Still more importance, however, lay in the proof afforded in

the results described of the ability of our new armies not

only to rush the enemy’s strong defences--as had been

accomplished on the 1st and 14th July--but also to wear down

and break the power of resistance by a steady relentless

pressure, as had been done during the weeks of this fierce

and protracted struggle. As has already been recounted, the

preparations made for our assault on the 1st July had been

long and elaborate; but though the enemy knew that an attack

was coming, it would seem that he considered the troops

already on the spot, secure in their apparent impregnable

defences, would suffice to deal with it. The success of that

assault, combined with the vigour and determination with

which our troops pressed their advantage, and followed by the

successful attack on the night of 14th July, all served to 67

awaken him to a fuller realisation of his danger. The great

depth of his system of fortifications, to which reference

has been made, gave him time to reorganise his defeated

troops, and to hurry up numerous fresh divisions and more

guns. Yet in spite of this he was still pushed back,

steadily and continuously. Trench after trench, and strong

point after strong point, were wrested from him. The great

majority of his repeated counter-attacks failed completely,

with heavy loss; while the few that achieved temporary

success purchased it dearly, and were soon thrown back from

the ground they had for the moment regained.

The enemy had, it is true, delayed our advance considerably,

but the effort had cost him dear; and the comparative

collapse of his resistance during the last days of the

struggle justified the belief that in the long-run decisive

victory would lie with our troops, who had displayed such

fine fighting qualities and such indomitable endurance and

resolution.

Practically the whole of the forward crest of the main

ridge, on a front of some 9,000 yards from Delville Wood to

the road above Mouquet Farm, was now in our hands, and with

it the advantage of observation over the slopes beyond. East

of Delville Wood, for a further 3,000 yards to Leuze Wood,

we were firmly established on the main ridge; while farther

east, across the Combles valley, the French were advancing

victoriously on our right. But though the centre of our line

was well placed, on our flanks there was still difficult

ground to be won.

From Ginchy the crest of the high ground runs northwards for

2,000 yards, and then eastward, in a long spur, for nearly

4,000 yards. Near the eastern extremity of the spur stands

the village of Morval, commanding a wide field of view and

fire in every direction. At Leuze Wood my right was still

2,000 yards from its objective at this village, and between 68

lay a broad and deep branch of the main Combles valley,

completely commanded by the Morval spur, and flanked, not

only from its head north-east of Ginchy, but also from the

high ground east of the Combles valley, which looks directly

into it.

Up this high ground beyond the Combles valley the French

were working their way towards the objective at

Sailly-Saillisel, situated due east of Morval, and standing

at the same level. Between these two villages the ground

falls away to the head of the Combles valley, which runs

thence in a south-westerly direction. In the bottom of this

valley lies the small town of Combles, then well fortified

and strongly held, though dominated by my right at Leuze

Wood, and by the French left on the opposite heights. It had

been agreed by the French and myself that an assault on

Combles would not be necessary, as the place could be

rendered untenable by pressing forward along the ridges

above it on either side.

The capture of Morval from the south side presented a very

difficult problem, while the capture of Sailly-Saillisel, at

that time some 3,000 yards to the north of the French left,

was in some respects even more difficult. The line of the

French advance was narrowed almost to a defile by the

extensive and strongly fortified wood of St. Pierre Vaast on

the one side, and on the other by the Combles valley, which,

with the branches running out of it and the slopes on either

side, is completely commanded, as has been pointed out, by

the heights bounding the valley on the east and west....

The general plan of the combined Allied attack which was

opened on the 15th September was to pivot on the high ground

south of the Ancre and north of the Albert-Bapaume road,

while the Fourth Army devoted its whole effort to the

rearmost of the enemy’s original systems of defence between 69

Morval and Le Sars.

Should our success in this direction warrant it, I made

arrangements to enable me to extend the left of the attack

to embrace the villages of Martinpuich and Courcelette. As

soon as our advance on this front had reached the Morval

line, the time would have arrived to bring forward my left

across the Thiepval Ridge. Meanwhile our Allies arranged to

continue the line of advance in close co-operation with me

from the Somme to the slopes above Combles; but directed

their main effort northwards against the villages of

Rancourt and Frigicourt, so as to complete the isolation of

Combles and open the way for their attack on

Sailly-Saillisel.”

That much was hoped from the big attack, to take place on the 15th,

there can be no doubt. Brigades resting in the rear of the divisional

area could see quantities of cavalry still farther back. It suggested

big results.

The limits of the Fourth Army attack were Combles Ravine and

Martinpuich, and it was to capture Morval, Les Bœufs, Gueudecourt, and

Flers. The Cavalry Corps was to have its head on Carnoy at 10 a.m.,

and as soon as the four villages had been captured it would advance

and seize the high ground round Rocquigny, Villers-au-Flos,

Riencourt-les-Bapaume, and Bapaume.

And it was the first battle in which Tanks were employed! [The battle

of Flers-Courcelette.]

Even in the midst of the struggle round about the Quadrilateral a

steady bombardment had been going on, in preparation of a further

attack, since the 12th September. Day firing commenced at 6 a.m. and

went on until 6.30 p.m., when night firing started. During the night 70

bombardment lethal shells were used.

On Z day the preliminary bombardment was to be the same as on former

days, with no increase until zero hour. When the intense fire, or

barrage, commenced, there were gaps left in it for the advance of

Tanks.

For the XIV Corps there were, taking part in this attack, fifteen

Tanks. Nine were allotted to the Guards Division, three to the 6th

Division, and three to the 56th Division.

The instructions given to Tanks were that they should start their

attack at a time which would enable them to reach the first objective

five minutes before the infantry. When they had cleared up the first

objective, a proportion of them was to push forward a short way, to

prearranged positions, and act as strong points. Departure from this

programme to assist any infantry held up by the enemy was left to the

discretion of the Tank Commander.

On the second objective Tanks and infantry would advance together and

pace was to be regulated to “tank pace,” which was given as from 30 to

50 yards a minute. For the third and fourth objectives there would be

no creeping barrage, and Tanks would start in time to reach the

objectives before the infantry. In all cases their action was to be

arranged so as to crush wire and keep down hostile rifle and

machine-gun fire.

Signals between Tank and infantry were arranged for by means of

coloured flags--a red flag meaning “out of action,” and a green flag

“am on objective.”

The main task of the 56th Division was to clear Bouleaux Wood and form

a strong protective flank, covering all the lines of advance from 71

Combles and the valleys running from the north-east of Combles. The

167th Brigade were ordered to advance as far as the bit of Beef Trench

running through Bouleaux Wood, and to Middle Copse on the left of the

wood; a flank was also to be formed to the south-east and clear of the

wood. The 168th Brigade were to pass through the 167th and carry on

the advance by further bounds. The 169th Brigade were to hold the line

through Leuze Wood and the left of square 27, and to capture the

well-known trench (Loop Trench) to the south-east of the wood which

runs into the sunken road to Combles.

One Tank was to advance on the right of Leuze Wood and assist the

169th Brigade to drive the enemy beyond the sunken road; it would then

establish itself in the Orchard as a strong point. This Tank was

called the Right Tank.

Two Tanks were to work from the north of Leuze Wood along the left of

Bouleaux Wood and assist the 167th and 168th Brigades. These were

known as the Centre and Left Tanks, and were eventually to proceed to

a railway cutting north-east of Bouleaux Wood, which promised to be a

point of some difficulty.

The Right Tank, having seen the 169th Brigade safely in its

objectives, was to move along the south-east of Bouleaux Wood and take

up a position on the cutting in the top end of square 22.

In the XIV Corps area the Tanks were by no means a success. It is only

right to say that this was not the fault of their crews. Every excuse

must be allowed, for the Tank was not only a new invention, and, like

most new inventions, somewhat clumsy in the first design, but the

ground was absolutely vile. We have not alluded to the weather, which, 72

however, was a most important factor just now. The field of battle was

a field of mud; the resting area of the division was a field of mud;

the roads and tracks were rivers of mud; anyone can paint a picture of

the battle of the Somme provided he can paint miles of mud. And the

Army had simply blasted its way forward so that the shell-holes cut

one another in the mud.

The scene round Leuze Wood, Guillemont, and Ginchy was a nightmare.

There had been little time to devote to the burial of the dead, and

corpses lay literally in heaps where the fighting had been severe. One

has only to imagine the results of repeated and obstinate attempts to

capture a position to realise what it must look like before it is

finally taken. An attack is launched and fails. Why does it fail?

Perhaps twenty men of a company get back to the trench from which they

attacked, and where are the others? On the ground. After five or six

attacks, each going out strong and coming back weak, each heralded by

a “barrage,” what will the place look like?

We may mention here that the stretcher-bearers worked with eight men

to each stretcher, and each ambulance required six horses to drag it

through the mud.

Just before 1 a.m. one of the Tanks allotted to the 56th Division

broke down on its way to the assembly position. This accident left the

division with one Tank working on either side of the Bouleaux Wood.

The assault commenced at 6.20 a.m., and was followed by some of the

fiercest fighting in the history of the war. On the right of the

division the 2nd London Regt. succeeded, after some hours of gallant 73

and determined effort, in driving the enemy from the greater part of

Loop Trench, the enemy clinging to the junction with the sunken road.

The Tank, which was some time before reaching the sunken road, gave

valuable assistance, but was set on fire by a direct hit from a field

gun. The fight then turned to the sunken road and the trench on the

far side of it; but the enemy was strong and no less determined than

the men of the 169th Brigade. No further advance was gained in this

direction.

On the left of the division the 167th Brigade attacked, with the 1st

London Regt. in line and the 7th Middlesex in support in Leuze Wood.

The 1st London Regt. captured that portion of Beef Trench outside

Bouleaux Wood and, together with the 7th Middlesex--who were to

advance through them, but both units became mixed--occupied Middle

Copse.

So far as the 56th Division was concerned, the result of the day’s

fighting remained with the advance on the south-east of Leuze Wood as

far as the Combles road, and on the north-west of Bouleaux Wood to

Beef Trench and Middle Copse. The enemy retained the whole of Bouleaux

Wood and the trenches to the north of the Combles road, and the road

itself. But the action, certainly of the 167th Brigade, was influenced

by the fortunes of the divisions on the left.

The centre of the horseshoe which had been formed from the east of

Ginchy to the cross-roads east of Guillemont, and then to the north of

Leuze Wood and along Bully Trench, and which was prevented by the

Quadrilateral from being a complete circle, can scarcely have been an

enviable place for the Germans who were there. As fighters, these

Germans deserve the highest praise. They were of the 21st and 7th 74

Bavarian Regts., of the 5th Bavarian Division. They were well wired

in, and had in the Quadrilateral deep dugouts in their front lines and

others in the ravine behind the position. But though we grant them a

perfect position and well-constructed defences, we must also admit

they performed a fine feat of arms. Those in the Quadrilateral had

resisted all efforts of the 56th and Guards Divisions to bomb them

out, and those in the horseshoe had repulsed the 16th Division and the

6th Division, which attacked them on the 13th. They had actually been

under severe artillery fire and subject to repeated assaults since the

9th September, and on the 15th, in spite of Tanks, of creeping

barrages, and of the heavy artillery, they remained immovable.

The worst kind of luck had attended the Tanks of the 6th

Division--only one managed to reach the jumping-off line. This Tank

went on with the infantry for a short way, had all its periscopes shot

away, was pierced by most of the bullets which hit it (and a perfect

stream of fire was directed on it), and, the driver being badly

wounded, it retired through the ranks of the 6th Division. Had the

three Tanks attacked, something might have been done, anyhow with the

enemy to the south-west of the Quadrilateral; but with only one, the

barrage, arranged with gaps for three, became ineffective, and a

concentrated fire on the one Tank soon put it out of action--it also

drew attention to the infantry attack. Briefly, the 6th Division

failed.

There was still a chance that the Guards would advance and render the

position of the Bavarians impossible. But this chance was not

realised. The Quadrilateral was a mass of machine guns, and, taking 75

the Guards Division in flank, inflicted fearful casualties. The first

objective was taken and held--on the left the second objective was

reached--but already the assaulting troops were being shot in the back

by the Bavarians, and no further progress was made. Tanks do not seem

to have helped in that direction either.

