the Government, and in favour of this Address to the Crown; but I
thought it was a statement remarkably feeble in fact and in argument, if
intended as a justification of the course he and his Colleagues have
taken. For the purposes of the noble Lord's defence, the Russian demand
upon Turkey is assumed to be something of far greater importance than I
have been able to discover it to be from a careful examination of the
terms in which it was couched. The noble Lord himself, in one of his
despatches, admits that Russia had reason to complain, and that she has
certain rights and duties by treaty, and by tradition, with regard to
the protection of the Christians in Turkey. Russia asserted these
rights, and wished to have them defined in a particular form; and it was
on the question of the form of the demand, and the manner in which it
should be conceded, that the whole of this unfortunate difference has
arisen. Now, if Russia made certain demands on Turkey, this country
insisted that Turkey should not consent to them; for although the noble
Lord has attempted to show that Turkey herself, acting for herself, had
resolved to resist, I defy any one to read the despatches of Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe without coming to the conclusion that, from the
beginning to the end of the negotiations, the English Ambassador had
insisted, in the strongest manner, that Turkey should refuse to make the
slightest concession on the real point at issue in the demands of the
Russian Government. As a proof of that statement, I may refer to the
account given by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in his despatch of the 5th
of May, 1853, of the private interview he had with the Sultan, the
Minister of the Sultan having left him at the door, that the interview
might be strictly private. In describing that interview, Lord Stratford
says, 'I then endeavoured to give him a just idea of the degree of
danger to which his Empire was exposed.' The Sultan was not sufficiently
aware of his danger, and the English Ambassador 'endeavoured to give him
a just idea of it;' and it was by means such as this that he urged upon
the Turkish Government the necessity of resistance to any of the demands
of Russia, promising the armed assistance of England, whatever
consequences might ensue. From the moment that promise was made, or from
the moment it was sanctioned by the Cabinet at home, war was all but
inevitable; they had entered into a partnership with the Turkish
Government (which, indeed, could scarcely be called a Government at
all), to assist it by military force; and Turkey, having old quarrels to
settle with Russia, and old wrongs to avenge, was not slow to plunge
into the war, having secured the co-operation of two powerful nations,
England and France, in her quarrel.
Now, I have no special sympathy with Russia, and I refuse to discuss or
to decide this question on grounds of sympathy with Russia or with
Turkey; I consider it simply as it affects the duties and the interests
of my own country. I find that after the first proposition for a treaty
had been made by Prince Menchikoff, that envoy made some concession, and
asked only for a _Sened_, or Convention; and when that was
disapproved of, he offered to accept a note, or memorandum merely, that
should specify what should be agreed upon. But the Turk was advised to
resist, first the treaty, then the convention, and then the note or
memorandum; and an armed force was promised on behalf of this country.
At the same time he knew that he would incur the high displeasure of
England and France, and especially of England, if he made the slightest
concession to Russia. It was about the middle of May that Prince
Menchikoff left Constantinople, not having succeeded in obtaining any
concession from the Porte; and it was on the 3rd of July that the
Russian forces crossed the Pruth; thinking, I believe, by making a dash
at the Principalities, to coerce Turkey, and deter her allies from
rendering her the promised support. It has been assumed by some, that if
England had declared war last year, Russia would have been deterred from
any further step, and that the whole matter would have been settled at
once. I, however, have no belief that Russia on the one hand, or England
and France on the other, would have been bullied into any change of
policy by means of that kind.
