Due north of Cambrai there is a very marshy tract of land. It was a

feature, it will be remembered, in the scheme of attack on Cambrai in

1917. These ponds are fed by the Sensée and Cojeul Rivers, and the

Canal du Nord is planned to run up, after passing Mœuvres, by

Inchy-en-Artois, Marquion to a place called Palleul, where it cuts

across this marsh and joins up with the Canal de l’Escaut and the

Canal de la Sensée. This water covers a stretch of ground running well

to the west, towards the Scarpe, and tails off near a village called

Etaing. When the Canadians made their gallant and successful attack on

the Quéant-Drocourt line, the left flank of the advance rested on the

ponds and marshes of the Sensée, and this was the front which the 56th

Division was to take over.

The line was well up to the water and extended from a point about 500 284

yards north of Eterpigny, south of Etaing, south of Lecleuse, and

joined with the Canadians 1,500 yards east of Récourt.

The relief of the 1st Division took place on the 6th, 7th, and 8th,

command passing at 10 a.m. on the 9th September. The enemy was quiet,

but the weather was bad, cold and showery.

On the 16th it was arranged that the 4th Division should relieve the

11th, on the left, and that the 56th would extend the front held to

their right, taking over from the 3rd Canadian Division. Battalions

then engaged in a series of side-stepping reliefs to the right until,

on the 25th, the right of the division was on the Arras-Cambrai road.

On this day the only incident of note occurred when the enemy twice

attempted to raid the London Scottish, and was, on each occasion,

driven off with loss.

By this time preparations were complete for a further advance across

the Canal du Nord on the 27th September. The crossing of the canal was

to be forced by the Canadian Corps, when the 11th and 56th Divisions

would relieve the left of the Canadians and attack due north along the

eastern bank of the canal and towards the marshes of the Sensée. The

56th Division would be on the left--that is to say, they would advance

along the canal bank. The 169th Brigade was given the task of

attacking along the eastern bank, and the 168th was to clear up the

western bank.

The great attack on the 27th September met with the fiercest

opposition. It was obviously of vital importance to the enemy to

maintain his front opposite St. Quentin and Cambrai. The advance of

the British Armies was striking directly at the all-important lateral 285

communications running through Maubeuge to Hirson and Mezières, by

which alone the German forces on the Champagne front could be supplied

and maintained. It had been decided that the Americans were to attack

west of the Meuse in the direction of Mezières, the French west of the

Argonne with the same general objectives, and the Belgians in the

direction of Ghent. The British attack in the centre was where the

enemy’s defences were most highly organised, and if these were broken

the threat directed at his vital communications would react on his

defence elsewhere.

The British attack was, too, largely on the field of a former attack

in 1917, but there was this difference: the Canadians had smashed

through the Quéant-Drocourt system on the left. This would make the

attack on the Bourlon Wood positions somewhat easier. But the whole

system of defence round and about the Hindenburg Line varied in depth

between 7,000 and 10,000 yards, and was a most formidable series of

fortifications.

The First and Third Armies attacked with the IV, VI, XVII, and

Canadian Corps, the operation of the 56th Division being on the

extreme left and subsequent to the launching of the main attack. The

problem on the left, which the 56th Division helped to solve, was that

the northern portion of the canal was too formidable an obstacle to be

crossed in the face of the enemy, and it was therefore necessary to

force a passage on the narrow front about Mœuvres, and turn the line

of the canal farther north by a divergent attack developed fan-wise

from the point of crossing.

The morning broke wet and misty. The wind was from the west, and 286

carried the opening crash of the British barrage, at 5.30 a.m., well

behind the German lines. But they did not need this sort of warning.

For days they had watched the assembling of batteries, stores, a

gigantic army behind the infantry, who were ever keeping a steady

pressure on their advanced lines. Prepared as they were, however,

nothing could stop the assaulting lines of Canadians. News came in to

the 56th Division early that all was going well.

Enemy retaliation on the 56th Division was slight, and practically

ceased by 5.40 a.m. But as the morning progressed it became apparent

that the Canadians were meeting with strong opposition on the extreme

left. They were timed to reach a line immediately south of Sauchy by

mid-day, and the 169th Brigade was to carry on the attack from there

at 2.48 p.m.

Brig.-Gen. Coke ordered the London Rifle Brigade to send a company, as

soon as the barrage would permit, to establish posts on the east bank

of the canal, and cover the Royal Engineers, who were to build a

bridge about 1,000 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai road. A similar

bridge was to be made some 300 yards south of the road. The northern

bridge was to be complete by 11 a.m. and the southern one by mid-day.

But the village of Marquion was on the east of the canal, and on the

Arras-Cambrai road, and at 11.45 a.m. the village was still holding

out, which made it impossible for the 169th Brigade to keep to the

time-table and be in position for attack by 2.48 p.m. It was therefore

decided to postpone the attack until 3.28 p.m.

Meanwhile, the Engineers (513th Coy. and 512th Coy.) and Pioneers had 287

gone forward to construct their bridges, and had found themselves

opposed by hostile infantry. They, however, cleared the eastern bank

and commenced to build.

At mid-day it was reported that Marquion was clear, and the 2nd London

Regt. started to cross about that time, followed by the Queen’s

Westminsters and the London Rifle Brigade. The advance of the 169th

Brigade to the assembly positions completed the clearing of the ground

behind the Canadians--the Queen’s Westminsters capturing no less than

50 prisoners from fighting groups they met with before forming up.

At three o’clock the brigade was in position with the 2nd Londons on

the right and the Queen’s Westminsters on the left. The London Rifle

Brigade had one company between the two branches of the River Agache

clearing up the ground, and two companies in support of the 2nd

Londons; the fourth company was engaged in covering the Engineers, who

were making the northern bridge.

The attack swiftly reached and captured all the small copses, Kamwezi,

Kiduna, and Cemetery, which yielded many prisoners, but the 2nd

Londons were checked by machine-gun nests on the railway embankment

south-west of Oisy. The 2nd Londons and the London Rifle Brigade

attacked four times without success, and on the fifth the surviving

enemy and their machine guns were captured.

The Queen’s Westminsters met with the same sort of opposition. The

swampy ground in the triangle where the Agache joins the canal was an

effective obstacle behind which the enemy had placed machine guns,

which swept the line of advance. But the Queen’s Westminsters 288

worked cunningly round by the banks of the Agache, and eventually

surrounded the Germans, capturing 1 officer and 22 other ranks (21

dead bodies were counted in the post). By 7 p.m. the line of the

railway south-west of Oisy was held, and with the capture of a final

machine-gun nest defending the canal bridge east of Mill Copse, the

Queen’s Westminsters reached the final objective of the attack early

in the morning of the 28th.

The task of advancing on the western bank of the canal was given to

the 168th Brigade, and was carried out by the Kensingtons. For some

way they advanced in line with the Queen’s Westminsters, but were then

held up by machine guns in Mill Copse. The country was extremely

difficult owing to water. Mill Copse could only be approached by a

narrow pavé lane, which was flooded and much blocked by fallen trees.

At 6.30 p.m. the leading company was about 500 yards south of the

copse, and it was decided not to attempt its capture by daylight, but

to wait for the moon. The advance was then continued at 2 a.m., and

reached the final objective without opposition.

The following day the 169th Brigade pushed on to the marsh land east

of Palleul, meeting with no resistance, but securing a few prisoners.

Altogether this brigade captured over 400 prisoners and 34 machine

guns.

The total captures of the division were: 12 officers, 501 other ranks,

45 machine guns, and 10 trench mortars.

The 8th Middlesex (167th Brigade) then entered the village of Palleul,

after making a temporary bridge over the blown-up causeway, and

established a bridgehead at Arleux, a village on the north of the 289

marshes. The enemy made a small attack in this direction on the 29th,

and drove in the bridgehead; they also shelled Palleul with mustard

gas.

But the German resistance was broken. Gouzeaucourt, Marcoing,

Noyelles-sur-l’Escaut, Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and Sailly had been

captured, together with over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns.

Consternation reigned at the headquarters of the Central Powers. The

Austrian Peace Note made its appearance on the 15th September;

Bulgaria surrendered on the 29th; and Damascus fell on the 20th. The

German troops on the Western Front fought desperately and well, but

they were being beaten, and frequently, on the British front, by

inferior numbers.

The actual position held by the 56th Division was along the marshy

ground on both banks of the canal. It included Palleul and the Bois de

Quesnoy. But on the 30th the front was prolonged to the right, when

the 168th Brigade took over from the 11th Division, up to a point on

the eastern outskirts of Aubencheu. The enemy were very alert, and

opened heavy machine-gun fire on the approach of patrols. And on the

6th they set fire to Aubenchaul. When the fires had died down, patrols

established posts on the bank of the canal.

This burning business was carried on extensively. Fires, accompanied

by explosions, were continually breaking out behind the enemy lines.

On the 9th October the division was ordered to take over a further

length of front and relieve the whole of the 11th Division, who had

their right flank on the village of Fressies. The object was to free

the 11th Division, so that they could follow the enemy, who were 290

evacuating the area between the Canal de l’Escaut and the Sensée

Canal, as the result of the capture of Cambrai by the Canadian Corps.

(Battle of Cambrai 8th-9th October.)

During the day it was found that the enemy were actually retiring on

the 11th Division front, and the 56th Division was ordered to

ascertain whether the villages of Arleux, Aubigny-au-Bac, and

Brunement were still occupied. Both the 167th Brigade on the left and

the 168th on the right sent out patrols, which were fired on and

engaged by the enemy the moment they crossed the canal. In Arleux

quite an exciting patrol action was fought, in which four of the enemy

were killed.

The relief of the 11th Division was completed by six in the evening.

Patrols found that the enemy was still holding Fressies, and the 168th

Brigade was ordered to attack and capture that village.

The operation was carried out by the Kensingtons, who stormed the

village most successfully at 7 a.m. on the 11th October. Two companies

only attacked, and the casualties were 1 killed and 9 wounded. On the

other hand, they captured 2 officers and 39 other ranks. A most

praiseworthy little action.

The enemy was now cleared from the south bank of the canal along the

whole of the divisional front. The 11th Division, pressing forward,

was still on the right of the 56th, and on the left was the 1st

Canadian Division. Farther on the left was the VIII Corps, and, on

this same day, they captured Vitry-en-Artois and drove the enemy back

on Douai. On receipt of this news the 56th Divisional Artillery was

ordered to keep the crossings of the canal from Arleux northwards

under fire, and the 167th Brigade were instructed to push forward 291

patrols and obtain a footing in Arleux if possible. This they were

unable to do, in face of the machine-gun fire, and a most unfavourable

approach.

