CHAPTER XIX.

HARROWING LA FOURCHE.

It will be remembered that when Banks marched to Opelousas, Taylor's

little army, greatly depleted by wholesale desertion and hourly

wearing away by the roadside, broke into two fragments, the main

body of the cavalry retiring, under Mouton, toward the Sabine,

while the remainder of the troops were conducted by Taylor himself

toward Alexandria and at last to Natchitoches. As soon as Kirby

Smith became aware that his adversary was advancing to the Red

River, he prepared to meet the menace by concentrating on Shreveport

the whole available force of the Confederacy in the Trans-Mississippi

from Texas to Missouri, numbering, according to his own estimate,

18,000 effectives. He accordingly called on Magruder for two

brigades and drew in from the line of the Arkansas the division of

John G. Walker. However, this concentration became unnecessary

and was given up the instant Smith learned that Banks had crossed

the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi and had sat down before Port

Hudson.

While this movement was in progress, Walker was on the march toward

Natchitoches or Alexandria, by varying routes, according as the

plans changed to suit the news of the day. Taylor observed Banks

and followed his march to Simmesport, while Mouton hung upon the

rear and flank of Chickering's column, guarding the big wagon-train

and the spoils of the Teche campaign.

Then Kirby Smith, not caring as yet to venture across the Atchafalaya,

ordered Taylor to take Walker's division back into Northern Louisiana

and try to break up Grant's campaign by interrupting his communications

opposite Vicksburg; but this attempt turned out badly, for Grant

had already given up his communications on the west bank of the

Mississippi and restored them on the east, and Taylor's forces,

after passing from Lake Catahoula by Little River into the Tensas,

ascending that stream to the neighborhood of Richmond and occupying

that town on the 3d of May, were roughly handled on the 7th in an

ill-judged attempt to take Young's Point and Milliken's Bend.

Then, leaving Walker with orders to do what damage he could along

the river bank--which was not much--and, if possible, as it was

not, to throw supplies of beef and corn into Vicksburg, Taylor went

back to Alexandria and prepared for his campaign in La Fourche,

from which Kirby Smith's superior orders had diverted him. Meanwhile

nearly a month had passed and Walker, after coming down to the Red

River, a week too late, was once more out of reach.

Taylor's plan was for Major, with his brigade of cavalry, to cross

the Atchafalaya at Morgan's Ferry, while Taylor himself, with the

main body under Mouton, should attempt the surprise and capture of

Brashear: then, if successful, the whole army could be thrown into

La Fourche, while in case of failure Major could easily return by

the way he came.

Major left Washington on the 10th of June, marched twenty-eight

miles to Morgan's Ferry, by a road then high and dry although in

April Banks had found it under water, and crossing the Atchafalaya

on the 14th rode along the Bayou Fordoche with the intention of

striking the river at the Hermitage; but a broken bridge turned

him northward round the sweep of False River toward Waterloo. Sage

was at False Point with six companies of his 110th New York, a

squadron of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry, and a section of Carruth's

battery. As soon as he found the enemy approaching in some force

he moved down the levee to the cover of the lower fleet and thus

lost the chance of gaining and giving timely notice of Major's

operation. Major on his part rode off by the Grosstête through

Plaquemine, as already related, and so down the Mississippi to

Donaldsonville, having passed on the way three garrisons without

being seen by any one on board. Making a feint on Fort Butler,

Major, under cover of the night, took the cut-off road and struck

the Bayou La Fourche six miles below Donaldsonville; thence he rode

on to Thibodeaux, entering the town at daylight on the 21st of

June. At Thibodeaux Major picked up all the Union soldiers in the

place to the number of about 100, mostly convalescents.

Soon after taking command in New Orleans, Emory had begun to look

forward to what might happen in La Fourche, as well as to the

possible consequences to New Orleans itself. The forces in the

district were the 23d Connecticut, Colonel Charles E. L. Holmes,

and the 176th New York, Colonel Charles C. Nott, both regiments

scattered along the railroad for its protection, Company F and some

odd men and recruits of the 1st Indiana, under Captain F. W. Noblett,

occupying the field works at Brashear, and two companies of the

28th Maine at Fort Butler. About this time Holmes, who as the

senior colonel had commanded the district since Weitzel quitted it

to enter on the Teche campaign, resigned on account of ill-health.

