There is, indeed, a question of a 'balance of power' which this country

might regard, if our statesmen had a little less of those narrow views

which they sometimes arrogantly impute to me and to those who think with

me. If they could get beyond those old notions which belong to the

traditions of Europe, and cast their eyes as far westward as they are

now looking eastward, they might there see a power growing up in its

gigantic proportions, which will teach us before very long where the

true 'balance of power' is to be found. This struggle may indeed begin

with Russia, but it may end with half the States of Europe; for Austria

and Prussia are just as likely to join with Russia as with England and

France, and probably much more so; and we know not how long alliances

which now appear very secure, may remain so; for the circumstances in

which the Government has involved us are of the most critical character,

and we stand upon a mine which may explode any day. Give us seven years

of this infatuated struggle upon which we are now entering, and let the

United States remain at peace during that period, and who shall say what

will then be the relative positions of the two nations? Have you read

the Reports of your own Commissioners to the New York Exhibition? Do you

comprehend what is the progress of that country, as exhibited in its

tonnage, and exports, and imports, and manufactures, and in the

development of all its resources, and the means of transit? There has

been nothing like it hitherto under the sun. The United States may

profit to a large extent by the calamities which will befall us; whilst

we, under the miserable and lunatic idea that we are about to set the

worn-out Turkish Empire on its legs, and permanently to sustain it

against the aggressions of Russia, are entangled in a war. Our trade

will decay and diminish--our people, suffering and discontented, as in

all former periods of war, will emigrate in increasing numbers to a

country whose wise policy is to keep itself free from the entanglement

of European politics--to a country with which rests the great question,

whether England shall, for any long time, retain that which she

professes to value so highly--her great superiority in industry and at

sea.

This whole notion of the 'balance of power' is a mischievous delusion

which has come down to us from past times; we ought to drive it from our

minds, and to consider the solemn question of peace or war on more

clear, more definite, and on far higher principles than any that are

involved in the phrase the 'balance of power.' What is it the Government

propose to do? Let us examine their policy as described in the message

from the Crown, and in the Address which has been moved to-night. As I

understand it, we are asked to go to war to maintain the 'integrity and

independence of the Ottoman Empire'--to curb the aggressive power of

Russia--and to defend the interests of this country.

These are the three great objects to which the efforts and resources of

this country are to be directed. The noble Lord the Member for London

is, I think, the author of the phrase 'the integrity and independence'

of Turkey. If I am not mistaken, he pledged himself to this more than a

year ago, when he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a

letter to somebody at Newcastle-on-Tyne, in answer to an Address from

certain enthusiasts in that town, who exhorted the Government to step in

for the support of the Ottoman Empire. But what is the condition of that

Empire at this moment? I have already described to the House what it

would have been if my policy had been adopted--if the thrice-modified

note of Prince Menchikoff had been accepted, or if the Vienna note had

been assented to by the Porte. But what is it now under the protection

of the noble Lord and his Colleagues? At the present moment there are no

less than three foreign armies on Turkish soil: there are 100,000

Russian troops in Bulgaria; there are armies from England and France

approaching the Dardanelles, to entrench themselves on Turkish

territory, and to return nobody knows when. All this can hardly

contribute to the 'independence' of any country. But more than this:

there are insurrections springing up in almost every Turkish province,

and insurrections which must, from the nature of the Turkish Government,

widely extend; and it is impossible to describe the anarchy which must

prevail, inasmuch as the control heretofore exercised by the Government

to keep the peace is now gone, by the withdrawal of its troops to the

banks of the Danube; and the licence and demoralization engendered by

ages of bad government will be altogether unchecked. In addition to

these complicated horrors, there are 200,000 men under arms; the state

of their finances is already past recovery; and the allies of Turkey are

making demands upon her far beyond anything that was required by Russia

herself. Can anything be more destructive of the 'integrity and

independence' of Turkey than the policy of the noble Lord?

I have seen only this day a letter in the Times from its Correspondent

at Constantinople, which states that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and one

of the Pashas of the Porte had spent a whole night in the attempt to

arrange concessions which her allies had required on behalf of the

Christian population of Turkey. The Christians are to be allowed to hold

landed property; the capitation tax is to be abolished--for they are

actually contending for the abolition of that which the hon. Member for

Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) says is a positive benefit to those upon whom it

is imposed; and the evidence of Christians is to be admitted into courts

of justice. But the _Times_' Correspondent asks, what is the use of

a decree at Constantinople, which will have no effect in the provinces?--

for the judges are Turks of the old school, and they will have little

sympathy with a change under which a Christian in a court of justice is

made equal with his master the Turk. This Correspondent describes what

Turkey really wants--not three foreign armies on her soil, nor any other

thing which our Government is about to give her, but 'a pure executive,

a better financial administration, and sensible laws;' and it must be

admitted that the true wants of the country are not likely soon to be

supplied.

