UNVEXED TO THE SEA.
With that quick appreciation of facts that forms so large a part
of the character of the American soldier, even to the extent of
exercising upon the fate of battles and campaigns an influence not
always reserved for considerations derived from a study of the
principles of the art of war, the men of the Army of the Gulf had
now made up their minds that the end sought was to be attained by
hard work on their part and by starvation on the part of the
garrison. Criticism and denunciation, by no means confined to
those officers whose knowledge of the art of war is drawn from
books, have been freely passed upon this peculiarity, yet both
alike have been wasted, since no proposition can be clearer than
that a nation, justly proud of the superior intelligence of its
soldiers, cannot expect to reap the full advantage of that intelligence
and at the same time escape every disadvantage attending its
exercise. Among these drawbacks, largely overbalanced by the
obvious gains, not the least is the peculiar quality that has been
aptly described in the homely saying, "They know too much." When,
therefore, the American volunteer has become a veteran, and has
reached his highest point of discipline, endurance, and the simple
sagacity of the soldier, it is often his way to stay his hand from
exertions that he deems needless and from sacrifices that he
considers useless or worse than useless, although the same exertions
and the same sacrifices would, but a few months earlier in the days
of his inexperience, have been met by him with the same alacrity
that the ignorant peasant of Europe displays in obeying the orders
of his hereditary chief in the service of the king.
After the 14th of June the siege progressed steadily without farther
attempt at an assault. This was now deferred to the last resort.
At four points a system of comparatively regular approaches was
begun, and upon these labor was carried on incessantly, night and
day; indeed, as is usual with works of this character, the greatest
progress was made in the short hours of the June nights. The main
approach led from Duryea's battery No. 12 toward the priest-cap,
following the winding of the ravines and the contour of the hill.
When at last the sap had, with great toil and danger, been carried
to the crest facing the priest-cap, and only a few yards distant,
the trench was rapidly and with comparative ease extended toward
the left, in a line parallel with the general direction of the
defences. The least distance from this third parallel, as it was
called by an easy stretch of the language, to the enemy's parapet
was about twenty yards, the greatest about forty-five.
About two hundred yards farther to the right of the elbow of the
main sap, a zigzag ran out of the ravine on the left flank of
Bainbridge's battery, No. 8, toward the bastion. Upon this approach,
because of its directness, the use of the sap-roller, or some
equivalent for it, could never be given up until the ditch was
gained.
From the extreme left, after the northern slope of Mount Pleasant
had been gained, a main approach was extended from the flank of
Roy's battery of 20-pounder Parrotts, No. 20, almost directly toward
the river, until the trench cut the edge of the bluff, forming
meanwhile a covered way that connected all the batteries looking
north from the left flank. Of these No. 24 was the seventeen-gun
battery, including two 9-inch Dahlgrens removed from the naval
battery of the right wing, and commanded by Ensign Swann. On the
2d of July, Lieutenant-Commander Terry took command of the _Richmond_
and turned over the command of the right naval battery to Ensign
Shepard. These "blue-jacket" batteries, with their trim and alert
gun crews, were always bright spots in the sombre line. From the
river bank the sap ran with five stretches of fifty or sixty yards,
forming four sharp elbows, to the foot and well up the slope of
the steep hill on the opposite side of the ravine, where the
Confederates had constructed the strong work known to both combatants
as the Citadel. From the head of the sap to the nearest point of
the Confederate works the distance was about ninety-five yards.
From the ravine in front of the mortar battery of the left wing,
No. 18, a secondary approach was carried to a parallel facing the
advanced lunette, No. XXVII., and distant from it 375 yards. The
object of this approach was partly to amuse the enemy, partly to
prevent his breaking through the line, now drawn out very thin,
and partly also to serve as a foothold for a column of attack in
case of need.
From the ravine near Slaughter's house a zigzag, constructed by
the men of the 21st Maine, under the immediate direction of Colonel
Johnson, led to the position of battery No. 16, where were posted
the ten guns of Rails and Baines. The distance from this battery
to the defences was four hundred yards.
On the 15th of June, on the heels of the bloody repulse of the
previous day, Banks issued a general order congratulating his troops
upon the steady advance made upon the enemy's works, and expressed
his confidence in an immediate and triumphant issue of the contest:
"We are at all points on the threshold of his fortifications," the
order continues. "Only one more advance, and they are ours!
"For the last duty that victory imposes, the Commanding General
summons the bold men of the corps to the organization of a storming
column of a thousand men, to vindicate the flag of the Union, and
the memory of its defenders who have fallen! Let them come forward!