Nott and Wordin, the lieutenant-colonel of the 23d, were on the

sick-list. Finding the country thus feebly occupied and the service

yet more feebly performed, as early as the 7th of June, Emory had

chosen a very intelligent and spirited young officer of the 47th

Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Stickney, placed him in

command of the district, without regard to rank, and sent him over

the line to Brashear to put things straight. In this work Stickney

was engaged, when, at daylight on the morning of the 20th of June,

he received a telegram from Emory conveying the news that the

Confederates were advancing on La Fourche Crossing; so he left

Major Anthony, of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry, in command at Brashear

and went to the point where the danger threatened. When, on the

afternoon of the 21st of June, the Confederate force drew near,

Stickney found himself in command of a medley of 838 men belonging

to eight different organizations--namely, 195 of the 23d Connecticut,

154 of the 176th New York, 46 of the 42d Massachusetts, 37 of the

26th Maine, 306 of the 26th Massachusetts, 50 troopers of the 1st

Louisiana cavalry, 20 artillerymen, chiefly of the 1st Indiana,

and one section, with 30 men, of Grow's 25th New York battery.

The levee at this point was about twelve feet high, forming a

natural fortification, which Stickney took advantage of and

strengthened by throwing up slight rifle-pits on his flanks. These

had only been carried a few yards, and were nowhere more than two

feet high, when, about seven o'clock in the evening, under cover

of the darkness, Major attacked. The attack was led by Pyron's

regiment, reported by Major as 206 strong, and was received and

thrown off by about three quarters of Stickney's force. For this

result the credit is largely due to the gallantry and good judgment

of Major Morgan Morgan, Jr., of the 176th New York, and the steadiness

of his men, inspired by his example. Grow's guns being separated

and one of them without support, this piece was abandoned by its

gunners and fell for the moment into the hands of the Confederates;

the other piece, placed by Grow himself to protect the flank, poured

an effective enfilade fire upon Pyron's column.

Stickney's loss was 8 killed and 41 wounded, including Lieutenant

Starr, of the 23d Connecticut, whose hurt proved mortal. The

Confederate loss is not reported, but Stickney says he counted 53

of their dead on the field, and afterward found nearly 60 wounded

in the hospitals at Thibodeaux. The next morning, June 22d, their

dead and wounded were removed under a flag of truce.(1)

While the flag was out, Cahill came up from New Orleans with the

9th Connecticut, a further detachment of the 26th Massachusetts,

and the remainder of Grow's battery. This gave Stickney about

1,100 men, with four guns in position and six field-pieces. Cahill's

arrival was seen by Major, who, after waiting all day in a drenching

rain, began to think his condition rather critical; accordingly,

at nine o'clock in the evening he set out to force his way to

Brashear, where he was expecting to find Green. Riding hard, he

arrived at the east bank of Bayou Boeuf late the next afternoon,

and, crossing by night, at daylight on the 24th he had completely

surrounded the post of Bayou Boeuf, and was just about to attack,

when he saw the white flag that announced the surrender of the

garrison to Mouton. Before this, Captain Julius Sanford, of the

23d Connecticut, set fire to the sugar-house filled with the baggage

and clothing of the troops engaged at Port Hudson.

Meanwhile, for the surprise of Brashear, Mouton had collected

thirty-seven skiffs and boats of all sorts near the mouth of the Teche,

and manned them with 325 volunteers, under the lead of Major Sherod

Hunter. At nightfall on the 22d of June Hunter set out, and by

daylight the next morning his whole party had safely landed in the

rear of the defences of Brashear, while Green, with three battalions

and two batteries of his command, stood on the western bank of

Berwick Bay, ostentatiously attracting the attention of the

unsuspicious garrison, and three more regiments were in waiting on

Gibbon's Island, ready to make use of Hunter's boats in support of

his movement.