Now, so far as regards Turkey herself, and the 'integrity and

independence' of that Empire, I put it seriously to the House--do you

believe, that if the Government and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had

advised Turkey to accept the last note of Prince Menchikoff, a note so

little different from the others, offered before and since, that it was

impossible to discover in what the distinction consisted; or if the

Government had insisted on Turkey accepting, as the condition of their

co-operation, the Vienna note, either as at first proposed by the

Conference, or with the explanatory definitions with which the Emperor

of Russia at Olmutz offered to accept it, that they would have injured

the 'integrity and independence' of Turkey? Nay, I will not insult you

by asking whether, under such circumstances, that 'integrity and

independence' would not have been a thousand times more secure than it

is at this hour? If that be true, then the 'balance of power' theory has

been entirely overthrown by the policy of the Government, for no one

will argue that Turkey will come out of her present difficulties more

able to cope with the power of Russia than she was before. With her

finances hopelessly exhausted, will she ever again be able to raise an

army of 200,000 men? But there are men, and I suspect there are

statesmen, in this country, and men in office, too, who believe that

Turkey will not be Turkey at the end of this war--that she cannot come

out of it an Ottoman Power--that such a convulsion has been created,

that while we are ready to contend with half the world to support the

'integrity and independence' of the Ottoman Empire, there will shortly

be no Ottoman Empire to take the benefit of the enormous sacrifices we

are about to make.

But we are undertaking to repress and to curb Russian aggression. These

are catching words; they have been amplified in newspapers, and have

passed from mouth to mouth, and have served to blind the eyes of

multitudes wholly ignorant of the details of this question. If Turkey

has been in danger from the side of Russia heretofore, will she not be

in far greater danger when the war is over? Russia is always there. You

do not propose to dismember Russia, or to blot out her name from the

map, and her history from the records of Europe. Russia will be always

there--always powerful, always watchful, and actuated by the same

motives of ambition, either of influence or of territory, which are

supposed to have moved her in past times. What, then, do you propose to

do? and how is Turkey to be secured? Will you make a treaty with Russia,

and force conditions upon her? But if so, what security have you that

one treaty will be more binding than another? It is easy to find or make

a reason for breaking a treaty, when it is the interest of a country to

break it.

I recollect reading a statement made by the illustrious Washington, when

it was proposed to land a French army in North America, to assist the

colonies in overthrowing the yoke of this country. Washington was afraid

of them--he did not know whether these allies once landed might not be

as difficult to get rid of as the English troops he was endeavouring to

expel; for, said he, 'whatever may be the convention entered into, my

experience teaches me that nations and Governments rarely abide by

conventions or treaties longer than it is their interest to do so.' So

you may make a treaty with Russia; but if Russia is still powerful and

ambitious--as she certainly will be--and if Turkey is exhausted and

enfeebled by the war--as she certainly will be--then I want to know what

guarantee you have, the moment the resources of Russia have recovered

from the utmost degree of humiliation and exhaustion to which you may

succeed in reducing her, that she will not again insist on terms with

Turkey infinitely more perilous than those you have ruined Turkey by

urging her to refuse? It is a delusion to suppose you can dismember

Russia--that you can blot her from the map of Europe--that you can take

guarantees from her, as some seem to imagine, as easily as you take bail

from an offender, who would otherwise go to prison for three months.

England and France cannot do this with a stroke of the pen, and the

sword will equally fail if the attempt be made.

But I come now to another point. How are the interests of England

involved in this question? This is, after all, the great matter which

we, the representatives of the people of England, have to consider. It

is not a question of sympathy with any other State. I have sympathy with

Turkey; I have sympathy with the serfs of Russia; I have sympathy with

the people of Hungary, whose envoy the noble Lord the Member for

Tiverton refused to see, and the overthrow of whose struggle for freedom

by the armies of Russia he needlessly justified in this House; I have

sympathy with the Italians, subjects of Austria, Naples, and the Pope; I

have sympathy with the three millions of slaves in the United States;

but it is not on a question of sympathy that I dare involve this

country, or any country, in a war which must cost an incalculable amount

of treasure and of blood. It is not my duty to make this country the

knight-errant of the human race, and to take upon herself the protection

of the thousand millions of human beings who have been permitted by the

Creator of all things to people this planet.

