* * * * *

The outstanding events of the year 1917 must be carried in the mind so

that the new situation can be appreciated. In the month of February

the Germans had started an unrestricted U-boat campaign and America

had broken off diplomatic relations with her. War was not declared

between these two countries until April, and as an immediate

consequence it influenced the plans of the Entente and Central Powers

according to the time which, in the judgment of either, it would be 211

possible for America to make her strength felt.

The Entente Powers looked upon America as a reserve upon which they

could count in twelve months’ time, or slightly over. They were free

to undertake large operations with ambitious objects, provided they

did not either break their armies, or so reduce them in strength as to

render their resisting power unequal to any sudden German attack.

On the other hand, the Central Powers had to do something before the

American troops arrived and gave the balance of power definitely to

the Entente.

Although American action in the future was the deciding factor, the

formation of plans could not rest entirely on such a direct

calculation. At first it seemed that the Entente had no reason to

think that the abdication of the Tsar would mean the defection of

Russia; and the Central Powers could only hope to delay the American

Armies by their U-boats. But the Russian debacle began with her defeat

in Galicia in the latter part of July, and it soon became evident to

the Entente that they would, before the American forces could be used,

have to fight for their existence. They had, it is true, brought the

Central Powers’ offensive in Italy, which had threatened to cause a

disaster, to a standstill, but the Bolshevist _coup d’état_ in Russia

in November had brought visions of an overwhelming mass of German

troops moving to the west. December, January, and February were gloomy

months of speculation which culminated in a state of nervous

apprehension in March.

During the first half of the year the Central Powers had not much to

congratulate themselves upon. Baghdad was captured in March. The 212

battles of Arras in April and of Messines in June were sudden and

definite blows which shook them, and though the Ypres battles in 1917

were a most costly affair to the British, the German losses had been

sufficiently heavy to create consternation. Well might Ludendorff

utter a cry of elation when events in Russia opened prospects of an

early release of the German armies on that front! He no longer

believed in the assurance of the German Navy that the U-boats would

neutralise American effort, but he saw a chance of victory before the

fatal date of effective American intervention.

He and the Field-Marshal Hindenburg must have known that they would

have to make the last fatal throw and that there was barely time to

rattle the dice. Austria was done, worn out, exhausted. It was

doubtful whether she could stand against the Italians. Allenby, under

whom the 56th Division had fought in April, had gone to Egypt in June,

and by December had captured Jerusalem; and Turkey, at the end of her

tether, lay at his mercy: events in this theatre of war might move so

fast as to bring disaster from that direction on the Central Powers.

The Bulgarians were not trusted. And there were signs that the German

Army itself had lost its arrogant spirit.

Hindenburg could count on a preponderance of numbers on the Western

Front, but desertions were appalling in number. Tens of thousands, we

are told, crossed the frontiers into neutral countries, and a great

many more stayed at home, “tacitly tolerated by their fellow-citizens

and completely unmolested by the authorities.”

The movement of troops from east to west was carried out rapidly. By 213

the New Year the Germans had a majority of thirty divisions over the

Entente on the Western Front. The plan was to attack with fifty to

sixty divisions under massed artillery, varying between twenty and

thirty batteries to each kilometre of front attacked, and a multitude

of trench mortars as well.

Meanwhile American troops were arriving and training in the back

areas.

* * * * *

The 56th Divisional Artillery had remained in the Mœuvres sector.

Brig.-Gen. Elkington and his headquarters had, however, moved with the

infantry, and we quote from the Brigadier’s diary:

“The headquarters of the division and the R.A. were

established in huts in Victory Camp, and I took over command

of the R.A. covering the division on the 8th [December]. On

the 17th and 18th the 56th Divisional Artillery returned to

the division and took over in the line. This part of the

front was at the time a very quiet one, but much harassing

fire was done and a certain amount of enemy counter-battery

work was done on the battery positions. Work was begun on

rear lines and rear battery positions. Very cold weather was

experienced in December.

We remained in this sector with headquarters at Victory

Camp, which consisted of Nissen huts and was the coldest and

bleakest spot I encountered--it was a desperately cold

winter. From the 1st to the 3rd January an American General

and his staff officers were attached to the division and

went round battery positions and saw some shooting. On the

5th January the 62nd Divisional Infantry relieved the 56th

Divisional Infantry, and on the 7th and 8th the R.A. of the

62nd Division came and looked over the batteries in the line.

On the 9th January the 62nd Divisional Artillery relieved 214

the 56th Divisional Artillery and I handed over to the

C.R.A., our batteries going back to the area round Berles

for rest and training, the infantry having moved to the

Villers-Chatel area. The R.A. Headquarters was established

for the first four days at Bertincourt, and afterwards at

the château at Berles, a very comfortable billet owned by a

French Count who was very hospitable and glad to see us and

did everything he could to make us comfortable. Inspection

and training of batteries took place, but this was greatly

hampered by the bad and severe weather.”

Training of the infantry was, owing to the weather, not very ardent

during the divisional rest from the 9th January to the 11th February.

But it was a welcome rest.

British strength on the Western Front was now on the downward grade.

From January divisions were cut down to nine battalions, and from the

30th of that month we must say good-bye to the 1st Battalion of the

Rangers, the 1st Battalion of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, and the

1/3rd London Regt. The headquarters and transport of these battalions

joined the 58th Division and were incorporated in the 2nd Battalions

of their respective regiments. The 56th Division retained a certain

number of the men, who were split up as follows: Queen Victoria’s

Rifles, 5 officers and 150 other ranks to the 13th London

(Kensingtons), 12 officers and 250 other ranks to the 16th London

(Queen’s Westminster Rifles), 4 officers and 76 other ranks to the 4th

London; the Rangers sent 8 officers and 300 other ranks to the London

Rifle Brigade; while the rest passed out of the Division (7 officers

and 230 other ranks to the 1/23rd London, and 12 officers and 200 215

other ranks to the 2nd Battalion Rangers); the 1/3rd London sent 11

officers and 250 other ranks to the 1/1st London, 11 officers and 250

other ranks to the 1/2 London, and 2 officers and 34 other ranks to

the 1/4 London (12 officers and 214 other ranks out of the division to

their 2nd Battalion).

So far as the infantry were concerned, the forty-seven divisions on

the Western Front in March 1918 were reduced by a quarter--this is

exclusive of the Canadian and Australian divisions, which retained

their original strength, and includes the 41st Division, which

returned from Italy on the 2nd March.

The relief of the 62nd Division by the 56th started on the 8th

February, and on the 11th Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line.

Meanwhile “the wind was whistling through the châteaux of the Higher

Command!” The severe cold and the snow at Christmas and the

commencement of the New Year was followed by a thaw and a lot of rain.

The result was that most of the trenches fell in. A period of feverish

activity followed; engineers and pioneers were working every night,

and the infantry had to provide as many men as was possible. Gradually

the defences were reconstructed and new ones added. All this activity,

mingled with orders and provisions for retirement, was greeted by the

troops with characteristic jeers.

We do not wish to contribute to the general abuse which was levelled

at the heads of the “Staff” or “Red Tabs”--the arrangements made on

this front at least were justified by the results--but we desire to

give as far as we can the feeling of the private soldier and

regimental officer.

Arrangements for retreat shock the troops in much the same way as a 216

coarse expression might shock a drawing-room full of ladies. They are

offended. They ask the question: “What’s the idea?” And although they

could not enumerate the difficulties of a gradual retirement, they

seem to “sense” the fearful responsibility that is being thrust upon

them. And the very nature of the situation caused orders to be given

which suggested uncertainty and indecision. The private soldier’s

point of view was simple: he wanted to be given orders to fight on a

certain spot, but to change the spot where he should fight annoyed

him.

The system which was adopted to meet the onslaught of the Germans was

to spread the defence over a wide belt of country. The front-line

system was not to be held; it was to be occupied by outposts whose

duty was to watch the enemy and retire on the next line if he

attacked. The fight itself was to take place in what was called the

“battle zone”; and behind was yet another line through which the enemy

must pass before our defence was broken. If the Germans penetrated

these lines, they might be said to have broken our first system of

defence.

Behind the 56th Division were other defences on which it might fall

back, but we are only concerned with the first system.

As to the general distribution of forces to meet the German offensive,

one-half of the British strength was devoted to protecting the Channel

ports, and the rest was thinly dispersed over the remaining front. It

must be remembered that additional front amounting to 28 miles had

been taken over by the British in January, and that Sir Douglas Haig

was now responsible for 125 miles. In view of this length of line and 217

the extreme importance of the Channel ports, the general disposition

of troops would seem to have been wise.

The Germans claim to have effected a surprise in March 1918--a

contention which is scarcely justified. In his interesting, lengthy,

but somewhat vague account of the assembly of the great attacking

force, Ludendorff says that ammunition dumps had been increased all

along the British front, that movement of troops was carried out at

night, but that German aviators sent up to report could see signs of

concentration on the area chosen for attack which the blind English

were _unable to perceive_! This is not accurate, but one must

admit that the German concentration and preparation were superbly

done.

We knew that a general movement of troops from east to west had been

started in November, and that roads and railways were being improved,

artillery increased, and ammunition accumulated all along the front

from Flanders to the Oise, and by the end of February indications

became apparent that the attack would be on the Third and Fifth

Armies.

On the 19th March the Intelligence Department reported to Sir Douglas

Haig that the enemy preparations on the Arras-St. Quentin front were

complete and that the attack would probably be launched on the 20th or

21st.

Ludendorff assumes that “nor did the enemy discover anything by other

means ... otherwise his defensive measures would have been more

effective and his reserves would have arrived more quickly.” In this

his claim of surprise might seem to be justified, although the charge

can be met by a statement of the considerations which influenced Sir

Douglas Haig through this anxious period; he could give up no ground 218

in the northern portion of the British area where the Channel ports

were threatened, and he knew that the ground was exceptionally dry and

that preparations for an attack had been almost completed from the

direction of Menin; the same applied to the centre, behind which lay

the collieries of northern France, and important tactical features

covering his lateral communications; in the south, in the Somme area,

ground could be given up to a certain extent without serious

consequences.

The dispositions of British troops according to the above

considerations had an effect on the Germans, for Ludendorff tells us

that when deciding on the front to be attacked he was faced with

strong forces about Ypres, that the condition of the centre (the Lys

Valley) would not admit an attack before April (which was late in view

of the Americans), that an attack in the direction of Verdun would

lead into very hilly country, and that in making his final decisions

he was influenced by the time factor and the “weakness of the enemy.”

During the early part of 1918 the whole of the British force in

forward areas was concerned with the problem of defence. It was not a

cheerful period. Closely typewritten sheets of paper flew about in all

directions, giving instructions, making amendments to previous

instructions, calling for suggestions, and ever warning commanders

against attack. The Cheshire Regt. and the Engineers of the 56th

Division worked night and day at improving rear lines and constructing

alternative ones; fatigue parties were called for from battalions both

in and out of the line; machine gunners and trench-mortar experts moved

restlessly from point to point, selecting possible emplacements for 219

their guns, and the artillery did the same farther back.

The men in the line were always the coolest in the whole of the army,

but the officers were gradually being worked up to a state of feverish

anxiety and a certain amount of bewilderment.

On the 9th March the Kensingtons carried out a smart and successful

raid, killing about 20 and capturing 4 Germans. The prisoners stated

that the German offensive was imminent. Orders were issued for battle

positions to be manned at 5 a.m. as from the 13th.

Another raid by the London Rifle Brigade on the 16th was hung up in a

mass of uncut wire, but 2/Lieut. Kite Powell hacked his way through

and, followed by four men, managed to enter the German line and kill

half a dozen of them. They secured no prisoner; still, the information

that the enemy front line was strongly held and that they were very

alert was of value.

Aeroplane activity was very great from the 18th onwards, and a great

deal of individual movement was seen behind the enemy lines. Harassing

fire by the 56th Divisional Artillery was increased, and with a good

percentage of gas shells. The enemy seemed to give a great deal of

attention to our wire with his trench mortars during the increasing

bursts of artillery fire.

On the 21st March, with one tremendous crash, the great battle opened

on a front of 44 miles, the artillery bombardment including the front

held by the 56th Division. But the attack was launched farther south

between La Fère and Croiselles.