With this state of affairs on the left of the 56th Division, the

attacking brigades were not likely to progress very far in the

building up of a flank facing Combles. Until the Quadrilateral was

taken the 167th Brigade could not possibly move. The 7th Middlesex had

lost a lot of men from machine guns firing into their left rear as

they advanced behind the assault of the 1st London Regt. And finally

their Tank had broken down and was being attacked by the enemy.

By 11 a.m. the two reserve battalions of the 169th Brigade were moved

forward to be used as reinforcements before the 168th Brigade was sent

into action. Gen. Hull was determined to clear Bouleaux Wood, which

had resisted so long. But at 1.30 p.m. the Corps Commander, Lord

Cavan, telephoned him that the Guards had not made as much progress as

he had thought, and that the operation against Bouleaux Wood would not

be practicable. But before this order could reach them the 8th

Middlesex made a further attempt to get into the wood and failed. All

attention was then centred on the Quadrilateral, which was holding up

the advance of no less than three divisions.

The division was ordered to consolidate where it stood, but during the

night bombing attacks were carried out by the 169th Brigade on the

sunken road and end of Loop Trench, and by the 167th Brigade on the 76

trench in Bouleaux Wood--neither met with success.

On the 16th the 6th Division again attacked the Quadrilateral and

failed, but they were now well up to the stronghold. The Guards

Division had also crept in from the north.

The 17th September was devoted to preparations for attacking on the

18th. The 169th Brigade made a trench parallel to the sunken road to

Combles, and also managed to occupy some 200 yards more frontage along

the road. Many dead Germans of the 26th Regiment were found.

The attack on the 18th was in conjunction with the 6th Division. The

task of the 56th Division was to capture the trench on the north of

the sunken road to Combles, and the south-west face of Bouleaux Wood,

to a point beyond Beef Trench, and from there through the wood to

Middle Copse, where touch would be obtained with the 6th Division, who

were making another effort to clear the Quadrilateral. The attacking

brigades of the latter division declined the aid of Tanks on this

occasion.

The weather was appalling. The state of the ground was rather worse

than what is so frequently called a quagmire--troops could not get

along.

The 167th Brigade had lost heavily, and was not in sufficient strength

to attack, so the London Scottish were attached to that brigade. But

the battalion was unable to reach the assaulting line.

Zero hour was 5.50 a.m., and on the right the 169th Brigade, with the

Queen’s Westminster Rifles and the London Rifle Brigade attacking,

failed to cross the fatal sunken road, which was not surprising, as 77

the mud by itself was an almost perfect obstacle from the German point

of view. While on the left the London Scottish failure to reach the

assembly trench caused the attack to be abandoned.

But the 6th Division was successful, and the Quadrilateral, which gave

such strong support to the enemy troops holding Bouleaux Wood, was

captured. The news was received by everyone with a sigh of relief.

Of the fighting as a whole on the 15th September and subsequent days

Sir Douglas Haig reported:

“The advance met with immediate success on almost the whole

of the front attacked. At 8.40 a.m. our Tanks were seen

entering Flers, followed by a large number of troops.

Fighting continued in Flers for some time, but by 10 a.m.

our troops had reached the north of the village, and by

midday had occupied the enemy’s trenches for some distance

beyond. On our right our line was advanced to within

assaulting distance of the strong line of defence running

before Morval, Les Bœufs, and Gueudecourt, and on our left

High Wood was at last carried after many hours of very

severe fighting, reflecting great credit on the attacking

battalions. Our success made it possible to carry out during

the afternoon that part of the plan which provided for the

capture of Martinpuich and Courcelette, and by the end of

the day both these villages were in our hands. On the 18th

September the work of this day was completed by the capture

of the Quadrilateral, an enemy stronghold which had hitherto

blocked our progress towards Morval.

The result of the fighting on the 15th September and the

following days was a gain more considerable than any which

had attended our arms in the course of a single operation

since the commencement of the offensive. In the course of

one day’s fighting we had broken through two of the enemy’s 78

main defensive systems, and had advanced on a front of over

six miles to an average depth of a mile. In the course of

this advance we had taken three villages, each powerfully

organised for prolonged resistance.... The total number of

prisoners taken by us in these operations amounted to over

4,000, including 127 officers.”

The 168th Brigade, on the left of the divisional front, was

responsible for holding Middle Copse. On the two nights of the 19th

and 20th September the London Scottish provided covering parties for

the 5th Cheshire Regt., who connected Beef Trench with Middle Copse,

and carried on two lines of trench in a north-easterly direction as

far as the rail or tram line; companies of these pioneers also

connected the Copse with the south-east side of the Quadrilateral.

This work resulted in a firm line some 900 yards in length facing

Bouleaux Wood, and gradually working round Combles.

Prisoners captured by the London Scottish while covering the digging

parties were from the 2nd Battalion, 235th Regiment, Reserve 51st

Division.

The right wing of the British Army had not yet reached the line

desired by Sir Douglas Haig. Morval, Les Bœufs, and Gueudecourt were

still in the hands of the enemy, and on the right Combles still held

out at the junction of the Allied Armies. An Allied attack from the

Somme to Martinpuich was arranged for the 23rd September, but the

weather was so bad that it had to be postponed until the 25th. [The

battle of Morval.]

[Illustration: 2. GINCHY & MORVAL.

THE BATTLES ON THE 9TH, 15TH, & 25TH, SEPR.]

The 168th Brigade were relieved by the 167th, and obtained a little

rest from the night of the 22nd to the night of the 24th. The battle 79

front of the division was then the 169th Brigade on the right between

Leuze Wood and Combles, the 167th Brigade in Beef and Bully Trenches,

and the 168th Brigade in the new trenches ready to attack Bouleaux

Wood from the north-west, or rather to envelop it, as the wood was not

to be entered.

The main task of the 56th Division was to continue building up the

flank, to neutralise the German detachments in Bouleaux Wood, and to

get touch with the 5th Division on the left. The actual objectives of

the 168th Brigade were some trenches between the north-east of the

wood and the tram-line, also the bank and cutting of the tram-line.

The 167th Brigade were to help by directing machine-gun and

trench-mortar fire on the wood, and the 169th Brigade by firing on the

north and north-east exits of Combles.

The whole Corps attacked at 12.35 p.m., and the German resistance

crumbled away.

The 4th London Regt. on the right and the London Scottish on the left

advanced under “a most efficient enfilade artillery barrage.” All

objectives were reached. The 4th London Regt. killed a large number of

Huns in shell-holes round the north end of the wood, and suffered

themselves somewhat from enemy snipers in the southern part of the

wood. The London Scottish had some trouble and quite a stiff fight to

clear the railway embankment, during which the left company suffered

severely. But four machine guns were captured there and eighty

prisoners. These two battalions overran their objectives and curled

round the end of Bouleaux Wood.

The 5th, 6th, and Guards Divisions on the left swept through all their 80

objectives--Morval and Les Bœufs were captured.

For some time the London Scottish were out of touch with the 5th

Division, which had swerved too far to the right, but the complete

success of the operations enabled the 56th Division to improve the

position round Combles. By three o’clock in the afternoon the 4th

London Regt. had two companies in the north end of Bouleaux Wood, and

both the attacking battalions of the 168th Brigade had pushed out

patrols towards Combles. Artillery observation officers reported to

Gen. Hull that the enemy could be seen hurrying, in small parties,

from Combles in an easterly direction.

A steady pressure was kept on the Germans in Bouleaux Wood. The centre

of resistance here was round the derelict Tank on the left edge of the

wood. The 1st London Regt. was on one side of the Tank and the enemy

on the other. On the right the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen

Victoria’s Rifles gave the enemy no rest in the sunken road and the

trench leading to Combles.

By midnight the 168th Brigade had posts east of Combles, the 167th

Brigade had cleared the lower end of Bouleaux Wood and got behind the

Tank, and the 169th Brigade had captured all of the sunken road trench

and the Combles trench. And at dawn an officer’s patrol of the 168th

Brigade had met a French patrol on the east of Combles. The London

Rifle Brigade had already entered the town at 3.30 a.m. and secured

touch with the French there.

The line desired by Sir Douglas Haig had been captured and there was a

momentary pause. The line held by the 56th Division at midday on the

26th was some 1,500 yards to the east of Combles. The 167th Brigade 81

were in the front line and in touch with the 5th Division and the

French; the 168th Brigade were a short distance in rear, round about

the railway cuttings; and the 169th Brigade were half in Combles and

half to the west of it. The Germans were some distance away, holding

what was known as Mutton Trench in force, and it was arranged that the

168th Brigade should attack with the assistance of five Tanks. But the

Tanks failed to put in an appearance, and after waiting twenty-four

hours, the Rangers were told that the attack was cancelled.

Meanwhile our Allies on the right had captured Frigicourt and had the

hard nut of Sailly-Saillisel to crack. To assist them in securing this

very important position, Sir Douglas Haig agreed to hand over the line

as far as Morval, so on the 28th the division was relieved and marched

for a few days’ rest to the neighbourhood of Ville-sur-Ancre and

Meaulte.

* * * * *

The battle, however, still raged. Sir Douglas Haig was pushing the

enemy hard:

“The success of the Fourth Army had now brought our advance

to a stage at which I judged it advisable that Thiepval

should be taken, in order to bring our left flank into line

and establish it on the main ridge above that village, the

possession of which would be of considerable value in future

operations.

Accordingly, at 12.25 p.m. on the 26th September, before the

enemy had been given time to recover from the blow struck by

the Fourth Army, a general attack was launched against

Thiepval and the Thiepval Ridge.... The attack was a

brilliant success. On the right our troops reached the

system of enemy trenches which formed their objective

without great difficulty. In Thiepval and the strong works 82

to the north of it the enemy’s resistance was more

desperate.... On the left of the attack fierce fighting, in

which Tanks again gave valuable assistance to our troops,

continued in Thiepval during the day and the following

night, but by 8.30 a.m. on the 27th September the whole of

the village of Thiepval was in our hands.”

The rest for the division, however, was not for very long. Reinforced,

though hardly refreshed, the brigades began to move back to the line.

On the 29th September the 167th Brigade was in Trones Wood, west of

Guillemont, and the 169th in a camp near by. On the last night of

September the latter brigade took over the line from the 6th Division,

with the right in touch with the French, while the 167th relieved the

2nd Guards Brigade on the left.

The position taken over was outside Les Bœufs, in the trenches called

Foggy and Windy. Battalions in line from the right were the Queen’s

Westminsters, Queen Victoria’s, 1st Londons, and the 7th Middlesex.

The orders were that they should send out patrols and occupy a line of

posts over the crest of the ridge--the 169th Brigade posts A, B, C, D,

and the 167th Brigade E, F, G, H, and K.

On October 2nd the 167th Brigade reported having joined up a line of

posts, but we cannot make the map-readings given agree with what is

known of positions in subsequent events. The country was more than

ever devoid of landmarks--it was just a wide expanse of shell-holes in

a dark brown, almost black, kind of earth--and no one knew either

their own position or those of the enemy within a few hundred yards;

and the few hundred yards were a matter of importance. Anyhow, the 83

line was not the line of posts, but probably near the line we have

sketched on the left of 34. Touch was obtained with the 20th Division

on the left.

Gen. Hull was now instructed that the Fourth Army would renew the

attack on the 5th October, and that the XIV Corps would establish

itself on a line from which the main Transloy defences could be

attacked at a later date. The 56th Division would capture Hazy,

Dewdrop, Spectrum, and part of Rainbow, and establish a line along the

west crest of the ridge; the Division would then, as a second phase of

the attack, establish a line on the forward slope of the ridge from

which Le Transloy could be seen. The General ordered that the 169th

Brigade should attack on the right, and the 167th Brigade on the left.

[The battle of the Transloy Ridges, 1st-18th October.]

The weather became steadily worse and, though water is supposed to run

downhill and the division was on the slope of a hill, the troops might

just as well have been in the middle of a pond. No one could move, and

the operations were postponed for forty-eight hours.