I hope no one will assume that I would invite--that is the phrase which

has been used--the aggressions of Russia. If I were a Russian, speaking

in a Russian Parliament, I should denounce any aggression upon Turkey,

as I now blame the policy of our own Government; and I greatly fear I

should find myself in a minority, as I now find myself in a minority on

this question. But it has never yet been explained how the interests of

this country are involved in the present dispute. We are not going to

fight for tariffs, or for markets for our exports. In 1791, Mr. Grey

argued that, as our imports from Russia exceeded 1,000,000_l_.

sterling, it was not desirable that we should go to war with a country

trading with us to that amount. In 1853, Russia exported to this country

at least 14,000,000_l_. sterling, and that fact affords no proof of

the increasing barbarism of Russia, or of any disregard of her own

interests as respects the development of her resources. What has passed

in this House since the opening of the present session? We had a large

surplus revenue, and our Chancellor of the Exchequer is an ambitious

Chancellor. I have no hope in any statesman who has no ambition; he can

have no great object before him, and his career will be unmarked by any

distinguished services to his country.

When the Chancellor of the Exchequer entered office, doubtless he hoped,

by great services to his country, to build up a reputation such as a man

may labour for and live for. Every man in this House, even those most

opposed to him, acknowledged the remarkable capacity which he displayed

during the last session, and the country has set its seal to this--that

his financial measures, in the remission and readjustment of taxation,

were worthy of the approbation of the great body of the people. The

right hon. Gentleman has been blamed for his speech at Manchester, not

for making the speech, but because it differed from the tone of the

speech made by the noble Lord, his colleague in office, at Greenock. I

observed that difference. There can be no doubt that there has been, and

that there is now, a great difference of opinion in the Cabinet on this

Eastern question. It could not be otherwise; and Government has gone on

from one step to another; they have drifted--to use the happy expression

of Lord Clarendon to describe what is so truly unhappy--they have

drifted from a state of peace to a state of war; and to no Member of the

Government could this state of things be more distressing than to the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, for it dashed from him the hopes he

entertained that session after session, as trade extended and the public

revenue increased, he would find himself the beneficent dispenser of

blessings to the poor, and indeed to all classes of the people of this

kingdom. Where is the surplus now? No man dare even ask for it, or for

any portion of it.

Here is my right hon. Friend and Colleague, who is resolved on the

abolition of the newspaper stamp. I can hardly imagine a more important

question than that, if it be desirable for the people to be instructed

in their social and political obligations; and yet my right hon. Friend

has scarcely the courage to ask for the abolition of that odious tax. I

believe, indeed, that my right hon. Friend has a plan to submit to the

Chancellor by which the abolition of the stamp may be accomplished

without sacrifice to the Exchequer, but that I will not go into at

present. But this year's surplus is gone, and next year's surplus is

gone with it; and you have already passed a Bill to double the income-

tax. And it is a mistake to suppose that you will obtain double the sum

by simply doubling the tax. Many persons make an average of their

incomes, and make a return accordingly. The average will not be

sustained at the bidding of Parliament; and profits that were

considerable last year, will henceforth show a great diminution, or will

have vanished altogether. I mention this for the benefit of the country

gentlemen, because it is plain that real property, lands and houses,

must bear the burden of this war; for I will undertake to say, that the

Chancellor of the Exchequer will prefer to leave that bench, and will

take his seat in some other quarter of the House, rather than retrace

the steps which Sir Robert Peel took in 1842. He is not the promoter of

this war; his speeches have shown that he is anxious for peace, and that

he hoped to be a Minister who might dispense blessings by the remission

of taxes to the people; and I do not believe the right hon. Gentleman

will consent to be made the instrument to reimpose upon the country the

Excise duties which have been repealed, or the Import duties which in

past times inflicted such enormous injury upon trade. The property-tax

is the lever, or the weapon, with which the proprietors of lands and

houses in this kingdom will have to support the 'integrity and

independence' of the Ottoman Empire. Gentlemen, I congratulate you, that

every man of you has a Turk upon his shoulders.

The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) spoke of our 'triumphant

position'--the position in which the Government has placed us by

pledging this country to support the Turks. I see nothing like a triumph

in the fact, that in addition to our many duties to our own country, we

have accepted the defence of twenty millions or more of the people of

Turkey, on whose behalf, but, I believe, not for their benefit, we are

about to sacrifice the blood and treasure of England. But there are

other penalties and other considerations. I will say little about the

Reform Bill, because, as the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) is aware, I

do not regard it as an unmixed blessing. But I think even hon. Gentlemen

opposite will admit that it would be well if the representation of the

people in this House were in a more satisfactory state, and that it is

unfortunate that we are not permitted, calmly and with mutual good

feeling, to consider the question, undisturbed by the thunder of

artillery and undismayed by the disasters which are inseparable from a

state of war.

