Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are
generated from the dead?
[Sidenote: _The circle of nature._]
That is clear, he replied.
Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world
below?
That is true.
And one of the two processes or generations is visible—for
surely the act of dying is visible?
Surely, he said.
What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the
opposite process? and shall we suppose nature to walk on
one leg only? Must we not rather assign to death some
corresponding process of generation?
Certainly, he replied.
And what is that process?
Return to life.
And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth
of the dead into the world of the living? 72
Quite true.
Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion
that the living come from the dead, just as the dead
come from the living; and this, if true, affords a most certain
proof that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of
which they come again.
Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow
necessarily out of our previous admissions.
[Sidenote: If there were no compensation or return in nature, all things
would pass into the state of death.]
And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said,
may be shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a
straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle
in nature, no turn or return of elements into their opposites,
then you know that all things would at last have the same
form and pass into the same state, and there would be no
more generation of them.
What do you mean? he said.
[Sidenote: _The doctrine of recollection._]
[Sidenote: The sleeping Endymion would be unmeaning in a world of
sleepers.]
A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case
of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alternation
of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping
Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all
other things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable
from the rest. Or if there were composition
only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of
Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my
dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die,
and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and
did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing
would be alive—what other result could there be? For if the
living spring from any other things, and they too die, must
not all things at last be swallowed up in death?[23]
There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your
argument seems to be absolutely true.
Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion;
and we have not been deluded in making these admissions;
but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living
again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the
souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls
have a better portion than the evil.
[Sidenote: The doctrine of recollection implies a previous existence.]
Cebes added: Your favourite doctrine, Socrates, that
knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily
implies a previous time in which we have learned that which
we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our
soul had been in some place before existing in the form of 73
man; here then is another proof of the soul’s immortality.
But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments
are urged in favour of this doctrine of recollection. I
am not very sure at the moment that I remember them.
[Sidenote: You put a question to a person, and he answers out of his own
mind.]
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions.
If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give
a true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless
there were knowledge and right reason already in him?
And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram
or to anything of that sort[24].
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I
would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you
look at the matter in another way;—I mean, if you are still
incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection?
Incredulous I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have
this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection,
and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect
and be convinced: but I should still like to hear what you
were going to say.
This is what I would say, he replied:—We should agree,
if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must
have known at some previous time.
Very true.
[Sidenote: _The association of ideas._]
[Sidenote: A person may recollect what he has never seen together with
what he has seen. How is this?]
And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection?
I mean to ask, Whether a person who, having seen or heard
or in any way perceived anything, knows not only that, but
has a conception of something else which is the subject, not
of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, may not be
fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception?
What do you mean?
I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:—The
knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of
a man?
True.
[Sidenote: Recollection is the knowledge of some person or thing derived
from some other person or thing which may be either like or unlike them.]
And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize
a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has
been in the habit of using? Do not they, from knowing the
lyre, form in the mind’s eye an image of the youth to whom
the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner
any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there
are endless examples of the same thing.
Endless, indeed, replied Simmias.
And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering
that which has been already forgotten through time and
inattention.
Very true, he said.
Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a
horse or a lyre remember a man? and from the picture of
Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes.
True.
Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias
himself?