Banks meant to have broken up the great depot of military stores

at Brashear, and to have removed to Algiers or New Orleans all

regimental baggage and other property that had gone into store at

Brashear and the Boeuf before and after the Teche campaign; such

were his orders, but for some reason not easy to explain they had

not been carried out. Besides the Indianians, who numbered about

30 all told, there were at Brashear four companies--D, G, I, K--of

the 23d Connecticut, two companies of the 176th New York, about

150 strong, and one company, or the equivalent of a company, of

the 42d Massachusetts, making in all rather less than 400 effectives;

there were also about 300 convalescents, left behind by nearly

thirty regiments. Notwithstanding the vast quantity of stores

committed to their care, including the effects of their comrades,

and in spite of all warnings, so slack and indifferent was the

performance of duty on the part of the garrison of Brashear that,

on the morning of the 23d of June, the reveillé was sounded for

them by the guns of the Valverde battery. Thus sharply aroused,

without a thought of what might happen in the rear, the garrison

gave its whole attention to returning, with the heavy guns, the

fire of Green's field-pieces across Berwick Bay. Soon the gunboat

_Hollyhock_ backed down the bay and out of the action, and thus it

was that about half-past six Hunter's men, running out of the woods

toward the railway station, and making known their presence with

their rifles, took the garrison completely by surprise, and, after

a short and desultory fight, more than 700 officers and men gave

up their swords and laid down their arms to a little less than one

half of their own number. Of the men, nearly all were well enough

to march to Algiers four days later, after being paroled. Worse

still, they abandoned a fortified position with 11 heavy guns--24-,

30-, and 32-pounders. The Confederate loss was 3 killed and 18

wounded. Hunter says the Union troops lost 46 killed and 40 wounded,

but about this there seems to be some mistake, for the proportion

is unusual, and the whole loss of the 23d Connecticut in killed

and wounded was but 7, of the 176th New York but 12.

Green crossed Berwick Bay as fast as he could, and pushing on found

the post at Bayou Ramos abandoned. The Union troops stationed

there had retired to Bayou Boeuf, and so at daylight on the 24th,

without feeling or firing a single shot, the united guards of the

two stations, numbering 433 officers and men, with four guns,

commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Duganne, of the 176th New York,

promptly surrendered to the first bold summons of a handful of

Green's adventurous scouts riding five miles ahead of their column.

Taylor now turned over the immediate command of the force to Mouton

and hastened back to Alexandria to bring down Walker, in order to

secure and extend his conquests. Mouton marched at once on

Donaldsonville.

When the Union forces at La Fourche Crossing found the Confederates

returning in such strength, they made haste to fall back on New

Orleans, and were followed as far as Boutte Station by Waller's

and Pyron's battalions.

On the 27th of June, Green, with his own brigade, Major's brigade,

and Semmes's battery appeared before Donaldsonville, and demanded

the surrender of the garrison of Fort Butler. This was a square

redoubt, placed in the northern angle between the bayou and the

Mississippi, designed to command and protect the river gateway to

La Fourche, mounting four guns, and originally intended for a

garrison of perhaps 600 men. The parapet was high and thick, like

the levee, and was surrounded by a deep ditch, the flanks on the

bayou and the river being further protected by stout stockades

extending from the levees to the water, at ordinary stages. The

work was now held by a mixed force of 180 men, comprising two small

companies of the 28th Maine--F, Captain Edward B. Neal, and G,

Captain Augustine Thompson,--besides a number of convalescents of

various regiments. Major Joseph D. Bullen, of the 28th, was in

command, and with him at the time was Major Henry M. Porter, of

the 7th Vermont, provost-marshal of the parish of Iberville, whose

quarters in the town on the other side of the bayou were no longer

tenable.

Farragut, who had gone down to New Orleans and hoisted his flag on

the _Pensacola_, leaving Palmer and Alden in command of the upper

and lower fleets before Port Hudson, had disposed his gunboats so

as to patrol the river in sections. The _Princess Royal_,

Lieutenant-Commander M. B. Woolsey, was near Donaldsonville; the

_Winona_, Lieutenant-Commander A. W. Weaver, near Plaquemine; and

the _Kineo_, Lieutenant-Commander John Watters, between Bonnet Carré

and the Red Church. As soon as the Confederates appeared before

Donaldsonville, Woolsey was notified, and couriers were sent up and

down the river to summon the _Winona_ and the _Kineo_.

Green brought to the attack six regiments and one battery, between

1,300 and 1,500 strong,(2) including three regiments of his own

brigade, the 4th, 5th, and 7th Texas, and three regiments of Major's

brigade--Lane's, Stone's, and Phillips's. The river, and therefore

the bayou, were now low, exposing wide margins of batture, and

Green's plan was, while surrounding and threatening the fort on

its land faces, to gain an entrance on the water front by crossing

the batture and passing around the ends of the stockades.

At ten minutes past midnight the red light of a Coston signal from

the fort announced to the Navy that the enemy were coming. At

twenty minutes past one the fight was opened by the Confederates

with musketry. Instantly the fort replied with the fire of its

guns, and of every musket that could be brought to the parapet.

