THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE.
Banks at once ordered up the ammunition and the stores from the
depot at Riley's, near the headquarters of the day before, and
early on the morning of the 28th of May established his headquarters
in tents at Young's, in rear of the centre, and began his arrangements
to reduce Port Hudson by gradual approaches. At six o'clock in
the morning he sent a flag of truce to Gardner, from Augur's front
on the Plains Store road, bearing a request for a suspension of
hostilities until two o'clock in the afternoon, to permit the
removal of the dead and wounded. To this Gardner at once refused
to agree unless Banks would agree to withdraw at all points to a
distance of eight hundred yards. He also demanded that the fleet
should drop down out of range. Banks was unable to consent. A
long correspondence followed, twelve letters in all, crossing and
recrossing, to the utter confusion of time. At length, shortly
after half-past three o'clock, Banks received Gardner's assent to
an armistice extending till seven o'clock. The conditions were
that the besiegers were to send to the lines of the defence, by
unarmed parties, such of the Confederate killed as remained unburied,
and such of their wounded as had not already been picked up and
sent to the rear. The killed and wounded of the Union army, lying
between their lines and the Confederate works, were to be cared
for in the same way.
Arnold was ordered to bring up the siege train, manned by the 1st
Indiana heavy artillery, and Houston to provide entrenching tools
and siege materials. When all the siege artillery was in position
there were forty pieces, of which six were 8-inch sea-coast howitzers
on siege carriages, eight 24-pounders, seven 30-pounder Parrotts,
four 6-inch rifles, four 9-inch Dahlgren guns, four 8-inch mortars,
three 10-inch mortars, and four 13-inch mortars. To these were
added twelve light batteries of sixty pieces, namely, six 6-pounder
Sawyer rifles, two 10-pounder Parrotts, twenty-six 12-pounder
Napoleons, two 12-pounder howitzers, twelve 3-inch rifles, and
twelve 20-pounder Parrotts. The Dahlgren guns were served by a
detachment of fifty-one men from the _Richmond_ and seventeen from
the _Essex_, under Lieutenant-Commander Edward Terry, with Ensign
Robert P. Swann, Ensign E. M. Shepard, and Master's Mates William
R. Cox and Edmund L. Bourne for chiefs of the gun divisions.
In the course of the next few days the eight regiments that had
been left on the Teche and the Atchafalaya rejoined the army before
Port Hudson, coming by way of Brashear, Algiers, and the river.
This gave to the cavalry under Grierson one more regiment, the 41st
Massachusetts, now mounted, and henceforth known as the 3d
Massachusetts cavalry, the three troops of the old 2d battalion
being merged in it; Weitzel got back the 114th New York; Paine
recovered the 4th Massachusetts and the 16th New Hampshire of
Ingraham's brigade, now practically broken up; and Grover the 22d
Maine and 90th New York of Dwight's brigade, the 52d Massachusetts
of Kimball's, and the 26th Maine of Birge's, while losing the 41st
Massachusetts by its conversion into a mounted regiment. The 16th
New Hampshire, however, had suffered so severely during its six
week's confinement in the heart of the pestilential swamp that it
was reduced to a mere skeleton, without strength either numerical
or physical. It was easy to see that officers and men alike were
suffering from some aggravated form of hepatic disorder, due to
malarial poison. Many were added to the sick-report every day.
Few that went to the regimental or general hospital returned to
duty, while of the men called well all were yellow, emaciated, and
restless, or so drowsy that the sentries were found asleep on their
posts at noonday. This unfortunate regiment was therefore taken
from the front and set to guard the general ammunition depot, near
headquarters. Without being once engaged in battle, so that it
had not a single gunshot wound to report, the 16th New Hampshire
suffered a loss by disease during its seven months' service in
Louisiana of 5 officers and 216 men--in all, 221; and nearly the
whole of this occurred in the last two months. This regiment was
replaced in Paine's division by the 28th Connecticut, from
Pensacola.
Dwight was now given the command of Sherman's division, relieving
Nickerson, who had assumed command the morning after the assault
of the 27th. Dow being disabled by his wounds, his brigade fell
to Clark. The 2d Louisiana was transferred from Dudley's brigade
to Chapin's, bringing Charles J. Paine in command. Halbert E.