"Officers who lead the column of victory in this last assault may
be assured of the just recognition of their services by promotion;
and every officer and soldier who shares its perils and its glory
shall receive a medal to commemorate the first great success of
the campaign of 1863 for the freedom of the Mississippi. His name
will be placed in General Orders upon the Roll of Honor."
Colonel Henry W. Birge, of the 13th Connecticut, at once volunteered
to lead the stormers, and although the whole project was disapproved
by many of the best officers and men in the corps, partly as
unnecessary and partly because they conceived that it implied some
reflection upon the conduct of the brave men that had fought and
suffered and failed on the 27th and the 14th, yet so general was
the feeling of confidence in Birge that within a few days the ranks
of the stormers were more than filled. As nearly as can now be
ascertained, the whole number of officers who volunteered was at
least 80; of enlisted men at least 956. Of these, 17 officers and
226 men belonged to the 13th Connecticut. As the different parties
offered and were accepted, they were sent into camp in a retired
and pleasant spot, in a grove behind the naval battery on the right.
On the 15th of June Birge was ordered to divide his column into
two battalions, and to drill it for its work. On the 28th this
organization was complete. The battalions were then composed of
eight companies, but two companies were afterwards added to the
first battalion. To Lieutenant-Colonel Van Petter, of the 160th
New York, Birge gave the command of the first battalion, and to
Lieutenant-Colonel Bickmore, of the 14th Maine, that of the second
battalion. On that day, 67 of the officers and 826 men--in all,
893, were present for duty in the camp of the stormers. Among
those that volunteered for the forlorn hope but were not accepted
were 54 non-commissioned officers and privates of the 1st Louisiana
Native Guards, and 37 of the 3d. From among the officers of the
general staff and staff departments that were eager to go, two were
selected to accompany the column and keep up the communication with
headquarters and with the other troops; these were Captain Duncan
S. Walker, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Edmund H.
Russell, of the 9th Pennsylvania Reserves, acting signal officer.
Then the officers and men quietly prepared themselves for the
serious work expected of them. Those that had any thing to leave
made their wills in the manner sanctioned by the custom of armies,
and all confided to the hands of comrades the last words for their
families or their friends.
Meanwhile an event took place, trifling in itself, yet accenting
sharply some of the more serious reasons that had, in the first
instance, led Banks to resist the repeated urging to join Grant
with his whole force, and afterward had formed powerful factors in
determining him to deliver and to renew the assault. Early on the
morning of the 18th of June a detachment of Confederate cavalry
rode into the village of Plaquemine, surprised the provost guard,
captured Lieutenant C. H. Witham and twenty-two men of the 28th
Maine, and burned the three steamers lying the bayou, the _Sykes,
Anglo-American_, and _Belfast_. Captain Albert Stearns, of the
131st New York, who was stationed at Plaquemine as provost marshal
of the parish, made his escape with thirteen men of his guard.
The Confederates were fired upon by the guard and lost one man
killed and two wounded. In their turn they fired upon the steamboats,
and wounded two of the crew. Three hours later the gunboat _Winona_,
Captain Weaver, came down from Baton Rouge, and, shelling the enemy,
hastened their departure. In the tension of greater events, little
notice was taken at the moment of this incident; yet it was not
long before it was discovered that the raiders were the advance
guard of the little army with which Taylor was about to invade La
Fourche, intent upon the bold design of raising the siege of Port
Hudson by blockading the river and threatening New Orleans.
Thus Banks was brought face to face with the condition described
in his letter of the 4th of June to Halleck:
"The course to be pursued here gives me great anxiety. If I abandon
Port Hudson, I leave its garrison, some 6,000 or 7,000 men, the
force under Mouton and Sibley, now threatening Brashear City and
the Army of Mobile, large or small, to threaten or attack New
Orleans. If I detach from my command in the field a sufficient
force to defend that city, which ought not to be less than 8,000
or 10,000, my assistance to General Grant is unimportant, and I
leave an equal or larger number of the enemy to reinforce Johnston.
If I defend New Orleans and its adjacent territory, the enemy will
go against Grant. If I go with a force sufficient to aid him, my
rear will be seriously threatened. My force is not large enough
to do both. Under these circumstances, my only course seems to be
to carry this post as soon as possible, and then to join General
Grant. If I abandon it I cannot materially aid him."
Taylor's incursion caused Banks some anxiety and appreciable
inconvenience, without, however, exercising a material influence
on the fortunes of the siege; accordingly, it will be better to
reserve for another chapter the story of this adventure.
