On the 19th something in the nature of an attack in force was carried 138

out. The 8th Middlesex made a night attack, in conjunction with the

29th Division, on Hook Trench and the support line behind it. The

Middlesex men gained the junction of Hook and Tool, but were very

“bunched”; the 187th Brigade on the left made no progress at all. It

is probable that the Middlesex were more to the left than they

imagined, as they were heavily bombed from both flanks, and eventually

forced to withdraw.

On the 20th May the weary troops of the 56th Division were relieved by

the 37th Division.

In these actions and in the battle on the 3rd May the objectives were

shallow and the enemy fully prepared to resist, with large

reinforcements of men and guns in the field. The enemy barrage was

considered the heaviest that had, as yet, been encountered. The

positions attacked were well sited and frequently masked, and there

was also the complication of night assaults at short notice.

Brig.-Gen. Freeth, in an interesting report of the battle on the 3rd,

says:

“... Owing to the darkness it was extremely difficult for

the assaulting troops to keep direction or the correct

distances between waves. The tendency was for rear waves to

push forward too fast for fear of losing touch with the wave

in front of them. Consequently, by the time the leading wave

was approaching Tool Trench, all the rear waves had

telescoped into it. Even if Tool Trench had been taken, much

delay would have been caused in extricating and moving

forward waves allotted to the further objectives.”

Anyone who has taken part in a night attack will appreciate these

difficulties. If it goes well it is very well, but if not the

confusion is appalling.

The casualties from the 29th April to 21st May were 79 officers and 139

2,022 other ranks.

The general situation was that on the 5th May the French had delivered

their attack on the Chemin-des-Dames and achieved their object, but on

the whole the French offensive was disappointing. On the British

front, however, 19,500 prisoners and 257 guns had been captured, and

the situation round Arras greatly improved. The spring offensive was

at an end.

But fighting did not cease round Arras and over the width of the sixty

square miles of regained country. The Messines attack in the north was

in course of preparation, and the orders to the Fifth, Third, and

First Armies were to continue operations, with the forces left to

them, with the object of keeping the enemy in doubt as to whether the

offensive would be continued. Objectives, of a limited nature, were to

be selected, and importance given to such actions by combining with

them feint attacks. They were successful in their object, but there

was bitter with the sweet, as Sir Douglas Haig writes:

“These measures seem to have had considerable success, if

any weight may be attached to the enemy’s reports concerning

them. They involved, however, the disadvantage that I

frequently found myself unable to deny the German accounts

of the bloody repulse of extensive British attacks which, in

fact, never took place.”

The attack on Messines was launched on the 7th June, and was a

complete success. With the first crash of our concentrated artillery

nineteen mines were exploded, and our troops swept forward all along

the line. By the evening 7,200 prisoners, 67 guns, 94 trench mortars, 140

and 294 machine-guns had been captured.

The 56th Division indulged in a little well-earned rest. We read of

sports and horse shows in the vicinity of Habarcq, of concerts given

by the “Bow Bells” concert party (formed in 1916 at Souastre), and

diaries have the welcome entries “troops resting” as the only event of

the day. But this was not for long. Battalions were soon back in the

line, though much reduced in strength. For the first time we find, in

spite of reinforcements, that the average strength of battalions fell

to just over eight hundred.

The 169th Brigade lost Capt. Newnham, who went to the New Zealand

Division as G.S.O.2. He instituted a form of official diary which is a

delight to read--concise, but with occasional reflections of a dry,

humorous nature. Capt. Carden Roe, from the 29th Division, took his

place as Brigade Major.

During the 9th, 10th, and 11th of June the division relieved the 61st

Division in the line. The position was the same--Tool Trench from the

copse, on the left, to Cavalry Farm, but it was extended to Wancourt

Tower on the right.

The front now held measured 2,700 yards. Wancourt Tower was on the

summit of the high spur which runs parallel to the Cojeul River on the

south bank. The line can, then, be visualised stretching across the

valley, with right and left flanks of the division on the high ground

on either side of the river. From the right good observation was

obtained over the enemy lines on the left of the divisional front, and

from the copse, on the left of the line, similar observation could be

had over the enemy on the right.

The 3rd Division was on the left of the 56th, and on the 14th June, at 141

7.30 a.m., the former launched an attack on Hook Trench. The attack

was a complete success; the division came level with the 56th and

captured 175 prisoners.

The right of the 56th Division was held by the Queen’s Westminster

Rifles, and a few minutes after five o’clock in the evening sentries

noticed enemy movement behind a wood (Bois du Vert) which was opposite

the 3rd Division and on the left flank of the 56th. Careful watching

revealed the massing of troops. A warning was sent over the telephone.

The 76th Brigade, immediately on the left of the 56th Division, was

informed, as was the artillery.

Killing human beings is not dear to the heart of Englishmen. Green

troops would stand violent shelling, merely looking a bit tense about

the face, but although they saw their comrades fall, shattered to

pieces, or badly wounded, they would sometimes show a great

disinclination to fire on Germans walking in the open behind the enemy

lines. It seemed as though the idea was that the particular German in

question was not trying to injure them--he might have been carrying a

plank or a bag of rations--and so they would watch him and no one

would attempt to shoot unless there was an old soldier with them. This

frame of mind, however, did not last long.

But the evening of the 14th June was an occasion for glee. The Hun was

going to attack and all was ready for him. At 5.30 the grey waves left

the enemy trenches, and at once a storm of artillery, machine-gun, and

rifle fire met them. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles, of course, could

not fire, but they watched the action with great joy, and kept Brigade

and Divisional Headquarters informed of every enemy move. The attack 142

was smashed up and, thanks to the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, the

enemy was chased out of sight by the artillery.

After this costly lesson the Germans tried a night attack on the 16th

at 2.30 a.m. This time they succeeded in entering two posts, but the

3rd Division drove them out and the men of the 56th inflicted heavy

casualties from the flank.

Nothing more was done in this line beyond some skirmishing round a

post. The division was relieved on the 4th July and moved to the Le

Cauroy area.

* * * * *

We have said very little about the Divisional Artillery, but to follow

them too closely in these engagements would lead to confusion. They

supported the 56th Division during the battle of Arras--in the

original scheme--and when the division moved on the 20th April the

artillery remained where it was. Brig.-Gen. Elkington writes:

“The 56th Divisional Artillery remained in the line in this

sector, under different C.R.A.s and covering different

divisions, and were not under my command again until the end

of May, as I remained with the 56th Division and commanded

the artillery covering them. All the divisional artilleries

became much mixed up, and very few of the C.R.A.s had their

own artillery under their own command....

On the 24th May the division moved to the Habarcq area, and

remained there until the 9th June. I established the R.A.

Headquarters at Beaumetz, so as to keep in touch with our

artillery, who were still in the line. At the end of May I

got four days’ leave and went to Paris with Hawkes,

Jorgensen, and Robinson, and we were joined there by Cols.

Groves and Lemon. We all had an excellent time, and 143

enjoyed it immensely.... On the 5th July the 56th Divisional

Artillery returned to my command, and we started to march to

the Ypres area, and arrived at Oudezeele on the 13th July

1917. This was a very clean and comfortable village, and all

ranks were well billeted. We remained there until the 28th

July, a very pleasant and well-earned rest for both officers

and men, beautiful weather, and many sports were organised

for officers and men. Several fatigue parties had to be

furnished to assist the heavy artillery in the supply of

ammunition, and these had very hard work and some

casualties. During the later part our trench mortar

batteries, under Capt. Robinson, went into the line with the

Guards Division, and had rather a strenuous time doing

excellent work. On the 9th July I went home on ten days’

leave, and I got married on the 12th July....”

At one period of the war it was thought that the artillery had a

“soft” time, but as the war progressed it was seen that the zone which

included the lighter guns included also conditions which rendered the

comfort of artillerymen scarcely more enviable than that of the

infantry. We shall soon be able to throw a little more light on the

work of this very gallant arm of the Service.

[4] _My War Memories, 1914-1918._

CHAPTER V 144

YPRES

On the 2nd July a rearrangement of the front had placed the 56th

Division in the VII Corps, and they remained at Le Cauroy under the

orders of that Corps until the 23rd July, when they moved to

Eperlecques, near St. Omer, and came under the Fifth Army.

But the division lost Gen. Hull. It was absolutely necessary that he

should undergo a surgical operation, and the matter could not be

postponed any longer, so he went back to England. He was looked upon

as a friend as much as a commander, his striking personality had

impressed itself on all ranks, and his tall figure was recognised from

afar and welcomed whenever he visited the line or billets. The men saw

in him a fearless commander who knew his business. We are indebted to

Major Newnham for the following anecdote:

“After the 1st July show (1916), the 169th Brigade held the

trenches in front of Fouquevillers. The trenches, though on

top of a hill, were dreadful. My diary records ‘all C.T.s

thigh-deep in mud.’ Gen. Hull doubted our statement, so on

Sunday, the 9th July, when he came to Brigade Headquarters,

I showed him the state of things. We went up the main C.T.,

and gradually the slime rose, first ankle, then knee, then

thigh-deep. At length, where the C.T. ran in a hollow, I

said, ‘Now we get to a really deep bit, sir!’ He said, 145

‘Well, I’m damned if I’m going through it--I’m getting out!’

And we went over the top, though in full view from a large

part of the Boche positions, and walked back in the open,

too!”

And the General was enthusiastic in praise of his division.

“We were a happy family,” he says. And “what pleased me as much as

their fighting qualities was their good temper and cheerfulness under

all circumstances,” and the circumstances were at times appallingly

severe. He was himself always cheerful, though his pet dog, an Irish

greyhound named Roy, has been described as “a miserable hound.” He

encouraged his staff to play “bridge” whenever their work permitted,

as a means of taking their minds off the war. All work and no play

would have made even a G.S.O.1 a dull boy, and relaxation was not easy

to find. He commanded the 4th Battalion Middlesex Regt. at Mons, and

was given command of the 10th Brigade on the 17th November 1914. When

he first entered the army in 1887, he joined the Royal Scots

Fusiliers, and was transferred to the Middlesex Regt. in 1912. We are

sorry to say that the “miserable hound,” Roy, who had been with the

General since January 1916, cut a tendon and had to be destroyed in

Belgium, although he survived the war.

Gen. Hull was not, however, lost to the division, as he returned

later. Meanwhile Gen. W. Douglas Smith was given command.

Troops were being massed for the big offensive at Ypres, and the Fifth

Army Staff, under Sir Hubert Gough, had been moved to take command of 146

the greater part of the salient. Sir Herbert Plumer was still there,

but on the southern side, and with a reduced army.

* * * * *

In July 1917 England reached the summit of her military power in

France. There were 52 divisions from the Motherland, 4 from Canada, 5

from Australia, 1 from New Zealand. One might, therefore, expect a

year of great results. And so it was, though not perhaps obviously

apparent.

Writing of the year as a whole, Sir Douglas Haig says:

“The general conditions of the struggle this year have been

very different from those contemplated at the conference of

the Allied Commanders held in November 1916. The great

general and simultaneous offensive then agreed on did not

materialise. Russia, though some of her leaders made a fine

effort at one period, not only failed to give the help

expected of her, but even failed to prevent the enemy from

transferring some forty divisions from her front in exchange

for tired ones used up in the Western theatre, or from

replacing losses in his divisions on this side by drafts of

fresh and well-trained men drawn from divisions in the East.

The combined French and British offensive in the spring was

launched before Italy could be ready; and the splendid

effort made by Italy at a later period was, unfortunately,

followed by developments which resulted in a weakening of

the Allied forces in this theatre before the conclusion of

our offensive.

In these circumstances the task of the British and French

armies has been a far heavier one throughout the year than

was originally anticipated, and the enemy’s means of meeting 147

our attack have been far greater than either he or we could

have expected.”

It was a year of disappointment, but was not a year without

achievement. We had failed against the Turk at Gaza, but had succeeded

at Baghdad; the French spring offensive had not succeeded, and our own

could only be described as a steadying blow at the Germans; Kerensky

came on the scene in Russia in May, and no doubt did his best, but

discipline had gone, and the offensive of Brussiloff and Korniloff,

though it succeeded at first, was well in hand, so far as the Central

Powers were concerned, in July. The East was the weak spot in our

calculations, with Russia going to ruin and dragging Rumania with her.