Paine's division was withdrawn from the earlier formation of the
right wing under Weitzel, and was established in position on Grover's
left, covering the Jackson road and the second position of Duryea's
battery at No. 12. Grover was placed in command, from the afternoon
of the 27th, of the whole right wing, but Dwight's brigade, under
Morgan, remained with Weitzel as part of a temporary division under
his command, Thomas retaining the command of Weitzel's brigade.
Finally, the 162d New York and the 175th New York were temporarily
taken from Paine and lent to Dwight, who, directly after the 14th
of June, united them with the 28th Maine of Sherman's division to
form a temporary 2d brigade. At the same time he transferred the
6th Michigan to Nickerson's brigade, evidently meaning to take the
command of the 1st brigade from Clark; but these arrangements were
promptly set aside by orders from headquarters. The left wing,
comprising Augur's division and Sherman's, now Dwight's, was placed
under the command of Augur.
Along the whole front the troops now held substantially the advanced
positions they had gained on the 27th of May. This shortened the
line, and, as it was on the whole better arranged and the connections
and communications better, Augur took ground a little to the left
and held, with Charles J. Paine's brigade, a part of the field that
had been in Sherman's front on the 27th; while Dwight, in closing
up and drawing in his left flank, moved nearer to the river and
covered the road leading in a southerly direction from the Confederate
works around the eastern slope of Mount Pleasant and past Troth's
house.
The cavalry, being of no further use to the divisions, but rather
an encumbrance upon them, was massed, under Grierson, behind the
centre, and assigned to the duty of guarding the rear, the depots,
and the communications against the incursions of the Confederate
cavalry, under Logan, known to be hovering between Port Hudson and
Clinton, and supposed to be from 1,500 to 2,000 strong. Logan's
actual force at this time was about 1,200 effective. Grierson had
about 1,700, including his own regiment, the 6th Illinois, the
7th Illinois, Colonel Edward Prince, a detachment of the 1st
Louisiana, the 3d Massachusetts cavalry, and the 14th New York.
As fast as the engineers were able to survey the ground and the
working parties to open the roads, Arnold and Houston chose with
great care the positions for the siege batteries, and heavy details
were soon at work upon them, as well as upon the long line of
rifle-pits, connecting the batteries and practically forming the
first parallel of the siege works. The positions of some of these
batteries, especially on the left, were afterward changed; but as
finally constructed and mounted, they began at the north, near the
position of the colored regiments on the right bank of Foster's
Creek, and extended, at a distance from the Confederate works
varying from six hundred to twelve hundred yards, to the Mount
Pleasant road, across which was planted siege battery No. 21. The
first position of siege battery No. 20 is marked "old 20," and the
three formidable batteries on the extreme left, Nos. 22, 23, and
24, were not established till later, the attack of the Confederate
works in their front being at first left to the guns of the fleet.
Two epaulements for field artillery were thrown up on either side
of the road at Foster's Creek to command the passage of the stream,
but no siege guns were mounted there. The extreme right of the
siege batteries was at No. 2.
While all eyes were turned upon the siege works and every nerve
strained for their completion, Logan's presence in the rear, though
at no time so hurtful as might fairly have been expected, was a
continual source of anxiety and annoyance. To find out just what
force he had and what he was about, Grierson moved toward Clinton
on the morning of the 3d of June with the 6th and 7th Illinois,
the old 2d Massachusetts battalion, now merged in the 3d, a squadron
of the 1st Louisiana, two companies of the 4th Wisconsin, mounted,
and one section of Nims's battery. Grierson took the road by
Jackson, and, when within three miles of that place, sent Godfrey,
with 200 men of the Massachusetts and Louisiana cavalry, to ride
through the town, while the main column went direct to Clinton.