In the evening the division passed to the command of the Canadian

Corps. The 1st Canadian Division, on the left of the 56th, had been

pushing forward on the north of the ponds and marshes for some days,

and on the 12th they captured Arleux in the early hours of the

morning. The 167th Brigade co-operated in clearing up the southern

portion of the village and relieved all Canadian troops, so as to

include Arleux in the divisional front.

Meanwhile, during the night 12th/13th October, the 169th Brigade

relieved the 168th on the right. A clever and daring enterprise to

capture Aubigny-au-Bac was then undertaken; in the words of Gen. Hull,

“initiated and carried out entirely under the orders of the

Brigadier-General commanding the 169th Infantry Brigade, who deserves

great credit for the successful exploit.”

The 169th Brigade held the right sector, with the London Rifle Brigade

and the Queen’s Westminsters in line, and as the front was very

extended, Brig.-Gen. Coke decided to attempt the capture of the

village with two companies of the 2nd London Regt.

The problem he had before him was to attack across the Canal de la

Sensée, which was 70 feet wide and had no bridges. Strong German posts

were stationed at two points, where bridges had formerly existed,

about 1,200 yards apart, and he decided to cross between these two

destroyed bridges.

Absolute silence was essential for the success of the scheme. The 292

416th Field Coy. R.E. was ordered to construct rafts to carry over an

officers’ patrol of the Queen’s Westminsters as soon as possible after

dark, and, after landing, the officers were to ascertain whether a

sufficiently large area, free of the enemy, existed for the assembly

of the attacking company. If it was found that there was room for a

company, the engineers were to construct a floating footbridge for

them to cross.

The time for making reconnaissance and bringing up material was very

short. The men who were to attack had to carry up the material. It was

raining, and the approach was over marshy ground. All the men were wet

to the skin before even the bridge was started.

Lieut. Arnold, of the 416th Field Coy., had silence and speed to

consider, and also the amount of material which could be brought up in

any given time. He decided he would not waste precious minutes over

rafts, but would proceed at once with the foot-bridge. By three

o’clock in the morning the bridge had been constructed, and the patrol

of Queen’s Westminsters went across. One cannot give higher praise to

the engineers than this: on landing, the patrol found that they could

not proceed more than ten paces in any direction without being

challenged by German sentries--there appeared to be three posts in the

immediate vicinity of the bridge.

It seemed as though the enterprise must be abandoned. But as the enemy

had not opened fire, the brigadier ordered the patrol to try to rush

the posts without raising an alarm.

The bridge was, from its very nature, an unstable affair, with no

hand-rail, and, owing to the rain which never ceased, a very slippery 293

surface. The night, however, was very dark and the rain was perhaps a

great advantage. A platoon of the 2nd Londons crossed over stealthily

and quickly overpowered two Germans, which was all the enemy force

they found. The remaining platoons of the attacking company now

crossed over.

The assembly area was far from a good one, being intersected by two

small streams, La Navie and La Petite Navie, of which nothing was

known. The artillery barrage was arranged against the flank of the

enemy position, creeping in a north-westerly direction. To follow it

in an ordinary way was out of the question, as the country was cut up

by many hedges and ditches. So platoons were directed to make their

own way to various points as soon as the barrage started.

At 4.30 a.m. Capt. Sloan, who was in command of the company, had his

men assembled, as well as he was able, in the blackness of early

morning, when dawn is postponed by rain and thick, low-flying clouds.

In silence they waited for zero, which was at 5.15 a.m.

The rest is a story of complete and absolute surprise. The attack came

from the least threatened side of the enemy position. Two machine-gun

teams tried to resist, but after several had been killed, the rest

threw up their hands. Altogether about 160 prisoners were taken in the

village.

Posts were established on the outskirts of the village, but it was not

found possible to occupy the station, where the enemy was strong and

thoroughly roused, and so the momentary hope that Brunemont might also

be surprised, vanished.

At 6 a.m. two platoons of the supporting company came up and were used 294

to reinforce the posts already established.

The enemy now began to show fight. Two machine guns worked up close

and gave Capt. Sloan a lot of trouble. They were engaged with rifle

grenades and rushed successfully. The remaining portion of the support

company was moved across the canal and into the village.

As the morning advanced and the light grew better, the infantry

observation posts in Quesnoy Wood reported parties of the enemy moving

towards Aubigny. These were quickly dispersed, with many casualties,

by the artillery, who also put to flight the crews of several trench

mortars which were giving some trouble.

About ten o’clock a heavy enemy barrage was put down on the village,

together with a concentration of machine-gun fire. This lasted for

half an hour, and was followed by a most determined attack, with a

force estimated at a battalion, from the north, and a smaller force

from Brunemont. In spite of heavy losses, the Germans pressed on and

slowly outflanked one post after another, greatly aided by trench

mortars. The 2nd Londons were pressed back to La Petite Navie stream,

where a stand was made and the enemy prevented from debauching from

the village.

Being familiar with the ground, however, the enemy made full use of

the hedges, and although the four Stokes mortars of the brigade

battery, which supported the 2nd Londons, did exceedingly good work,

it became advisable to fall back farther to the canal bank.

A bridgehead was maintained for some time, but at 5 p.m. all troops 295

had returned to the southern bank. They brought with them three enemy

machine guns, and threw ten others into the canal.

But in the early morning, when still dark, a patrol started to cross

over the bridge with the object of establishing a post on the north

bank. The enemy was so close that the end of the bridge was within

bombing distance. This caused the men to “bunch,” with the result that

the bridge broke. Cpl. McPhie and Sapper Cox, of the 416th Field Coy.

R.E., jumped into the water and held the cork floats, which supported

the structure, together, getting their fingers badly trodden on by the

patrol. But the patrol crossed before the two gallant men let go. Cpl.

McPhie, realising the serious position of the men who had crossed to

the north side, set about gathering material to repair and strengthen

the bridge. Daylight came on apace, but the corporal never wavered in

his intention. Having assembled what he wanted, in the nature of wood,

he led the way with the curt remark to his men: “We’ve got to make a

way for the patrol--it’s a death-or-glory job.”

The patrol on the north bank helped him to the best of their power,

but they had the slenderest hold on that side of the canal. It was

daylight, and enemy snipers were concealed in every hedge. The

corporal started to work with bullets cracking like whips round his

ears. He was shot in the head and fell in the water. Sapper Cox tried

to pull him out, but Cpl. McPhie had sufficient strength to tell him

to leave go, as he himself “was done.” Sapper Cox persisted in his

efforts. The enemy fire increased: the corporal was hit again and

again; Sapper Cox had six bullets through him. The corporal was dead, 296

and Cox let go of his body.

Then Sapper Hawkins ran to the bank and threw a rope to Cox. This

wonderful man still had the strength to hold on to it while Hawkins

drew him ashore.

Cox died two days later!

McPhie was awarded the Victoria Cross.

* * * * *

In this very fine enterprise 3 officers and 87 other ranks formed the

attacking party. Altogether 6 officers and 165 other ranks passed over

the canal. But this small force captured 4 officers and 203 other

ranks. The casualties suffered by the whole of the 2nd Londons during

the day were 3 officers and 140 other ranks.

Until the 169th Brigade handed over to the 10th Canadian Infantry

Brigade, on the 14th October, they held the bridgehead and patrolled

the north bank of the canal. But on the 15th the Germans succeeded in

rushing the bridgehead, although they failed to get any

identification.

On relief the 169th Brigade moved back to Sauchy-Cauchy, and the

168th, who were in reserve, entrained for Arras. On the 15th the 167th

Brigade was relieved by the 11th Canadian Brigade and moved to

Rumancourt. On the 16th the whole division was in the outskirts of

Arras with headquarters at Etrun (except the artillery).

[Illustration: 10. BATTLE OF THE CANAL DU NORD.]

All through these weeks of fighting a great strain had been imposed on

the Royal Army Service Corps and the Divisional Ammunition Column. The

roads were bad and fearfully congested, and the distances were great 297

and continually changing. When the great advance commenced railhead

was at a place called Tincques; on the 23rd August it changed to

Gouy-en-Artois; on the 27th to Beaumetz; on the 31st to

Boisleux-au-Mont. On the 8th September it was at Arras and on the 11th

October at Quéant. Not for one moment had supplies failed to be up to

time. The work of this branch of the organisation was excellent, and

the work of these units of supply should always be borne in mind in

every account of actions fought and big advances made.

The artillery remained in the line until the 23rd October, and then

rested in the neighbourhood of Cambrai until the 31st October.

* * * * *

The whole of the Hindenburg Line passed into our possession during the

early part of October, and a wide gap was driven through such systems

of defence as existed behind it. The threat at the enemy’s

communications was now direct. There were no further prepared

positions between the First, Third, and Fourth Armies and Maubeuge.

In Flanders the Second Army, the Belgian Army, and some French

divisions, the whole force under the King of the Belgians, had

attacked on the 28th September, and were advancing rapidly through

Belgium.

Between the Second Army, the right of the Flanders force, and the

First Army, the left of the main British attacking force, was the

Fifth Army under Gen. Birdwood. This army was in front of the Lys

salient, which was thus left between the northern and southern attacks

with the perilous prospect of being cut off. On the 2nd October the 298

enemy started an extensive withdrawal on the Fifth Army front.

Meanwhile the Belgian coast was cleared. Ostend fell on the 17th

October, and a few days later the left flank of the Allied forces

rested on the Dutch frontier. The Fourth, Third, and First Armies

still pushed on towards Maubeuge, and by the end of the month the

Forêt de Mormal had been reached.

The enemy was thoroughly beaten in the field. Though he blew up the

railways and roads as he fled, he was becoming embarrassed by his own

rearguards pressing on his heels as they were driven precipitately

before the Allied infantry; and the position of his armies revealed

certain and overwhelming disaster.

* * * * *

On the 27th October Austria sued for peace.

On the 28th the Italians crossed the Piave.

On the 29th the Serbians reached the Danube.

On the 30th October Turkey was granted an armistice.

The Central Powers lay gasping on the ground.

* * * * *

The 56th Division meanwhile led a quiet life, training and resting

round Etrun and Arras. Organisation of battalions was overhauled in

accordance with a pamphlet numbered O.B./1919 and issued by the

General Staff. It was designed to deal with the decreasing strength of

battalions, but, as it supposed a greater number of men than were in

many cases available, it was troublesome.

