The Bishop had argued in this manner: “If there be no liberty, there
shall be no last judgment, no rewards nor punishments after death.” To
this I answered, that though God cannot sin, because what he doth, his
doing maketh just, and because he is not subject to another’s law, and
that therefore it is blasphemy to say that God can sin; yet to say, that
God hath so ordered the world that sin may be necessarily committed, is
not blasphemy. And I can also further say, though God be the cause of
all motion and of all actions, and therefore unless sin be no motion nor
action, it must derive a necessity from the first mover; nevertheless it
cannot be said that God is the author of sin, because not he that
necessitateth an action, but he that doth command and warrant it, is the
author. And if God own an action, though otherwise it were a sin, it is
now no sin. The act of the Israelites in robbing the Egyptians of their
jewels, without God’s warrant had been theft. But it was neither theft,
cozenage, nor sin; supposing they knew the warrant was from God. The
rest of my answer to that inconvenience, was an opposing to his
inconveniences the manifest texts of St. Paul, Rom. ix. The substance of
his reply to my answer is this.
(_a_) “Though punishment were an act of dominion, not of justice, in
God; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act, or
why he should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which he
himself did necessitate them to do.”
I never said that God denied his act, but that he may expostulate with
men; and this may be (I shall never say directly, it is) the reason of
that his expostulation, viz. to convince them that their wills were not
independent, but were his mere gift; and that to do, or not to do, is
not in him that willeth, but in God that hath mercy on, or hardeneth
whom he will. But the Bishop interpreteth _hardening_ to be a permission
of God. Which is to attribute to God in such actions no more than he
might have attributed to any of Pharaoh’s servants, the not persuading
their master to let the people go. And whereas he compares this
permission to the indulgence of a parent, that by his patience
encourageth his son to become more rebellious, which indulgence is a
sin; he maketh God to be like a sinful man. And indeed it seemeth that
all they that hold this freedom of the will, conceive of God no
otherwise than the common sort of Jews did, that God was like a man,
that he had been seen by Moses, and after by the seventy elders (Exod.
xxiv. 10); expounding that and other places literally. Again he saith,
that God is said to harden the heart _permissively_, but not
_operatively_; which is the same distinction with his first, namely
_negatively_, not _positively_, and with his second, _occasionally_, and
not _causally_. So that all his three ways how God hardens the heart of
wicked men, come to this one of _permission_; which is as much as to
say, God sees, looks on, and does nothing, nor ever did anything, in the
business. Thus you see how the Bishop expoundeth St. Paul. Therefore I
will leave the rest of his commentary upon Rom. ix. to the judgment of
the reader, to think of the same as he pleaseth.
(_b_) “Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith, ‘that he who doth
permit anything to be done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing
that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will
it;’ I say in some sort, that is either by an antecedent will, or by a
consequent will; either by an operative will, or by a permissive will;
or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to do it.”
Whether it be called antecedent, or consequent, or operative, or
permissive, it is enough for the necessity of the thing that the heart
of Pharaoh should be hardened; and if God were not willing to do it, I
cannot conceive how it could be done without him.
(_c_) “T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action, and yet
not be the cause of the irregularity of the action? I answer, because he
concurs to the doing of evil by a general, but not by a special,
influence.”
I had thought to pass over this place, because of the nonsense of
general and special influence. Seeing he saith that God concurs to the
doing of evil, I desire the reader would take notice, that if he blame
me for speaking of God as of a necessitating cause, and as it were a
principal agent in the causing of all actions, he may with as good
reason blame himself for making him by concurrence an accessory to the
same. And indeed, let men hold what they will contrary to the truth, if
they write much, the truth will fall into their pens. But he thinks he
hath a similitude, which will make this permissive will a very clear
business. “The earth,” saith he, “gives nourishment to all kinds of
plants, as well to hemlock as to wheat; but the reason why the one
yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is
not from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special
quality of the root.” It seemeth by this similitude, he thinketh, that
God doth, not operatively, but permissively will that the root of
hemlock should poison the man that eateth it, but that wheat should
nourish him he willeth operatively; which is very absurd; or else he
must confess that the venomous effects of wicked men are willed
operatively.
(_d_) “Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and
determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to
act, is from God; but the specification of this general and good power,
to murder, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free
will of man.”
But why am I so mightily mistaken? Did not God foreknow that Uriah in
particular, should be murdered by David in particular? And what God
foreknoweth shall come to pass, can that possibly not come so to pass?
And that which cannot possibly not come to pass, doth not that
necessarily come to pass? And is not all necessity from God? I cannot
see this great mistake. “The general power,” saith he, “to act is from
God, but the specification to do this act upon Uriah, is not from God,
but from free-will.” Very learnedly. As if there were a power that were
not the power to do some particular act; or a power to kill, and yet to
kill nobody in particular. If the power be to kill, it is to kill that
which shall be by that power killed, whether it be Uriah or any other;
and the giving of that power, is the application of it to the act; nor
doth power signify anything actually, but those motions and present acts
from which the act that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily
proceedeth. And therefore this argument is much like that which used
heretofore to be brought for the defence of the divine right of the
bishops to the ordination of ministers. They derive not, say they, the
right of ordination from the civil sovereign, but from Christ
immediately. And yet they acknowledge that it is unlawful for them to
ordain, if the civil power do forbid them. But how have they right to
ordain, when they cannot do it lawfully? Their answer is, they have the
right, though they may not exercise it; as if the right to ordain, and
the right to exercise ordination, were not the same thing. And as they
answer concerning right, which is legal power, so the Bishop answereth
concerning natural power, that David had a general power to kill Uriah
from God, but not a power of applying this power in special to the
killing of Uriah from God, but from his own free will; that is, he had a
power to kill Uriah, but not to exercise it upon Uriah, that is to say,
he had a power to kill him, but not to kill him, which is absurd.