Godfrey pushing on briskly through Jackson, captured and paroled,
after the useless fashion of the time, a number of prisoners, and
rejoined the column two miles beyond. When eight miles west of
Clinton, Grierson heard a report that Logan had gone that morning
toward Port Hudson, but pushing on toward Clinton, after crossing
the Comite Grierson found Logan's advance and drove it back on the
main body, strongly posted on Pretty Creek. A three hours' engagement
followed, resulting in Grierson's retirement to Port Hudson, with
a loss of 8 killed, 28 wounded, and 15 missing; 3 of the dead and
7 of the wounded falling into the hands of the enemy. Logan reports
his loss as 20 killed and wounded, and claims 40 prisoners. Among
the killed, unfortunately, was the young cavalry officer, Lieutenant
Solon A. Perkins, of the 3d Massachusetts, whose skill and daring
had commended itself to the notice of Weitzel during the early
operations in La Fourche, and whose long service without proper
rank had drawn out the remark: "This Perkins is a splendid officer,
and he deserves promotion as much as any officer I ever saw."
Banks determined to chastise Logan for this; accordingly, at daylight
on the morning of the 5th of June, Paine took his old brigade under
Fearing, with the 52d Massachusetts, the 91st New York, and two
sections of Duryea's battery, and preceded by Grierson's cavalry,
marched on Clinton by way of Olive Branch and the plank road. That
night Paine encamped at Redwood creek; on the 6th he made a short
march to the Comite, distant nine miles from his objective, and
there halted till midnight. Then, after a night march, the whole
force entered Clinton at daylight on the morning of the 7th, only
to find that Logan, forewarned, had gone toward Jackson. Then
Paine countermarched to the Comite, and, remaining till sunset,
marched that evening to Redwood, and, there going into bivouac, at
two o'clock on the following morning, the 8th of June, returned to
the lines before Port Hudson. On this fruitless expedition the
men and horses suffered severely from the heat, and there were many
cases of sunstroke.
By the 1st of June the artillery and the sharp-shooters of the
besieged had obtained so complete a mastery over the guns of the
defenders, that on the whole line these were practically silent,
if not silenced. In part, no doubt, this is to be ascribed to a
desire on the part of the Confederate artillerists to reserve their
ammunition for the emergency, yet something was also due to the
effect of the Union fire, by which, in the first week, twelve heavy
guns were disabled. The 10-inch columbiad in water battery 4 was
dismounted at long range. This gun was known to the Union soldiers,
and perhaps to the Confederates first, as the "Lady Davis," and
great was the dread awakened by the deep bass roar and the wail of
the big shells as they came rolling down the narrow pathway, or
searched the ravines where the men lay massed. The fire of the
navy also did great damage among the heavy batteries along the
river front. When the siege batteries were nearly ready, on the
evening of the 10th of June, Banks ordered a feigned attack at
midnight by skirmishers along the whole front, for the purpose, as
stated in the orders, "of harassing the enemy, of inducing him to
bring forward and expose his artillery, acquiring a knowledge of
the ground before the enemy's front, and of favoring the operations
of pioneers who may be sent forward to remove obstructions if
necessary." None of these objects can be said to have been
accomplished, nor was any advantage gained beyond a slight advance
of the lines, at a single point on Weitzel's front, by the 131st
New York. The full loss in this night's reconnoissance is not
known; in Weitzel's own brigade, there were 2 killed, 41 wounded,
6 missing--in all, 49; in Morgan's, a partial report accounts for
12 wounded and 59 missing, including two companies of the 22d Maine
that became entangled and for the moment lost in the ravines.
On the evening of the 12th of June, all arrangements being nearly
complete, Banks ordered a vigorous bombardment to be begun the next
morning. Punctually at a quarter past eleven on the morning of
the 13th, every gun and mortar of the army and navy that could be
brought to bear upon the defences of Port Hudson opened fire, and
for a full hour kept up a furious cannonade, limited only by the
endurance of the Union guns and gunners, for the Confederates hardly
ventured to reply, save at first feebly. When the bombardment was
at its fiercest, more than one shell in a second could be seen to
fall and explode within the narrow circuit of the defences visible
from the headquarters on the field. The defenders had three heavy
guns dismounted during the day, yet suffered little loss in men,
for long before this nearly the whole garrison had accustomed
themselves to take refuge in their caves and "gopher-holes" at the
first sound of Union cannon, and to await its cessation as a signal
to return to their posts at the parapet. They were not always so
fortunate, however, for more than once it happened that three or
four men were killed by the bursting of a single shell.