It was as well that Britain was at the crest of the power wave.

After all, battles have a further object than the mere killing of men.

For quite a long while after the commencement of the war the Germans

talked boastfully of their “will.” The will to victory was going to

crush the _moral_ of their enemies. But although the Russian

revolution caused great rejoicing, although the German High Command

claimed a long list of victories, it seemed that German _moral_

was somehow flagging, and their enemy’s will to victory was as

determined as ever.

Ludendorff admits that in the summer of 1917 the position of the

Central Powers was better than that of the Entente, but that there

were other causes for “our spiritual decline.” He says that

Field-Marshal Hindenburg wrote to the Emperor on the 27th June that

“our greatest anxiety at this moment, however, is the decline of the

national spirit. It must be revived or we shall lose the war.” There

were speeches in the Reichstag containing the despairing cry that 148

it was impossible to win the war. On the 7th July Hindenburg and

Ludendorff met members of the Reichstag to discuss “our defensive

attitude throughout the first half of 1917, the various failures near

Arras, in the Wytschæte salient, and in Galicia, where we had not as

yet attacked, the absence up to date of any decisive result from the

submarine war, and our serious situation as regards food and raw

materials....” And finally, on the 25th July, General Ludendorff wrote

that “it is certain that the Independent Social Democrats are carrying

on an agitation in the army which is in the highest degree detrimental

to discipline.”

And the allies of Germany were giving her a great deal of trouble.

One can only ask what created this frame of mind? Even a Social

Democrat must have the ground prepared before his doctrines can

germinate and flourish; it must be fertilised with dissatisfaction and

watered with despair. The German and Austrian nations were as one in

their desire for war in August 1914, and so strong that they had

little difficulty in winning the Turkish and Bulgarian nations to

their cause. Then surely we may answer the question by saying that it

was the guns of the Allied artillery and the rifles of the Allied

infantry that caused the “will” to falter, even when the position

seemed most favourable to the War Lord and his advisers. It was a slow

process, but a sure one.

One must admit disappointment to France and Britain, as the leaders of

the countries allied against the Central Powers, but we cannot see the

justice of the German contention that their own position was good. 149

In considering the events of this war, it is not easy to appreciate

the mind of a man who says “the military situation was good, but the

condition of the country behind the army was bad.” Country and army

surely hang together. The Germans never looked upon war as a clash of

armies alone, but sought by every means in their power, by oppression,

by slavery, by terror, to bend the non-combatant population to their

will. It is a logical view. This war, at least, was waged by country

against country, by nation against nation, and as a nation Germany was

cracking, and her allies with her.

This was the state of affairs when the Battles of Ypres, 1917, after

an artillery preparation which had been growing in volume for a month,

opened with a stupendous crash on the 31st July--an official date.

From the very first the Second and Fifth British Armies, and the First

French Army on the left, met with the fiercest resistance. The left of

the Fifth Army and the First French Army gained the greatest

success--the right of the Fifth Army and the Second Army did little

more than capture the enemy first line of defence. Whatever the

condition of the German people, the German Army seemed as strong as

ever. And yet it was being nursed.

The system with which the Germans started the war was not one based on

consideration for lives. Verdun and the Somme had shaken the very

foundations of that system, and, if the German Army was still strong

and good, German Commanders had already expressed anxiety as to the

future conduct of their troops. Loss of lives and loss of _moral_ had

been responsible for a new method of defence. The front line was to be 150

held by few men and many machine guns, and retirement before strong

enemy fire was advocated. The position was to be regained by means of

rapid counter-attack. Instead of holding a “line,” a zone was held.

Defence in depth was the policy.

This loosened method of defence lessened the wastage of troops from

artillery fire, and in addition the system of “pill-boxes” was

instituted. These small reinforced concrete forts could withstand a

direct hit of all but the heaviest shell, and were admirably adapted

for the defence of a place like Flanders, where dugouts were almost an

impossibility. In fact, the new German pamphlet, “The Defensive

Battle,” was a distinct departure from the old “Cannon Fodder” point

of view. If the Reichstag was openly saying that the war could not be

won, the High Command of the Army was wondering if it would stand many

more blows.

Men who fought at Ypres will say that they noticed no loss of

_moral_ in the enemy, and with this we agree; we only wish to insist

that there were indications which had not escaped the eyes of the

German Command. As to the hard, heart-breaking fighting of the Battles

of Ypres, 1917, it is only just to the gallant French and British

troops to point out once more the many advantages that lay with their

enemies.

For over two years the Germans had held their semicircle round the

east of Ypres. The positions they occupied, though only the summits of

insignificant-looking “rises,” not even worthy of the name of “hills,”

overlooked the whole of the French and British assembly area. Not a

move escaped their observers, who knew every inch of the ground. What 151

a place to prepare for an attack!

Books of reference will give the 31st July as the opening date of the

1917 Battles of Ypres. It is false. The 31st is the date of the

assault--the battles started with the first indications of the British

intention to attack. Every new trench, every trace of new digging,

every new track taped out, every building, every hamlet, every wood

was bombarded by the enemy with guns and aeroplanes, which became

extremely active at this period. As the concentration of troops

increased, all attempts at concealment were abandoned, and camps were

pitched in the open. The whole area was a “target,” and was well

described by a gunner who remarked, “Every time a coconut!”

Observation, on the other hand, was denied to us.

All this, bad in itself, the troops were able to face. But the enemy

had another advantage, being on the defensive, and that was the

condition of the ground over which the attackers had to advance.

There is no place on the whole of the Western Front which can be

compared to this stretch of Flanders. If an infantryman or an

artilleryman attempted to give an adequate account of the conditions,

and the horrors which they occasioned, he would not be believed. We

will, therefore, give the words of the Higher Command, with the one

criticism that they are not strong enough. Sir Douglas Haig wrote:

“The weather had been threatening throughout the day (31st

July) and had rendered the work of the aeroplanes very

difficult from the commencement of the battle. During the 152

afternoon, while the fighting was still in progress, rain

fell, and fell steadily all night. Thereafter for four days

the rain continued without cessation, and for several days

after the weather remained stormy and unsettled. The

lowlying clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden with rain,

turned into a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of

the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed

into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few

well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy’s

artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by

drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting, on

several occasions, both men and pack animals were lost in

this way.... As had been the case in the Arras battle, this

unavoidable delay in the development of our offensive was of

the greatest service to the enemy. Valuable time was lost,

the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the

disorganisation produced by our first attack, and the enemy

was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements.”

The enemy view of the conditions is given by Ludendorff:

“Enormous masses of ammunition, such as the human mind had

never imagined before the war, was hurled upon the bodies of

men who passed a miserable existence scattered about in

mud-filled shell-holes. The horror of the shell-hole area of

Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all. It was

mere unspeakable suffering. And through this world of mud

the attackers dragged themselves, slowly but steadily, and

in dense masses. Caught in the advance zone by our hail of

fire they often collapsed, and the lonely man in the

shell-hole breathed again. Then the mass came on again.

Rifle and machine gun jammed with the mud. Man fought

against man, and only too often the mass was successful.... 153

And yet it must be admitted that certain units no longer

triumphed over the demoralising effects of the defensive

battle as they had done formerly.”

[Illustration: INVERNESS COPSE AND GLENCORSE WOOD, AUGUST 1917]

Very naturally Ludendorff claims that statues in bronze should be

erected to the German soldier for the suffering he experienced at

Ypres. But his own picture of the attackers seems somehow to be worse

than that of the defenders, if there are degrees of suffering.

On the 31st July the assault of the Fifth Army met with complete

success on the left, where the crossing of the Steenbeke was secured.

But on the right the II Corps was only partially successful. After

overrunning the first system of defence about Hooge and Sanctuary

Wood, divisions were met with tremendous opposition, and eventually

checked at Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood.

On the 4th of August the 56th Division started to move from

Eperlecques, and on the 6th Divisional Headquarters were at

Reninghelst under the II Corps. Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon assumed

command of the division on the 10th; and on the 12th the division took

over the line from Surbiton Villas to Westhoek, facing Glencorse Wood

and Nonne Bosschen. But before this date the Divisional Artillery was

in action.

* * * * *

We cannot do better than quote from Brig.-Gen. Elkington’s most

interesting diary:

“On the 2nd and 3rd of August the 56th Divisional Artillery

relieved the 8th Divisional Artillery in the line, taking over

their gun positions near Hooge. The artillery then experienced

what I think was their worst time during the war. All the 154

battery positions were shelled day and night, more in the nature

of harassing fire with occasional counter-battery shoots. The

ground was so wet that digging was impossible, and the men lived

in holes in the ground covered with corrugated iron. The early

dawn was the only time it was safe to get supplies and ammunition

if casualties were to be avoided, and with all precautions most

batteries lost 100 per cent. of their gun line strength in killed

and wounded. The artillery supported operations on the 10th,

12th, 16th, and 25th August, and answered S.O.S. calls on most

days; also a very heavy day on the 24th of August, when the enemy

counter-attacked in force. On the 16th and 17th the whole of the

guns of D/280 were put out of action; enemy shell fire and

exploding ammunition practically blew them to pieces, and except

for the actual tubes of the three howitzers, nothing was found

worth salving. On the 31st August the artillery came out of the

line, and entrained south on the 1st September to rejoin the 56th

Division, and all ranks hoped they had seen the last of the Ypres

salient.”

We can only add to this that the selection of gun positions was a

matter of finding a place where the guns would not disappear in the

mud and which was not already occupied by another battery.

The battle of the 16th is the one which concerns us. On that day the

Fifth Army attacked from the north-west corner of Inverness Copse to

the junction with the First French Army south of St. Janshoek [the

Battle of Langemarck, 1917]. The French always attacked on the left.

The II Corps, on the right, attacked with the 56th and 8th Divisions.

The objective was the same as that of the 31st July, a line drawn to

include some 500 yards in depth of Polygon Wood, and so on to the 155

north. But there is not much point in going over orders. Brig.-Gen.

Freeth reports (with some bitterness it seems to us): “Orders were

received and issued so hurriedly that it was impossible for brigade

and battalion staffs to keep pace with them. There was not time for

the scheme of operations to be thoroughly explained to regimental

officers, much less to the men.” Indeed, the mass of documents is

appalling, and, taken together with the facts, point to confusion of a

most distressing nature.

It must be understood that Gen. Dudgeon was in no better case than

Brig.-Gen. Freeth. On the 11th August the division had been ordered to

take over the line from the 18th Division and portions of the 25th

Division. On that same day the General attended a conference at Corps

Headquarters and learnt that the 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division

would remain in the line and come under his orders for the battle. He

was called upon to attack on a front of 1,500 yards on a depth of

1,700 yards, with a defensive flank of 1,700 yards extending from the

south-eastern corner of Stirling Castle to Black Watch Corner. On the

12th the 169th Brigade was ordered to undertake a small operation with

the object of improving the line about Glencorse Wood, an undertaking

which the 18th Division had failed to carry out. But the 169th Brigade

met with strong opposition and also failed. On the 14th the enemy

attacked the 167th Brigade, on the left of the line, and drove in some

posts; they were re-established. Later on that day, at a conference,

the Brigadier-General commanding the 53rd Brigade represented that his

brigade was not in a state to carry out the attack ordered owing to

heavy casualties. The General then placed the 4th London Regt. under 156

the orders of the 53rd Brigade and the trouble commenced--the

Commanding Officer was wounded on his way to interview the Brigadier.

The second in command had then to go and reconnoitre on the following

day, which left his battalion less than twenty-four hours in which to

make the necessary reconnaissance and preparation to get into

position.

On the 15th instant, as the result of a conference with the Corps

Commander and the G.O.C. 8th Division, the starting line was altered.

