THE TECHE.
In effect, this plan was to turn Port Hudson by way of the Atchafalaya.
For the original conception, the credit must be given to Weitzel,
who seems indeed to have formed a very similar scheme when he first
occupied La Fourche. However, his force was, at that time, barely
sufficient for the defence of the territory confided to his care.
Not only was there then no particular object in moving beyond the
Atchafalaya, but any advance in that direction would have exposed
his little corps to disaster on account of the great facilities
afforded by the numberless streams for a movement by detachments
of the enemy into his rear. It was largely to prepare for an
advance into Western Louisiana, as well as to defend his occupancy
of La Fourche, that Butler, upon Weitzel's suggestion, had created
the gunboat flotilla.
Soon after Banks took the command, Weitzel, who had opinions and
the courage to enforce them, laid his ideas before his new chief.
On the 18th of January, disturbed by hearing that Admiral Farragut
meant to take one of the army gunboats, recently transferred to
the navy, away from Berwick Bay, instead of sending more, Weitzel
expressed himself strongly in a despatch to headquarters.
"With such a naval force in that bay, in co-operation with a suitable
land force, the only true campaign in this section could be made.
Look at the map. Berwick Bay leads into Grand Lake, Grand Lake
into the Atchafalaya, the Atchafalaya into Red River. Boats drawing
not more than four or five feet and in the force I mention [10 or
12], with a proper land force, could clear out the Atchafalaya,
Red River, and Black River. All communications from Vicksburg and
Port Hudson cross this line indicated by me. By taking it in the
manner I propose, Vicksburg and Port Hudson would be a cipher to
the rebels. It would be a campaign that 100,000 men could not so
easily fight, and so successfully. It is an operation to which
the taking of Galveston Island is a cipher and the capture of the
Mobile Bay forts a nonentity."
With these views Banks was himself in accord, yet not in their
entirety. The pressure of time led him to desire to avoid divergences
into the Teche country. If it were possible, he wished to gain
the Atchafalaya by some route at once speedier and more direct.
While the explorations were in progress to discover such a route,
Weitzel once more took occasion to urge his original plan. On the
15th of February, he wrote to Augur, his division commander:
"I feel it a duty which I owe you and my country to address you at
this late hour in the night on the present proposed movement on
Butte à la Rose and the Teche country. . . . In all honesty and
candor, I do not believe the present plan to be a proper one. . . .
Sibley's Texas brigade is somewhere in the Opelousas country. . . .
Mouton's main body is in rear of intrenchments on Madame Meade's
plantation, six miles below Centreville. If we defeat these two
commands we form a junction with our forces near Vicksburg. By
pursuing our success to Alexandria, we may capture General Mouton's
force, and with little loss, unless it form a junction with Sibley.
If it forms a junction, we will meet them near Iberia and engage
them in open field, and with a proper force can defeat them.
General Emory's whole division (moved to Brashear City) and my
brigade can do this work. Let the light transportation, now with
General Emory, and all destined for and collected by me be collected
at Brashear City. Let two of the brigades be moved to and landed
at Indian Bend, while the other two are crossed and attack in front.
If Mouton escapes (which I think, if properly conducted, will be
doubtful) we form a junction at Indian Bend. We proceed to attack
and with much superior force, because I do not believe Mouton and
Sibley united will exceed 6,000 men. We can defeat them, pursue
our success to Alexandria and of course get Butte à la Rose; our
gunboats to facilitate its fall, attacking it as they cannot
accompany us farther up than Saint Martinville. I believe this to
be the true and only correct plan of the campaign."
These views were unquestionably sound; they were such as might have
been expected of an officer of Weitzel's skill and experience and
special knowledge of the theatre of operations. Supported by the
strong current of events, they were now to be carried into effect.
At the date of this despatch, Emory's division had been for several
weeks near the head of the Bayou Plaquemine, with headquarters at
Indian Village, endeavoring to find or force a waterway to the
Atchafalaya, while Weitzel was holding his brigade in readiness to
co-operate by a simultaneous movement against Taylor on the Teche.