The outstanding points were that platoons would now be composed of two

rifle and two Lewis-gun sections; that a platoon, so long as it 299

contained two sections of three men each, was not to be amalgamated

with any other platoon; and that not more than six men and one

non-commissioned officer to each section should be taken into action.

“The fighting efficiency of the section,” says the pamphlet,

“is of primary importance, and every endeavour must be made

to strengthen the sections, if necessary, by the recall of

employed men and men at courses, or even by withdrawing men

from the administrative portions of battalion and company

headquarters, which must in an emergency be temporarily

reduced. After the requirements of the fighting portion for

reconstruction have been met (50 other ranks), if the

battalion is up to its full establishment, a balance of 208

men will remain for the administrative portion (90) and for

reinforcements. This balance will include men undergoing

courses of instruction, men on leave and in rest camps, men

sick but not evacuated, and men on army, corps, divisional,

or brigade employ. These latter must be reduced to the

lowest figure possible, and will in no case exceed 30 men

per battalion.”

The order against the amalgamation of platoons applied also to

sections, but was not invariably carried out by company commanders. It

had become a universal practice to detail six men and one

non-commissioned officer to each post. With double sentries this gave

each man one hour on and two hours off--anything less than these

numbers threw a big strain on the men; and so long as the company

commander had sufficient men for an adequate number of sentry posts,

he made them up of that number.

The details of a battalion as arranged by this pamphlet are 300

interesting:

[Header Key:

A - Fighting position.

B - Administrative position.

C - Reconstruction (not for reinforcement).

D - Supplies for reinforcement.]

--------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------

| A | B | C | D | Total.

|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----

Battalion | | | | | | | | | |

Headquarters | 5 | 70 | 2 | 66 | 2 | 8 | - | 27 | 9 | 171

| | | | | | | | | |

4 Company | | | | | | | | |} |

Headquarters | 4 | 74 | -- | 24 | 4 | 10 | -- | -- |} |

| | | | | | | | |} 8 | 110

Attached from | | | | | | | | |} |

platoons | -- | 2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |} |

| | | | | | | | | |

16 Platoon | | | | | | | | |} |

Headquarters | 12 | 38 | -- | 4 | 4 | 8 | -- | -- |} |

| | | | | | | | |} |

Section | | | | | | | | |} |

commanders | | | | | | | | |} |

acting as | | | | | | | | |} 16| 64

platoon | | | | | | | | |} |

sergeants | -- | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |} |

| | | | | | | | |} |

N.C.O.s for | | | | | | | | |} |

reconstruction| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 8 | -- | -- |} |

| | | | | | | | | |

64 sections | -- |448 | -- | -- | -- | 16 | -- | 91 | -- | 555

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----

Total | 1 |642 | 2 | 90 | 10 | 50 | -- |118 | 33 | 900

--------------+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----

It will be seen that 732 other ranks were required to fill the

fighting and administrative minimum. The ration strength of battalions

from the 1st August and on the first of each month to the date of the

armistice was:

---------------+----------+----------+----------+----------

| August. |September.| October. | November.

+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----

|Off.| O.R.|Off.| O.R.|Off.|O.R. |Off.|O.R.

|----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----

7th Middlesex | 39 | 950 | 35 | 678 | 43 | 865 | 43 | 863

8th “ | 40 | 948 | 38 | 787 | 41 | 864 | 39 | 813

1st Londons | 40 | 931 | 27 | 613 | 40 | 657 | 40 | 712

4th “ | 42 | 898 | 32 | 710 | 37 | 705 | 38 | 721

13th “ | 38 | 925 | 24 | 685 | 41 | 691 | 46 | 649

14th “ | 43 | 925 | 30 | 548 | 31 | 622 | 34 | 705

2nd “ | 37 | 891 | 27 | 599 | 31 | 717 | 35 | 601

5th “ | 35 | 989 | 25 | 669 | 32 | 603 | 33 | 631

16th “ | 42 | 959 | 27 | 577 | 31 | 560 | 29 | 612

---------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----

But these figures must be read with a reservation. In spite of all 301

efforts, men always disappeared. No battalion or company commander

ever had the men who were on the ration strength. Guards, fatigue

parties, sudden demands for men from higher commands, dozens of

reasons could be given for the evaporation of strength. Probably

two-thirds only of these men were really available for fighting. In

those days a general when inspecting companies had no difficulty in

finding fault if he wished to do so.

During the rest Gen. Hull discussed the subjects of organisation and

training with the officers of each of his brigades.

But in the evening officers and men could be cheered by “Bow Bells,”

which were to be heard at the theatre in Arras and the cinema at Haut

Avesnes.

On the 31st the division moved into XXII Corps Reserve with

headquarters at Basseville, and on the 1st November was ordered to

relieve the 49th Division during the night 2nd/3rd.

On the 31st October the line immediately south of Valenciennes rested

on the 4th Canadian Division, from the Canal de l’Escaut to the

outskirts of the village of Famars, the 49th Division, on the high

ground west of the River Rondelle, the 4th Division, astride the river

and to the east of Artres, and then the 61st Division.

The 4th and 49th Divisions of the XXII Corps attacked on the 2nd

November with the object of capturing the two villages of Preseau and

Saultain, but only the first was taken, and the 49th Division held the

Preseau-Valenciennes road.

The 56th Division was now plunged into real open fighting. Their

objectives were no longer trench lines, but tactical features, such as 302

spurs, rivers, woods, and villages. An examination of Gen. Hull’s

operation orders reveals the new nature of the fighting.

The 169th Brigade was given the right and the 168th the left. The

objective of the XXII Corps, which was attacking with the 11th

Division on the right and the 56th on the left, was given as the

“general line of the Aunelle River left bank.” The Canadian Corps

would cover the left flank of the 56th Division by the capture of

Estreux. The division would be covered by six brigades of field

artillery.

On attaining the high ground on the left of the Aunelle River, patrols

would be pushed out, “since if there is any sign of enemy retreat the

G.O.C. intends to push on mounted troops to secure the crossing of the

Petite Aunelle River and will order the leading brigades to support

them.” The mounted troops referred to were two squadrons of Australian

Light Horse.

Each of the attacking brigades had at the disposal of the Brigadier a

battery of field artillery, also two sections (8 guns) of the M.G.

Battalion.

As the front to be covered by the 56th Division was very extensive,

the 146th Brigade, of the 49th Division, remained in line on the left,

and was to advance until squeezed out by the converging advance of the

56th and Canadian Divisions.

On the night 2nd/3rd November the 169th and 168th Brigades relieved

the right of the 49th Division on the Preseux-Valenciennes road

without incident. Soon after 8 a.m. on the 3rd, patrols reported that

the enemy had retired. The two brigades advanced and occupied

Saultain, which was full of civilians, before mid-day. The cavalry and

a company of New Zealand Cyclists were then ordered to push forward 303

and secure the crossings of the River Aunelle. The line of the left

bank of the river was reached at 6 p.m., where machine-gun fire was

encountered. The brigades remained on that line for the night.

The advance was resumed at dawn on the 4th, when the Queen’s

Westminster Rifles crossed the River Aunelle and captured the village

of Sebourg; there was some half-hearted opposition from about thirty

of the enemy who were rounded up, but when they attempted to advance

east of the village they came under intense machine-gun and rifle fire

from the high ground. Attempt to turn the enemy flank met with no

success, and as there was no artillery barrage arranged, Brig.-Gen.

Coke contented himself by holding the road to the east of the village.

The 168th Brigade on the left were also held up by the enemy on the

high ground. The 4th London Regt. led the attack and took the hamlet

of Sebourtquiaux (slightly north of Sebourg), only to find that they

were not only faced with the enemy on the high ground to the east, but

that heavy enfilade fire was being directed on them from the village

of Rombies, on the western bank of the river, and on the Canadian

Corps front. The 4th London Regt. took up a position to the east of

Sebourtquiaux and astride the river, and so remained for the night.

(Battle of the Sambre.)

This attack had been made without artillery preparation, but the

position of the artillery is well described by Brig.-Gen. Elkington in

a short report drawn up at the end of the operations. He says the

barrage put down on the 1st November had been a very heavy one, and

that the enemy never again waited for the full weight of the artillery 304

to get into action.

“The problem for the artillery then became a matter of

dealing with machine-gun nests, isolated guns, and small

parties of the enemy who were delaying our advance and

enabling the main body of the enemy to retire. The enemy

blew up bridges and roads, whenever possible, to delay the

advance of our guns. In these circumstances the following

points were emphasised:

(1) The benefit of allotting artillery to each battalion

commander in the front line. The battery commander, by

remaining with the battalion commander and keeping good

communication with his battery, could bring fire to bear at

very short time on targets as they were encountered. In

practice it was generally found that a full battery was too

large a unit, and that four guns, or even a section, was of

more use.

(2) When more than one artillery brigade was available for

an infantry brigade, the necessity of keeping them écheloned

in depth and maintaining all but one brigade on wheels. If

resistance was encountered, the brigade, or brigades, on

wheels in rear could be moved up to reinforce the artillery

in the line to put down a barrage for an attack, or, if no

resistance was encountered, a brigade in rear could advance

through the artillery in action, which in turn could get on

wheels as the advancing brigade came into action. This

procedure enabled brigades to get occasional days’ rests and

obviated the danger of getting roads choked with advancing

artillery.

(3) The necessity of impressing on infantry commanders that

though at the commencement of an attack it is possible to

support them with a great weight of artillery, it is not

possible to push this mass of artillery forward when

movement becomes rapid, and that if they push forward 305

rapidly, they are better served by a small mobile allotment

of guns.”

The rapidity of the advance was little short of marvellous, for one

must remember that it did not depend on the ability of the infantry to

march forward, but on the engineers behind them, who were

reconstructing the roads and railways for the supply services.

Lieut.-Col. Sutton, who was controlling the Quartermasters’ Branch of

the division, has a note in his diary:

“The enemy has done his demolition work most effectively.

Craters are blown at road junctions and render roads

impassable, especially in villages, where the rim of the

crater comes in many cases up to the walls of the houses.

Culverts are blown on main roads, and a particularly

effective blockage is caused in one place by blowing a

bridge across a road and stream, so that all the material

fell across the road and in the river.”

This demolition was the great feature of the advance. The infantry

could always go across country, but guns and lorries were not always

able to use these short cuts. The weather was unfavourable, as it

rained practically every day. When craters were encountered, the

leading vehicles could perhaps get round, by going off the road, but

they had the effect of churning up the soft ground so that the crater

soon became surrounded by an impassable bog. The engineers and 5th

Cheshires worked like Trojans to fill up these terrific pits, or make

a firm surface round them.

