FARRAGUT PASSES PORT HUDSON.
While Farragut was putting his fleet in thorough order for this
adventure, looking after all needful arrangements with minute
personal care, Banks concentrated all his disposable force at Baton
Rouge. By the 7th of March, leaving T. W. Sherman to cover New
Orleans and Weitzel to hold strongly La Fourche, Banks had a marching
column, composed of Augur's, Emory's, and Grover's divisions, 15,000
strong. On the 9th of March tents were struck, to be pitched no
more for five hard months, and the next morning the troops were
ready, but repairs delayed the fleet, the last vessels of which
did not reach Baton Rouge until about the 12th. On that day, for
the first time, Banks reviewed his army, on the old battle-ground,
in the presence of the admiral, his staff, and many officers of
the fleet. The new regiments, with some exceptions, showed plainly
the progress already attained under the energetic training and
constant work of their officers. The degree of instruction and
care then apparent forecast the value of their actual service.
The 38th Massachusetts and 116th New York were specially commended
in orders.
To hold Baton Rouge about 3,000 men were detached, under Chickering,
including the 41st Massachusetts, 173d New York, 175th New York,
1st Indiana heavy artillery, 3d Louisiana native guards, Mack's
battery, and Troop F of the Rhode Island cavalry.
All arrangements being concerted for the passage of the batteries
on the evening of the 14th of March, Grover set out on the afternoon
of the 13th, followed, at daybreak the next morning, by Emory, with
Augur bringing up the rear. In the afternoon Grover went into
camp, covering the intersection of the Bayou Sara road and the road
that leads from it toward the river. Emory formed on his left,
covering the branches of this road that lead to Springfield Landing
and to Ross Landing, his main body supporting the centre at
Alexander's plantation. Augur, on the right, held the cross-road
that leads from the Bayou Sara road by Alexander's to the Clinton
road at Vallandigham's. At two o'clock in the afternoon the signal
officers opened communication from Springfield Landing with the
fleet at anchor near the head of Prophet Island, and a strong
detachment was posted near the landing to maintain the connection.
As the Confederates were known to have a force of about 1,200
cavalry somewhere between Clinton and Baton Rouge, strong detachments
became necessary to observe all the approaches and to hold the
roads and bridges in the rear in order to secure the withdrawal of
the army when the demonstration should be completed, as well as to
guard the operation from being inopportunely interrupted. These
dispositions reduced the force for battle to about 12,000.
It had been intended to concentrate nearly all the artillery near
the river in the vicinity of Ross Landing in such a manner as to
engage, or at least divide, the attention of the lower batteries
of Port Hudson; but the maps were even more imperfect than usual,
and when a reconnoissance, naturally retarded by the enemy's advance
guard, showed that the road by which the guns were to have gone
into position did not exist, the daylight was already waning. A
broken bridge also caused some delay.
At five o'clock in the afternoon Banks received a despatch from
Farragut announcing an important change in the hour fixed for the
movement of the fleet. Instead of making the attempt "in the gray
of the morning," as had been the admiral's first plan, he now meant
to get under way at eight o'clock in the evening. When darkness
fell, therefore, it found the troops substantially in the positions
already described, yet with their outposts well thrown forward.
About ten o'clock the fleet weighed anchor and moved up the river.
The flagship _Hartford_ took the lead, with the _Albatross_ lashed
to her port side, next the _Richmond_ with the _Genesee_, the
_Monongahela_ with the _Kineo_, and last the side-wheeler _Mississippi_
alone. The _Essex_ and _Sachem_ remained at anchor below, with
the mortar boats, to cover the advance. An hour later a rocket
shot up from the bluff and instantly the Confederate batteries
opened fire. They were soon joined by long lines of sharpshooters.
To avoid the shoal that makes out widely from the western bank, as
well as to escape the worst of the enemy's fire, both of musketry
and artillery, the ships hugged closely the eastern bluff; so
closely, indeed, that the yards brushed the leaves from the
overhanging trees and the voices of men on shore could be distinctly
heard by those on board. Watch-fires were lighted by the Confederates
to show as well the ships as the range; yet this did more harm than
good, since the smoke united with that of the guns ashore and afloat
to render the fleet invisible. On the other hand, the pilots were
soon unable to see.
The _Hartford_, meeting the swift eddy at the bend, where the
current describes nearly a right angle, narrowly escaped being
driven ashore. The _Richmond_, following, was disabled by a shot
through her engine-room when abreast of the upper battery at the
turn. The _Monongahela's_ consort, the _Kineo_, lost the use of
her rudder, and the _Monongahela_ herself ran aground on the spit;
presently the _Kineo_, drifting clear, also grounded, but was soon
afloat again, and, with her assistance, the _Monongahela_ too swung
free, after nearly a half hour of imminent peril. Then the _Kineo_,
cast loose by her consort, drifted helplessly down the stream,
while the _Monongahela_ passed up until a heated bearing brought
her engines to a stop and she too drifted with the current.
Last of the fleet, the _Mississippi_, unseen in the smoke, and
therefore safe enough from the Confederate guns, yet equally unable
to see either friend, foe, or landmark, was carried by the current
hard on the spit; then, after a half hour of ineffectual exertion,
lying alone and helpless under the concentrated aim of the Confederate
batteries, she was abandoned and set on fire by her captain. About
three in the morning, becoming lighter, as the fire did its work,
she floated free and drifted down the stream one mass of flames,
in plain view, not merely of the fleet, but also of the army,
condemned to stand to arms in sight and sound of the distant battle
and now to look on idly as, with a mighty flash and roar, the
_Mississippi_ cast to the heavens her blazing timbers, amid a myriad
of bursting shells, in one mountain of flame: then black silence.
