OPELOUSAS.
Cooke, after detaching the _Clifton_ to go up the Teche after the
_Diana_, as already related, remained at anchor in Grand Lake
opposite Grover's landing-place and awaited developments. He had
not long to wait. The first news of Banks's movement across Berwick
Bay had overtaken and recalled Taylor on his way up the Atchafalaya
to bring down the _Queen of the West_ and her consorts, the _Grand
Duke_ and _Mary T_, to join in the intended operations against
Weitzel. Although Taylor at once sent a staff officer to urge
despatch, yet from some cause more than two full days had passed
before, on the afternoon of the 13th, the distant smoke of the
Confederate gun-boats coming down Lake Chicot was seen by the
lookouts of the Union navy in Grand Lake. At daylight the _Queen
of the West_ and the _Mary T_, were seen approaching from Chicot
Pass. Cooke at once got the _Estrella, Calhoun_, and _Arizona_
under way, opened fire at long range, and forming his boats in a
crescent began to close with the enemy. Soon, however, the _Queen
of the West_ was seen to be in flames, from the explosion of the
Union shells, and, her consort having promptly taken to flight,
Cooke ceased firing and lowered all his boats to save the crew of
the burning vessel from drowning. Captain Fuller, who had formerly
commanded the _Cotton_, was rescued with 90 of his men, but nearly
30 were lost. Then with a loud explosion the eventful career of
the _Queen of the West_ came to an end, leaving her five guns,
however, once more in the hands of the Union navy. This fortunate
stroke gave the mastery of the Atchafalaya into Cooke's hands with
nothing save Butte-à-la-Rose and two feeble gunboats to hinder his
taking possession.
Once safely across the Cypremort, Taylor's army began to melt away
and his men, as they passed their homes, to fall out without
hindrance. Many were of the simple class called Acadians, with
scant sympathy for either side of the great war into which they
found themselves drawn, and in all the regiments there were many
conscripts.
On the 15th of April, Taylor marched ten miles to New Iberia.
While there, he had the unfinished ironclad gunboat _Stevens_,
previously known as the _Hart_, floated two miles down the Teche,
destroyed by fire, and the wreck sunk in the channel.
On the 16th he marched twenty miles, crossed the Vermilion River,
went into camp on high ground on the north bank, and burned the
bridges behind him.
Early in the morning of the 15th of April, Banks took up the pursuit
with his united force, now outnumbering Taylor's as three to one.
Weitzel led the advance of the main column on the direct road.
Emory followed him, and Grover marching at first on the bayou road
fell in the rear after passing the fork. The army halted for the
night at Jeannerette.
On the following afternoon Banks entered New Iberia. Here the ways
parted, the right-hand road by Saint Martinville following for
many miles the windings of the Teche, while the left-hand road
leads almost directly to Opelousas, by way of Vermilionville, now
called Lafayette.
Beyond Indian Bend the lowlands, in many places below and nowhere
much above the level of the adjacent waters, may be said to end
and the plains to begin; and soon after leaving New Iberia and
Saint Martinville the troops found themselves on the broad prairies
of Western Louisiana, where the rich grasses that flourish in the
light soil sustain almost in a wild state vast herds of small yet
fat beeves and of small yet strong horses; where in favored spots
the cotton plant is cultivated to advantage; where the ground,
gently undulating, gradually rises as one travels northward; where
the streams become small rivers that drain the land upon their
borders, instead of merely bayous taking the back waters of the
Mississippi and the Red. Near the right bank of the Teche runs
even a narrow ribbon of bluffs that may be said to form the western
margin of the great swamps of the Atchafalaya. Along the streams
live-oaks, magnolias, pecans, and other trees grow luxuriantly;
but, for the most part, the prairies are open to the horizon, and
at this time, though the gin-houses were full of cotton, the fields
were mainly given over to the raising of corn for the armies and
the people of the Confederacy.
