[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Fifthly, if there be no liberty, there shall be no day of doom,
no last judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death. A man can
never make himself a criminal, if he be not left at liberty to commit a
crime. No man can be justly punished for doing that which was not in his
power to shun. To take away liberty hazards heaven, but undoubtedly it
leaves no hell.”
_T. H._ The arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fifth,
and fall both into one: namely, if there be a necessity of all events,
that it will follow that praise and reprehension, reward and punishment,
are all vain and unjust: and that if God should openly forbid, and
secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could
not avoid, there would be no belief among them of heaven or hell.
To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from St. Paul (Rom. ix.),
from the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid down
the very same objection in these words: _When they_ (meaning Esau and
Jacob) _were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the
purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that
calleth, might remain firm, it was said to her_ (viz. to Rebecca) _that
the elder shall serve the younger. And what then shall we say, is there
injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth,
nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth mercy. For the
Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up, that I may show my
power in thee, and that my name may be set forth in all the earth.
Therefore whom God willeth he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he
hardeneth._ Thus, you see, the case put by St. Paul is the same with
that of J. D., and the same objection in these words following (verse
19): _Thou wilt ask me then, why will God yet complain; for who hath
resisted his will?_ To this therefore the apostle answers, not by
denying it was God’s will, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was
not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what
he did; but thus (verse 20, 21): _Who art thou, O man, that
interrogatest God? Shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made
me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to
make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour?_ According therefore to
this answer of St. Paul, I answer J. D.’s objection, and say, the power
of God alone, without other help, is sufficient justification of any
action he doth. That which men make among themselves here by pacts and
covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men
are counted and termed rightly just and unjust, is not that by which God
Almighty’s actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his
counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does is made
just by his doing; just I say in him, not always just in us by the
example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly
the hindrance of the same, if he punish him he so commanded for not
doing it, is unjust. So also his counsels, they be therefore not in
vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When
God afflicted Job, he did object no sin to him, but justified that
afflicting him by telling him of his power. _Hast thou_ (says God) _an
arm like mine? Where wast thou, when I laid the foundations of the
earth?_ and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man that was born
blind, said, it was not for his sin, nor his parents’ sin, but that the
power of God might be shown in him. Beasts are subject to death and
torment, yet they cannot sin. It was God’s will it should be so. Power
irresistible justified all actions really and properly, in whomsoever it
be found. Less power does not. And because such power is in God only, he
must needs be just in all his actions. And we, that not comprehending
his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it.
I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by distinguishing
between will and permission. As, that God Almighty does indeed permit
sin sometimes, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth
shall be committed; but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know
also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, God
Almighty doth indeed cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not
the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance between
the action and the law. Such distinctions as these dazzle my
understanding. I find no difference between the will to have a thing
done, and the permission to do it, when he that permitteth it can hinder
it, and knows it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any
difference between an action that is against the law, and the sin of
that action. As for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin
of David in killing Uriah. Nor when one is cause both of the action and
of the law, how another can be cause of the disagreement between them,
no more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment, another
can make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot
sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin:
and because whatsoever can sin is subject to another’s law, which God is
not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin. But to say, that
God can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in
a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such
or other distinctions can make it clear that St. Paul did not think
Esau’s or Pharaoh’s actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God,
or that proceeding from his will could not therefore without injustice
be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto
J. D.’s opinion. For I now hold nothing in all this question between us,
but what seemeth to me not obscurely, but most expressly said in this
place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.
_J. D._ T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and satisfy two
arguments with one answer, whereas in truth he satisfieth neither.
First, for my third reason. (_a_) Though all he say here were as true as
an oracle; though punishment were an act of dominion, not of justice in
God; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act, or
why he should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which he
himself did necessitate them to do, and whereof he was the actor more
than they, they being but as the stone, but he the hand that threw it.
Notwithstanding anything which is pleaded here, this stoical opinion
doth stick hypocrisy and dissimulation close to God, who is truth
itself.