Assembly trenches were dug; and patrols reported the enemy some 200

yards on the farther side of the ridge. The objectives for the attack

were well beyond the line of posts it had been hoped to occupy with

patrols, and the 2/1st London and 1/1st Edinburgh Field Companies

R.E., with two companies of the 5th Cheshire Regt., were given to the

two brigades to consolidate what was gained.

The assault took place at 1.45 p.m. on the 7th October, and on the

left was fairly successful. The 7th Middlesex, on the extreme left, 84

and the left company of the 1st London Regt. drove the enemy out of

the northern half of Spectrum and part of Rainbow, where they joined

with the 20th Division. The right company of the 1st Londons, however,

was held up by machine-gun fire from Dewdrop and failed to reach that

end of Spectrum.

The 168th Brigade fared badly on the right. Three battalions attacked

in line--the London Scottish, the 4th London Regt., and the Rangers.

Two machine guns were in the front line, for covering fire, and four

others west of Les Bœufs, for indirect covering fire; there were also

six Stokes mortars in Burnaby to put a barrage on Dewdrop. In some

respects the attack was peculiar. As was so often the case, the

direction of the attack was at an angle to our front, and the London

Scottish, starting the assault from the right at 1.45 p.m., were

followed by the 4th London Regt. at 1.47 and the Rangers at 1.49 p.m.;

this was calculated to bring the three battalions into line by the

time Dewdrop and the gun-pits were reached.

The leading company of the Rangers, on the left, was knocked out,

before it had gone fifty yards, by machine guns in the northern end of

Dewdrop, and the reserve companies of the battalion came under a very

heavy barrage and did not succeed in carrying forward the attack. The

remnants of this battalion lay out in shell-holes until dusk, when

they returned to the original line.

The 4th London Regt., in the centre, met with much the same fate. The

left company was annihilated, and the right company, managing to reach

a patch of dead ground, lay down unable to move. The rear waves were

met with intense artillery fire, but advanced most gallantly to the 85

line of the leading troops. From the dead ground attempts were made to

outflank the gun-pits, from which the hostile machine-gun fire was

directed, and small parties managed to work well round to the south.

The London Scottish advanced well for about 400 yards, and occupied

the south gun-pits and the southern end of Hazy. The enemy at once

attempted a counter-attack from the northern end, but this was driven

off. But it was found that a wide gap existed between the right of the

battalion and the French, who had attacked east instead of north-east,

and small parties of the London Scottish were successively pushed out

to fill the gap and get touch. At six o’clock they had succeeded in

establishing a thin but continuous line in touch with our Allies. But

the situation was a very difficult one. The enemy had received

reinforcements in Hazy and the north gun-pits--from all appearances

fresh troops--and both flanks of the London Scottish were in the air

and exposed to the immediate presence of the enemy.

At 8.30 p.m. the German counter-attack developed, and, though heavy

casualties were inflicted on the enemy, he succeeded in forcing the

London Scottish and the right of the 4th London Regt., which was

creeping round the gun-pits, to retire to our original line.

The division, at nightfall, was left with a net gain of part of

Spectrum and Rainbow. Gen. Hull then ordered a renewal of the attack

on the next day, and sent up the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen

Victoria’s Rifles to the 168th Brigade, and the Queen’s Westminster

Rifles to the 167th Brigade.

The assault took place at 3.30 p.m. on the 8th October, and almost at 86

once Brig.-Gen. Freeth reported that the barrage was very feeble.

On the 168th Brigade front the attack was arranged this time so that

it started simultaneously all along the line. The London Rifle Brigade

on the right advanced steadily for about 500 yards, and again gained a

foothold in Hazy. But the experience of the previous day was repeated.

The northern gun-pits, with their garrison of machine-gunners, was

held by the enemy, who poured a devastating fire into the left flank

of the four advancing waves, and on this occasion there was fire from

the right flank as well; the attack was in the main held up about

fifty yards from Hazy, where a shell-hole line was established. The

reserve company was sent forward to fill the gap which existed, as on

the first attack, between us and the French.

The Queen Victoria’s Rifles and the 3rd London Regt., on the 167th

Brigade front, failed to make any appreciable advance. Both Dewdrop

and the south of Spectrum resting on the sunken road were strongly

garrisoned, and the machine-gun fire was withering. At 10.30 p.m. all

troops were withdrawn to the original line.

The position on the morning of the 9th was that we held Spectrum to

the bend in the trench just south of the sunken road, and had a strong

party of the Queen’s Westminsters in the sunken road. On the remainder

of the front there had been no advance.

[Illustration: 3. THE TRANSLOY RIDGE.]

On these two days 84 prisoners of the 31st and 84th Reserve Infantry

Regts., 18th Division, and two machine guns were captured. The great

difficulty experienced was to know where troops were situated. The

weather was bad, and the effort of attacking was in itself a gigantic 87

one, but that effort had been made, and seemed to hang on the brink of

success, and if the artillery could have helped a little more would

have been entirely satisfactory. The artillery, however, were greatly

handicapped. Maps could not tell them where the new enemy trenches

were, and aeroplanes were unable to take photographs. As to being

helped by roads, though these were clearly marked on the map, they had

been almost completely blown away by shell fire on the ground and were

by no means easy to distinguish. It was a vile country.

The latter days of the Somme battle were even worse for the R.A.M.C.

Wounded men had to be carried to Ginchy and frequently from there to

Montauban. The medical branch of the division never experienced a

harder time than that on the Somme.

On the night of the 9th October the 56th Division was relieved by the

4th Division. The battles of the Somme were practically over. Sir

Douglas Haig wanted to push on in the direction of Le Transloy:

“On our eastern flank ... it was important to gain ground.

Here the enemy still possessed a strong system of trenches

covering the villages of Transloy and Beaulencourt and the

town of Bapaume; but although he was digging with feverish

haste, he had not been able to create any very formidable

defences behind this line. In this direction, in fact, we

had at last reached a stage at which a successful attack

might reasonably be expected to yield much greater results

than anything we had yet attained. The resistance of the

troops opposed to us had seriously weakened in the course of

our recent operations, and there was no reason to suppose

that the effort required would not be within our powers.

This last completed system of defence, before Le Transloy, 88

was flanked to the south by the enemy’s position at

Sailly-Saillisel and screened to the west by the spur lying

between Le Transloy and Les Bœufs. A necessary preliminary,

therefore, to an assault upon it was to secure the spur and

the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground

at this latter village would at once give us far better

command over the ground to the north and the north-west,

secure the flank of our operations towards Transloy, and

deprive the enemy of observation over the Allied

communications in the Combles valley. In view of the enemy’s

efforts to construct new systems of defence behind the Le

Transloy line, it was desirable to lose no time in dealing

with the situation.

Unfortunately, at this juncture very unfavourable weather

set in, and continued with scarcely a break during the

remainder of October and the early part of November. Poor

visibility seriously interfered with the work of our

artillery, and constant rain turned the mass of hastily-dug

trenches for which we were fighting into channels of deep

mud. The country roads, broken by countless shell craters,

that cross the deep stretch of ground we had lately won,

rapidly became almost impassable, making the supply of food,

stores, and ammunition a serious problem. These conditions

multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that

it was found impossible to exploit the situation with the

rapidity necessary to enable us to reap the full benefits of

the advantages we had gained.”

Two attacks were, indeed, made to assist the French in their

operations against the important village of Sailly-Saillisel, which

fell to them on the 18th of the month, but by that time the weather

had become so bad, and the delay had been so long, that the decisive

moment had passed. [The short and successful battle of the Ancre was 89

fought on the 13-18th November, bringing the total number of 1916

Somme battles up to twelve.]

* * * * *

Lieut.-Col. A. D. Bayliffe, who commanded the 168th Brigade through

this great battle, wrote at the time an interesting paper which he

heads: “Lessons to be deducted from the Operations on the Somme.”

Written with the incidents and conditions fresh on his mind, and for

future guidance, it is not a criticism of the actions fought, but from

his recommendations we may gather something of the difficulties which

had to be faced and overcome. We give only some striking extracts:

“The results of the operations carried out by this brigade

bear out more than ever the necessity for an assault being

made direct at the objective. Failures, or partial failures,

are attributable to present-day troops being asked to

perform a complicated manœuvre such as a wheel or change of

direction during an assault.

The objectives allotted should be as far as possible

definite, and should be chosen on the ground so that

well-defined landmarks may be included. With the heavy

casualties which occur among the officers, and considering

the partially-trained state of N.C.O.s and men, it is seldom

any use leaving the site of the objective to the judgment of

the assaulting troops.

In order to comply with this suggestion, it is essential

that a proper scheme of assembly trenches should be thought

out, and proper time given for their construction even in

the rapid advances which have been taking place.

In this connection it should be remembered that troops

engaged in holding the line cannot be expected to do much 90

digging work. Also that, without further training,

reinforcement officers are incapable of finding their way

over unknown ground, even with good maps, and that they

cannot tape out trenches and extend working parties. It is

therefore necessary to use pioneers very largely for the

digging of assembly trenches if this essential work is to be

well done.

Attacks delivered on too broad a front with too little

weight fail even against what appears to be inferior hostile

defences. The reason is that assaulting troops edge away

from the source of hostile fire, and when the lines of men

are too thin, they move forward through the gaps in the

hostile defences without dealing with them.

It appears that assaults, to be successful, should never be

delivered with less than four waves even against near

objectives. One hostile machine gun may completely break up

the first wave or two; if there are two or more waves in

rear they may successfully carry on the assault.

It is desirable to have Battalion Headquarters as far

forward as possible, right up in the front assembly trenches

if possible, before an attack. But it is no good placing

them there unless there is some suitable shelter (however

small), and unless time is available to lay communication

lines forward. Brigade Headquarters should also be right

forward, provided there is some accommodation. This

facilitates personal reconnaissance and liaison.

If the efficiency of a brigade is to be maintained as a

fighting unit through a period of several weeks of active

operations, a far larger proportion of officers and men

should be left back than is customary. The average

reinforcement officer is quite useless when his first

appearance on service is in the middle of a modern battle. I

would suggest that a battalion should go into action with

from 12 to 16 officers only, and that 4 to 8 more should be

kept about the line of Brigade Headquarters, and the remainder 91

to be at the transport lines. N.C.O.s should be dealt with

in the same proportion.

It is well borne out through these operations that, if the

artillery barrage is good and the infantry advance close to

it, they will probably reach their objective without heavy

loss. Usually the standing barrage was put up behind the

objective, and it is thought that the standing barrage

should be on the objective until the creeping barrage

coincides with it and then both move together to their next

standing line.

On one occasion (7th October) the three battalions of

infantry on this brigade front had to advance at different

times; the consequence was that the last to move had to face

a very heavy barrage in addition to machine-gun fire. It is

thought that the infantry should always move at zero, even

if they are not in line with each other, and that the

barrage line should be made to conform with the line of the

assaulting infantry.

As usual there was a complete lack of touch throughout the

operations with the heavy artillery. It is thought that the

artillery group system should be extended so as to include

some heavy artillery.

It is suggested that a large supply of signboards, painted

white or luminous, should be prepared for active operations,

and also a supply of trench bridges ... reliefs were often

much complicated and delayed by the lack of good tracks.

The value of the Stokes mortars in the more open fighting we

have been having is very doubtful. The results achieved have

never been commensurate with the great labour involved in

getting the guns and ammunition forward. The trench mortar,

from an administrative point of view, is more trouble than

any other unit when frequent moves and reliefs occur, as it

is not self-contained, and much work and trouble is involved

at very busy moments in devising how its stores are to be

moved.

The Tanks allotted to co-operate with this brigade were not 92

found to be of any use at all. It is thought that Tanks

require select crews of great determination, and officers in

charge who have more experience and knowledge of the methods

of infantry and artillery in war. If the speed of the Tanks

could be increased, it would add very greatly to their

value.”