With regard to trade, I can speak with some authority as to the state of

things in Lancashire. The Russian trade is not only at an end, but it is

made an offence against the law to deal with any of our customers in

Russia. The German trade is most injuriously affected by the uncertainty

which prevails on the continent of Europe. The Levant trade, a very

important branch, is almost extinguished in the present state of affairs

in Greece, Turkey in Europe, and Syria. All property in trade is

diminishing in value, whilst its burdens are increasing. The funds have

fallen in value to the amount of about 120,000,000_l_. sterling,

and railway property is quoted at about 80,000,000_l_. less than

was the case a year ago. I do not pretend to ask the hon. Member for

Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) to put these losses, these great destructions of

property, against the satisfaction he feels at the 'triumphant position'

at which we have arrived. He may content himself with the dream that we

are supporting the 'integrity and independence' of Turkey, though I

doubt whether bringing three foreign armies on her soil, raising

insurrections in her provinces, and hopelessly exhausting her finances,

is a rational mode of maintaining her as an independent Power.

But we are sending out 30,000 troops to Turkey, and in that number are

not included the men serving on board the fleets. Here are 30,000 lives!

There is a thrill of horror sometimes when a single life is lost, and we

sigh at the loss of a friend, or of a casual acquaintance! But here we

are in danger of losing--and I give the opinions of military men and not

my own merely--10,000, or it may be 20,000 lives, that may be sacrificed

in this struggle. I have never pretended to any sympathy for the

military profession--but I have sympathy for my fellow-men and fellow-

countrymen, where-ever they may be. I have heard very melancholy

accounts of the scenes which have been witnessed in the separations from

families occasioned by this expedition to the East. But it will be said,

and probably the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton will say, that it is

a just war, a glorious war, and that I am full of morbid sentimentality,

and have introduced topics not worthy to be mentioned in Parliament. But

these are matters affecting the happiness of the homes of England, and

we, who are the representatives and guardians of those homes, when the

grand question of war is before us, should know at least that we have a

case--that success is probable--and that an object is attainable, which

may be commensurate with the cost of war.

There is another point which gives me some anxiety. You are boasting of

an alliance with France. Alliances are dangerous things. It is an

alliance with Turkey that has drawn us into this war. I would not advise

alliances with any nation, but I would cultivate friendship with all

nations. I would have no alliance that might drag us into measures which

it is neither our duty nor our interest to undertake. By our present

alliance with Turkey, Turkey cannot make peace without the consent of

England and France; and by this boasted alliance with France we may find

ourselves involved in great difficulties at some future period of these

transactions.

I have endeavoured to look at the whole of this question, and I declare,

after studying the correspondence which has been laid on the table--

knowing what I know of Russia and of Turkey--seeing what I see of

Austria and of Prussia--feeling the enormous perils to which this

country is now exposed, I am amazed at the course which the Government

have pursued, and I am horrified at the results to which their policy

must inevitably tend. I do not say this in any spirit of hostility to

the Government. I have never been hostile to them. I have once or twice

felt it my duty to speak, with some degree of sharpness, of particular

Members of the Administration, but I suspect that in private they would

admit that my censure was merited. But I have never entertained a party

hostility to the Government. I know something of the difficulties they

have had to encounter, and I have no doubt that, in taking office, they

acted in as patriotic a spirit as is generally expected from Members of

this House. So long as their course was one which I could support, or

even excuse, they have had my support. But this is not an ordinary

question; it is not a question of reforming the University of Oxford, or

of abolishing 'ministers' money' in Ireland; the matter now before us

affects the character, the policy, and the vital interests of the

Empire; and when I think the Government have committed a grievous--it

may be a fatal error--I am bound to tell them so.

I am told indeed that the war is popular, and that it is foolish and

eccentric to oppose it. I doubt if the war is very popular in this

House. But as to what is, or has been popular, I may ask, what was more

popular than the American war? There were persons lately living in

Manchester who had seen the recruiting party going through the principal

streets of that city, accompanied by the parochial clergy in full

canonicals, exhorting the people to enlist to put down the rebels in the

American colonies. Where is now the popularity of that disastrous and

disgraceful war, and who is the man to defend it? But if hon. Members

will turn to the correspondence between George III and Lord North, on

the subject of that war, they will find that the King's chief argument

for continuing the war was, that it would be dishonourable in him to

make peace so long as the war was popular with the people. Again, what

war could be more popular than the French war? Has not the noble Lord

(Lord John Russell) said, not long ago, in this House, that peace was

rendered difficult if not impossible by the conduct of the English press

in 1803? For myself, I do not trouble myself whether my conduct in

Parliament is popular or not. I care only that it shall be wise and just

as regards the permanent interests of my country, and I despise from the

bottom of my heart the man who speaks a word in favour of this war, or

of any war which he believes might have been avoided, merely because the

press and a portion of the people urge the Government to enter into it.

I recollect a passage of a distinguished French writer and statesman

which bears strongly upon our present position: he says,--

'The country which can comprehend and act upon the lessons which

God has given it in the past events of its history, is secure in

the most imminent crises of its fate.'

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