Five minutes later the _Princess Royal_, which, since nightfall,

had been under way and cleared for action, began shelling the woods

on the right of the fort, firing a few 9-inch and 30-pounder shells

over the works and down the bayou, followed presently by 30-pounder

and 20-pounder shrapnel and 9-inch grape, fired at point-blank

range in the direction of the Confederate yells. The assault was

made in the most determined manner. Shannon, with the 5th Texas,

passed some of his men around the end of the river stockade, others

climbed and helped one another over, some tried to cut it down with

axes, many fired through the loopholes; Phillips made a circuit of

the fort and tried the bayou stockade, while Herbert's 7th Texas

attempted to cross the ditch on the land side. The fight at the

stockade was desperate in the extreme; those who succeeded in

surmounting or turning this barrier found an impassable obstacle

in the ditch, whose existence, strange to say, they had not even

suspected. Here the combatants fought hand to hand; even the sick,

who had barely strength to walk from the hospital to the rampart,

took part in the defence. The Texans assailed the defenders with

brickbats; these the Maine men threw back upon the heads of the

Texans; on both sides numbers were thus injured. Lane, who was to

have supported Phillips, somehow went adrift, and Hardeman, who

was to have attacked the stockade on the bayou side, was delayed

by his guide, but toward daylight he came up to join in the last

attack. By way of a diversion, Stone had crossed the bayou to the

east bank on a bridge of sugar coolers, and his part in the fight

was confined to yells.

At a quarter before four the yelling, which had gone on continuously

for more than two hours, suddenly died away, the fire slackened,

and three rousing cheers went up from the fort. A few minutes

later the _Winona_ came down and opened fire, and at half-past four

the _Kineo_ hove in sight. The fight was ended. "The smoke clearing

away," says Woolsey, "discovered the American flag flying over the

fort. Gave three cheers and came to anchor." Yet the same sun

rose upon a ghastly sight--upon green slopes gray with the dead,

the dying, and the maimed, and the black ditch red with their blood.

Green puts his loss at 40 killed, 114 wounded, 107 missing, in all

261. However, during the 28th, the _Princess Royal_ and the _Kineo_

received on board from the provost-marshal 124 prisoners, by actual

count, including 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 major, 3 captains, and 5

lieutenants; and Lieutenant-Commander Woolsey says the garrison

buried 69 Confederates and were "still at it." Among the Confederates

killed was Shannon, and among the missing Phillips. Of the garrison,

1 officer, Lieutenant Isaac Murch, of the 28th Maine, and 7 men

were killed, 2 officers and 11 men wounded--in all 21. The _Princess

Royal_ had 1 man killed, 2 wounded. The vessel was struck in twenty

places by grape-shot.

Green has been sharply criticised for the apparent recklessness

with which he delivered his assault, even after having announced

to Mouton his intention of waiting; yet it is clear that he was

sent there to attack; if he was to attack at all, he had nothing

to gain by waiting; an assault by daylight would have been wholesale

suicide; while, on the other hand, the garrison would unquestionably

be reinforced by troops and gunboats before another night. Having

paid this tribute to his judgment, and to his daring and the

intrepidity of his men the homage that every soldier feels to be

his due, one may be allowed to quote without comment this passage

from Green's report of the affair, in naked frankness hardly

surpassed even among the writings of Signor Benvenuto Cellini:

"At daylight I sent in a flag of truce, asking permission to pick

up our wounded and bury our dead, which was refused, as I expected.

My object in sending the flag so early was to get away a great

number of our men, who had found a little shelter near the enemy's

works, and who would have been inevitably taken prisoners. I must

have saved one hundred men by instructing my flag-of-truce officer,

as he approached the fort, to order our troops to steal away."

Bullen's message to Emory has the true ring: "The enemy have

attacked us, and we have repulsed them. I want more men; I must

have more men." Emory responded with the remaining two companies

of the 28th Maine, that had been left near New Orleans when the

regiment moved to Port Hudson, and Banks relieved the 1st Louisiana

on the lines and sent it at once to Donaldsonville, with two sections

of Closson's battery under Taylor, and Stone to command. This put

the place out of peril.