(_e_) “But if the case be put why God doth punish one more than another,
or why he throws one into hell fire, and not another, which is the
present case between us; to say with T. H., that it is because God is
omnipotent, or because his power is irresistible, or merely because it
is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is plainly condemned by
St. Paul in this place.”
I note first, that he hath no reason to say, the case agitated between
us is, whether the cause why God punisheth one man more than another, be
his irresistible power, or man’s sin. The case agitated between us is,
whether a man can now choose what shall be his _will_ anon, or at any
time hereafter. Again, it is not true that he says, it is my opinion
that the irresistible power of God is the cause why he punisheth one
more than another. I say only that when he doth so, the irresistible
power is enough to make it not unjust. But that the cause why God
punisheth one more than another, is many times the will he hath to show
his power, is affirmed in this place by St. Paul, _Shall the thing
formed, say to him that formed it_, &c. And by our Saviour in the case
of him that was born blind, where he saith, _Neither hath this man
sinned nor his parents; but that the works of God may be made manifest_.
And by the expostulation of God with Job. This endeavour of his to bring
the text of St. Paul to his purpose, is not only frustrate, but the
cause of many insignificant phrases in his discourse; as this: “It was
in their own power, by their concurrence with God’s grace, to prevent
these judgments, and to recover their former estates,” which is as good
sense, as if he should say, that it is in his own power, with the
concurrence of the sovereign power of England, to be what he will. And
this, that “God may oblige himself freely to his creature.” For he that
can oblige, can also, when he will, release; and he that can release
himself when he will, is not obliged. Besides this, he is driven to
words ill-becoming him that is to speak of God Almighty; for he makes
him unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary power of men
to do. “God,” he saith, “cannot destroy the righteous with the wicked;”
which nevertheless is a thing ordinarily done by armies: and “He could
not destroy Sodom while Lot was in it;” which he interpreteth, as if he
could not do it lawfully. One text is Genesis xviii. 23, 24, 25. There
is not a word that God could not destroy the righteous with the wicked.
Only Abraham saith (as a man): _Shall not the Judge of all the earth do
right?_ Another is Genesis 22): _Haste thee, escape thither; for I
cannot do any thing till thou be come thither_. Which is an ordinary
phrase, in such a case where God had determined to burn the city and
save a particular man, and signifieth not any obligation to save Lot
more than the rest. Likewise concerning Job, who, expostulating with
God, was answered only with the explication of the infinite power of
God, the Bishop answereth, that there is never a word of Job’s being
punished without desert; which answer is impertinent. For I say not that
he was punished without desert, but that it was not for his desert that
he was afflicted; for punished, he was not at all.
And concerning the blind man, (John ix.), who was born blind, that the
power of God might be shewn in him; he answers that it was not a
punishment, but a blessing. I did not say it was a punishment; certainly
it was an affliction. How then doth he call it a blessing? Reasonably
enough: “because,” saith he, “it was the means to raise his soul
illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ.
The sight of the body is common to us with ants and flies, but the sight
of the soul, with the blessed angels.” This is very well said; for no
man doubts but some afflictions may be blessings; but I doubt whether
the Bishop, that says he reads of some who have put out their bodily
eyes, because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the
soul, think that they did well. To that where I say that brute beasts
are afflicted which cannot sin, he answereth, that “there is a vast
difference between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable
and endless pains of hell.” As if the length or the greatness of the
pain, made any difference in the justice or injustice of the inflicting
it.
(_f_) “But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make
justice to be the proper result of power.”
He would make men believe, I hold all things to be just, that are done
by them who have power enough to avoid the punishment. This is one of
his pretty little policies, by which I find him in many occasions to
take the measure of his own wisdom. I said no more, but that the power,
which is absolutely irresistible, makes him that hath it above all law,
so that nothing he doth can be unjust. But this power can be no other
than the power divine. Therefore let him preach what he will upon his
mistaken text, I shall leave it to the reader to consider of it, without
any further answer.
(_g_) “Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out that God cannot sin, yet in
truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin.
For he makes him to be the cause not only of the law, and of the action,
but even of the irregularity itself, &c. wherein the very essence of sin
doth consist.”
I think there is no man but understands, no, not the Bishop himself, but
that where two things are compared, the similitude or dissimilitude,
regularity or irregularity, that is between them, is made in and by the
making of the things themselves that are compared. The Bishop,
therefore, that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies
him to be the cause both of the law and of the action. So that by his
doctrine, there shall be a good law whereof God shall be no cause, and
an action, that is, a local motion that shall depend upon another first
mover that is not God. The rest of this number is but railing.