Owing to the date fixed for the attack, an inter-battalion relief was

necessary on the night 14/15th. In fact the ground was so bad that

there were reliefs, or remains of reliefs, going on every night. It

was not possible to undertake any patrolling to gain a knowledge of

the ground, and in daylight the shelling was so constant and accurate

that study of the country was most difficult.

The General writes:

“The darkness of the night, the boggy state of the ground,

heavy shelling of all approaches, and the fact that the

division was strange to the ground and had little

opportunity for reconnaissance and preparation presented

great difficulties in carrying out the assembly ... but the

difficulties were surmounted and the troops assembled in

time, though there is no doubt that the state of the ground

caused much fatigue.”

So by 4 a.m. the 53rd Brigade, with the 7th Bedford, 6th Berkshire,

and 4th London Regts. in line, was on the right. In the centre was the

169th Brigade with the 5th and 2nd London Regts. in line. On the left

the 167th Brigade with the 8th Middlesex and 1st London Regts. in 157

line.

At 4.45 a.m. on the 16th August the barrage opened and the assaulting

troops clambered out of their mud holes. Red and green lights were

fired from the enemy rear lines, but his barrage did not answer to

these signals for some minutes. But the new enemy system of defence in

depth and by means of concrete forts was to be met for the first time

by the 56th Division. The barrage was good and, if anything, crept

forward too slowly, but the concrete fort was immune from damage by

shells from the lighter batteries, and the German machine-gunner was

able to fire through our barrage.

The 7th Bedford Regt. was stopped at once by one of these forts on the

north-west of Inverness Copse. The failure to capture this point

reacted on the 4th London Regt., which suffered very heavy loss and

was brought to a standstill to the north of the western side of the

wood; they managed to work their way forward and form a defensive

flank along the southern edge of Glencorse Wood.

* * * * *

The 169th Brigade progressed well at first. The London Rifle Brigade

and the 2nd London Regt. disposed of isolated parties with machine

guns dotted about in shell holes on their front, but soon bumped into

a marsh. The 2nd London Regt. edged to the right, pushing the London

Rifle Brigade still farther away. And the same obstruction being met

by the 167th Brigade, the 8th Middlesex edged to the left, to avoid

the marsh, pushing the 1st London Regt. as they did so. There was then

a big gap between the two Brigades very soon after the start.

The enemy resistance was found by the 169th Brigade beyond the marsh 158

in the centre of Glencorse Wood. Here, along a sunken road, was a line

of concrete forts, or pill-boxes. Hard fighting and heavy casualties

followed. The artillery was no longer helpful, but Glencorse Wood was

finally cleared. The leading waves of the two battalions then went on

and reached Polygon Wood, but what happened to them is not known. The

second waves were checked at Polygon Wood by heavy fire from the front

and the flanks, and before they could steady themselves were thrown

back by a counter-attack which was only stopped by the Queen

Victoria’s Rifles, who were coming up in support. Later in the day a

second and heavier counter-attack from the east and south drove the

whole of the brigade back to the original front line.

[Illustration: 5. THE BATTLE OF LANGEMARCK 1917.]

The 167th Brigade, on the left, made better progress than any of the

others--for a time. The gap between the 169th and 167th Brigades was

never filled, so that when the 8th Middlesex came across a second lake

of mud, four feet deep, about the north end of Nonne Bosschen, their

right flank was exposed. And on the left the 1st London Regt. had been

heavily shelled before the start, so that when they did advance the

rear waves pressed on the leading wave until all became mixed, and no

one carried out the special task of clearing the ground as it was won;

the position was that, although the main weight of the attack was

carried forward to the left of the 8th Middlesex, many enemy snipers

were behind both battalions of the 167th Brigade. There is also, on

this flank, the mystery of a company that disappeared. Although it

seems pretty clear that the waves bunched up together, they must also 159

have split; the third wave, composed of the larger part of a company,

was reported by its company commander, in writing sent by runner, to

be in a position north of Polygon Wood; and no doubt he got there, but

neither he nor his men were heard of again. A thin wave of the 8th

Division reached this same line, but were immediately driven back by a

massed and carefully timed counter-attack.

But the attack of the 167th Brigade was completely held up. At 7 a.m.

the 8th Middlesex saw the troops of the 169th Brigade falling back

through Glencorse Wood; they then took up a position to their rear,

their southern flank being refused so as to gain touch with the 169th

Brigade. The situation remained unaltered through the afternoon.

About 3 p.m. the enemy was reported to be massing opposite the 25th

Brigade on the left of the 56th Division, and shortly after to be

attacking all along the 167th Brigade front. In view of the barrier of

mud it is probable that he was only trying to reoccupy the ground from

which he had retired. But our artillery had direct observation and

heavy fire was opened on him, and his troops dispersed.

About 5 p.m. the 167th Brigade again retired to a more favourable

position, which gave them a net gain of 400 yards beyond their

original line. They were then in touch with the 25th Brigade, 8th

Division.

All attacking battalions were withdrawn and the line was held by the

Queen Victoria’s Rifles, the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, and the 7th

Middlesex Regt. The division was relieved the following night by the

14th Division, and moved to Steenvoorde E., Ouderdom, Wippenhoek, the

brigades being quartered in that numerical order.

The total casualties from the 13th to the 17th August were 111 160

officers and 2,794 other ranks. The loss in senior officers was

particularly heavy: Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, Major V. A. Flower, Major

J. E. L. Higgins, and Major M. R. Harris, all of the 13th London Regt.

(Kensingtons); Lieut.-Col. R. R. Husey of the 5th London Regt.;

Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett of the 2nd London Regt.; Lieut.-Col. P. L.

Ingpen of the 8th Middlesex; and Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. Bendall of the

7th Middlesex Regt. were all wounded.

Maybe the confusion was inevitable, but it makes a sorry story in

which the great gallantry of the London Territorials stands forth like

something clean and honest in the midst of slime and mud. Gen. Dudgeon

gives us some of the causes of the failure to reach the desired

objective.

“Insufficient time for preparation and explanation of the

scheme of attack to those taking part, and insufficient time

to study the terrain.

The portion of the 25th Division relieved by the 167th

Brigade had only been in the line twenty-four hours

previously, and could not assist much.

Lack of previous preparation. No dumps of any kind were

taken over in the area, and there was insufficient time to

form all those that were necessary.

Indifferent communications. Tracks east of Château Wood were

non-existent, and the tapes were soon obliterated by the

mud.

Difficulty of maintaining signal communication.

Fatigue of troops previous to the attack, owing to the bad

weather.

The condition of the ground over which the attack took

place. The bog at the source of the Hanebeck made a gap

between the 169th and 167th Brigades, which laid their left 161

and right flanks respectively open to counter-attack. It

also caused great fatigue to the troops.

The nature of the hostile defences and new system of defence

in depth. The enemy’s counter-attacks were so timed as to

strike the leading waves about the same time as they reached

their objectives, when they were more or less disorganised,

and had been unable to consolidate the ground gained.

The concentration of hostile guns opposite the front. The

heavy shelling prevented the moving up of reinforcements,

machine guns, and replenishment of ammunition.”

It seems very certain that the British Staff was somewhat rattled by

the German tactics in defence. Questions--long lists of them--were

sent out, and reports asked for. The pill-box, it was agreed,

disorganised our assaulting waves, although it did not stop them. But

there is a limit to the possible advance of troops in a rush, and this

had been calculated by the enemy, who placed his main forces so as to

counter-attack the exhausted leading waves of attackers before they

had time to consolidate, or even mop up the ground behind them. How

was this to be overcome?

All officers of the 56th Division seemed to agree on this question.

The answer was, “Do not try to penetrate too deeply.” Five hundred

yards was a distance which troops could cover without exhaustion, and

they would then be at such a distance from any troops assembled for

counter-attack as would give them time to consolidate, bring up

machine guns, and be ready for the counter-attack. Something of the

sort was eventually done, so the experience of the 56th Division was

of some service.

The attack was not renewed on this sector of the front until the 20th 162

September, when the Second Army (Sir Herbert Plumer’s command was

extended to his left) captured Glencorse and the half of Polygon Wood.

The fighting in Flanders was carried on until November. The French

launched a big attack at Verdun on the 20th August, which met with

notable success. Ludendorff confesses to a feeling of despair.

Concrete had failed him, and as to his troops, “At some points they no

longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local

commanders, had hoped for.” By limiting the depth of penetration and

breaking up the German counter-attacks with artillery fire the British

troops were slowly eating their way through the defences in Flanders,

in spite of having to wade through mud. Many were the consultations at

German Headquarters. “Our defensive tactics had to be developed

further, somehow or other.” The wastage of troops had “exceeded all

expectations.” Seven divisions were sent to Italy. A countering blow

was the best defence.

Sir Douglas Haig hoped that the phenomenal wet summer would be

followed by a normal autumn, and continued his attacks through

October. But the wet still continued, and important engagements, with

large numbers of troops and tremendous expenditure of ammunition, only

resulted in a “nibble” at the enemy territory.

The German-Austrian attack on Italy started on the 24th October, and

resulted in the Italian Armies being driven back almost to the

outskirts of Venice. This misfortune had the immediate effect of

reducing the British Army on the Western Front by several divisions, 163

which were sent under the command of Sir Herbert Plumer, and later of

Lord Cavan, to help our Italian Allies; it also determined Sir Douglas

Haig to continue his operations in Flanders. The fierce battle for

Passchendaele, in which the proud divisions from Canada added to their

immortal fame, was fought, and operations in Flanders reached their

final stages about the middle of November.

For the effort expended, the gain in territory was small, the number

of prisoners was 24,065, the number of guns captured (74) was

insignificant. But the balancing of results is a very delicate affair.

During the three and a half months of the offensive the enemy had

employed 78 divisions (18 of them had been engaged a second or third

time after having rested and refitted). Deductions from such facts,

however, are a weak basis for argument. Sir Douglas Haig wrote: “It is

certain that the enemy’s losses considerably exceeded ours,” but,

apart from considerations of expediency, it is not clear how he

arrived at this startling conclusion.

To compare the number of prisoners we captured with the number of

bayonets which the Germans could transfer from the Russian front is

absurd. What then have we left to show as a result for this costly

enterprise? Only damage to that highly important but very elusive

thing which we call “enemy _moral_.” The enemy charges us,

perhaps with some truth, with being clumsy soldiers with no

imagination, but he speaks with respect of the determination of the

British infantry, in a manner which suggests a growing conviction that

they could never be defeated.

* * * * *

An interesting figure was compiled by the II Corps giving the amount 164

of ammunition fired by the artillery of that corps from the 23rd June

to 31st August--2,766,824 rounds with a total weight of 85,396 tons,

delivered by 230 trains of 37 trucks and one of 29 trucks.

The battles of Ypres, 1917, are as follows: Battle of Pilckem Ridge,

31st July-2nd August; Battle of Langemarck, 16th-18th August; Battle

of the Menin Road Ridge, 20th-25th September; Battle of Polygon Wood,

26th September-3rd October; Battle of Broodseinde, 4th October; Battle

of Poelcappelle, 9th October; First Battle of Passchendaele, 12th

October; Second Battle of Passchendaele, 26th October-10th November.

[Illustration: BATTERY POSITION, ZOUAVE WOOD, HOOGE, AUGUST 1917

From a photograph taken by Lt. Wallis Muirhead, R.F.A.]

CHAPTER VI 165

CAMBRAI

The Divisional Headquarters opened at Reninghelst on the morning of

the 18th August; brigades were quartered at Steenvoorde and

Wippenhoek. These forward areas did not give uninterrupted rest;

frequent and close attention was paid to them by aeroplanes, and

during the following night two lorries were set on fire by bombs

dropped by the night birds.

On the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the division moved back, resting at

Busseboom, and eventually arrived at the peaceful area of Eperleques.

The 5th Cheshire Regt., however, remained in the battle area until the

29th. A further move started on the 30th, by train, to the ruined

villages to the east and south of Bapaume, with Divisional

Headquarters at Fremicourt.

Sports, horse-shows, and the Divisional Band now played a more

prominent part in the life of the soldier, and we find the divisional

canteen being enlarged--a greengrocery, eggs, and butter department

being added, also a wholesale beer department. And, of course, there

was training!

