(_a_) “This argument was sent forth only as an espy, to make a more full
discovery, what were the true grounds of T. H.’s supposed necessity.”
The argument which he sendeth forth as an espy, is this: “If either the
decree of God, or the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the
stars, or the concatenation (which he says falsely I call a concourse)
of causes, of the physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last
dictate of the understanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam
before his fall had no true liberty.” In answer whereunto I said, that
all the things now existent were necessary to the production of the
effect to come; that the _foreknowledge_ of God causeth nothing, though
the _will_ do; that the influence of the stars is but a small part of
that cause which maketh the necessity; and that this consequence, “if
the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, then Adam had no
true liberty,” was false. But in his words, if these do take away true
liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty, the consequence
is good; but then I deny that necessity takes away liberty; the reason
whereof, which is this, _liberty is to choose what we will, not to
choose our will_, no inculcation is sufficient to make the Bishop take
notice of, notwithstanding he be otherwhere so witty, and here so
crafty, as to send out arguments for spies. The cause why I denied the
consequence was, that I thought the force thereof consisted in this,
that necessity in the Bishop’s opinion destroyed liberty.
(_b_) “Concerning the eternal decree of God,” &c.
Here begins his reply. From which if we take these words; “knowledge of
approbation;” “practical knowledge;” “heavenly bodies act upon sublunary
things, not only by their motion, but also by an occult virtue, which we
call influence;” “moral efficacy;” “general influence;” “special
influence;” “infuse something into the will;” “the will is moved;” “the
will is induced to will;” “the will suspends its own act;” which are all
nonsense, unworthy of a man, nay, and if a beast could speak, unworthy
of a beast, and can befal no creature whose nature is not depraved by
doctrine; nothing at all remaineth to be answered. Perhaps the word,
_occult virtue_, is not to be taxed as unintelligible. But then I may
tax therein the want of ingenuity in him that had rather say, that
heavenly bodies _do work by an occult virtue_, than that they _work he
knoweth not how_; which he would not confess, but endeavours to make
_occult_ be taken for a _cause_. The rest of this reply is one of those
consequences, which I have answered in the beginning, where I compare
the inconveniences of both opinions, that is, “that either Adam did not
sin, or his sin proceeded necessarily from God;” which is no stronger a
consequence than if out of this, “that a man is lame necessarily,” one
should infer, that _either he is not lame_, or that _his lameness
proceeded necessarily from the will of God_. To the end of this number
there is nothing more of argument. The place is filled up with wondering
and railing.