“And to my fifth argument, which he changeth and relateth amiss, as by
comparing mine with his may appear, his chiefest answer is to oppose a
difficult place of St. Paul (Rom. ix. 11.) Hath he never heard, that to
propose a doubt is not to answer an argument: _nec bene respondet qui
litem lite resolvit_? But I will not pay him in his own coin. Wherefore
to this place alleged by him, I answer, the case is not the same. The
question moved there is, how God did keep his promise made to Abraham,
_to be the God of him and of his seed_, if the Jews who were the
legitimate progeny of Abraham were deserted. To which the apostle
answers (vers. 6, 7, 8), that that promise was not made to the carnal
seed of Abraham, that is, the Jews, but to his spiritual sons, which
were the heirs of his faith, that is, to the believing Christians; which
answer he explicateth, first by the allegory of Isaac and Ishmael, and
after in the place cited of Esau and Jacob. Yet neither does he speak
there so much of their persons as of their posterities. And though some
words may be accommodated to God’s predestination, which are there
uttered, yet it is not the scope of that text, to treat of the
reprobation of any man to hell fire. All the posterity of Esau were not
eternally reprobated, as holy Job and many others. But this question
which is now agitated between us, is quite of another nature, how a man
can be a criminal who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsically
necessitated to do, or how God in justice can punish a man with eternal
torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone;
or why he who did imprint the motion in the heart of man, should punish
man, who did only receive the impression from him. So his answer _looks
another way_.
“But because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it can be
cleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examine all those
passages which may seem to favour his cause. First, these words (ver.
11): _being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil_, upon
which the whole weight of his argument doth depend, have no reference at
all to those words (verse 13), _Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I
hated_; for those words were first uttered by the prophet Malachi, many
ages after Jacob and Esau were dead (Mal. i. 2, 3), and intended of the
posterity of Esau, who were not redeemed from captivity as the
Israelites were. But they are referred to those other words (verse 12),
_the elder shall serve the younger_, which indeed were spoken before
Jacob or Esau were born. (Gen. xxv. 23.) And though those words of
Malachi had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were born, yet it
had advantaged his cause nothing: for hatred in that text doth not
signify any reprobation to the flames of hell, much less the execution
of that decree, or the actual imposition of punishment, nor any act
contrary to love. God saw all that he had made, and it was very good.
Goodness itself cannot hate that which is good. But hatred there
signifies comparative hatred, or a less degree of love, or at the most a
negation of love. As (Gen. xxix. 31), _when the Lord saw that Leah was
hated_, we may not conclude thence that Jacob hated his wife; the
precedent verse doth fully expound the sense (verse 30): _Jacob loved
Rachel more than Leah_. So (Matth. vi. 24), _No man can serve two
masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other_. So (Luke
xiv. 26), _If any man hate not his father and mother, &c. he cannot be
my disciple_. St. Matthew (x. 37) tells us the sense of it: _He that
loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me_.
“Secondly, those words (ver. 15) _I will have mercy on whom I will have
mercy_, do prove no more but this, that the preferring of Jacob before
Esau, and of the Christians before the Jews, was not a debt from God
either to the one or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of
this? All men confess that God’s mercies do exceed man’s deserts, but
God’s punishments do never exceed man’s misdeeds. As we see in the
parable of the labourers (Matth. xx. 13-15): _Friend, I do thee no
wrong. Did not I agree with thee for a penny? Is it not lawful for me to
do with mine own as I will? Is thy eye evil, because I am good?_ Acts of
mercy are free, but acts of justice are due.
“That which follows (verse 17) comes something nearer the cause. _The
Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, for this same purpose I have raised thee
up_, (that is, I have made thee a king, or I have preserved thee), _that
I might show my power in thee_. But this particle, _that_, doth not
always signify the main end of an action, but sometimes only a
consequent of it, as Matth. ii. 15: _He departed into Egypt_, that _it
might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, out of Egypt have I
called my son_. Without doubt Joseph’s aim or end of his journey was not
to fulfil prophecies, but to save the life of the child. Yet because the
fulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent of Joseph’s journey, he
saith, _that it might be fulfilled_. So here, _I have raised thee up,
that I might show my power_. Again, though it should be granted that
this particle _that_, did denote the intention of God to destroy Pharaoh
in the Red Sea, yet it was not the antecedent intention of God, which
evermore respects the good and benefit of the creature, but God’s
consequent intention upon the prevision of Pharaoh’s obstinacy, that
since he would not glorify God in obeying his word, he should glorify
God undergoing his judgments. Hitherto we find no eternal punishments,
nor no temporal punishment without just deserts.