At the commencement of the war the British infantry were the greatest

riflemen in the world. Then came a period when everyone was mad on

throwing bombs, and the rifle was neglected. At the end of the war one 166

sighed in vain for a half, even a quarter of the efficiency of the

pre-war rifleman.

Training in 1917 was based on four weapons, and the platoon. The

platoon, we were told, was the smallest unit comprising all the

weapons with which the infantry was armed. Exclusive of Headquarters,

twenty-eight other ranks was the minimum strength, and when the

platoon was below that strength the necessary numbers would be

obtained by the _temporary amalgamation of companies, platoons, or

sections_. We draw attention to these words because the order was

afterwards reversed.

The platoon was comprised of a rifle section, a Lewis-gun section, a

bomber section, and a rifle-grenade section. The principles governing

training were based on these various weapons. The rifle and bayonet

were for assault, for repelling attack, or for obtaining superiority

of fire, and the training of this section was considered of much

importance. Each man should be a marksman, first class with bayonet

and bomb, and a scout, in addition to being either a Lewis-gunner or

rifle grenadier. Bayonet fighting was recommended to all sections, as

it produced “lust for blood.”

The bomb was called the second weapon of all N.C.O.s and men, and was

to be used for dislodging the enemy from behind cover or killing him

below ground. The section should study bombing attacks and the duties

of “moppers-up.” These last individuals should work in pairs. They

were to drop into their objectives and work laterally outwards. They

killed the enemy met with in the trenches, and they also guarded the

entrances to dug-outs and side trenches. They were not to penetrate

down dug-outs until the platoon they were working for arrived. 167

The rifle grenade was described as the howitzer of the infantry, and

was used to dislodge the enemy from behind cover and to drive him

below ground. The section was trained to a rifle-grenade barrage.

The Lewis gun was the weapon of opportunity. Its mobility and the

small target it presented made it peculiarly suitable for working

round an enemy’s flank.

In each section sufficient ammunition was carried for immediate

requirements. Every man (except bombers, signallers, scouts, runners,

and Lewis gunners who carried 50 rounds) carried at least 120 rounds

of rifle ammunition and 2 bombs. The Lewis-gun section carried 30

“drums.” The bombers (with the exception of “throwers,” who carried 5)

carried at least 10 bombs each.

The men of the rifle-grenade section each carried at least six

grenades. With this organisation training was carried out in

trench-to-trench warfare and the enveloping of strong points.

In 1917 the strength of a platoon was not definitely laid down by the

Higher Command. It was suggested that a suitable number for each

section was nine--1 non-commissioned officer and 8 men. But there was

an order to leave 10 officers and 50 other ranks out of line for

“reconstruction.” They would not be available as reinforcements, but

were, generally, specialists and good instructors, on whom the

battalion could be rebuilt if casualties were heavy. Most units

carried out the suggestion of 9 to a section, and any extra men,

exclusive of the 50 for reconstruction, were used as reinforcements

during the battle.

On arrival in the Third Army area (now under the command of General 168

Byng, General Allenby having been given command in Egypt), the

strength of the 56th Division was very low.

The four battalions of the 167th Brigade totalled altogether 63

officers and 1,754 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers

and 150 other ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 50

other ranks.

The four battalions of the 168th Brigade totalled 94 officers and

2,802 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 160 other

ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 90 other ranks.

The four battalions of the 169th Brigade totalled 61 officers and

1,921 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 10 officers and 145 other

ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 2 officers and 75 other ranks.

It was therefore probable that when the period of rest was over the

division would go into a quiet bit of the line.

All doubts as to the ultimate destination of the division were laid at

rest on the 4th September, when the 168th Brigade relieved the 9th

Brigade, 3rd Division, in the Lagnicourt section. The 169th Brigade

relieved the 8th Brigade in the Louverval section on the 5th; and the

167th Brigade relieved the 76th Brigade in the Morchies section on the

6th. The situation was quiet, and the weather fine and hot.

Patrolling, of an active nature, commenced at once, and on the 10th

September the 167th Brigade secured a man of the 31st Reserve Infantry

Regt.; and on the same night the 168th Brigade secured two of the 86th

Reserve Infantry Regt. Various enemy posts were visited from time to

time, and occasionally entered, but the gem of these small enterprises 169

was that of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles. On the 29th September

2/Lieut. W. H. Ormiston, with thirty men, lay in wait in the middle of

No Man’s Land and successfully ambushed a patrol of fifteen Germans.

Eleven were killed and two brought in; unfortunately, the remaining

two proved swift of foot and got away. It was not done without a

fight. Six of the Queen’s Westminsters were wounded. Both Corps and

Army Commanders sent their congratulations to this well-known and

gallant regiment, with the added message that the identification was

of great importance. The prisoners were of the 414th Infantry Regt.

During this month six hundred gas projectors were dug into the 56th

Divisional Front.

During the month of October raids were attempted by the London

Scottish and the Kensingtons, but the enemy were found alert and the

parties failed to enter the German line. The Kensingtons, however,

were successful in rescuing a British pilot whose machine was brought

down in No Man’s Land, but they had to fight for him.

The only incident of importance in the month of October was a visit of

ten days of Major-Gen. Bloxom, U.S.A., with his chief of staff, with

the object of gaining experience.

The strength of the division remained about the same.

On the 2nd November a document headed “IV Corps, No. H.R.S. 17/48” was

received, into which we must enter at some length.

The Third Army stretched from the little stream of l’Omignon, which

runs into the St. Quentin Canal a few miles above that town, to

Gavrelle, north of the Scarpe. It was composed of the VII, III, IV, 170

VI, and XVII Corps from right to left (and later, the V Corps). The

III Corps had its right on 22 Ravine, between Villers-Guislain and

Gonnelieu, and its left to the east of Trescault. Then came the IV

Corps, with its left north of Lagnicourt, on a little stream called

the Hirondelle. These two corps were facing the Hindenburg Line, and

had in their immediate rear the battlefields of the Somme, and the

country which the Germans had laid to waste in their retreat in the

early spring.

At the time when our pursuing troops were brought to a standstill in

front of this celebrated line, preparations were at once commenced for

attack. Several actions had been fought on this sector before it

settled down to a “quiet sector”; assembly trenches existed, and

adequate shelter for brigade and battalion headquarters had been

constructed. It was now chosen as a sector to be attacked.

At this time our Italian Allies were in serious difficulties, and

seven German divisions were engaged in this theatre. And, although the

movement of whole divisions had started from Russia without exchange

from the Western Front, a mass of enemy troops were still pinned down

in Flanders. It seemed as though a sudden surprise attack might

benefit the Italian Armies and also improve the position on the

Western Front. But there was the obvious difficulty of a lack of

troops at Sir Douglas Haig’s disposal; the Flanders adventure had been

a most costly one for us, for practically the whole of the British

Army had passed through the salient inferno Ypres. Finally it was

decided that sufficient troops could be mustered to justify the

attack, and as the French not only promised to engage the enemy’s 171

attention elsewhere, but actually set aside a large force of cavalry

and infantry to help in the attack (they started to move on the 20th

November), the order was given.

The scheme, as set forth in this document, was for the infantry to

break through the German defensive system with the aid of Tanks on a

front from Gonnelieu to Hermies, seize the crossings of the Canal de

l’Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, cut the last of the enemy’s

defences on the Beaurevoir-Masnières line, and pass the cavalry

through the break thus made.

The cavalry were then to capture Cambrai and Bourlon Wood, cut all

railway communications into Cambrai, and to occupy the crossings of

the Sensée between Paillencourt and Palleul to the north of Cambrai.

They would come up from Gouzeaucourt and Metz-en-Couture.

If this part of the plan was accomplished, the whole of the Third Army

would participate in further operations to complete the surrounding of

all the enemy forces in the Quéant salient. Presumably our Allies

would have been called upon as well.

The III Corps, composed of the 20th, 6th, 12th, 29th Divisions, and

2nd and 3rd Brigades, Tank Corps (less three companies) would secure

the canal crossings at Marcoing and Masnières, and form a flank from

Gonnelieu through Bois Lateau, Creve-cœur, to a spot called la Belle

Etoile a few miles south-east of Cambrai.

The IV Corps, composed of the 51st, 62nd, 36th, 56th Divisions, and

1st Brigade, Tank Corps, would attack with two divisions, on the left

of the III Corps, and the right of the Canal du Nord, towards 172

Flesquières and Graincourt.

The success of the whole plan depended on the capture of Masnières and

Marcoing, at which point the cavalry would be passed through the

break, and, as speed was the essence of the operation, in order to

obtain liberty of movement before the enemy could organise either

counter-attack or a fresh line of defence by bringing up fresh troops,

the leading cavalry divisions would have to pass through on the

afternoon or evening of zero day.

Meanwhile, the IV Corps would be pushing forward on the left, with the

first object of establishing a line from Noyelles, along the Canal de

l’Escaut, through Fontaines, and relieve the cavalry on Bourlon, or

fight for that position, and join with the original front line in the

Louverval sector.

Surprise was essential, so there would be no preliminary bombardment,

and these instructions insisted that the greatest care should be taken

not to divulge the presence of increased artillery to the enemy.

Registration and calibration was to be carried out by order of the

General Officer Commanding the Third Army Artillery.

One of the first tasks was to erect camouflage over all positions

which would be occupied by the artillery. Then weatherproof cover for

ammunition would be constructed. But little more than this could be

done in the time at the disposal of the Army. In any case, the

accumulation of ammunition would have to be spread over as long a

period as possible, so as to minimise the increase of activity on the

railways.

The action of the artillery would consist mainly in the formation of

smoke screens and barrages, on the front and flanks of the attack (to 173

cover the advance of the Tanks), and the neutralisation of hostile

batteries, the bombardment of positions of assembly, rest billets,

telephone routes, and known centres of communication and command. But

the very nature of the operation precluded the careful registration of

all batteries.

All the elaborate preparations of a trench-to-trench attack would be

reduced to a minimum, and in many items must be done away with. Cover

from weather would have to be provided for the full number of troops

when concentrated, but no extensive scheme of hutting or new camps

could be undertaken. In thick woods tents, suitably camouflaged, could

be erected, and in thin woods wire netting must be stretched

horizontally amongst the trees, about ten feet from the ground, and

have twigs scattered on the top of it, thus making a sort of roof

under which bivouacs could be pitched.

As to concentration, the idea was to complete the move of the

artillery before the infantry was brought into the area, to have the

extra infantry in the area as short a time as possible, and to bring

up the Tanks at the very last moment.

Finally, No. 15 Squadron R.F.C. was ordered to note particularly

whether any of the work being carried out was noticeable from the air.

The rôle of the 56th Division in all this was to make a demonstration

on Z day and attract the attention of the enemy, and later on take

part in the operation of rolling up the Hindenburg Line. When Bourlon

Wood had been captured, the IV Corps would secure a line

Rumancourt-Buissy-Inchy, which would cut off the German divisions in

the Quéant salient and threaten with immediate capture their gun

positions. In this move two brigades of the 36th Division would 174

take part on the east bank of the canal and one brigade on the west of

the canal, starting from the Spoil Heap near Hermies and moving in the

direction of Mœuvres and Inchy.

The 169th Brigade, which would be on the right of the 56th Divisional

front, would be responsible for joining hands with the 109th Brigade,

36th Division, and with them attack in the direction of Tadpole Copse.

In this attack Tanks were to be employed, but the number was never

given.

Nothing amuses troops more than to deceive the enemy--and we say

“amuse” advisedly, for though it is in the midst of a battle, with

death and destruction going on all round them, men will be as keen as

children in carrying out the scheme of make-believe, and if it

succeeds will roar with laughter. Such a scheme was on foot for the

56th Division.

For the purpose of making the demonstration on the divisional front as

realistic as possible, a number of dummy Tanks were to be made by the

C.R.E., while brigades would amuse themselves by making dummy figures

of men to act as supporting infantry. The Tanks were to be put out in

No Man’s Land during the night, and would be half hidden by the smoke

barrage in the morning when the attack started; the figures would be

pushed above the trenches as though infantry were just emerging. A

motor-bicycle in the front-line trench was to imitate the noise of a

Tank.