At this date railhead was at Aubigny-au-Bac, the scene of that great

exploit of the 2nd London Regt. And when one takes into account dates 306

and distances, the achievement of those who were working behind the

infantry must be ranked as one of the finest in the war. One cannot

get a picture of the advance by considering the mere width of an army

front. The infantry were the spearhead, the supplies the shaft, but

the hand that grasped the whole weapon and drove it forward was that

of the engineer, the pioneer, the man of the Labour Battalion. The

effort of the army then must be considered in depth, from the scout to

the base.

Under these circumstances communication between units became a matter

of vital importance. The ordinary administrative routine of trench

warfare required little modification, up to the point of the break

through the Hindenburg Line--after that it became impossible. Brigade

Headquarters were responsible for the distribution of rations,

engineer material, ordnance, mails, and billeting. In the orders for

advance the General Staff informed the Brigadier-General what units,

or portion of divisional troops, including Divisional Artillery, would

be under his tactical control, and these units, irrespective of their

arm of the service, constituted the Brigade Group. The supply of

ammunition, on the other hand, was worked by arms of the service and

not by Brigade Groups. The channel of supply being the ordinary

one--from the Divisional Ammunition Column to batteries, or Infantry

Brigade Reserve, or Machine-gun Battalion Reserve.

* * * * *

The administrative instructions for the division point out:

“The outstanding difficulty in all the administrative

services will be that of intercommunication between the 307

troops and the échelons in rear which supply them. The

system of interchange of orderlies between the forward and

rear échelons has been found unsatisfactory, as if the two

échelons both move at the same time, all touch is lost.

Prior to the advance, therefore, the administrative staff of

each brigade group will fix a ‘meeting-point’ or ‘rear

report centre’ as far forward as possible on the probable

line of advance. This point will serve as a rendezvous for

all maintenance service.... The principle of

intercommunication by means of a fixed report centre will

also be adopted by Divisional Artillery and the Machine Gun

Battalion for the purpose of ammunition supply.”

This arrangement does not seem to have worked well for the artillery,

as we find Brig.-Gen. Elkington reporting:

“For a time communication by orderly between units became

the only feasible plan. Owing to the rapid movement these

orderlies had the utmost difficulty in locating units. In

this Divisional Artillery the system of using village

churches as report centres was successfully tried, but,

owing to the cessation of hostilities, the trial was not as

exhaustive as could be wished. Notices showing change of

location were simply stuck on the church doors or railings,

and orderlies were instructed to at once proceed to the

church for information on entering a village.”

This modification of the original scheme would seem to be a useful

one.

In spite of all these difficulties, the 56th Division was advancing.

On the 5th November a barrage was arranged to cover troops attacking

the high ground to the east of the River Aunelle, as a preliminary 308

to subsequent advance. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack of the

169th Brigade at 5.30 a.m., and by 7.30 a.m. had captured the village

of Angreau. Here they were checked by the enemy, who occupied the

woods on both banks of the Honnelle River. On their right the 11th

Division captured the village of Roisin, but on their left the 168th

Brigade had not made such good progress.

Attacking, with the London Scottish on the right and the Kensingtons

on the left, the 168th Brigade were much hampered by flank fire from

Angre and the ground to their left, which was still held by the enemy.

The situation was somewhat eased by the capture of Rombies, by the 4th

Canadian Division, and at 3 p.m. the artillery put down a rolling

barrage, behind which the Kensingtons, and the London Scottish on

their right, advanced to the outskirts of Angre. The position for the

night was on the high ground west of the River Grande Honnelle.

The enemy had determined to defend the crossing of the river, and had

an excellent position on the eastern bank, where they held the Bois de

Beaufort in strength. The advance was to be resumed at 5.30 a.m., but

just before that hour the German artillery put down a heavy barrage of

gas-shells. Undaunted, the 2nd Londons on the right and the London

Rifle Brigade on the left of the 169th Brigade attacked in gas-masks

and crossed the river. The 168th Brigade, attacking with the London

Scottish and Kensingtons in line, met at first with slight resistance,

but as soon as the river was reached they were faced with a heavy

barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire. In spite of very accurate

fire, they succeeded in crossing the river to the north and south of 309

Angre. The position in front of them was of considerable natural

strength, but was turned by a clever move of the London Scottish from

the south, which established them firmly on the east bank. The

Kensingtons advanced to the high ground immediately east of the

village of Angre, and here met a heavy counter-attack which drove them

back to the west bank.

Meanwhile the 169th Brigade was engaged in heavy fighting. Only the

northern portion of the Bois de Beaufort was included in the attack,

and the enemy were found to be strongly situated on ground which

dominated the western bank of the river. The attack was delivered with

spirit, and the enemy driven back. The 2nd Londons had the wood in

front of them, and the London Rifle Brigade shot ahead on the left,

outside the wood. The enemy rallied and counter-attacked the forward

troops, while at the same time a force of Germans debouched from the

wood on the right flank of the Rifle Brigade men, who were driven back

to the west of the river. Some of the 2nd Londons were involved in

this successful enemy counter-attack, but a party of forty--a large

party in those days--held on to the position they had reached in the

Bois de Beaufort until late in the afternoon, when, discovering what

had happened on the left, and being almost entirely surrounded, they

retired fighting to the western bank of the river.

The right brigade, therefore, remained on the west bank. The

casualties had been heavy, amounting to 394.

The London Scottish had retained their hold of the east bank, and

later in the afternoon the Kensingtons again succeeded in crossing 310

the river, and definitely established themselves to the east and in

touch with the London Scottish. The casualties of the 168th Brigade

during these operations were 207. The prisoners captured by them were

111. The prisoners captured by the 169th Brigade were 43.

The general destruction of roads, combined with the vile weather, now

began to cause anxiety. Horses were used as much as possible--a horse

can drag a cart through places which would be impossible for a motor

lorry--and civilian wagons were pressed into service, being used in

conjunction with spare army horses. This was all the more necessary as

the administrative branch of the division had the additional

responsibility of feeding civilians.

All the villages captured or occupied by the troops were filled with

civilians. So great was their emotion on their release that they

pressed whatever they had in the nature of food and drink on the

troops. The coffee-pot of the French or Belgian housewife was

replenished with reckless disregard for “to-morrow.” And then as the

country was regained, so the villagers were cut off from the source

which had provided them with their limited supplies. With Germans in

retreat on one side and roads blown up on the other, they were more

isolated than they had ever been. On the 6th November the 56th

Division was rationing 16,000 civilians, and most of this work was

being done by the transport of the 168th and 169th Brigades.

[Illustration: 11. GENERAL MAP.]

The battle on the right of the division had progressed with almost

unfailing success. The 11th Division on their immediate right had met

with the same check on the River Honnelle, but farther south the Army

had forced their way through the great Forest of Mormal, and troops 311

were well to the east of it. The German rearguards were only able, on

especially favourable positions, to check the advance of a few

divisions; on the whole the rearguards were being thrown back on the

main retreating force. The roads were packed with enemy troops and

transport, and the real modern cavalry, the low-flying aeroplanes,

swooped down on them, with bomb and machine gun spreading panic and

causing the utmost confusion.

During the night 6th/7th November the 63rd Division was put into line

on the front of the 168th Brigade, and the 169th was relieved by the

167th Brigade. The 56th Division was then on a single brigade front,

with the 11th Division on the right and the 63rd on the left.

At dawn on the 7th patrols found that the enemy was still in front of

them, and at 9 a.m. the brigade attacked with the 8th Middlesex on the

right and the 7th Middlesex on the left. They swept on through the

northern part of the wood, and by 10.30 a.m. the 7th Middlesex entered

the village of Onnezies. The Petite Honnelles River was crossed, and

the village of Montignies taken in the afternoon. But after the

Bavai-Hensies Road was crossed, opposition stiffened, and both

artillery and machine-gun fire became severe. A line of outposts held

the east of the road for the night.

Explosions and fires, which were continually observed at night behind

the enemy lines, were more numerous on the night of 7th/8th, and when

the advance was continued at 8 a.m., the two Middlesex battalions

occupied the villages of Athis and Fayt-le-Franc with practically no

opposition. By nightfall outposts were covering Petit Moranfayt, Trieu 312

Jean Sart, Ferlibray, and Richon.

The road situation was worse than ever. Railhead was at

Aubigny-au-Bac, and supply lorries were unable to proceed any farther

than the Honnelle River owing to the destruction of the bridges. Rain

fell all the time, and cross-country tracts were impassable. All

traffic was thrown on the main roads, which, to the west of the river,

were now in such a state that all supplies were late. Arrangements

were made for aeroplanes to drop food to the advance troops, but

fortunately this was found unnecessary.

The enemy was now in full retreat on the whole of the British front.

To the south the Guards Division entered Maubeuge, and to the north

the Canadians were approaching Mons. The 56th Division marched forward

through the villages of Coron, Rieu-de-Bury, Quevy-le-Grand, and

Quevy-le-Petit, and by the evening were on the line of the

Mons-Maubeuge road behind a line of outposts held by the 1st London

Regt.

On the 10th November the 1st Londons continued the advance, preceded

by cavalry. No serious opposition was encountered until the infantry

had passed through Harvengt, when heavy machine-gun fire from both

flanks held up the advance. A squadron of 16th Lancers attempted to

get through, but failed. The infantry then attacked and cleared the

ground, entered Harmignies, and held a line to the east.

Orders were received that night that the 63rd Division would carry on

the advance as advance guard to the XXII Corps, and the necessary

reliefs were carried out. The artillery of the 56th Division remained 313

in action, and were just two miles south of the spot where Brig.-Gen.

Elkington was in action on the 23rd August 1914, at the battle of

Mons. Gen. Hull, on the other hand, had actually held an outpost line

before Harmignies with his battalion on the 22nd August, and had moved

to the north to hold a line from Obourg to Mons on the 23rd. After the

battle the celebrated retreat had taken him through the village of

Nouvelles due west of Harmignies, and so through Quevy to Bavai,

Caudray, Ham, and so on. What memories this second visit to Harmignies

must have brought back to him! From retreat to victory--from a

battalion to a division--Harmignies 1914, Harmignies 1918.

Brig.-Gen. Coke also fought as company commander in August 1914 within

five miles of the spot where he finished in 1918.

At 7.30 a.m. on the 11th November the XXII Corps issued orders that

hostilities would cease at 11 a.m. on that day, and that all troops

would stand fast.