When the hour was up the cannonade ended as suddenly as it began,
and profound silence followed close on the intolerable din. Then
Banks sent a flag of truce summoning the garrison to surrender in
these words: "Respect for the usages of war and a desire to avoid
unnecessary sacrifice of life, impose on me the necessity of formally
demanding the surrender of the garrison at Port Hudson. I am not
unconscious, in making this demand, that the garrison is capable
of continuing a vigorous and gallant defence. The events that have
transpired during the pending investment exhibit in the commander
and garrison a spirit of constancy and courage that, in a different
cause, would be universally regarded as heroism. But I know the
extremities to which they are reduced. . . . I desire to avoid
unnecessary slaughter, and I therefore demand the immediate surrender
of the garrison, subject to such conditions only as are imposed by
the usages of civilized warfare." To this Gardner replied: "My
duty requires me to defend this position, and therefore I decline
to surrender."
In the evening the generals of division met in council at headquarters.
In anticipation of what was to come, Dudley had already been ordered
to send the 50th Massachusetts, and Charles J. Paine the 48th
Massachusetts, to Dwight; and Dudley himself, with the 161st and
174th New York, was to report to Grover. This left under Augur's
immediate command only five regiments of his division, namely, one,
the 30th Massachusetts, of Dudley's brigade, and four of C. J.
Paine's. Shortly before midnight a general assault was ordered
for the following morning. At a quarter before three Augur was to
open a heavy fire of artillery on his front, following it up half
and hour later by a feigned attack of skirmishers. Dwight was to
take two regiments, and, with a pair of suborned deserters for
guides, was to try and find an entrance on the extreme left of the
works near the river. But the main attack was to be made by Grover
on the priest-cap. Its position is shown on the map at XV. and
XVI., and the approach was to be from the cover of the winding
ravine, near the second position of Duryea's battery, at No. 12.
The artillery cross-fire at this point was to begin at three o'clock,
and was to cease at a signal from Grover. At half-past three the
skirmishers were to attack. The general formation of each of the
two columns of attack had been settled in orders issued from
headquarters on the morning of the 11th. Each column, assumed to
consist of about 2,000 men, was to be preceded and covered by 300
skirmishers; immediately behind the skirmishers were to be seventy
pioneers, carrying thirty-five axes, eighteen shovels, ten pickaxes,
two handsaws, and two hatchets; next was to come the forlorn hope,
or storming party, of 300 men, each carrying a bag stuffed with
cotton; following the stormers, thirty-four men were to carry
the balks and chesses to form a bridge over the ditch, in order
to facilitate the passage of the artillery, as well as of the
men. The main assaulting column was to follow, marching in
lines-of-battle, as far as the nature of the ground would permit,
which, as it happened, was not far. The field-artillery was to go
with the assaulting column, each battery having its own pioneers.
To the cavalry, meanwhile, was assigned the work of picketing and
protecting the rear, as well as of holding the telegraph road
leading out of Port Hudson toward Bayou Sara, by which it was
thought the garrison might attempt to escape, on finding their
lines broken through, or even to avoid the blow.
As was the uniform custom during the siege, all watches at division
and brigade headquarters were set at nine o'clock, by a telegraphic
signal, to agree with the adjutant-general's watch.
These final orders for the assault bear the hour of 11.30 P.M.
This was in fact the moment at which the earliest copies were sent
out by the aides-de-camp, held in readiness to carry them. There
were seven hundred and fifty words to be written, and eleven o'clock
had already passed when the council listened to the reading of the
drafts and broke up. From the lateness of the hour, as well as
from the distance and the darkness of the night, it resulted that
one o'clock came before the last orders were in the hands of the
troops that were to execute them. Many arrangements had still to
be carried out and many of the detachments had still to be moved
over long distances and by obscure ways to the positions assigned
to them. In some instances all that was left of the night was thus
occupied, and it was broad daylight before every thing was ready.
A dense fog prevailed in the early morning of Sunday, the 14th of
June, strangely veiling, while it lasted, even the sound of the
big guns, so that in places it was unheard a hundred yards in the
rear. Punctually at the hour fixed the cannonade opened. It was
an hour later, that is to say, about four o'clock, when the first
attack was launched.
For the chief assault Grover had selected Paine's division and had
placed the main body of his own division with Weitzel's brigade,
in close support. Paine determined to lead the attack himself.