I come now to the celebrated 'Vienna note.' I am bound here to say, that
nobody has yet been able clearly to explain the difference between the
various notes Turkey has been advised to reject, and this and other
notes she has been urged to accept. With respect to this particular
note, nobody seems to have understood it. There were four Ambassadors at
Vienna, representing England, France, Austria, and Prussia; and these
four gentlemen drew up the Vienna note, and recommended it to the Porte
as one which she might accept without injury to her independence or her
honour. Louis Napoleon is a man knowing the use of language, and able to
comprehend the meaning of a document of this nature, and his Minister of
Foreign Affairs is a man of eminent ability; and Louis Napoleon and his
Minister agree with the Ambassadors at Vienna as to the character of the
Vienna note. We have a Cabinet composed of men of great individual
capacity; a Cabinet, too, including no less than five Gentlemen who have
filled the office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and who may,
therefore, be presumed to understand even the sometimes concealed
meaning of diplomatic phraseology. These five Foreign Secretaries,
backed by the whole Cabinet, concurred with the Ambassadors at Vienna,
and with the Emperor of the French and his Foreign Secretary, in
recommending the Vienna note to the Sultan as a document which he might
accept consistently with his honour, and with that integrity and that
independence which our Government is so anxious to secure for him. What
was done with this note? Passing by the marvellous stupidity, or
something worse, which caused that note not to be submitted to Turkey
before it was sent to St. Petersburg, he would merely state that it was
sent to St. Petersburg, and was accepted in its integrity by the Emperor
of Russia in the most frank and unreserved manner. We were then told--I
was told by Members of the Government--that the moment the note was
accepted by Russia we might consider the affair to be settled, and that
the dispute would never be heard of again. When, however, the note was
sent to Constantinople, after its acceptance by Russia, Turkey
discovered, or thought, or said she discovered, that it was as bad as
the original or modified proposition of Prince Menchikoff, and she
refused the note as it was, and proposed certain modifications. And what
are we to think of these arbitrators or mediators--the four Ambassadors
at Vienna, and the Governments of France and England--who, after
discussing the matter in three different cities, and at three distinct
and different periods, and after agreeing that the proposition was one
which Turkey could assent to without detriment to her honour and
independence, immediately afterwards turned round, and declared that the
note was one which Turkey could not be asked to accede to, and
repudiated in the most formal and express manner that which they
themselves had drawn up, and which, only a few days before, they had
approved of as a combination of wisdom and diplomatic dexterity which
had never been excelled?
But it was said that the interpretation which Count Nesselrode placed
upon this note made it impossible for Turkey to accede to it. I very
much doubt whether Count Nesselrode placed any meaning upon it which it
did not fairly warrant, and it is impossible to say whether he really
differed at all from the actual intentions of the four Ambassadors at
Vienna. But I can easily understand the course taken by the Russian
Minister. It was this:--seeing the note was rejected by the Turk, and
considering that its previous acceptance by Russia was some concession
from the original demand, he issued a circular, giving such an
explanation or interpretation of the Vienna note as might enable him to
get back to his original position, and might save Russia from being
committed and damaged by the concession, which, for the sake of peace,
she had made. This circular, however, could make no real difference in
the note itself; and notwithstanding this circular, whatever the note
really meant, it would have been just as binding upon Russia as any
other note will be that may be drawn up and agreed to at the end of the
war. Although, however, this note was considered inadmissible,
negotiations were continued; and at the Conference at Olmutz, at which
the Earl of Westmoreland was present, the Emperor of Russia himself
expressed his willingness to accept the Vienna note--not in the sense
that Count Nesselrode had placed upon it, but in that which the
Ambassadors at Vienna declared to be its real meaning, and with such a
clause as they should attach to it, defining its real meaning.
It is impossible from this fairly to doubt the sincerity of the desire
for peace manifested by the Emperor of Russia. He would accept the note
prepared by the Conference at Vienna, sanctioned by the Cabinets in
London and Paris, and according to the interpretation put upon it by
those by whom it had been prepared--such interpretation to be defined in
a clause, to be by them attached to the original note. But in the
precise week in which these negotiations were proceeding apparently to a
favourable conclusion, the Turkish Council, consisting of a large number
of dignitaries of the Turkish Empire--not one of whom, however,
represented the Christian majority of the population of Turkey, but
inspired by the fanaticism and desperation of the old Mahomedan party--
assembled; and, fearful that peace would be established, and that they
would lose the great opportunity of dragging England and France into a
war with their ancient enemy the Emperor of Russia, they came to a
sudden resolution in favour of war; and in the very week in which Russia
agreed to the Vienna note in the sense of the Vienna Conference, the
Turks declared war against Russia,--the Turkish forces crossed the
Danube, and began the war, involving England in an inglorious and costly
struggle, from which this Government and a succeeding Government may
fail to extricate us.