The difficulties indicated in this paper were those which faced the

actual fighting men. We have already mentioned the zigzag line, and

the reader will readily appreciate how the attempt to form a front,

moving in a given direction after the men had left the trenches,

frequently led to confusion and loss of direction. Col. Bayliffe’s

statement that men will edge away from the source of fire does not

necessarily contravert our assertion that they are drawn towards the

sound of fire, which must be read in conjunction with the admitted

uncertainty of the exact position of an objective. During an attack no

officer or N.C.O. can control more than half a dozen men, and the more

usual number is two. On this basis the proportion of officers and

N.C.O.s is totally inadequate, and it follows that success depends

largely on the men themselves. The assaulting troops will fall

naturally under two heads: leaders and followers. The leaders are the

men of greater initiative, and in moments of uncertainty, when doubt

of their direction seizes them, when no trench is visible, they turn

towards the sound of the enemy--the place where the firing comes from.

It is one of the factors to be dealt with in keeping direction. A line

which has become thin through casualties will, no doubt, swerve from a

strongly-held post.

And what a lot is covered by the paragraph on digging! The physical 93

effort required to go through a battle like the Somme was colossal.

Relief meant only relief from the actual front line, not relief from

open trenches, from wet, from mud, from cold, or even from severe

casualties; it was merely a case of moving a short way back to other

trenches. After days of this sort of life an assault was a most

exhausting experience and, if successful, was not finished with the

written message, “We are on our objective.” Exhausted men were called

upon to dig new trenches at once, under fierce fire, and the trenches

dug, they waited for the counter-attack which, on the Somme,

inevitably followed. Perhaps the counter-attack succeeded and the men

were driven back to their original line--and still there was no rest.

Imagine the condition of mind of the surviving officers and men of a

company when they were reinforced by troops straight from home, with

no experience of modern or indeed any other form of fighting. The

reinforcements came almost as an added anxiety to the old men. And how

could the new arrivals be expected to appreciate the advantage of

following close on our own barrage, in itself a doubt-provoking thing?

There was nothing easy for the regimental officer or for his men; they

fought the enemy, the earth, and the sky.

We give the gallant colonel’s remarks on Tanks as an interesting light

on the early proceedings of the new engines of war. We are well aware

that they will provoke a smile from some readers, but they are none

the less justifiable. Tanks accomplished very little on this part of

the battle front. To the infantry they seemed only to attract the

attention of the enemy with the appalling noise they made and the very

definite target they afforded, and then they broke down! Col. 94

Bayliffe’s opinion, which does not absolutely condemn the use of

Tanks, was shared by two Brigadier-Generals of the 16th Division, and

most of the infantry in less exalted positions. That they afterwards

accomplished the object of their inventors is beside the point.

Heaven forbid that we should appear to offer excuses for the 56th

Division--none are needed. But we find it impossible to give a true

picture of the conditions under which men fought, and by placing a few

of the difficulties before the reader, hope to enable him to

appreciate the truly great fighting qualities of these London men.

Success conjures up to the mind a picture of swift movement, and such

successes were gained during the war--but not on the Somme. The enemy

was strong and determined, and fought to the last. Gen. Falkenhayn,

who was the instigator of the Verdun offensive, seems to rather

pooh-pooh the battle of the Somme, and give the impression that it had

little effect on the Central Powers; but as he was dismissed at the

end of August, one might deduce that other people did not share his

views. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, on the other hand, wag their heads

gravely over the whole business. The Germans were being badly

battered, and were fighting most desperately to arrest disaster. And

so, in recording the exploits of the 56th Division, we have to repeat

somewhat monotonously the account of attacks being continually

delivered on the same trench or point.

The trouble in a battle of this sort is to reconcile the two points of

view: that of the Higher Command and that of the infantry. For the

infantry there was no break in the fighting--if they did not assault 95

“over the top,” they were bombing the enemy out of a trench or being

bombed out themselves. And it is not too easy to decide what

particular trenches were held at any one moment. The position in Loop

Trench, for instance, was continually changing. Combles Trench, the

sunken road, and the southern end of Bouleaux Wood were points of

continual struggle. The enemy exerted his full pressure on the 56th

Division. But for the Higher Command this month of fighting divides

itself into five attacks!

The plan on this part of the front was to surround Combles by joining

the French on the far side. The junction of two armies of different

nationalities might always be considered a point of weakness, and the

movement itself was one of which the enemy could take advantage. Lord

Cavan explains the position very clearly with a small rough sketch:

“The plan to take Combles was like this:

[Illustration]

Therefore during the advance the protection of my flank from

a possible counter-stroke down the arrow was most important. 96

This protection from Leuze Wood to Morval was splendidly and

gloriously afforded. Further, in the actual attack on Morval

and Les Bœufs this protecting flank had to be advanced to

keep pace with the attack. The key of this was the capture

of a trench about X-X. This was captured and held, and the

complete success of the battle was assured. I had every

confidence in Hull and his men, tired though they were, and

this confidence was more than justified.”

This grim, determined, and desperate struggle reveals qualities in the

London troops which, though they existed, would not in a more

spectacular success have been so clearly demonstrated. It requires

good men to attack again and again until their object is gained, and

when these attacks are launched against such splendidly trained

soldiers as the Germans, one can only marvel that the thing was ever

done, and applaud the steadfast courage, the endurance of body and

spirit, which enabled the men to do it.

True, the battles of the Somme ended with both sides being stuck in

the mud--an inglorious ending to so much heroism--and the final, and

perhaps fatal, stroke was snatched from our grasp by the weather; but

those who came through the battle may now consider dispassionately

what it was they had accomplished.

The Central Powers (we must always remember that we fought more than

the strength of Germany) had decided, as we know, to bleed France

white on the field of Verdun. They were also pressing Italy hard and

had gained important successes. The Entente Powers replied first with

Brussiloff’s attack, and secondly with the Franco-British offensive on

the Somme. Falkenhayn declares that the most dangerous moment of 97

the Russian offensive had been passed before the first shot of the

battle of the Somme had been fired. He also maintains that the

Austrian loss of the right bank of the Isonzo had no connection with

the Somme; that the Germans would not in any case have sent troops to

help their ally in Italy. As for Verdun, he deals with it in a

somewhat unsatisfactory paragraph:

“The only tangible gain, then, of this battle to the enemy

remains in its effect on the situation on the Western Front.

As a matter of course, an expenditure of strength such as

the enemy favoured demanded the use of corresponding forces

for the defence. The operations in the Meuse area were not

yet, however, immediately affected. On the 11th July we were

still able, by a strong thrust, to advance our line on the

east bank.... After this it was the tension of the whole

situation, and especially the necessity to husband our

_matériel_ and ammunition, which necessitated the

abandonment of any big German offensive operations on the

Meuse. The headquarters of the Crown Prince’s Army Group

were instructed to carry on the offensive calmly and

according to plan, so as to give the enemy no good reason

for concluding that he could hope for its cessation. This,

too, was quite successful, for the French were unable to

bring up reinforcements from the Meuse to the Somme front

until September, when, following on the change of Chief of

the General Staff, the ‘Verdun-offensive’ had been

completely abandoned.”

The last sentence is, of course, the bitter pill for Falkenhayn. It is

perhaps only natural that he would seek to justify his policy, and

persist that he was right and would have succeeded had he been left

alone. Hindenburg’s memoirs give one a somewhat different impression: 98

“Very soon after I took over my new post I found myself

compelled by the general situation to ask His Majesty the

Emperor to order the offensive at Verdun to be broken off.

The battles there exhausted our forces like an open wound.

Moreover, it was obvious in any case that the enterprise had

become hopeless, and that for us to persevere with it would

cost us greater losses than those we were able to inflict on

the enemy. The battlefield was a regular hell, and was

regarded as such by the troops.”

And of the Somme he says:

“The extent of the demands which were being made on the army

in the West was brought before my eyes quite vividly for the

first time during this visit to France. I will not hesitate

to admit that it was only now that I fully realised all that

the Western Armies had done hitherto.... I could now

understand how everyone, officers and men alike, longed to

get away from such an atmosphere.... Many of our best and

finest fighting men had to pour out their heart’s blood in

destroyed trenches....

It was only when the arrival of the wet season began to make

the ground impossible that things became quieter in the

battle area of the Somme. The million of shell-holes filled

with water became mere cemeteries.... Over everyone hovered

the fearful spectre of this battlefield, which for

desolation and horror seemed to be even worse than that of

Verdun.”

General Ludendorff carries the impression still further[3]:

“On the Somme the enemy’s powerful artillery, assisted by 99

excellent aeroplane observation and fed with enormous

supplies of ammunition, had kept down our fire and destroyed

our artillery. The defence of our infantry had become so

flabby that the massed attacks of the enemy always

succeeded. Not only did our _moral_ suffer, but in

addition to fearful wastage in killed and wounded, we lost a

large number of prisoners and much material....

The 25th saw the beginning of the heaviest of the many heavy

engagements that made up the battle of the Somme. Great were

our losses. The enemy took Rancourt, Morval, Gueudecourt,

and the hotly-contested Combles. On the 26th the Thiepval

salient fell....

The fighting had made the most extraordinary demands both on

commanders and troops.... Divisions and other formations had

to be thrown in on the Somme front in quicker succession,

and had to stay in the line longer. The time for

recuperation and training on quiet sectors became shorter

and shorter. The troops were getting exhausted. Everything

was cut as fine as possible. The strain on our nerves in

Pless was terrible....”

We may conclude, then, that the Somme, as the chief counter-stroke of

the Entente Powers, defeated the Central Powers; France was not bled

white; and although the Russians were driven back, and Roumania, who

had entered the war, was speedily defeated by the Central Powers,

Italy was relieved and delivered a successful counter-attack on the

Austrians. The situation, as a result of the Somme, although the

individual British soldier may not have thought it vastly improved,

was more than ever serious for the Central Powers, and one could not

at that stage hope for more.

The total number of prisoners taken by the British Armies on the 100

Somme, from 1st July to 18th November, was over 38,000. Also 29 heavy

guns, 96 field guns, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine guns.

[3] _My War Memories, 1914-1918_, Ludendorff.

CHAPTER III 101

LAVENTIE-RICHBOURG

One might well imagine that the 56th Division was entitled to a rest,

but the days when armies retired into winter-quarters had

passed--unless a “quiet” bit of the line may be so called. There was a

rest for a few days in the neighbourhood of Belloy-sur-Somme,

north-west of Amiens. Battalions moved there, after a night at

Bernafay Wood, Mansell Camp, or the Citadel, by bus, and all moves

were complete by the 12th October. Then they rested and cleaned up.

There was a slight rearrangement on the 20th, which brought Divisional

Headquarters to Hallencourt, and some of the units into other

villages, but the division was once more on the move almost

immediately, and on the 24th October was behind the 61st Division in

the country round Lestrem. Three days later brigades commenced the

relief of the 61st Division in the Richbourg l’Avoué-Laventie line.

This bit of country was exceedingly flat, and in normal times was

drained by innumerable ditches. It was one of those bits of country

where trenches are an impossibility--soil and water seem to be

combined in equal proportions. Naturally war conditions did not

improve the draining, and at times large tracts of the country were

flooded. Our defences were breastworks, and the system of holding the 102

line was by a combination of posts. There were certain advantages

about this line, matters of space and of easy approach, but they were

only apparent when the weather was fine; when it was cold and wet,

shelter was very difficult to find.

At first all three brigades were in line, but on the 27th November the

5th Division was put in on the right and the front was shortened, so

that two brigades held the line and one was in reserve.

The whole of the division, however, did not arrive in this sector at

once. The artillery had been left on the Somme battlefield covering

the left of the French. Of this time Brig.-Gen. Elkington writes:

“During the whole of the month of October the heavy and

incessant rain had made the going so bad that it was almost

impossible to get vehicles up to the positions. Improvised

ammunition carriers were made out of the baskets from the

ammunition wagons, and for the last part of the operations

all ammunition, rations, and water went up on pack animals.