No less than 68 German divisions took part in the battle on the first 220

day, many more than the whole of the British Army contained. The

training, carried out in some cases behind the Russian front, had been

so complete as to include the practising of infantry behind an actual,

live barrage. The result was admirable. Swarms of men, followed

resolutely and closely by artillery, broke through the Fifth and the

right of the Third Armies, which were composed of a total force of 29

infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions.

The German 17th Army, composed of 24 divisions, attacked north of

Cambrai; the 2nd Army, of 17 divisions, immediately south of Cambrai;

and the 18th Army, of 27 divisions, carried the attack down to La

Fère.

The 2nd and 18th German Armies made good progress against the British

Fifth Army, but the resistance of our Third Army limited the enemy’s

success, so that the 17th German Army was not able to cut off the

Flesquières salient, near Cambrai, as had been planned. But during the

night of 22nd/23rd March the Fifth Army was back at Peronne, and there

was a deep bulge in the Third Army towards Bapaume. On the 27th the

German line ran through Albert and Montdidier. But the right of the

German 17th Army was not too comfortable--Arras must be swept aside!

Behind Arras the wildest excitement prevailed. The word “panic,” a

humiliating word, can be applied. But, as we have said before, there

was always a zone of calmness, and that zone was the forward zone. Had

the London men of the 56th Division been able to see the scurrying

motors and anxious faces of the “soft job” men behind them, they would 221

have been amazed. But the 56th Division just went on with the

ordinary, somewhat strenuous routine which had been instituted at the

commencement of the year, strengthening the defences, putting out

wire, arranging “blocks,” constructing emplacements for machine guns

and trench mortars. Being, however, on the flank of the XIII Corps,

regimental officers were subjected to the annoyance of frequent

changes of orders and plans.

On the 19th March an order was given for the 56th Division to alter

the method of holding the line from a three-brigade front to a

two-brigade front. Each of the two front-line brigades would have two

battalions in line and one in reserve, and the division would have an

entire brigade in reserve. The necessary moves were made on the night

of 21st/22nd March.

An order was issued on the 20th that the division would be relieved by

the 62nd Division, but this was cancelled on the 21st. On the 22nd a

further warning order was given that the division would be relieved by

the 2nd Canadian Division, and this also was cancelled on the 23rd.

The situation of the Third Army, on the right of the 56th Division,

brought a multitude of instructions. On the 22nd the XVII Corps had

been ordered to withdraw to its third system on the south of the

Scarpe, but to continue holding Monchy lightly. But north of the

Scarpe the 4th Division, on the right of the 56th, would not move

until Monchy had been captured by the enemy, in which case the 56th

Division would adjust their line to run through Beatty Post, Bailleul

Post, to le Point du Jour Post. General Matheson, commanding the 4th

Division, did not, however, intend to move unless definitely ordered 222

to do so, and if attacked would fight in three successive lines, the

last bringing him to the Point du Jour Post.

This last assurance of General Matheson was of a nature to simplify

the possible actions of officers of the 56th Division, and was

welcome. That the enemy was going to do something was becoming

evident. At 5.30 p.m. on the 23rd he exploded a land mine under the

wire in front of Towy Post, and appeared to be manning the line

opposite the divisional front thicker than usual. Harassing fire was

turned on the German trenches, and the reserve brigade was ordered to

stand to at 5 a.m. in future.

In the south the Germans were now approaching Albert and Roye. All

sorts of rumours were flying about behind the lines. On the 24th the

169th Brigade captured a wounded German, and he was sent for

examination in the early morning of the 25th. He said that the 101st

Reserve and 102nd Reserve Regiments, belonging to the 219th and 23rd

(Reserve) Divisions, had occupied the Wotan Stellung, behind the front

line, on the night of the 24th. These divisions had come from Riga,

and would attack on the 26th together with the 240th and 5th Bavarian

Reserve Divisions. They were to advance to a depth of four kilometres

with the right flank on Oppy, and then swing round towards Vimy. The

battalion section of the 471st Regt. had already 60 trench mortars in

position, and 8 more trench mortar companies were to arrive on the

night of the 25th. The ammunition was already in the line. One may

imagine that Gen. Dudgeon’s conference at 6.30 p.m. was far from a

dull affair.

The artillery were ordered to fire on chosen targets through the 223

night, and patrolling was active.

A great deal of movement had been seen throughout the day of men and

light railways. Troops were seen detraining at Vitry.

And that night there was an inter-battalion relief on the right, the

Queen’s Westminsters relieving the 2nd London. The party sent to

relieve Gavrelle Post found it occupied by two dead men only--the

remainder of the garrison had entirely disappeared. Signs of a

struggle were there, but no one on either flank had reported the post

being attacked, and, apparently, nothing unusual had been seen.

Gen. Dudgeon ordered both brigades to do their utmost to secure a

German prisoner. Every effort was made, but the enemy was found more

than ever on the alert, with parties lying out to catch patrols. It is

curious that one patrol reported the enemy repairing their wire--it is

probable that they were cutting it down.

The attack was coming, and Divisional Headquarters strained every

nerve to direct, encourage, and advise for the struggle. Some of the

orders are not too easy to understand, and one is of interest as an

example of rumour being accepted as fact.

The artillery, of course, was very busy, and we find an instruction to

cut German wire and to keep the gaps open! And the order we refer to

as being founded on rumour was as follows: “In view possible

appearance enemy agents warn all ranks against use of word

RETIRE. Any person using this word before or during an attack

to be shot.” This was, no doubt, based on a much-circulated statement

that the Fifth Army debacle was largely due to German agents, dressed 224

as British officers, giving the order to retire. We cannot believe in

a swarm of disguised Germans.

It must, however, have been a very weighty consideration which induced

the Higher Command to order an extension of divisional front on the

27th. General Sir H. de Lisle, better known as the commander of the

29th Division and now in command of the XIII Corps, was ordered to

take over the line to the Souchez River, on his left. This meant that

the 56th Division had to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division, on the

left, at Tommy and Arleux Posts during the night of 27th/28th March.

At the same time the division was again ordered to treat the front

line as an outpost line, and to fight on the line between Ditch Post

and Willerval South. But at the last moment the front line was ordered

to be held as such so as to conform with the 4th Division on the

right; the 56th Division was already so stretched out that this

curious eleventh-hour change did not make much difference.

The Vimy Ridge lay behind the division, but the ground they fought on

was not level. The 4th Division, on the right, was on high ground, and

Gavrelle lay in a slight depression; the ground rose again towards

Bailleul East Post, and fell once more in the direction of Oppy. The

division was, however, on a forward slope which gave them good

observation from a somewhat exposed position (see map contours).

The rearrangement of the line, which took place during the night, gave

the Queen’s Westminsters the right, holding Towy Post and Gavrelle

Post with one company, while the other three companies held posts

defending Naval Trench. The London Rifle Brigade held Mill, Bradford,

and Bird Posts with two companies and one platoon, the remainder of 225

the battalion holding posts on the Marine Trench line. The third

battalion of the brigade, the 2nd London Regt., held the Ditch,

Bailleul, and Bailleul East line. Behind them, in the Farbus line, was

one company of the 5th Cheshire Regt., and in reserve the 169th

Brigade held two companies of the 1st London Regt., attached from the

167th Brigade, and a detachment of the 176th Tunnelling Company, who

were in the Point du Jour Post.

The 168th Brigade, on the left, held Beatty, Wood, and Oppy Posts with

two companies of the 4th London Regt., and two in support on the line

Duke Street; and Tommy and Arleux Posts with the Kensingtons, two

companies in the front line and in support.

The actual distribution of troops on the left is not very clear, as

the redistribution was not complete when, at 3 a.m. on the 28th March,

the enemy opened a furious bombardment. We find a note that the London

Rifle Brigade had not at that hour relieved Bailleul East Post, and

that one company of the 1st Canadian Rifles were still holding Sugar

Post. This latter company remained at Sugar Post throughout the

battle, being placed, with that complete disregard of all, except the

winning of the battle, which characterised the Canadians, under the

orders of the 168th Brigade. But the London Scottish were also in this

Sugar Post-Willerval line. In the Farbus line were two platoons of the

5th Cheshires, and behind them, in the Point du Jour-Ridge Post line,

two companies of the 1st London Regt. and one and a half companies of

the 5th Cheshires.

The two remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and three field 226

companies of Royal Engineers were in Divisional Reserve.

The opening of a modern battle is, with few exceptions, a matter of

artillery. Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s diary gives us some interesting

facts:

“On the morning of the 28th March the 56th Division was

holding a line south of Gavrelle to Arleux, a front of about

5,000 yards. To cover this front the field-guns under the

command of the division consisted of the 56th Divisional

Artillery and 9 guns of the 52nd Army (Field Artillery

Brigade), or 45 18-pounders and 12 4·5 howitzers. Six 6-inch

Newton mortars were in action in the first-line system, and

three were covering the Bailleul-Willerval line (that is our

main line of resistance). Of the former, only two were

manned, as all the ammunition at the other mortars had been

expended previously, in accordance with orders which, later

on, were cancelled, but not before the ammunition had been

expended.

Between 3 a.m. and 3.20 a.m. the Germans put down a heavy

barrage of gas and H.E. shells of all calibres on the

Bailleul-Willerval line and the support line. At 4 a.m. the

barrage increased over the whole of the front-line system

and our posts were heavily bombarded with trench mortars.

From 6 a.m. the hostile barrage of all calibres was heavily

concentrated on the front line, and continued to be intense

on this area until 7.15 a.m.

During the above periods, that is from 3 a.m. until 7.15

a.m., our artillery was firing heavily on the enemy’s front

system of trenches, special concentrations being put down,

in co-operation with the heavy artillery, on lines of

organised shell-holes. It was considered at the time that

these shell-holes were temporary trench-mortar emplacements,

but from information given by prisoners after the attack, 227

it appears likely that they were the assembly positions of

the assaulting troops. From 6.45 a.m. onwards “counter

preparation” was put into effect. At 7.15 a.m. the hostile

barrage lifted from the front line to our support line, and

the S.O.S. went up in the Gavrelle sector and was repeated

almost immediately in the Oppy sector. Our S.O.S. was put

down over the whole of the divisional front at the same

time.”

As may be imagined, the effect of this bombardment was terrible. The

bulk of the forward posts were obliterated. But even such

concentration as the Germans directed against the front line was not

sufficient to destroy all life--it could not deal with the whole of

the line. Towy Post and Wood Post had, during the last few days, been

subjected to a great deal of enemy attention, and the posts had been

moved--but even so the casualties were severe. One survivor came out

of Mill Post and reported that the trenches had been “blotted out,”

and that the entrance to a big dug-out there was blown in and

destroyed.

The Germans, advancing almost shoulder to shoulder, entered Gavrelle,

which, as we know, was in a hollow. Although there was no living soul

there to oppose them, the machine gunners had the place under indirect

fire from fourteen guns, and the enemy losses were severe. But the

first stages of the battle were centred round Towy and Wood Posts.

Capt. G. A. N. Lowndes, of the Queen’s Westminsters, was in command of

Towy Post, and with the lifting of the enemy barrage and the

appearance of the first Germans there came from the post the crackling

sound of rifle fire, joined, almost at once, by the rattle sound of 228

Lewis guns, until the whole developed into what might be described as

a roar. But the enemy was in Gavrelle and the undefended portions of

the front line on either side of Towy Post. Once in the trenches, the

storming troops could work slowly forward under some sort of cover. To

the rifle fire of the defenders was soon added the crash of bombs. The

enemy was confident; he worked slowly and surely round the post.

The glorious little band of Queen’s Westminsters knew what was

happening, but kept cool. Gradually they were forced into a small and

cramped area; Lewis guns and rifles dealt with Germans in the open,

clearing the ground round about and forcing the enemy to seek the

safety of the battered trench; but the store of bombs was getting low.

Capt. Lowndes, ably supported by 2/Lieuts. L. W. Friend and J. C. B.

Price, after hanging on to the last moment, directed his dwindling

company to fight through the Germans in rear, using the remaining

bombs, and swiftly, desperately, they broke through and reached Naval

Trench and joined the rest of the battalion round headquarters.

But the Germans, coming through Mill Post, were already in Marine

Trench, and Lieut.-Col. Glazier, commanding the Queen’s Westminsters,

passed a portion of his force into Thames Alley to form a flank.