From New Iberia Banks ordered Grover to send a detachment to destroy
the famous Avery salt-works, on Petit Anse Island, distant about
twelve miles toward the southwest. On the 17th of April, Grover
accordingly dispatched Kimball on this errand, with his 12th Maine,
the 41st Massachusetts, one company of the 24th Connecticut, and
Snow's section of Nims's battery. The extremely rich natural
deposit of rock salt was, at that time, in the hands of the
Confederate government, being, indeed, the main source of supply
of this indispensable article for the whole Confederacy, especially
for the region between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. The works
required for its extraction are, however, very simple, for the
deposit lies close to the surface, and has only to be quarried in
blocks of convenient size. These, always as clear and beautiful
as crystal, have only to be crushed or broken to be ready to use
for common purposes, and when pulverized, however rudely, yield
the finest table salt. Kimball burned all the buildings, destroyed
the engines and implements, with six hundred barrels of salt, and
marched back to New Iberia, and, on the 19th, rejoined Grover on
the Vermilion. The Confederates having drawn off the detachment
and the guns previously posted to guard the works, Kimball met with
no opposition.
On the 17th of April, Grover, with the main body of his division,
reinforced by Gooding's brigade, temporarily commanded by Colonel
John W. Kimball, of the 53d Massachusetts, continued the pursuit
toward Vermilion, while Banks, with Weitzel and Emory, marched to
Saint Martinville, on the Teche.
Early in the afternoon Grover caught sight of Green's rear-guard
of Taylor's retreating forces, then about two miles distant, and
in the act of crossing the Vermilion. Before Grover could overtake
them, the bridges were in flames. Dwight's skirmishers deployed
on the right and left of the road, and, with the help of the guns
of Closson and Nims, drove off the enemy, posted to hinder or
prevent the work of reconstruction. In this affair Dwight lost
one killed and five wounded. The next day, the 18th of April, was
spent by Grover in rebuilding the main bridge.
Then began to be felt the need of such a force of mounted troops
as on these plains formed the main strength of Taylor's little
army, and the source of its safety; for Banks's cavalry, taken as
a whole, with some splendid exceptions, was at this time greatly
inferior, not only in numbers but in fitness for the work at hand,
to the rough riders led by the restless and indomitable Green. A
few more horsemen, under leaders like Barrett, Williamson, and
Perkins, would have saved the bridge and insured the dispersion or
the destruction of Taylor's force.
Weitzel, who, as far as Saint Martinville, had led the advance of
the main column, followed by Emory with Paine and Ingraham, there
took the road to the left and halted on the evening of the 17th of
April at Côte Geleé, four miles in the rear of Grover. The next
morning Weitzel moved up to Grover's support, while Banks, with
Emory, rested at Côte Geleé to await the rebuilding of the bridge.
From St. Martinville, Emory sent the 173d New York, under Major
Gallway, with Norris's section of Duryea's battery, to follow the
Teche road to Breaux Bridge and endeavor to capture the bayou
steamboats, five in number, that were still left to the Confederates.
Five miles below the village of that name, Gallway met a small
Confederate picket, and pushing it aside, soon afterward found the
bridge over the bayou in flames. On the morning of the 18th he
learned that four of the boats had been burned by the Confederates,
and about the same time his farther advance was stopped by orders
from Banks, despatched as soon as it was known that Grover had been
brought to a stand. A courier from headquarters having lost his
way in the night of the 18th, on the following morning Gallway
found himself in the air without any apparent object. He accordingly
marched along the banks of the Teche and the Bayou Fusilier, and
taking the road to Opelousas, there rejoined Paine on the 1st.
On the 19th of April the army crossed the Vermilion and the Carencro,
and marched unopposed sixteen miles over the prairie to Grand
Coteau. Gooding's brigade rejoined Emory during the day.
On the 20th the march was continued about eight miles to Opelousas.
Just outside the town the Corps went into bivouac, after throwing
forward all the cavalry, the 13th Connecticut, and a section of
Rodgers's battery, to Washington, on the Courtableau.
