IRISH BEND.
Grover's instructions were to gain a landing on the shore of Grand
Lake, and then marching on Franklin, to cut off Taylor's retreat
or to attack him in the rear, as circumstances might suggest.
We have seen how, instead of being ready to move from Berwick Bay
on the morning of the 10th of April, Grover found his departure
delayed by the various causes already mentioned until the morning
of the 12th was well advanced.
The flotilla, under Lieutenant-Commander Cooke, composed of the
flag-ships _Estrella, Arizona, Clifton_, and _Calhoun_, having
completed the ferriage of Emory and Weitzel over Berwick Bay, was
now occupied in assisting the army transports to convey Grover to
his destination, besides standing ready to protect his movement
and his landing with its guns.
About noon, when off Cypress Island, the _Arizona_ ran hard and
fast aground, and four precious hours were lost in a vain attempt
to get her afloat. If, in the light of after events, this may seem
like time wasted, it should always be remembered that all four of
the gunboats were crowded with troops, while an attack from the
_Queen of the West_ and her consorts was to be looked for at any
moment. Finally, rather than to put the adventure in peril by a
longer delay, Cooke determined to leave the _Arizona_ to take care
of herself, and once more steaming ahead, at half-past seven o'clock,
the gunboats and transports came to anchor below Miller's Point,
off Madame Porter's plantation. At this place, known as Oak Lawn,
Grover in the orders under which he was acting had been told he
might expect to find a good shell road leading straight to the
Teche, and crossing the bayou about the middle of the bow called
Irish Bend. Grover at once sent Fiske with two companies of the
1st Louisiana ashore in the _Clifton_'s boats to reconnoitre. It
was midnight when, after carefully examining the ground, Fiske
returned to the gunboat and reported the road under water, and
quite impracticable for all arms. The fleet then got under way,
and proceeding about six miles farther up the lake, anchored beyond
Magee's Point.
Before daylight Dwight sent two of his staff officers, Captain
Denslow and Lieutenant Matthews, ashore, with a small detachment
from the 6th New York, to examine the plantation road leading from
this point to the Teche. The road being found practicable for all
arms, the debarkation began at daybreak.
Dwight landed first. As soon as his leading regiment, the 1st
Louisiana, reached the shore, Holcomb threw forward two companies,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Fiske, as skirmishers, and formed the
battalion in line to cover the landing.
Taylor, when he first learned that the gunboats and transports had
passed up Grand Lake, had sent Vincent, with the 2d Louisiana
cavalry and a section of Cornay's battery, to Verdun landing, about
four miles behind Camp Bisland, to observe and oppose the movement.
This was about noon on Sunday, the 12th. In the evening, hearing
of the progress of the fleet, Taylor sent a second section of
Cornay's battery to the lake, and going himself to Vincent ordered
him to follow the movement and try to prevent a landing. The next
morning Taylor sent Reily with the 4th Texas, to join Vincent and
aid him in retarding Grover's progress.
Taylor seems to have censured Vincent for letting Grover land, yet
in truth Vincent was not to blame. The line he had to watch was
too long for his numbers, and the Union flotilla could and did move
more rapidly on the lake than the Confederate troops by the roads.
When he had stationed his pickets at the probable landing-places,
and taken up a central position to support them, he had done all
that lay in his power. The range and weight of the 9-inch shells
of the navy were alone enough to put a serious opposition to the
landing out of the question, but as soon as Vincent found where
the attempt was to be made, he disposed his men and guns to retard
it. Two of Cornay's guns even tried, ineffectually of course, to
destroy the transports: Cooke quickly drove them off.
As Holcomb's skirmishers deployed they were met by a brisk fusillade
from Vincent's men strongly posted in ambush behind a high fence
in the thick wood that skirts the shore; but when Holcomb advanced
his battalion Vincent's men fell back on their main body and left
the wood to Holcomb, who immediately moved to the edge of the
clearing and held it, observing the enemy on the farther border.
This was Vincent with his regiment and the four guns of Corney;
and from this moment all that was happening on the lake shore passed
unseen by the Confederates.
