CHAPTER XII

FINAL REFLECTIONS

The farther the world war progressed, the more did it lose the

character of the work of individual men. It assumed rather the

character of a cosmic event, taking more and more from the

effectiveness of the most powerful individuals.

All settlements on which coalitions were based were connected with

certain war aims by the Cabinets, such as the promises of compensation

given to their own people, the hopes of gain from the final victory.

The encouragement of intense and boundless hatred, the increasing

crude brutality of the world all tended to create a situation making

each individual like a small stone which, breaking away from an

avalanche of stones, hurls itself downwards without a leader and

without goal, and is no longer capable of being guided by anyone.

The Council of Four at Versailles tried for some time to make the

world believe that they possessed the power to rebuild Europe

according to their own ideas. According to their own ideas! That

signified, to begin with, four utterly different ideas, for four

different worlds were comprised in Rome, Paris, London, and

Washington. And the four representatives--"the Big Four," as they were

called--were each individually the slave of his programme, his

pledges, and his people. Those responsible for the Paris negotiations

_in camera_, which lasted for many months, and were a breeding ground

for European anarchy, had their own good reasons for secrecy; there

was no end to the disputes, for which no outlet could be found.

Here, Wilson had been scoffed at and cursed because he deserted his

programme; certainly, there is not the slightest similarity between

the Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles and St. Germain, but

it is forgotten now that Wilson no longer had the power to enforce his

will against the three others. We do not know what occurred behind

those closed doors, but we can imagine it, and Wilson probably fought

weeks and months for his programme. He could have broken off

proceedings and left! He certainly could have done so, but would the

chaos have been any less; would it have been any better for the world

if the only one who was not solely imbued with the lust of conquest

had thrown down his arms? But Clemenceau, too, the direct opposite of

Wilson, was not quite open in his dealings. Undoubtedly this old man,

who now at the close of his life was able to satisfy his hatred of the

Germans of 1870, gloried in the triumph; but, apart from that, if he

had tried to conclude a "Wilson peace," all the private citizens of

France, great and small, would have risen against him, for they had

been told for the last five years: _Que les boches payeront tout_.

What he did, he enjoyed doing; but he was forced to do it or France

would have dismissed him.

And Italy? From Milan to Naples is heard the subterraneous rumbling of

approaching revolution; the only means the Government have adopted to

check the upheaval is to drown the revolution in a sea of national

interests. I believe that in 1917, when the general discontent was

much less and finances were much better, the Italian Government might

much more probably have accepted Wilson's standpoint than after final

victory. Then they could not do it. At Versailles they were the slaves

of their promises. And does anyone believe that Lloyd George would

have had the power at Versailles to extend the Wilson principle of the

right of self-determination to Ireland and the Dominions? Naturally,

he did not wish to do otherwise than he did; but that is not the

question here, but rather that neither could have acted very

differently even had he wished to do so.

It seems to me that the historical moment is the year 1917 when Wilson

lost his power, which was swallowed up in Imperialism, and when the

President of the United States neglected to force his programme on his

Allies. Then power was still in his hands, as the American troops were

so eagerly looked for; but later, when victory came, he no longer held

it.

And thus there came about what is now a fact. A dictated peace of the

most terrible nature was concluded and a foundation laid for a

continuance of unimaginable disturbances, complications and wars.

In spite of all the apparent power of victorious armies, in spite of

all the claims of the Council of Four, a world has expired at

Versailles--the world of militarism. Solely bent on exterminating

Prussian militarism, the Entente have gained so complete a victory

that all fences and barriers have been pulled down and they can give

themselves up unchecked to a torrent of violence, vengeance and

passion. And the Entente are so swallowed up by their revengeful

paroxysm of destruction that they do not appear to see that, while

they imagine they still rule and command, they are even now but

instruments in a world revolution.

The Entente, who would not allow the war to end and kept up the

blockade for months after the cessation of hostilities, has made

Bolshevism a danger to the world. War is its father, famine its

mother, despair its godfather. The poison of Bolshevism will course in

the veins of Europe for many a long year.

Versailles is not the end of the war, it is only a phase of it. The

war goes on, though in another form. I think that the coming

generation will not call the great drama of the last five years the

world-war, but the world-revolution, which it will realise began with

the world-war.