Even this bright spot on the dull, dark background was not to be

permitted to go untarnished, for, on the 5th of July, Bullen, the

hero of this heroic defence, whose name deserves to live in the

memory of all that love a sturdy man, a stout heart, a steady mind,

or a brave deed, was murdered by a tipsy mutineer of the relieving

force. On Friday, the 14th of August, 1863, this wretched man,

Francis Scott, private of Company F, 1st Louisiana, suffered the

military penalty of his crime.

Taylor now gave up the attempt to capture the position at

Donaldsonville, and devoted his attention to a blockade of the

river by establishing his batteries at various points behind the

natural fortification formed by the levee. Seven guns, under

Faries, were placed on Gaudet's plantation, opposite Whitehall

Point, while the guns of Semmes, Nichols, and Cornay were planted

opposite College Point and at Fifty-five Mile Point, commanding

Grand View reach. On the 3d of July Semmes opened fire on the

Union transports, as they were approaching College Point on their

way up the river. The steamer _Iberville_ was disabled, and from

this time until after the surrender no transport passed up, except

under convoy, and it was only with great difficulty that even the

fastest boats made their way down with the help of the current.

When this state of things was reported to Farragut, who had gone

back to Port Hudson, he sent to New Orleans for his Chief of Staff,

Captain Jenkins, to come up, in order that he himself might once

more go down and give his personal attention to the affair. On

the 7th of July the _Tennessee_ started from New Orleans with

Jenkins aboard; she had successfully run the gauntlet of the

batteries, when, between eight and nine o'clock in the evening, as

Faries was firing his last rounds, a solid shot struck and instantly

killed Commander Abner Read. Captain Jenkins was, at the same

time, wounded by a flying fragment of a broken cutlass. Of the

crew two were killed and four wounded.

On the 8th the _Saint Mary's_, a fine seagoing steamer and one of

the fastest boats in the department, was carrying Lieutenant Emerson,

Acting-Assistant Adjutant-General, with important despatches from

headquarters to Emory and to the Chief Quartermaster, when, about

three o'clock in the morning, she drew the fire of all the Confederate

guns. The _Princess Royal_ and the _Kineo_ convoyed her past the

upper battery, but from this point she had to trust to her speed

and her low freeboard. In rounding Fifty-five Mile Point she was

struck five times, one conical shell and one shrapnel penetrating

her side above the water-line and bursting inboard.

At half-past six on the morning of the 9th of July, Farragut, who

had left Port Hudson on the _Monongahela_ on the evening of the

7th, started from Donaldsonville with the _Essex, Kineo_, and

_Tennessee_ in company, ran the gauntlet of the batteries, swept

and silenced them with his broadsides, and endured for nearly two

hours a brisk musketry fire from the enemy without serious loss

suffered or inflicted. At half-past one o'clock on the morning of

the 10th of July, the gunboat _New London_, bearing Captain Walker,

Assistant Adjutant-General, with a despatch announcing the surrender

of Port Hudson, came under the fire of Faries's battery, opposite

Whitehall. She was very soon disabled by a shot through her boilers,

and was run ashore near the left bank, where the _Tennessee_ and

the _Essex_ came to her assistance from below. Landing on the east

bank, Captain Walker made his way afoot down the river along the

levee until he came in sight of the _Monongahela_, when, at six

o'clock in the morning, his signals being perceived, he was taken

aboard in one of the ship's boats and communicated to the admiral

the good news that the campaign was at an end. To dispose of Taylor

could be but a matter of a few days; then once more, in the words

of Lincoln, would the great river flow "unvexed to the sea."

Taylor's plans were well laid, and had been brilliantly executed.

In no other way, with the force at his disposal, could he have

performed a greater service for his cause. Save the severe yet

not material check at Donaldsonville, he had had everything his

own way: he had overrun La Fourche; his guns commanded the river;

his outposts were within twenty miles of the city; he even talked

of capturing New Orleans, but this, in the teeth of an alert and

powerful fleet, was at best but a midsummer fancy.

In New Orleans, indeed, great was the excitement when it became

known that the Confederate forces were so near. In Taylor's army

were the friends, the brothers, the lovers, the husbands, even the

fathers of the inhabitants. In the town were many thousands of

registered enemies, and of paroled Confederate prisoners of all

ranks. At one time there were no Union troops in the city, save

a detachment of the 42d Massachusetts, barely two hundred and fifty

strong. But the illness that had deprived Emory's division of its

leader in the field had given to New Orleans a commander of a

courage and firmness that now, as always, rose with the approach

of danger, with whom difficulties diminished as they drew near,

and whose character had earned the respect of the townspeople.