Just before 11 o’clock all batteries opened fire. Each gunner was

determined to be the last man to fire a shot at the Germans. And then,

in the midst of the rolling thunder of rapid fire, teams straining

every nerve to throw the last shell into the breach of their gun

before the “cease fire” sounded, 11 o’clock struck, the first blast of

the bugles pierced the air, and with the last note silence reigned.

“There was no cheering or excitement amongst the men,” writes

Brig.-Gen. Elkington. “They seemed too tired, and no one seemed able

to realise that it was all over.”

G.Q.G.A. 314

_le 12 Novembre, 1918._

_Officiers, Sous-officiers, Soldats des Armées

Alliées_,

Après avoir résolument arrêté l’enemi, vous l’avez pendant

des mois, avec une foi et une énergie inlassables, attaqué

sans répit.

Vous avez gagné le plus grande bataille de l’Histoire et

sauvé la cause la plus sacrée: la Liberté du Monde.

Soyez Fiers!

D’une gloire immortelle vous avez paré vos drapeaux.

La Postérité vous garde sa reconnaissance.

Le Maréchal de France,

Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées,

F. FOCH.

The division did not move to the Rhine, but remained in this area,

with headquarters at Harvengt. They mended the roads, they drilled,

and they had sports. Towards the end of January 1919 demobilisation

had reached a point which rendered the division ineffective as a

fighting unit.

The London Scottish were moved to the 9th Division, in Germany, on the

16th January, and the 7th Middlesex to the 41st Division on the 25th

February. On the 14th March Gen. Hull gave up command of the division.

But their work was done. Officially the 56th Division returned the

first cadre on the 14th May, the last on the 10th June, 1919.

The total casualties of this division were:

Officers 1,470

Other ranks 33,339

------

Total 34,809

APPENDIX 315

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING

------------+-------------------------+-------------------------------

Rank. | Name. | Remarks.

------------+-------------------------+-------------------------------

Major-Gen. | C. P. A. Hull, C.B. | Joined Royal Scots Fusilier

| | Regt. 16/11/87. Middlesex

| | Regt. 24/2/12.

| | Brigade Major 11th Brigade

| | 10/11/03 to 9/11/07.

| | General Staff Officer, 2nd

| | Grade, Staff College,

| | 10/3/15 to 4/2/16.

| | Commanded the 4th Bn.

| | Middlesex Regt. at the

| | battle of Mons. Brigadier

| | commanding 10th Brigade

| | 17/11/14.

| | After his illness he commanded

| | the 16th Division

| | from the 23/2/18 until he

| | resumed command of the

| | 56th.

Major-Gen. | W. Douglas Smith, C.B. | Royal Scots Fusilier Regt.

| | Commanded 56th Division

| | 24/7/17 to 9/8/17.

T/Major-Gen.| F. A. Dudgeon, C.B. | The South Lancashire Regt.

G.S.O.s1

Lieut-Col. | J. E. S. Brind, C.M.G., | From Royal Artillery.

| D.S.O. | Joined the 56th Division

| | 6/2/16 and left 31/10/16.

Lieut.-Col. | A. Bryant, D.S.O. | The Gloucestershire Regt.

| | With the 56th Division

| | 30/10/16 to 23/12/16.

Lieut.-Col. | G. de la P. B. Pakenham,| The Border Regt.

| C.M.G., D.S.O. |

------------+-------------------------+-------------------------------

G.S.O.s2 316

------------+-------------------+--------+---------+------------------

Rank. | Name. | From. | To. | Regt.

------------+-------------------+--------+---------+------------------

Major |A. E. G. Bayley, |5/2/16 |1/10/16 |Oxford and Bucks

| D.S.O. | | | Light Infantry.

Major |E. A. Beck, D.S.O. |28/9/16 |17/2/17 |The Royal Scots

| | | | Fusiliers.

Major |W. T. Brooks, |15/2/17 |3/9/17 |The D.C.L.I.

| M.C. | | |

Major |F. B. Hurndall, |4/9/17 |9/7/18 |The 20th Hussars.

| M.C. | | |

Captain, |T. O. M. Buchan, |9/7/18 |Demob. |The Queen’s R.W.

T/Major | M.C. | | | Surrey Regt.

G.S.O.s3

Captain. |T. W. Bullock |5/2/16 |20/4/16 |The Dorsetshire

| | | | Regt.

Captain. |M. G. N. Stopford, |10/6/16 |5/12/16 |The Rifle

| M.C. | | | Brigade.

Captain. |J. D. Crosthwaite, |7/12/16 |7/7/17 |The 1st London

| M.C. | | | Regt.

Captain. |E. L. Rabone, M.C. |11/7/17 |11/11/17 |The Worcestershire

| | | | Regt.

Captain. |C. W. Haydon, |11/11/17|11/5/18 |The Middlesex

| M.C. | | | Regt.

Captain. |T. L. C. Heald |14/5/18 |4/2/19 |The 5th Cheshire

| | | | Regt.

A.A. & Q.M.G.s

Bt. Lieut.- |H. W. Grubb, |5/2/16 |4/12/17 |The Border Regt.

Col. D.S.O. | | |

Bt. Major |W. M. Sutton, |4/12/17 |Demob. |Somerset Light

T/Lieut.- | D.S.O., M.C. | | | Infantry.

Col.

D.A.A.G.s

Captain. |W. M. Sutton, |5/2/16 |4/12/17 |Somerset Light

| D.S.O., M.C. | | | Infantry.

Major |A. C. Dundas |4/12/17 |10/12/18 |The Middlesex

| | | | Regt.

Major |A. Scott, D.S.O., |10/12/18|Demob. |A. & S.

| M.C. | | | Highlanders.

D.A.Q.M.G.s 317

Major |F. J. Lemon, D.S.O.| 5/2/16 | 22/4/18 |The West Yorkshire

| | | | Regt.

Captain |T. F. Chipp, M.C. |23/4/18 | 2/2/19 |The Middlesex

T/Major | | | | Regt.

A.D.C.s

[6]Lieut. |H. C. B. Way |10/2/16 | Demob. |The 2nd London

| | | | Regt.

2/Lieut. |C. Burn-Callender | 4/3/16 | 2/2/17 |The

| | | | Montgomeryshire

| | | | Yeomanry.

Lieut. |H. M. Woodhouse |10/4/17 | 30/4/17 |The Notts

| | | | Yeomanry.

2/Lieut. |C. Y. Jones |26/5/17 | 23/7/17 |The 13th London

| | | | Regt.

Captain |G. A. Greig |24/7/17 | 9/8/17 |The Royal Scots

| | | | Fusiliers.

Lieut. |R. W. Broatch |10/8/17 | Demob. |The 14th London

| | | | Regt.

56TH DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS

C.R.A.

Col., |R. J. G. Elkington,| 6/2/16 | Demob. |

T/Brig.-Gen.| C.M.G., D.S.O. | | |

BRIGADE MAJORS

Major |W. J. McLay | 6/2/16 | 4/6/16 |

Major |J. A. Don |28/6/16 | 27/9/16 |

Major |D. Thomson |27/7/16 | 21/1/18 |

Major |H. D. Gale, M.C. |21/1/18 | Demob. |

STAFF CAPTAINS

Captain |B. Macmin | 6/2/16 | 22/1/17 |

Captain |N. C. Lockhart |22/1/17 | 12/2/19 |

Captain |J. D. Hendley Smith|12/2/19 | Demob. |

-------------+-------------------+--------+---------+-----------------

[6] NOTE.--Lieut. H. C. B. Way was away from 4/2/18 to

4/4/18 as A.D.C. to G.O.C. 16th (Irish) Division.

ARTILLERY 318

1/1ST LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (280TH BRIGADE R.F.A.)

Commanded by:

Lieut.-Col. L. A. C. Southam until March 1918.

Lieut.-Col. Batt.

1916

April 16th. 93rd Battery joined and designated D/280th Brigade

R.F.A.

May 6th. Designated 280th Brigade R.F.A.

“ 17th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C.

“ 28th. 93rd Battery ceased to be D/280th Bde. R.F.A., and was

transferred to 283rd Bde. R.F.A., and the original

1/11th London Howitzer Battery became D/280.

Nov. 5th. Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries; “A,” 93rd, and

“C,” 18-pounders; “D,” howitzers.

93rd Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred

from 283rd Bde. R.F.A. The original “B” Battery

split up: one section to “A,” and one section to “C.”

“D” Battery only had 4 howitzers until 25/1/17, when

one section 500th Howitzer Battery joined from 282nd

Bde. R.F.A.

1/2ND LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (281ST BRIGADE R.F.A.)

Commanded by Lieut.-Col. C. C. Macdowell.

1916.

April 15th. 109th Battery joined.

May 12th. Designated 281st Bde. R.F.A.

“ 16th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C.

“ 28th. 10th (Howitzer) Battery transferred from 283rd Bde.

R.F.A. and designated D/281st Battery R.F.A.

109th Battery transferred to 283rd Bde. R.F.A.

Nov. 5th. Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries.

“A,” 109th, and “C” 18-pounders; “D” howitzers.

109th Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred

from 283rd Bde. R.F.A.

The original “C” Battery split up. One section to

“A” Battery. One section to “B” Battery.

“D” Battery only had 4 howitzers till 23/1/17, when

one section 500th Howitzer Battery joined from 282nd

Bde. R.F.A.

1/3RD LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (282ND ARMY BRIGADE R.F.A.)

Commanded by Lieut.-Col. A. F. Prechtel.

1916

April 16th. 109th Battery R.F.A. joined and designated “R”

Battery. (Duplicate--see 281st Bde.)

May 6th. Designated 282nd London Bde. R.F.A.

“ 7th, 8th, and 9th Batteries designated “A,” “B,” and

“C” Batteries.

May 17th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C. 319

“ 28th. “R” Battery posted to 283rd Bde. R.F.A.

B/167th (Howitzer) Battery joined and designated

D/282nd Battery R.F.A.

Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries. “A,” “B,” and

Nov. 5th. “C,” 18-pounders; “D” howitzers.

to 500th How. Bty. R.F.A. joined 4/12/16.

1917 One Section to D/280th Bde. R.F.A. One section to

D/281st Bde. R.F.A.

Jan. 25th. B/126th Battery R.F.A. joined and designated A/282nd

Battery.

The original “A” Battery having been split up, one

section each to “B” and “C.”

One section D/126th Battery R.F.A. joined 25/1/17.

Jan. 20th. Designated 282nd Army Bde. R.F.A.