On the same day, after a brief engagement, Cooke, with the gunboats
_Estrella, Arizona_, and _Calhoun_, and a detachment of four
companies of the 16th New Hampshire from Brashear, captured Fort
Burton at Butte-à-la-Rose, with its garrison of 60 men of the
Crescent regiment and its armament of two 32-pounders; thus at last
gaining the complete control of the Atchafalaya, and at the same
time opening communication with Banks by way of Port Barré or
Barré's Landing on the Courtableau, distant about nine miles
northeasterly from Opelousas. Then Cooke steamed up the Atchafalaya
to make his report to Farragut, lying in the Mississippi off the
mouth of the Red River, and to seek fresh orders.
At the outset of the campaign the 16th New Hampshire had been
detached from Ingraham's brigade of Emory and left at Brashear to
guard the main depots and the surplus baggage. After the battle
of Bisland, the 4th Massachusetts was turned back to Brashear to
relieve the 16th New Hampshire. This regiment having assisted in
the capture of Butte-à-la-Rose, now formed the garrison of that
desolate and deadly hummock.
While at Opelousas the army could draw its supplies from Brashear
by the Atchafalaya and the Courtableau, but so long as the direction
of the future operations remained uncertain, it was necessary to
keep a firm hold of the communications by the Teche. Accordingly,
the 175th New York took post at Franklin and the 22d Maine at New
Iberia.
On the 22d of April the 162d New York, under Blanchard, with a
section of the 1st Maine battery and one troop of the 2d Rhode
Island cavalry, marched to Barré's Landing, seized the position,
and captured the little steamboat _Ellen_, the last of the Teche
fleet.
On the 23d of April the little _Cornie_ arrived at Barré's Landing
from the depot at Brashear, and the next day the first wagon-train
came into camp laden with the supplies now sadly needed. At sight
of the white-covered wagons winding over the plain, the men gave
way to those demonstrations of delight so familiar to all who have
ever seen soldiers rejoice. For fifteen days they had been subsisting
upon an uncertain issue of hard bread, coffee, and salt, eked out
by levies, more or less irregular, upon the countryside. They were
sick of chickens and cornbread, and fairly loathed the very sight,
to say nothing of the smell, of fresh-killed beef; tough at best,
even in the heart of the tenderloin, the flesh had to be eaten with
the odor and the warmth of the blood still in it, under penalty of
finding it fly-blown before the next meal. Thus it was that, as
Paine relates in his Diary, the men now "howled for salt pork and
hard tack."
Although the army had now a double line of communication with its base,
yet the long haul from New Iberia and the scarcity of light-draught
steamboats adapted to the navigation of the narrow and tortuous bayous
made the task of supplying even the urgent wants of the troops
both tedious and difficult. The herds near Opelousas were fast
disappearing under the ravages of the foragers, authorized and
unauthorized, yet had it not been for the beef obtained from
this source and for the abundant grass of the prairie men and horses
must soon have suffered greatly.
On the 24th of April, Banks reviewed his army in the open plain,
near Opelousas. The troops, not as yet inured to the long and hard
marches, were indeed greatly diminished in numbers by the unaccustomed
toil and exposure, as well as by the casualties of battle and the
enervating effects of the climate, yet they presented a fine
appearance, and were in the best of spirits.
On learning of Cooke's success at Butte-à-la-Rose, Banks detached
Dwight, posted him at Washington in observation, and placed Grover
with his remaining brigades at Barré's Landing, to secure the
depots, while Emory and Weitzel covered Opelousas.
Having by burning the Vermilion bridge gained a day's rest for his
tired soldiers, Taylor resumed the retreat at noon on the 17th of
April, and passing through Opelousas and Washington on the 18th
and 19th, on the following day found himself with all his trains
behind the Cocodrie and the Boeuf. On the 20th he sent Mouton,
with all the cavalry except Waller's battalion, westward over the
prairie toward Niblett's Bluff, on the Sabine. Then, with Waller
and the frayed remnant of the infantry, day by day wearing away at
the edges, Taylor continued his retreat toward Alexandria, halting
with what may be called his main body at Lecompte. To hinder the
pursuit he burned the bridges over the Bayou Cocodrie and the Bayou
Boeuf.
