BISLAND.
The works behind which the Confederates now stood to battle were
named Camp Bisland or Fort Bisland, in honor of the planter whose
fields were thus given over to war. The defences consisted of
little more than a line of simple breastworks, of rather low relief,
thrown completely across the neck of dry land on either bank of
the Teche, the flanks resting securely on the swamps that border
Grand Lake on the left and on the right extend to the Gulf. The
position was well chosen, for five miles below Centreville, where
the plantation of Mrs. Meade adjoins the Bethel Place, the neck is
at its narrowest. The Teche, passing a little to the left of the
centre of the works, enabled the guns of the _Diana_, moving freely
around the bends, to contribute to the defence, while the obstructions
placed below the works hindered the ascent of the bayou by the
Union gunboats. The Confederate right was also somewhat strengthened
by the embankment of the unfinished railroad to Opelousas. On the
other hand, from the nature of the ground, low and flat as it was,
the works were in part rather commanded than commanding; yet the
difference of level was inconsiderable, and for a force as small
as Taylor's, outnumbered as his was, any slight disadvantage in
this way was more than compensated by the shortness of the line.
Along the banks of the bayou were a few live oaks; on either flank
the swamp was densely wooded, mainly with cypress, cottonwood, and
willow, with an outlying and almost impenetrable canebrake, while
between the attacking columns and the Confederate position, on
either bank of the bayou, stretched a field where the young shoots
of the sugar-cane stood knee-high. This was crossed at right angles
with the bayou, by many of those wide and deep ditches by which
the planters of Louisiana are accustomed to drain their tilled
lowlands.
Such was the scene of the action now about to be fought, known to
the Union army as the battle of Bisland or Fort Bisland; to the
Confederates, as the battle of Bethel Place or Bayou Teche.
During the whole of the night of the 12th a dense fog prevailed,
but this lifting about eight o'clock on the morning of Monday, the
13th of April, disclosed a day as bright and beautiful as the scene
was fair. At an early hour the whole line advanced to within short
musketry range, in substantially the same order as on the previous
day. An attack by a detachment of Confederate cavalry upon the
skirmishers of the 4th Wisconsin, in advance of the sugar-house,
was easily thrown off, and a later demonstration by the Confederate
infantry upon Paine's position in the grove shared the same fortune.
Emory moved first the 8th New Hampshire, and afterwards the 133d
and 173d New York, to the support of the 4th Wisconsin. At the
same time Banks ordered Emory to send the other four regiments of
Gooding's brigade and the two remaining sections of the 1st Maine
battery to reinforce Bryan with the 175th New York on the left bank
of the Teche, in order to be prepared, not only to meet a flank
movement of the Confederates from that direction, but also to carry
to works on that side, should this be thought best. After these
dispositions had been completed the advance was steady and continuous,
yet not rapid, until toward noon the last of the Confederates
retired behind their breastworks and opened fire with musketry.
The ditches already spoken of hindered the progress of the Union
artillery, yet not seriously, while they afforded an excellent
protection for the supports of the batteries and enabled the lines
of infantry to rest at intervals: no small gain, for the sun grew
very hot, and the march over the heavy windrows and across the deep
ditches was exhausting.
The Confederate gunboat _Diana_ took position well in front of the
works, so as to command completely the right flank of Emory and
Weitzel as they approached by a fire that, had it not been checked,
must have enfiladed the whole line. Just as this fire was beginning
to be disturbing it was silenced by a fortunate shot from one of
the two 30-pounder Parrott guns, served by the 1st Indiana, posted
in rear of Weitzel's left and trained upon the _Diana_, under the
personal supervision of Arnold. The third shot from this battery,
aimed at the flash of the _Diana_'s guns, exploded in her engine
room; then above the trees, whose leafage full and low hid the
vessel, was seen a flash like a puff of vapor; a rousing cheer was
heard from the sharpshooters of the 4th Wisconsin and 8th New
Hampshire, who had been told off to keep down the fire of the
gunboat; and the _Diana_ was seen to pass up the bayou and out of
the fight.
All risk of an enfilade file being thus removed, the whole Union
line quickly closed with the Confederates, and the engagement became
general with artillery and musketry. On both sides of the bayou
the firing was brisk, at times even severe. Save where the view
was broken here and there by the trees or became lightly clouded
by the smoke of battle, the whole field lay in plain sight. As
the course of the Teche in ascending turned toward the left, Gooding,
on the east bank, had the wheeling flank, while Weitzel formed the
pivot.