As might well be expected, excitement ran high in the division. The

construction of dummy figures and dummy Tanks was taken in hand at

once, and by the 19th November a dozen full-sized Tanks were ready,

together with some two hundred and fifty figures to each brigade 175

front.

On the 6th November wire-cutting was commenced by trench mortars in

the neighbourhood of Quéant--250 rounds a day being fired--the Germans

would probably think a raid was contemplated, which would account for

any suspicious movements!

The time was short and, as preliminary preparation was to be cut down

to a minimum, fatigues were not very arduous. There was a certain

amount of work done on the roads near the front line, but the greatest

care had to be exercised not to make improvements of an apparent

nature. In the back areas, however, the strain was becoming

intolerable. There were troops in every hole and corner. Tents were

crammed full; huts, ruins, any place where men could find a little

shelter was used. And the weather was cold, and regulations about

lights and fires were very stringent.

In the front line every precaution against accidents was taken. The

attacking divisions occupied their positions in line, but the old

troops remained in the outpost line in case the enemy should secure

identification; also patrols were ordered to avoid any possibility of

capture.

On the 14th November the Corps ordered the 56th Division to hold the

line with two brigades instead of three, so as to have a concentrated

force ready to act in case of necessity. So on the night of the 18th

the 167th Brigade extended its left and took over the frontage of the

168th Brigade, which concentrated in Fremicourt and Beugny, to the

east of Bapaume.

On the night of the 19th the dummy Tanks were put in position about

300 yards from the front line. At 2 a.m. on the 20th gas drums were 176

projected into the German lines where the wire-cutting had taken place

(Quéant), and at 6.20 a.m. the whole of the artillery on the Third

Army front opened on the enemy lines with one stupendous crash.

In the 56th Division front line all was activity. The parties with the

dummy figures moved them up and down in as lifelike a manner as they

could, and other parties hurled smoke grenades so that the enemy might

not see too clearly.

The “make-believe” attack was a great success. The Germans opened

frantic and furious fire with machine-guns and artillery, and the

dummy Tanks were shelled until mid-day!

By 9.15 a.m. the 36th Division (109th Brigade) had advanced along the

west bank of the canal from the Spoil Heap to the Bapaume-Cambrai

road, where the 169th Brigade joined up with it on the old German

outpost line.

Meanwhile, great events had been taking place on the right. The III

Corps, on which so much depended, advanced through the Hindenburg Line

in grand style and, thanks to the rapid action of the 29th Division

(General de Lisle), which was to wait until news arrived of the

capture of the Hindenburg Support Line before advancing but attacked

instead on observer reports, seized Marcoing and Masnières. The first

bit of bad luck happened at Masnières, where the enemy had only

partially destroyed the iron bridge over the Escault Canal. It might

have been sufficiently strong for cavalry to cross over, or it might

have been repaired to enable them to do so, but a Tank attempted to

cross first and broke through it altogether. This unfortunate accident

did not stop a squadron of Canadian cavalry, who, with the dash usually 177

associated with that arm, rode over a flimsy bridge across a lock on

the Marcoing side of the town and attacked the enemy on Rumilly Ridge.

It was probably troopers from this very gallant squadron who reached

the outskirts of Cambrai.

Lieut.-Col. Johnston took the 2nd Hampshires across in a similar way

and secured the crossing. But in Marcoing other troops of the 29th

Division secured the bridge intact.

The III Corps had therefore done its job, but the IV Corps was not so

fortunate. Havrincourt Wood had been of great service to the IV Corps

in the assembly. The 51st and 62nd Divisions, with a fringe of the

36th Division in front of them until the last moment, had completed

their concentration without a hitch. On the nights of the 16th, 17th,

and 18th all the Tanks were moved into Havrincourt Wood, and except

that a battery of 6-inch howitzers got into difficulties farther

north, and that a lorry “ran into a train carrying Tanks,” the whole

concentration was carried out as desired. But, although we do not

believe it made much difference, the enemy were aware of the attack.

Unfortunately, some men were captured in a raid on the 36th Divisional

front, and from the statements of prisoners they evidently divulged

the fact that an attack was contemplated. The time and the extent of

it, however, seems to have been a complete surprise to the Germans.

At zero hour the Tanks advanced, followed by the 51st and 62nd

Divisions. There was in this sector some of the most formidable wire

on the whole of the western front, but the Tanks crushed wide lanes

through it and the troops advanced steadily. There was some obstinate 178

fighting in Havrincourt village and park, where parties of the enemy

held out until the afternoon, but otherwise the Hindenburg front line

was captured by 8 o’clock. A pause of two hours was allowed here to

enable troops and Tanks to reorganise for the attack on the Hindenburg

Support.

Once more the attack moved forward. The 62nd Division on the left met

with little opposition, and that portion of the support line allotted

to them was in their hands between 10 and 11 o’clock. But the 51st

Division on the right met with resistance at the village of

Flesquières. The infantry were prevented from advancing by machine

guns and uncut wire, and the Tanks, which came up on the ridge, were

at once put out of action by field guns, which had been pulled out of

their pits on to the slopes to the north of the village. Six Tanks

were to be seen here in a line, smashed to bits by a very gallant

German Battery Commander, who, it was said, served and fired the guns

himself, when his men had bolted.

The 51st Division could make no progress, but on their left the 62nd

moved forward to Graincourt, and the 36th, still farther on the left,

had moved along the canal to the Cambrai road. And on the right troops

of the III Corps were well on towards Cantaign. The 51st Division made

a second attempt with Tanks and again failed.

What follows is one of the mysteries of the Cambrai battle. A patrol

of King Edward’s Horse, operating with the 62nd Division, rode into

Flesquières soon after mid-day from the direction of Graincourt. They

reported only a few of the enemy there and do not appear to have

suffered any casualties themselves. But the 1st Cavalry Division,

which had been concentrated in the neighbourhood of Equancourt, had 179

been ordered at 8.25 a.m. to move forward with their head on Metz,

ready to advance. This they did. About 11 o’clock they were ordered to

push forward through the Hindenburg Support Line, but found that

Flesquières was still in the hands of the enemy, and they were unable

to pass. About 2.30 p.m. they were ordered to pass at least two

regiments by Ribecourt and Premy Chapel and work round Flesquières

from the north-east and assist the 51st Division in their attack from

the south. But they found they were unable to carry out this

co-operation on account of the delay which had occurred, due to their

first effort, and also that Nine Wood was not clear of the enemy. At 4

p.m. the Third Army ordered the cavalry to push forward in full

strength through Marcoing and carry out the original plan of a

break-through at that point; but darkness had come on and the order

was modified, one brigade being ordered to occupy Cantaign and cut off

the enemy retreating from Flesquières. Cantaign, however, was found to

be too strongly held for the cavalry to capture it, and therefore the

leading brigade remained at Noyelles for the night. It would seem that

the opportunity was missed.

As dusk fell, the 62nd and 36th Divisions were well forward towards

the Bourlon Ridge, the former just short of Anneaux, and then forming

a long flank back east of Graincourt and to the west of Flesquières,

where they connected with the 51st Division. Farther to the right of

the IV Corps the III Corps had also pushed well forward and made a

similar flank facing west, the ground between the two points of

greatest advance about Orival Wood being occupied by the enemy’s

artillery. (Line C.)

Immediately after the capture of the Hindenburg system the 180

redistribution of the artillery and machine guns began. The machine

guns, which had been massed under corps control, reverted to their

divisions. Four brigades of Field Artillery, one 60-pounder battery,

and one, horsed, 6-inch Howitzer battery were placed under the orders

of each of the 36th, 62nd, and 51st Divisions. But a fortunate

circumstance arose: it was found difficult to get the heavy artillery

across No Man’s Land into the Flesquières salient, and the congestion

there was such that the supply of ammunition would have been

uncertain; so it was decided to move the bulk of the artillery to the

left, close to the old front line round about Demicourt, Hermies, and

Morchies. In this position they assisted very materially in breaking

up the great German attack on the 30th November.

During this first day the Queen Victoria’s Rifles were on the right of

the 169th Brigade, and worked along the German outpost line in touch

with the 109th Brigade, who were clearing the Hindenburg Line, as far

as the Cambrai road. The 2nd London Regt. was on the left of the Queen

Victoria’s Rifles.

It had been calculated that no large hostile reinforcements would be

likely to reach the scene of action for forty-eight hours after the

commencement of the attack, and Sir Douglas Haig had informed General

Byng that the advance would be stopped after that time, unless the

results then gained, and the general situation, justified its

continuance. Although, as we have said, the movements of the Canadian

Cavalry and King Edward’s Horse would seem to suggest that the

opportunity of passing other cavalry through had been missed, there

remained one day when, given success, they could still be employed. 181

The 51st and 62nd Divisions were therefore ordered to capture the

Bourlon position, when the 1st Cavalry Division would follow up the

attack and seize the passages of the Canal du Nord between Palleul and

Sains-les-Marquion; and the 36th Division was to continue the advance

on the west of the canal, and hold the two brigades on the eastern

bank ready to push through and seize the canal, between

Sains-les-Marquion and Mœuvres, as soon as Bourlon was taken. The 56th

Division would be drawn farther into the operations on the left in the

direction of Tadpole Copse.

When the day broke, Flesquières was found, by the 51st Division, to be

unoccupied by the enemy; they therefore pushed on to the

Marcoing-Graincourt road, capturing a number of guns in the valley

which the enemy had not been able to remove in the night. The 1st

Cavalry Division then advanced and took Cantaing, after some stiff

fighting in which some of the 51st Division took part. On the left the

62nd Division captured Anneaux and Anneaux Chapel, after heavy

fighting, and made more progress north of the Cambrai road, where they

established themselves on the ridge west of Bourlon Wood, and also

gained a further stretch of the Hindenburg Support Line. On the left

of the 62nd the 36th Division advanced along the west bank of the

canal, meeting increased opposition, and for a time held the south of

the village of Mœuvres. On their left again the Queen Victoria’s

Rifles worked along the outpost line and captured a machine gun with

its crew of seven. Resistance, however, was stiffening. The dividing

line between the 109th and the 169th Brigades was the grid line to the

west of Mœuvres, and any farther advance to the north would bring the 182

56th Division in contact with the Hindenburg Line itself.

Meanwhile, in the centre of the battlefield, progress was not what had

been hoped it would be. The 51st Division were to work round Bourlon

Wood from the east, and join hands with the 62nd Division; but they

met with such opposition as delayed their advance, and they did not

capture Fontaine until late in the afternoon. The capture of Bourlon

was not achieved. At nightfall the 51st Division was holding a line

north of Cantaing forward to Fontaine, making a dangerous salient, and

then in a westerly direction to the north of Anneaux, where, joining

with the 62nd, the line was carried north of the Cambrai road, forming

another salient north of the Sugar Factory. The 36th Division then

carried on the line, which bent back towards the road near the canal

bridge and then forward again to Mœuvres. Due west of Mœuvres the 56th

Division held the line to the old British trenches. The Tanks, in

diminished numbers, had assisted during the day, but no advance had

been made without a struggle. (Line D.)

In the III Corps area there had been some heavy fighting during the

day, which resulted in some improvement of our positions. Heavy

counter-attacks were launched by the enemy, and much useful and

gallant work was done by dismounted cavalry beating off these attacks.

But the forty-eight hours had expired, and the high ground at Bourlon

Village and Wood, as well as certain tactical features to the east and

west of the wood, still remained in the enemy’s hands. It seemed

fairly clear that the surprise break-through and complete

disorganisation of the enemy’s back areas would not be accomplished.

Sir Douglas Haig had to decide whether to continue the offensive or 183

take up a defensive attitude and rest content with what had been done.

“It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they

were. The positions captured by us north of Flesquières were

completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless the

ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them,

except at excessive cost. If I decided not to go on, a

withdrawal to the Flesquières ridge would be necessary, and

would have to be carried out at once.