“It follows, (ver. 18), _whom he will he hardeneth_. Indeed hardness of
heart is the greatest judgment that God lays upon a sinner in this life,
worse than all the plagues of Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart?
Not by a natural influence of any evil act or habit into the will, nor
by inducing the will with persuasive motives to obstinacy and rebellion
(James i. 13, 14): _For God tempteth no man, but every man is tempted
when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed_. Then God is said to
harden the heart three ways; first, negatively, and not positively; not
by imparting wickedness, but by not imparting grace; as the sun
descending to the tropic of Capricorn, is said with us to be the cause
of winter, that is, not by imparting cold, but by not imparting heat. It
is an act of mercy in God to give his grace freely, but to detain it is
no act of injustice. So the apostle opposeth hardening to shewing of
mercy. To harden is as much as not to shew mercy.
“Secondly, God is said to harden the heart occasionally and not
causally, by doing good, (which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of
growing worse and worse), and doing evil; as a master by often
correcting of an untoward scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally
harden his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he grows
even to despise the rod. Or as an indulgent parent by his patience and
gentleness doth encourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious.
So, whether we look upon God’s frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or God’s
iterated favours in removing and withdrawing those judgments upon
Pharaoh’s request, both of them in their several kinds were occasions of
hardening Pharaoh’s heart, the one making him more presumptuous, the
other more desperately rebellious. So that which was good in it was
God’s; that which was evil was Pharaoh’s. God gave the occasion, but
Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly
confirmed, Exodus viii. 15: _When Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he
hardened his heart_. And Exodus ix. 34: _When Pharaoh saw that the rain
and the hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and
hardened his heart, he and his servants_. So Psalm cv. 25: _He turned
their hearts, so that they hated his people, and dealt subtly with
them_. That is, God blessed the children of Israel, whereupon the
Egyptians did take occasion to hate them, as is plain, Exodus i. 7, 8,
9, 10. So God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own
heart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as he did to
Nebuchadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he, or God hardened it
occasionally; but still Pharaoh was the true cause of his own
obduration, by determining his own will to evil, and confirming himself
in his obstinacy. So are all presumptuous sinners, (Psalm xcv. 8):
_Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, or as in the day of
temptation in the wilderness_.
“Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively, but not
operatively, nor effectively, as he who only lets loose a greyhound out
of the slip, is said to hound him at the hare. Will you see plainly what
St. Paul intends by hardening? Read Rom. ix. 22, 23: _What if God,
willing to shew his wrath and to make his power known_ (that is, by a
consequent will, which in order of nature follows the prevision of sin),
_endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to
destruction. And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the
vessels of mercy_, &c. There is much difference between _enduring_ and
_impelling_, or inciting the vessels of wrath. He saith of the vessels
of mercy, that _God prepared them unto glory_. But of the vessels of
wrath, he saith only that they were _fitted to destruction_, that is,
not by God, but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth _endure the
vessels of wrath with much long-suffering_. T. H. saith, that God wills
and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad, that he
necessitateth them, and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts
which he condemneth as evil, and for which he punisheth them. If _doing
willingly_, and _enduring_, if _much long-suffering_, and
_necessitating_, imply not a contrariety one to another, _reddat mihi
minam Diogenes_, let him that taught me logic, give me my money again.
“But T. H. saith, that this distinction between the _operative_ and
_permissive_ will of God, and that other between the action and the
irregularity, do dazzle his understanding. Though he can find no
difference between these two, yet others do; St. Paul himself did (Acts
xiii. 18): _About the time of forty years suffered he their manners in
the wilderness_. And (Acts xiv. 16): _Who in times past suffered all
nations to walk in their own ways._ T. H. would make suffering to be
inciting, their manners to be God’s manners, their ways to be God’s
ways. And (Acts xvii. 30): _The times of this ignorance God winked at_.