It was most difficult to get material for dugouts up to the

guns, and in consequence officers and men suffered a great

deal of discomfort. The horses also suffered very much from

the constant hard, heavy work. The 56th Divisional Artillery

were relieved on the 31st October by the 8th Divisional

Artillery. Owing to the heavy going, the withdrawal of the

guns was a difficult job, and one section of A/280, which

got stuck in deep mud, took two days to get out. The 56th

Divisional Artillery marched from the Somme on the 1st

November, badly in need of a rest and refit in the way of

clothes, etc., and on the 5th we arrived on the Neuville-St.

Vaast front, and went into the line, covering the 3rd

Canadian Division facing the Vimy Ridge, on the 6th. The

headquarters of the artillery was established at Aubigny, 103

where the headquarters of the Canadian Division, under

Major-Gen. Lipsett, were.

From the 7th November to the 1st December we remained

covering the Canadian Division. The sector was a very quiet

one, but the batteries were very extended, and it was a

matter of very long walks going round them, as cars were not

allowed forward. We were very well done by the Canadians,

and the men were able to get reclothed, and the horses

managed to pick up in the good stabling.... On the 1st

December the 56th Divisional Artillery was relieved by the

Canadian R.F.A., and we marched to the Neuve Chapelle area

to cover our own division.”

Meanwhile the 56th Division was covered by the 6th Divisional

Artillery.

Reinforcements for the shattered battalions were prompt, and all

monthly strength returns show a good average of a thousand men for

battalions. Horses remained steadily about 5,100, although the number

fell during the battle of the Somme. In actual numbers the division

was of average strength, but the quality had suffered. We find, for

instance, a record that a draft of over a thousand men arrived about

this period, and that they had not been instructed in musketry! With

all the will in the world such men were not of very great use.

Provision was made, however, for their instruction.

Almost at once the reputation of this Neuve Chapelle front began to

change. It had been considered a quiet bit of line with nothing much

happening beyond mining and counter-mining. On the 28th October the

enemy opened a trench-mortar bombardment which Australian miners

declared to have been the heaviest they had experienced during their 104

stay in that line. The system of holding the line by means of posts,

too, gave many opportunities for patrol work, as it was a system

adopted by both sides. The advantage of position, as was so often the

case, was with the Germans, who were on the Aubers Ridge, with better

observation and drier ground.

The month of November was a quiet month, cold and wet. No Man’s Land

was flooded and patrols found it very difficult to move about, as they

could not avoid splashing and consequent betrayal of their presence.

On the 30th November the enemy raided the 7th Middlesex, who occupied

as part of their line a mine-crater. Major Emery was on the spot, and

with two men drove them off. They failed to secure identification. The

next day, however, we secured identification in the shape of a Lieut.

Steinhardt, 19th Bavarian Regt., who was in charge of a patrol which

was dispersed by one of our Lewis-gun teams--an experience which the

lieutenant found so bewildering that he lost his way and entered our

lines, under the impression that they were his own.

Two lance-corporals, Millar and Wodley, of the 2nd London Regt., also

secured identification by chasing a German patrol of five men, of whom

they killed one and the remaining four put up their hands. These men

were of the 7th Bavarian Regt., 5th Bavarian Division, III Bavarian

Corps.

The policy of the XI Corps (Gen. Haking) was to annoy the enemy on all

occasions and keep him always uneasy. The month of December was

therefore devoted to most active patrolling, and the enemy lines were

entered again and again only to be found empty. There is only one 105

record of finding the line occupied, when the Queen Victoria’s Rifles

captured two prisoners. The reason, of course, was the state of the

ground, and it affords an interesting sidelight on the endurance shown

by the men of the 56th Division, as the trenches, or rather defences,

they occupied were similar to those of the Hun.

The operations of the winter are, in fact, only of interest as showing

the endurance, the determination, and the spirit of the 56th Division.

There was nothing in the nature of an attack or even a raid of any

magnitude--it was a matter of small parties of men resisting the

fearful conditions of climate, and penetrating with the greatest

boldness into the enemy lines.

Having ascertained that the enemy was not occupying his line, but

merely patrolling it, a more aggressive attitude was adopted from the

1st January, 1917. On the first day of the year snipers, from the

battalions in line, established themselves in the German front line

and remained there all day. They had a few opportunities which they

did not miss.

The operations until the 14th January were carried out by battalions

of the 167th Brigade; those between the 14th and 29th by the 169th

Brigade. Briefly they may be summarised.

On the night of the 3rd/4th January 100 men of a new draft were taken

across No Man’s Land, in parties of six, to “visit” the enemy

trenches; this was no easy matter on account of the state of the

ground. On the same night two officers of the 3rd London Regt.

penetrated almost to the enemy support lines, when they were held up

by deep water.

On the night 9/10th January four posts were established in the enemy 106

front line, and on the next night two more.

On the 14th a post known as Hampstead Heath was violently attacked by

the enemy in very superior numbers. This post was held by the 7th

Middlesex, and the men were so cold they could scarcely move; the

Queen’s Westminster Rifles were actually halfway across No Man’s Land

on the way to relieve them when the attack occurred. This relief was

apparently driven back by trench-mortar barrage and machine-gun fire.

The 7th Middlesex men put up a fight, but their Lewis gun was jammed

and useless, and they were forced out of the post. One man was found

to be missing. The record of this regiment is particularly fine, and

they felt very acutely the taking of this prisoner by the enemy. The

7th Middlesex is one of the two Imperial Service Battalions of the

Territorial Force which existed at the outbreak of war. It was the

first battalion to leave the country and was sent to hold Gibraltar.

In March 1915 it arrived in France and was attached to the 8th

Division at La Gorgue--in this same area. From the taking over of the

line immediately after the battle of Neuve Chapelle it went through

many engagements before joining the 56th Division, and up to this

time, in spite of all the attacks on the Somme, it had only lost six

men as prisoners. Its casualties in France, to date, were: 28 officers

and 338 other ranks killed, 35 officers and 763 other ranks wounded.

On the morning of the 15th January another post called Bertha was

attacked under cover of a dense fog, and after four men out of eleven

had been killed, the post (of the 1st London Regt.) was driven

out--but two were taken prisoners. Almost immediately, however, a

patrol of the same regiment, composed of four men, left our front 107

line and reoccupied the post, and by noon our troops had restored the

position. The enemy made another attack, but were driven off. This

post evidently caused the Germans great annoyance, as they attacked it

on the night of the 16/17th January and were again driven off.

From the 17th to the 20th the posts were bombarded by artillery and

trench mortars, and on the 21st, under cover of an intense

bombardment, the enemy succeeded in occupying Bertha Post. A

counter-attack was at once organised, but it failed, owing to two

machine guns which the enemy had brought up with them. In the early

morning our patrols discovered the enemy leaving it, and it was again

occupied.

During the night 22nd/23rd January the enemy made an organised attempt

to recapture all the posts. After repeated attacks the garrison of

Bertha Post was once more forced to retire, and again reoccupied the

spot in the early morning.

The enemy shelled the posts all day on the 23rd and 24th, on the

latter with a large percentage of lachrymatory shells, which shelling

was followed by four separate attacks. After hand-to-hand and bombing

fights they were driven off.

On the evening of the 27th the enemy concentrated his artillery fire

on Irma Post, which until then had only received general attention

from him, and succeeded in driving the garrison out. We then drove the

enemy out by artillery fire, and the post was reoccupied by us.

On the 28th the Army Commander, Gen. Horne, directed that all the

posts should be vacated.

One cannot consider these incidents only as small bickerings. The 108

artillery fire which the men had to face was remarkably accurate and

very fierce, and there was also the weather. At first No Man’s Land

was a swamp, or a lake, and then a cold snap set in, which was

paralysing to all who had to live in the open. The men had no cover

either from shell fire or the weather--the “posts” were only a matter

of shell-holes on our side of the German breastworks, and improved

with the help of a shovel and a pick. In face of these hardships the

courage and determination of the troops of the 56th Division never

faltered, although at one time Capt. Newnham felt impelled to write

that, “although wiring has been much strengthened, actual

consolidation is impossible owing to the frozen ground. The garrison

feel they are occupying shell traps. Battalions are on the defensive

and not offensive, and the _moral_ of the men is suffering. At the

same time our existing defences are falling into disrepair.” In spite

of this dictum the men succeeded, after it was written, in driving off

four severe attacks, but it gives an indication of the desperate

conditions under which the 56th Division carried out an aggressive

policy.

All this work drew from the Corps Commander a personal letter to Gen.

Hull:

“I should be glad if you would convey, to the troops of the

division under your command, my appreciation of the

operations they have carried out so successfully during the

last month in establishing posts in the German front line,

and holding them in spite of heavy bombardments and hostile

infantry attacks.

The effects of the operations are much greater than the

troops that took part in them are probably aware of. They 109

have shown the enemy the offensive and enterprising spirit

displayed by our troops, and have encouraged other British

formations to adopt similar tactics which will have a

far-reaching effect.

Brig.-Gens. Loch and Freeth, who conducted the operations at

different periods when you were acting in command of the

Corps, deserve credit for the determined manner in which

they continued the pressure against the enemy in spite of

serious opposition. The various counter-attacks by our

troops, immediately delivered without waiting for any

further orders and simply adhering to the plan laid down by

you, show a fine military spirit on the part of officers and

men of the battalions engaged.

I was particularly pleased with the action of the scouts of

the 1st London Regt. who went across No Man’s Land in

daylight on the 14th January, and with the prompt action of

“B” Company, Queen Victoria’s Rifles, under Capt. Brand, on

the night of January 22nd/23rd, when the posts were

attacked. Also with “A” and “B” Companies of the London

Rifle Brigade, under Lieut. Prior and 2/Lieut. Rose, who

held Enfield and Barnet Posts in the enemy lines on the

night of January 24/25th, when their posts were shelled with

lachrymatory shells and our men had to wear respirators.

These posts were then heavily attacked, and the supporting

platoons quickly traversed No Man’s Land before the hostile

barrage was put down. I am also glad that the artillery

support on all occasions throughout these operations has

been prompt and effective.

R. HAKING, Lieutenant-General,

Commanding XI Corps.

_3rd February, 1917._”

The division then settled down to more ordinary trench routine; but

the active season was approaching.

* * * * *

Although the first day of the new year seems to mark a definite break 110

in time, no such break was obvious to the British troops in France and

Belgium. Sir Douglas Haig was determined to seize every favourable

opportunity to push the advantage that had been won at the battle of

the Somme. Between the Ancre and the Scarpe valleys the enemy was in a

very pronounced salient. A series of operations were undertaken

against the flank of this salient, commencing in November 1916. It

was, however, necessary to wait on the weather, and although some

valuable positions were captured, real advance was not made until

January, when actions were won and ground gained at Beaumont Hamel,

Grandcourt, Miraumont, Serre, Gommecourt, and Irles. These successes

opened the way for a big operation against the Le Transloy-Loupart

line. The enemy then made his celebrated retreat to the Hindenburg

Line. This line branched off from the original German defences near

Arras, ran south-east for twelve miles to Quéant, and then west of

Cambrai towards St. Quentin.

The opening of the new year is a most interesting study. The Germans

were beginning to feel the lack of men. Their retreat was decided upon

for the purpose of shortening their line and avoiding a battle. They

knew it would require months of preparation before an army could

advance to the attack across the wide area which they had

systematically laid waste. Here at least they reckoned on a breathing

space. And in Germany itself the Hindenburg programme for production

was coming into operation--everywhere they were carefully going over

their resources and reorganising.

England reached, in 1917, the height of her fighting power as regards 111

the number of divisions, and this was known to the enemy. So he waited

with some anxiety for developments on the Western Front.

The Germans had started their unrestricted submarine campaign, from

which they hoped to gain much benefit, but, on the other hand, they

were nervous of Russia--and Russia complicated the situation.

Ludendorff writes:

“How often had I not hoped for a revolution in Russia in

order that our military burden might be alleviated! But my

desire had been merely a castle in the air. Now it had come

true and as a surprise. It felt as though a weight had been

removed from my chest.”

The revolution in Russia took place in March, and so, right at the

beginning of what promised to be an ominous year for the Germans, they

were able, by a stroke of fortune, to save ammunition in the East, and

to transfer fresh divisions from the East to the West, and let their

worn-out divisions deal with the Russians.