On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an

intention to withdraw. Craters had been formed at road

junctions, and troops could be seen ready to move east. The

possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to

obtain observation over the ground to the north, which

sloped gently down to the Sensée River. The enemy’s

defensive lines south of the Scarpe and the Sensée Rivers

would thereby be turned, his communications exposed to the

observed fire of our artillery, and his positions in this

sector jeopardised. In short, so great was the importance of

the ridge to the enemy that its loss would probably cause

the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared

defence systems for a considerable distance to the north of

it....

It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile

reinforcements coming up at this stage could at first be no

more than enough to replace the enemy’s losses; and although

the right of our advance had been definitely stayed, the

enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon as

it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my

disposal. As has already been pointed out, on the Cambrai

side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a

defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed northwards 184

and north-westwards, and this part of my task had been to a

large extent achieved.

An additional and very important argument in favour of

proceeding with my attack was supplied by the situation in

Italy, upon which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai

front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important

effect, no matter what measures of success attended my

efforts. Moreover, two divisions previously under orders for

Italy had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with

this accession of strength the prospect of securing Bourlon

seemed good.

After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I

decided to continue the operations to gain the Bourlon

position.”

But in the morning, about 9.30 a.m., the enemy launched a heavy

counter-attack on the 62nd Division west of Bourlon Wood which,

although it did not succeed in driving them back, prevented any

advance. And about 10.30 they attacked Fontaine from the north-west

and east, and after heavy fighting drove the 51st Division out and

clear of the village.

During the afternoon the Germans again attacked the 62nd Division, but

were again repulsed, as they had been in the morning. On the left of

the 62nd, the 36th were unable to gain ground on the east of the

canal, and on the west bank entered Mœuvres for the second time, but

after an hour or so were driven out. (Line E.)

On this day, the 22nd November, the 56th Division played a more

important part. The 169th Brigade were still on the right of the

division. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles, in touch with the 109th

Brigade, were holding a line of posts across No Man’s Land and in the

old German outpost line. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles were ordered 185

to concentrate, slightly to the north of the Cambrai road, and to

advance, in conjunction with the 109th Brigade, at 11 o’clock along

the front trench of the Hindenburg Line which runs to Tadpole Copse.

They would also work their way up the communication trenches to the

second line of the Hindenburg first system, and clear both lines as

far as Tadpole Copse. The London Rifle Brigade were ordered to

assemble in the captured Hindenburg Line south of the Cambrai road,

and follow the attack of the 109th Brigade to where the Hindenburg

system turned away from the canal at Mœuvres (see Map); they would

then follow the Queen’s Westminsters in two columns, one in the first

line and one in the second, and reinforce if necessary. The 5,000

yards of British line up to the Hirondelle River were held by the

167th Brigade.

The instructions were to carry out a determined advance. The idea, of

which this was the preliminary operation, was for the 36th Division to

move forward through Mœuvres and Inchy, while the 56th Division

captured the Hindenburg Line up to Quéant.

It was entirely a bombing fight, and was supported by an artillery

barrage, which lifted off Swan Lane at 11.30 a.m. and moved forward at

the rate of fifty yards every five minutes. The division, until the

night 21st/22nd, had been covered by the 281st Brigade R.F.A. only--as

was usual in these battles, the artillery was switched about from one

command to another--but during the night the 280th Brigade R.F.A. had

moved to positions near Boursies and took part in this attack.

It was hard and slow fighting, as is generally the case in bombing 186

fights. Colonel Glazier, of the Queen’s Westminsters, writes:

“The barrage got some way ahead of our men, but owing to the

uncertainty of the position of the troops it was impossible

to bring it back. At 12.30 p.m. a runner came with a request

for more bombs, and the news that our men had passed the

Boursies-Mœuvres road and were using German bombs.... Bombs

were sent forward; large quantities were taken forward by

the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.”

News of progress was very slow in coming in, and the first definite

information indicating success was obtained from observers, who

reported at 2.40 p.m. that the enemy were shelling Tadpole Copse. Not

until 5.30 was it known for certain that the copse was occupied by

three companies of the Queen’s Westminsters. They captured 3 officers,

70 men, and 3 machine guns.

The London Scottish had arrived at the old British front line about

Louverval at mid-day with the object of relieving the Queen’s

Westminsters and carrying on the attack. They were informed that the

attack would not be continued that day, and so formed a flank from the

south of Tadpole Copse to the old British line, although for the

moment they were unable to dislodge the enemy from a deep crater at

the road junctions some two hundred yards south-west of the copse. At

dawn they relieved the forward companies of the Queen’s Westminsters

and made ready for the morning attack.

[Illustration: 6. LOCAL MAP. FRONT OF THE DIVISION AT CAMBRAI 1917.]

Most useful work was also done during the night by the 416th Field

Coy. R.E., who constructed a bridge over the canal at the Cambrai

road, although the enemy kept up a persistent shelling of the road, 187

and particularly of the point of intersection with the canal. The

512th Coy. R.E. at the same time made good the road from Boursies to

the canal.

So the only progress made by the IV Corps on the 22nd was the capture

of Tadpole Copse by the Queen’s Westminsters, an important gain as it

occupies the high ground to the west of Mœuvres. But it became

apparent that the enemy was rapidly massing strong forces to stay our

farther advance.

The 40th Division passed into the Corps command and was sent to

relieve the 62nd. The Corps orders that evening were for the advance

to continue on the 23rd, with the assistance of Tanks, the chief

objective being Bourlon village. The 51st Division was to attack it

from the east and the 40th from the south-west; but when it became

known that the 51st Division had been driven out of Fontaine, their

task was modified to the recapture of that village. The 36th and 56th

Divisions were to continue the advance up the canal, and roll up the

Hindenburg Support Line.

All through the night there had been much shell fire on the 56th

Divisional front. Two counter-attacks had been successfully repulsed.

Owing to darkness and the congested state of the trenches, the London

Scottish were late in getting into their assembly positions, but as

they were not to move until an hour and a half after zero (6.30 a.m.),

which time was occupied by bombardment of the enemy positions, it did

not matter.

“It was then found,” Colonel Jackson writes, “that the 169th

Brigade had not reached Tadpole Lane, but the communication

trench running from front to support trench on the north-west 188

side of Tadpole Copse, and that a fairly deep valley existed

between this communication trench and the Inchy-Louverval

road. The Germans could thus directly enfilade the front and

support trenches with rifle and machine-gun fire from the

other side of the valley, where they had built strong blocks

and loopholes during the night. The battalion was thus held

up at this point until 2.30 p.m. By this time “D” Company

had, with the assistance of the Stokes Mortars (169th), been

able to cross the valley, face the block on the other side,

and cross the Inchy road, thus surrounding the enemy still

holding the block in the front line opposite “B” Company.

Ten officers, 69 other ranks, 6 machine guns, and 1 trench

mortar--all of the 20th German Division.”

It would appear that the German counter-attacks during the night had

gained some ground. The valley alluded to by Colonel Jackson is not

shown clearly on the British maps and is only indicated by the very

unsatisfactory sign of “banks.” An imaginative person might have

traced the re-entrant starting in square 7 right up to these banks,

but it was not always wise to be too imaginative with the British map;

at any rate the shape of the ground seems to have been a surprise.

By 4.30 p.m. the battalion had reached its objective, Adelaide street,

and was immediately strongly counter-attacked. The supply of bombs

failed--it is extraordinary how many bombs can be thrown on such

occasions--and the support line was lost as far as the Inchy road, but

the front line was held. In this counter-attack the London Scottish

were reinforced by two companies of the 4th London Regt. They were

ordered to consolidate.

The operations on the rest of the Corps front during the day resulted 189

in fierce fighting through Bourlon Wood, and the capture of Bourlon

village by the 40th Division, and a tremendous struggle for Fontaine

into which the 51st Division never really penetrated. Repeated and

heavy counter-attacks forced the 40th Division out of Bourlon village

to the north edge of Bourlon Wood. The 36th Division had captured and

again been forced out of Mœuvres, and had not been able to make much

progress on the east bank of the canal, a failure which caused the

position of the 40th Division to become a somewhat isolated one. The

gallant 51st Division, which had been used in such ruthless fashion,

was relieved by the Guards Division and went back to Albert (Line F).

At 12.50 a.m. on the 24th the Corps issued orders for the ground

gained to be held at all costs. The 40th Division were to consolidate

their position and attack Bourlon village with the assistance of

twelve Tanks at noon. The Guards Division were to consolidate the line

taken over from the 51st, and the 36th and 56th Divisions to continue

their clearing of the Hindenburg Line. But, as we have said, the order

applying to the 56th Division was subsequently cancelled.

The 168th Brigade, which was now in the centre of the division, took

over a stretch of the old British front line from the 167th on the

left; the forward position of the 169th was still in the Hindenburg

Line on the right. The main strength of the division was concentrated,

of course, about the Hindenburg Line to the west of Mœuvres, while in

the old British line it was strung out and thin. But the division as a

whole was strengthened on the 24th by the addition of one brigade of

Royal Horse Artillery.

At three o’clock in the afternoon the enemy again attacked under a 190

very severe barrage, and the London Scottish lost their hold on the

second line of the first German system, to the north of Tadpole Copse,

but not without a strong fight. The enemy came down all communication

trenches at once, while small parties of snipers advanced from

shell-hole to shell-hole over the open. The attack was pressed so

closely that the supply of bombs could not be maintained, and the

London Scottish men had eventually to retire across the open. The

front line, however, was still held to a point opposite Adelaide

Street.

On the night of the 24th the division passed from the IV Corps to the

VI Corps. But although the 56th Division passed from the IV Corps we

must not lose sight of the doings of that corps, which continued to

press towards the north, with the 56th Division on its flank. During

the day many attacks and counter-attacks took place, and in the end

the 40th Division retook the village of Bourlon.

By the morning of the 25th the London Scottish had been relieved by

the Rangers (12th London), in view of an attack to regain the stretch

of Hindenburg Line lost on the previous day.

The 4th London Regt. were in position on the right and the Rangers

(12th) on the left. The 4th Londons, holding the bit of the Second

Line north of Tadpole Copse, were to bomb straight ahead while the

Rangers, who were in the First Line, would bomb up the communication

trenches to the Second Line and join hands with the 4th Londons. The

attack started at 1 p.m. and progressed very satisfactorily for a

while; but the fighting was very hard and the men very tired. The 4th

London at one time reached the Inchy road, but their arrival there 191

seems to have coincided with a particularly violent effort of the

enemy which caused the Rangers to call for protective artillery fire;

the artillery responded and the 4th London, being in the zone of fire,

had to retire. The attack, which lasted until the evening, ended with

a small gain, but left the Germans in possession of the banks about

the valley north-west of the copse.

On the 25th the 40th Division was driven out of Bourlon village, but

retained the ridge running through Bourlon Wood. They were relieved by

the 62nd during the night. Three dismounted battalions of the 2nd

Cavalry Division were placed at the disposal of the IV Corps, and did

good work during the next three days in Bourlon Wood.

Bomb-fighting was carried on through the night about Tadpole Copse. We

have casually mentioned that the men were tired, and on the 26th Gen.

Dudgeon represented to the Corps that he considered his division was

too extended. It had captured and was holding about one mile of the

Hindenburg system, and, until Mœuvres was captured, his right flank

was in danger, while his left flank, on Tadpole Copse spur, was not

only exposed but being constantly attacked. Two brigades were involved

in the fighting about the Hindenburg system, and, in addition, were

holding a flank 2,000 yards long connecting up to the old British

front line. The remaining brigade was holding 5,500 yards of British

line, and had also to supply one battalion each night to work in the

captured position. There was therefore no divisional reserve, nor

could any reliefs be arranged for the troops who had been fighting.

The VI Corps placed one battalion of the 3rd Division (on the left) at

the disposal of the 167th Brigade, and this enabled the 8th Middlesex 192

Regt. to be placed at the disposal of the 168th Brigade, which eased

the situation in the Hindenburg system.

A heavy attack on the 27th was repulsed by the Rangers and the

Kensingtons, and on the following two days there is nothing more to

record than heavy shelling.