Many attempts were made by Emory to carry out the object confided
to him, yet all proved failures. Bayou Sorrel, Lake Chicot, Grand
River, and the Plaquemine itself, from both ends of the stream,
were thoroughly explored, but only to find the bayous choked with
driftwood impossible to remove, and until removed rendering the
streams impassable. Two of these drifts in Bayou Sorrel were
carefully examined by Captain Henry Cochen, of the 173d New York.
The first he reported to be about a mile in length, "composed of
one mass of logs, roots, big and small trees, etc., jammed tightly
for thirty feet, the whole length of my pole." The second drift,
just beyond, was found nearly as bad, and farther on lay another
even worse. Moreover, a thorough reconnoissance showed the whole
country, between the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya above the
Plaquemine, to be impracticable at that season for all arms. After
more than a month of this sort of work, Emory was called across
the river to Baton Rouge to take part in the events narrated in
the last chapter.
Banks returned to New Orleans on the 24th of March, and the next
day ordered Grover to embark and move down the river to Donaldsonville,
and thence march down the Bayou La Fourche to Thibodeaux. At the
same time Emory was ordered, as soon as Grover's river transports
should be released, to embark his command for Algiers, and thence
move by the railway to Brashear. Meanwhile, on the 18th of March,
Weitzel learned of the presence of the _Queen of the West_ and
_Webb_ in the Atchafalaya, and as this seemed to indicate an
intention to attack him, and the navy had no more light-draught
gunboats to spare for his further security, to avoid having his
hand forced and the game spoiled, he discreetly fell back on the
21st to the railway bridge over Bayou Boeuf, and took up a position
where he was not exposed, as at Brashear, to the risk of being cut
off by any sudden movement of the enemy.
On the 28th of March the _Diana_ was sent to reconnoitre the
Confederate position and strength on the lower Teche; but continuing
on down the Atchafalaya, instead of returning by Grand Lake as
intended, and thus running into the arms of the enemy, she fell an
easy prey. The _Calhoun_ went to her relief, but ran aground,
and the _Estrella_ had to go to the assistance of the _Calhoun_.
Acting-Master James L. Peterson, commanding the _Diana_, was killed,
and Lieutenant Pickering D. Allen, aide-de-camp to General Weitzel,
was wounded. With the _Diana_ there fell into the enemy's hands
nearly one hundred and fifty prisoners. This gave the Confederates
three rather formidable boats in the Atchafalaya and the Teche.
The movement of the troops was necessarily slow, as well by reason
of the extremely limited facilities for transportation, as because
of the state of the roads, but by the 8th of April every thing was
well advanced, and on that day Banks moved his headquarters to
Brashear. Weitzel, who had been reinforced by the siege-train,
manned by the 1st Indiana heavy artillery, had already re-occupied
his former front on Berwick Bay. Emory was in bivouac at Bayou
Ramos, about five miles in the rear of Weitzel, and Grover at Bayou
Boeuf, about four miles behind Emory. Thus the whole movement was
almost completely masked from the Confederates, who from their side
of the bay saw only Weitzel, and knew little or nothing of the
gathering forces in his rear. So little, indeed, that Taylor, with
his usual enterprise, seems to have thought this a favorable moment
for attempting upon Weitzel the same operation that Weitzel had
been so long meditating for the discomfiture of Taylor.
Emory marched early in the morning of the 9th of April and closed
up on Weitzel, who, an hour later, about ten o'clock, began to
cross. No enemy was seen save a small outpost, engaged in observing
the movement. This detachment retired before Weitzel's advance,
without coming to blows. Weitzel at once sent his Assistant
Adjutant-General, Captain John B. Hubbard, with Perkins's and
Williamson's troops of cavalry and one section of Bainbridge's
battery to discover the enemy's position. The Confederates were
found to be in some force in front of Pattersonville, with their
cavalry pickets advanced to within a mile of Weitzel's front.
As soon as Weitzel had completed his crossing, and released the
boats, Emory followed him. The four brigades bivouacked in front
of the landing-place that night. The gunboats, having done the
greater share of the ferriage, went back to the east bank for
Grover.