Neither at Versailles nor St. Germain has any lasting work been done.

The germs of decomposition and death lie in this peace. The paroxysms

that shattered Europe are not yet over; as, after a terrible

earthquake, the subterraneous rumblings may still be heard. Again and

again we shall see the earth open, now here, now there, and shoot up

flames into the heavens; again and again there will be expressions of

elementary nature and elementary force that will spread devastation

through the land--until everything has been swept away that reminds us

of the madness of the war and the French peace.

Slowly but with unspeakable suffering a new world will be born. Coming

generations will look back to our times as to a long and very bad

dream, but day follows the darkest night. Generations have been laid

in their graves, murdered, famished, and a prey to disease. Millions,

with hatred and murder in their hearts, have died in their efforts to

devastate and destroy.

But other generations will arise and with them a new spirit: They will

rebuild what war and revolution have pulled down. Spring comes always

after winter. Resurrection follows after death; it is the eternal law

in life.

Well for those who will be called upon to serve as soldiers in the

ranks of whoever comes to build the new world.

_June, 1919._

APPENDIX

1

=Resolutions of the London Conference, of April 26, 1915=[11]

On February 28, 1917, the _Isvestia_ published the following text of

this agreement:

"The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, acting on the

instructions of his Government, has the honour to convey to the

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, the French Ambassador

in London, M. Cambon, and the Russian Ambassador in London, Count

Benckendorff, the following notable points:

§1. A _Military Convention_ shall be concluded without delay between

the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy. This

convention to determine the minimum of forces to be directed by Russia

against Austria-Hungary in case that country should turn all its

forces against Italy, provided Russia decides to concentrate chiefly

against Germany. The Military Convention referred to shall also settle

questions bearing upon an armistice, in so far as these by their

nature come within the scope of the Army Command.

§2. Italy on her part undertakes to carry on war with all the means at

her disposal, together with France, Great Britain and Russia, against

all countries at war with them.

§3. The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render Italy

undiminished, active assistance until the _destruction of the Austrian

fleet_, or until the moment peace is concluded. A _Naval Convention_

shall be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain and

Italy.

§4. At the coming conclusion of peace Italy is to receive: the

district of the _Trentino; the whole of South Tyrol as far as its

natural geographical boundary, thereby understood the Brenner; the

city and district of Trieste; the provinces of Goerz and Gradisca,

the whole of Istria_ as far as Quarnero, including Volosca and the

Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, also the smaller islands of

Plavnica, Unie, Canidolo, Palazzoli, as well as the island of St.

Peter de Nembi, Astinello and Cruica, with the neighbouring islands.

Note: 1. By way of supplement to §4, the frontier shall be drawn

through the following-points: From the peak of the Umbrail in a

northerly direction as far as the Stilfserjoch, and thence along the

watershed of the Ratische Alps as far as the sources of the rivers

Etsch and Eisack, then over the Reschen-Scheideck, the Brenner and the

Oetztaler and Zillertaler Alps; the frontier line then to turn

southwards, cutting the Toblach range, and proceeding as far as the

present frontier of Grein, drawn towards the Alps; following this it

will run to the heights of Tarvis, then, however, pursuing a course

along the watershed of the Julian Alps, over the heights of Predil,

Mangart and Triglav group, and the passes of Podbrda, Podlaneskan and

Idria. From there the frontier continues in a south-easterly direction

to the Schneeberg, so that the basin of the River Save, with its

sources, shall not fall within the Italian territory. From the

Schneeberg the frontier proceeds towards the coast, enclosing Castua,

Matuglie and Volosca in the Italian possessions.

§5. Similarly, Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its

present form, including Lissarik and Trebinje in the north, and all

possessions as far as a line drawn from the coast at Cape Blanca

eastward to the watershed in the south, so as to include in the

Italian possessions all valleys on the course of the rivers debouching

at Sebenico, such as Cikola, Kerke and Budisnica, with all those

situate on their sources. Similarly also, Italy is promised _all the

islands lying north and west of the Dalmatian coast_, beginning with

the islands of Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda Maon, Pago and Puntadura,

etc., in the north; as far as Malarda in the south, adding also the

islands of St. Andrae, Busi, Lissa, Lessina, Torzola, Curzola, Cazza

and Lagosta, with all rocks and islets thereto pertaining, as well as

Pelagosa, but not to include the islands of Great and Lesser Zirona,

Pua, Solta and Brazza.