Now trouble came from the right. The Lancashire Fusiliers, of the 4th

Division, fell back on to the Ditch Post line, and the enemy entered

Humid Trench. Col. Glazier swung back his right flank into Towy Alley,

and held the Germans firmly. And then for a moment the fortunes of war

turned against the Queen’s Westminsters.

The 56th Divisional Artillery, aware that the enemy were in our lines, 229

attempted to adjust their barrage in consultation with brigadiers. It

was a most difficult task, for, needless to say, communication was

almost non-existent. At the junction of Naval and Towy Trenches was a

block, and in front of it the enemy was held, but the artillery,

probably seeing the Germans in Humid and the end of Naval Trenches,

put down their barrage too close and blew in our block. The German

hordes quickly took advantage of this bit of luck and swarmed down

Naval Trench, either killing or capturing the garrison up to the

Gavrelle road.

About the same time the block on the left of the line, near Thames

Valley, was forced by the enemy, and the whole of the Naval Line was

in his hands. But the Queen’s Westminsters, gallantly led by Col.

Glazier, were still in front of the Germans on the line Keiller,

Pelican, and Thames Posts. Every bit of the communication trenches

which gave a good fire position, every dump-hole, even the shell-holes

were manned, and, as the Germans advanced over the open, in

reorganised lines, from Naval Trench, they were met with a fresh

rattle and roar of rifle fire. The ground was covered with silent and

groaning figures in the field-grey uniform, and the enemy had to

resort once more to bombing.

Again the Queen’s Westminsters gave up a little ground, but the

enemy’s effort was smashed. At 11 a.m. the position was: we held a

block in Towy Alley, about 300 yards east of the Ditch-Bailleul East

line, and Castleford Post, and the rest of the battalion had joined

the 2nd London Regt. in the Bailleul-Willerval line.

The account given by the London Rifle Brigade on the left of the 230

Queen’s Westminsters is short, but in it one can read the desperate

nature of the fighting and the gallant resistance which was put up.

The relief of Bradford and Bird Posts was not completed until 3.30

a.m., when the bombardment which heralded the attack commenced. All

forward and lateral communication was at once cut. Wire and posts

defending the front line were wiped out. When the enemy infantry

advanced, they simply walked into the front line, rushed the few men

left at the blocks in Belvoir and Brough, and commenced bombing

towards Naval Trench. The battalion was almost annihilated, and what

was left joined the Queen’s Westminsters in Thames Valley and became

mixed up with them. The fighting strength of this battalion at the

commencement of the battle was 23 officers and 564 other ranks; it was

reduced to 8 officers and about 60 other ranks.

The whole of the 169th Brigade now stood on the Bailleul-Willerval

line and the enemy was held. Twice he attacked over the open, with

aeroplanes flying low and pouring a hail of bullets on the defenders,

while field guns were dragged by plunging horses and straining men

across No Man’s Land as far as Naval Trench, but each time he was

defeated. The field guns fired no more than twenty rounds before being

silenced by the 56th Divisional Artillery; and though the enemy

infantry had a novel method of advancing--they stood up, threw their

rifles forward into a shell-hole, held up their hands, and advanced,

only to drop by the side of their arms, which they immediately

proceeded to use--they made no further progress.

The right of the 56th Division was, at 11 a.m., in touch with the 4th 231

Division. A battalion of the 167th Brigade was placed under the orders

of the 169th, and six machine guns were sent up to Point du Jour, and

two field companies of the Engineers to Tongue and Blanch Posts, so

that the right flank of the division seemed secure.

The 4th Londons, on the right of the 168th Brigade, put up a most

gallant defence. Wood Post, held by 2 officers and 45 other ranks, had

been moved before the bombardment and so was untouched. The full

garrison was there to meet the enemy, who advanced in a solid line on

the left of the wood, but came through the wood in groups of about ten

men each, 40 yards or so apart, and followed by further groups of

about thirty men each some 200 yards in rear.

The enemy was completely checked in the wood and on the left; but

Beatty Post, on the right, which had been badly battered about by

trench mortars, was occupied. The garrison, consisting at first of 3

officers and 84 other ranks, though much depleted when the assault was

launched, was overwhelmed by sheer numbers, and only 1 officer and 6

men ever returned. The enemy then started to work round to the rear of

Wood Post, but for over an hour this hard little band held out and

repulsed the enemy.

Oppy Post was also smothered by artillery and trench mortars, and

eventually overwhelmed by the storming infantry. Of the 2 officers and

48 other ranks forming the garrison, 1 officer and 5 other ranks were

left.

Fifteen minutes after the assault was launched, the enemy was in the

Earl Lane and Viscount Street, but were held for a time by the troops

in Ouse Alley. But so long as Wood Post held, the enemy did not make 232

any great progress.

Major F. A. Phillips was in command of the forward fighting, and moved

about encouraging his men, who were inflicting heavy casualties on the

enemy whenever an attempt was made to advance over the open. But Wood

Post fell back just before 9 o’clock, and soon after the enemy began

to force their way up Ouse Alley from Viscount Street, in rear of the

troops who were fighting so successfully in Marquis Trench. Major

Phillips promptly attacked over the open with about twenty details

from headquarters, and drove them back.

The enemy had built up heavy rifle fire from Oppy Wood, although he

was suffering severely there from our artillery fire, and attacked the

left of the battalion many times over the open; but the Marquis line

held, and at 11 o’clock the position was extraordinary. The 169th

Brigade on the right was back in the Bailleul-Willerval line; and

while the advance companies of the 4th London were still holding the

Marquis line, the enemy was in Ouse Alley and bombing his way towards

the Bailleul line, also he was advancing over the open south of Ouse

Alley. The position then was very precarious, and the reserve company,

which Colonel Marchment had sent to get in touch with the forward

troops and form a flank, was unable to reach the forward troops. Major

Phillips decided to withdraw.

The withdrawal was witnessed by Colonel Marchment from his

headquarters:

“I watched it through my glasses. It was carried out in a

very steady and orderly way, the men leaving in groups of 233

about a dozen. Although exposed to a heavy fire from front

and flanks, they made excellent use of the ground, and

suffered very few casualties.... The men of the reserve

company met the survivors returning and covered their

retirement.”

The Kensingtons on the left of the division were not attacked. Some

fifty of the enemy approached Tommy Post, but were at once driven off

with casualties. But the battalion gave invaluable aid to the 4th

Londons, on the right, inflicting heavy losses by Lewis gun, rifle,

and rifle grenade fire on the German support troops as they came up to

the wood. About 11.30 a.m. the battalion was ordered to retire, in

conjunction with the right of the 3rd Canadian Division, on the left,

and so came into line with the rest of the division.

The intense anxiety at Brigade and Divisional Headquarters can best be

imagined. For the first two hours of the battle little news could be

gained from Battalion Headquarters as to the progress of the fight.

The whole battlefield was enveloped in smoke, and interest was chiefly

centred on the fine stand which was being made by the Queen’s

Westminsters at Towy Post, where a power buzzer was installed, and

messages were received from the signallers even after the capture of

the post. At one time, while the 4th Londons were still holding the

front-line system, the enemy was attacking Bailleul East Post, held by

the London Scottish, and had captured two machine guns with crews just

in front of the post. A well-timed counter-attack from this gallant

regiment drove the enemy back and released the guns and crews.

As the smoke cleared from the field, the Divisional Artillery took 234

every advantage of their well-situated observation posts. But, though

the struggle was going on before them, observers found that both sides

were frequently so mixed up that they could give no help. Small bodies

of our infantry could be seen clearly, fighting with Germans on all

sides of them.

On the right the situation of the 4th Division was very obscure. The

division was reported to have lost touch with its own brigades, while

the lateral line between the 169th and 12th Brigades was also cut.

With the withdrawal of the 56th Division to the Bailleul-Willerval

line the situation cleared. They were then in touch with the 4th

Division, and the artillery was able to put down a protective barrage

in front of this line. The 3rd Canadian Division gave valuable

assistance with nine 18-pounders.

[Illustration: 8. THE FIRST BATTLE OF ARRAS 1918.]

“From this time till about 3 p.m.” (writes Brig.-Gen.

Elkington), “many excellent targets in the open were engaged

by both field and heavy artillery with great effect.

Unfortunately, owing to the limited number of guns

available, and that many had to be used for the immediate

protection of our infantry, only a few could be used for the

excellent targets in the open. At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy

made a heavy attack against the Bailleul line, particularly

on Bailleul East Post; this was completely shattered by a

concentrated barrage and by rifle and machine-gun fire. With

the exception of hostile bombing attacks up the

communication trenches leading to the Bailleul line, the

enemy made no further serious effort to attack. All battery

positions were heavily shelled throughout the day by all

calibres of ordnance, the shelling being more of the nature 235

of area shoots than definite counter-battery work. As a

result, from dawn on the 28th to dawn on the 29th twelve

18-pounders were destroyed or put out of action by enemy

shell-fire. In addition two 18-pounders in position as an

enfilade section near Arleux, facing south-east, had to be

destroyed and abandoned when our line was withdrawn to the

Bailleul line. This section engaged many targets with

observation from the vicinity of the guns, and was fought

until our infantry withdrew through it. The detachments then

retired after damaging the guns, burning the dug-outs, and

removing dial sights and breach blocks. All the six 6-inch

mortars in the front line were lost to the enemy, and no

news was available as to the fate of the officers and

detachments of the two that were manned (they were

afterwards found to have been made prisoners).... During the

night of the 28th/29th, with the exception of two batteries,

all the Divisional Artillery was withdrawn to positions at

an average of about 3,600 yards to our new front, this move

being carried out by single batteries in turns.... The

ammunition expended from the early morning of the 28th to

the early morning of the 29th by the 56th Divisional

Artillery alone was: 23,000 rounds of 18-pounder and 8,000

rounds of 4·5 howitzer.... As a result of an urgent request

to the Corps on the afternoon of the 28th for new guns to

replace the damaged ones, six new ones were sent up--these

turned out to be 15-pounders, for which we had no

ammunition.... The Germans in their official communiqué

reported that the 56th Division had been annihilated!”

The German attack was definitely crushed in the morning, but during

the afternoon a number of half-hearted and tentative attacks were

made. The situation, however, became more quiet about 6 p.m., and the 236

169th Brigade was relieved by the 167th, with the 5th Canadian Mounted

Rifles in support at Point du Jour.

During the night the engineers were employed in blocking and

filling-in the communication trenches in front of the new line, and

patrolling was actively carried out. The Kensingtons penetrated into

Arleux Loop South, Kent Road, and the junction of Tommy and Baron,

which seems to show that the enemy were dazed.

On the 29th, except for some demonstrations at the bombing blocks, the

enemy made no move. There were many reports that he was massing for

further attacks, but it became evident that he was relieving his

storming troops. As night fell, the first platoons of the 4th Canadian

Division started to relieve, and during the night the 167th Brigade

moved back to Villers au Bois, the 168th to Mont St. Eloi, and the

169th to Ecoivres.

On the 30th General Dudgeon visited the First Army Headquarters, where

he was congratulated by His Majesty the King.

There is little doubt that the enemy hoped to achieve great results by

this new stroke, and that its failure was a serious set-back. Five

divisions attacked the 4th and 56th Divisions north of the Scarpe and,

according to captured documents, when the line Vimy-Bailleul-St.

Laurent-Blangy had been won, three special divisions were to attack

and capture the Vimy Ridge on the following day. South of the Scarpe

eleven divisions were launched, with the object of capturing Arras and

carrying the attack as far south as Bucquoy. The German official list

(published 1919) gives eleven divisions attacking north and south of 237

the Scarpe, one division at Neuville Vitasse, and one at

Moyenneville--thirteen in all. It makes no mention of an attack south

of Moyenneville. But the eleven which attacked on the Scarpe were

beaten by the four British divisions which held that line--the 4th and

56th on the north, and the 3rd and 15th on the south.

From this date onward the great German offensive began to decline, and

ended in the Somme area with a final effort to separate the French and

British Armies on the 4th and 5th April, by an attack on the north and

south of the Somme. “It was an established fact,” says Ludendorff,

“that the enemy’s resistance was beyond our strength.” Strategically

the Germans had not won what the events of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th

March had led them to hope for--the failure to take Amiens was a great

disappointment.

