The question in general is stated by the Bishop himself, (towards the
end of No. III.), in these words: “Whether all events, natural, civil,
moral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that
concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and
inevitably, without their own concurrence; so as all the actions and
events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise
after any other manner or in any other place, time, number, measure,
order, nor to any other end than they are. And all this in respect of
the supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsical causes, determining
them to one.”
Which though drawn up to his advantage, with as much caution as he would
do a lease, yet (excepting that which is not intelligible) I am content
to admit. Not intelligible is, first, “that the conversion of a sinner
concerns not the question.” If he mean, that the conversion of a sinner
is from necessity, and predetermined, then he is, for so much as the
question concerns religion, of the same mind that I am; and what he can
mean else by that exception, I cannot guess. Secondly, these words,
“without their own concurrence,” are insignificant, unless he mean that
the events themselves should concur to their production: as that fire
doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning, as the
words properly import: or at least without concurrence of the fuel.
Those two clauses left out, I agree with him in the state of the
question as it is put universally. But when the question is put of the
necessity of any particular event, as of the will to write, or the like,
then it is the stating of that particular question: but it is decided in
the decision of the question universal.
He states the same question again in another place thus: “This is the
very question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a
liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical determination to one, or
not.” And I allow it also for well stated so.
Again he says, “In a word, so great difference there is between natural
and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this
question.” So that the state of the question is reduced to this,
“Whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural?” I say there is
not: he says there is.
Again he writes thus: “And therefore as it were ridiculous to say, that
the object of sight is the cause of seeing; so it is to say, that the
proposing of the object by the understanding to the will, is the cause
of willing.” Here also the question is brought to this issue, “Whether
the object of sight be the cause that it is seen?” But for these words,
“proposing of the object by the understanding to the will,” I understand
them not.
Again, he often useth such words as these: “The will willeth; the will
suspendeth its act, (_Rid est_, the will willeth not); the understanding
proposeth; the understanding understandeth.” Herein also lyeth the whole
question. If they be true, I, if false, he is in error.
Again, the whole question is decided, when this is decided, “Whether he
that willingly permitteth a thing to be done, when without labour,
danger, or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do not will the
doing of it?”
Again the whole question of free-will is included in this, “Whether the
will determine itself?”
Again, it is included in this, “Whether there be an universal grace,
which particular men can take without a particular grace to take it?”
Lastly, there be two questions; one, “Whether a man be free in such
things as are within his power, to do what he will;” another, “Whether
he be free to will.” Which is as much as to say (because will is
appetite), it is one question, whether he be free to eat that has an
appetite, and another, whether he be free to have an appetite? In the
former, “whether a man be free to do what he will,” I agree with the
Bishop. In the latter, “whether he be free to will,” I dissent from him.
And, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he allegeth to prove
that a man hath liberty to do what he will, are impertinent to the
question. If he has not been able to distinguish between these two
questions, he has not done well to meddle with either: if he has
understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if
he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers. And
thus much for the state of the question.
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