The Entente Powers, however, had no reason to feel more than

disappointment, as they dealt the Central Powers a blow by the capture

of Baghdad; and although they had no immediate support from America,

that country declared war on Germany as a result of the submarine

policy adopted.

The 56th Division opened the new year in very fair strength, as the

following return will show:

Officers. Other Ranks.

Divisional Headquarters 22 103

167th Brigade Headquarters 2 3

1st London Regt. 34 1,028

3rd London Regt. 32 1,066

8th Middlesex Regt. 22 1,051

167th Machine Gun Coy. 11 171 112

168th Brigade Headquarters 7 25

4th London Regt. 40 1,003

12th London Regt. 47 1,073

13th London Regt. 38 1,043

14th London Regt. 37 963

168th Machine Gun Coy. 11 165

169th Brigade Headquarters 8 26

2nd London Regt. 41 1,012

5th London Regt. 35 1,052

9th London Regt. 34 1,030

16th London Regt. 39 975

169th Machine Gun Coy. 11 182

5th Cheshire Regt. 38 890

193rd Machine Gun Coy. 10 174

56th Divisional Artillery Headquarters 4 19

280th Brigade R.F.A. 29 756

281st Brigade R.F.A. 26 748

282nd Brigade R.F.A. 28 705

D.A.C. 24 806

56th Divisional R.E. Headquarters 2 10

416th Edinburgh Field Coy. 10 210

512th London Field Coy. 10 212

513th London Field Coy. 10 218

Divisional Signals 6 212

Divisional Train 18 388

Medical Units 26 573

Mobile Veterinary 1 23

But soon after New Year’s Day the artillery was reorganised. The 56th

Divisional Artillery became two brigades (280th and 281st), each of

three (six-gun) 18-pounder batteries, and one (six-gun) howitzer

battery. For this purpose A/282 Howitzer Battery was split up, one

section going to D/280 and one to D/281. The 282nd Brigade, under the

new organisation, became an Army Field Artillery Brigade, and to bring

it up to strength it absorbed “B” Battery, 126th Brigade, and one

section of “D” Battery, 126th Brigade. This battery and section came

from the 37th Division.

In the big operations which were soon to take place, Gen. Hull had 113

Lieut.-Col. Packenham to help him as G.S.O.1.

* * * * *

Although we say the division went back to ordinary trench warfare

after January, it must not be thought that the policy of aggression

had been abandoned. The enemy lines were constantly visited and found

on most occasions to be empty. But the 13th London Regt., the

Kensingtons, secured five prisoners of the 13th Bavarian Regt., and

killed about forty on one occasion; and the London Rifle Brigade

obtained identification and killed three in a subsequent raid. The

enemy also made one attempt, and entered our line between two posts,

but the posts attacked him vigorously and drove him out, after killing

three of the party, who proved to be of the 13th Bavarian Regt.

On the 6th March the line was handed over to the 49th Division, and

the 56th Division left the First Army and was transferred to the VII

Corps (Snow), Third Army. Brigades marched back to the Flers area,

Divisional Headquarters being at Le Cauroy, and battalions scattered

about the country between Frevent and St. Pol, in the villages of

Beauvois, Hernicourt, Croisette, Pronay, Siracourt, Blangermont,

Blangerol, Guinecourt, Héricourt, Framecourt, Petit Houvin, Nuncy,

Haute Côte, Sibiville, Séricourt, Honval, etc.

CHAPTER IV 114

THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917

THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE SCARPE, 1917--THE THIRD BATTLE OF

THE SCARPE--MINOR ACTIONS

The Germans had commenced their retreat, and we know that the British

Higher Command had planned large movements. On the 14th March the

169th Brigade took over the front line between Achicourt and Agny, to

the south of Arras, with the 30th Division on the right and the 14th

Division on the left. Two days after a number of fires were seen in

the enemy lines to the south. The Hun was moving, but patrols found

him very alert on their immediate front.

Brig.-Gen. Coke, 169th Brigade, went round his line on the 15th March,

and the diary notes that “trenches in a shocking condition, full of

mud and dirt”! It was a normal condition for trenches, and one might

well be excused for wondering if the Italians or the forces in

Salonica fared any better in this respect. Did they find mud on the

top of a real mountain? Maybe their position was always in the valley,

in the centre of a stream!

As usual, patrols were out on the night of the 17th (the patrolling of

the 56th Division is worthy of great praise) and noticed nothing in

particular. But some scouts of the 2nd London Regt., lying close to

the enemy wire as dawn was breaking on the 18th, came to the

conclusion that the enemy line was not normal. They investigated and 115

found it empty. This was promptly reported to the company commander,

who sent out strong fighting patrols and occupied the front line.

Officers in the line acted with the greatest promptitude. Brigades on

either side were quick to follow the example of the 2nd London Regt.,

and all Headquarters were buzzing with excitement, although the

situation, in view of what was happening farther south, was not

unexpected.

By midday the 2nd London Regt. had occupied Beaurains. The whole Corps

was ordered to advance; the German second line was occupied, and on

the left the 14th Division were in the third line. The Corps order for

the advance, however, was cautious. It pointed out the probability of

the enemy withdrawing to a main line of defence, Telegraph Hill, and

the east half of Neuville Vitasse. The 169th Brigade were to keep

touch with the enemy, but Brig.-Gen. Coke must avoid becoming involved

in a serious engagement at present.

By the early morning of the 19th March patrols had established the

fact that the enemy were indeed holding Neuville Vitasse, and on the

left he was found at Tilloy, the Harp, Telegraph Hill, and Nice

Trench. Troops remained in front of Neuville Vitasse and constructed

advance trenches.

We have pointed out the salient, between the Ancre and the Scarpe,

which was the result of the battles of the Somme; and we have

mentioned the actions that had been fought on the right of this

salient in preparation to a bigger operation. It was the intention of

Sir Douglas Haig to attack the salient from both sides--the Fifth Army

in the south operating on the Ancre Front, and the Third Army about 116

Arras. The plan included the pinching off of the whole area, and on

the north of the Scarpe the capture of the Vimy Ridge. This latter

operation was the task of the First Army.

So far as the Fifth Army was concerned, the German retreat had avoided

a battle, but on the Third Army front their retirement must be

limited, as the enemy had no intention of giving up the Vimy Ridge on

our First Army front. Indeed, there was no retirement on the left of

the VII Corps, just south of Arras, which was the flank of the

Hindenburg Line.

But adjustments and new orders were necessary to meet the situation.

It was most desirable to attract as many enemy troops to our front

before the French offensive was launched in the south, and so the

Fifth Army was ordered to follow the enemy closely to the Hindenburg

Line, where it would exert the greatest pressure, and the Third and

First Armies would, with slight modifications of detail, carry out the

original attack as planned on their front.

The VII Corps was the most affected. The objectives of the Third Army

had been Mercatel, Hill 90, the German third-line system from Feuchy

Chapel, and the high ground about Monchy. The effect of the enemy

withdrawals on the VII Corps front was

“to change our task from an attack in a south-easterly

direction from prepared positions, to an attack in an

easterly and north-easterly direction from improvised

positions. But the objects of the attack remain the same;

that is, to break through the enemy’s defensive line on the

right of the Third Army front, to overrun all his defences

as far as the Green Line (the far side of the Cojeul River),

and to clear and hold the southern side of the gap which the 117

VI Corps, advancing simultaneously with us, will have made.”

The VII Corps front was held by the 21st, 30th, 56th, and 14th

Divisions in line, with the 50th in reserve. On the right the 21st

Division had a very small rôle allotted to it. The first attack was to

be delivered by the 56th and 14th Divisions with the VI Corps on their

left (no German retreat had taken place here), and gradually the 30th

and then the 21st Divisions would take part in the advance.

The first phase of the planned attack gave to the 56th Division the

task of capturing Neuville Vitasse (the 30th would conform on the

right, but even so would not approach the enemy main line), and to the

14th Division the piercing of the extreme left of the Hindenburg Line

and part of the Harp; the 3rd Division, VI Corps, on the left would

capture Tilloy.

The second phase placed the right of the 30th Division on the south of

the Cojeul River and in possession of St. Martin-sur-Cojeul, and the

left through the Hindenburg (Cojeul Switch) Line, while the 56th and

14th would be in front of Wancourt.

The 56th and 14th Divisions were not to go beyond Nepal Trench, as the

30th Division, pushing up from the south-west, would cross their front

and, passing entirely to the south bank of the Cojeul, would join

hands with the troops of the VI Corps east of Guemappe. The 21st

Division would contribute to the flank thus formed with its right

standing fast on Croisilles.

After this Green Line, as it was called, there was the usual hopeful

reference to a distant objective, Cambrai, and some talk of cavalry,

no doubt a necessary provision, but one which, nevertheless, was 118

greeted with hilarity. One thing, however, seems very certain: the

German retreat caused very little inconvenience to the Third Army, and

none at all to the First.

Preparations for the attack on the Third Army front were carried on

swiftly. The enemy made no further move, but to the south, where he

had many miles to go before reaching the Hindenburg Line, he was still

being closely pursued by the Fifth Army. By the 2nd April the general

line was Sélency, Jeancourt, Epéhy, Royaulcourt, Doignies, Mercatel,

Beaurains. Between Sélency and Doignies the enemy still held positions

in advance of the Hindenburg Line, and minor engagements were

continually taking place on this section of the front.

On the night of the 1st April the 167th and 168th Brigades relieved

the 169th Brigade in the front line. The bombardment of the enemy

positions commenced on the 4th, and was carried on for five days.

Meanwhile troops could study the country they were to attack.

While the 169th Brigade had been in the line, training had been

carried on extensively by the other two brigades. Some of the

instructions and arrangements are worthy of note. For the men, open

fighting was the main practice. Regimental officers were told that

“it must be realised that the maintenance of forward

movement depends on the determination and power of direction

of sections, platoons, companies, and battalions. The habit

of digging a trench and getting into it, or of waiting for

scientifically-arranged artillery barrages before advancing,

must be discarded. A slow advance will give time for the 119

German reinforcements to arrive--the greater the rapidity of

an advance the more is resistance likely to lessen. A few

sticky company commanders may not only delay the whole

operation but, by giving the enemy time to reinforce, will

also cause unnecessary casualties.”

We quote this for comparison with other instructions given at a later

date. There is nothing new in it, and nothing to criticise in it, but

man is a lover of precedent, and trench warfare, and failure to get

through to open fighting, was the precedent established for him.

Very interesting instructions were issued on the subject of signals

between infantry and artillery. One of the most curious facts of the

war was the general lack of communication between attacking infantry

and artillery. True, the infantryman in the front line is not always

in the best position to direct artillery fire, but, on the other hand,

he is frequently the only man who knows anything at all. We learned,

to our cost, the excellence of the German control of artillery fire,

and though our artillery observation officers performed the most

gallant feats, our method never seemed as good as that of the enemy.

The instructions issued were in imitation of the German method.

Coloured lights were to be fired from any sort of pistol. Green lights

were to mean “open fire,” and white lights “increase the range.” These

were the only signals to be employed, either by the Forward

Observation Officer or by the infantry. The plan does not appear to

have answered very well.

There were also definite instructions as to the strength of battalions

and the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men to be 120

left out of the fight. We must deal with that in another place, merely

noting here that platoons were now made up of one rifle section, one

Lewis-gun section, one bombing section, and one rifle grenade section,

and that a Divisional Depot Battalion was formed at Bouquemaison,

where all details left out of the battle were sent. The Depot

Battalion ensured a number of trained reinforcements being available.

We have left the 167th and 168th Brigades looking at Neuville Vitasse.

The way to that heap of ruins seemed clear, with the exception of a

strong point, Neuville Mill, situated on the right and in a position

to enfilade the attacking troops. On the 7th the 1st London Regt.

attempted to capture the place, but found it well defended with

machine guns, and failed. It was decided to deal with it by means of

Tanks.

The attack launched by the Third and First Armies on the morning of

the 9th April was on a front of fifteen miles, from Croisilles to the

northern foot of the Vimy Ridge. It included between four and five

miles of the Hindenburg Line.