The 26th had been a quiet day for the IV Corps. Certain reliefs were

carried out. The 36th Division was replaced by the 2nd Division; the

1st Cavalry Division, which had taken part in the fighting up to this

time, was ordered to return to its own corps; and the 47th Division

was ordered into the battle area east of the canal.

On the 27th, after a night of storm and snow, the Guards and 62nd

Divisions attacked Fontaine and Bourlon villages. Though both

divisions entered their objectives, the positions were not held. The

resources of the Army were considered to be almost exhausted at this

stage, which was probably the reason for using only three battalions

of the Guards Division for this operation.

The 59th Division was placed at the disposal of the IV Corps and

relieved the Guards on the next day, while the 47th Division relieved

the weary 62nd. And the Tanks were completely withdrawn.

The battle had therefore petered out, leaving a most unsatisfactory

state of affairs about Bourlon Wood and village; the situation

opposite Fontaine was also not good. It will have been noticed that,

after the first rush, the fighting was done by the IV Corps against

the northern side of the salient which had been created, and the III

Corps held an extended flank which, at the junction with the VII Corps 193

on their right, was somewhat thin.

On the face of it it seems as though the mind of the Third Army Staff

was concentrated on the doings of the IV Corps and the enemy opposite

them. The Bourlon position had a mesmerising effect, and even though

the III Corps was suddenly warned by the Army to expect an attack on

the 29th, no very great preparation for such an event seems to have

been made. The divisions did all they could. The 12th Division on the

right of the Corps moved the two battalions in divisional reserve

nearer the line, and organised all reinforcements and the 10 per cent.

personnel, left out of the line, into a battalion about 850 strong.

Other divisions issued a warning to troops in the line. The 55th, on

the left of the VII Corps and next to the 12th, sent out a long order:

“Certain indications during the day point to the possibility of

the enemy making an attack against our front. All troops will be

warned to be specially on the alert in trenches and all posts.

Special patrols will be sent out at 4 a.m. to watch for enemy

movement. Artillery will open fire on the enemy front line,

commencing at 5 a.m. The most likely places for concentration to

be selected by brigadier-generals commanding infantry brigades in

consultation with group commanders. In case of enemy attack all

posts and trenches will be held to the last at all costs, and

there will be no retirement from any line to another line. The

action of troops available for counter-attack will be considered

now. All machine guns will be warned to be specially on the

look-out for S.O.S. signals. From 5 a.m. 29th inst., 1/4th North

Lancs. will be ready to move at half-hour’s notice from receipt

of orders. Remainder of 164th Brigade will be ready to move 194

at one hour’s notice from the same time.”

On the other hand, the Guards and 62nd Divisions had already started

to move out of the salient.

Nothing happened on the 29th, but on the 30th the enemy launched a big

attack on the III and IV Corps with the intention of pinching off the

salient and capturing all the troops in the area.

The enemy broke through the III Corps, the weight of his attack being

directed at the junction of the 55th and 12th Divisions. General H. B.

Scott, commanding the 12th Division, says:

“I do not consider that the troops in the front system were

in any way surprised. In fact, far from it, as on some

portions there was a heavy bombardment and the Divisional

Artillery had opened fire on S.O.S. lines at 6.30 a.m. Also

on the evening of the 29th November warning had been sent to

all infantry brigades and the C.R.A. that an attack was

possible on the eastern flank.

In my opinion, the troops in the centre of the 12th Division

were pushed back by the force of numbers. The question of

the flanks being turned is another one for which I have no

evidence to show what actually happened to bring about those

situations. From all accounts the flanks of the division

were turned before the troops vacated the Banteaux Spur and

Lateau Wood. This is verified by those in the vicinity of

those places.

The enemy had great facilities in assembling unknown to us

in Banteaux, in the factory, and in the wood. Undoubtedly

these were the places he used. The main attacks were, I

consider, made along the Banteaux Ravine, keeping south of

the Banteaux Spur; up the ravine from Banteaux to R23c (in 195

the direction of la Vacquerie) and from the factory and wood

(in the valley north of Banteaux) towards the western edge

of Bonavis Ridge.

I am confident that the enemy suffered heavy losses.

Undoubtedly he attacked in force, and some must have been

caught by the artillery and machine-gun barrage during the

assembly and the initial stages of his advance. Besides

this, there was much close fighting and many

counter-attacks.”

The gallant 29th Division held on to Masnières like grim death, and

the enemy never moved them an inch, but he advanced as far as

Gouzeaucourt and was threatening Metz, through which lay the only good

road to the IV Corps.

It is not quite clear whether this was the main German attack or not.

About six divisions seem to have been used, but, judging by the length

of the attack and its ferocity, the big effort is indicated on the

other side, the northern side of the salient.

On the north side of the salient the divisions ran: the 59th, the 47th

(London Territorials), the 2nd, and the 56th. On the 56th Divisional

front the brigades holding the captured Hindenburg system were

disposed as follows:

The Queen’s Westminster Rifles on the right and the 2nd London Regt.

on the left of the 169th Brigade front in the Hindenburg Line, the

London Rifle Brigade and Queen Victoria’s Rifles being in the old

British line behind them.

The 168th Brigade, reinforced by one battalion, came next in the

Hindenburg Line, with the 8th Middlesex (attached) on the right and

the London Scottish on the left, and the 4th London Regt. holding the

defensive flank back to the old British front line. The Kensingtons 196

were in support in the old British front line, and the Rangers were at

Beugny.

The 167th Brigade had been relieved by the 3rd Division, and had

marched back to Fremicourt.

At about 10 o’clock in the morning the 2nd Division, who were astride

the canal holding the ground won by the 36th Division, reported a

heavy concentration of the enemy on the east of Quarry Wood, between

the wood and the canal, and just behind Mœuvres, also a division

entering Mœuvres itself. But before this mass of troops was reported,

the London Scottish, 8th Middlesex, and Queen’s Westminster Rifles had

noticed unusual happenings in the enemy lines.

The enemy had started registration by aeroplane, which caused other

observers than sentries to be on the watch. And then it was seen that

the Germans were wearing steel helmets instead of the usual soft caps.

The aerial activity increased, and soon heavy enemy fire was opened

between Mœuvres and Bourlon. The registration on the 56th Divisional

front was followed by slow, steady bombardment, which increased, until

about a quarter to ten a heavy barrage crashed down on the whole

front. It was obvious that an attack was impending, and the S.O.S.

rockets were sent up.

The enemy barrage, which consisted of light howitzers, field guns, and

trench mortars, was particularly heavy on the blocks in the captured

communication trenches. Gradually the German guns lifted, and at 10.15

a.m. the enemy swarmed forward to the attack.

[Illustration: 7. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI.]

A glance at the map will show the precarious position, not only of the

56th Division and neighbouring units, but of the whole of the Third 197

Army troops engaged in the salient. South of the salient the Germans

were through our lines, and if they broke through in the north an

unparalleled disaster would be inflicted on the British Army. The

Germans tried hard. During the day no less than five set attacks were

launched, the heaviest with eleven lines of infantry advancing in

succession to the assault. We wish to emphasise the position of the IV

and III Corps and the general situation in the salient, for if the

56th Division failed to stand fast (and we know they could not be

called fresh troops) the fate of the two Corps was sealed. On no

portion of the front attacked could the Germans hope to gain a greater

success than on the part held by the 56th Division.

The intricate nature of the Hindenburg Line, although it afforded the

attackers cover for assembly close up to the troops of the 56th

Division, had its disadvantages. Small bodies of defenders could

inflict incalculable loss and, though surrounded, could break up the

attack so that it only trickled through feebly; but, of course, they

must be good men.

The 56th proved themselves once more to be good men. The German

storming parties were most cleverly supported by their trench mortars

and field artillery. A deluge of shells descended on the posts holding

the blocks in the communication trenches, and the enemy infantry

supplemented the bombardment with rifle grenades. The artillery lifted

slowly, and as it moved so the infantry, assembled at the other side

of the blocks, leapt out on the parapet and attempted to rush the

defending post. At the same time other infantry advanced over the open

from the main trenches.

With such a short distance between opposing troops one might well 198

suppose that this form of attack would succeed. It was sudden, it was

confusing, inasmuch as Germans appeared everywhere. But the men of the

56th Division showed the most astonishing, the most praiseworthy

calmness. The training of the division in the new organisation, with

platoons composed of rifle, bombing, rifle grenadier, and Lewis-gun

sections, combined with the coolness of the men now bore fruit.

Volleys from the rifle grenadier sections shook the Germans as they

emerged from their trenches; the riflemen picked off individuals who

were getting too close; Lewis guns, sited to sweep enemy avenues of

approach, sent streams of bullets into the mass of the enemy; and

where the Germans succeeded in reaching the trenches they had to deal

with the bombers.

In the tremendous battle that followed, the Stokes mortar batteries

supported their comrades in exemplary fashion. The most striking

individual work of all that was done by these batteries was that

carried out by Corporal Macintosh, of the 168th Battery. This corporal

had done extraordinarily good work on the 24th, but on this occasion

he surpassed his previous record. Captain Crawford writes of his utter

disregard for his personal safety, of his standing exposed, not only

to the fire of artillery and trench mortars, but the more deadly

sniper, calmly directing the fire of his gun where it was most

urgently needed. And what of Private Woods?

“Private Woods had been forced to withdraw his gun from its

original position, and in doing so he lost the stand. He

took up a new position with another gun, and carried on 199

firing incessantly; and later, when the stand of his gun was

giving way through excessive firing, continued to use the

primary ammunition on the enemy whilst holding the barrel of

the gun between his legs.”

The Germans attacked with the greatest determination, and pressed

forward with a multitude of men. Posts all along the front line were

gradually surrounded, but the grim, steadfast fierceness of the men of

the 56th Division was doing its work. The enemy losses were appalling.

The losses of the 56th Division were great, and where gaps occurred

the enemy slipped through. They appeared in the front line (the

support line of the Hindenburg front system), on the right, in the

centre, on the left. Hard fighting had reached the second line of the

Queen’s Westminsters and the 2nd Londons. Col. Pank, of the 8th

Middlesex, was in his headquarter dug-out, situated in the support

line (German front line), when he was told the enemy was in the front

line; he ordered his runners, signallers, everybody to man the trench

outside, and, leading the way himself, clambered out of one entrance

to the dug-out while the Germans threw bombs down the other. Col. Pank

slipped down the communication trench which ran to the old German

outpost line, and gathering together the first men he could find of

his support company, with a supply of bombs led them back to attack.

The London Scottish were on the extreme left, holding the old German

front line through Tadpole Copse and across the Inchy road, and

therefore a continuation of the 8th Middlesex second line. Col.

Jackson was suddenly startled by finding the enemy in his line. But

the fierce attack led by Col. Pank shook the enemy, and though the 200

London Scottish had their hands fairly full on their front and left

flank, they dealt with the party in their trench. Col. Pank then

cleared the whole of his section of the old German front line. This

was the point of deepest penetration by the enemy, and was reached

somewhere about one o’clock.

We must point out that dug-outs in this line were far from comfortable

quarters. Their positions were naturally known to the Germans and they

were continually bombarded with enormous trench mortars, said to be

12-inch. In the expressive language of the Cockney, they were “bumped”

from morning to night. To get some idea of the effect of these engines

on those in the dug-outs, we need only say that each explosion

extinguished all the candles and left the occupants in darkness.

The Kensingtons had been sent up to Barbican, the sunken road in No

Man’s Land, as reinforcements, but in view of the uncertainty of the

position they were ordered to remain there.

One cannot hope to give a detailed account of attack and

counter-attack in this mass of trenches. Every hour brought a new

situation, now in our favour, now against us. The Queen’s Westminsters

and the 2nd Londons had suffered severe casualties. Everywhere the

line stood firm in the old German front line. Two companies of the

London Rifle Brigade had reinforced the Queen’s Westminsters, and

three companies of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had gone to the 2nd

Londons. Practically the whole of the 169th Brigade was engaged, and

gradually they wore down the German attack.