The total casualties of the division were 55 officers and 1,433 other

ranks--not excessive, considering the weight of the attack and the

immortal triumph gained by the 56th Division. The importance of this

battle is so great that we give the comments of the two brigadiers.

Brig.-Gen. Coke says that during the six weeks his brigade had been in

the line, the Cheshire Regt. had worked splendidly, and had put up

double apron belts of wire where they would be most effective--the

Naval-Marine line was protected by five belts of wire--and this stood

the bombardment well enough to be a serious obstacle. When the smoke,

which had enveloped the field at the commencement of the battle, had

cleared, excellent observation was obtainable, and the divisional

observers and artillery observers did splendid work. The enemy 238

batteries, which came into action in the open during the afternoon,

were brought up under cover of smoke, and started to fire point-blank

at the Bailleul line, but the Divisional Artillery silenced them in a

few minutes. There was no shortage of ammunition or bombs. The system

of keeping a plentiful supply in deep dug-outs proved sound.

“All concerned are convinced that the enemy losses were

extremely heavy in front of this brigade. The fullest use

was made of Lewis guns and rifles, and every attempt of the

enemy to advance on the Bailleul line over the open was

checked by these means. The fire-bays constructed along Towy

Alley proved specially valuable, and very considerable

losses were inflicted on the enemy from them during our

withdrawal to the Bailleul line.

Many officers testify to the gallant way in which the

Machine Gun Battalion served its guns to the last and to the

good results of the machine-gun fire.

Our artillery inflicted the maximum amount of damage

possible. The number of guns available for the brigade

section was quite inadequate to cover effectively such a

wide front. But the infantry testify to the heavy losses

inflicted on the enemy owing to the quick way in which the

group and battery commanders engaged each good target as

soon as it was observed.

Gallant work was done by the 169th Light Trench Mortar

Battery during the day. Three of the teams disappeared with

the garrisons in the left sector. During the withdrawal,

mortars were placed to cover Pelican and Bailleul Posts.”

It was widely noticed by the men of this brigade that the enemy

approached in a slow, dazed manner. The brigadier thinks that this may

have been due to the great weight carried by the German infantry, who 239

seem, amongst other things, to have carried a week’s rations. The

enemy advanced in three or four lines and almost shoulder to shoulder.

Brig.-Gen. Loch sent in a frank and interesting paper, in which he

points out:

“(_a_) The uselessness of locking up large garrisons in the

front-line posts which are clearly known to the enemy and

are within effective trench-mortar range. Front-line posts

should be held lightly, and be used as observation posts and

to keep the enemy patrols from approaching our main line of

defence. They should be carefully concealed, need have no

regular communication trenches, and should be frequently

changed. The garrisons should be small and frequently

relieved. If rushed and captured from time to time, little

harm is done, provided the garrison have no identification

marks. Deep dug-outs in such posts are a positive danger and

should not be allowed; shelters against the weather are

ample. If heavily attacked, the rôle of such posts should be

to put up the S.O.S. and withdraw. The sole exception to

this rôle is in the case of posts whose whereabouts can be

properly hidden from the enemy. Such posts can be strongly

garrisoned and may have machine guns, as they will have to

break up and delay an attack. The losses in the forward

posts are sufficient commentary on the unsoundness of the

(present) system.

(_b_) The value of changing the actual position of the

garrison in any post--_vide_ Wood Post.

(_c_) The grave danger of altering carefully thought-out

dispositions at the eleventh hour. On the evening of the

27th inst. my dispositions, which had been most minutely

worked out to meet the situation of an attack on my right

flank at the junction with the left of the 169th Brigade,

about Viscount Street, and covering Bradford and Mill Posts, 240

had to be changed as the result of orders, and consequently

this portion of the line (always weak) was rendered

hopelessly incapable of withstanding a strong attack. It is

recognised that larger questions were involved, and no doubt

decided the redistribution, which was not complete before

the attack developed.

(_d_) The uselessness of Stokes mortars in the actual front

line. Such weapons can only open on their S.O.S. lines, and

are very vulnerable from attacks on the flanks. The four

forward guns only fired about 50 rounds before being

surrounded. Had they been behind the main defensive line

covering the communication trenches, and themselves covered

by the infantry, they would have been far more valuable, and

would not possibly have been overrun.

(_e_) The value of trench blocks was fully found out. Such

blocks should be prepared ready against penetration

laterally, so as to localise it.

(_h_) Previous rehearsals and thorough knowledge of overland

routes are essential. To the fact that these points had

received proper attention is attributable the successful

delaying action of this brigade.

(_i_) Defensive flanks prepared as such are invaluable.

(_j_) Infantry and machine guns must establish closer

liaison.... It should be recognised once and for all that

all machine guns in a brigade sector must come under the

senior machine-gun officer in that sector.... Nothing herein

said, however, should be permitted to detract from the

principle that the battalion commander can and should issue

orders to the guns covering him if he considers the

situation demands it....

(_k_) Main forward communication trenches should never be

traced to lead into strong points.... Such communication

trenches are mere covering approaches to these strong points

and afford easy access to the enemy. Our main battle zone 241

should not be covered by a single trench, e.g. the Red Line

(Bailleul), but should consist of at least three trenches

with strong points so constructed as not to be apparent and

obvious. As with garrisons of forward posts, so with

garrisons of battle trenches, they should be constantly

moved so as to avoid giving away the position actually held.”

A captured German officer of the 152nd I.R., 41st Division, gave as

the main causes of the failure of the attack (_a_) the intensity of

the machine-gun barrage, which caused heavy casualties. His regiment

lost 12 officers and the 16th I.R. lost 24 officers; (_b_) watches did

not appear to have been correctly synchronised. We have mentioned the

service rendered by the Machine Gun Battalion, but, unfortunately,

there is no record of Lieut.-Col. E. C. S. Jervis’ dispositions. This

gallant and able officer says that the “tender spots” in his defence

were the low ridges running due east and west through Bradford Post,

and from Mill Post, south of Belvoir Alley, and then west. The former

could not be covered by machine-gun fire, the latter was. And we know

that the enemy, having exterminated the garrison, were mown down, in

and round Gavrelle, from the indirect fire of fourteen machine-guns.

Apart from the heavy artillery fire, which, in itself, caused heavy

casualties, Colonel Jervis points out an interesting feature in this

battle: the complete mastery of the air which the enemy had throughout

the day, resulting in machine-guns being spotted and engaged by

low-flying aeroplanes, which also directed the fire of specially

detailed heavy artillery. Needless to say, machine-guns are very

vulnerable to this form of attack; and we must also point out, having 242

mentioned the capture of guns, that when once the enemy has penetrated

the trench system machine-gunners have great difficulty in dealing

with bombing attacks from the flanks. The Machine Gun Battalion,

however, had a great opportunity in this battle, and took full

advantage of it.

Brig.-Gen. Elkington expresses the opinion that this was the best

action fought by the 56th Division. We do not go quite so far as this.

It was more satisfactory to the troops, no doubt, but there is a great

difference between defence and attack. A successful defence is more

cheering to the infantry and artillery, inasmuch as they can more

easily estimate the damage they do to the enemy; but it would not be

fair to say that this was better than the hard fighting at Gommecourt

and south of Arras in April 1917, or indeed on the Somme in 1916 and

Ypres in 1917. The fact remains, however, that the 56th Division had,

by its stout defence, twice saved the situation, which had been

imperilled by enemy successes elsewhere.

CHAPTER VIII 243

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY

BATTLE OF ALBERT 1918--BATTLE OF THE SCARPE 1918

It must not be thought that this first great German effort ended like

Act I at a theatre, with a curtain dropping for fifteen minutes while

the actors rested and changed their clothes, and the spectators found

solace in nicotine or alcohol.

Troops in line, though they were not being attacked, probably worked

harder than ever before and the nervous tension was as great as ever.

All were conscious that the Germans might erupt again, and, as is

usual in such times of stress, the weak-hearted were always ready to

endow the enemy with miraculous powers of assembling, of covering

himself with a cloak of invisibility. The rush had been stopped, but

only by the sacrifice of a very considerable area of ground, and at

the expense of many reserves; but a mass of enemy divisions was still

concentrated on the Somme.

It was certain that the enemy would attack again, and it seemed

probable that it would be about the centre of the British line, where

his preparations were already complete. Indeed, the situation was more

serious than it had ever been.

The British Army had used up all its reserves in the fighting on the 244

Somme, and in addition ten divisions had been withdrawn from the north

and replaced with worn-out divisions, reinforced from England. The

reasons for draining the north are given by Sir Douglas Haig as being

that he could, under urgent necessity, give ground there to a limited

extent, but a break-through in the centre, about Vimy, “would mean the

realisation of the enemy’s plans, which had been foiled by our defence

of Arras on the 28th March, namely, the capture of Amiens and the

separation of the bulk of the British Armies from the French and from

those British forces acting under the direction of the latter.”

Therefore, in view of the preparations which had been made on that

sector by the enemy, British forces could not be reduced.

Certain preparations for an attack north of the La Bassée Canal had

been observed prior to the 21st March, and there were indications that

the enemy was completing these early in April; but the extent and

force of the possible attack could not be gauged.

On the 7th April a heavy and prolonged bombardment with gas shell was

opened by the Germans from Lens to Armentières. And at 4 o’clock in

the morning of the 9th the bombardment was reopened with the greatest

intensity. At 7 o’clock, again helped by a thick fog, the enemy

attacked the left brigade of the Portuguese 2nd Division and broke

into their trenches; a few minutes later the attack spread to the

north and south. The attack included the left of the First Army and

the right of the Second Army.

This great thrust in the direction of Hazebrouck was brought to a

standstill between Merville and the Forêt de Nieppe, but the enemy

penetrated beyond Bailleul, and in the north took Kemmel Hill and 245

forced a retirement from the Passchendaele Ridge.

This brings the general situation up to the end of April. But we must

note that on the 14th Marshal Foch became the Allied Generalissimo.

The next German move was on the 27th May, north-west of Rheims, on the

Aisne front. The 19th, 21st, 25th, and 50th British Divisions, which

had taken part in both the Somme and the Lys Valley fighting, had been

sent down to a quiet part of the French front; they were joined by the

8th Division, which had been in some of the hardest fighting on the

Somme. These divisions constituted the IX Corps and were included in

the Sixth French Army. The German attack fell on the IX Corps and the

French Corps on their left, which was holding the Chemin des Dames;

they were forced from their positions, and by the 30th May the enemy

had reached the Marne. The attacks continued until the 6th June, when

they culminated in two attempts on the Montagne de Bligny, but here

they were held.

By this time the Allied reserves were being used wherever they were

wanted. But it had been for the most part French reserves which had

come to the aid of the British. At the beginning of July, however,

Marshal Foch believed that the enemy was about to attack east and west

of Rheims, and he moved the whole of his French troops (eight

divisions) from Flanders, and in addition asked for four British

divisions to relieve French troops on the Somme. A further four

divisions were also sent down as a reserve behind the French front.

As the Marshal had foreseen, the enemy attacked on the 15th July, and,

after making progress and crossing the Marne, was held by French, 246

American, and Italian divisions.

On the 18th July the Marshal launched his great counter-offensive on

the Château Thierry-Soissons front, and in this used the four British

divisions he had held in reserve, and which constituted the XXII

Corps. (The 56th Division entered this Corps later on.)

In view of the defeats inflicted up to the moment of the

counter-offensive, it might well be supposed that the troops of the

Entente were despondent. The Germans were surprised at M. Clemenceau

stating that he would fight before Paris, that he would fight in

Paris, and that he would fight behind Paris, and this same spirit

certainly pervaded the 56th Division. With these great enemy successes

throughout the months of March, April, May, and July in mind, the

actions of the 56th Division during those months are perhaps the most

significant and, in our opinion, the most gallant work they performed.

There was no set battle. And a set battle is in some ways the easiest

kind of attack for the infantry. The operations through those months

were of a minor character, calling for a high level of courage and

determination from small parties of men, parties so small that the

success of the enterprise must depend on individual gallantry, as

there was no mass to drag them along. At any time minor operations

deserve more praise than is allotted to them, and at this time, in the

face of a series of German victories, they are worthy of the highest

admiration.

