[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Fifthly, take away liberty, and you take away the very nature
of evil, and the formal reason of sin. If the hand of the painter were
the law of painting, or the hand of the writer the law of writing,
whatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be
good. Seeing therefore that the first cause is the rule and law of
goodness, if it do necessitate the will or the person to evil, either by
itself immediately, or mediately by necessary flux of second causes, it
will no longer be evil. The essence of sin consists in this, that one
commit that which he might avoid. If there be no liberty to produce sin,
there is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it appears, both
from Scripture and reason, that there is true liberty.”
_T. H._ To the fifth argument from reason, which is, that if liberty be
taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away, I answer
by denying the consequence. The nature of sin consisteth in this, that
the action done proceed from our will, and be against the law. A judge,
in judging whether it be sin or not which is done against the law, looks
at no higher cause of the action than the will of the doer. Now when I
say the action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the will
of the doer, but with his will, and so necessarily; because man’s will,
that is, every act of the will, and purpose of man had a sufficient, and
therefore a necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was
necessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and
nevertheless be necessary. And God may afflict by right derived from his
omnipotency, though sin were not. And the example of punishment on
voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin
less frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed before,
is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his objections, both out
of Scripture and reason.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “_Scis tu simulare cupressum._ _Quid hoc?_” It was shrewd
counsel which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when he was busy about
his accounts to the state; that he should rather study how to make no
accounts. So it seems T. H. thinks it a more compendious way, to baulk
an argument, than to satisfy it. And if he can produce a Rowland against
an Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he hath
quitted himself fairly. But it will not serve his turn. And that he may
not complain of misunderstanding it, as those who have a politic
deafness to hear nothing but what liketh them, I will first reduce mine
argument into form, and then weigh what he saith in answer, or rather in
opposition to it. (_a_) That opinion which takes away the formal reason
of sin, and by consequence, sin itself, is not to be approved; this is
clear, because both reason and religion, nature and Scripture, do prove,
and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin. But this opinion, of
the necessity of all things by reason of a conflux of second causes,
ordered and determined by the first cause, doth take away the very
formal reason of sin. This is proved thus. That which makes sin itself
to be good, and just, and lawful, takes away the formal cause, and
destroys the essence of sin; for if sin be good, and just, and lawful,
it is no more evil, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the
necessity of all things, makes sin to be very good, and just, and
lawful; for nothing can flow essentially by way of physical
determination from the first cause, which is the law and rule of
goodness and justice, but that which is good, and just, and lawful. But
this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of physical
determination from the first cause, as appears in T. H.’s whole
discourse. Neither is it material at all whether it proceed immediately
from the first cause, or mediately, so as it be by a necessary flux of
second and determinate causes, which produce it inevitably. To these
proofs he answers nothing, but only by denying the first consequence, as
he calls it, and then sings over his old song, ‘that the nature of sin
consisteth in this, that the action proceed from our will, and be
against the law’, which, in our sense, is most true, if he understand a
just law, and a free rational will. (_b_) But supposing, as he doth,
that the law enjoins things impossible in themselves to be done, then it
is an unjust and tyrannical law; and the transgression of it is no sin,
not to do that which never was in our power to do. And supposing,
likewise as he doth, that the will is inevitably determined by special
influence from the first cause, then it is not man’s will, but God’s
will, and flows essentially from the law of goodness.
(_c_) “That which he adds of a judge, is altogether impertinent as to
his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of
the land the proper rule of sin. But it makes strongly against him; for
the judge goes upon a good ground; and even this which he confesseth,
that ‘the judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer’,
proves that the will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that
the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law, if he would. Certainly,
a judge ought to look at all material circumstances, and much more at
all essential causes. Whether every sufficient cause be a necessary
cause, will come to be examined more properly, No. XXXI. For the present
it shall suffice to say, that liberty flows from the sufficiency, and
contingency from the debility of the cause. (_d_) Nature never intends
the generation of a monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a
perfect creature is produced; but by reason of the insufficiency, or
debility, or contingent aberration of some of the causes, sometimes a
monster is produced. Yet the causes of a monster were sufficient for the
production of that which was produced, that is a monster: otherwise a
monster had not been produced. What is it then? A monster is not
produced by virtue of that order which is set in nature, but by the
contingent aberration of some of the natural causes in their
concurrence. The order set in nature is, that every like should beget
its like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it
is in the generation of a monster, the generation of a monster is
necessary; as all the events in the world are when they are, that is, by
an hypothetical necessity. (_e_) Then he betakes himself to his old
help, that God may punish by right of omnipotence, though there were no
sin. The question is not now what God may do, but what God will do,
according to that covenant which he hath made with man, _fac hoc et
vives_, _do this and thou shalt live_. Neither doth God punish any man
contrary to this covenant (Hosea xiii. 9): _O Israel, thy destruction is
from thyself; but in me is thy help_. He that wills not the death of a
sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent creature. By
_death_ or _destruction_ in this discourse the only separation of soul
and body is not intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as
Lord of life and death, may justly do, and make it not a punishment, but
a blessing to the party; but we understand, the subjecting of the
creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he tells of that benefit which
redounds to others from exemplary justice; which is most true, but not
according to his own grounds. For neither is it justice to punish a man
for doing that which it was impossible always for him not to do; neither
is it lawful to punish an innocent person, that good may come of it. And
if his opinion of absolute necessity of all things were true, the
destinies of men could not be altered, either by examples or fear of
punishment.”