And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived
from things either like or unlike?
It may be.
And when the recollection is derived from like things, then
another consideration is sure to arise, which is—whether the
likeness in any degree falls short or not of that which is
recollected?
[Sidenote: _The ideal equality and the material equals._]
Very true, he said.
And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there
is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone
with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute
equality? Shall we say so?
Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the
confidence in life.
And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?
To be sure, he said.
[Sidenote: The imperfect equality of pieces of wood or stone suggests the
perfect idea of equality.]
And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not
see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and
stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is
different from them? For you will acknowledge that there
is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way:—Do
not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time
equal, and at another time unequal?
That is certain.
But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality
the same as of inequality?
Impossible, Socrates.
Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea
of equality?