I differ very much from those Gentlemen who condemn the Government for
the tardy nature of their proceedings. I never said or thought that the
Government was not honestly anxious for peace; but I believe, and indeed
I know, that at an early period they committed themselves and the
country to a policy which left the issue of peace or war in other hands
than their own--namely, in the hands of the Turks, the very last hands
in which I am willing to trust the interests and the future of this
country. In my opinion, the original blunder was committed when the
Turks were advised to resist and not to concede; and the second blunder
was made when the Turks were supported in their rejection of the Vienna
note; for the moment the four Powers admitted that their recommendation
was not necessarily to be accepted by the Porte, they put themselves
entirely into the hands of the Turk, and might be dragged into any depth
of confusion and war in which that respectable individual might wish to
involve them.
The course taken by Turkey in beginning the war was against the strong
advice of her allies; but, notwithstanding this, the moment the step was
taken, they turned round again, as in the case of the Vienna note, and
justified and defended her in the course she had adopted, in defiance of
the remonstrances they had urged against it. In his speech to-night, the
noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) has occupied some time in showing that
Turkey was fully justified in declaring war. I should say nothing
against that view, if Turkey were fighting on her own resources; but I
maintain that, if she is in alliance with England and France, the
opinions of those Powers should at least have been heard, and that, in
case of her refusal to listen to their counsel, they would have been
justified in saying to her, 'If you persist in taking your own course,
we cannot be involved in the difficulties to which it may give rise, but
must leave you to take the consequences of your own acts.' But this was
not said, and the result is, that we are dragged into a war by the
madness of the Turk, which, but for the fatal blunders we have
committed, we might have avoided.
There have been three plans for dealing with this Turkish question,
advocated by as many parties in this country. The first finds favour
with two or three Gentlemen who usually sit on the bench below me--with
a considerable number out of doors--and with a portion of the public
press. These persons were anxious to have gone to war during last
summer. They seem actuated by a frantic and bitter hostility to Russia,
and, without considering the calamities in which they might involve this
country, they have sought to urge it into a great war, as they imagined,
on behalf of European freedom, and in order to cripple the resources of
Russia. I need hardly say that I have not a particle of sympathy with
that party, or with that policy. I think nothing can be more unwise than
that party, and nothing more atrocious than their policy. But there was
another course recommended, and which the Government has followed. War
delayed, but still certain--arrangements made which placed the issue of
war in other hands than in those of the Government of this country--that
is the policy which the Government has pursued, and in my opinion it is
fatal to Turkey, and disastrous to England. There is a third course, and
which I should have, and indeed have all along recommended--that war
should have been avoided by the acceptance on the part of Turkey either
of the last note of Prince Menchikoff, or of the Vienna note; or, if
Turkey would not consent to either, that then she should have been
allowed to enter into the war alone, and England and France--supposing
they had taken, and continued to take, the same view of the interests of
Western Europe which they have hitherto taken--might have stood aloof
until the time when there appeared some evident danger of the war being
settled on terms destructive of the balance of power; and then they
might have come in, and have insisted on a different settlement. I would
either have allowed or compelled Turkey to yield, or would have insisted
on her carrying on the war alone.
