Mode of Election of Senators—of Representatives.—Personal Votes
and Property-Votes.—Voting by Ballot.—Eligibility of
Candidates.—Aboriginal Blood.—Mixed Blood.—Government
Rent.—Public Expenditure.—Unwise Economy.—Choice of
Statesmen.—Explanations.
Mr. Adamson,—properly designated as the worshipful Christopher
Adamson,—being himself a member of the senate of his own state of Bath,
obtained for the strangers, as a special favour, permission to witness
the mode of election of a senator to fill up a vacancy which had just
occurred.
He explained to them, that, in this particular state, the members of the
senate, or upper house, are elected by the lower house (or commons); and
that the appointment is for life, or till resignation. But though in
these particulars the constitution of this state differs from that of
several of the others, the _mode_ of election is similar to that by
which several of the public functionaries are chosen in all the states.
No personal canvassing, he informed them, is allowed in any case; nor is
it regular to ask or to promise a vote. But at the time of the election,
the president or chairman of the assembly solemnly admonishes the voters
of their obligation to divest themselves, as far as possible, of all
personal bias, and nominate such persons as they shall in their
consciences believe to be most fit. Admonitions of this kind stand in
the place of the oaths which in Europe are usually administered on such
occasions. The commons-assembly having been duly convened, each member
was directed to write down on separate slips of paper, and deliver to
the president, the names of five persons as candidates; or, not _more_
than five: for he was at liberty to write fewer; or, if he pleased, none
at all.
The president next proceeded to inspect their names, and select the five
that had the greatest number of votes. It so happened on this occasion
that there were _six_ names, of which two had each the same number of
votes. This, as Mr. Adamson explained, creates no difficulty, and only
prolongs in a trifling degree the business of the election. All six
names were put in nomination; and each member was next called on to give
his vote _against_ one of the six, by giving in a paper inscribed with
the name of the candidate he wished to have struck off the list. The one
who had the greatest number of these counter-votes being then removed
from the list, the remaining five were proposed in like manner, to have
one name struck off; and the same process was repeated till only one
remained, who was thereupon declared duly elected. For example: suppose
the five names that, in the first instance, have most votes, to be A, B,
C, D, and E, and these being put in nomination, in the counter-voting A
has the most votes against him; then B, C, D, and E are proposed in like
manner, and B is struck off by a majority of counter-votes; there remain
C, D, and E, from which, by the same process, C and D are successively
struck off: then E is the one elected.
If in any case the number of counter-votes against two of the names are
equal, and that number exceeds the votes against any other one, then
_both_ names are struck off, except it should happen that they are the
_last_ two; in which case, of course, the question is, whether D or E
shall be elected: and if on this question the numbers are equal, the
president has the casting vote.
Mr. Adamson was about to answer the inquiries of the visitors as to the
peculiar advantages proposed by this mode of election, when a blunt,
humorous-looking commoner, who sat near them, interposed, by telling
them that, in plain terms, this was the advantage; that each voter
placed his _own friend_ first, and the _best candidate_ second, and so
the best was elected in the end. Mr. Adamson replied with a smile, that,
making due allowance for satire, there was a good deal of truth in the
statement.
“It is a truth,” said he, “that has been presented to you, dressed with
vinegar alone, which you may easily suppose might fairly be tempered
with a due proportion of oil. But I will leave that to your own
reflections; only reminding you of the well-known instance of the
Grecian states discussing the respective merits of the several
commanders after the overthrow of Xerxes. Each state, it was observed,
placed _their own_ commander first on the list of merit, and allotted
the second place to Themistocles the Athenian; whence it was reasonably
inferred that Themistocles was clearly the most distinguished of all.
Now, suppose he had been candidate for a prize in some assembly in which
the Athenians were not present; he would not, you observe, have obtained
a single vote according to the direct mode of voting, while on our plan
he would have gained a decisive triumph. I have heard also of a
new-comer in some town consulting each of his neighbours as to the
choice of a physician, and fixing on the one whom most of them accounted
the second-best; each placing his own family physician first.”
* * * * *
The travellers having inquired into the mode of appointment of the lower
house, were informed that the members are the representatives each of a
certain town or district, as in England, America, &c.; and that they are
elected for seven years at the utmost; one-seventh of the house, by lot,
going out every year, but being capable, however, of re-election.
There is, besides this, a power lodged in a certain council of state and
president,—for this state is a republic,—to dissolve the house and
appoint a general election. In all the states there is a house of
representatives, constituted substantially on the same principle. In
their designations, and in some points of detail, there are several
differences.
In the election of members all citizens have, in most of the states, a
vote, though not all _equal_ votes. Any citizen, who is unconvicted of
any crime, of sound mind, and of a certain specified age, (in the state
of Bath it is thirty-five,) is entitled to be enrolled as a voter, on
producing a certificate of his having gone through a certain course of
elementary school-learning, and attained the required proficiency. He is
then entitled to what is called a _personal vote_; _i. e._ a vote
without any reference to the amount of his property. In Bath, and some
of the other states, an individual may have conferred on him the honour
and privilege of a double or treble personal vote, in consideration of
peculiar public services or personal qualifications.