Gooding went forward in gallant style, his men quickening their
pace at times to a run, in order to keep the alignment with the
main body on the west bank. Perceiving on his extreme right, toward
the lake, a fine grove or copse, Gooding threw out Sharpe with the
156th New York to examine the wood with a view of attempting to
turn the left flank of the Confederate lines. These, as it proved,
did not extend beyond the grove, but there ended in an unfinished
redoubt. Indeed, nearly the whole of the Confederate works on the
east side of the bayou, although laid out long since, had been but
recently and hastily thrown up, after it became known to Taylor
that Banks was crossing to attack him. In the wood, about five
hundred yards in advance of the breastworks, Mouton had posted
Bagby's 3d Texas regiment. The Texans held their ground so stiffly
that Gooding found it necessary to send his own regiment, the 31st
Massachusetts, to the support of Sharpe. Mouton supported Bagby
with the left wing of the 18th Louisiana and part of Fournet's and
Waller's battalions. Gooding's men carried the rifle-pits in the
wood by a spirited charge, in which they took two officers and
eighty-four men prisoners. His main line in the open ground between
the wood and the bayou was formed by the 38th Massachusetts, deployed
as skirmishers, covering the front and followed, at a distance of
about one hundred and fifty yards, by the 53d Massachusetts, in
like order. Behind the 53d, two sections of the 1st Maine battery
were posted to command two parallel plantation roads leading up
the bayou, while the third section was held in reserve. After the
31st Massachusetts had gone to the support of the right, the main
line here was composed of the 175th New York. Shortly after five
o'clock the 53d Massachusetts relieved the 38th, which had expended
its ammunition, and was falling back under orders to replenish.
When this was done, the 38th once more advanced and formed in
support of the skirmish line.
Meanwhile on the left of the Teche the main body moved forward in
two lines of battalions deployed, Paine on the right and Weitzel
on the left, while Ingraham, in column of companies, formed the
reserve for both. Paine's first line on the right, nearest the
bayou, was composed of the 4th Wisconsin and 8th New Hampshire,
his second line of the 133d New York and the 173d New York. Mack's
20-pounders commanded the bayou road, and Duryea went into battery
in advance of the centre, between Paine and Weitzel.
Weitzel's front line was composed of the 8th Vermont and 114th New
York, with the 12th Connecticut, 160th New York, and 75th New York
in the second line. The guns of Bainbridge and Carruth went into
battery near the left flank, and working slowly kept down the fire
of the Confederate artillery in their front. When the fire of
musketry became hot, Weitzel sent the 75th New York to try to gain
the canebrake on the left, in advance of the enemy's works, with
a view of turning that flank. Of this movement Taylor says in his
report that it was twice repulsed by the 5th Texas and Waller's
battalion, under Green, and the 28th Louisiana, Colonel Gray, aided
by the guns of Semmes's battery and the Valverde battery. However,
the counter-movement on the part of the Confederates, being begun
in plain view, was instantly seen, and Banks sent word to Weitzel
to check it. With this object, Weitzel ordered the 114th New York
to go to the support of the 75th. A brisk fight followed, without
material advantage to either side. In truth, the canebrake formed
an impenetrable obstacle to the combatants, who, when once they
had passed within the outer edge of the tangle, were unable either
to see or approach one another, although the struggle was plainly
visible from the front of both armies.
The reserve of Parrott guns, manned by the 1st Indiana and composed
of four 30-pounders and four 20-pounders, was posted under McMillan
to cover the left flank and the broken centre where it was pierced
by the bayou, as well as to watch for the return of the _Diana_ to
activity. Toward evening the remaining guns of the 1st Indiana,
two 12-pounder rifles under Cox, after being posted in support of
the centre, were sent to the left to assist Bainbridge and Carruth,
whose ammunition was giving out.
Banks, after gaining advanced positions in contact with the enemy,
forbore to press them hard because, as has been seen, his whole
purpose was to hold the Confederates where they stood until he
could hear of Grover or from Grover. As the day advanced without
news or the long-expected sound of Grover's guns, Banks began to
grow impatient and to fear that the adventure from which so much
had been hoped had somehow miscarried. He therefore became even
more anxious than before lest the Confederates should move off
under cover of the coming night. Accordingly, during the afternoon,
although it had been his previous purpose not to deliver an assault
until certain that Grover held the Confederate line of retreat,
Banks gave discretionary orders to Emory and Weitzel to form for
an attack and move upon the Confederate works if a favorable
opportunity should present itself. The exercise of this discretion
in turn devolved upon the commanders of the front line, that is,
upon Weitzel and Paine, for Gooding, being out of communication,
except by signal, with the troops on the west bank, was occupied
in conforming to their movements. Paine and Weitzel, after
conferring, resolved to attack, and having made every preparation,
only waited for the word from the commanding general.