Grover, who had marched from Bayou Boeuf at nine o'clock, just as
Emory was arriving at Brashear, came there, in his turn, early in
the afternoon. The plan had been that Grover should embark
immediately, and, having his whole force on board by an early hour
in the night, the boats should set out at daylight, so as to place
Grover by nine o'clock on the morning of the 11th in position for
the work cut out for him. With few pilots, and the shores unlighted,
it was out of the question to attempt the navigation of the waters
of the Grand Lake during the night. However, it was not until the
night of the 11th that Grover was able to complete the embarkation
of his division. To understand this it is necessary to observe
that Emory and Weitzel, in making the passage of Berwick Bay, were
merely crossing a short ferry, so that the boats engaged in the
transfer could be loaded rapidly to almost any extent, so long as
they remained afloat, and being unloaded with equal facility, were
in a few minutes ready to repeat the operation. In Grover's case,
however, the infantry, artillery, cavalry, and stores had all to
be taken care of at once, with every provision for fighting a
battle. For this the artillery was considered indispensable, and
it was not without great trouble and long delay that the guns and
horses were got afloat. Fate seemed to be against Grover, for
after all had been accomplished by the greatest exertion on his
part, as well as on the part of his officers and the corps
quartermasters, a fog set in so dense that the pilots were unable
to see their way. This continued until nine o'clock on the morning
of the 12th; then at last the movement began.
About noon, on the 11th of April, Weitzel, leading the advance of
the main column, moved forward. At once his skirmishers felt the
skirmishers of the enemy, who retired slowly, without attempting
any serious opposition. In the evening, Weitzel rested in line of
battle a short distance above Pattersonville. Emory followed
closely, and went into bivouac on Weitzel's left. The march had
not been begun earlier, and the enemy was not pressed, because it
was desired to keep him amused until Grover should have gained his
rear, and Grover had not yet started.
After the early morning of Sunday, the 12th of April, had been spent
in light skirmishing and in demonstrations of the cavalry, designed
to observe the enemy, and at the same time to attract and hold his
attention, word came that Grover was under way. Banks knew that
the passing fleet must soon be in plain sight of the Confederates.
Therefore, it was now necessary to move promptly, and to feel the
enemy strongly, yet not too strongly, lest he should abandon his
position too soon and suddenly spoil all. From this moment it is
important to remember that, save in the event of complete success,
no word could come from Grover for nearly two days. The first news
from him was expected to be the sound of his guns in the enemy's
rear.
At eleven o'clock the bugle again sounded the advance. The whole
line moved forward, continually skirmishing, until, about four
o'clock in the afternoon, the infantry came under fire of the
Confederate guns in position on the lines known as Camp Bisland.
The line of march led up the right bank of the Atchafalaya until
the mouth of the Teche was reached, thence up the Teche, partly
astride the stream, yet mainly by the right bank. At first Weitzel
formed on the right, Emory on the left, but as the great bend of
the Teche was reached, about four miles below Bisland, and by the
nature of the ground the front became narrowed at the same time
that in following the change of direction of the bayou the line
was brought to a wheel, Weitzel took ground to the left in two
lines, while Emory advanced Paine's brigade into the front line on
Weitzel's right, placed Ingraham in his second line, and made a
third line with Godfrey.
Then finding the enemy beyond the Teche too strong for the cavalry
to manage single-handed, Banks called on Emory to reinforce the
right bank. Emory sent Bryan across with the 175th New York and
a section of the 1st Maine battery, commanded by Lieutenant Eben
D. Haley. They were to push the enemy back, and to conform to the
advance of the main line.
The day was hot, the air close, and the march over the fields of
young cane, across or aslant the heavy furrows and into and over
the deep ditches, was trying to the men, as yet but little accustomed
to marches. Fortunately, however, there was no need of pressing
the advance until Grover's guns should be heard. About half-past
five in the afternoon a brisk artillery fire began, and was kept
up until night fell; then Emory moved the 4th Wisconsin forward to
hold a grove in front of a sugar-house, near the bayou, well in
advance of his right, in order to prevent the Confederates from
occupying it, to the annoyance of the whole line.
After dark all the pickets were thrown well forward in touch with
those of the enemy, but the main lines were drawn back out of range,
for the sake of a good night's sleep before a hard day's work.