Besides this, each individual who may pay a certain _proportion_ of
taxes,—_i. e._ who may possess a certain amount of taxable property,—is
entitled, on that ground, to a _property-vote_;[3] if he has a certain
greater amount specified,—which is more, however, than double the
first,—he has a second property-vote; and so on, up to a certain limited
number. In the republic of Bath, six is the utmost number of
property-votes that one person can hold; but this varies in the several
states; the distinction of personal and property-votes, and the power of
holding more than one of the latter, are regulations common to all.
Footnote 3:
Any property not taxable,—as, for instance, professional income,—the
holder may, if he think fit, enroll as equivalent to so much land, and
pay taxes accordingly, which entitles him to a corresponding number of
votes.
“This part of our system,” Mr. Adamson remarked to them, “is not so much
unlike that of Great Britain as you had at the first glance conceived:
for with you, if a man chance to have landed property in several
_different counties_, he is entitled to a vote in each; and this is
nearly equivalent to his having several votes in one county, should all
the property chance to be in that one. The anomaly is with _you_; in
giving one man more direct influence in the election of the legislature
than another, who, perhaps, has double his estate, but all within one
county. I say,” continued he, “_direct_ influence; because, indirectly,
a rich man among you does, it appears, influence his tenants, tradesmen,
and other dependents in their votes. With us, the weight which property
has, and ought to have, is allowed to operate _directly_ and _openly_:
with you, on the system of single votes, it does not.
“And accordingly you apprehend, I find, a danger in the threatened
introduction of the ballot; as tending to place the richest and poorest
on a footing of democratical equality, by taking away the indirect
influence of the one over the votes of the other. And it is remarkable
that the tendency of the ballot to produce this effect,—which is
manifestly the great _danger_ to be apprehended from it,—seems to be
_asserted_ by its advocates among you, and _denied_ by its opponents.
With us, on the contrary, there is no such consequence to be
apprehended; and, accordingly, our voting for representatives is always
by ballot. On our system, this is not only unobjectionable but highly
important; for, as the successful candidate is elected by the majority
of _votes_, while it is possible that his opponent might be supported by
a much greater number of _voters_, it would be very inexpedient to let
this be publicly displayed and recorded; as it might tend to array the
wealthier and poorer classes against each other.
“On the whole,” added he, “our system seems to be the simplest and most
effectual for preserving that principle which _must_ be maintained in
every _good_ representative system; viz. that _persons_ and _property_
should both be represented. The democrat aims at a representation of
_persons alone_; at putting on a political level those who have the
largest stake in the country, and those who have little or none. The
aristocrat (or rather, oligarchist) is for representing _property
alone_; as if the _taxes_ imposed by the legislature towards the
expenses of the state were everything, and the _life and liberty_ of
individuals, which may be affected by the laws passed, were nothing. The
true wisdom, surely, is to take _both_ into account, and to provide that
both persons and property shall be duly represented.”
* * * * *
In all the states but one, all persons are eligible to a seat in the
lower house,—that of representatives,—who possess certain property and
personal qualifications. In that one,—the kingdom of Upper-London, a
small state, which was separated, above a hundred years since, from that
of Nether-London,—a sort of hereditary restriction exists, which, at the
first glance, appeared to the travellers exceedingly whimsical. No one
is eligible to their commons’ assembly who is not descended, or married
to one who is, from both blacks and whites.
The origin of the regulation was this:—Before the state was separated,
the district which constitutes its present territory was occupied by a
considerable proportion of blacks, viz. the descendants of the allied
and reclaimed aboriginals formerly described. It was observed by the
then king of Nether-London, (then called New-London,) that the whites of
pure blood were beginning to hold aloof, not only from the blacks, but
from those of mixed breed, and to disdain associating with them on equal
terms, however personally deserving. To remedy this state of things, and
prevent a mutual alienation between two sets of fellow-citizens, the
king,—who seems to have inherited something of the eccentric, original,
and daring character of the younger Müller, from a daughter of whom he
was descended,—devised the plan, which, with the concurrence of the
legislature, he carried into effect, for constituting this district—a
thriving and, in other respects, promising one—into a distinct state,
under some peculiar regulations.
A brother of his own was appointed the first king of it,—whose wife is
said to have been a lady of beauty and accomplishments, though she had a
slight mixture of aboriginal blood. Inducements were held out to several
of the most respectable and intelligent persons in various states who
were of mixed race, to come and settle in the new kingdom. Some of the
ablest of these,—who, by the bye, are said to have had a considerable
over-proportion of European blood in their veins,—together with others
of purely white race, were nominated as the original senate (or upper
house); and the lower house was, by a fundamental law, to consist
exclusively, and for ever, of persons of mixed race, or who are married
to such. And, to this day, no one is eligible who cannot prove his
descent, or his wife’s, from blacks and whites.
This, however, is easily done at present; for the descent may be ever so
remote, the mixture ever so unequal. Every one, therefore, is eligible,
of whom any ancestor has been enrolled as such. There are, accordingly,
many members of the house who, perhaps, have not above ¹⁄₁₆ or ¹⁄₃₂ of
aboriginal blood; and, indeed, most of the population are at present not
very dissimilar from Europeans in feature and complexion, and yet are
qualified, as far as the above rule is concerned, for a seat in the
house.