Across his front as skirmishers he deployed the 4th Wisconsin, now
again dismounted, and the 8th New Hampshire. The 4th Massachusetts
was told off to follow the skirmishers with improvised hand-grenades
made of 6-pounder shells. Next the 38th Massachusetts and the 53d
Massachusetts were formed into line of battle. At the head of the
infantry column the 31st Massachusetts, likewise deployed, carried
cotton bags, to fill the ditch. The rest of Gooding's brigade
followed, next came Fearing's, then Ingraham's under Ferris. In
rear of the column was posted the artillery under Nims. At a point
on the crest of the ridge, ninety yards distant from the left face
of the priest-cap, Paine's advance was checked. Then Paine, who
had previously gone along the front of every regiment, addressing
to each a few words of encouragement and of preparation for the
work, passed afoot from the head of the column to the front of the
skirmish line, and exerting to the full his sonorous voice, gave
the order to the column to go in. At the word the men sprang
forward, but almost as they did so, the Confederates behind the
parapet in their front, with fairly level aim and at point-blank
range, poured upon the head of the column a deadly volley. Many
fell at this first discharge; among them, unfortunately, the gallant
Paine himself, his thigh crushed by a rifle-ball. Some of the men
of the 4th Wisconsin, of the 8th New Hampshire, and of the 38th
Massachusetts gained the ditch, and a few even climbed the parapet,
but of these nearly all were made prisoners. The rear of the column
fell back to the cover of the hill, while all those who had gained
the crest were forced to lie there, exposed to a pitiless fire of
sharp-shooters and the scarcely more endurable rays of the burning
sun of Louisiana, until night came and brought relief. In this
unfortunate situation the sufferings of the wounded became so
unbearable, and appealed so powerfully to the sympathy of their
comrades, that many lives were risked and some lost in the attempt
to alleviate the thirst, at least, of these unfortunates. Two men,
quite of their own accord, took a stretcher and tried to reach the
point where Paine lay, but the attempt was unsuccessful, and cost
both of them their lives. These heroes were E. P. Woods, of Company
E of the 8th New Hampshire, and John Williams, of Company D, 31st
Massachusetts. Not less nobly, Patrick H. Cohen, a private soldier
of the 133d New York, himself lying wounded on the crest, cut a
canteen from the body of a dead comrade and by lengthening the
strap succeeded in tossing it within reach of his commander; this
probably preserved Paine's life, for unquestionably many of the
more seriously hurt perished from the heat and from thirst on that
fatal day.
It was about seven o'clock, and the fog had lifted, when Weitzel
advanced to the attack on the right face of the priest-cap. The
12th Connecticut and the 75th New York of his own brigade were
deployed to the left and right as skirmishers to cover the head of
the column. Two regiments of Morgan's brigade, loosely deployed,
followed the skirmishers; in front the 91st New York, with
hand-grenades, and next the 24th Connecticut, every man carrying two
cotton bags weighing thirty pounds each. In immediate support came
the remainder of Weitzel's brigade in column of regiments, in the
order of the 8th Vermont, 114th New York, and 160th New York,
followed by the main body of Morgan's brigade. Birge was in close
support and Kimball in reserve. Finally, in the rear, as in Paine's
formation, was massed the artillery of the division.
Toward the north face of the priest-cap the only approach was by
the irregular, but for some distance nearly parallel, gorges cut
out from the soft clay of the bluffs by Sandy Creek and one of its
many arms. The course of these streams being toward the Confederate
works, the hollows grew deeper and the banks steeper at every step.
At most the creeks were but two hundred yards apart, and the ridge
that separated them gave barely standing room. Within a few feet
of the breastworks the smaller stream and its ravine turned sharply
toward the north and served as a formidable ditch until they united
with the main stream and ravine below the bastion. This larger
ravine near its outlet and the natural ditch throughout its length
were mercilessly swept by the fire of the bastion on the right,
the breastworks in front, and the priest-cap on the left. The
smaller ravine led toward the south to the crest from which Paine's
men had recoiled, where their wounded and their dead lay thick,
and behind which the survivors were striving to restore the broken
formations.