Meanwhile the landing went on very slowly, for the transports could
not come nearer to the beach than a hundred yards, and, although
the foot-soldiers were able to jump overboard and scramble ashore,
and the horses could also take to the water, it was necessary to
make a bridge of flats for the guns and caissons of the artillery.
Thus it was four o'clock in the afternoon before the whole division
found itself assembled on the plantation of Duncan McWilliams on
the shore of the lake, with the Teche at the upper reach of Irish
Bend four miles to the southward, and Charenton in the hollow of
Indian Bend lying but two miles toward the southwest. There were
roads in either direction, but Irish Bend was the way to Franklin,
and to Franklin Grover was under orders to go.
About nine o'clock in the morning Dwight had borrowed from Birge
his two leading regiments, the 13th Connecticut and the 159th New
York, to support the 1st Louisiana. Grover also gave Dwight
Closson's battery and Barrett's troop of cavalry. Toward noon,
moving a detachment by his left, Dwight seized the bridge that
crosses the Teche in approaching Madame Porter's plantation from
the northward, just in time to extinguish the flames that Vincent's
men had lighted to destroy it. After seizing the bridge at Oak
Lawn, Barrett galloped down the left bank of the Teche and seized
the bridge a mile or two below, by which the same small plantation
is reached from the eastward; probably by the shell road that Grover
had been told to take, and at which he had tried to land. Barrett
was in time to save the bridge from Vincent, and to hold the
advantage thus gained Dwight soon sent Holcomb with the 1st Louisiana,
131st New York, 6th New York, 22d Maine, and Closson's battery.
Meanwhile, the division being entirely without wagons, save a few
that were loaded with the reserve ammunition, still another wait
took place while the men's haversacks were being filled with hard
bread and coffee. All these delays were now having their effect
upon Grover's own calculations. He now knew nothing of Banks's
movements or his situation. Of his own movements he was bound to
suppose that Taylor had received early and full information.
Moreover, the topography of the country where Grover found himself
was obscure and to him unknown. Instead, therefore, of marching
forward as fast as his troops could land, boldly and at all hazards
to seize the roads by which Taylor must retreat, Grover now took
counsel with prudence and concealing his force behind the natural
screen of the wood, waited till his whole division should be fully
ready.
Thus it was six o'clock and the sun stood low among the tree-tops
when Grover, with Birge and Kimball, took up the line of march for
the Teche. Crossing the upper of the two bridges, he went into
bivouac on the right bank on the plantation of Madame Porter, and
called in Dwight's detachment. Before setting out to rejoin the
division Holcomb burned the lower bridge, under orders, and then
marching up the left bank, crossed the upper bridge at a late hour
of the night. In Grover's front stood Vincent alone, for Reily
had not yet come; but in the darkness it was impossible for Grover
to make out the enemy's force, or even to find his exact position.
When about nine o'clock that night, as related in the last chapter,
Taylor heard the news from Reily, he supposed Grover to be already
in strong possession of the only road by which the Confederates
could make good their retreat up the Teche; yet desperate as the
situation seemed, Taylor at once made up his mind to try to extricate
himself from the toils. Sending his wagon train ahead, soon after
midnight he silently moved out of the lines of Bisland and marched
rapidly on Franklin, leaving Green to cover the rear and retard
the pursuit. These dispositions made, Taylor himself rode at once
to his reversed front, a mile east of Franklin. With him were
Reily, whom he had picked up on the road below Franklin, Vincent
who with the four guns of Cornay was still watching Grover, and
Clack's Louisiana battalion, which had come in from New Iberia just
in the nick of time. The plantation with the sugar-house, then
belonging to McKerrall, is now known as Shaffer's. The grounds of
Oak Lawn adjoin it toward the east and north, and along its western
boundary stand Nerson's Woods, whence the coming battle takes the
name given to it in the Confederate accounts. Here, beneath the
trees, along their eastern skirt and behind a stout fence, Taylor
formed his line of battle, facing toward the east, and waited for
the coming of Grover. South of the bayou road stood Clack; on his
left, two pieces of Cornay's battery, next Reily, then Vincent with
a second section of Cornay's guns. The task before them was simple
but desperate. They were to hold off Grover until all but they
had safely passed behind the living barrier. Then they were to
extricate themselves as best they could, and falling in the rear
of the main column of the Confederate army try to make good their
own escape. Before this could happen, Grover might overwhelm them
or Banks might overtake them; yet there was no other way.