The question is, whether the advantages both to Turkey and England of
avoiding war altogether, would have been less than those which are
likely to arise from the policy which the Government has pursued? Now,
if the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton is right in saying that Turkey
is a growing Power, and that she has elements of strength which
unlearned persons like myself know nothing about; surely no immediate,
or sensible, or permanent mischief could have arisen to her from the
acceptance of the Vienna note, which all the distinguished persons who
agreed to it have declared to be perfectly consistent with her honour
and independence. If she has been growing stronger and stronger of late
years, surely she would have grown still stronger in the future, and
there might have been a reasonable expectation that, whatever
disadvantages she might have suffered for a time from that note, her
growing strength would have enabled her to overcome them, while the
peace of Europe might have been preserved. But suppose that Turkey is
not a growing Power, but that the Ottoman rule in Europe is tottering to
its fall, I come to the conclusion that, whatever advantages were
afforded to the Christian population of Turkey would have enabled them
to grow more rapidly in numbers, in industry, in wealth, in
intelligence, and in political power; and that, as they thus increased
in influence, they would have become more able, in case any accident,
which might not be far distant, occurred, to supplant the Mahomedan
rule, and to establish themselves in Constantinople as a Christian
State, which, I think, every man who hears me will admit is infinitely
more to be desired than that the Mahomedan power should be permanently
sustained by the bayonets of France and the fleets of England. Europe
would thus have been at peace; for I do not think even the most bitter
enemies of Russia believe that the Emperor of Russia intended last year,
if the Vienna note or Prince Menchikoff's last and most moderate
proposition had been accepted, to have marched on Constantinople.
Indeed, he had pledged himself in the most distinct manner to withdraw
his troops at once from the Principalities, if the Vienna note were
accepted; and therefore in that case Turkey would have been delivered
from the presence of the foe; peace would for a time have been secured
to Europe; and the whole matter would have drifted on to its natural
solution--which is, that the Mahomedan power in Europe should eventually
succumb to the growing power of the Christian population of the Turkish
territories.
The noble Lord the Member for London, and his colleague the noble Lord
the Member for Tiverton, when they speak of the aggrandisement of Russia
relatively to the rest of Europe, always speak of the 'balance of power'
a term which it is not easy to define. It is a hackneyed term--a phrase
to which it is difficult to attach any definite meaning. I wish the
noble Lord would explain what is meant by the balance of power. In 1791,
the whole Whig party repudiated the proposition that Turkey had anything
to do with the balance of power. Mr. Burke, in 1791, when speaking on
that subject, used the following language:--
'He had never heard it said before, that the Turkish Empire was
ever considered as any part of the balance of power in Europe.
They had nothing to do with European policy; they considered
themselves as wholly Asiatic. What had these worse than savages
to do with the Powers of Europe, but to spread war, destruction,
and pestilence among them? The Ministry and the policy which
would give these people any weight in Europe, would deserve all
the bans and curses of posterity. All that was holy in religion,
all that was moral and humane, demanded an abhorrence of
everything which tended to extend the power of that cruel and
wasteful Empire. Any Christian Power was to be preferred to these
destructive savages.'
Mr. Whitbread, on the same occasion, said:--
'Suppose the Empress at Constantinople, and the Turks expelled
from the European provinces, would any unprejudiced man contend
that by such an event mankind would not be largely benefited?
Would any man contend that the expulsion of a race of beings
whose abominable tyranny proscribed the arts, and literature, and
everything that was good, and great, and amiable, would not
conduce to the prosperity and happiness of the world? He was
convinced it would. This was an event with which the paltry
consideration of the nice adjustment of the balance in Europe was
not to be put in competition, although he was a friend to that
balance on broad and liberal principles. He abhorred the wretched
policy which could entertain a wish that the most luxuriant part
of the earth should remain desolate and miserable that a
particular system might be maintained.'
And Mr. Fox, when speaking of Mr. Pitt's system, said--and be it
remembered that nobody is so great an authority with the noble Lord the
Member for London as Mr. Fox, whose words I am now about to quote:--
'His (Mr. Pitt's) defensive system was wicked and absurd--that
every country which appeared, from whatever cause, to be growing
great, should be attacked; that all the Powers of Europe should
be confined to the same precise situation in which this defensive
system found them.... Her (Russia's) extent of territory, scanty
revenue, and thin population made her power by no means
formidable to us--a Power whom we could neither attack nor be
attacked by; and this was the Power against which we were going
to war. Overturning the Ottoman Empire he conceived to be an
argument of no weight. The event was not probable; and if it
should happen, it was more likely to be of advantage than
injurious to us.'
