Prediction Office.—Prophecies.—Useful Register.—Political
Bustlers.—Disposal of Land.—Rents.—Laws of Tenantry.—Government
Loans.
Among the other political curiosities, as they may be called, which came
to the knowledge of the travellers, was a most whimsical institution,
existing in several of the states, called a “prediction office;” viz. an
establishment consisting of two or three inspectors and a few clerks,
appointed to receive from any one, on payment of a trifling fee, any
sealed-up _prediction_, to be opened at a time specified by the party
himself. His name is to be signed to the prediction _within_; and on the
outer cover is inscribed the date of its delivery, and the time when the
seal is to be broken. There is no pretence made to supernatural
prophetic powers; only, to supposed political sagacity.
At stated times, the inspectors break the seal of those papers whose
term is elapsed, and examine the contents. In a great majority of cases,
as might be expected, these predictions turn out either false, nugatory,
or undecided: false, if contradicted by events; nugatory, if containing
nothing but what had been naturally and generally anticipated by
all,—like our almanacks, which foretell showers in April, heat in
summer, and cold in winter; or undecided, when proceeding hypothetically
on some _condition_ which does not take place,—as when a man foretells
that _if_ such a measure be adopted, so and so will ensue; if then the
measure is _not_ adopted, the prediction remains undecided. But here and
there a case occurs in which a man has foretold truly something not
generally expected, and the foreseeing of which evinces, accordingly,
more or less of sagacity. In such a case he is summoned to receive an
honourable certificate to that effect. And the travellers were assured
that some of their most eminent men, who afterwards attained to offices
of dignity and trust, had been first called into notice from obscurity
by means of this office. The other predictions are kept and registered,
but not made public, except when the author of any of them is named as a
candidate for any public office.
Previously to any such appointment, the inspectors are bound to look
over their register, and produce, as a set-off against a candidate’s
claims, any unsuccessful prediction he may have sent in. “Oh that he
were here,” exclaims Mr. Sibthorpe, “‘to write me down an ass!’ Many a
man there is to whom we have committed important public trusts, who, if
such an institution had existed among us, would be found to have
formally recorded, under the influence of self-conceit, his own
incapacity.” He seems to consider this portion of the effects of the
plan as hardly less useful than the other,—the establishment of the
claims of some to superior foresight.
“There is,” he adds, “among our political bustlers usually a great
squabble when any event takes place on the question, whether any one,
and who, may claim the honour of having foreseen it; and ill-founded
claims are often admitted. Moreover, a prediction publicly uttered will
often have had, or be supposed to have had, a great share in bringing
about its own fulfilment. He who gives out, for instance, that the
people will certainly be dissatisfied with such and such a law, is, in
this, doing his utmost to _make_ them dissatisfied. And this being the
case in all unfavourable, as well as favourable, predictions, some men
lose their deserved credit for political sagacity through their fear of
contributing to produce the evils they apprehend; while others, again,
do contribute to evil results by their incapacity to keep their
anticipations locked up in their own bosoms, and by their dread of not
obtaining deserved credit. For such men, this office,” says he,
“provides a relief like that which the servant of King Midas found by
telling his secret to the hole he dug in the ground; only there are here
no whispering reeds to divulge it.”
* * * * *
The mode in which the states that have considerable tracts of uncleared
land in their territory usually dispose of these from time to time,
struck the travellers as judicious and simple. When, from increasing
population, a demand arises for a fresh portion of land requiring to be
cleared and brought into cultivation, each person who desires to become
a settler rents from the state (which, as has been before observed, is
always held to be the sole proprietor in fee-simple of its whole
territory,) a suitable allotment, at a rent which is always very small,
and often merely nominal. He obtains a lease of this for a term of
years,—commonly twenty-one,—either at this nominal rent for the whole
term, or with a trifling increase for the last seven or fourteen years
of it. At the end of the term, it is _divided_ between him and the
state; part being made over to him in perpetuity, (subject to the
general land-tax, or government-rent, as it is called,) and the other
part reverting to the state. The proportions vary according as the
expenses of reclaiming the land are greater or less. If the requisite
outlay is considerable, the settler retains, perhaps, two-thirds, or
even three-fourths, of the allotment; if the reverse, his share will be
half, or one-third. In all cases, the proportions in which it is to be
divided are a matter of express agreement previously to his first
entering on the farm. Then, in order to secure a fair division of the
land in respect of _quality_,—that the more fertile and the poorer land,
the more and the less improved, may be duly apportioned,—recourse is had
to the obvious plan of “one to divide and the other to choose.”