“ 25th. One Section 56th D.A.C. joined and designated 282nd

B.A.C.

1/4TH (LONDON) HOWITZER BRIGADE R.F.A. (283RD BRIGADE R.F.A.)

Commanded by Lieut.-Col. Wainwright.

1915

Nov. 19th, Half of the B.A.C. left for Salonica to join 10th Division.

1916

May 6th. Designated 283rd (Howitzer) Bde. R.F.A.

“ 17th. B.A.C. transferred to 56th D.A.C.

“ 28th. “R” Battery joined from 282nd Bde. R.F.A.

109th Battery joined from 281st Bde. R.F.A.

93rd Battery joined from 280th Bde. R.F.A. (all

18-pounders).

10th (Howitzer) Battery transferred to 281st Bde.

R.F.A.

11th (Howitzer) Battery transferred to 280th Bde.

R.F.A.

Nov. 5th. 93rd Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred

to 280th Bde. R.F.A.

109th Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred

to 281st Bde. R.F.A.

Brigade ceased to exist, but the new organisation was

not completed until January 1917.

56TH DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN

Commanded by Lieut.-Col. E. W. Griffith.

1916

May 17th. The B.A.C.s of 280th, 281st, 282nd, and 283rd Bdes.

R.F.A. absorbed, Then consisted of “A” Echelon

(H.Q., Nos. 1, 2, and 3 sections) and “B” Echelon.

1917

Jan. 25th. One Section (No. 2) became the 282nd Army Bde. Ammunition

Column.

Sept. “B” Echelon reorganised as S.A.A. Section.

Reorganised as H.Q., No. 1, 2, and S.A.A. Sections.

TRENCH MORTARS 320

1916

March 8th. “X” “Y,” and “Z” 2-inch Medium Batteries formed.

Four mortars each.

May. “V” Heavy Battery formed.

1917

Sept./Oct. Medium Batteries handed in 2-inch mortars and were

armed with four 6-inch mortars each.

1918

Feb. 13th. Medium batteries reorganised into two batteries (“X”

and “Y”) of 6-inch mortars each.

Heavy battery taken over by Corps.

1919

Feb. 6th. Reduced to Cadre. Surplus personnel to Brigades and

D.A.C.

ROYAL ENGINEERS

(See C.R.E.)

416th (Edinburgh) Field Coy. R.E.

512th (London) Field Coy. R.E.

513th (London) Field Coy. R.E.

56th Divisional Signal Coy.

PIONEER BATTALION

1/5th Bn. Cheshire Regt. (Earl of Chester’s).

Commanded by:

Lieut.-Col. J. E. C. Groves, C.M.G., T.D., 14/2/15 to 21/2/18.

Major (T/Lieut.-Col.) W. A. V. Churton, D.S.O., T.D., 21/2/18

to end.

MACHINE GUN CORPS

56th Bn. Machine Gun Corps formed on 1/3/18.

(See Divisional M.G. Officers.)

R.A.S.C. UNITS

213th Coy. R.A.S.C.

214th “ “

215th “ “

216th “ “

Divisional Train commanded by:

Lieut.-Col. A. G. Galloway, D.S.O., to Sept. 1917.

Lieut.-Col. E. P. Blencowe, D.S.O., to May 1918.

R.A.M.C.

2/1st London Field Ambulance.

2/2nd “ “ “

2/3rd “ “ “

1/1st London Mobile Vet. Section.

247th Divisional Employment Coy. formed in May 1917.

A.D.sM.S. 321

------------+-----------------------+---------+---------+----------

Rank. | Name. | From. | To. | Regt.

------------+-----------------------+---------+---------+----------

Colonel |E. G. Browne, C.B., |Feb. ’16 | Feb, ’17|R.A.M.C.

| A.M.S. | | |

Colonel |G. A. Moore, |Feb. ’17 | Feb. ’18|R.A.M.C.

| C.M.G., D.S.O. | | |

Colonel |E. C. Montgomery-Smith,|Feb. ’18 | Demob. |R.A.M.C.

| D.S.O., A.M.S. (T.F.)| | |

D.A.D.sM.S.

Major |L. M. Purser, |Feb. ’16 |Sept. ’16|R.A.M.C.

| D.S.O. | | |

Captain |D. Jobson Scott, |Sept. ’16| Feb. ’18|R.A.M.C.

| M.C. | | | (T.F.)

Major |W. T. Hare, M.C. |Feb. ’18 | Demob. |R.A.M.C.

D.A.D.sV.S.

Major |F. Hibbard | 5/2/16 | 30/9/16 |

Major |W. Ascott, O.B.E. | 1/10/16 | Demob. |

D.A.D.sO.S.

Major |J. Bishop | 6/2/16 | 10/3/16 |

Captain |P. S. Tibbs | 11/3/16 | 23/7/16 |

Lieut. |V. C. Ward | 24/7/16 | 22/11/16|

Captain |W. D. Harbinson | 23/11/16| 27/5/17 |

Major |J. W. Burbidge | 28/5/17 | Demob. |

C.sR.E.

Lieut.-Col. |H. W. Gordon, | 6/2/16 | Oct. ’17|Royal

| D.S.O. | | | Engineers.

Lieut.-Col. |E. N. Mozeley, | Oct. ’17| Demob. |Royal

| D.S.O. | | | Engineers.

DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN OFFICERS

Major |E. C. S. Jervis | Jan. ’17| May ’17 |R. of O.

| | | | 6th D.G.s.

Major |Roberts | May ’17 | Aug. ’17|M.G.C.

Lieut.-Col. |E. C. S. Jervis | Aug. ’17| Mar. ’18|R. of O.

| | | | 6th D.G.s.

167TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

BRIGADE COMMANDERS

Major |F. H. Burnell-Nugent, | 6/2/16 | 26/7/16 | The Rifle

(T/Brig.- | D.S.O. | | | Brigade.

Gen.) | | | |

Bt. Col. |G. Freeth, C.M.G., | 7/7/16 | Demob. | Lancashire

(T/Brig.- | D.S.O. | | | Fusiliers.

Gen.) | | | |

BRIGADE MAJORS 322

Bt. Major |G. Blewitt, D.S.O., | 6/2/16 | 5/12/16 |The Oxford

| M.C. | | | and Bucks

| | | | Light

| | | | Infantry.

Captain |M. Stopford, M.C. | 5/12/16 | 25/3/18 |The Rifle

| | | | Brigade.

Captain |C. E. Clouting | 25/3/18 | 8/4/18 |General List.

Captain |C. W. Haydon, M.C. | 25/4/18 | Demob. |Middlesex

| | | | Regt.

STAFF CAPTAINS

Captain |O. H. Tidbury, M.C. | 6/2/16 |27/12/16 |Middlesex

| | | | Regt.

Captain |T. F. Chipp, M.C. |27/12/16 | 23/4/18 |Middlesex

| | | | Regt.

Captain |H. F. Prynn, M.C. | 23/4/18 | Demob. |13th London

| | | | Regt.

| | | | (Kensingtons).

168TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

BRIGADE COMMANDERS

Bt. Col. |G. G. Loch, C.M.G., | 5/2/16 | Demob. |The Royal

(T/Brig.- | D.S.O. | | | Scots.

Gen.) | | | |

BRIGADE MAJORS

Major |P. Neame, V.C., D.S.O. | 5/2/16 | 28/11/16 |Royal

| | | | Engineers.

Captain |J. L. Willcocks, M.C. |28/11/16 | 3/7/18 |The Black

| | | | Watch.

Captain |A. R. Abercrombie, | 3/7/18 | 11/8/18 |The Queen’s

| D.S.O., M.C. | | | Regt.

Captain |R. C. Boyle | 11/8/18 | Demob. |West Somerset

| | | | Yeomanry.

STAFF CAPTAINS

Major |L. L. Wheatley, | 5/2/16 | 7/3/16 |A. & S.

| D.S.O. | | | Highlanders.

Captain |R. E. Otter, M.C. | 7/4/16 | 20/4/17 |London Rifle

| | | | Brigade.

Captain |J. C. Andrews, M.C. | 26/4/17 | 7/3/18 | Q.V.R.

Captain |E. F. Coke, M.C. | 7/3/18 | Demob. |8th Canadian

| | | | Inantry

| | | | Battn.

169TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

BRIGADE COMMANDER

Brig.-Gen. |E. S. D. E. Coke, | 5/2/16 | Demob. |K.O.S.B.

(Bt. Col.)| C.M.G., D.S.O. | | |

BRIGADE MAJORS 323

Captain |L. A. Newnham | 5/2/16 | 27/5/17 |Middlesex

| | | | Regt.

Captain |W. Carden Roe, | 27/5/17 | 24/3/18 |Royal Irish

| M.C. | | | Fusiliers.

Captain |Chute | 28/3/18 | 9/4/18 |

Captain |T. G. McCarthy | 1/4/18 | Demob. |2nd London

| | | | Regt.

STAFF CAPTAINS

Captain |E. R. Broadbent, | 5/2/16 | 5/11/17 |8th Hussars.

| M.C. | | |

Captain |F. Bishop | 5/11/17 | Demob. |1/5th Bn.

| | | | Cheshire

| | | | Regt.

--------------+-----------------------+---------+---------+------------

INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 167TH BRIGADE

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks.

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/7th Middlesex|Lieut.-Col. E. J. King, |The Battalion went to

Regt. | C.M.G., to 2/11/16, and | Gibraltar Sept. 1914.

| from 4/2/17 to 14/5/17 | France to the 23rd

|Lieut-.Col. E. D. Jackson, | Brigade, 8th Division,

| D.S.O., from 2/11/16 to | in Feb. 1915.

| 4/2/17 |

|A/Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. |

| Bendall, from 15/5/17 |

| to 17/8/17 |

|A/Lieut.-Col. P. C. Kay, |

| D.S.O., M.C., from |

| 31/8/17 to 16/2/18. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. M. Beevor, |

| from 16/2/18. |

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/8th Middlesex|T/Lieut.-Col. E. D. W. |This Battalion went to

Regt. | Gregory, from 31/5/15 to | Gibraltar in Sept.

| Sept. 1915. | 1914. To the 88th

|Lieut.-Col. P. L. Inkpen, | Brigade, 3rd during

| D.S.O., from Sept. 1915 | Division, in France

| to Oct. 1916, and Mar. | March 1915, and in

| 1917 to Aug. 1917. | April joined the 23rd

|Lieut.-Col. F. D. W. Bendall,| Brigade, when it was

| from Oct. 1916 to | amalgamated with the

| Mar. 1917. | 1/7th Middlesex.

|Lieut.-Col. C. H. Pank, | Resumed independence

| C.M.G., D.S.O., Sept. | on joining 56th

| 1917 to Mar. 1919. | Division.

|Lieut.-Col. M. B. Beevor, |

| from Mar. 1918. |

---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 324

1/1st London |Lieut.-Col. E. G. Mercer, |Went to Malta in Sept.