It was never heard that one was said to wink or connive at that which
was his own act. And (1 Cor. x. 13): _God is faithful, who will not
suffer you to be tempted above that you are able_. To tempt is the
devil’s act; therefore he is called the _tempter_. God tempts no man to
sin, but he suffers them to be tempted. And so suffers, that he could
hinder Satan, if he would. But by T. H.’s doctrine, to tempt to sin, and
to suffer one to be tempted to sin when it is in his power to hinder it,
is all one. And so he transforms God (I write it with horror) into the
devil, and makes tempting to be God’s own work, and the devil to be but
his instrument. And in that noted place, (Rom. ii. 4, 5): _Despisest
thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long-suffering, not
knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance; but after
thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath
against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of
God?_ Here are as many convincing arguments in this one text against the
opinion of T. H. almost as there are words. Here we learn that God is
_rich in goodness_, and will not punish his creatures for that which is
his own act; secondly, that he _suffers_ and _forbears sinners long_,
and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve. Thirdly,
that the reason of God’s forbearance is to _bring men to repentance_.
Fourthly, that _hardness of heart and impenitency_ is not causally from
God, but from ourselves. Fifthly, that it is not the insufficient
proposal of the means of their conversion on God’s part, which is the
cause of men’s perdition, but their own contempt and despising of these
means. Sixthly, that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but
an act of righteous judgment, whereby God renders to every man according
to his own deeds, wrath to them and only to them who _treasure up wrath
unto themselves_, and eternal life to those who _continue patiently in
well-doing_. If they deserve such punishment who only neglect the
goodness and long-suffering of God, what do they who utterly deny it,
and make God’s doing and his suffering to be all one? I do beseech T. H.
to consider what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one obscure text
wholly misunderstood to contradict the clear current of the whole
Scripture. Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter, (1 Peter iii.
20): _The long-suffering of God waited once in the days of Noah_. And 2
Peter iii. 15: _Account that the long-suffering of the Lord is
salvation_. This is the name God gives himself, (Exod. xxxiv. 6): _The
Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering_, &c.
(_b_) “Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true,
that he who doth permit any thing to be done, which it is in his power
to hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in
some sort will it. I say in some sort, that is, either by an antecedent
will, or by a consequent will, either by an operative will, or by a
permissive will, or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to
do it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer
that to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer. So Darius suffered
Daniel to be cast into the lion’s den, to make good his rash decree; so
Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath.
How much more may the immutable rule of justice in God, and his fidelity
in keeping his word, draw from him the punishment of obstinate sinners,
though antecedently he willeth their conversion? He loveth all his
creatures well, but his own justice better. Again, sometimes a man
suffereth that to be done, which he doth not will directly in itself,
but indirectly for some other end, or for the producing of some greater
good; as a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body, to
save the life of the whole. Or as a judge, being desirous to save a
malefactor’s life, and having power to reprieve him, doth yet condemn
him for example’s sake, that by the death of one he may save the lives
of many. Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such
courses as tend to their own ruin, so long as their sufferings do make
for the greater manifestation of his glory, and for the greater benefit
of his faithful servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would
not suffer evil to be in the world unless he knew how to draw good out
of evil. Yet this ought not to be understood, as if we made any priority
or posteriority of time in the acts of God, but only of nature. Nor do
we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to
another; because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other
respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but considered
after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in
God; for they are the same with the divine essence, which is one. But
the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor,
lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a mere permission.
God causeth all good, permitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both
good and evil.