Weitzel therefore chose the main ravine. Bearing to the right from
the Jackson road, the men moved by the flank and cautiously, availing
themselves of every advantage afforded by the timber or the
irregularities of the ground, until they gained the crest of the
ridge at points varying from twenty to fifty yards from the works
near the north face of the priest-cap. In advancing to this position
the column came under fire immediately on filing out of the ravine
and the wood in front of the position of battery No. 9. Then, in
such order as they happened to be, they went forward with a rush
and a cheer, but beyond the crest indicated few men ever got. From
this position it was impossible either to advance or retire until
night came.
At the appointed hour Dwight sent the 6th Michigan, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Bacon, and the 14th Maine, to the extreme left
to make an attempt in that quarter, the arrangements for which have
been already described; but either Dwight gave his orders too late,
or the column mistook the path, or else the difficulties were really
greater than they had been thought beforehand or than they afterward
seemed, for nothing came of it. Then recalling this detachment to
the Mount Pleasant road, Dwight tried to advance in that direction.
The 14th Maine was sent back to its brigade and Clark deployed his
own regiment, the 6th Michigan, as skirmishers, supported by the
128th New York, now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel James Smith.
The 15th New Hampshire followed and the 26th Connecticut, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Selden, brought up the rear. These two
regiments went forward in column of companies on the main road,
but as the Confederates immediately opened a heavy artillery fire
upon the head of the column, they had to be deployed. However,
the ground, becoming rapidly narrower, did not long permit of an
advance in this order, so that it soon became necessary to ploy
once more into column. About 350 yards from the outer works the
Mount Pleasant road enters and crosses a deep ravine by a bridge,
then destroyed. The hollow was completely choked with felled
timber, through which, under the heavy fire of musketry and artillery,
it was impossible to pass; so here the brigade stayed till night
enabled it to retire. Nickerson's brigade supported the movement
of Clark's, but without becoming seriously engaged. Thus ended
Dwight's movement. It can hardly be described as an assault, as
an attack, or even as a serious attempt to accomplish any valuable
result; yet indirectly it was the means of gaining, and at a small
cost, the greatest, if not the only real, advantage achieved that
day, for it gave Dwight possession of the rough hill, the true
value of which was then for the first time perceived, and on the
commanding position of its northern slope was presently mounted
the powerful array of siege artillery that overlooked and controlled
the land and water batteries on the lower flank of the Confederate
defences.
Of Augur's operations in the centre, it is enough to say that the
feigned attack assigned to this portion of the line was made briskly
and in good order at the appointed time, without great loss.
The result of the day may be summed up as a bloody repulse; beholding
the death and maiming of so many of the bravest and best of the
officers and men, the repulse may be even termed a disaster. In
the whole service of the Nineteenth Army Corps darkness never shut
in upon a gloomier field. Men went about their work in a silence
stronger than words.
On this day 21 officers and 182 men were killed, 72 officers and
1,245 men were wounded, 6 officers and 180 men missing; besides
these, 13 were reported as killed, 84 as wounded, and 2 as missing
without distinguishing between officers and men, thus making a
total of 216 killed, 1,401 wounded, 188 missing--in all, 1,805.
Among the wounded many had received mortal hurts, while of the
missing, as in the first assault, many must now be set down as
killed.
Paine, as we have seen, fell seriously hurt while in the very act
of leading his division to the assault. Nine days earlier he had
received his well-earned commission as brigadier-general. He was
taken to New Orleans, and there nine days later, at the Hôtel de
Dieu Hospital, after vain efforts to save the limb, the surgeons
performed amputation of the thigh. A few days after the surrender,
in order to avoid the increasing dangers of the climate, Paine was
sent to his home in Wisconsin on the captured steamer _Starlight_,
the first boat that ascended the river. Thus the Nineteenth Corps
lost one of its bravest and most promising commanders, one who had
earned the affection of his men, not less through respect for his
character than by his unfailing sympathy and care in all situations,
and who was commended to the confidence and esteem of his associates
and superiors by talent and devotion of the first order joined to
every quality that stamps a man among men.