Opelousas, miles away from every thing, in the heart of a vast
prairie, presented in itself no object for an invading army. Even
the temptation of a good position was wanting.
Banks meant merely to halt there a day or two for rest, and then,
if it should be found practicable to obtain the necessary supplies,
to push on rapidly to Alexandria, and dispose for the season of
Taylor's disordered fragments. Whether this could have been done
will never be known, for although the army had now far outmarched
its supplies, and even from its secondary base at Brashear was
separated by nearly a hundred miles, and although the campaign had
so far been made upon less than half the regular rations for men
and animals, supplemented from farm, sugar-house, and prairie, the
country on the line of march was no longer to be counted on for
any thing save sugar in plenty and a little corn; nevertheless, it
might have been possible, by great exertions, to replenish the
trains and depots, as well as to fill up the haversacks. Moreover,
a three days' march would find the army on the banks of Red River,
with a new and ample source of supply open to them, and within easy
reach of Grant, provided only the navy might be counted upon to
control the waters of that stream and its larger tributaries. Of
this Banks had no doubt whatever. To open communication with Grant
and to dispose of Taylor had been the chief ends that Banks had
proposed to himself in setting out on the campaign. These ends he
now held almost in his hand. But on the 21st of April an event
occurred that, slight as was its apparent importance, was destined,
in the train of consequences, vitally to affect the operations of
the Army of the Gulf.
This was the arrival at headquarters of Lieutenant Joseph T. Tenney,
one of Dudley's aides-de-camp, who had been sent by Augur to find
Banks, wherever he might be. With him Tenney brought important
despatches from Grant and Farragut. What the contents were and
what came of them will be related in the next chapter.
From Opelousas Bean, with the 4th Wisconsin, a section of Duryea's
battery, and a squadron of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry, went a
day's march toward the southwest, to the crossing of the Plaquemine
Brulé, and discovered that Mouton was retreating beyond the Mermentau.
From Washington, Dwight moved out twenty miles along the Bayou
Boeuf to Satcham's plantation without finding the enemy in force.
After learning these things, on the 25th of April, Banks turned
over the command of the forces to Emory and went to New Orleans to
give his attention to affairs of urgency, chiefly affecting the
civil administration of the department. He returned to headquarters
in the field on the evening of the 1st of May.
Meanwhile Emory sent Paine, who, when crossing the Carencro, had
seen the last of the Confederates disappearing in the distance,
with his brigade and a section of Duryea's battery far out on the
Plaquemine Brulé road, in order to find and disperse some cavalry,
vaguely reported to be moving about somewhere in that quarter, a
constant menace to the long trains from New Iberia. In fact Mouton,
with the Texans, was now on the prairie, beyond the Calcasieu eighty
miles away, in good position to retreat to Texas or to hang on the
flank and rear of the Union army, as circumstances might suggest.
On the 26th of April Paine marched sixteen miles to the Plaquemine
Brulé, and on the following day sent four companies on horseback
twenty miles farther toward the southwest across Bayou Queue de
Tortue, and another detachment to Bayou Mallet to reconnoitre.
Seeing nothing of the enemy, on the 28th Paine rejoined his division
and resumed the command of it at Opelousas. Some time before this
orders had been given to mount the 4th Wisconsin, and when the army
finally marched from Opelousas this capital regiment made its
appearance in the new rôle of mounted infantry. To say nothing of
the equipments, a wide divergence in the size, color, and quality
of the horses, hastily gathered from the four quarters of the
prairie, gave to these improvised dragoons rather a ludicrous
appearance it must be confessed; yet marching afoot or standing to
horse, the 4th Wisconsin was always ready and equal to the work
cut out for it.
From his advanced camp, on Shields's plantation, twenty-three miles
beyond Washington and twenty-nine from Opelousas, Dwight fell back
on the 28th of April to his bivouac at Washington and waited for
the movement of the army to begin.
In preparation for this, on the evening of the 1st of May, Bean,
with the 4th Wisconsin, mounted, was sent forward to join the main
body of the cavalry, under Major Robinson, in front of Washington.