As early on the morning of Tuesday the 14th of April as it was
light enough to see, Grover marched on Franklin by the winding
bayou road. Preceded by Barrett and a strong line of skirmishers,
Birge with Rodgers's battery led the column; Dwight with Closson's
battery, followed; while Kimball with Nims's battery brought up
the rear.
The head of Grover's column had gone about two miles, and in a few
moments more would have turned the sharp corner of the bayou and
faced toward Franklin, when, on the right, near the sugar-house,
Birge's skirmishers ran into those of Clack's battalion, and the
battle of Irish Bend began.
Between Birge and the concealed Confederate ranks, past which he
was in fact marching, while his line of direction gave his right
flank squarely to the hostile front, lay the broad and open fields
of McKerrall's plantation, where the young sugar-cane stood a foot
high above the deep and wide furrows. From recent ploughing and
still more recent rains the fat soil was soft and heavy under foot,
and here and there the cross-furrows, widening and deepening into
a ditch, added to the toil and difficulty of movement, both for
men and guns. On the left flowed the dark and sluggish Teche. On
the right lay the swamp, thickly overgrown and nearly impassable,
whence the waters of the Choupique begin to ooze toward the Gulf.
Along the southern border of this morass ran a great transverse
ditch that carried off the gathered seepage of the lesser drains.
In front, on the western edge of the cane-field, stood Nerson's
woods, where, as yet unseen, the Confederates lay in wait; while
before them, like a screen, stretched a low fringe of brake and
undergrowth.
Birge's order of march placed the 25th Connecticut in the advance,
one wing deployed as skirmishers across the road, the other wing
in reserve. Next came the 26th Maine with Bradley's section of
Rodgers's battery, then the 159th New York, then the remainder of
Rodgers's battery, while the 13th Connecticut brought up the rear.
When he saw his skirmishers briskly engaged and by the sound and
smoke discovered the position of the enemy, Birge made the reserved
battalion of the 25th Connecticut change front forward and move
across the field against the Confederate left. Bissell led his
men quickly to within a hundred yards of the wood, where they lay
down under the partial cover of a ditch and began firing. Hubbard,
with the 26th Maine, came up on Bissell's left and took up the same
tactics. At once the enfilade fire of the Confederate line became
vigorous and annoying, until Bradley took his two guns at a gallop
to the skirt of the undergrowth opposite the interval between the
infantry battalions and, opening fire at five hundred yards' range,
engaged for a time the whole attention of the Confederate cannoneers.
Then Grover, who rode with Birge, sent in the 159th New York on
the left of the 26th Maine, with orders to take the wood, while
the 13th Connecticut, marching round the bend of the bayou, formed
on the extreme left between the stream and the road.
Molineux promptly deployed his regiment, and gallantly led it
forward at the double-quick over and beyond the left of the line
already formed, until the men were within short point-blank range
of the enemy's musketry; there, finding them exhausted by the rapid
advance over the rough and heavy ground, as well as suffering
severely from the bullets of the enemy, he made the men throw off
their blankets and overcoats, lie down, and open a vigorous fire.
Perhaps under the stress of this, but more probably in preparation
for the counter-attack, the Confederates slackened their fire, and
Molineux, perceiving his opportunity, as it seemed, was in the act
of uttering the command "Forward!" when a bullet struck him in the
mouth and he fell, painfully wounded, leaving the command of the
regiment, for the time, to Captain Dayton. Lieutenant-Colonel
Draper had already fallen, and Major Burt was with Grover, serving
on the staff.
At the word the men sprang to their feet, but before the command
could be carried out, suddenly came the crisis of the battle.
