_, in other sense than I have
mentioned, is insignificant.
(_b_) “But supposing, as he doth, that the law enjoins things impossible
in themselves to be done, then it is an unjust and tyrannical law, and
the transgression of it no sin,” &c. “And supposing likewise, as he
doth, that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from
the first cause, then it is not man’s will, but God’s will.” He mistakes
me in this. For I say not the law enjoins things impossible in
themselves; for so I should say it enjoined contradictories. But I say
the law sometimes, the law-makers not knowing the secret necessities of
things to come, enjoins things made impossible by secret and extrinsical
causes from all eternity. From this his error he infers, that the laws
must be unjust and tyrannical, and the transgression of them no sin. But
he who holds that laws can be unjust and tyrannical, will easily find
pretence enough, under any government in the world, to deny obedience to
the laws, unless they be such as he himself maketh, or adviseth to be
made. He says also, that I suppose the will is inevitably determined by
special influence from the first cause. It is true; saving that
senseless word _influence_, which I never used. But his consequence,
“then it is not man’s will, but God’s will”, is not true; for it may be
the will both of the one and of the other, and yet not by concurrence,
as in a league, but by subjection of the will of man to the will of God.
(_c_) “That which he adds of a judge, is altogether impertinent as to
his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of
the land a proper rule of sin.” A judge is to judge of voluntary crimes.
He has no commission to look into the secret causes that make them
voluntary. And because the Bishop had said the law cannot justly punish
a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it was no impertinent answer to
say, “the judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer”. And
even this, as he saith, is enough to prove, that “the will of the doer
did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have
kept the law if he would”. To which I answer, that it proves indeed that
the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would; but it
proveth not that he had the liberty to have a will to keep the law. Nor
doth it prove that the will of the doer did determine itself freely;
for, nothing can prove nonsense. But here you see what the Bishop
pursueth in this whole reply, namely, to prove that a man hath liberty
to do if he will, which I deny not; and thinks when he hath done that,
he hath proved a man hath liberty to will, which he calls the will’s
determining of itself freely. And whereas he adds, “a judge ought to
look at all essential causes”; it is answer enough to say, he is bound
to look at no more than he thinks he can see.
(_d_) “Nature never intends the generation of a monster. If all the
causes concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced; but by
reason of the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aberration of
some of the causes, sometimes a monster is produced.” He had no sooner
said this, but finding his error he retracteth it, and confesseth that
“the causes of a monster were sufficient for the production of that
which was produced, that is, of a monster; otherwise a monster had not
been produced;” which is all that I intended by sufficiency of the
cause. But whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause or not,
he meaneth to examine in No. XXXI. In the meantime he saith only, that
liberty flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from the debility of
the cause; and leaves out necessity, as if it came from neither. I must
note also, that where he says nature never intends the generation of a
monster, I understand not whether by nature he means the Author of
nature, in which meaning he derogates from God; or nature itself, as the
universal work of God; and then it is absurd; for the universe, as one
aggregate of things natural, hath no intention. His doctrine that
followeth concerning the generation of monsters, is not worth
consideration; therefore I leave it wholly to the judgment of the
reader.
(_e_) “Then he betakes himself to his old help, that God may punish by
right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. The question is not, now
what God may do, but what God will do, according to that covenant which
he hath made with man, _Fac hoc et vives_, _do this and thou shalt
live_.” It is plain (to let pass that he puts punishment where I put
affliction, making a true sentence false) that if a man do this he shall
live, and he may do this if he will. In this the Bishop and I disagree
not. This therefore is not the question; but whether the will to do
this, or not to do this, be in a man’s own election. Whereas he adds,
‘he that wills not the death of a sinner, doth much less will the death
of an innocent creature’; he had forgot for awhile, that both good and
evil men are by the will of God all mortal; but presently corrects
himself, and says, he means by death, eternal torments, that is to say,
eternal life, but in torments; to which I have answered once before in
this book, and spoken much more amply in another book, to which the
Bishop hath inclination to make an answer, as appeareth by his epistle
to the reader. That which followeth to the end of this number, hath been
urged and answered already divers times; I therefore pass it over.