The 56th Division attacked with the 167th Brigade on the right, having

the 3rd London Regt. and 8th Middlesex Regt. in line, with the 1st

London Regt. in support and the 7th Middlesex in reserve; the 168th

Brigade was on the left, with the 13th and 12th London Regts. in line,

the 14th in support, and the 4th in reserve. The Edinburgh Field Coy.

R.E. (less two sections) were with the right brigade, and the 513th

Field Coy. R.E. (less two sections), one company of the 5th Cheshires,

and two sections of the 193rd Divisional M.G. Coy. with the left

brigade. As the whole success of the operation depended on the 14th 121

Division, the left brigade had to be prepared to make a defensive

flank--hence the machine guns and pioneers.

The method of attack was what was sometimes called leap-frog. The two

battalions in line on each brigade front were to capture Pine Lane and

Neuville Vitasse, and then the supporting battalion would “go through”

them and capture the second defence, which was the Hindenburg, or

Cojeul Switch. In the case of the 167th Brigade, the reserve

battalion, the 7th Middlesex, were to carry on the game of leap-frog

and capture Nepal Trench.

The weather up to this point had been fine, but on the morning of the

9th dark clouds rolled up, bringing heavy showers. The attack was

started by the Corps on the left. The 56th Division moved to the

assault at 7.45 a.m.

The first phase of the attack was the capture of Neuville Vitasse. The

3rd London Regt., on the right, progressed well--two Tanks worked on

this battalion front and dealt with the strong point, Neuville

Mill--and at 10 a.m. had reached their first objective--that is to

say, they were in a position short of the Hindenburg Line. The 8th

Middlesex Regt. were delayed at first by uncut wire, but soon entered

the ruined village. Just before reaching the site of the church they

found themselves confronted by a “pocket” of determined Germans with

several machine guns. Working round the flanks of this “pocket,”

bombers and riflemen succeeded in enveloping the enemy, so that just

before eleven o’clock sixty-eight survivors surrendered with four

machine guns. The battalion then cleared the rest of Neuville Vitasse 122

and were in touch with the 3rd London Regt.

The Kensingtons swept through the enemy front line with little

opposition, and soon reached Moss Trench. Their reserve company,

seeing that all was well, moved south into the village and rendered

some assistance to the 8th Middlesex.

On the extreme left of the divisional line the 12th London Regt.,

after going through the first line, met some uncut wire which delayed

them, but soon after ten o’clock they were in touch with the

Kensingtons in Moss Trench, although their left was thrown back owing

to the right of the 14th Division being held up by uncut wire.

Of the two Tanks on the 168th Brigade front, which were supposed to

work round the north of the village, only one ever started, and very

soon that one was on fire.

Meanwhile the artillery, the 281st, 293rd, and “C” Battery of the

232nd Brigades, had moved across the old German line and taken

positions, about a thousand yards west of Neuville Vitasse, by ten

o’clock. (It will be noticed that the artillery was “grouped” again.)

Everything was therefore ready for the assault on the northern

extremity of the Hindenburg Line, and an advance to Nepal Trench.

This, as we have said, was to be done by the 14th and 1st London

Regts., who were the supporting battalions to each brigade.

The general plan at this point was that the 14th and 56th Divisions

should attack simultaneously, and the 30th Division, on the right, was

to follow in echelon. Not until the 7th Middlesex Regt.--which was in

reserve to the 167th Brigade, and was detailed to attack and capture 123

Nepal Trench after the Hindenburg Line had been made secure--had

passed Neuville Vitasse was the 30th Division to move. As the fighting

on this right flank of the 56th Division was the most severe, we will

deal first with the left flank.

The attack started at 12.10 p.m., and the London Scottish, passing

through the Kensingtons and 12th London Regt., were soon engaged in

some lively fighting which lasted about two hours. They killed a

number of the enemy, captured 100 of them and one machine gun, and

overran the mass of trenches by 1,000 yards. On their left they were

in touch with the 14th Division, but their right was in the air. As

the 167th Brigade had not progressed so well, the London Scottish

position was not too good.

On the right of the 56th Division the situation was obscure. The 30th

Division--timed to advance after the 167th Brigade--had failed, and

this failure enabled the enemy in Egg and the adjacent trenches to

give their undivided attention to the flank of the 56th Division. The

attack was held up.

Gen. Hull had foreseen strong opposition in this direction, and had

given Brig.-Gen. Freeth the 4th London Regt., the reserve battalion of

the 168th Brigade, and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles from the 169th

Brigade. So when it was seen that the 1st London Regt. had failed to

make progress, the 7th Middlesex and 4th London Regts. were launched.

Some progress was made, but casualties were heavy, and the position

remained uncertain and enveloped in a fog of rumour.

In order to give more stability to the line, Brig.-Gen. Loch, 168th

Brigade, ordered the Kensingtons forward into that part of the

Hindenburg Line which the London Scottish had captured, and the latter 124

battalion to withdraw from their forward position and reorganise.

The situation at 6 p.m. is shown (_A_) on map.

But the 14th Division, on the left, ordered an assault of the Wancourt

Line at 6.45 p.m., which attack, owing no doubt to the situation on

the 56th and 30th Divisional fronts, failed.

Soon after ten o’clock that night (9th April) the Corps ordered the

assault of the Wancourt Line to take place at eight the following

morning, but Gen. Hull pointed out that fighting was still going on,

that the situation would not be clear until daylight, and that his

division would not be able to attack at that hour. The order was,

therefore, amended so that the attack should take place when the

situation on the 56th and 14th Divisional fronts was clear.

In the darkness of the night the 167th Brigade troops bombed the

Germans out of all of the Hindenburg Line on their front, but they

were still giving much trouble from the 30th Division area. The London

Scottish were now able to advance again on the left and get in touch

with the 14th Division about 15.

The position did not seem too favourable unless something was done on

the right, but at 10.45 a.m. the Corps issued a more ambitious order:

that the attack was to be carried on to the east of Guemappe.

At midday the attack was launched, but now the whole direction was

altered. The left of the line, advancing on Wancourt, was held up, and

the right, in order to get elbow room, was forced to clear the

Hindenburg Line on the 30th Division front. In this maze of trenches

the 167th Brigade made steady progress towards the junction of the

Hindenburg and Wancourt Lines. This was good work, and the Corps 125

ordered the occupation of Hill 90, on the far side of the Wancourt

Line. Gen. Hull, however, informed the Corps that it could not be done

that night.

On the left the position was as uncertain as it had been the previous

day on the right. The 14th Division claimed to be in the Wancourt

Line, and eventually it was found that they had swerved to their left

and created a large gap between their right and the left of the London

Scottish, who were lying out in the open.

So the situation (_B_) remained through the night. The next day,

the 11th, nothing was done on the left of the line, but the 167th

Brigade carried on their good work and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles

cleared the Hindenburg Line as far as the Cojeul River, and a long

length of Nepal Trench, which was part of the Wancourt Line. The

difficulty of the 30th Division was apparently uncut wire. They seemed

to be stuck facing the Hindenburg Line, while the Queen Victoria’s

Rifles cleared it. A Corps telegram to this division reads:

“Not satisfied that the infantry are receiving sufficient

support from the artillery. The situation demands that as

many batteries as possible be pushed forward so that enemy

machine guns be dealt with at decisive range.”

The 167th were relieved by the 169th Brigade late in the afternoon,

after three days of very severe and successful fighting.

The 169th Brigade were ordered to consolidate Hill 90 and to push

patrols into Heninel, and later, when the 30th Division had occupied 126

the Hindenburg Line, to cross the River Cojeul and make good the high

ground to the south.

The attack ordered started at 5.15 a.m. on the 12th, and after stiff

bombing fights, the 2nd and 5th London Regts., working to the north

and south of Hill 90, joined hands on the other side of it. It was

found necessary, during this operation, to have a password, so that

converging parties should not bomb each other. To the great amusement

of the men the words “Rum jar” were chosen. The Germans, being bombed

from both sides, must have thought it an odd slogan. The enemy were

then seen withdrawing from Heninel, and the leading company of the 2nd

London Regt. immediately advanced and occupied the village. The 30th

Division then crossed to the south of the Cojeul River, and made

progress along the Hindenburg Line. Meanwhile the 2nd London Regt. had

pushed forward patrols and occupied the high ground to the east of

Heninel, where they got in touch with the 30th Division.

The occupation of Hill 90, which had been made possible by the 167th

Brigade and the Queen Victoria’s Rifles (attached), also caused the

enemy to vacate the village of Wancourt, which was entered by patrols

of the London Rifle Brigade about eleven o’clock. The 14th Division

moved two battalions, one on either side of the village, with a view

to continuing the advance to the high ground east of the Cojeul River,

and at 1 p.m. the Corps ordered the advance to be continued to the

Sensée River; but these orders were modified and the 56th Division was

told to consolidate (_C_) and prepare for an advance on the 13th.

On the 13th April nothing much was done. The 56th Division held the 127

ridge from 35 to Wancourt Tower; on the right the 33rd Division, which

had relieved the 30th, failed to advance; on the left the 50th

Division, which had relieved the 14th on the preceding night, also

failed to advance, having been held up by machine-gun fire from

Guemappe. But the Corps ordered a general advance on the next day, the

objective being the line of the Sensée River.

During the night the enemy blew up Wancourt Tower, which seemed to

suggest that he was contemplating retirement. At 5.30 a.m. our attack

was launched, but almost at once the 169th Brigade reported that the

Queen’s Westminster Rifles had gone forward with no one on their left.

About five hundred yards in front of them were some practice trenches

which the enemy had used for bombing. Capt. Newnham writes of the

attack dissolving about the line of these trenches. Apparently

Guemappe had not been taken on the left, and a perfect hail of

machine-gun fire enfiladed the advancing troops from this village. The

Queen Victoria’s Rifles, who attacked on the right, met with no better

fate, the leading waves being wiped out. From the diary of 169th

Brigade we learn that

“the 151st Brigade attack on our left never developed,

leaving our flank exposed. Enemy met with in considerable

strength; they had just brought up fresh troops, and the

allotment of machine guns, according to prisoners, was two

per battalion. The 151st Brigade attack was ordered with

their left flank on Wancourt Tower, which was our left and

the dividing-line between brigades. Great confusion

consequently on our left front, where two battalions of

Durhams were mixed up with the Queen’s Westminster Rifles,

and the London Rifle Brigade, moving up in support, added to 128

the congestion. Casualties were heavy--Queen’s Westminster

Rifles, 12 officers, 300 other ranks; Queen Victoria’s

Rifles, 15 officers and 400 other ranks.”

The attack had not, however, dissolved at all points, as a thin line

of troops undoubtedly advanced a thousand yards, and more, beyond the

practice trenches. But these gallant fellows soon found themselves in

a very lonely position, and as the 30th and 50th Divisions failed to

make any ground at all, they had Germans practically on all sides of

them. They remained for some time and eventually withdrew.

The next two days, the 15th and 16th, were occupied in consolidating

the ground gained. The division had alarms of counter-attack, but

nothing developed on their front. On the left, however, the enemy

attacked and recaptured Wancourt Tower from the 50th Division. This

point was not retaken by us until the next day, but the 56th Division

were not concerned. Further advance was postponed until the 22nd

April, and on the 18th the 30th Division took over the line from the

56th Division.

This was the opening battle of the Arras series, and is known as the

First Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, and is linked up with the Battle of

Vimy Ridge. The student would do well to consider the two battles as

one. The capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadians, and of Monchy by

troops of the Third Army, gave us positions of great importance and

improved the situation round Arras. The feeling of the 56th Division

was that it had been a great fight, and that they had proved

themselves undoubtedly better men than the Germans. The capture of

Neuville Vitasse and subsequent rolling up of the Hindenburg Line to 129

the south of Heninel was a feat of which they felt proud. And they had

killed a lot of the enemy at close quarters.