The fiery Holcomb, wounded in the assault of the 27th, yet refusing
to leave his duty to another, fell early on this fatal morning at
the head of his regiment and brigade, in the first moment of the
final charge of Weitzel's men. This was another serious loss, for
Holcomb had that disposition that may, for want of a better term,
be described as the fighting character. All soldiers know it and
respect it, and every wise general, seeing it anywhere among his
officers, shuts his eyes to many a blemish and pardons many a fault
that would be severely visited in another; yet in Holcomb there
was nothing to overlook or forgive. As he was the most prominent
and the most earnest of the few officers of the line that to the
last remained eager for the fatal assault, so he was among the
earliest and noblest of its victims.
Mortally wounded at the head of Weitzel's brigade fell Colonel
Elisha B. Smith, of the 114th New York. Barely recovered from a
serious illness, his spirit could not longer brook the restraint
of the hospital at New Orleans with the knowledge that his men were
engaged with the enemy. Thomas was ill and had received a slight
wound of the scalp; this brought Smith to the head of the brigade;
his fall devolved the command upon Lieutenant-Colonel Van Petten,
for though Thomas, unable to bear the torture inflicted upon him
by the sounds of battle, rose from his sick-bed and resumed the
command, his weakness again overcame him when the day's work was
done.
No regiment at Port Hudson approached the 8th New Hampshire in the
number and severity of its losses, no brigade suffered so much as
Paine's, to which this regiment belonged, and no division so much
as Emory's, under the command of Paine. On this day, Fearing
commanded the brigade, and later the division, and Lull having
fallen in the previous assault, the regiment went into action 217
strong, led by Captain William M. Barrett; of this number, 122, or
56 per cent., were killed or wounded. On the 27th of May, out of
298 engaged, the regiment lost 124, or 41 per cent.
Next to the 8th New Hampshire on the fatal roll stands the 4th
Wisconsin. This noble regiment, at all times an honor to the
service and to its State, whence came so many splendid battalions,
was a shining monument to the virtue of steady, conscientious work
and strict discipline applied to good material. Bean had been
instantly killed by a sharp-shooter on the 29th of May; the regiment
went into action on the 14th of June 220 strong, commanded by
Captain Webster P. Moore; of these, 140 fell, or 63 per cent. In
the first assault, however, it had fared better, its losses numbering
but 60.
The eccentric Currie, who came to the service from the British
army, with the lustre of the Crimea still about him, rather brightened
than dimmed by time and distance, fell severely wounded on the same
fatal crest. He was struck down at the head of his regiment, boldly
leading his men and urging them forward with the quaint cry of "Get
on, lads!" so well known to English soldiers, yet so unfamiliar to
all Americans as to draw many a smile, even in that grim moment,
from those who heard it.
To the cannonade that preceded the assault and announced it to the
enemy must be attributed not only the failure but a great part of
the loss. The wearied Confederates were asleep behind the breastworks
when the roar of the Union artillery broke the stillness of the
morning, and gave them time to make ready. Such was their extremity
that in Grover's front they burned their last caps in repelling
the final assault, and, for the time, were able to replenish only
from the pouches of the fallen.
Under cover of night all the wounded that were able to walk or
crawl made their way to places of safety in the rear; while,
disregarding the incessant fire of the sharp-shooters, heavy details
and volunteer parties of stretcher-bearers, plying their melancholy
trade, carried the wounded with gentle care to the hospitals and
the dead swiftly to the long trenches. The proportion of killed
and mortally wounded, already unusually heavy, was increased by
the exposure and privations of the long day, while many, whom it
was impossible to find or reach during the night, succumbed sooner
or later during the next forty-eight hours. For although when, on
the morning of the 15th, Banks sent a flag of truce asking leave
to send in medical and hospital supplies for the comfort of the
wounded of both armies, Gardner promptly assented, and in his reply
called attention to the condition of the dead and wounded before
the breastworks, yet it was not until the evening of the 16th that
Banks could bring himself to ask for a suspension of hostilities
for the relief of the suffering and the burial of the slain. But
three days and two nights had already passed; most of the hurt,
and these the most grievously, were already beyond the need of
succor. The same thing had already occurred at Vicksburg.