Divisional Headquarters were at a place called Acq, to the north-west

of Arras, and the brigades in the neighbouring villages. Again the

division was not to know a lengthy period of rest, for on the 8th 247

April the 56th Division had relieved the 1st Canadian Division and

Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line. During the week of

so-called rest, brigades were called upon to provide anything between

1,200 and 1,500 men each night for fatigues, digging further lines of

defence. “Bow Bells” were active, and those who were not on fatigue

joined in many a chorus with a flavour and memory of London Town.

The new front was south of the Scarpe and the Arras-Douai railway,

ground over which the division had fought in the same month of the

previous year. The high ground of Monchy and Orange Hill, on this side

of the Scarpe, had been lost on the 28th, and the line now ran through

Fampoux, on the north of the river, in front of Feuchy to Bois des

Bœufs, to the east of Tilloy, and so to Neuville Vitasse. Bois des

Bœufs was about the centre of the line held by the division, which was

thus astride of the Arras-Cambrai road. The Corps was the XVII

(Fergusson), and had been part of the Third Army, but on the 8th it

was transferred to the First Army.

From the moment of taking over the line, patrols were pursuing an

aggressive policy. Many small encounters took place in No Man’s Land,

the 56th Division gradually gaining the ascendancy over the enemy.

On the 19th, at 4.30 a.m., the 168th Brigade carried out a most

successful enterprise. The idea was to advance the outpost line on the

Tilloy-Wancourt road, and was undertaken by the London Scottish on the

right, with one company and a bombing section, and the 4th London

Regt. on the left, with one platoon and two bombing sections. The enemy 248

were taken completely by surprise. One warrant officer and three other

ranks were captured, together with nine machine guns and a

Grenatenwerfer. The enemy line was held throughout the day, but the

hostile artillery fire became stronger, the position was not

particularly good, and towards the evening orders were given to

evacuate it. While this was being done at dusk, the Germans launched a

counter-attack and a lively scuffle ensued. The enemy was first beaten

off, and then the retirement was effected.

A curious incident occurred during this brush with the enemy. The

Germans, as usual, sent up a multitude of lights, and a combination of

these appear to have presented to the artillery observers a cluster of

lights such as our S.O.S. rocket contained at that moment. The S.O.S.

barrage was accordingly put down, much to the surprise of the London

Scottish.

The prisoners were of the 65th Infantry Regt., 185th Division.

On the 23rd April the 56th Division took over from the 15th Division

the sector north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and held the whole of the

XVII Corps front.

The enemy raided on the 24th, and occupied for a short period a

gun-pit post. He was ejected and gained no identification, but two of

his dead were found and proved to be of the 28th Infantry Regt., 185th

Division. But the next night two prisoners were captured by a patrol

on the extreme left of the line, near Broken Mill, belonging to the

14th Bavarian Regt., 16th Bavarian Division, which indicated a relief

of the 185th Division.

Gen. Dudgeon, who had led the division through some very heavy 249

fighting, fell ill on the 25th and was sent to hospital. His record

with the division is a fine one. At the third battle of Ypres he had

scarcely time to look round, knew no one in the division, and his

position might be described as most unenviable; at the battle of

Cambrai he was called upon to carry out a most difficult task; at

Arras he went through a most anxious and trying period. At none of

these places did he falter. The ordeals which were thrust upon him

were heavy, but he brought the division through them triumphantly.

Brig.-Gen. Freeth assumed temporary command of the division, until

Gen. Hull arrived on the 4th May.

No man had such power over the 56th Division as Gen. Hull. The

wonderful pugnacious spirit they had shown in the Laventie-Richebourg

line was roused to its highest pitch when, after a quiet ten days’

study of the line, the General ordered a whole series of raids, which

at last caused the Germans to erect a board, in their line, on which

was chalked: “Please don’t raid us any more!”

On the 21st May the 8th Middlesex raided near the Tilloy-Wancourt road

and captured four prisoners and a machine gun. They established the

important fact that the 16th Bavarian Division had been relieved by

the 214th, the prisoners being of the 50th Regt.

On the 27th patrols ran into strong parties of the enemy covering a

large number of men engaged in wiring the enemy front. The next night

a somewhat ambitious raid was made on a wide front of either side of

the Tilloy-Wancourt road. On the left was the 7th Middlesex, in three 250

parties (one company in all), on the right two platoons of the 1st

London Regt.

The raid was a great success. Under an excellent barrage, of which

everyone spoke with the highest praise, the raiders entered the enemy

lines. They found it packed with men north of the road. The 1st

Londons claimed to have killed 40 south of the road, and the 7th

Middlesex appear to have spread terror and devastation in their area.

The right party of Middlesex estimated that they had killed 32 of the

enemy and captured 1 machine gun. The centre party first met the enemy

in shell-holes outside their wire, and quickly disposed of them; they

claimed 35 Germans killed, 1 prisoner, and 1 machine gun. The left

party counted the damage they inflicted as no less than 60 killed. The

artillery had also done fearful execution. Although many of the enemy

were seen running away, the total casualties inflicted by this raid

were reckoned to be 200. Making every allowance for exaggeration--for

it is extremely difficult to count dead men during a raid--the facts

remain that the raid was a huge success and the casualties inflicted

exceedingly heavy.

No attempt was made to advance our outpost line and our wounded were

taken safely back. The total casualties of the raiding parties were 2

officers killed and 2 wounded, 2 other ranks killed and 49

wounded--the wounds were mostly slight. The identification procured

was normal--50th Regt., 214th Division.

On the 30th May the Kensingtons sent out an enterprising patrol which

rushed an enemy post and captured two more prisoners. Identification

normal.

The month of June opened with a raid by the Kensingtons near the 251

Cambrai road. Many of the enemy were killed and 27 taken prisoners.

The Germans did not show much fight on this occasion, but in most

cases emerged from dug-outs with no rifles or equipment. They were

again of the 50th Infantry Regt., 214th Division. The Kensingtons’

casualties were 1 killed and 17 wounded.

On the 10th June the 7th Middlesex raided on the left of the line,

near Broken Mill, and secured two prisoners of the 358th Infantry

Regt., 214th Division.

One company of the London Rifle Brigade suddenly raided at 3 o’clock

in the afternoon on the 12th June south of the Cambrai road. They

advanced under cover of smoke and killed about 24 of the enemy and

captured 1 machine gun. Their casualties were only 3 killed and 11

wounded, in spite of their daring. Identification normal.

Soon after this raid the Germans were seen to be active in their

lines. Many officers were noticed examining our lines on the 24th

June, and the next night a platoon of the 1st Londons and a platoon of

the 8th Middlesex entered the enemy lines on the left and inflicted

casualties, but failed to obtain identification. This was soon

secured, however, by the London Rifle Brigade, who brought in a man of

the 50th Infantry Regt. on the 3rd July.

The Queen’s Westminsters sent a company over into some fortified

gun-pits on the 8th July, and secured three prisoners of the 358th

Regiment, 214th Division. They took over with them some heavy charges

of ammonal, as it was known that a deep dug-out existed. As soon as

the raiders reached the gun-pits the garrison, led by an officer,

attempted to come out of the dug-out. The officer was promptly shot, 252

though he missed the leading man of the Queen’s Westminsters by a

hair’s-breadth, and a charge of the explosive was thrown down the

dug-out. A terrific explosion completely destroyed that entrance. The

raiders then found the second entrance and treated it in the same

fashion. The prisoners stated that between fifty and sixty men were in

the dug-out with two officers.

This ended the series of raids, and it would seem as though the 185th

and 214th German Divisions had good cause to remember the 56th

Division. But it is an exceedingly fine record, and speaks highly of

the _moral_ of the London men and the inspiring leadership of

their General.

Gen. Hull handed over to the 2nd Canadian Division on the 15th July,

and the division moved through Roellecourt to Villers Châtel.

Before leaving this period we must quote from Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s

diary:

“In addition to the 56th Divisional Artillery I had several

other R.A. brigades under my command to assist in covering

the front, namely the 29th, 277th, and 311th R.A. Brigades.

During April and May Gen. Dudgeon suffered from severe

rheumatism and had to give up command of the division.

Major-Gen. Hull returned and took over command.

Reconnaissances and selection of several back lines, in case

of withdrawal being necessary on this front, were carried

out, and all battery positions carefully marked and their

observation posts selected, also their lines of retreat if

necessary. Continual training in moving warfare was also

carried out by means of skeleton drill with full staff. A

polo ground was used near Dainville and play went on twice a

week until the enemy elected to shell the ground, when it

had to be stopped. During this period the artillery 253

supported many successful raids by our infantry and the

Canadians on our right.... The ‘Bow Bells’ established

themselves in a hut near our headquarters and gave many

excellent shows to crowded houses. Towards the end of May

Indian drivers were sent to us from the Divisional

Ammunition Column to release the European personnel. These

drivers did very well after they had been trained, but

suffered rather from the cold during the winter. On the 15th

July the 56th Divisional Infantry was relieved by the 2nd

Canadian Division, and I remained in the line commanding the

R.A. until the 21st July, when we were relieved.”

Refitting and training were carried out, and after two weeks in the

back area, which was not free from enemy attention in the nature of

aeroplane bombs, the division started on the 31st July to relieve

portions of the 1st Canadian Division in the Tilloy and Vitasse

sections of the line. The Telegraph Sector was relieved during the

night of the following day, and on the 2nd August Gen. Hull took over

command of the line.

The weather generally was very good and the line quiet. The 167th

Brigade obtained identification on the 4th showing that the 185th

German Division had been relieved by the 39th Division. On the 8th the

division projected gas on Neuville Vitasse, but otherwise everything

was quiet.

On the 15th the 167th Brigade was relieved by the 44th Brigade, 15th

Division, and moved by rail to Izel-les-Hameau area. On the 18th the

168th Brigade was relieved by the 46th Brigade and moved to Mazières

area. And on the 18th the 169th Brigade went to Arras.

At that date there was a proposal that the XVII Corps should attack 254

Orange Hill and Chapel Hill, and the 56th Division was to take part in

this attack. Days, however, were spent in moving about.

On the 20th Sir Douglas Haig visited Gen. Hull. The same day the 169th

Brigade moved to Avesne-le-Comte area, and the 168th to Lignereuil. At

mid-day on the 21st the 56th Division was transferred from the XVII

Corps to the VI Corps, and the whole division moved to the Bavincourt

area, when an entirely new scheme of attack came into being.

* * * * *

In his dispatch covering this period Sir Douglas Haig writes:

“The definite collapse of the ambitious offensive launched

by the enemy on the 15th July, and the striking success of

the Allied counter-offensive south of the Aisne, effected a

complete change in the whole military situation.”

This first big operation of Marshal Foch had inflicted heavy losses on

the enemy. Ten divisions were broken up and the remnants used as

reinforcements to others. The attempt to make the Entente Powers sue

for peace before the arrival of the Americans had failed--not only

were a million troops from the United States in France, but the

English divisions had been largely made up to strength. Between May

and June ten English divisions had been reduced to cadres--seven of

these were reconstituted during July and August. And German General

Headquarters had been forced to take momentous decisions. They had to

withdraw from the salient between Rheims and Soissons, and also abandon 255

their idea of a new offensive in Flanders. “By the beginning of

August,” says Ludendorff, “we had suspended our attack and reverted to

the defensive on the whole front.”

At a conference, held on the 23rd July, it was arranged by Marshal

Foch that the British, French, and American Armies should each prepare

plans for a local offensive. The objectives on the British front were

the disengagement of Amiens and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens

railway by an attack on the Albert-Montdidier front. The rôle of the

French and American Armies was to free other strategic railways

farther south and east.

There seems a suggestion in his dispatches that the British

Commander-in-Chief was somewhat perturbed by this decision. He had the

safety of the Channel ports and the danger of a fresh German offensive

in that direction ever in his mind, and we know that it was

Ludendorff’s plan. There is an indication that Sir Douglas Haig was

urging a counter-stroke in the north. “These different operations,” he

says, “had already been the subject of correspondence between Marshal

Foch and myself.” Ultimately he came to the conclusion that the tasks

assigned to the British forces east of Amiens should take precedence

“as being the most important and the most likely to give large

results.”

The attack opened on the 8th August on a front of over eleven miles

from just south of the Amiens-Roye road to Morlancourt. On the right

was the Canadian Corps, in the centre the Australian Corps, and on the

left the III Corps. The attack of the First French Army was timed to

take place an hour later between Moreuil and the British right. By the

12th August 22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been captured, and 256

the line had been advanced to a depth of twelve miles, to the old

German positions in 1916.