Regt. (Royal | C.M.G., T.D., from Jan. | 1914. France Jan.

Fusiliers) | 1916 to June 1916. | 1915, joining the

|Lieut.-Col. D. V. Smith, | 25th Brigade, 8th

| D.S.O., V.D., from June | Division, in March.

| 1916 to Oct. 1916; from | To the 56th Division

| Feb. 1917 to April 1917. | April 1916.

|Lieut.-Col. Kennard, from |

| Oct. 1916 to Nov. 1916. |

|Lieut.-Col. W. R. Glover, |

| C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D., |

| from Nov. 1916 to Mar. |

| 1917; from April 1917. |

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/3rd London |A/Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland,|To Malta in Sept. 1914.

Regt. (Royal | D.S.O., M.C., until | France Jan. 1915 with

Fusiliers) | Mar. 1917. | G.H.Q. troops.

|Lieut.-Col. F. D. Samuel, | Garhwal Brigade,

| D.S.O., T.D. | Meerut Division, on

| | 1/3/15. To 142nd

| | Brigade, 47th Division,

| | 1/1/16. Left 56th

| | Division and joined

| | 173rd Brigade, 58th

| | Division, 2/2/18.

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 168TH BRIGADE

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks.

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/4th London |Major W. J, Clark, until |To Malta Sept. 1914.

Regt. (Royal | 23/3/16. | France Jan. 1915 as

Fusiliers) |Lieut.-Col. L. L. Wheatley, | G.H.Q. troops. Joined

| 8/4/16 to 11/10/16. | Ferozepore Brigade,

|Lieut.-Col. H. J. Duncan | Lahore Division, on

| Teape, until 17/3/17. | 1/3/15. To 140th

|Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland, | Brigade, 47th

| 17/3/17 to 20/4/17. | Division, 1/1/16.

|Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, |

| 20/4/17 to 14/8/17. |

|Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, |

| 14/8/17 to the end. |

----------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 325

1/12th London |Colonel A. D. Bayliffe, |To France 4/1/15 as

Regt. | C.M.G., T.D. | G.H.Q. troops. Joined

(Rangers) | | 84th Brigade, 28th

| | Division, on 4/2/15.

| | Brigade moved to 5th

| | Division 19/2/15 and

| | rejoined 28th Division

| | 6/4/15. To G.H.Q. on

| | 19/5/15. Left 56th

| | Division 2/2/18, and

| | joined 58th Division.

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/13th London |Lieut.-Col. H. Stafford |To France on 13/11/14,

Regt. | until 28/6/16. | and joined the 24th

(Kensingtons)|A/Lieut.-Col. W. W. Young | Brigade, 8th Division.

| until 27/10/16. | To G.H.Q. on 19/5/15.

|A/Lieut.-Col. J. C. R. |

| King, until 13/6/17. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. J. E. J. |

| Higgins, M.C., until |

| 5/8/17. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. V. Flower, |

| D.S.O., until 16/8/17. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. R. E. F. |

| Shaw, M.C., until 23/8/18. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. M. A. Prismall,|

| M.C., until 28/9/18. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. J. Forbes |

| Robertson, V.C., D.S.O., |

| M.C., until 13/10/18. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. F. S. B. |

| Johnson, D.S.O. |

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/14th London |Lieut-.Col. B. C. Green, |To France on lines of

Regt. (London| C.M.G., T.D., until 2/8/16.| communication Sept.

Scottish) |Lieut.-Col. J. H. Lindsay, | 1914. Joined 1st

| D.S.O., until 6/10/16. | Brigade, 1st Division,

|Lieut.-Col. James Paterson, | on 7/11/14.

| M.C., until 6/3/17. |

|Lieut.-Col. E. D. Jackson, |

| D.S.O. |

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 169TH BRIGADE 326

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks.

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/2nd London |Lieut.-Col. James |To Malta Sept. 1914.

Regt. (Royal | Attenborough, C.M.G., T.D.,| France Jan. 1915 as

Fusiliers) | until Nov. 1916, and | G.H.Q. troops. Joined

| Feb. 1917 to April 1917. | 17th Brigade, 6th

|A/Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett, | Division, 1/3/15. The

| D.S.O., M.C., Nov. 1916 | Brigade was transferred

| to Feb. 1917; May 1917 | to 24th Division

| to Aug. 1917; Jan. 1918 | 1/1/16.

| to Oct. 1918; Jan. 1919. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. R. E. F. |

| Sneath, M.C., Aug. 1917 |

| to Dec. 1917. |

|A/Lieut.-Col. S. H. Stevens, |

| M.C., Nov. 1918 to Jan. |

| 1919. |

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/5th London |Lieut.-Col. Bates, D.S.O., |To France and joined

Regt. | until 13/8/16. | 11th Brigade, 4th

(London |Lieut.-Col. R. H. Husey, | Division, 24/11/14.

Rifle | D.S.O., 13/8/16 to 4/5/18. | To G.H.Q. 19/5/15.

Brigade) |Lieut.-Col. C. D. Burnell, | To 8th Brigade, 3rd

| D.S.O., 4/5/18 to end. | Division, 1/1/16.

| Also for one month, |

| 22/4/17 to 20/5/17, |

| during Lieut.-Col. |

| Husey’s absence. The |

| latter C.O. was also |

| absent from 26/3/17 to |

| 22/4/17, and 12/8/17 to |

| 3/12/17, when Major |

| F. H. Wallis took command. |

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/9th London |Colonel J. W. F. Dickens, |To France 24/11/14 and

Regt. (Queen | D.S.O., V.D. | joined 13th Brigade,

Victoria’s |Lieut.-Col. F. B. Follett, | 5th Division. Brigade

Rifles) | D.S.O., M.C. | moved to 28th Division

|Lieut.-Col. M. Beevor, | on 19/2/15, and back to

| D.S.O. | 5th Division on 6/4/15.

|Lieut.-Col. E. G. H. Towell | Left 56th Division and

| | joined 58th 2/2/18.

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

1/16th London |Lieut.-Col. R. Shoolbred, |To France and joined

Regt. | C.M.G., T.D. | 18th Brigade, 6th

(Queen’s |Lieut.-Col. E. P. Harding, | Division, 11/11/14.

Westminster | O.B.E., M.C. |

Rifles) |Lieut.-Col. P. M. Glazier, |

| D.S.O. |

| Lieut.-Col. S. R. Savill, |

| D.S.O., M.C. |

---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

INDEX 327

Ablainzeville, 32

Achicourt, 114

Achiet-le-Grand, 32

Acq, 246

Adinfer Wood, 32

Agny, 114

Albert, battle of, 258-268

Ambrines, 8

American power, 211

Angreau, 308

Arnold, Lt., 292

Arras, battles of, 114-143, 208-242

Arthur, G. S., 40

Artillery Coy. of London (H.A.C.), 2

Athis, 311

Aubers Ridge, 104

Aubigny-au-Bac, 290-297, 312

Avesnes-le-Comte, 9, 254

Baghdad, 111, 145

Bapaume, 69

Barber, Capt. J. B., 9

Basseux, 266

Basseville, 301

Bavincourt, 254, 259

Bayley, Major A. E. G., 3

Bayliffe, Lt.-Col. A. D., 89

Bazentin, 53

Bazentin Ridge, battle of, 53

Beaudricourt, 8

Beaufort, 8

Beaumetz, 297

Beauvois, 113

Bedford Regt., 156

Belfort, 14

Bendall, Lt.-Col. F. W. D., 160

Berkshire Regt., 156

Berlencourt, 8

Berles-au-Bois, 214

Bernafay, 101

Bertincourt, 214

Beugny, 175

Biez Wood, 32

Blairville, 25, 259

Blangermont, 113

Blangerol, 113

Blavincourt, 8

Blewitt, Capt. G., 4

Bloxam, Major-Gen. (U.S.A.), 169

Boisleux-au-Mont, 297

Boisleux St. Marc, 283

Bouleaux Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 56

Bouquemaison, 120

Bouret-sur-Canche, 9

Bourlon (_see_ Cambrai)

Bovill, E. H., 40

Bow Bells, 140

Boyelles (_see_ Albert)

Brand, Capt., 109

Brigades:

6th, 202

8th, 168

9th, 168

12th, 234

44th, 253

46th, 253

53rd, 155

76th, 168

99th, 202

109th, 174

137th, 42

139th, 42

140th, 202

145th, 18

171st, 278

172nd, 275

Tank Brigades, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 171

Brigades, composition of, 4, 5

Brind, Lt.-Col. J. E. S., 3, 24

Broadbent, Capt. E. R., 4

Bruilly, 8

Brussiloff, Gen., 14, 96, 147

Bucquoy, 32

Bullecourt, 135 (_see_ Scarpe, 269-280)

Bullock, Capt. T. W., 3

Busseboom, 165

Cambrai, battle of, 163-208, 290

Campbell, Lt.-Col. H., 160

Canadian Cavalry, 177 328

Canadian Mounted Rifles, 236

Canal du Nord (battle), 280-289

Cannettemont, 8

Canteen, 9, 165

Carnoy, 69

Cavan, Gen. Lord, 75, 95

Chemin-des-Dames, 130

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, 50

Citadel, 52, 101

Cockerill, Capt., 39

Coke, Brig.-Gen. E. S., 3, 18, 114, 134, 237, 275, 286, 291, 303, 313

Combles (_see_ Ginchy)

Corbie, 51

Coron, 312

Corps:

II, 154, 163

III, 170, 171

IV, 27, 170, 171, 190, 258, 265, 285

V, 170

VI, 6, 117, 131, 170, 190, 254, 258, 265, 285

VII, 10, 19, 113, 114, 170

IX, 245

X, 48

XI, 104

XIII, 209, 221

XIV, 51, 59, 70

XV, 59

XVII, 170, 221, 247, 269, 285

XXII, 246, 283, 301

Canadian, 169, 282, 284, 291

French XVII, 6

German XIV, 18

Couin, 131

Cox (Sapper), 295

Crawford, Capt., 198

Croisette, 113

Croisilles, 117, 268-275

Dainville, 7

Delville Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 53

Divisional Band, 164

Divisional Depot Bn., 120

Divisions:

Infantry:

1st, 283

2nd, 193, 202, 258

3rd, 117, 140, 168, 191, 237, 277

4th, 87, 221, 234, 237, 284, 301

5th, 55, 65, 79, 102

6th, 70, 74, 79, 82, 103, 171

8th, 154, 245

11th, 284, 301, 308, 311

12th, 171, 193

13th, 114

14th, 10, 114, 117, 134

15th, 131, 237, 253

16th, 57, 62

18th, 86, 128, 155

19th, 245

20th, 171

21st, 117, 245

25th, 155, 160, 245

29th, 171, 176

30th, 117, 128

31st, 210

36th, 171, 177

37th, 112, 138, 258

40th, 259, 279

41st, 215

42nd, 258

46th, 26

47th, 27, 192, 202

48th, 18

49th, 113, 301

50th, 128, 245

51st, 171, 177

52nd, 266, 278, 282

55th, 193

57th, 260, 272, 282

58th, 214

59th, 192

61st, 101, 140, 301

62nd, 171, 177, 210

63rd, 279, 282, 311

Cavalry:

1st, 178, 181

2nd, 191

Canadian:

1st, 247, 253

2nd, 252

3rd, 102, 224, 234, 284

4th, 236, 301, 308

New Zealand, 258

Guards, 62, 70, 74, 79, 82, 189, 258, 263, 266, 312

German:

Guards, 2nd R., 35, 47

5th Bav., 74, 104

5th Bav. R., 222

5th R., 210

16th Bav., 248

20th, 188

23rd R., 222

39th, 253

41st, 241

51st R., 78

52nd, 18, 46 329

185th, 61, 248

214th, 249, 250

219th R., 222

240th, 222

Portuguese, 2nd, 244

Domart-en-Ponthieu, 6

Doullens, 6, 48

Dudgeon, Gen. F. A., 153-249

Emery, Major, 104

Eperlecques, 144, 153, 165

Essart, 32, 36

Etrun, 296

Falfemont Farm (_see_ Ginchy), 54

Falkenhayn, Gen., 10, 29, 94, 97

Fayt-le-Franc, 311

Ferlibray, 312

Flers, battle of, 54, 69

Flower, Major V. A., 160

Foch, Marshal, 245

Fonquevillers, 48

Fosseux, 209

Freeth, Brig.-Gen., 86, 109, 123, 138, 155, 249, 268

Fremicourt, 175

Frevent, 113

Friend, L. W., 228

Frigicourt, 53

Fromer-le-Grand, 48

Garland, Capt. J. R., 41

Gavrelle (_see_ Arras)

Gaza, 147

German prisoners (_see_ Regiments)

Ginchy, battle of, 55-66

Givenchy-le-Noble, 8

Glazier, Lt.-Col., 186, 228

Glencorse (_see_ Ypres)

Gommecourt, action of, 18-47

Gouy-en-Artois, 297

Grand Rullecourt, 7

Grenas, 19

Grouping of units, 5

Grubb, Lt.-Col. H. W., 3

Guemappe (_see_ Arras, battles of), 117

Guillemont, 55

Guinecourt, 113

Haking, Gen. R., 109

Hallencourt, 3, 10, 101

Halloy, practice at, 36

Hampshire Regt., 177

Handyside, Capt. P. A. J., 41

Happy Valley, 52

Harbarcq, 140

Harmignies, 312

Harris, Major M. R., 160

Harvengt, 312

Hauteville, 131

Hawkins (Sapper), 296

Hayward, Cpl., 40

Hébuterne, 10

Heninel, 126

Henri, P., 35

Henu, 10, 18

Héricourt, 113

Hernicourt, 113

Higgins, Major J. E., 160

Hindenburg, Gen. von, 94, 98, 129, 147

Honval, 8, 113

Horne, J. A., 40

Horses, 103

Houvin, 8, 113

Hull, Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A., 1-144, 249-314

Husey, Col. R. R., 160

Ide, W. C., 40

Identification (_see_ Regiments)

Indian drivers, 253

Ingpen, Lt.-Col. P. L., 160

Isonzo, 97

Ivergny, 8

Izel-les-Hameau, 253

Jackson, Lt.-Col., 188, 199

Jervis, Lt.-Col. E. C. S., 241, 265

Joffre, Marshal, 51

Kellet, Lt.-Col. J. P., 160

Kerensky, 147

King Edward’s Horse, 178

Korniloff, 147

Lagnicourt, 168

Lancashire Fusiliers, 228

Laventie, 101-113

Le Cauroy, 7, 117

Lemon, Major F. J., 3

Lestrem, 101

Leuze Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 55

Liencourt, 8

Lignereuil, 8, 254

Loch, Brig.-Gen., 3, 19, 55, 109, 123, 239, 264

Louverval, 168

Lowndes, G. A. N., 227

Ludendorff, Gen. von, 94, 98, 111, 129, 147, 152

Macdowell, Lt.-Col., 23 330

Macgregor, Capt. A. H., 56

Macintosh, Cpl., 198

McPhie, Cpl., 295

Magnicourt, 8

Maltzhorn Farm, 57

Manin, 8

Mansell Camp, 101

Marchment, Lt.-Col., 232

Marcoing (_see_ Cambrai)

Maricourt, 16, 52

Masnières (_see_ Cambrai)

Maurepas, 53

Mazières, 253

Méaulte, 81

Mercatel, 116

Millar, Cpl., 104

Moncheaux, 9

Monchy, 116

Mons, 313

Montauban, 53, 87

Montignies, 311

Morchies, 168

Mott, Capt., 39

Neame, Capt. P., 4

Negus, A. G., 40

Neuve Chapelle, 103

Neuville Vitasse (_see_ Arras, battles of), 115

Newnham, Capt. L. A., 4, 108, 140, 144

Nicholls, W. G., 40

Nonne Bosschen (_see_ Ypres)

North Staffordshire Regt., 42

Nugent, Burnell-, Brig.-Gen., 3, 18, 20

Nuncy, 113

Oburg, 313

Onnezies, 311

Oppy (_see_ Arras)

Organisation, 167, 298

Ormiston, W. H., 169

Ouderdom, 159

Ovillers, 53

Packenham, Lt.-Col., 113

Pank, Lt.-Col., 199

Petit Moranfayt, 312

Petley, R. E., 41

Phillips, Major F. A., 232

Pill-boxes, 150

Pommier, 131

Powell, Kite, 219

Prechtel, Lt.-Col., 32, 36, 46

Price, J. C. B., 228

Prior, Lt., 109

Proney, 113

Pyper, Capt. J. R., 9

Quadrilateral, 26, 60, 74

Quéant, 177, 297

Quevy-le-Grand, 312

Raids, near Arras, 247-252

Rancourt, 53

Rebreuve, 8

Regiments, German:

5th Gren. Regt., 137

7th R.I.R., 210

7th Bav., 74, 104

13th Bav., 113

14th Bav., 248

16th I.R., 241

19th Bav., 104

21st Bav., 74

28th I.R., 248

31st R.I.R., 86, 168

50th I.R., 249, 251

65th I.R., 248

84th R.I.R., 86

86th R.I.R., 168

91st I.R., 48

101st R.I.R., 222

102nd R.I.R., 222

107th I.R., 57

128th I.R., 137

152nd I.R., 241

161st I.R., 61

169th I.R., 18, 32

170th I.R., 32

214th I.R., 250

235th I.R., 78

358th I.R., 251

414th I.R., 169

471st I.R., 222

Reincourt-les-Bapaume, 69

Reninghelst, 153, 165

Richon, 312

Rieu-de-Bury, 312

Rocquingny, 69

Roe, Cardon, 140

Rose, 2/Lieut., 109

Royal Flying Corps, 15th Squad., 173

Royal Irish Rifles, 56

Rumancourt, 296

Rum jar, 126

St. Pol, 113

St. Riquier, 49

Sambre, battle of, 303

Sars-les-Bois, 8

Sauchy-Cauchy, 296 331

Savill, Lt.-Col., 272

Scarpe, 269-280 (_see_ Arras, battles of)

Sebourg, 303

Séricourt, 8, 113

Shaw, Lt.-Col. R. S. F., 263

Sherwood Foresters, 42

Shoolbred, Lt.-Col., 39

Shops, 9

Sibiville, 113

Siracourt, 113

Sloan, Capt., 293

Smith, Gen. W. Douglas, 145

Souastre, 10, 19, 131

Southam, Lt.-Col., 39

Steenvoorde, 159

Stow, F. H., 41

Sutton, Capt. W. M., 3

Sutton, Lt.-Col., 305

Swainson, Capt., 39

Swift, Gen. (U.S.A.), 210

Tadpole Copse (_see_ Cambrai)

Tagart, Capt., 39

Tanks, 51, 69, 70, 92, 171, 177, 261

Tidbury, Capt. O. H., 4

Tilloy (_see_ Arras, battles of), 115

Tincques, 297

Training, 166

Transloy, battle of ridges, 83

Trieu Jean Sart, 312

Trones Wood, 53

Upton, D. F., 40

Verdun, reasons for battle, 4

Victory Camp, 213

Ville-sur-Ancre, 81

Villers-au-Flos, 69

Villers Châtel, 252

Villers-sire-Simon, 8

Vimy Ridge, 102, 116, 128

Wamin, 8

Wamlin, 8

Wancourt, 124

Way, H. C. B., 3

Wheatley, Major L. L., 4

Wippenhoek, 159

Wireless, 205

Wodley, Cpl., 104

Woods, Pte., 198

Yates, A. G. V., 40

Ypres, battles of, 144-164

PRINTED BY

HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,

LONDON AND AYLESBURY,

ENGLAND.

* * * * * *

Transcriber's note:

Unprinted punctuation was added where appropriate.

Footnotes were renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of the

chapter in which the anchor occurs.

On page 240, there are no subparagraphs (f) and (g); subparagraph (h)

follows subparagraph (e).

A header key was added to the table on page 300 so that it would fit

on a standard computer screen.

Other changes:

“compaign” to “campaign” ... unrestricted submarine campaign ...

“bebauching” to “debauching” ... prevented from debauching from the ...

“277//16” to “27/7/16”, entry for D. Thomson.

in the table of 56th Divisional Artillery Headquarters, C.R.A.

“5/2/6” to “5/2/16”, appendix entry for E. S. D. E. Coke,

169th Infantry Brigade.

“Marchmont” to “Marchment” in the index and twice in the text of

Chapter VII.

“O.” to “Off.”, table header for Officers in September on page 340.