The message “Am holding on--hard pressed” came by pigeon and runner 201

with distressing frequency. The Rangers were put under the orders of

the 169th Brigade. The remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and

the 5th Cheshires were marching towards the battle. The S.O.S. was

signalled by the London Scottish at 4 p.m. At 6 p.m. fierce bombing

was still going on in all trenches forward.

The position was that the 169th and 168th Brigades held the old German

front line with blocks in all the communication trenches running to

the second line. The Queen’s Westminsters (in touch with the 2nd

Division on the right), 2nd London, and 8th Middlesex, on whom the

greatest weight of the attack had fallen, had lost the old German

second line; the London Scottish, faced with the flank of the German

attack, but nevertheless a hotly pressed attack, had lost no ground.

On this day the Divisional Artillery had fired on S.O.S. lines

continuously from soon after ten in the morning until six at night. A

number of fleeting targets and enemy batteries were also engaged with

good results. The Germans attempted to press forward with their

batteries; in fact, they believed they were going to break through,

and the batteries could be seen galloping into action. On one

occasion, about 1 p.m., a brigade of three German 77-mm. batteries

raced into the open, and were engaged so swiftly by the 280th Brigade

R.F.A. that only one battery was able to get off a round before being

knocked out. As usual the 56th Divisional Artillery supported the

gallantry of the infantry with equal gallantry and determination.

The German counter-battery fire had increased rapidly every day from

the commencement of the operations, gas being used chiefly at night. 202

But at no time did it reach anything like the same intensity as was

experienced on the Ypres front, or even on the Somme. Hostile aircraft

were very active, flying low over the front line and battery positions

during the latter part of the battle; and on two or three occasions

they hindered batteries in the open by machine-gunning their crews

when they were firing on S.O.S. lines.

On the right of the 56th Division, and on the west side of the canal,

the 6th Brigade (2nd Division) stood firmly in line with the 56th. The

attack on the east of the canal fell on the 99th Brigade of the 2nd

Division and the 140th Brigade of the 47th Division, holding the crest

of the ridge running from Bourlon Wood to the Bapaume-Cambrai road.

The attack came on, time after time, only to be hurled back by the

fire of the guns and the machine guns, and the fine fighting of the

infantry. Full-strength attacks were delivered at 9.30 a.m., 11.25

a.m., and at 2.30 p.m., but the enemy gained nothing more than a few

advanced posts, and an advance of about 300 yards near Bourlon Wood.

The situation in the morning had been a precarious one, indeed the

greatest anxiety prevailed throughout the day. The Guards Division had

stopped the German rush on the south side of the salient during the

early afternoon, but if the 56th, 2nd, and 47th Divisions had not

stood firm on the northern side, the Third Army would have suffered a

heavy defeat. There were some frantic telegrams sent at times. At

10.30 a.m. the 2nd, 47th, 59th, and 62nd Artillery were ordered to be

prepared to move their guns from the Graincourt Valley, and to have

their teams up in readiness, but these same guns did fearful execution. 203

The 47th Division reported at 11.35 a.m.: “Waves attacking over crest

F21 (Fontaine) held up by our barrage, which is very accurate. Our

guns have broken up concentration on E16 (west of Bourlon Wood). Dense

waves moving along crest E to W. Our guns apparently drawing them.”

But the relief felt by the General Staff found expression in a booklet

entitled _The Story of a Great Fight. (Being an account of the

operations of the 47th, 2nd, and 56th Divisions in the neighbourhood

of Bourlon Wood and Mœuvres, on the 30th November, 1917.)_ We can

only give extracts which concern us:

“The 56th Division had been in line prior to the British

attack of the 20th November, in which its right brigade had

taken part, and since that date had captured and held about

a mile of the Hindenburg Line west of Mœuvres, including

Tadpole Copse. Almost constant fighting had taken place in

this area since our attack, and the division, which at one

time had been holding a front of 11,000 yards, had already

been subjected to a very severe strain.... The story of the

subsequent fighting on the Bourlon-Mœuvres front is one so

brimful of heroism that it deserves to take its place in

English history for all time. The most determined attacks of

four German divisions, with three other German divisions in

support, were utterly crushed by the unconquerable

resistance of the three British divisions in line. The 30th

November, 1917, will be a proud day in the lives of all

those splendid British soldiers who, by their single-hearted

devotion to duty, prevented what would have become a serious

situation had they given way.... At 9.20 a.m. the enemy had

been seen advancing from the north towards the Canal du

Nord, and subsequently attack after attack was delivered by 204

him on both sides of the canal against the 6th and 169th

Infantry Brigades. South of Mœuvres the enemy succeeded in

gaining an entry, but was driven back by a bombing attack

after heavy fighting.... From Mœuvres westward to Tadpole

Copse a desperate struggle was taking place for the

possession of the Hindenburg Line, in the course of which

the enemy at one time reached the Battalion Headquarters of

the 8th Middlesex Regt., attached to the 168th Brigade, 56th

Division. Here the German infantry were stopped by the

gallant defence of the officer commanding the battalion,

who, with the assistance of his headquarters staff, held off

the enemy with bombs until further help was organised and

the trench regained. Though much reduced in strength by the

fighting of the preceding days, and hard-pressed by superior

forces, the troops of the 168th and 169th Brigades beat off

all attacks. Queen’s Westminsters, London Scottish, and the

men of the 1/2nd Bn. London Regt. and 1/8th Bn. Middlesex

Regt. vied with one another in the valour of their

resistance.... At the end of this day of high courage and

glorious achievement, except for a few advanced positions,

some of which were afterwards regained, our line had been

maintained intact. The men who had come triumphantly through

this mighty contest felt, and rightly felt, that they had

won a great victory, in which the enemy had come against

them in full strength and had been defeated with losses at

which even the victors stood aghast.”

The survivors will at least agree that when General Headquarters took

the trouble to print anything of this sort it had been well earned.

During the night of the 30th November reliefs took place. On the 169th

Brigade front the London Rifle Brigade relieved the Queen’s

Westminsters and the 3rd London (attached) relieved the 2nd London. 205

On the 168th Brigade front the Rangers relieved the London Scottish

and the 1st London the 8th Middlesex. The Queen’s Westminsters and the

2nd London, being the most worn troops, were sent into the divisional

reserve at Louverval, while the rest occupied the old British line.

The reliefs were not complete until 5 a.m. on the 1st December.

At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of the

trenches held in the Hindenburg Line and the S.O.S. went up. From

movement noticed beforehand on the north-west of Tadpole Copse it

seemed likely that he would attack again, but the attempt, if it was

to be made, was crushed by the artillery.

On the night of the 1st December the 51st Division started to relieve

the 56th, but, so as not to involve the 51st Division until the

following night, the front line was not relieved before the night of

the 2nd December.

Gen. Dudgeon makes some interesting remarks on the battle:

“Although up to Z day the rôle of the division was to attack

with Tanks over the open, the fighting which developed was

almost entirely trench fighting with bombs. No shortage of

bombs occurred, but the men employed at the divisional dump

(eleven men) worked day and night detonating, and at one

time the Divisional Artillery Column echélon had to be drawn

on.

It was found that pigeon messages were very slow, probably

owing to the season of the year. Trench wireless sets were

used with success from positions within 200 yards of the

enemy, being erected only at night and dismantled by day. 206

The reliable method of communication was by runner from the

captured trenches to our old line, viz. over about 2,300

yards of No Man’s Land, and a series of relay posts was

arranged.

The 168th Brigade, with the help of, on an average, two

companies 1/5th Cheshire Regt. and one battalion 167th

Brigade (occasional help), dug a communication trench ...

(about 1,500 yards). This trench, being rather in line with

the Inchy road, was somewhat subject to shell fire. 169th

Brigade also, with the help of one company of Pioneers and

one Field Company, dug a trench ... (1,300 yards), which was

less shelled. The Barbican and Houndsditch provided some

shelter, but in most cases reinforcements and supplies had

to go over the open in full view of Mœuvres, from which it

was impossible to obtain concealment.”

During these operations the 56 machine guns in the division (two

companies of 16 guns and two companies of 12 guns) were used as

follows: With each infantry brigade, 8 guns; in Divisional Pool, 32

guns. The 32 guns of the pool were employed on the 20th inst. in

barrage work outside the divisional area to cover the attack of the

36th and 62nd Divisions. They returned to divisional control on the

night of the 20th November. On the 21st and subsequent days the

headquarters of the Divisional Pool were in a central position in

Beaumetz.... On subsequent days the guns in the pool were used for

protection of the flank (a maximum of 10 guns were employed on this);

protective barrage on the Hindenburg Line and on the Hindenburg

Support; machine-gun defence behind the infantry.

We have mentioned the word “mystery” with regard to the battle of 207

Cambrai and the handling of the cavalry. Though they fought on foot

with the best at Bourlon Wood and Villers Guislan, there seems to have

been some hesitation on the first day of the battle. It is, however,

debatable whether they could have done much. Of the other mysteries

the success of the Germans on the southern side of the salient is one.

Early in the proceedings General Sir O’D. Snow, commanding the VII

Corps, is reported to have placed his fingers on a map at the point of

Twenty-two Ravine, and said, “If I were a German, I should attack

there”! No attempt was ever made to reinforce divisions before the

German counter-attack, although the Army was aware that one was

threatened. And this brings us to another mystery. Sir Douglas Haig

repeats several times in his dispatch a suggestion that he had a very

limited number of troops at his command. But we know that he had the

offer of French troops. He closes his account of the fighting on the

30th November by recording--

“my obligation to the Commander-in-Chief of the French

Armies for the prompt way in which he placed French troops

within reach for employment in case of need at the

unfettered discretion of the Third Army Commander. Part of

the artillery of this force actually came into action,

rendering valuable service; and though the remainder of the

troops were not called upon, the knowledge that they were

available should occasion arise was a great assistance.”

One naturally asks the question: “What would have happened if French

troops had been used even as late as the 21st November?” If they were

still too far away, there were undoubtedly British divisions quite 208

close up and quite fresh which could have been used to press the first

great advantage gained, and the French would still have been in hand

as a reserve.

Casualties from the 20th November to the 3rd December were 9 officers

killed, 202 other ranks killed, 43 officers and 1,003 other ranks

wounded, 17 officers and 352 other ranks missing.

CHAPTER VII 209

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE

THE FIRST BATTLE OF ARRAS, 1918

Telegrams of congratulation on the action at Cambrai came from Corps

and Army Headquarters; Sir Douglas Haig also sent a wire. But there

was no question of rest for the 56th Division.

The strength of battalions on the 1st December was:

Officers. Other ranks.

7th Middlesex 41 760

8th “ 35 571

1st London 43 740

3rd “ 37 813

4th “ 32 622

12th “ 28 754

13th “ 36 850

14th “ 42 949

2nd “ 32 529

5th “ 40 730

9th “ 31 789

16th “ 30 592

On the 3rd the division, less artillery, moved by tactical trains to

the area behind Arras; Divisional Headquarters were at Fosseux; the

167th Brigade in the Montenescourt-Gouves-Wanquentin area; the 168th

in the Warlus-Simencourt area; the 169th in the Bernaville-Dainville

area. The next day the division moved into the XIII Corps area with

Divisional Headquarters in camp near Roclincourt. Gen. Dudgeon went 210

to see the new line on the 6th, and on the 7th the relief of the 31st

Division started.

The line taken over was between Gavrelle and Oppy: Gavrelle was held

by us and Oppy by the Germans.

The enemy was very quiet and the weather not too bad for the time of

year. There was, of course, rain, and it was very cold; a short time

after the division took over the line it began to snow. Battalions had

about a week in the front line, a week in support, and then in camp

for a week. The great feature of this line was Arras, for at Arras

many comforts could be purchased to alleviate the life of the soldier.

Identification was obtained by the 168th Brigade--a prisoner from the

7th Reserve Infantry Regt., 5th Reserve Division. There were one or

two bickerings between patrols, but nothing of importance. And so

Christmas Day was passed with the division still in line.

On the 26th December General Swift, U.S.A., and his Chief of Staff

joined the division for a week, to study British methods.

On the 9th January the 62nd Division took over the line from the 56th.