About the same time, Logan again became troublesome. At first he
seems to have thought of retiring on Jackson, Mississippi; but this
Johnston forbade, telling him to stay where he was, to observe and
annoy the besiegers, and if pressed by too strong a force, to fall
back only so far as necessary, hindering and retarding the advance
of his assailants. By daylight, on the morning of the 15th of
June, Logan dashed down the Clinton road, surprised the camp of
the 14th New York cavalry, who made little resistance, and the
guard of the hospital at the Carter House, who made none. In this
raid Logan took nearly one hundred disabled prisoners, including
six officers, and carried off a number of wagons. However, finding
Grierson instantly on his heels, Logan promptly "fell back as far
as necessary." On the evening of the 30th of June, while hovering
in the rear of Dwight, Logan captured and carried off Brigadier-General
Dow, who, while waiting for his wound to heal, had taken up his
headquarters in a house some distance behind the lines. At daylight,
on the morning of the 2d of July, Logan surprised the depot at
Springfield Landing, guarded by the 162d New York, Lieutenant-Colonel
Blanchard, and a small detachment of the 16th New Hampshire,
under Captain Henry. Careless picket duty was the cause, and a
great stampede the consequence, but Logan hardly stayed long enough
to find out exactly what he had accomplished, since he reports
that, besides burning the commissary and quartermasters' stores,
he killed and wounded 140 of his enemy, captured 35 prisoners,
fought an entire brigade, and destroyed 100 wagons, with a loss on
his part of 4 killed and 10 wounded; whereas, in fact, the entire
loss of the Union army was 1 killed, 11 wounded, 21 captured or
missing, while the stores burned consisted of a full supply of
clothing and camp and garrison equipment for about 1,000 men. The
wagons mentioned by Logan were part of a train met in the road,
cut out, and carried off as he rapidly rode away, and the number
may be correct.
The end of June was now drawing near, and already the losses of
the besiegers in the month of constant fighting exceeded 4,000.
At least as many more were sick in the hospitals, while the
reinforcements from every quarter barely numbered 3,000. There
were no longer any reserves to draw from; the last man was up.
The effective strength of all arms had at no time exceeded 17,000.(1)
Of these less than 12,000 can be regarded as available for any duty
directly connected with the siege, and now every day saw the command
growing smaller in numbers, as the men fell under the fire of the
sharp-shooter, or succumbed to the deadly climate, or gave out
exhausted by incessant labor and privation. The heat became almost
insupportable, even to those who from time to time found themselves
so fortunate as to be able to snatch a few hours' rest in the dense
shade of the splendid forest, until their tour of duty should come
again in the trenches, where, under the June sun beating upon and
baking all three surfaces, the parched clay became like a reverberating
furnace. The still air was stifling, but the steam from the almost
tropical showers was far worse. Merely in attempting to traverse
a few yards of this burning zone many of the strongest men were
sunstruck daily. The labor of the siege, extending over so wide
a front, pressed so severely upon the numbers of the besieging
army, always far too weak for such an undertaking in any climate
at any season, above all in Louisiana in June, that the men were
almost incessantly on duty, either in digging, as guards of the
trenches, as sharp-shooters, or on outpost service; and as the
number available for duty grew smaller, and the physical strength
of all that remained in the ranks daily wasted, the work fell the
more heavily. When the end came at last the effective force,
outside of the cavalry, hardly exceeded 8,000, while even of this
small number nearly every officer and man might well have gone on
the sick-report had not pride and duty held him to his post.
This will seem the less remarkable when it is remembered that the
garrison during the same period suffered in the same proportion,
while from like causes less than a year before Breckinridge had,
in a much shorter time, lost the use of half his division. Butler's
experience had been nearly as severe.
To the suffering and labors that are inseparable from any operation
in the nature of a siege were added insupportable torments, the
least of which were vermin. As the summer days drew out and the
heat grew more intense, the brooks dried up; the creek lost itself
in the pestilential swamp; the wells and springs gave out; the river
fell, exposing to the almost tropical sun a wide margin of festering
ooze. The mortality and the sickness were enormous.
The animals suffered in their turn, the battery horses from want
of exercise, the train horses and mules from over-work, and all
from the excessive heat and insufficiency of proper forage. There
was never enough hay; the deficiency was partly eked out by making
fodder of the standing corn, but this resource was quickly exhausted,
and after the 3d of July, when Taylor sealed the river by planting
his guns below Donaldsonville, all the animals went upon half or
quarter rations of grain, with little hay or none. At length, for
two or three days, the forage depots fairly gave out; the poor
beasts were literally starving when the place fell, nor was it for
nearly a week after that event that, by the raising of Taylor's
blockade below and the arrival of supplies from Grant above, the
stress was wholly relieved.
