Forms of Government.—Senatorial Regulations.—Speakers.—Peculiar
Debate.—Fundamental Laws.—Unwise Legislators.—Timely
Improvements.—Legislative Problem.—Legislative Expedient.—Error in
Government.—Division of Laws.—Repeal of Fundamental Laws.—Guard
against Precipitancy.—Laws of Treason.—Mature Deliberation.—National
Will.
All the states, which, as has been mentioned above, are eleven in
number, differ more or less from each other in their form of government,
but are alike in all the most important and fundamental principles
adopted; several of which are strangely at variance with everything that
is to be found in the northern hemisphere. Seven out of the eleven
states are denominated kingdoms: but of these, four only are under an
hereditary royalty; the other three being, as far as the travellers
could ascertain, rather of the character of republics than of strictly
regal governments; but retaining the title of King to denote the chief
magistrate for the time being, somewhat corresponding to the Athenian
archon, Roman consul, or American president. There are four other states
also which are, in name as well as in substance, republics. But these
differences are greater in appearance than in reality; the kingdoms
which are the most strictly so called, being by no means under an
unlimited monarchy.
Many of the particulars respecting the constitutions and laws of the
several states the travellers were of course, during their short stay,
unable to collect, except very slightly and imperfectly. From those
which they did collect, and ascertain with sufficient certainty, we
shall select such as are likely to be the most interesting, from their
dissimilarity to European institutions.
It was in the state of Atroloria,—so called from the lake of the same
name[1] within its territory,—which the travellers first reached, that
they had the earliest opportunity of witnessing debates in their senate.
They afterwards, on several occasions, attended the legislative
assemblies in other places. The circumstance which in the first instance
most attracted, by its novelty to them, the attention of the visitors,
was one which they found on inquiry was common to all the states in
their deliberative assemblies; being a regulation originally established
by Müller, and afterwards, from its tried advantage and convenience,
continued universally and uninterruptedly. It was this, that no member
was allowed to _speak_ and to _vote_ on the same question, but each had
his choice between the two. The proceedings, accordingly, bore some
resemblance to those of a court of justice in civil causes; the speakers
corresponding to the pleaders who address the court,—the voters, to the
jury, who give the verdict. The difference is, that each member has it
left to his choice which character he will take. Any member wishing to
address the house, quits his seat and places himself in front of the
chair of the moderator,—answering to the speaker or chairman; and when
he has spoken, seats himself, not in his former place, but, with a view
to prevent mistake or confusion, on a bench appropriated to the purpose,
and thence called the speakers’ bench; or he is at liberty to leave the
assembly if he thinks fit. When the question has been put to the vote
and decided, and a fresh question is coming on, he resumes his original
seat. Certain public functionaries, who are not members, have a seat by
right on the speakers’ bench, and are at liberty to address the house
(though they have no vote) when there is any reference to the business
of their own peculiar departments.
Footnote 1:
The lake was so called by the early settlers; doubtless from the same
cause which led to the name of our own colony in Western Australia.
Whether owing to this circumstance, or to any other, the debates were
observed to be shorter, and the speakers much fewer, than is usual in
European assemblies. They seldom exceeded two or three on each side.
The travellers observed that the speakers rarely used even the smallest
degree of action, but usually kept themselves remarkably still while
speaking. This, it appears, was one of the results of that general and
deep-rooted association already alluded to. In the course of
conversation on this subject, the Southlanders, it appeared, considered
it as something uncivilized to use either vociferation or gesticulation
in speaking, “as the savages do.” They even accounted the refined
Athenians and Romans of old as little better than half-reclaimed
barbarians in this respect, because they would not attend to an orator
unless he stamped and shouted, and brandished his arms about, as if he
were speaking to a pack of hounds, instead of to an assembly of rational
beings.
* * * * *
The travellers were so fortunate as to witness on one occasion a debate
of a peculiar kind, which is of rare occurrence, and which served to
throw light on the whole system of legislature of this singular people.
It occurred in the kingdom of Nether-London, one of the most ancient and
populous of all the states. They found a considerable excitement and
bustle prevailing, though all was orderly and decorous, on account of a
summons issued (in our phraseology, “a call of the house”) to the
members of their assembly, called in that state the parliament, to
deliberate on the question of removing a _fundamental law_. The
particular law then in question was, they found, like the Salic law of
the French, one which confined the succession to the throne to males.
But a further inquiry let them into the knowledge of matter far more
curious and interesting,—the general principle of “fundamental laws,”
which materially affects the whole of the system of legislature in the
country; being, with slight differences of detail, common to all the
states, regal and republican, and extending also to the several
ecclesiastical communities.