The operations at Vicksburg and Port Hudson were so far alike in
their character and objects that no just estimate of the events at
either place can well be formed without considering what happened
at the other. In this view it is instructive to observe that Grant
assaulted the Confederate position at Vicksburg within a few hours
after the arrival of his troops in front of the place, on the
afternoon of the 19th of May, when two determined attacks were
easily thrown off by the defenders, with a loss to their assailants
of 942 men. On the 22d of May Grant delivered the second assault,
in which about three fourths of his whole effective force of 43,000
of all arms were engaged. The full corps of Sherman and McPherson,
comprising six divisions, were repulsed by four brigades of the
garrison, numbering probably 13,000 effectives. In this second
assault Grant's loss was 3,199. These are the reasons he gives
for his decision to attack:
"Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not
much in inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew
he was being reinforced. There was danger of his coming to the
assistance of Pemberton, and, after all, he might defeat my
anticipations of capturing the garrison, if, indeed, he did not
prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg
would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted
elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston
from the State. But the first consideration of all was--the troops
believed they could carry the works in their front, and they would
not have worked so patiently in their trenches if they had not been
allowed to try."
Having tried, he now "determined upon a regular siege--to 'outcamp
the enemy,' as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience
of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they
went to work on the defences and approaches with a will."(1)
It has also to be remembered, in any fair and candid consideration
of the subject, that at this comparatively early period of the war
even such bloody lessons as Fredericksburg had not sufficed to
teach either the commanders or their followers on either side,
Federal or Confederate, the full value, computed in time, of even
a simple line of breastworks of low relief, or the cost in blood
of any attempt to eliminate this value of time by carrying the
works at a rush. Indeed, it may be doubted whether, from the
beginning of the war to the end, this reasoning, in spite of all
castigations that resulted from disregarding it, was ever fully
impressed upon the generals of either army, although at last there
came, it is true, a time when, as at Cold Harbor, the men had an
opinion of their own, and chose to act upon it. It is also very
questionable whether earthworks manned by so much as a line of
skirmishers, prepared and determined to defend them, have ever been
successfully assaulted save as the result of a surprise. Sedgwick's
captures of the Rappanhannock redoubts and of Marye's Heights have
indeed been cited as instances to the contrary, yet on closer
consideration it is apparent that although in the former case the
Confederates had been looking for an attack, they had given up all
expectation of being called on to meet it that day, when, just at
sunset, Russell fell suddenly upon them and finished the affair
handsomely before they had time to recover. Marye's Heights, again,
may be described as a moral surprise, for no Confederate officer
or man that had witnessed the bloody repulse of Burnside's great
army on the very same ground, but a few weeks before, could have
expected to be called on so soon to meet the swift and triumphant
onset of a single corps of that army. Moreover, Sedgwick's tactical
arrangements were perfect.
The truth is, the insignificant appearance of a line of simple
breastworks has almost always caused those general and staff-officers
especially that viewed them through their field-glasses, with the
diminishing power of a long perspective, to forget that an assault
upon an enemy behind entrenchments is not so much a battle as a
battue, where one side stands to shoot and the other goes out to
be shot, or if he stops to shoot it is in plain sight of an almost
invisible foe. European examples, as usual misapplied or misunderstood,
have contributed largely to the persistency of this fatal illusion,
and Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos have served but as incantations to
confuse many a mind to which these sounding syllables were no more
than names; ignorant, therefore, of the stern necessities that
drove Wellington to these victories, forgetful of their fearful
cost, and above all ignoring or forgetting the axiom, on which
rests the whole art and science of military engineering--that the
highest and stoutest of stone walls must yield at last to the
smallest trench through which a man may creep unseen. Vast, indeed,
is the difference between an assault upon a walled town, delivered
as a last resort after crowning the glacis and opening wide the
breach, and any conceivable movement, though bearing the same name,
made as the first resort, against earthworks of the very kind
whereby walled towns are taken, approached over ground unknown and
perhaps obstructed.
Even so, in the storm of Rodrigo the defenders struck down more
than a third of their own numbers; Badajos was taken by a happy
chance after the main assault had miserably failed; at both places
the losses of the assailants were in proportion less, and in number
but little greater, than at Port Hudson; yet, in the contemplation
of the awful slaughter of Badajos, even the iron firmness of
Wellington broke down in a passion of tears.
(1) "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," pp. 530, 532.