About seven o'clock, Gray had brought up the 28th Louisiana to
Taylor's aid, and with it the news that the rest of the forces from
Bisland were close at hand and all was well with them. Under cover
of the wood, Taylor moved Gray quietly to the left, and perceiving
that his line now overlapped Grover's right, promptly determined
to gain the brief time he still needed for the safe retreat of his
main body by a bold and vigorous attack with the whole force he
had under his hand. The order was obeyed with spirit. Out of the
wood beyond the right, and from the main ditch, well in the rear
of the 159th, the Confederates came charging strongly, and halting,
they poured in a hot volley. Seeing that the situation was critical
Dayton ordered the regiment to retire. Under a severe fire it fell
back quickly, yet in good order, to the road. There it promptly
re-formed on its colors, and Burt rejoining took command.
In their retreat the New Yorkers swept over the position of the
26th Maine and the 25th Connecticut and carried these already shaken
regiments with them, in some natural disorder; but his lasted hardly
longer than was needed for Dwight to hear and obey the command that
now came back from Grover, to deploy the first brigade and take up
the broken battle.
Bradley held his ground stoutly to the last moment, and when finally
the choice was narrowed to retreat or capture, he retired in good
order to a fresh position, and there serving his canister with
coolness and deliberation, held off the enemy's advance. At this
point, Rodgers, who with his centre section was in the road on the
left, engaged at 800 and 400 yards with Cornay's right section,
turned his attention to the Confederate infantry on the right, and
crossing with spherical case-shot the canister fire of his Lieutenant,
made good the check.
Almost at the moment when Taylor's left was thus roughly bearing
down the right of Birge, on his left his own 13th Connecticut,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, enveloped in a grove, was moving
steadily on the Confederate right, where Clack stood and the two
guns of Cornay. Emerging from the grove into an open field that
still lay between them and the enemy in the wood, Warner's men
instantly replied to the volleys of cannon and small-arms that
greeted their appearance and pushed on, firing as they went. More
fortunate than their comrades in the direction and the moment of
their attack, they pressed back Clack, drove off Cornay's guns,
and took two of his caissons, a limber, and a color presented to
his battery by the ladies of Franklin. Nearly 60 prisoners at the
same time fell into their hands. They were still advancing when
Grover's orders recalled them to the restored line of battle of
the brigade.
As Birge's right retired, Dwight deployed in two lines, the 6th
New York and the 91st New York in front, the 22d Maine, 1st Louisiana,
and 131st New York in support, and advancing against Taylor's left
flank and overlapping it in its turn pushed it back into and beyond
the woods. In this movement Dwight took 70 prisoners. The resistance
he encountered was feeble compared with the vigor with which Birge
had been met and turned back, for in that effort the Confederate
line of battle had practically gained its main object and had now
only to extricate itself and make good its own withdrawal.
Birge, at the same time that he drew back the 13th Connecticut,
once more moved forward his three other regiments and re-formed
the brigade in two lines on Dwight's left.
Kimball, whose brigade was in two lines in reserve, brought up the
12th Maine to the support of the 13th Connecticut.
This done, Grover advanced the whole division through the woods to
the open fields on their farther or western verge, and seeing the
Confederates in force on the knoll beyond, to which they had retired,
halted and began to observe and reconnoitre.
To cover the right flank of the last Confederate position Semmes
brought up the _Diana_, whose injuries of the day before he had
during the night partly made good by repairs. Her 30-pounder
Parrott now opened a slow fire without great effect other than to
add to Grover's caution.
Shortly after eight o'clock Mouton rode up. To him Taylor turned
over the command of the force confronting Grover, and then rode
into Franklin to direct the retreat. By half-past nine Green with
the rear-guard moved out on the direct road toward New Iberia.
The last of Green's troopers had not quitted the little town at
the upper end when the first of Weitzel's entered at the lower end.
Some time passed before Mouton knew of this. Then for a brief
space his peril was great; but fortunately for him the unlooked-for
situation of affairs raised a momentary doubt in the minds of
Green's pursuers. Should they go to the right or to the left?