(_c_) “T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet
not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because he
concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special
influence. As the earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as
well to hemlock as to wheat; but the reason why the one yields food to
our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the
general nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the
root. Even so the general power to act is from God. _In him we live, and
move, and have our being._ This is good. But the specification, and
determination of this general power to the doing of any evil, is from
ourselves, and proceeds from the free-will of man. This is bad. And to
speak properly, the free-will of man is not the efficient cause of sin,
as the root of the hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or
being in it, as poison hath; but rather the deficient cause. Now no
defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection. (_d_) Wherefore
T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act
of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God,
but the specification of this general and good power to murder, or to
any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free-will of man. So
T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the law,
and likewise of the action in some sort, that is, by general influence;
and yet another cause concurring, by special influence and determining
this general and good power, may make itself the true cause of the anomy
or the irregularity. And therefore he may keep his longer and shorter
garments for some other occasion. Certainly, they will not fit this
subject, unless he could make general and special influence to be all
one.
“But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, and the
objection used by the Jews, (verse 19): _Why doth he yet find fault; who
hath resisted his will?_ is the very same with my argument; and St.
Paul’s answer, (verse 20:) _O man, who art thou that repliest against
God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou
made me thus? Hath not the potter power over his clay?_ &c., is the very
same with his answer in this place, drawn from the irresistible power
and absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all his actions. And that
the apostle in his answer doth not deny that it was God’s will, nor that
God’s decree was before Esau’s sin.
“To which I reply, first, that the case is not at all the same, but
quite different, as may appear by these particulars; first, those words,
_before they had done either good or evil_, are not, cannot be referred
to those other words, _Esau have I hated_. Secondly, if they could, yet
it is less than nothing, because before Esau had actually sinned, his
future sins were known to God. Thirdly, by the potter’s clay, here is
not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass of mankind.
Fourthly, the hating here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that
is, a less degree of love. Fifthly, the hardening which St. Paul speaks
of, is not a positive, but a negative obduration, or a not imparting of
grace. Sixthly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to
eternal punishment, much less doth he speak of the actual inflicting of
punishment without sin, which is the question between us, and wherein T.
H. differs from all that I remember to have read, who do all acknowledge
that punishment is never actually inflicted but for sin. If the question
be put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or why God
imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it is there, the answer
is just and fit, because it is his pleasure, and it is sauciness in a
creature in this case to reply, (Matthew xx. 15): _May not God do what
he will with his own?_ No man doubteth but God imparteth grace beyond
man’s desert. (_e_) But if the case be put, why God doth punish one more
than another, or why he throws one into hell-fire, and not another,
which is the present case agitated between us; to say with T. H., that
it is because God is omnipotent, or because his power is irresistible,
or merely because it is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is
plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place. So many differences there
are between those two cases. It is not therefore against God that I
reply, but against T. H. I do not call my Creator to the bar, but my
fellow-creature; I ask no account of God’s counsels, but of man’s
presumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their own fancies
upon God, and when they cannot justify them by reason, to plead his
omnipotence, or to cry, _O altitudo_, that the ways of God are
unsearchable. If they may justify their drowsy dreams, because God’s
power and dominion is absolute; much more may we reject such
phantastical devices which are inconsistent with the truth and goodness
and justice of God, and make him to be a tyrant, who is the Father of
Mercies and the God of all consolation. The unsearchableness of God’s
ways should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for
spirits of error.
“Secondly, this objection contained ver. 19, to which the apostle
answers ver. 20, is not made in the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H.
supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews, who thought much at that grace
and favour which God was pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to
acknowledge them for his people, which honour they would have
appropriated to the posterity of Abraham. And the apostle’s answer is
not only drawn from the sovereign dominion of God, to impart his grace
to whom he pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, but also from the
obstinacy and proper fault of the Jews, as appeareth verse 22: _What if
God, willing_ (that is, by a consequent will) _to shew his wrath, and to
make his power known, endureth with much long-suffering the vessels of
wrath fitted to destruction_. They acted, God endured; they were
tolerated by God, but fitted to destruction by themselves; for their
much wrong-doing, here is God’s _much long-suffering_. And more plainly,
verse 31, 32: _Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness.