It will probably be said, that these were opinions held by Gentlemen who
sat on that side of the House, and who were ready to advocate any course
that might serve to damage the Ministers of the day. I should be sorry
to think so, especially of a man whose public character is so much to be
admired as that of Mr. Fox; but I will come to a much later period, and
produce authority of a very similar kind. Many hon. Members now in the
House recollect the late Lord Holland, and they all know his sagacity
and what his authority was with the party with which he was connected.
What did he say? Why, so late as the year 1828, when this question was
mooted in the House of Lords, he said:--
'No, my Lords, I hope I shall never see--God forbid I ever should
see--for the proposition would be scouted from one end of England
to another any preparations or any attempt to defend this our
"ancient ally" from the attacks of its enemies. There was no
arrangement made in that treaty for preserving the crumbling and
hateful, or, as Mr. Burke called it, that wasteful and disgusting
Empire of the Turks, from dismemberment and destruction; and none
of the Powers who were parties to that treaty will ever, I hope,
save the falling Empire of Turkey from ruin.'
I hope it will not be supposed that I am animated by any hostility to
Turkey, in quoting sentiments and language such as this, for I have as
much sympathy with what is just towards that country as any other man
can have; but the question is, not what is just to Turkey, but what is
just to this country, and what this House, as the depositary of the
power of this country, has a right to do with regard to this most
dangerous question. I am, therefore, at liberty to quote from the
statesmen of 1791 and 1828, the political fathers and authorities of the
noble Lord the Member for London, and to say, that if I hold opinions
different from those held by the Government, I am, at least, not
singular in those opinions, for I can quote great names and high
authorities in support of the course I am taking.
This 'balance of power' is in reality the hinge on which the whole
question turns. But if that is so important as to be worth a sanguinary
war, why did you not go to war with France when she seized upon Algiers?
That was a portion of Turkey not quite so distinct, it is true, as are
the Danubian Principalities; but still Turkey had sovereign rights over
Algiers. When, therefore, France seized on a large portion of the
northern coast of Africa, might it not have been said that such an act
tended to convert the Mediterranean into a French lake,--that Algiers
lay next to Tunis, and that, having conquered Tunis, there would remain
only Tripoli between France and Alexandria, and that the 'balance of
power' was being destroyed by the aggrandisement of France? All this
might have been said, and the Government might easily have plunged the
country into war on that question. But happily the Government of that
day had the good sense not to resist, and the result had not been
disadvantageous to Europe; this country had not suffered from the
seizure of Algiers, and England and France had continued at peace.
Take another case--the case of the United States. The United States
waged war with Mexico--a war with a weaker State--in my opinion, an
unjust and unnecessary war. If I had been a citizen of the American
Republic, I should have condemned that war; but might it not have been
as justly argued that, if we allowed the aggressive attacks of the
United States upon Mexico, her insatiable appetite would soon be turned
towards the north--towards the dependencies of this Empire--and that the
magnificent colonies of the Canadas would soon fall a prey to the
assaults of their rapacious neighbour? But such arguments were not used,
and it was not thought necessary to involve this country in a war for
the support of Mexico, although the Power that was attacking that
country lay adjacent to our own dominions.
If this phrase of the 'balance of power' is to be always an argument for
war, the pretence for war will never be wanting, and peace can never be
secure. Let any one compare the power of this country with that of
Austria now, and forty years ago. Will any one say that England,
compared with Austria, is now three times as powerful as she was thirty
or forty years ago? Austria has a divided people, bankrupt finances, and
her credit is so low that she cannot borrow a shilling out of her own
territories; England has a united people, national wealth rapidly
increasing, and a mechanical and productive power to which that of
Austria is as nothing. Might not Austria complain that we have disturbed
the 'balance of power' because we are growing so much stronger from
better government, from the greater union of our people, from the wealth
that is created by the hard labour and skill of our population, and from
the wonderful development of the mechanical resources of the kingdom,
which is seen on every side? If this phrase of the 'balance of power'
the meaning of which nobody can exactly make out, is to be brought in on
every occasion to stimulate this country to war, there is an end to all
hope of permanent peace.