And where was Grover? After questioning prisoners and townspeople,
Banks directed Weitzel to follow by the cut-off road and Emory to
move up the bayou. The interval, short as it was, enabled Mouton
to fall back quickly, and taking a by-way across country to strike
into the cut-off road beyond the northern outskirts of Franklin.
Not an instant too soon, for in the confusion Sibley had fired the
bridge over the Choupique and across the blazing timbers lay Mouton's
last hope of escape. Hardly had his men reached the north bank in
safety when Weitzel's advance guard came in sight down the road.
They galloped to the bridge only to find it impassable.
Before retiring the Confederates blew up the _Diana_ and applied
the match to all their transport steamers on the Teche save the
hospital boat, the _Cornie_, which loaded with the sick and wounded
of Bisland fell into the hands of the Union forces. Captain Semmes,
who had but the day before left his battery to command the _Diana_,
was taken prisoner, with all his crew. He and Weitzel had been
friends and classmates at West Point; he now refused the offered
courtesies of his captor, and a few hours later, finding himself
rather loosely guarded, cleverly managed to regain his liberty.
To return to Grover. The situation of the enemy's force in his
front, the vigorous resistance encountered in his advance, and
lastly, the information gathered from the prisoners he had taken,
had convinced him that he had to deal with Taylor's whole force,
save a small rear-guard, and that Taylor had already succeeded in
passing him, so that it was no longer possible to cut the Confederate
line of retreat. Indeed, Grover seems rather to have thought that
Taylor meant to attack him. It was while careful reconnoissances
were being conducted to develop the true facts that Taylor slipped
away, as we have seen, having thus adroitly extricated himself from
the net spread in his sight.
About two o'clock, however, as Taylor did not attack, Grover moved
forward, and as he marched down the bayou road soon met Emory coming
up, as related in the last chapter.
Banks, seeing that the bridge could not be made passable before
morning, and that nothing was to be gained by marching his tired
troops over the long roundabout of the bayou road, went into bivouac
early in the afternoon, covering the northern approaches of Franklin.
Grover occupied his battle-field of the morning, Emory held the
bayou road between Grover and the town, and Weitzel the cut-off
road.
Taylor crossed the Cypremort and having marched fifteen miles since
quitting Franklin, or twenty-five since midnight, rested near
Jeannerette.
Grover reported his loss during the 13th, 14th, and 17th as 53
killed, 270 wounded, and 30 captured or missing; in all 353. In
the battle of Irish Bend, according to the nominal lists as complied
in the Official Records, his loss was 6 officers and 43 men killed,
17 officers and 257 men wounded, and 30 men missing; in all 353;
agreeing with the first statement covering the three days, yet
differing slightly in the details. Of this total Dwight's brigade
lost 3 killed and 9 wounded on the 13th, 1 killed and 5 wounded on
the 17th, and only 2 killed and 13 wounded in the battle. Both
statements seem to leave out the 1st Louisiana, which had 2 men
killed and the lieutenant-colonel and 2 men wounded on the 13th.
In Birge's brigade the loss in the battle, according to Grover's
report, was 46 killed, 236 wounded, 49 missing; in all 312. The
official reports show 16 less in the columns of wounded and in the
total: these are probably the 16 wounded officers accounted for
in the nominal lists. Of the regiments engaged the heaviest loss
fell upon the 159th New York, in which the nominal lists show 4
officers and 15 men killed, 5 officers and 73 men wounded, and 20
men captured or missing; in all 117.(1) But this fine regiment
suffered even more severely than these figures indicate, for besides
having to mourn the death of the gallant and promising Draper,
Molineux received a grievous wound that for many weeks deprived
the regiment of one of the best colonels in the service, while of
the wounded officers two were mortally hurt and died soon afterward.
Birge's loss was nearly one man in four or five, for his strength
did not exceed 1,500, and it is probable that his fighting line
numbered not more than 1,200.
The Confederate loss is not reported. They left on the field, to
be cared for by their adversary, 21 of their dead and 35 of their
wounded. Among these were Gray, Vincent, and Reily.