The two colored regiments, the 1st and 3d Louisiana Native Guards,
besides strongly picketing their front, were mainly occupied, after
the 27th of May, in fatigue duty in the trenches on the right.
While the army was in the Teche country, Brigadier-General Daniel
Ullmann had arrived at New Orleans from New York, bringing with
him authority to raise a brigade of colored troops. With him came
a full complement of officers. A few days later, on the 1st of
May, Banks issued, at Opelousas, an order, which he had for some
time held in contemplation, for organizing a corps of eighteen
regiments of colored infantry, to consist, at first, of five hundred
men each. These troops were to form a distinct command, to which
he gave the name of the Corps d'Afrique, and in it he incorporated
Ullmann's brigade. By the end of May Ullmann had enrolled about
1,400 men for five regiments, the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th.
These recruits, as yet unarmed and undrilled, were now brought to
Port Hudson, organized, and set to work in the trenches and upon
the various siege operations.
About the same time the formation of a regiment of engineer troops
was undertaken, composed of picked men of color, formed in three
battalions of four companies each, under white officers carefully
chosen from among the veterans. The ranks of this regiment, known
as the 1st Louisiana engineers, were soon recruited to above a
thousand; the strength for duty was about eight hundred. Under
the skilful handling of Colonel Justin Hodge it rendered valuable
service throughout the siege.
Company K of the 42d Massachusetts, commanded by Lieutenant Henry
A. Harding, had for some months been serving as pontoniers, in
charge of the bridge train. During the siege it did good and hard
work in all branches of field engineering under the immediate
direction of the Chief Engineer.
While at Opelousas, Banks had applied to Halleck to order
Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone to duty in the Department of the
Gulf. Stone had been without assignment since his release, in the
preceding August, from his long and lonely imprisonment in the
casemates of the harbor forts of New York, and, up to this moment,
every suggestion looking to his employment had met the stern
disapproval of the Secretary of War. Even when in the first flush
of finding himself at last at the top notch of his career, Hooker, in
firm possession, as he believed, of the post he had long coveted, as
commander of the Army of the Potomac, had asked for Stone as his Chief
of Staff, the request had been met by a flat refusal. A different fate
awaited Banks's application. On the 7th of May Halleck issued the
orders asked for, and in the last days of the month Stone reported
for duty before Port Hudson. At first Banks was rather embarrassed
by the gift he had solicited, for he saw that he himself was falling
into disfavor at Washington; the moment was critical; and it was
easy to perceive how disaster, or even the slightest check, might
be magnified in the shadows of Ball's Bluff and Fort Lafayette.
Moreover, Stone was equally unknown to and unknown by the troops
of the Nineteenth Army Corps. Instead, therefore, of giving him
the command of Sherman's division, for which his rank indicated
him, Banks kept Stone at headquarters without special assignment,
and made every use of his activity, as well as of his special
knowledge and ready skill in all matters relating to ordnance and
gunnery.
On the evening of the 26th of June a strange thing happened. While
it was yet broad daylight Colonel Provence of the 16th Arkansas,
posted in rear of the position of battery XXIV, discovering and
annoyed by the progress made on battery 16 in his front, sent out,
one at a time, two bold men, named Mieres and Parker, to see what
was going on. After nightfall, on their report, he despatched
thirty volunteers, under Lieutenant McKennon, to drive off the
guard and the working party and destroy the works. The position
was held by the advance guard of the 21st Maine, under Lieutenant
Bartlett, who, for some reason hard to understand, ordered his men
not to fire. The Arkansas party, therefore, accomplished its
purpose, without further casualty than having one man knocked down,
as he was leaping the parapet of the trench, by a soldier who
happened to consider his orders as inapplicable to this method of
defence. Then Major Merry, with the reserves of the 21st, coming
promptly to the rescue, easily drove out the enterprising assailants,
with whom went as prisoners Lieutenant Bartlett and five of his
men, with fourteen muskets that had not been fired.(2)
As the saps in front of Bainbridge's and Duryea's batteries drew
every day nearer to the bastion and the priest-cap, the working
parties were harassed and began to be greatly delayed by the
unceasing fire of the Confederate sharp-shooters. Moreover, in
spite of the vigilance of the sharp-shooters in the trenches, their
adversaries had so much the advantage of ground that they were able
to render the passage of certain exposed points of the approaches
slow and hazardous. At first, cotton bales were used to protect
the head of the sap, but these the adventurous enemy set alight
with blazing arrows or by sallies of small parties under cover of
darkness. In the short night it was impossible to raise a pile of
sand-bags high enough to overlook the breastworks. Toward the end
of June this was changed in a single night by the skill and ingenuity
of Colonel Edward Prince, of the 7th Illinois cavalry.