That night Dwight, with the cavalry, his own brigade, and a section
of Nims's battery, marched out some distance to discover the position
of the Confederate outposts. These, in the interval that elapsed,
had been advanced to the junction of the Cocodrie and the Boeuf.
After driving them in Dwight returned the next morning to
Washington.
The advance of the column from Franklin to Opelousas had been
disfigured by the twin evils of straggling and marauding. Before
the campaign opened, Banks had taken the precaution to issue
stringent orders against pillage, yet no means adequate to the
enforcement of these orders were provided, and the marches were so
long and rapid, the heat at times so intense, and the dust so
intolerable, that comparatively few of the men were able to keep
up with the head of the column. This contributed greatly to disorder
of the more serious kind. One regiment, neither the best nor the
worst, halting at the end of a particularly hard day's march, found
itself with scarcely fifty men in the ranks. Then, too, the men
were on short rations, in what they considered the enemy's country;
the whole region was sparsely populated; and the residents had,
for the most part, fled from their homes at the news of the approach
of the Union army.
With these disorders there sprang up a third, less prevalent indeed,
but to the last degree annoying and not without its share of danger,
for when the straggler chanced to find himself in easy range of
any thing, from a steer to a chicken, that he happened to fancy
for his supper, he was not always careful in his aim or accurate
in his judgment of distance; thus a number of officers and men were
wounded and the lives of many put in peril.
As if to complete the lesson so often taught in all wars, that
discipline, care, and efficiency go hand in hand, when the army
moved out from Opelousas, though but a fortnight later, a different
state of things was seen. This must be ascribed to the fact that
immediately after entering Opelousas the most stringent and careful
orders were given for the regulation of future marches, and the
punishment of stragglers and marauders. By these orders was provided
for the first time a system adequate to their enforcement, and
sufficiently elastic to meet without annoyance and difficulty all
those cases, of hourly and even momentary occurrence in the movement
of an army, that require officers or men to quit the column. In
the rear of each regiment was posted a surgeon, without whose
permission no sick man was allowed to fall out. In the rear of
each brigade and division marched a detachment of cavalry, under
the orders of the provost marshal of the brigade or division,
charged with the duty of picking up as stragglers all men found
out of the ranks without a written permit from the surgeon or the
company commander. The vital importance of a strict enforcement
of these arrangements was personally impressed upon the division
and brigade commanders; yet this was not now necessary, for there
were but few persons in the column of any rank that did not realize,
in part at least, the evil consequences resulting from the irregular
practices that had hitherto prevailed. Thus the march to the Red
River was made rapidly and in order, and now for the first time
the soldiers of the Nineteenth Army Corps marched with that swift
and regulated movement of the column as a unit that was to be ever
afterwards a source of comfort to the men, of satisfaction to their
officers, and of just pride to every one belonging to the corps.
Unhappily, on the 25th of April, before the result of these
arrangements had had a chance to show themselves, Dwight, while on
detached service in the advance, caught an unfortunate man of the
131st New York, Henry Hamill by name, absent from his regiment
under circumstances that pointed him out as a plunderer. Then,
without pausing to communicate with the general commanding, Dwight
took upon himself the task of trial and judgment on the spot, and
becoming satisfied of the man's guilt, caused him to be shot to
death at sunset in front of the brigade. This action Banks, who
was just setting out for New Orleans, sustained in special orders
as soon as he returned. Indeed, between this course and the instant
delivery of Dwight to punishment, Banks had practically no choice.
Nevertheless, whatever may have been the excuse or how extreme the
provocation, the act was altogether wrong. The rules and articles
of war lay down the penal code of armies in all its severity, in
terms too clear to be misunderstood and too ample to warrant an
attempt on the part of any one in the service, however exalted his
rank, to enlarge or evade them. The offender should have been
tried by court-martial. No emergency or exigency existed to delay
the assembling of the court. Had he been found guilty, his death
might swiftly have followed. Then the terrible lesson would have
been impressive. Then none would have thought it hasty, needless,
violent, or unlawful.
As it was, the wretched man's punishment furnished chiefly matter
for regret, and an example to be avoided.