These, though their hearts beat high and their pulses were tremulous

with emotion, conducted themselves with a propriety and an outward

calmness that reflected the highest credit upon their virtue and

their good sense. Yet, when all that was possible had been done,

things were at such a pass that, on the 4th of July, Emory thought

it imperative to speak out. "I respectfully suggest," he wrote to

Banks, "that unless Port Hudson be already taken, you can only save

this city by sending me reinforcements immediately and at any cost.

It is a choice between Port Hudson and New Orleans."

Banks made the choice with serenity and without a moment's hesitation

determined to run the remote risk of losing New Orleans for the

moment, with the destruction of Taylor's army in reserve as a

consolation, rather than to insure himself against this peril at

the price of instant disaster at Port Hudson, even on the very eve

of victory.

"Operations here," was the reply sent from headquarters on the 5th

to Emory's urgent appeal, "can last but two or three days longer

at the outside, and then the whole command will be available to

drive back the enemy who is now annoying our communications and

threatening New Orleans." So the event proved and such was now

the task to be performed.

Augur, who had been ill for some time, yet unwilling to relinquish

his command, now found himself unfitted for the summer campaign

that seemed in prospect. He accordingly turned over his division

to Weitzel, took leave of absence on surgeon's certificate, and

went North to recruit his health. Shortly afterward he was assigned

to the command of the Department of Washington and did not rejoin

the Nineteenth Corps.

Weitzel, as has been said, took transport on the 9th of July

immediately after the formal capitulation. Getting under way toward

evening, he landed at Donaldsonville early the next morning. His

presence there so threatened the flank and front of Taylor's forces,

as to induce an immediate withdrawal of the guns from the river

and the calling in of all detachments. Morgan, with Grover's First

brigade and Nims's battery, followed Weitzel about midnight on the

10th, and Grover himself, with his other two brigades, on the 11th.

During the night of that day, Grover therefore found himself before

Donaldsonville, holding both banks of Bayou La Fourche with two

divisions. He was confronted by Green with his own brigade and

Major's, together with the batteries that had lately been annoying

the transports and drawing the attention of the gunboats on the

river. When, on the 10th, Green saw the transports coming down

the Mississippi laden with troops, it did not at once occur to him

that Port Hudson was lost; he simply thought these troops were

coming to attack him. Concentrating his whole force, he posted

Major with four regiments and four guns on the left or east bank

of the bayou, and on the right or west bank three regiments and

two guns of his own brigade. Green's pickets were within two miles

of Donaldsonville. As Grover developed and took more ground in

his front, Green drew back toward Paincourtville.

On the morning of the 13th of July, without any intention of bringing

on a battle or of hastening the enemy's movements, but merely to

gain a little more elbow-room and to find new fields for forage

for his animals, Grover moved out an advance guard on either side

of the bayou. "The enemy is evidently making preparation," he said

in his despatch of the 12th before ordering this movement, "to

escape if pursued by a strong force or to resist a small one. Our

gunboats can hardly be expected at Brashear City for some days,

and it is evidently injudicious to press them until their retreat

is cut off." Dudley, with two sections of Carruth's battery under

Phelps and with Barrett's troop, marched on the right bank of the

bayou, supported by Charles J. Paine's brigade with Haley's battery.

Morgan, under the orders of Birge, temporarily commanding Grover's

division, moved in line with Dudley on the opposite bank. They

went forward slowly until, about six miles out, they found themselves

upon the estate of the planter whose name is variously spelled Cox,

Koch, and Kock. Here, as Dudley and Morgan showed no disposition

to attack, Green took the initiative, and, favored by a narrow

field, a rank growth of corn, dense thickets of willows, the deep

ditches common to all sugar plantations in these lowlands, and his

own superior knowledge of the country, he fell suddenly with his

whole force upon the heads of Dudley's and Morgan's columns, and

drove them in almost before they were aware of the presence in

their front of anything more than the pickets, whom they had been

seeing for two days and who had been falling back before them.

Morgan handled his brigade badly, and soon got it, or suffered it

to fall, into a tangle whence it could only extricate itself by

retiring. This fairly exposed the flank of Dudley, who was making

a good fight, but had already enough to do to take care of his

front against the fierce onset of Green's Texans. The result of

this bad mismanagement was that the whole command was in effect

clubbed and on both banks driven back about a mile, until Paine came

to its support; then Grover rode out, and, seeing what had happened,

drew in his whole force.