“The system I am about to describe to you,” said Mr. Adamson, who was
one of their principal informants on this occasion, “was established by
the Müllers; the younger of whom, during the whole of his long reign, as
it may be called, laboured earnestly and successfully to explain its
advantages, and to perpetuate its adoption. I will put into your hands
presently a little popular tract on the subject written by him, which,
like the many others he wrote, is in every one’s hands at this day. He
sets forth in that the evils resulting, on the one hand, from retaining,
or, oftener, vainly striving to retain, all laws, usages, and
institutions unaltered, some of which, even though the result originally
of consummate wisdom, may become utterly unsuitable to other times and
altered circumstances; and, on the other hand, from frequent, sudden,
and violent changes, which are apt to agitate and unsettle men’s minds,
and to lead to consequences not designed or foreseen,—like the pulling
out of one stone from a wall, which is apt to loosen some of the others.
His discussion of this subject bears much resemblance to those I lately
saw in the little book you lent me the other day, by Lord Bacon,[2] who
strikes me as a very able writer, and likely to be well worthy of the
reputation you tell me he enjoys.
Footnote 2:
A little pocket edition of Bacon’s Essays, one of four or five small
volumes which the travellers had brought with them to beguile any
occasional tedious half-hour at their halting-places, or in their
boat.
“Müller goes on to say that unwise legislators have been in all ages apt
to bring on themselves, not one only, but both of these classes of
evils. Unmindful of the proverb, that “a stitch in time saves nine,”
they often, through dread of change, maintain unaltered things which
manifestly want altering, at the expense of much loss and inconvenience;
and when the change does come, from the inconvenience having grown to an
intolerable height, it is apt to be, in consequence, a violent, hasty,
and sometimes ruinous change. ‘That dirt made this dust,’ is a homely
old saying, which he used frequently to apply in speaking of such
instances, in allusion to those who in wet weather neglect to scrape off
the mud from the roads; and consequently, besides being for a long time
continually splashed and bemired, at length, when the mud is all dried
up by the sun, they are half smothered by the dust it produces. He would
always, therefore, he said, be, by choice, an _improver_, rather than a
_reformer_; introducing corrections and additions, from time to time, as
occasion offered, rather than letting a building become so inconvenient
or ruinous as to require being pulled down and rebuilt.
“A great reformation he considered as, in all cases, a great evil;
though frequently by far the least evil that circumstances admit of, and
though he had himself, accordingly, been always a strenuous supporter of
the great reformation of religion, notwithstanding the many evils
resulting, according to him, from its having been so long delayed and so
obstinately resisted. To avoid both of the opposite evils,—the liability
to sudden and violent changes, and the adherence to established usage
when inconvenient or mischievous,—to give the requisite stability to
governments and other institutions without shutting the door against
improvement,—this is a problem which both ancient and modern
legislators, he thought, had not well succeeded in solving. And the
same, it appears, may be said of those who have appeared in Europe since
his time. Some, like the ancient Medes and Persians, and like Lycurgus,
have attempted to prohibit all change; but those who constantly appeal
to the wisdom of their ancestors, as a sufficient reason for
perpetuating everything these have established, forget two things;
first, that they cannot hope for ever to persuade all successive
generations of men that there was once one generation of such infallible
wisdom as to be entitled to dictate to all their descendants for
ever,—so as to make the earth, in fact, the possession, not of the
living, but of the dead; and, secondly, that, even supposing our
ancestors gifted with such infallibility, many cases must arise in which
it may be reasonably doubted whether they themselves would not have
advocated, if living, changes called for by altered circumstances; even
as our own forefathers, who denoted the _southern_ quarter from
_meridies_ (noon), would not have been so foolish as to retain that
language had they come to live in this hemisphere, where the sun at noon
is in the north.
“The expedient of having two or more deliberative assemblies, or other
authorities, in a state, whose concurrent sanction shall be requisite
for enacting or abrogating laws, has often been resorted to, as a
safeguard against sudden and violent measures adopted under an
ebullition of feeling, yet without precluding well-weighed and
deliberate changes. This expedient he thought a very good one, as far as
it goes; it is adopted in various forms in each of our states. But it
appeared to him that experience had proved this provision to be not
alone sufficient for accomplishing fully the object he had in view,
which was to give the requisite stability to those more fundamental laws
which may be considered as part of the constitution of any state, (yet
not so as to attempt prohibiting a wary and deliberate alteration of
them,) and at the same time to afford proper facilities for introducing
changes into matters of detail.
“‘Nature,’ said he, ‘does not give the same degree of strength to the
footstalks of the leaves of a tree,—destined, as these are, to be shed
every year,—and to the roots, which are designed to hold the trunk fast
in the ground. If she did, either the one would be far too strong or the
other far too weak, or both of these inconveniences might take place at
once; yet this is the error committed by almost all governments. The
same machinery is provided to facilitate or to impede _every_ change
alike, in great or in small matters; the same mode is prescribed for the
maintaining, or abrogating, or introducing of _every_ law and _every_
institution alike. Among you, for instance, an act for regulating the
manufacture of soap, or an act which should introduce a complete change
into your constitution,—which should take away or restore the liberties
of half the nation,—must go through exactly the same forms, and be
passed or rejected by the same authorities under the same regulations:
in short, you are like a tree whose leaf-stalks and main roots have
neither more nor less toughness and stoutness the one than the other.’