The day was waning; it was already past four o'clock; and Banks
was still somewhat anxiously weighing the approach of night and
the cost of the assault against the chance of news from Grover,
when suddenly, straight up the bayou, and high above the heads of
Banks and his men, a 9-inch shell came hurtling, and as it was seen
to burst over the lines of Bisland, from far in the rear broke the
deep roar of the _Clifton_'s bow-gun. Soon from below the obstructions
that barred her progress came a messenger bearing the long-expected
tidings of Grover. At last he was on land and in march toward his
position. With a sense of relief Banks recalled the orders for
the assault and drew his front line back out of fire of the
Confederate musketry so that the men might rest. To relieve the
exhausted skirmish line, the 4th Massachusetts and the 162d New
York of Ingraham's brigade were sent forward from the reserve,
leaving him only the 110th New York.
By dawn the next morning, at all events, Banks calculated, the
turning column would be in place; accordingly during the night he
gave orders to assault along the whole front as soon as it should
be light enough to see.
However, shortly after midnight, sounds were heard on the picket
line, indicating some unusual movement behind the Confederate works.
When, at daybreak, the various skirmishers moved forward in eager
rivalry, they found the Confederates gone. Captain Allaire, leading
his company of the 133d New York, was the first to enter the works;
the regiment itself and the 8th New Hampshire followed closely,
and the colors of the 8th were the first to mount the parapet,
where they were planted by Paine. On the left bank, this honor
fell to the 53d Massachusetts. But in truth the surge was so nearly
simultaneous that the whole line of entrenchments on both sides of
the bayou, from right to left, was crossed almost at the same
instant.
It was nine o'clock on Monday night when Taylor learned of Grover's
movements and position, as narrated in the next chapter. Taylor
at once began to move out of the lines of Bisland and to direct
his attention to Grover in order to secure a retreat. Just before
daylight Green, to whom, with his 5th Texas, Waller's battalion,
and West's section of Semmes's battery, Taylor had given the more
than usually delicate task of covering the rear, marched off the
ground, leaving nothing behind save one 24-pounder siege gun and
a disabled howitzer of Cornay's battery.
Without losing an instant the pursuit of the retreating Confederates
was begun, Weitzel leading the way, and was conducted with vigor
and with scarcely a halt, notwithstanding the energetic opposition
of the Confederate rear-guard, until early in the afternoon, just
beyond Franklin, Emory's advance guard, under Paine, following the
bayou road, ran into Grover's under Dwight, approaching from the
opposite direction. Weitzel, having entered Franklin without
opposition, kept the left-hand or cut-off road until he came to
the burnt bridge over the Choupique, by which, as will presently
be seen, the Confederates had escaped.
Gooding, after occupying the works in his front, crossed the Teche
by a bridge to the west bank and fell into Emory's column behind
Ingraham. The _Clifton_, as soon as the obstructions could be
removed, got under way and moved up the bayou abreast with the
advance of the army.
The losses of the Nineteenth Army Corps in this its first battle
were 3 officers and 37 men killed, 8 officers and 176 men wounded;
in all 224. The 38th Massachusetts headed the list with 6 killed
and 29 wounded, and Gooding's brigade, to which this regiment
belonged, reported 87 casualties, or 38 per cent. of the whole.
In the six light batteries 15 horses were killed and 12 wounded,
and one caisson of the 1st Maine was upset and lost in crossing
the Teche to go into action.
The losses of the Confederates have never been reported and no
means are known to exist for estimating them.
The disparity of the forces engaged was more than enough to overcome
the Confederate advantage of position, for Banks had 10,000 men
with 38 guns, while Taylor reports but 4,000 men with four batteries,
estimated at 24 or 25 guns. To these must be added the _Diana_,
until disabled on Monday morning, and to the Union strength the
_Clifton_, after she arrived and opened fire at long range on Monday
afternoon.
At Bisland the new headquarters flags were for the first time
carried under fire. These distinguishing colors, as prescribed in
General Orders on the 18th of February, were guidons four feet
square attached to a lance twelve feet long, made for convenience
in two joints. In camp or garrison they served to indicate the
quarters of the general commanding the corps, division, or brigade,
while on the march they were borne near his person by a mounted
orderly, commonly a trusty sergeant. The flag of the Nineteenth
Army Corps was blue with a white four-pointed star in the middle,
and on the star the figures 19 in red. From this the division
flags differed only in having a red ground and the number of the
division in black. The brigade flags had blue, white, and blue
horizontal stripes of equal width, with the number of the brigade
in black in the white stripe. Thenceforward these colors were
borne through every engagement in which the corps took part. Not
one of them was ever abandoned by its bearer or taken by the enemy.