The 8th August was the black day of the German Army in the history of

this war, says Ludendorff.[5]

“The Emperor told me later that, after the failure of the

July offensive and after the 8th August, he knew the war

could no longer be won. The official report of the evening

of the 8th announced briefly that the enemy had penetrated

our line south of the Somme on a wide front. Early the

following morning General von Cramon rang me up from Baden.

He informed me that my report had caused great alarm in

Vienna. I could not leave him in any doubt as to the serious

view I took of the situation. Nevertheless he begged me to

remember how detrimentally the blunt admission of defeat

must affect our allies, who had placed all their hopes in

Germany. This occurred again on the 2nd September.

The impression made on our Allies by the failure on the

Western Front was great. The Emperor Charles announced his

intention of coming to Spa in the middle of August.”

The great salient the Germans had created towards Amiens was

disappearing, and Sir Douglas Haig was faced with the old positions of

the opening of the battle of the Somme in 1916. But there was a

difference. The situation and his reasoning are succinctly related in

his dispatch:

“In deciding to extend the attack northwards to the area 257

between the Rivers Somme and Scarpe I was influenced by the

following considerations.

The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack in this

direction, and, owing to the success of the Fourth Army, he

occupied a salient the left flank of which was already

threatened from the south. A further reason for my decision

was that the ground north of the Ancre River was not greatly

damaged by shell-fire, and was suitable for the use of

Tanks. A successful attack between Albert and Arras in a

south-easterly direction would turn the line of the Somme

south of Péronne, and give every promise of producing

far-reaching results. It would be a step towards the

strategic objective, St. Quentin-Cambrai.

This attack, moreover, would be rendered easier by the fact

that we now held the commanding plateau south of Arras about

Bucquoy and Ablainzeville, which in the days of the old

Somme fighting had lain well behind the enemy’s lines. In

consequence we were here either astride or to the east of

the intricate system of trench lines which in 1916 we had no

choice but to attack frontally, and enjoyed advantages of

observation which at that date had been denied us.

It was arranged that on the morning of the 21st August a

limited attack should be launched north of the Ancre to gain

the general line of the Arras-Albert railway, on which it

was correctly assumed that the enemy’s main line of

resistance was sited. The day of the 22nd August would then

be used to get troops and guns into position on this front,

and to bring forward the left of the Fourth Army between the

Somme and the Ancre. The principal attack would be delivered

on the 23rd August by the Third Army and the divisions of

the Fourth Army north of the Somme, the remainder of the

Fourth Army assisting by pushing forward south of the river

to cover the flank of the main operation. Thereafter, if

success attended our efforts, the whole of both armies were 258

to press forward with the greatest vigour and exploit to the

full any advantage we might have gained.”

* * * * *

It will be seen, therefore, that as the attack from Amiens advanced,

it was being taken up by troops on the left. On the 21st August the IV

Corps was engaged, with the 42nd, New Zealand, and 37th Divisions, and

the VI Corps, with the 2nd and Guards Divisions. On the 23rd a series

of strong assaults were delivered on practically the whole front of

thirty-three miles from our junction with the French at Lihons.

As the attack spread to the north, so activity in Corps, Division, and

Brigade Headquarters preceded actual movement of troops. A state of

brain and nerve tension prevailed. There was, too, a change of plan,

which is always one of the trials of the regimental soldier. It is as

well to recapitulate some of the movements.

The relief in the line was completed on the 18th August, and on the

19th the 169th Brigade was sent to Arras to carry out preparations for

an attack on Orange and Chapel Hills. Owing to the change of plan this

brigade was sent back to the Avesnes-le-Comte area on the 21st, and on

the same day the 168th Brigade marched from the Mazières area to

Lignereuil. The 56th Division now came under the VI Corps (Haldane),

and Gen. Hull at once visited Corps Headquarters, but did not succeed

in gaining any exact information as to the rôle the division would

play in the forthcoming operations. During the night 21st/22nd the

division marched to the area Barly-St. Amand-Saulty-Bavincourt.

Early in the morning of the 22nd Gen. Hull was called to a conference 259

at Corps Headquarters, where the operations for the next day were

decided upon. He did not get back to Bavincourt until 10.30 a.m., when

he held a conference and explained the operations to all concerned.

Officers of all brigades were then sent off to reconnoitre; and the

168th Brigade marched at 3.30 p.m. to Blairville, a distance of seven

and a half miles.

Time was now getting on and the Corps Operation order had not been

received. Gen. Hull, however, sent out his orders based on what had

been said at the conference in the morning, and at 9 p.m. the 168th

Brigade, with the 1st London Regt. attached, moved to the assembly

area, a march of another four and a half miles, ready to attack on the

left of the Guards Division. In the midst of all this movement and

with only a short time at their disposal, officers had no opportunity

of seeing the forward assembly areas or the objectives. They assembled

in the dark and attacked in the morning, never having seen the ground

before.

The artillery was no better off than the infantry.

“On the 21st August orders were received to join the VI

Corps, and I went off to see the Corps R.A., who were a long

way back, and also to see the 40th Division Artillery and

the Guards Artillery and to try to reconnoitre the new

front. On the evening of the 21st I received instructions

from the R.A. VI Corps that all arrangements were at once to

be made to put the 56th Artillery in action to cover the

attack of the 56th Division on the morning of the 23rd, the

divisional front being roughly from 500 yards north of

Hamelincourt to just north of Boiry Becquerelle. The 260

Divisional Artillery, for purposes of the initial attack,

consisted of six brigades R.F.A., as follows: (_a_) Guards

Divisional Artillery, (_b_) 57th, (_c_) 56th. On the 21st

August these brigades were as follows: (_a_) in action on

the front, (_b_) in reserve near St. Pol, (_c_) in reserve

at Simencourt and Berneville. Reconnaissance was carried out

during the morning of the 22nd, and at 8 p.m. that evening

the brigades moved off to occupy the positions selected, and

ammunition to the extent of 400 rounds per gun had to be

dumped at the same time. This involved an immense amount of

work, but it was successfully carried out by the brigades of

the 56th Divisional Artillery by 2 a.m. on the 23rd; but the

brigades of the 57th Divisional Artillery, though all guns

were got into action, were delayed by heavy gas shelling,

and were as a result unable to complete the gun-dumps by the

opening of the barrage. At this time the artillery covering

the division was organised as follows:

Right group:

74th and 75th Brigades R.F.A. Guards Divisional

Artillery, in action west of Boisleux-au-Mont.

Centre group:

285th and 286th Brigades R.F.A. 57th Divisional

Artillery, in action south-east of Boisleux-au-Mont.

Left group:

280th and 281st Brigades R.F.A. 56th Divisional

Artillery, in action south-west of Boisleux-au-Mont.

As far as the field artillery was concerned, the strength of

the barrage was about one 18-pounder gun per 27 yards.

Affiliated Heavy Artillery group--two brigades R.G.A.” [Gen.

Elkington.]

The position from which the division attacked was a very strong one 261

for defence. The Cojeul River has two branches. The northern branch,

running from the high ground by Adinfer Wood, passes to the north of

Boisleux-St. Marc and Boiry Becquerelle. The southern branch, running

across the front of the division, is underground between Hamelincourt

and Boyelles, where it comes to the surface and joins the main stream

south of Henin.

The left flank of the division rested on Cojeul (north). There was,

therefore, a wide field of vision in front of them, with the one

exception of the spur which shoots out between the two branches of the

river to the north of Boyelles, and which afforded the enemy a

concealed position on that portion of the front. The general run of

the valley was across the direction of the 56th Division attack, and

Croisilles and St. Leger were over the ridge on the far side of the

valley. Beyond these villages the Hindenburg Line ran roughly from

Arras in a south-easterly direction, obliquely across the line of

attack.

The first objective of the 168th Brigade, which was to make the

attack, was the blue line--that is, the two villages of Boyelles and

Boiry Becquerelle; and the brigade would then push out a fringe of

posts in front. Twenty-one Tanks (two companies, 11th Battalion Tank

Corps) were to help in this attack.

As the battalions of the 168th Brigade marched to their positions, the

Germans used gas freely and respirators had to be worn. Fortunately

the night was light, but even so progress was slow, and such light as

there was did not help officers, when they had placed their men in

position, to see very much of what sort of a place it was they would

attack in the morning. It seemed that the enemy was very alert, as he 262

fired a great deal with machine guns and light trench mortars during

the night.

At 4.55 a.m. in the murky light of dawn the barrage, which had opened

at 4 a.m. at Gommecourt on the right of the VI Corps, crashed down in

front of the 56th Division. The Kensingtons, on the right, north of

Hamelincourt, the 4th Londons in the centre, and the London Scottish

on the left advanced to the assault twelve minutes later. The Tanks

cleared the way for the Kensingtons very effectively, only a few small

parties of the enemy showing much fight. The battalion, however, was

worried by machine-gun fire from the left, and it was seen that the

4th Londons were meeting with more determined opposition. Two platoons

of the Kensingtons were, therefore, sent to assist by attacking

Boyelles from the south. By 6 o’clock the Kensingtons had reached

their objective.

The 4th Londons had the village of Boyelles and the curious circular

Marc system in front of them. The ruins of the village could be seen

from the right, but Marc system was blind. Actually the ground between

our front-line trench and the enemy line was level, but it dropped

suddenly from the German line and was helped by a sunken road, so that

there was plenty of shelter from the barrage. The left of the 4th

Londons was held up in front of this place. For some reason no Tank

attacked the forward Marc system, and until a platoon enfiladed the

sunken road from the south, and the London Scottish threatened from

the north, the garrison held up the advance and inflicted heavy

casualties. When the troops pressed in from the flanks, however, the 263

Germans, 2 officers and 80 men, surrendered.

Much the same thing happened to the right company of the 4th Londons

in the village of Boyelles. But here four Tanks came on the scene, and

again the garrison surrendered with eleven machine guns. Six light,

heavy, and medium trench mortars were captured in the banks on the

north of the stream.

The London Scottish on the left met with opposition from Boiry

Becquerelle, but carried out a smart enveloping movement, closing on

the village from the flanks, and eventually getting behind it. Over

100 prisoners and 8 machine guns were taken by this well-known

battalion.

All the first objective was then in our hands.

At 9.15 a.m. the 168th Brigade was ordered to continue the advance so

as to conform with the 2nd Guards Brigade on the right. The brigade

was to gain touch with the Guards at Bank Copse on the east side of

the railway curve into St. Leger. But this order had to be transmitted

by runner and distances were great; it did not reach the centre

battalion until 11.15 a.m.

The Kensingtons started their advance at 1.30 p.m., and almost at once

met with strong machine-gun and artillery fire. The advance was held

up on the Ervillers-Boyelles road, and much confused fighting ensued.

Two platoons managed to get round the opposition and joined the

Guards, with whom they attacked the railway bank to the west of Bank

Copse. The remainder of the battalion was apparently fighting in small

groups and was much scattered. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Col. R.

S. F. Shaw, went forward to try to clear up the situation and was

killed by a sniper. The position on this battalion front was not 264

certain until 9.30 p.m., when it was ascertained that they were on the

line of the Ervillers-Boyelles road.

The 4th Londons did not advance until 4.30 p.m. They attacked in

widely extended formation and casualties were very light. There was

opposition from five enemy machine guns, but these were outflanked and

overcome. The line of Boyelles Reserve was reached and patrols pushed

out 500 yards beyond without encountering any of the enemy.

The London Scottish attacked at the same time as the 4th Londons and

encountered strong opposition at Boiry Work, at the northern end of

Boyelles Reserve. For one hour the London Scottish worked slowly to

get round this position, but before they closed in the garrison

surrendered--86 prisoners. They were then in line with the 4th Londons

and their posts pushed out some 500 yards in advance.

In spite of the hurried orders it had been a successful day for the

56th Division. The Kensingtons had had the worst time, but they

captured in all 167 prisoners, while the 4th Londons had 243, and the

London Scottish 253.

Commenting on the attack, Brig.-Gen. Loch says that the chief

difficulty was the short notice given, and the fact that the brigade

was billeted in a much scattered area made the rapid issue of orders

impossible. It was also impossible to reconnoitre the ground, and the

approach march was made in exceptionally hot weather. There had been

no preparation of the front prior to the attack, and signal

communications were poor. Visual signalling was of little value, owing

to the dust and the heavy state of the atmosphere, and reliance had 265

to be placed, as it invariably was, on runners who worked well, but as

the distances were ever increasing it was a slow method.