“Now this is a state of things which he considered as always
inexpedient, and often dangerous, and which he accordingly proposed to
remedy. The system which he recommended, and which has been universally
adopted, is this. All our laws are divided into two classes; the
ordinary or repealable laws, and the fundamental. The former are
enacted, altered, or repealed much in the same manner as all laws of all
other nations: but a fundamental law is one which there exists no
immediate power to enact, annul, or amend; and it is forbidden by the
rules of the house to propose any measure that, even incidentally, goes
to defeat or interfere with the operation of any fundamental law. But it
is allowed to propose, and to pass, a bill for removing any fundamental
law from the list, and reducing it to an ordinary law; after which, it
is open to be dealt with like any other law. So, also, it is allowed to
pass a bill for placing any already existing ordinary law on the list of
fundamentals.
“The enactment, therefore, or repeal of a fundamental law, may be
accomplished at _two_ steps, though not at one; but it is further
provided that these two steps shall not take place in one session of
parliament.” [He was describing the details, he said, in the terms, and
according to the usages, of the kingdom of Nether-London; having
premised that there is a substantial agreement in principle throughout
all the states on this subject.] “When it is proposed to remove a law
from the list of fundamentals, the motion made is, ‘that such and such a
law shall, _at the close of the present session_, cease to be
fundamental.’ It remains, therefore, even should the motion be carried,
and the act receive the royal assent, irrevocable during the existing
session. When, again, the reverse measure is to be proposed, of
enrolling on the list of fundamentals some existing law, an act must
have first passed, authorizing the legislature to take into
consideration, in the _ensuing_ (or some subsequent session) the
question of enrolling such and such a law.
“Lastly, another and more important safeguard against precipitancy, is
that, in the case of a motion for removing any law from the list of the
fundamentals, or adding one to that list, every member who does not vote
_for_ the motion is, by a rule of the house, reckoned, whether present
or absent, as having voted _against_ it. In other words, such a motion
can be carried only by an _absolute_ majority of the whole house, not by
a mere comparative majority of members _present_.”
Mr. Sibthorpe having interposed a remark, that there is something in the
British constitution of the nature of a fundamental law, inasmuch as it
is treason to propose the abolition of kingly government,—so that the
maintenance of that government is irrevocable till a bill shall first
have been passed for altering the laws of treason,—Mr. Adamson admitted
that this was so far on the same footing with the law he had been
describing; “but,” added he, “if any one should—which I allow is highly
improbable—propose such an alteration of the laws of treason, that
question might legally be put to the vote in as thin a house as is
competent to transact ordinary business. I think you would do well,
after introducing our last regulation as to an absolute majority, to
place some more of your laws on the same footing. Not that there would
be any occasion for saying anything about treason. With you, as with us,
it would no doubt be quite sufficient that a member should be at once
‘called to order’ if he presumed to make any motion contrary to the
rules of the house.
“You would find, I think,” he continued, “that the adoption of our
system in regard to fundamental laws would tend to promote among you
that comparative calmness and moderation which you have remarked in our
proceedings, and to mitigate the vehemence with which, by your accounts,
one set of men oppose every change, good or bad, while another seem to
be hostile to everything that is established. Those who are by temper
and habit most disposed to the dread of innovation, lest rash schemes
should be adopted, would have their apprehensions somewhat calmed by
seeing a provision made at least against any great change being
introduced with inconsiderate _haste_; and those, again, who are most
disposed to dread the perpetuation of abuses, might be moderated in
their impatient eagerness for reform, by seeing a regular path open for
the examination and remedy of anything, however consecrated by long
usage, that should appear, on mature deliberation, to be evil.
“That you would be exempt from the possibility of error, or that we are
so, it would be an absurd presumption to pretend. Our system does not
profess to make human judgment infallible; it professes only to provide
that our deliberative assemblies shall decide according to the _best_ of
their judgment, and shall neither retain nor reject anything, without a
full opportunity at least being given for the exercise of deliberate
reflection and mature discussion. To attempt more than this is mere
folly. One generation of fallible men has neither the right nor the
power to supersede for ever, by irrevocable laws, the judgment of all
future generations of their posterity; though the endeavour to do so may
delay a beneficial change, and convert it, when it does come, into a
noxious one. The will of a whole nation can no more be permanently and
effectually stopped in its course than the current of a river. If you
dam up the regular channel, you cause it first to flood the neighbouring
country, and then to work itself new and circuitous channels. You may
think yourself well off if this is the worst. Should your dam be
ultimately burst, a fierce and destructive deluge of revolutionary
violence will succeed.”
* * * * *
The debate which the visitors witnessed, and which led to the foregoing
explanations, terminated in the removal of the law in question from the
list of fundamentals. But as the minority had been considerable, the
general expectation was, that before the next session,—in which alone
the final repeal of the law could be proposed,—a dissolution of
parliament would take place, in order that the sentiments of the people
on the subject might be fully ascertained.