Thus, when at last the gray of the morning came, the _Hartford_
and _Albatross_ rode in safety above Port Hudson, while the _Richmond,
Monongahela, Genesee_, and _Kineo_, all battered and more or less
injured, lay at anchor once more near Prophet Island, and the
_Mississippi_ had perished in a blaze of glory.
Narrowly escaping the total failure of his plans and the destruction
of his fleet, Farragut had so far succeeded in his objects that
henceforth the Confederates practically lost the control of the
Mississippi above Port Hudson, as well as the use of the Red River
as their base of supplies. Save in skiff-loads, beef, corn, and
salt could no longer be safely carried across the Mississippi, and
the high road from Galveston and Matamoras was closed against the
valuable and sorely needed cargoes brought from Europe by the
blockade runners.
As for the army, it had gained some facility of movement, some
knowledge of its deficiencies, and some information of great future
value as to the topography of the unknown country about Port Hudson;
more than this could hardly have been expected. Indeed, the sole
object of the presence of the army was defeated by the movement of
the fleet so many hours before the time agreed upon. This object
was to make a diversion that might attract the enemy's attention
and thus tend to reduce the fire of musketry on the exposed decks
of the fleet, and to draw off or hold off the fire of the
field-pieces that might otherwise be massed on the river front.
The disparity between the relative strength of Banks's army and
that of the garrison was too well known to justify the thought of
an actual attack upon the works.
Such, however, was not the opinion of the government, which to the
last seems to have taken for granted that all that was needed to
insure the surrender of Port Hudson was a desire to attack it.
Even after the surrender, Halleck, in his annual report for 1863,
speaking of the position of affairs in March, said: "Had our land
forces invested Port Hudson at this time, it could have been easily
reduced, as its garrison was weak . . . but the strength of the
place was not then known." In truth, the place was never so strong,
before or after, as at this time; nor is it often in war that the
information tallies so nearly with the fact. The effective strength
of the garrison was more than 16,000. Gardner's monthly report
accounts for 1,366 officers and 14,921 men present for duty, together
16,287 out of a total present of 20,388. Besides the twenty-two
heavy guns in position, he had thirteen light batteries.
Morning found the army alone and in a bad position, either for
attack or defence. Nothing was to be gained by staying there, and
much was to be risked. As soon, therefore, as word came through
the ever-active and adventurous signal-officers that all was well
with what remained of the fleet, Banks once more took up the line
of march for Baton Rouge, and went into bivouac in great discomfort
on the soggy borders of the Bayou Montesanto, about eight miles
north of the town.
Meanwhile, what had become of Farragut? The last seen of the
_Hartford_ and _Albatross_ was on the morning of the 15th by the
signal officers at Springfield Landing. The two vessels then lay
at anchor beyond the bend above Port Hudson. Several attempts were
made to communicate with the Admiral across the intervening neck
of lowland. The first was on the 16th, by Parmele, with the 174th
New York and a squadron of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry. Next, on
the 18th, Banks, eager to advance the effort, took Dudley's brigade,
two sections of Rails's battery, and Magen's troop, and joined
Parmele. But for a time these efforts accomplished nothing, since
it was impossible to see far over the flat and wooded country; and
the Confederates having cut the great levee at Morganza, the whole
neighborhood was under water and the bridges gone. Finally, on
the 19th, Colonel Charles J. Paine went out with the 2d Louisiana,
the 174th New York, and a small squad of cavalry, and leaving first
the infantry and then most of the troopers behind, and riding on
almost alone, succeeded in crossing the bend and gained the levee
at the head of the old channel known as Fausse River, about three
miles above Port Hudson. There he had a good view of the river,
yet nothing was to be seen of the _Hartford_ and _Albatross_.
Again, on the 24th, Dudley sent Magen with his troop to Hermitage
Landing. Pushing on with a few men, Magen got a full view of the
reach above Waterloo for five miles, but he too learned nothing of
the fleet. Farragut had in fact gone up the river on the 15th,
after vainly attempting to exchange signals with his ships below
and with the army, and was now near Vicksburg in communication with
Admiral Porter, engaged in concerting plans for the future. Before
getting under way he had caused three guns to be fired from the
_Hartford_. This was the signal agreed upon with Banks, but for
some reason it was either not heard or not reported.
Just before separating at Baton Rouge, Banks had handed to Farragut
a letter addressed to Grant, to be delivered by the Admiral in the
event of success. This letter, the first direct communication
between the two generals, Grant received on the 20th of March, and
from it derived his first information of the actual state of affairs
in the Department of the Gulf. After stating his position and
force Banks wound up by saying: "Should the Admiral succeed in
his attempt, I shall try to open communication with him on the
other side of the river, and, in that event, trust I shall hear
from you as to your position and movements, and especially as to
your views as to the most efficient mode of co-operation upon the
part of the forces we respectively command."
With the _Hartford_ and _Albatross_ controlling the reach between
Port Hudson and Vicksburg, as well as the mouth of the Red River
and the head of the Atchafalaya, Banks might now safely disregard
the movements of the Confederate gunboats. Accordingly, while
waiting for Grant's answer, he turned to the execution of his former
plan.