“The Tanks,” he says, “were most valuable, although through

various causes they, in some cases, arrived late in the

assembly areas. Their greater speed enabled them to catch up

the infantry, and by working forward and then to a flank

they evidently much demoralised the enemy and caused them to

surrender more freely than usual.”

The machine guns, which since the beginning of March had been formed

into a battalion, were controlled by Lieut.-Col. Jervis, who was with

the Brigade Headquarters, and were echéloned in depth, the forward

line advancing with the assaulting infantry.

The enemy was in considerable strength, as is shown by the number of

prisoners, 663, and the 59 machine guns and 18 trench mortars which

were captured.

Other divisions of the VI and IV Corps were equally successful, and

the Germans holding the defences to the south, about Thiepval (which

had caused us such efforts to win in 1916), were in a precarious

position. The attack was pressed without giving the enemy

breathing-space, and he was becoming disorganised and showing signs of

confusion.

But in writing of this great and last advance we are conscious that a

division, which until this moment had always appeared to be a large

and important unit in any operations, was being swamped by the numbers

set in motion. One of five or six is such a much bigger proportion

than one of fifty-seven or fifty-eight. And the French, American, and 266

Belgian Armies were moving too.

During the night the London Scottish were placed under the orders of

the 167th Brigade, which relieved the Kensingtons and 4th London

Regiment. The 169th Brigade moved to the Basseux area and, in the

morning of the 24th, to the Purple Line behind Boisleux-au-Mont.

The 167th Brigade were ordered to attack the next day, the 24th, with

Summit Trench as their first objective, refusing their left flank so

as to join with the 52nd Division on the northern boundary. The second

objective was Fooley Reserve-Hill Switch-Cross Switch, with the object

of enveloping Croisilles from the north, while the Guards Division

carried out a similar operation from the south. Twelve Tanks and one

company of the Machine Gun Battalion were to assist.

At 7 a.m. the barrage opened on the enemy frontline posts, and, after

ten minutes, crept forward, at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes,

followed by the infantry. The whole of the brigade, of course,

attacked--the 8th Middlesex being on the right, the 7th Middlesex in

the centre, and the 1st London Regiment on the left. The Guards

Division also attacked on the right, and the 52nd on the left.

The 8th Middlesex reached their objective in Summit Trench and Ledger

Reserve about 10 o’clock. Opposition was not of a fierce nature and

took the form of “patchy” machine-gun fire and rifle fire. Small

parties of men kept working forward and could be seen, with Tanks, in

and about Summit Trench by 8.30 a.m. The 7th Middlesex and 1st Londons

advanced in a similar fashion and with the same opposition. 267

But news came from the Corps which, for the moment, checked the

advance. From prisoners’ statements it was learned that three fresh

divisions had arrived in Bullecourt and Hendicourt, and the 56th

Division was ordered to make preparations to meet a counter-attack.

The 169th Brigade was ordered forward behind Boyelles, and the 167th

Brigade was told to occupy Croisilles “by peaceful penetration.”

Meanwhile the right brigade of the 52nd Division, which was attacking

Henin Hill, had been compelled to withdraw and was echéloned on the

forward slopes to the left rear of the 56th Division.

Patrols began to probe the country before them, and at 1.30 p.m. the

situation was: the 8th Middlesex had one company on the western side

of Croisilles with patrols on the outskirts of the village, two

companies in Summit Trench and that end of Leger Reserve, and one

company in Boyelles Reserve. The 7th Middlesex had two companies in

Summit Trench, with patrols in front, and support and reserve

companies in depth in rear. The 1st Londons had two companies in

Summit Trench, in touch with the 52nd Division, and support and

reserve companies in rear.

Reports tended to show that Croisilles had been evacuated, and after a

consultation with Brig.-Gen. Freeth, Gen. Hull ordered the Brigade to

attack and establish itself in the Hindenburg Support Line between

Hump Lane and River Road (Sensée River). Six Tanks were to be used,

and the 52nd Division was to attack on the left.

Attempts made by the 8th Middlesex to enter Croisilles were not 268

successful, and at zero hour, 7.30 p.m., the village was still in the

hands of the enemy.

The attack was met with determined and very heavy machine-gun and

artillery fire, and failed to gain any ground. Only one Tank came into

action, and that was met with gas which rendered it useless.

Croisilles Trench had been reached by troops, but found to be only 2

feet deep at the most, and quite useless as a reorganising point for

further advance. This trench had unfortunately been shown as an

organised and deep defensive work. Brig.-Gen. Freeth, therefore,

ordered Summit Trench to be held as the line of resistance.

The days’ fighting had resulted in an appreciable gain, but the

enemy’s resistance was increasing. The Corps ordered an attack on the

Hindenburg Support the following day, without the help of Tanks, and

Gen. Hull had to point out that the resistance was not only very

strong, as he had proved that day, but that the Hindenburg system was

very heavily wired. Tanks would have dealt with this wire had they

been available. The Corps then modified the order and instructed the

General to capture Croisilles and obtain a footing in Sensée Avenue,

to the north-east, so as to conform with the 52nd Division, who were

to attack on the left.

During the night the front-line battalions were heavily shelled with

gas, which forced them to wear gas-masks, in one case for six hours.

Patrols, however, went out, and their reports coincided with that of

the Guards Division on the right, that Croisilles was full of machine

guns. Also the 52nd Division on the left reported that the Hindenburg 269

Line was very strongly held. It was decided to bombard the village

while patrols would try to gain ground.

But the 25th August was a negative day. Some posts were established in

front of the main line, but the village itself was too strongly held

and the bombardment, apparently, failed to dislodge the enemy.

Meanwhile the 169th Brigade reconnoitred the position with a view of

attacking and enveloping Croisilles from the north and capturing the

Hindenburg Line.

At 8 a.m. the 56th and 52nd Divisions had been moved from the command

of the VI Corps to that of the XVII Corps, and it was decided that the

167th Brigade should attack on the 26th and establish itself on the

line of the shallow Croisilles Trench and Fooley Reserve. Roughly the

XVII Corps faced the Hindenburg Line, which swung round the left flank

of the 56th Division, and on this flank the 52nd Division were to

advance on the Hindenburg Line in conjunction with the attack of the

167th Brigade. Farther north the Canadian Corps were to assault the

actual Hindenburg Line, and if they were successful the 52nd Division

would continue to push down the system and roll it up in a

south-easterly direction.

The attack of the 167th Brigade took place at 3 a.m., and was nowhere

successful. The wire was still uncut (there were in some spots five

belts of it), and the machine guns in Croisilles poured a devastating

hail of bullets on the assaulting troops. But to the north the

Canadian Corps had been successful and had pierced the Hindenburg 270

system. The 52nd Division had thrust one battalion into the celebrated

line, and was progressing towards Henin Hill.

During the afternoon the 52nd Division reported the line from the

Cojeul River to Henin Hill clear of the enemy, and the 167th Brigade

was then relieved at 6 o’clock by the 169th.

The battalions in line from the right were the Queen’s Westminsters,

the London Rifle Brigade, and the 2nd Londons. On taking over, the 2nd

Londons attempted to clear the situation on the left by a “stealth”

raid with two platoons. The experiment was bad, as the platoons were

almost wiped out by machine guns.

The battle was continued the following day, the 27th, at 9.30 a.m. The

task was to keep in touch with the 52nd Division and sweep round the

north of the village. The Queen’s Westminsters, therefore, stood fast

while the London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd Londons executed a wheel to

the right. This was successful in reaching Farmers’ Avenue and Sensée

Avenue, while, on the left, the 52nd Division reached Fontaine

Croisilles and established themselves to the east of that village. A

glance at the map will show how the Hindenburg Line was being rolled

up, how desperate was the case of the Germans opposite the 56th

Division, and how necessary it was for them to concentrate their

fiercest resistance against the advance of the 56th Division. The day

was noteworthy for the good work done by the 2nd Londons in what was

the nearest approach to open warfare which had as yet been attempted.

Croisilles was the obstacle which stood in our way. The Guards

Division attacked on the right of it, and after an initial success was 271

counter-attacked so severely that they fell back on Leger Reserve, and

left a gap on the right of the Queen’s Westminsters, which was filled

by two platoons of the latter regiment. Farther to the south troops

were fighting on the Somme battlefield of the month of September

1916--still some way from the Hindenburg Line. But, as has been

pointed out, the whole of the old Somme positions were being turned

from the north.

During the afternoon the 168th Brigade took over the frontage held by

the right and centre battalions of the 169th Brigade. These two

battalions were then able to enter the Hindenburg system which had

been captured by the 52nd Division, and move along it towards the

Sensée River, where they would start the attack. The 2nd Londons

meanwhile cleared their front of some small parties of the enemy and

crossed the Sensée to Nelly Avenue, part of an outpost line to the

main defences. The division then stood fast under orders to attack the

Bullecourt area the next day.

During the night dispositions were altered. The 167th Brigade took

over the right of the Divisional front, with the 8th Middlesex, to the

west of Croisilles, and the 168th Brigade moved in position to support

the 169th in the attack along the Hindenburg Line. Also, the 168th

Brigade was to protect the flank of the 169th, if the village was not

taken, and “mop up” generally behind the attacking troops.

The first objective for the 169th Brigade was given as Queen’s

Lane-Jove Lane; the second was the trenches south-east of Bullecourt.

Patrols of the 8th Middlesex attempted to enter Croisilles several

times during the night, but were always met with machine-gun fire. In 272

the morning of the 28th, however, an aeroplane reported the village

empty, but at 8.30 a.m. patrols of the 8th Middlesex found only the

western portion of the village clear. The whole battalion then

advanced, and after some lively fighting occupied the village.

The 52nd Division, which had been relieved by the 57th Division,

passed through the troops in the line and joined in the general attack

of the 56th Division at 12.30 p.m. The action that followed is one of

the utmost confusion. The Queen’s Westminsters, who led the attack,

started from the line Nelly Avenue. The Germans on the right, in

Guardian Reserve, held out, and the 167th Brigade found sufficient of

the enemy to hold them up on the railway south-east of Croisilles. But

two companies of the Queen’s Westminsters and part of the 2nd Londons

lost direction, and seem to have become inextricably mixed with troops

of the 57th Division somewhere to the north of Hendicourt.

Apparently trouble started on the previous day (27th), when the

Queen’s Westminsters and part of the London Rifle Brigade were

relieved by the London Scottish in front of Croisilles. The two former

battalions had to march to a flank to get into the Hindenburg Line,

and were severely shelled in doing so. On arriving at the Hindenburg

Line, progress to their positions of assembly was seriously impeded by

the 52nd Division, who, at that moment, were also assembling to attack

on the following day. Col. Savill, who was commanding the Queen’s

Westminsters, says that his men arrived “dead beat” at Nelly Avenue

and Burg Support, having been on the move all night. He gives as the

cause of the loss of direction the heavy machine-gun fire which his 273

troops met from the right on emerging from the trenches, but a glance

at the map suggests another and more probable reason. He was unable to

assemble his battalion on a front conforming with the general line of

advance. The right of his leading companies was in Nelly Avenue, and

the left in Burg Support with orders “to swing round at right angles

to the Hindenburg system.”

It was pointed out at the battle of the Somme that the complicated

manœuvre of changing direction at the commencement of an assault

should be avoided. It is probable that the commanding officer had no

other alternative, but the lesson is once more demonstrated. To the

difficult task imposed upon them must be added the further

embarrassment of never having seen the ground. True that the attack

did not start until 12.30 p.m., but it was extremely difficult to fix

landmarks owing to the country being so overgrown with long grass and

weeds, and in any case there was rising ground between Burg Support

and Bullecourt, so that the few hours from dawn to the attack were of

little benefit.

The change of front by the left of the attacking force was further

complicated by the thick wire between the trenches of the Hindenburg

System. Before any manœuvre of the sort could be undertaken, these

belts of wire had to be passed, and by the time this had been

accomplished, all idea of direction had fled.