It is an interesting battle, as it undoubtedly inflicted a terrifying

defeat on the enemy. Ludendorff says of it[4]:

“The 10th April and the following days were critical. The

consequences of a break through, of 12 to 15 kilometres wide

and 6 or more kilometres deep, are not easy to meet. In view

of the heavy losses in men, guns, and ammunition resulting

from such a break through, colossal efforts are needed to

make good the damage.... A day like 9th April threw all

calculations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a

line could really be formed and consolidated. The end of the

crisis, even if troops were available, depended very

largely, as it generally does in such cases, on whether the

enemy, after his first victory, would attack again, and by

further success aggravate the difficulty of forming a new

line. Our position having been weakened, such victories were

to be won only too easily....”

Hindenburg also confesses to very anxious moments, and suggests that

“the English did not seem to have known how to exploit the success

they had gained to the full.”

In his dispatch on this battle Sir Douglas Haig said that:

“With the forces at my disposal, even combined with what the

French proposed to undertake in co-operation, I did not

consider that any great strategical results were likely to be 130

gained by following up a success on the front about Arras,

and to the south of it, beyond the capture of the objectives

aimed at.... It was therefore my intention to transfer my

main offensive to another part of the front after these

objectives had been secured.

The front selected for these operations was in Flanders.

They were to be commenced as soon as possible after the

Arras offensive, and continued throughout the summer, so far

as the forces at my disposal would permit.”

It must be remembered that the plans for the year were drawn up in

consultation with our Allies, and the battles of Arras must be taken

as a part only of those plans. The First and Third Armies secured

positions which Sir Douglas Haig intended that they should secure;

they inflicted great loss on the enemy, more than 13,000 prisoners and

over 200 guns; they drew German reserves until at the end of the

operations there were twice as many enemy troops on that front as at

the beginning, which materially helped our Allies, who were on the

point of launching a big offensive on the Aisne and in Champagne. On

the whole, these battles fulfilled their object and may be viewed with

satisfaction.

On the 16th April the French attacked the Chemin-des-Dames, north-west

of Rheims, and in the Champagne, south of Rheims. They met with very

heavy losses and most obstinate resistance. These were the

much-discussed operations under Gen. Nivelle, and, in order to assist,

Sir Douglas Haig agreed to continue the operations round Arras longer

than was his first intention. Plans, which had been made for a

rearrangement of artillery and troops for the operations at Ypres, 131

were cancelled, and orders were issued for a continuance, with shallow

objectives, of the fighting at Arras.

The First Battle of the Scarpe and the Battle of Vimy Ridge were,

therefore, the original scheme, and the subsequent battles should be

considered with this fact in mind. They were: the Second Battle of the

Scarpe, 1917, 23rd-24th April; the Battle of Arleux, 28th-29th April;

the Third Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, 3rd-4th May. The Battle of

Bullecourt, 3rd-17th May, and a number of actions must also be

included in the subsequent Arras offensive.

A few days’ rest was granted to the 56th Division. The 167th Brigade

was round Pommier, the 168th round Couin, the 169th round Souastre.

Divisional Headquarters were first at Couin and then at Hauteville. On

the 25th Gen. Hull was ordered to hold himself in readiness to move

into either the VI or the VII Corps, and the next day was definitely

ordered into the VI Corps. On the 27th the 167th Brigade relieved the

15th Division in the front line, and Divisional Headquarters opened in

Rue de la Paix, Arras.

* * * * *

From the Harp, which it will be remembered was the original line, to

east of Monchy there runs a ridge of an average height of 100 metres;

at Monchy itself it rises above 110 metres. This ridge shoots out a

number of spurs towards the Cojeul River to the south. The position

taken over by the 167th Brigade was from a small copse south-east of

Monchy to the Arras-Cambrai road, about 500 yards from the Cojeul, and

on the reverse slope of one of these spurs. Observation for them was 132

bad, and the enemy trenches were well sited and frequently over the

crest of the hill.

On the 29th the 169th Brigade took over the right of the line from the

167th. The front line was then held by the London Rifle Brigade, the

2nd London Regt., the 1st London Regt., and the 7th Middlesex

Regiment. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles were in support of the Queen’s

Westminster Rifles in reserve to the right brigade, and the 3rd London

Regt. in support and the 8th Middlesex Regt. in reserve to the left

brigade.

With a view to the important operations which the French were to carry

out on the 5th May, it was decided to attack on an extended front at

Arras on the 3rd. While the Third and First Armies attacked from

Fontaine-les-Croisilles to Fresnoy, the Fifth Army launched an attack

on the Hindenburg Line about Bullecourt. This gave a total front of

over sixteen miles. [The Third Battle of the Scarpe, 1917.]

Zero hour was 3.45 a.m., and in the darkness, illumined by wavering

star-shells fired by a startled enemy, and with the crashing of the

barrage, the men of the 56th Division advanced from their assembly

trenches. As soon as the first waves topped the crest, they were met

with a withering machine-gun and rifle fire. The ground was confusing

and the darkness intense--officers, as was so often the case in night

attacks, found it impossible to direct their men. Exactly what

happened will never be known in detail. No reports came in for a

considerable time.

With daylight the artillery observation officers began to communicate

with headquarters. Our men, they said, had advanced 1,000 yards on 133

the right, and were digging in near a factory (Rohart) on the bank of

the Cojeul, and the 14th Division on their right seemed to have

reached its objectives. About 300 yards over the crest of the spur was

a trench known as Tool, and this seemed to be occupied by the enemy.

Soon after this the 169th Brigade reported that the London Rifle

Brigade were holding a pit near the factory and a trench about the

same place; the 2nd London Regt. had a footing in Tool Trench. The

latter position is doubtful, but the 2nd Londons were well forward.

Cavalry Farm, near and to the right of the original line, was still

held by the enemy, and about 10 o’clock the Queen Victoria’s Rifles,

after a short bombardment by the Stokes mortars, rushed and secured

the farm. They found a number of dugouts, which they bombed, and

secured 22 prisoners. The farm was connected with Tool Trench, and

they proceeded to bomb their way up it. It would appear, therefore,

that the 2nd London Regt. held a small section of this trench farther

to the north, if any at all.

We must now follow the 167th Brigade on the left. The two attacking

battalions had been met with even worse machine-gun fire than the

169th Brigade. There was no news of them for a long time. It is clear

that neither the 1st London Regt. nor the 7th Middlesex ever held any

of Tool Trench, but a few gallant parties did undoubtedly overrun

Tool, and, crossing a sunken road known as Stirrup Lane, reached

Lanyard Trench, quite a short distance from the men of the London

Rifle Brigade, who had lodged themselves in the pit near Rohart

Factory. They were, however, not in sufficient numbers to join hands 134

with the London Rifle Brigade, or some small groups of the 2nd London,

who were also in advanced shell-holes, and about 8 o’clock in the

evening were forced to surrender. (A small party was seen marching

east without arms.) The remaining 1st London and 7th Middlesex men lay

out in shell-holes in front of Tool Trench.

Soon after the Queen Victoria’s Rifles had captured Cavalry Farm and

started to bomb up Tool Trench, with the forward artillery and trench

mortars helping them, the 3rd Division on the left of the 56th

declared that their men were in the northern end of Tool. They asked

that the artillery should be lifted off the trench, as they were going

to bomb down towards the Queen Victoria’s Rifles. But it appears that

they were very soon driven out, as by 3 p.m. the 3rd Division were

definitely reported to be in touch with the 7th Middlesex in the

original line.

Meanwhile the 14th Division, on the right, which had made good

progress at the start, had been violently counter-attacked, and at

11.50 a.m. reported that they had been driven back to their original

line.

Brig.-Gen. Coke, of the 169th Brigade, now found his men in a queer

position. The troops on either flank of his brigade were back in the

line they had started from; he ascertained that none of his brigade

were north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and so he held a long tongue in

the valley of the Cojeul open to attack from the high ground on either

side of it.

[Illustration: _4. THE BATTLES OF ARRAS 1917._]

[Illustration: _4. THE BATTLES OF ARRAS 1917._]

Much movement by the enemy was observed during the afternoon;

reinforcements were assembling in Tool and the sunken road behind it.

About 10 o’clock in the evening the Germans started a fierce 135

bombardment of the tongue of land held by the London Rifle Brigades

and 2nd London Regts., and, after an hour of ceaseless fire,

counter-attacked and drove the troops back to their original lines.

Gen. Hull then ordered them to hold their original line and

reorganise, but before the orders could reach them these two fine

battalions had attacked again and reoccupied all the positions they

had gained in the morning with the exception of Cavalry Farm. But they

were in a bad situation. With the enemy holding the Cambrai road in

force, the only communication with the advanced troops was down the

bottom of the valley, a place of much water and mud. Brig.-Gen. Coke

therefore withdrew his men just before sunrise. They brought with

them, however, a German officer and 15 men who had surrendered in the

neighbourhood of Cavalry Farm.

It had been a day of very hard fighting, and the gain on the whole of

the sixteen miles of front attacked was Fresnoy, which had been taken

by the Canadians, and a portion of the Hindenburg Line, east of

Bullecourt, captured by the Australians. The enemy had been terribly

frightened by the successful start of the battles of Arras. Hindenburg

and Ludendorff were putting into effect their new system of holding

the front in depth, but thin in the forward zones, with many machine

guns, and strong supports for immediate counter-attack. It seemed as

though their system had broken down at the first test, and, as the

Russians were no longer a menace to them, they poured reinforcements

across Germany. But, as we know, this continuation of the offensive

was with the object of helping our Allies by holding troops and guns 136

which might otherwise have been used against them.

The 167th and 169th Brigades held the line for one day more, and were

relieved by the 168th on the 5th May. The latter brigade also took

over a stretch of extra line to the north.

The enemy was exceedingly quiet and our patrols very active. If any

indication is wanted of the high _moral_ of the 56th Division, it can

be found in this patrol work. After an action of this kind, when the

two brigades lost just on a thousand men, really audacious

reconnoitring deserves the highest praise. Again and again attempts

were made by patrols to enter Tool Trench, only to find the enemy

alert. Cavalry Farm, on the right, and the copse, on the left, were

both entered and found unoccupied; but the exact position of the enemy

in Tool Trench was ascertained.

Meanwhile the heavy artillery kept up a steady fire on Tool Trench,

causing large numbers of Germans to run over the open and seek safer

ground. And troops worked hard on our trenches, which were greatly

improved.

At 8.30 p.m. on the 11th May the 4th London Regt. on the right and the

London Scottish on the left attacked Cavalry Farm and the trench on

the far side of it, and Tool Trench.

A practice barrage on the previous day had drawn heavy fire in a few

minutes, and it had been decided not to have a barrage, but to keep

the heavy artillery firing steadily to the last minute. The enemy, who

held the line in full strength, were taken by surprise. Only Cavalry

Farm was visible from our line, and the 4th London Regt. swept into

this place with no difficulty. But the right of the enemy line was 137

able to put up a fight, and the left company of the London Scottish

suffered somewhat severely. Except for this one point, the trench was

vacated by its garrison in a wild scramble. They could not, however,

escape the Lewis gunners and brigade machine-gunners, who did some

good execution. Quite a lot of the enemy were killed in the trench and

a round dozen taken prisoner--they were of the 128th Infantry Regt.

and the 5th Grenadier Regt. Eight machine guns were also found.

Tool Trench was only a part of the enemy line which ran up the hill on

the east of Monchy. To the south of the copse it was Tool and to the

north it was Hook. The very northern end of Tool and all of Hook

remained in the hands of the enemy. A block was made by filling in

about forty yards of the trench and the new line was consolidated.

The new line had been much damaged by our fire, but it was soon

reconstructed, and two communication trenches were dug to the old

line. Meanwhile the trench mortars kept up a steady bombardment of

Hook Trench, and snipers picked off the enemy as he attempted to seek

the safer shell-holes in the open.

During the next few days several deserters from the 5th Grenadier

Regt. came in, and they, in common with other prisoners, persisted in

stating that the enemy was contemplating a retirement. Patrols,

however, always found Lanyard Trench and Hook fully garrisoned. The

167th Brigade had taken over the line from the 168th, and the 8th

Middlesex attempted to rush both Lanyard and Hook; this was not done

in force, but was more in the nature of a surprise by strong patrols.

They found the enemy too alert.