Suppose, for instance, the tenant is to be entitled by his contract to
one-half; then, at the end of his term, he divides his holding into
any two portions, at his pleasure, and gives notice to the
state-surveyors, who, after due inspection, assign one of them
(whichever they please) to him. Besides this, however, it is very
often made a separate point of special agreement in the first
instance, that, at the end of his term, he shall have the option of
obtaining, at an advantageous rate, a lease for a further term of the
portion assigned to the state. He is to be allowed to hold it at a
rent below the market price. No _definite sum_, however, is fixed, and
the land is offered to the highest bidder; but the tenant who shall
have made such a contract as has been just alluded to, is to have a
certain _portion of his rent remitted_,—suppose 20, 30, or 40 per
cent. according to the agreement. He is thus enabled,—supposing all
parties to agree in their calculations of the land,—to outbid the
rest. Suppose A. to be the former tenant, and that the bidders for the
land do not offer quite so much as one hundred pounds rent for it, and
that he is under agreement to have twenty per cent. remitted; if he
then thinks the land worth eighty pounds, he may bid one hundred
pounds, and will be the successful competitor. But should A. not think
it worth while to pay so much as eighty pounds, while B. is willing to
pay one hundred pounds, then B. obtains it. Any bidder, to whom the
land is knocked down, forfeits a certain deposit in the event of his
not completing the bargain.
This mode of procedure it was found necessary to introduce on account of
the great and unexpected alterations in the value of land, which, in a
new settlement especially, may take place by means of new towns, roads,
and other improvements. A certain _proportion_ of the market price,
therefore, was fixed on, instead of a certain _definite sum_, as a more
equitable mode of adjusting the amount of the advantage agreed for.
All rents, whether for lands or houses, and whether from a tenant of the
state or of an individual, are payable a year _in advance_; in other
words, are payable, not for the year that is _past_, but for the year
that is to come.
[The rent, in short, is like the purchase-money of an estate, which is
to be paid _before_ the title-deeds are delivered and the possession
transferred.]
In like manner, with them, rent is the _purchase-money_ of the house or
land _for one year_; and the tenant has no claim upon it till that is
paid. Rent, accordingly, is not recoverable or claimable as a _debt_;
nor is there any such thing as distraining. It is, in fact, no debt; but
at the end of the year, if the rent, or rather purchase-money, for the
_ensuing_ year have not been paid, the occupier ceases to have any
interest in the land, and is exactly in the situation of a tenant whose
lease has expired. If, however, he has _agreed_ to take the house or
land at a certain annual rent for a term of years, and fails to fulfil
the engagement, he may be sued for a breach of contract, and, as in the
case of any other breach of contract, will have to pay damages according
to the circumstance of the case.
The travellers suggested, on this being first described, that it must be
an inconvenience to a farmer to pay a sum of money out of his capital
before he has got anything from his land. But they learned that, to
prevent this, it is customary to let a farm for a term of years, and to
fix the rent for the _first_ year (to a new tenant) at a mere nominal
sum. “At the end of each year, therefore,” said they, “we have our rents
coming in, just as you have in England; and if (as you say is common in
England) the same tenant and his family continue to renew from time to
time, the landlord is just in the same situation in both countries.
“It is only when there is occasion to get rid of a bad tenant, and put
in a new one, that there need be any difference; and when that is the
case, your landlord is not, by your account, always better off than
ours; but, on the contrary, sometimes loses _more_ than _one_ year’s
rent, and incurs a great deal of trouble and law-expense besides.”
New settlers, becoming government-tenants under the arrangement above
described, are sometimes in want of sufficient capital for the requisite
improvements, especially irrigation, which is conducted on a great
scale. In such cases, the state often advances a loan at moderate
interest, secured on the land that is to be the tenant’s portion at the
end of his term.
There are no usury laws in the country; every one lets either his land,
his money, or any other property, on whatever terms the parties agree
on.