LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE.

Whether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from _necessity_, or some

things from _chance_, has been a question disputed amongst the old

philosophers long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, without

drawing into argument on either side the almighty power of the Deity.

But the third way of bringing things to pass, distinct from _necessity_

and _chance_, namely, _freewill_, is a thing that never was mentioned

amongst them, nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity.

For St. Paul, that disputes that question largely and purposely, never

useth the term of _freewill_; nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to

that which is now called the doctrine of freewill; but deriveth all

actions from the irresistible will of God, and nothing from the will of

him that _runneth or willeth_. But for some ages past, the doctors of

the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of God’s will the will

of man; and brought in a doctrine, that not only man, but also his will

is free, and determined to this or that action, not by the will of God,

nor necessary causes, but by the power of the will itself. And though by

the reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, this

opinion was cast out, yet not many years since it began again to be

reduced by Arminius and his followers, and became the readiest way to

ecclesiastical promotion; and by discontenting those that held the

contrary, was in some part the cause of the following troubles; which

troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at

Paris, where we discoursed together of the argument now in hand; from

which discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion, and for

aught I remember, without any offensive words, as blasphemous,

atheistical, or the like, passing between us; either for that the Bishop

was not then in passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in the

presence of my Lord of Newcastle.

But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship his opinion concerning

the question in writing, and desired him to persuade me to send an

answer thereunto likewise in writing. There were some reasons for which

I thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad; yet the

many obligations wherein I was obliged to him, prevailed with me to

write this answer, which was afterwards not only without my knowledge,

but also against my will, published by one that found means to get a

copy of it surreptitiously. And thus you have the occasion of this

controversy.

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The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11) · 第 21 / 101 题