And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea
of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?
Very true, he said.
Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Yes.
But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one
thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there
must surely have been an act of recollection?
Very true.
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and
stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression
produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in
which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall short of
this perfect equality in a measure?
Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.
[Sidenote: But if the material equals when compared to the ideal equality
fall short of it, the ideal equality with which they are compared must be
prior to them, though only known through the medium of them.]
And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at
any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at
being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that
other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation
must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the
other, although similar, was inferior?
[Sidenote: _The ideal equality._]
Certainly.
And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals
and of absolute equality?
Precisely.
Then we must have known equality previously to the time
when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all 75
these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but
fall short of it?
Very true.
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only
been known, and can only be known, through the medium of
sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all
alike in this respect?
Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of
them is the same as the other.
From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all
sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall
short?
Yes.
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any
way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or
we could not have referred to that standard the equals which
are derived from the senses?—for to that they all aspire, and
of that they fall short.
No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.
And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other
senses as soon as we were born?
Certainly.
[Sidenote: That higher sense of equality must have been known to us
before we were born, was forgotten at birth, and was recovered by the use
of the senses.]
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at
some previous time?
Yes.
That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?
True.
[Sidenote: _The two alternatives._]
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born,
and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before
we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or
the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not
speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice,
holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence
in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we
answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that
we acquired the knowledge before birth?
We may.
But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what
in each case we acquired, then we must always have come
into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know
as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining
knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias,
just the losing of knowledge?
Quite true, Socrates.
[Sidenote: What is called learning therefore is only a recollection of
ideas which we possessed in a previous state.]
But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was
lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses
we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process
which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge
which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed
recollection?
Very true.
So much is clear—that when we perceive something, either 76
by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from
that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other
thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been
forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives
follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued
to know through life; or, after birth, those who are
said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.
Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.
And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we
the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things
which we knew previously to our birth?