The London Rifle Brigade, in close support to the Queen’s

Westminsters, had three companies in line, the fourth company being in

support on the right and Battalion Headquarters on the left. The left

and centre companies followed the Queen’s Westminsters--even in field 274

practice this would probably occur.

The 2nd London Regt. was already reduced to 11 officers and 193 other

ranks, and assembled in King’s Avenue. The two left companies followed

the Queen’s Westminsters, while the two right companies fought down

Tunnel Trench.

Col. Savill, believing his battalion to be more or less on their way

to Bullecourt, moved with his headquarters down Burg Support and very

soon encountered the enemy. He was joined by the headquarters of the

London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd London Regt. It was thought that the

“mopping-up” had been badly done, and a message was sent for

reinforcements while the staff details tried to bomb their way

forward.

Soon after the attack opened, therefore, the 169th Brigade was trying

to capture Bullecourt with two companies of the London Rifle Brigade

on the right, three battalion headquarter staffs and a few scattered

men of the Queen’s Westminsters in the centre, and two companies of

the 2nd London Regt. (not a hundred men) on the left. The right, which

was the strongest part of the total force, was definitely held up by a

strong enemy garrison in Guardian, and in other parts of the front the

enemy resistance was too strong to be overcome by so weak a force.

Eventually a company of the 4th London Regt. was sent up Burg Support,

and by 5 p.m. progress had been made as far as the Hump. But on the

right the enemy, who were being continually reinforced by troops

falling back from the attack of the 167th Brigade through Croisilles,

still held Guardian Reserve. “Guardian Reserve,” writes Brig.-Gen. 275

Coke, “was a thorn in the side of the brigade until 6 p.m.” Not only

was the advance severely harassed from this place, but no track for

carrying ammunition, etc., was available until it had been captured.

By 6 p.m., however, the London Rifle Brigade, reinforced by two

companies of the Kensingtons and the 168th Trench Mortar Battery,

drove the greater part of the remaining Germans to surrender.

The advance continued on the right as far as Pelican Avenue, but in

the centre the Knuckle was not cleared until 5 a.m. on the 29th. The

situation all through the afternoon and night of the 28th August was

most complicated, the 2nd London, London Rifle Brigade, 4th London,

and Kensington Regts. being involved in a series of separate

operations dealing with scattered machine-gun nests, disposed in

trenches and in broken ground.

During the afternoon the 168th Brigade had been ordered to move to Leg

Lane and get in touch with the 167th Brigade, also to be prepared to

move into Pelican Avenue with the object of attacking Bullecourt early

in the morning of the 29th. But, owing to the state of affairs in the

main Hindenburg System, this was impossible, and troops were moved

into position in daylight on the 29th.

Meanwhile, all those troops who had gone careering about on the left

had become mixed up with the 172nd Brigade in the neighbourhood of

Cemetery Avenue to the north of Hendicourt. They had suffered a number

of casualties, and the remaining captain of the Queen’s Westminsters

had returned wounded during the afternoon, and had reported to the

169th Brigade that he and the force of which he assumed command had 276

occupied Pelican Lane. This will give some idea of the difficulties

which confronted Brig.-Gen. Coke.

The attack was resumed in strength at 1 p.m. on the 29th. The 168th

Brigade were in Pelican Avenue, with the Kensingtons on the right and

the London Scottish on the left, right and left support being the 4th

and 1st London Regts.

Pelican Lane appears to have been held by small parties of the enemy,

and the 169th Brigade assembled in the trenches north-west of that

place. But the missing companies, with the exception of the 2nd London

Regt., had not returned. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack with

two companies, having in close support 40 men of the Queen’s

Westminsters (which were all that could be found), and behind them the

2nd Londons, with a total strength of 7 officers and 95 other ranks.

The objective for the division was the trench system east of

Bullecourt and south of Riencourt. At the very start of the attack the

Kensingtons were held up at Station Redoubt; but the London Scottish

made good progress on the left, and by 2.15 p.m. were through

Bullecourt. The weak 169th Brigade made progress as far as Saddler

Lane and the sunken road on the left of the village. And the 57th

Division reported that they had captured Riencourt and were through

Hendicourt.

Tank Avenue was strongly held by the enemy and successfully arrested

any further advance in the centre; and on the flanks the first check

was not overcome. And so the line remained with the London Scottish

bulged out round Bullecourt, and the Kensingtons bringing the right

flank back to Station Redoubt, and the 169th Brigade the left flank 277

to Saddler Lane. The right of the division was in touch with the 3rd

Division, but the position of the 57th was obscure.

The 167th Brigade then relieved the whole of the divisional front, and

the night passed in comparative quietness.

At about 5 a.m. on the 30th the enemy counter-attacked the line

Hendicourt-Bullecourt-Ecoust in strength, and drove the 167th Brigade

out of Bullecourt to the line Pelican Lane and Pelican Avenue. At the

same time the 3rd Division on the right was driven out of Ecoust, and

on the left the 57th Division lost Riencourt and fell back on the

Bullecourt-Hendecourt road, the enemy securing the factory on that

road.

The 167th Brigade at once attempted to regain Bullecourt; but the

enemy forces in Bullecourt received such strong support from the

Station Redoubt that all efforts failed. Gen. Hull arranged for a

bombardment of the Station Redoubt by the heavy artillery.

Orders from the Corps fixed the 31st August for a renewal of the

attack in conjunction with the VI Corps on the left. And so the 168th

Brigade was once more ordered to take Bullecourt and the Station

Redoubt, relieving the 167th Brigade on that portion of the front. A

company of the latter brigade would then take up a position on the

left of the 168th Brigade and attack the factory. The objective was

Tank Support with the left flank thrown back to the factory.

The relief took place, and all preparations were completed. At 5.15

a.m. on the 31st the brigade advanced under a creeping barrage, with 278

the London Scottish on the right, the 4th London Regt. in the centre,

and the 7th Middlesex on the left.

The London Scottish carried the Station Redoubt, and attacked

Bullecourt Avenue at 8 o’clock, obtaining touch with the 4th Londons.

But the latter regiment was held up in front of Bullecourt; and on the

left the 7th Middlesex were unable to capture the factory. A company

of the Kensingtons was sent up on the left, and by 10.15 a.m. the

factory was captured, and touch obtained with the 171st Brigade of the

division on that flank. Meanwhile, the London Scottish had captured

Bullecourt Avenue.

At 1 o’clock an artillery observer reported the enemy advancing over

the open and assembling in Tank Avenue and Support. All field guns and

the heavy artillery was concentrated on this target, and no

counter-attack developed. But the plans were modified to the capture

of the village only.

Two companies of the Kensingtons were sent up as reinforcements, and

bombing from the flanks was carried on round the village. By the time

it was dark only the eastern portion was not cleared up; and the enemy

remained in Gordon Reserve.

The 56th Division was then relieved by the 52nd, and marched out of

the line to rest about Boyelles. The captures during these operations

were:

29 officers, 1,047 other ranks.

2 77-mm. guns and 1 8-inch howitzer.

200 machine guns and over 50 trench mortars.

The casualties of the division were:

123 officers and 2,381 other ranks.

[Illustration: 9. THE BATTLES OF ALBERT & THE SCARPE 1918.]

The hard-working but cheery artillery remained in the line. All

through the battle they had pushed forward close behind the infantry. 279

On the 25th August the Guards Artillery had returned to their own

division, and as a consequence the 56th Divisional front had been

covered by the 57th Divisional Artillery on the right and their own

artillery on the left. At this time the 13th and 22nd Brigades of the

Royal Garrison Artillery had been affiliated with the 56th Divisional

Artillery. The enemy paid the closest attention to our artillery,

bombarding the battery positions incessantly with high-explosive and

gas shells.

On the 29th, early in the morning, all brigades of artillery advanced

to the outskirts of Croisilles. In the previous fighting they had been

1,200 yards behind the infantry in Summit Trench. On this same day the

232nd Army Brigade R.F.A. was transferred to the 56th Division, and

formed an independent group with S.O.S. lines superimposed. After the

advance in the morning the 56th Divisional Artillery became the right

group and the 57th the left group. And the next day the 40th

Divisional Artillery replaced the 57th.

The artillery passed under the command of the 40th and then the 63rd

Divisions, and eventually withdrew from the line on the 5th September,

all ranks and horses having suffered severely from gas.

There was to be little rest.

It is interesting to note that the official report of the Battles

Nomenclature Committee gives the Battle of Albert the dates 21st-23rd

August and boundaries Road Chaulnes--Lamotte--Corbie--Warloy--Acheux--

Souastre--Berles-au-Bois--Brétencourt--Héninel; and the Battle of the

Scarpe 1918 the dates 26th-30th August and boundaries Noreuil

(exclusive)--St. Leger (exclusive)--Boisleux-au-Mont--Roclincourt-- 280

Bailleul--Oppy. The ground from the right of Boyelles (about the

station) to Mercatel is therefore included in both battle fronts--the

Battle of the Scarpe opening with the 167th Brigade attack on

Croisilles Trench and Fooley Reserve--and places the 56th Division

operating on the flank in each battle.

[5] _My War Memories, 1914--1918._

CHAPTER IX 281

THE ARMISTICE

BATTLE OF THE CANAL DU NORD--BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918--BATTLE

OF THE SAMBRE

When once the great offensive had started there was no pause in the

fighting. Divisions were relieved to reorganise. Sometimes they stood

their ground, so that supplies could be brought up, and so that they

might not shoot too far ahead of the base from which supplies were

drawn. The turmoil of the front line was assuredly no greater than the

turmoil in rear of the fighting troops. Activity, effort, unending

toil, went on behind the line as well as in the line. As the troops

drove the enemy in front of them, so engineers stood ready to rebuild

the shattered railways and reconstruct the shell-battered roads. But

the Army Service Corps could not stand still while the railways and

roads were in the hands of the engineers. They had to struggle forward

as best they could, and it is to their everlasting industry that the

troops in the fighting areas were fed, clothed, supplied with

ammunition, and, very frequently indeed, provided with water.

When the infantry of the 56th Division returned to Boyelles, the place

was unrecognisable. The railway was through. Trains were in Boyelles,

and lines of lorries stood, being loaded by a swarm of men. It was a

cheering sight for the tired but happy division.

Meanwhile the advance continued, fiercely opposed, but irresistible. 282

On the right of Bullecourt the Fourth and Third Armies had, by the

night of the 30th, reached a line from Cléry-sur-Somme, past the

western edge of Marrières Wood to Combles, les Bœufs, Bancourt,

Fremicourt, and Vraucourt. And, south of Péronne, Allied infantry had

reached the left bank of the Somme from Nesle to the north. Farther

south still, the French held Noyon. On the 1st September the

Australians entered Péronne.

On the left of Bullecourt the First Army had advanced (we have already

noted the advance of the Canadians) and were now on the high ground

east of Cherisy and Hautcourt, and had captured Eterpigny. On the

north of the Scarpe we had captured Plouvain. The Quéant-Drocourt line

was now within assaulting distance.

This powerful line ran from the Hindenburg Line at Quéant to Drocourt,

in the neighbourhood of Lens, and was attacked by the Canadian Corps

and 4th Division, of the First Army, and the 52nd, 57th, and 63rd

Divisions, of the Third Army, on the 2nd September. It was one of the

greatest assaults of the war, and was completely successful.

As the 56th Division knew very well, the Germans had been contesting

every inch of the ground. But now the enemy were in a most

unfavourable position, and started to fall back on the whole of the

Third Army front and on the right of the First Army. On the 3rd

September the enemy was on the line of the Canal du Nord; on the

following day he commenced to withdraw from the east bank of the

Somme, south of Péronne, and on the night of the 8th September was on

the line Vermand, Epehy, Havrincourt, and so along the east bank of

the canal.

Meanwhile the division rested, bathed, and reorganised. Divisional 283

Headquarters were at Boisleux St. Marc, and on the 3rd September Sir

Douglas Haig visited Gen. Hull and congratulated him on the good work

done for the division.

On the 4th a warning order, followed by one of confirmation, was

received that the division would move to the Quéant-Pronville area in

readiness to relieve the 63rd Division in the line on the 5th. But at

mid-day on the 5th this order was cancelled. Meanwhile the 167th and

169th Brigades had already moved to the new area, and so had a useless

march back again.

On the same day Gen. Hull was informed that his division would be

transferred to the XXII Corps and would relieve the 1st Division in

the line, command to pass on the 9th.