Taylor gives the number of his infantry engaged in the charge on
Birge's right as less than 1,000. The disparity of the opposing
forces in that affair was, therefore, not important, and Birge's
somewhat greater numbers may fairly be considered as off-set by
the advantages of Taylor's position and the familiarity with the
country common to nearly all the Confederate soldiers there engaged,
while to their antagonists it was an unknown land. Grover's whole
force was about 5,000, of all arms, but of these, though all are
to be taken into account, nearly a third were in reserve, neither
firing nor under fire, while another third met a resistance so
light that its loss was no more than one per cent. of its numbers
--hardly more than it had suffered in the skirmishes of the day
before. Grover had eighteen pieces of artillery, of which but four
were in action; Taylor also had four guns of which he made good
use, and these, toward the close of the battle, were reinforced by
the five heavy guns of the _Diana_, of which, however, it is probable
that but one, or at most two, could be brought to bear.
The field of battle was so contracted that Taylor's strength sufficed
to occupy its front, while Grover was hindered or prevented from
deploying a force large enough to outflank and crush his antagonist
at a blow.
Viewed from a Confederate standpoint, the issue forms an instructive
example of the great results that may be achieved by a right use
of small forces. If, on the other hand, one turns to consider the
lost opportunity of Grover, two things stand out in strong relief:
the one, the positive disadvantage of employing forces, too large
for the affair in hand or for the scene of operations; the other,
that bold adventures must be carried boldly to the end.
Instead of making the campaign with four brigades and twenty-four
guns, as Weitzel's original plan had contemplated, Banks, for
greater security, set out with seven brigades and fifty-six guns.
So far as concerned the main body ascending the Teche, this excess
of strength could do no harm, but it was otherwise with the turning
column by the lake; for to the needless augmentation of the artillery
were directly due not only the day and night first lost, but also
the still more precious hours of daylight consumed in landing guns
that were not to fire a shot. Two brigades of infantry, with six
guns at most, landing at Indian Bend, and marching directly toward
the Cypremort, and quickly entrenching across both roads at or near
their upper fork, would have been enough to hold the position
against the best efforts of the whole of Taylor's army, with Emory
close on their heels; and thus Taylor must have been lost and the
war in Western Louisiana brought to an end. Consequences many and
far-reaching would have followed. Moreover, when it was determined
to use more than two divisions one of these was naturally Grover's,
and thus it happened that to Grover, who knew nothing of the country,
was assigned the delicate duty first cut out for Weitzel, while
Weitzel, who had studied to the last point every detail of the
topography and of the plan, stayed behind as the third in command
of the column destined to butt its nose against the breastworks of
Bisland and wait for the real work to be done a day's march on
their farther side.
Grover has been often criticised and much misunderstood for alleged
over-caution and for taking the wrong direction after quitting the
borders of the lake. Both criticisms are unjust. Generals, like
other men, act according to their temperaments. In the whole war
no braver man than Grover ever rode at the head of a division, nor
any more zealous, more alert, more untiring in his duty. No troops
of his ever went into battle but he was with them. But he was by
nature cautious, and the adventure was essentially one that called
for boldness. Moreover, he was by nature conscientious. That his
orders, based as they were on misinformation of a date much later
than Weitzel's intelligence, required him to land at Irish Bend
instead of at Indian Bend, as first arranged, and to march on
Franklin instead of toward the Cypremort, was not his affair.
Surely no soldier is to be blamed, least of all in combined and
complex operations, for choosing to obey the clearly expressed
orders of those set over him, rather than to follow the illusory
inspirations of the will-o'-the-wisp commonly mistaken for genius.
As for the orders themselves, they were correct upon the information
at hand when they were given and the state of affairs then existing.
To land at Madame Porter's and to seize the roads at Franklin was
better than to go farther afield to gain the same end; for the
distance was less, and while on the march Grover was enabled to
offer his front instead of his flank to the enemy. But the
information proved inexact; when Madame Porter's road was tried it
was found impassable, and with this and the unforeseen delays it
happened that the orders became inapplicable.
(1) According to the regimental history (MS.), 4 officers and 22
men killed; 5 officers and 76 men wounded; 11 men missing; in all,
118: of the wounded, 2 officers and 10 men mortally.