Wherefore? Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the
works of the law._ This reason is set down yet more emphatically in the
next chapter (Rom. x. 3): _They_ (that is, the Israelites) _being
ignorant of God’s righteousness_, (that is, by faith in Christ), _and
going about to establish their own righteousness_, (that is, by the
works of the law), _have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness
of God_. And yet most expressly (chap. xi. 20): _Because of unbelief
they were broken off, but thou standest by faith_. Neither was there any
precedent binding decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and
consequently to punishment. It was in their own power by their
concurrence with God’s grace to prevent these judgments, and to recover
their former estate; verse 23: _If they_ (that is, the unbelieving Jews)
_abide not still in unbelief they shall be grafted in_. The crown and
the sword are immovable, (to use St. Anselm’s comparison), but it is we
that move and change places. Sometimes the Jews were under the crown,
and the Gentiles under the sword; sometimes the Jews under the sword,
and the Gentiles under the crown.
“Thirdly, though I confess that human pacts are not the measure of God’s
justice, but his justice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready
to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good,
punishments to the bad; so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to
his creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and
therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own covenant, but for the
transgression of his duty. And divine justice is not measured by
omnipotence or by irresistible power, but by God’s will. God can do many
things according to his absolute power, which he doth not. He could
raise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a
rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which argues any
wickedness or imperfection: as God cannot deny himself (2 Timothy ii.
13); he cannot lie (Titus i. 2). These and the like are the fruits of
impotence, not of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous with the
wicked (Genesis xviii. 25.) He could not destroy Sodom whilst Lot was in
it, (Genesis xix. 22); not for want of dominion or power, but because it
was not agreeable to his justice, nor to that law which himself had
constituted. The apostle saith (Hebrews vi. 10), _God is not unrighteous
to forget your work_. As it is a good consequence to say, this is from
God, therefore it is righteous; so is this also, this thing is
unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We see how all
creatures by instinct of nature do love their young, as the hen her
chickens; how they will expose themselves to death for them. And yet all
these are but shadows of that love which is in God towards his
creatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God did create so
many millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, without any
fault of theirs except such as he himself did necessitate them unto,
merely to shew his dominion, and because his power is irresistible? The
same privilege which T. H. appropriates here to power absolutely
irresistible, a friend of his, in his book _De Cive_, cap. VI., ascribes
to power respectively irresistible, or to sovereign magistrates, whose
power he makes to be as absolute as a man’s power is over himself; not
to be limited by any thing, but only by their strength. The greatest
propugners of sovereign power think it enough for princes to challenge
an immunity from coercive power, but acknowledge that the law hath a
directive power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their
strength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly.
“But, saith he, God objected no sin to Job, but justified his afflicting
him by his power. First, this is an argument from authority negatively,
that is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the afflictions of Job were no
vindicatory punishments to take vengeance of his sins, (whereof we
dispute), but probatory chastisements to make trial of his graces.
Thirdly, Job was not so pure, but that God might justly have laid
greater punishments upon him, than those afflictions which he suffered.
Witness his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of his nativity
(Job iii. 3). Indeed God said to Job, (Job xxxviii. 4): _Where wast
thou, when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ that is, how canst thou
judge of the things that were done before thou wast born, or comprehend
the secret causes of my judgments? And (Job xl. 9): _Hast thou an arm
like God?_ As if he should say, why art thou impatient; dost thou think
thyself able to strive with God? But that God should punish Job without
desert, here is not a word.
“Concerning the blind man mentioned John ix, his blindness was rather a
blessing to him than a punishment, being the means to raise his soul
illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ.
The sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight
of the soul with the blessed angels. We read of some who have put out
their bodily eyes, because they thought they were an impediment to the
eye of the soul. Again, neither he nor his parents were innocent, being
conceived and born in sin and iniquity (Psalm li. 5). And in many things
we offend all (James iii. 2). But our Saviour’s meaning is evident by
the disciples’ question, John ix. 2. They had not so sinned, that he
should be born blind; or they were not more grievous sinners than other
men, to deserve an exemplary judgment more than they; but this corporal
blindness befel him principally by the extraordinary providence of God,
for the manifestation of his own glory in restoring him to his sight. So
his instance halts on both sides; neither was this a punishment, nor the
blind man free from sin. His third instance of the death and torments of
beasts, is of no more weight than the two former. The death of brute
beasts is not a punishment of sin, but a debt of nature. And though they
be often slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a vast difference
between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and
endless pains of hell; between the mere depriving of a creature of
temporal life, and the subjecting of it to eternal death. I know the
philosophical speculations of some, who affirm, that entity is better
than non-entity, that it is better to be miserable and suffer the
torments of the damned, than to be annihilated and cease to be
altogether. This entity which they speak of, is a metaphysical entity
abstracted from the matter, which is better than non-entity, in respect
of some goodness, not moral nor natural, but transcendental, which
accompanies every being. But in the concrete it is far otherwise, where
that saying of our Saviour often takes place, (Matthew xxvi. 24): _Woe
unto that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed. It had been good for
that man, that he had not been born._ I add, that there is an analogical
justice and mercy due even to the brute beasts. _Thou shalt not muzzle
the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn._ And, _a just man is
merciful to his beast_.
(_f_) “But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make
justice to be the proper result of power. Power doth not measure and
regulate justice, but justice measures and regulates power. The will of
God, and the eternal law which is in God himself, is properly the rule
and measure of justice. As all goodness, whether natural or moral, is a
participation of divine goodness, and all created rectitude is but a
participation of divine rectitude, so all laws are but participations of
the eternal law from whence they derive their power. The rule of justice
then is the same both in God and us: but it is in God, as in him that
doth regulate and measure; in us, as in those who are regulated and
measured. As the will of God is immutable, always willing what is just
and right and good; so his justice likewise is immutable. And that
individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us, cannot
possibly proceed from the special influence and determinative power of a
just cause. See then how grossly T. H. doth understand that old and true
principle, that the will of God is the rule of justice; as if by willing
things in themselves unjust, he did render them just by reason of his
absolute dominion and irresistible power, as fire doth assimilate other
things to itself, and convert them into the nature of fire. This were to
make the eternal law a Lesbian rule. Sin is defined to be that which is
done, or said, or thought, contrary to the eternal law. But by this
doctrine nothing is done, nor said, nor thought, contrary to the will of
God. St. Anselm said most truly, ‘then the will of man is good, and
just, and right, when he wills that which God would have him to will.’
But according to this doctrine, every man always wills that which God
would have him to will. If this be true, we need not pray, _Thy will be
done in earth as it is in heaven_. T. H. hath devised a new kind of
heaven upon earth. The worst is, it is an heaven without justice.
Justice is a constant and perpetual act of the will, to give every one
his own; but to inflict punishment for those things which the judge
himself did determine and necessitate to be done, is not to give every
one his own; right punitive justice is a relation of equality and
proportion between the demerit and the punishment. But supposing this
opinion of absolute and universal necessity, there is no demerit in the
world. We use to say, that right springs from law and fact; as in this
syllogism, every thief ought to be punished, there is the law; but such
an one is a thief, there is the fact; therefore he ought to be punished,
there is the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to be
punished, neither upon law, nor upon fact, but upon the irresistible
power of God. Yea, it overturneth, as much as in it lies, all law;
first, the eternal law, which is the ordination of divine wisdom, by
which all creatures are directed to that end which is convenient for
them, that is, not to necessitate them to eternal flames; then the law
participated, which is the ordination of right reason, instituted for
the common good, to show unto man what he ought to do, and what he ought
not to do. To what purpose is it, to show the right way to him who is
drawn and haled a contrary way by adamantine bonds of inevitable
necessity?
(_g_) “Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out, that God cannot sin, yet in
truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin.
For he makes him to be the cause, not only of the law and of the action,
but even of the irregularity itself, and the difference between the
action and the law, wherein the very essence of sin doth consist. He
makes God to determine David’s will, and necessitate him to kill Uriah.
In causes physically and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause
is evermore the cause of the effect. These are those deadly fruits which
spring from the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all things;
which T. H. seeing, and that neither the sins of Esau, nor Pharaoh, nor
any wicked person do proceed from the operative, but from the permissive
will of God, and that punishment is an act of justice, not of dominion
only, I hope that according to his promise he will change his opinion.