The plan was at first laughed at, as whimsical, by many of the
Southlanders themselves; but the expediency of it in promoting mutual
respect and speedy amalgamation between the two races, who were thus
_both alike excluded_ from an important branch of the legislature, was
so apparent, and the joke was so good-humouredly joined in by those who
were the objects of it, that the laughter was soon divested of all
bitterness. The satirists had suggested, as a symbol for the new state,
two swans,—an Australian black swan (Cygnus ater) and white
European,—lovingly entwining their necks: on which the Upper-Londoners
immediately adopted this as the arms of the kingdom; and so it remains
to this day, with the motto of “Nimium ne crede colori.” The state,
though one of the smaller ones, (its population about two hundred and
fifty thousand,) is prosperous, and its citizens respectable,
intelligent, and polite.
* * * * *
In most of the states, there are few or no considerable taxes, except a
land tax; and in many of them even this is not heavy, from the
government being in possession of considerable tracts of land, which in
some instances have become very valuable from having been covered with
buildings, wharfs, &c. [The word “tax” is used as best conveying to
English ears the sense intended. They themselves call it
“government-_rent_;” for they consider the state as alone holding what
we call the fee-simple of all land, which it assigns to individuals,
either for terms of years at a stipulated rent, or in perpetuity,
subject to what we should call a land-tax.]
On the whole, Mr. Sibthorpe is of opinion, that, taking into
consideration the very small military (and, of course, no naval)
establishments, and also the comparative wealth of these and the
European states, the government revenues are proportionably greater in
the Southland states than in those of Europe,—the revenue that is
actually _expended in the public service_ each year; for he does not
take into account, as a part of our revenue, the enormous sum annually
paid as interest on the national debt. These states having happily been
exempt from the prodigal expenditure of wars, have no national debt.
Their public expenditure is, however, what we should be apt to call
profuse in the payment of public functionaries. All are paid, even the
representatives; and to most offices is attached, besides what may be
considered an ample salary in reference to the prevailing style of
living, a comfortable retiring pension: sinecures however, strictly so
called,—_i. e._ payments for _no_ services, either present or
_past_,—are not known. When the more frugal system, in reference to this
point, that prevails among us, was described to them, and also the
prevailing clamour for still further reductions on that head, they gave
it as their opinion that there could not be money worse saved, and that
is must be a great wonder if we were well governed.
“The natural tendency,” they urged, “of a system of _frugal_ government
in this sense, is, to obtain a worse commodity. Try the experiment,”
they said, “of being frugal to your physicians, and reduce their fees to
half-crowns, and you will have a half-crown’s worth of skill instead of
a guinea’s worth. You will still have plenty of physicians, but we
should not like to be under their hands. While a man of talents and
character, with a liberal education and industry, can realize a handsome
and secure income in some of your learned professions, you cannot expect
him, especially if he have a family to provide for, and but little
private fortune, to give up a lucrative employment, and devote himself
to the labours of political life, either gratuitously, or with an
uncertain recompense in view. He will either keep aloof from public
business, or will bestow on it a hurried, divided, and secondary
attention. Thus, political business, and ultimately political power, is
thrown into the hands of one or both of two classes of men:—those of
_large estates_; and _adventurers_,—men, who, for want of character, or
of steady application, are not succeeding in any reputable and lucrative
profession, and therefore see nothing better to do than to take their
chance in the profession—an ill-paid and precarious one, as it seems to
be among you—of politics.
“Many persons of both these classes, among you, may, we doubt not, be
possessed of high qualifications; but it seems evident that with so
large a total number as you possess of educated and intelligent gentry,
you practically limit your choice to a very small proportion of them for
persons to conduct public affairs; and these affairs, therefore, we
should expect to find conducted, if not ill, yet by no means so well as
they might be. We should expect to find the department of government—one
of such paramount importance—not so well filled as many subordinate
departments; and that there would be among you a larger proportionate
number of highly qualified legal, military, and naval men, for instance,
of engineers, artisans, &c. than of statesmen.
“You are to observe,” they added, “that we are only throwing out our
_conjectures_: we are ready and willing to stand corrected. You must
know how the matter of fact stands; which may perhaps be at variance
with our anticipations, through the operation of some causes we are not
aware of. But we lay before you our notions and expectations, as the
thought strikes ourselves.”
[There follows here, in the memoranda of the travellers, the
explanations they gave, in answer to the foregoing remarks, of our
institutions and usages,—the reasons by which they are vindicated,—and
the practical working of them. But all this, though of course most
interesting to the persons to whom it was addressed, would probably not
be so to our readers, who must of course be familiar with discussions
relative to our own institutions and customs, and curious rather to
learn particulars concerning those of a strange nation, however
unreasonable and whimsical their novelty may cause them to appear. For
this reason, we have, in several other places as well as here, omitted
much that we find recorded of the descriptions and discussions laid
before the Southlanders by their guests; inserting only what was
necessary to make their descriptions intelligible.]