Happening to be at headquarters when the trouble was being talked
about, he heard an officer suggest making use of the empty hogsheads
at the sugar-house; how to get them to the trenches was the next
question. This he promptly offered to solve if simply ordered to
do it and left to himself. Cavalry had never been of any use in
a siege, he said; it was time for a change. The order was instantly
given. Prince swung himself into the saddle and rode away. Before
daylight his men had carried through the woods and over the hills
to the mouth of the sap, opposite the southern angle of the
priest-cap, enough sugar hogsheads to make two tiers. The heads had
been knocked in, a long pole thrust through each hogshead, and thus
slung, it was easy for two mounted troopers to carry it between
them. Quietly rolled into position by the working parties and
rapidly filled with earth, a rude platform erected behind for the
sharp-shooter to mount upon, with a few sand-bags thrown on top to
protect his head,--this was the beginning of the great trench
cavalier, whose frowning crest the astonished Confederates awoke
the next morning to find towering high above their heads. Afterwards
enlarged and strengthened, it finally dominated the whole line of
defence not only in its immediate front, but for a long distance
on either side.
Not less ingenious was the device almost instinctively resorted to
by the artillerists for the safety of the gunners when, after the
siege batteries opened, the Confederate sharp-shooters began picking
off every head that came in sight. The first day saw a number of
gunners stricken in the act of taking aim, an incident not conducive
to deliberation or accuracy on the part of their successors at the
guns. The next sunrise saw every exposed battery, from right to
left, protected by a hinged shutter made of flat iron chiefly taken
from the sugar troughs, covered with strips of rawhide from the
commissary's, the space stuffed tight with loose cotton, and a hole
made through all, big enough for the gunner's eye, but too small
for the sharp-shooter's bullet. Such was substantially the plan
simultaneously adopted at three or four different points and
afterwards followed everywhere. The remedy was perfect.
On the 3d of July arrangements were made for the daily detail of
a brigade commander to act as General of the Trenches during a tour
of twenty-four hours, from noon to noon. His duties were to
superintend the siege operations, to post the guards of the trenches,
to repulse sorties, and to protect the works. The works to be
constructed were indicated and laid out by the Chief Engineer,
whose duties, after the 17th of June, when Major Houston fell
seriously ill, were performed by Captain John C. Palfrey, aided
and overlooked by General Andrews, the Chief of Staff. Daily, at
nine o'clock in the morning, the General of the Trenches and the
Chief Engineer made separate reports to headquarters of everything
that had happened during the previous day. Each of these officers
made five reports, yet of the ten but two are to be found printed
among the Official Records. These are the engineer's reports of
work done on the 5th and 6th of July. They contain almost the only
details of the siege to be gathered from the record, notwithstanding
the fact that every paper, however small, or irregular in size or
form, or apparently unimportant in substance, that related in any
way to the military operations of the Army of the Gulf was carefully
preserved on the files of its Adjutant-General's office, where,
for safety as well as convenience, documents of this character were
kept separate from the ordinary files covering matters of routine
and requiring to be handled every day or hour. The proof is strong
that these important records were in due time delivered into the
custody of the War Office, where, for a considerable period after
the close of the war, little or no care seems to have been taken
of the documents thus turned in by the several Corps and Departments,
as these were discontinued; and although the care and management
of the War Records division of the Adjutant-General's Office at
Washington has, from its earliest organization, been such as to
deserve the highest admiration, yet many of these papers are not
to be found there. The probability is that they were either mislaid
or else swept away and destroyed before this office was organized.
Palfrey's report for the 5th of July shows the left cavalier finished
and occupied, and the right cavalier nearly finished, but constantly
injured by a 24-pounder gun that had so far escaped destruction by
the artillery of the besiegers. The sap in front of Bainbridge's
battery, No. 8, was advanced about twenty yards during this day,
and the parallel in front of the priest-cap extended to the left
eleven yards; work was greatly retarded by a heavy rain in the
night. The mine was so far advanced that a shaft was begun to run
obliquely under the salient, this course being chosen instead of
the usual plan of a vertical shaft with enveloping galleries, as
shorter in time and distance, although more dangerous.
On the 6th the sap was pushed forward forty-two feet, and the
parallel carried to the left sixty-nine feet. The mine shaft,
begun the day before, was carried about twenty-seven feet underground,
directly toward the salient. The cavaliers were finished.