Grover's losses in this affair, called the battle of Cox's Plantation,

were 2 officers and 54 men killed, 7 officers and 210 men wounded,

3 officers and 183 men captured or missing; in all 465. To add to

the reproach of this rough treatment at the hands of an inferior

force, two guns were lost, one of the 1st Maine battery and one of

the 6th Massachusetts, but without the least fault on the part of

the artillerists.

After the close of the campaign Colonel Morgan was arraigned before

a general court-martial upon charges of misbehavior before the

enemy and drunkenness on duty, and, being found guilty upon both

charges, was sentenced to be cashiered and utterly disqualified

from holding any office of employment under the government of the

United States; but Banks disapproved the proceedings, findings,

and sentence on the ground that the evidence appeared to him too

conflicting and unsatisfactory. "The execution of this sentence,"

his order continue, "is suspended until the pleasure of the President

can be known." When the record with this decision reached the

Judge Advocate-General of the Army at Washington, he sent it back

to Banks with instructions that, as no sentence remained for the

action of the President, the proceedings were at an end and Colonel

Morgan must be released from arrest. This was accordingly done on

the 26th of October, 1863.

Green puts his loss at 3 killed and 30 wounded, including 6 mortally

wounded. The Union loss, he says, was "little less than 1,000;

there were over 500 of the enemy killed and wounded, of whom 200

were left out on the field, and about 250 prisoners."

When, on the evening of the 14th of July, at Port Hudson, Banks

received this news, he went at once to Donaldsonville to confer

with Grover and Weitzel on the situation and the plan of campaign.

It was agreed on all hands that it was inexpedient to press Taylor

hard or to hasten his movements in any way until time should have

been allowed for the light-draught gunboats to re-enter Berwick

Bay and thus gain control of Taylor's line of retreat. In thus

refraining from any attempt to avenge promptly what must be regarded

as a military affront, the depleted ranks and the wearied condition

of the troops were perhaps taken into account, and, moreover, it

must have been considered to the last degree inadvisable to entangle

the command in the dense swamps that would have to be crossed,

after pushing Taylor prematurely back from the fertile and

comparatively high lands that border the Bayou La Fourche. Then

Banks continued on to New Orleans, where he arrived on the 18th,

and renewed his pressure on the admiral for the gunboats; but,

unfortunately, the gunboats were not to be had. Of those that had

accompanied the army in the campaign of the Teche, only one, the

feeble _Hollyhock_, had remained in Berwick Bay after the army

descended the Red River, crossed the Atchafalaya, and moved on Port

Hudson. The others, with the transports, had followed the movements

of the troops and had been caught above the head of the Atchafalaya

when the waters fell. Thus they had long been without repairs and

not one of them was now in condition for immediate service. The

water on the bar at the mouth of the Atchafalaya was now nearly at

its lowest point, so that even of the light-draught gunboats only

the lightest could cross. Accordingly it was not until the 22d of

July that the _Estrella_ and _Clifton_ made their appearance in

Berwick Bay and put an end to Taylor's operations.

On the afternoon of the 21st of July, knowing that the gunboats

were coming, Taylor set the finishing touch to his incursion by

burning the rolling-stock of the railway and running the engines

into the bay. He had already destroyed the bridges as far back as

Tigerville, thus rendering the road quite useless to the Union forces

for the next five weeks.

On the morning of the 25th the advance of Weitzel's brigade, under

Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, consisting of his own 12th Connecticut

and the 13th Connecticut, commanded by Captain Comstock, arrived

at Brashear by steamer from Donaldsonville, and, landing, once more

took possession of the place; but in the meantime Taylor had safely

withdrawn to the west bank, and gone into camp on the Teche with

all of his army intact and all his materials and supplies and most

of his captures safe.

(1) The history of the 23d Connecticut says: "We delivered to them

108 dead. We captured 40 prisoners."--"Connecticut in the War,"

p. 757.

(2) When Green says 800, he of course refers to the four regiments

actually engaged in the assault; for, after losing, as he says,

261 of these 800, he makes the four regiments of Major's brigade,

with two sections of Faries's battery, number 800; while his own

force, with one section of Gonzales's battery, he puts at 750.

800 + 750 + 261 = 1,811.

History of the Nineteenth Army Corps · 第 19 / 35 章