During the 7th, although there is no report for that day, the shaft
for the mine under the priest-cap was finished, the chamber itself
excavated and charged with about twelve hundred pounds of powder,
and the mine tamped with sand-bags. The mine on the left had been
ready for some days; it was now charged with fifteen hundred pounds
of powder and tamped.
Heavy thunder-storms, accompanied by warm rain, had been frequent
of late, and the night dews had been at times heavy. Accordingly
it was thought best not to trust so delicate an operation as the
explosion of the mines to the chance of a damp fuse. Daybreak on
the 9th of July having been set as the hour for the simultaneous
explosion of the mines, to be instantly followed by one last rush
through the gaps, Captain Walker was sent on the evening of the
7th, to the _Richmond_ to ask for dry fuses from the magazines of
the Navy.
Meanwhile events were moving rapidly to an end. In the early
morning of Tuesday, the 7th, the gunboat _General Price_ came down
the river bringing the great news that Vicksburg had surrendered
to Grant on the 4th of July. Commodore Palmer, on board the
_Hartford_, was the first to receive the news, but for some reason
it happened that signal communication was obstructed or suspended
between the _Hartford_ and headquarters, so that it was not until
a quarter before eleven that Colonel Kilby Smith, of Grant's staff,
delivered to Banks the welcome message of which he was the bearer.
In less time than it takes to tell, an aide-de-camp was on his way
to the General of the Trenches bearing the brief announcement,
"Vicksburg surrendered on the 4th of July." This note, written
upon the thin manifold paper of the field order-books, the General
of the Trenches was directed to wrap securely around a clod of clay
--the closest approach to a stone to be found in all the lowlands
of Louisiana--and toss it over into the enemy's works. At the same
time the good news was sped by wire and by staff officers to the
commanders of divisions. At noon a national salute was to be fired
and all the bands were to play the national airs; but the men could
not wait for these slow formalities. No sooner was the first loud
shout of rejoicing heard from the trenches, where for so many weary
nights and days there had been little to rejoice at, than by a sort
of instinct the men of both armies seem to have divined what had
happened. From man to man, from company to company, from regiment
to regiment, the word passed, and as it passed, once more the cheers
of the soldiers of the Union rang out, and again the forest echoed
with the strains of "The Star-Spangled Banner" from the long-silent
bands. Many a rough cheek, unused to tears, was wet that morning,
and the sound of laughter was heard from many lips that had long
been set in silence; but when the first thrill was spent, it gave
way to a deep-drawn sigh of relief. The work was done; all the
toil and suffering was over. Nor was this feeling restricted to
the outside of the parapet; the defenders felt it even more strongly.
At first they received the news with real or affected incredulity.
An officer of an Arkansas regiment, to whom was first handed the
little scrap of tissue paper on which the whole chapter of history
was told in seven words, acknowledged the complement by calling
back, "This is another damned Yankee lie!" Yet before many minutes
were over the firing had died away, save here and there a scattering
exception, although peremptory orders were even given to secure
its renewal. In spite of everything the men began to mingle and
to exchange story for story, gibe for gibe, coffee for corn-beer,
and when night fell there can have been few men in either army but
believed the fighting was over.
That evening Gardner summoned his commanders to meet him in council.
Among them all there was but one thought--the end had come.
Shortly after half-past twelve the notes of a bugle were heard on
the Plains Store road sounding the signal, "Cease firing." A few
seconds later an officer with a small escort approached, bearing
a lantern swung upon a long pole, with a white handkerchief tied
beneath it, to serve as a flag of truce. At the outpost of Charles
J. Paine's brigade the flag was halted and its purpose ascertained.
This was announced to be the delivery of an important despatch from
Gardner to Banks. Thus it was that a few minutes after one o'clock
the hoofs of two horses were heard at the same instant at headquarters,
yet each with a sound of its own that seemed in keeping with its
story. One, a slow and measured trot, told of duty done and stables
near; the other, quick and nervous, spoke of pressing news. Two
officers dismounted; the clang of their sabres was heard together;
together they made their way to the tent where the writer of these
lines lay awake and listening. One was Captain Walker, with the
fuse, the other was Lieutenant Orton S. Clark, of the 116th New
York, then attached to the staff of Charles J. Paine. The long
envelope he handed in felt rough to the touch; the light of a match
showed its color a dull gray; every inch of it said, "Surrender."
When opened it was found to contain a request for an official
assurance as to the truth of the report that Vicksburg had surrendered.
If true, Gardner asked for a cessation of hostilities with a view
to consider terms. At a quarter-past one Banks replied, conveying
an exact copy of so much of Grant's despatch as related the
capitulation of Vicksburg. He told when and how the despatch had
come, and wound up by regretting that he could not consent to a
truce for the purpose indicated. In order to avoid all chance of
needless excitement or disturbance, as well as of the premature
publication of the news, the Adjutant-General carried this despatch
himself, and, accompanied by Lieutenant Clark, as well as, at his
own request, by General Stone, rode first to Augur's headquarters
to acquaint him with the news and to borrow a bugler, and then to
the outposts to meet the Confederate flag of truce. A blast upon
the bugle brought back the little party of horsemen, with the
lantern swaying from the pole; but it was nearly daylight before
they again returned with Gardner's reply. Meanwhile, right and
left word had been quietly passed to the pickets to cease firing.
In his second letter Gardner said:
"Having defended this position so long as I deem my duty requires,
I am willing to surrender to you, and will appoint a commission of
three officers to meet a similar commission, appointed by yourself,
at nine o'clock this morning, for the purpose of agreeing upon and
drawing up the terms of surrender, and for that purpose I ask a
cessation of hostilities. Will you please designate a point outside
of my breastworks where a meeting shall be held for this purpose?"
To this Banks answered at 4:30 A.M.:
"I have designated Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone, Colonel
Henry W. Birge, and Lieutenant-Colonel Richard B. Irwin as the
officers to meet the commission appointed by you. They will meet
your officers at the hour designated at a point near where the flag
of truce was received this morning. I will direct that all active
hostilities shall entirely cease on my part until further notice
for the purpose stated."
The division commanders, as well as the commanders of the upper
and lower fleets, were at once notified, and at six o'clock Captain
Walker was sent to find Admiral Farragut, wherever he might be,
and to deliver to him despatches conveying the news of the surrender,
outlining Banks's plans for moving against Taylor in La Fourche,
and urging the Admiral to send all the light-draught gunboats at
once to Berwick Bay.
Banks meant to march Weitzel directly to the nearest landing, which
was within the lines of Port Hudson, as soon as the formal capitulation
should be accomplished, and to send Grover after him as fast as
steamboats could be found. This called for many arrangements; the
occupying force had also to be seen to; and finally, it was necessary
that the starving garrison should be fed. Colonel Irwin was
therefore relieved, at his own request, from duty as one of the
commissioners, and Brigadier-General Dwight was named in his stead.
This drew an objection from Weitzel, who naturally felt that there
were claims of service as well as of rank that might have been
considered before those of the temporary commander of the second
division; however, it was too late to make any further change, and
when Banks offered to name Weitzel, whose protest had been not for
himself but for his brigades, as the officer to receive Gardner's
sword, the offer was declined. Among the officers of the navy,
too, especially those of higher grades, great cause of offense was
felt that, after all their services in the siege, they were left
unrepresented in the honors of the surrender. This feeling was
natural enough; yet before determining how far the complaints based
on it were just, it is necessary to consider how important was
every hour, almost every moment, with reference to the operations
against Taylor, while three and a half hours were required to make
the journey between headquarters and the upper fleet, and four and
a half hours to reach the lower fleet. Moreover, the Admiral had
gone to New Orleans the evening before.
At nine the commissioners met under the shade of the beautiful
trees, nearly on the spot where O'Brien had rested among his men
while waiting for the word on the 27th of May. On the Confederate
side the commissioners were Colonel William R. Miles, commanding
the right wing of the garrison, Colonel I. G. W. Steedman, of the
1st Alabama, commanding the left wing, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Marshall J. Smith, Chief of Heavy Artillery.
Among those thus brought together there was more than one gentleman
of marked conversational talent; the day was pleasant, the shade
grateful, and, to one side at least, the refreshment not less so;
and thus the time passed pleasantly until two o'clock, when the
commissioners signed, with but a single change, the articles that
had been drawn up for them and in readiness since six in the morning.
The alteration was occasioned by the great and unexpected length
to which the conference had been protracted. Five o'clock in the
afternoon had been named as the time when the besiegers were to
occupy the works; this had to be changed to seven o'clock on the
morning of the 9th. The terms, which will be found in full in the
Appendix, were those of an unconditional surrender. Gardner, who
was in waiting conveniently near, at once approved the articles,
and at half-past two they were completed by the signature of Banks.
A few minutes later the long wagon-train, loaded with provisions,
that had been standing for hours in the Plains Store road, was
signalled to go forward. The cheers that welcomed the train, as
it wound its way up the long-untravelled road and through the
disused sally-port, were perhaps not so loud as those with which
the besiegers had greeted the news from Vicksburg, yet they were
not less enthusiastic. From this moment the men of the two armies,
and to some extent the officers, mingled freely.
Andrews was designated to receive the surrender, and from each
division two of the best regiments, with one from Weitzel's brigade,
were told off to occupy the place.
Punctually at seven o'clock on the morning of the 9th of July the
column of occupation entered the sally-port on the Jackson road.
At its head rode Andrews with his staff. Next, in the post of
honor, came the stormers with Birge at their head, then the 75th
New York of Weitzel's brigade, followed by the 116th New York and
the 2d Louisiana of Augur's division, the 12th Maine, and the 13th
Connecticut of Grover's division, the 6th Michigan and the 14th
Maine of Dwight's division, and 4th Wisconsin and the 8th New
Hampshire of Paine's.(3) With the column was Duryea's battery.
The 38th Massachusetts was at first designated for this coveted
honor, but lost it through some necessary changes due to the intended
movement down the river. Weitzel, with his own brigade under
Thomas, on the way to the place of embarkation, closely followed
the column and witnessed the ceremonies.
These were simple and short. The Confederate troops were drawn up
in line, Gardner at their head, every officer in his place. The
right of the line rested on the edge of the open plain south of
the railway station; the left extended toward the village. At the
word "Ground arms" from their tried commander, followed by the
command of execution from the bugles, every Confederate soldier
bowed his head and laid his musket on the ground in token of
submission, while Gardner himself tendered his sword to Andrews,
who, in a few complimentary words, waived its acceptance. At the
same instant the Stars and Bars, the colors of the Confederacy,
were hauled down from the flagstaff, where they had so long waived
defiance; a detachment of sailors from the naval batteries sprang
to the halyards and rapidly ran up the flag of the United States;
the guns of Duryea's battery saluted the colors; the garrison filed
off as prisoners of war, and all was over.
The last echo of the salute to the colors had hardly died away when
Weitzel, at the head of the First Division, now for the first time
united, marched off to the left, and began embarking on board the
transports to go against Taylor.
With the place were taken 6,340 prisoners of war, of whom 405 were
officers and 5,935 enlisted men. The men were paroled with the
exact observance of all the forms prescribed by the cartel then in
form; yet the paroles were immediately declared void by the
Confederate government, and the men were required to return to duty
in the ranks. The officers, in accordance with the retaliatory
orders of the period, had to be kept in captivity; they were,
however, given the choice of their place of confinement. About
211 elected to go to Memphis, and were accordingly sent up the
river a few days after the surrender, the remainder were sent to
New Orleans with instructions to Emory to keep them safely under
guard in some commodious house or houses, to be selected by him,
and to make them as comfortable as practicable.(4) There were also
captured 20 pieces of light artillery and 31 pieces of field
artillery; of these 12 heavy guns and 30 light guns were in
comparatively good order.
The total losses of the Corps during the siege were 45 officers
and 663 men killed, 191 officers and 3,145 men wounded, 12 officers
and 307 men captured or missing; in all, 4,363. Very few prisoners
were taken by the Confederates, and little doubt remains that a
large proportion of those set down as captured or missing in reality
perished.
Of the Confederate losses no complete return was ever made. A
partial return, without date, signed by the chief surgeon, shows
176 killed, 447 wounded, total 632. In this report the number of
those that had died in the hospital is included among the wounded.
Nor does this total include the losses at Plains Store, which,
according to the surgeon's return, were 12 killed and 36 wounded,
or, according to Colonel Miles's report, 8 killed, 23 wounded, 58
missing; in all, 89. Major C. M. Jackson, who acted as assistant
inspector-general under Gardner, and, according to his own account,
came out through the lines of investment about an hour after the
surrender, reported to Johnston that the total casualties during
the siege were 200 killed, between 300 and 400 wounded, and 200
died from sickness.
(1) The figures here given do not agree with those of the monthly
and tri-monthly returns for May and June. These returns are,
however, simply the returns for March carried forward, owing to
the impossibility of collecting and collating the reports of
regiments, brigades, and divisions during active operations.
(2) Colonel Provence, in his report, claims 7 prisoners, and says:
"The enemy fired but once, and then at a great distance." (Official
Records, vol. xxvi., part I., p. 150.)
(3) No record exists of these details, but the list here given is
believed to be nearly correct.
(4) As evidence of the considerate manner in which these gentlemen
were treated, see the interesting article, "Plain Living on Johnson's
Island," by Lieutenant Horace Carpenter, 4th Louisiana, printed in
the _Century_ for March, 1891, page 706.