The following are to be _neutralised_: (1) The entire coast from Cape

Blanca in the north as far as the southern end of the peninsula of

Sabbioncello, and in the south including the whole of the mentioned

peninsula in the neutralised area; (2) a part of the coast beginning

from a point situate 10 versts south of the cape of Alt-Ragusa, as far

as the river Wojusa in the south, so as to include within the

boundaries of the neutralised zone _the whole of the Bay of Cattaro_

with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo;

this not to affect the declarations of the contracting parties in

April and May, 1909, as to the rights of _Montenegro_.

In consideration, however, of the fact that these rights were only

admitted as applying to the present possessions of Montenegro, they

shall not be so extended as to embrace any lands or ports which may in

the future be ceded to Montenegro. In the same way, no part of the

coast at present belonging to Montenegro shall be subject to future

neutralisation. The restrictions in the case of the port of Antivari,

agreed by Montenegro itself in 1909, remain in force. (3) Finally, the

islands not accorded to Italy.

Note: 3. The following lands in the Adriatic Sea are accorded by the

Powers of the Quadruple Alliance to the territories of _Croatia,

Serbia and Montenegro_: In the north of the Adriatic, _the entire

coast, commencing from the Bay of Volosca_ on the frontier of Istria

as far as the _northern frontier_ of Dalmatia, including the whole of

the coast-line now belonging to Hungary, the entire coast of Croatia,

the port of Fiume and the small harbours of Novi and Carlopago, as

also the islands of Velia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. In the

south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Austrian interests lie, the

entire coast from Cape Planca as far as the river Drina, with the

principal ports of _Spaluto, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and

San Giovanni di Medua_, and with the islands of Greater Zirona, Pua,

Solta, Brazza, Jaklian and Calamotta.

The port of Durazzo can be accorded to an independent Mohammedan State

of Albania.

§6. Italy to be given full possession of _Valona, the Island of

Sasseno_, and a sufficiently extensive territory to protect it in

military respects, approximately from the River Vojusa in the north

and east to the boundary of the Chimara district in the south.

§7. Italy, receiving the Trentino according to §4, Dalmatia and the

islands of the Adriatic according to §5, as well as Valona, is not to

oppose the possible wishes of France, Great Britain and Russia in case

of the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised state in

Albania, as to _division of the northern and southern frontier belts

of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece_. The southern strip

of coast from the frontier of the Italian district of Valona as far as

Cape Stiloa to be subject to neutralisation.

Italy has the prospect of _right to determine the foreign policy of

Albania_; in any case, Italy undertakes to assent to the cession of a

sufficient territory to Albania to make the frontiers of the latter on

the west of the Ochrida Lake coincide with the frontiers of Greece and

Serbia.

§8. Italy to have full possession of all the _islands of the

Dodecanessus_ which it occupies at present.

§9. France, Great Britain and Russia accept in principle the fact of

_Italy's interest in maintaining political equilibrium_ in the

Mediterranean, as also Italy's right, in case of any _division of

Turkey, to a like portion with themselves_ in the basin of the

Mediterranean, and that in the part adjacent to the _province of

Adalia_, where Italy has already acquired particular rights, and

developed particular interests, to be noted in the Italo-British

Convention. The zone then falling to the possession of Italy will in

due time be determined according to the vital interests of France and

Great Britain. Similarly, the interests of Italy are also to be

considered in case the territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey should

be maintained by the Powers for a further period, and only a

limitation between the spheres of interest be made. Should, in such

case, any areas of Asiatic Turkey be occupied by France, Great Britain

and Russia during the present war, then the entire area contiguous to

Italy, and further defined below, shall be granted to Italy, together

with the right to occupy the same.

§10. In Lybia, Italy is to be granted all rights and claims hitherto

conceded to the Sultan on the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne.

§11. Italy to receive such part of the war contribution as shall be

commensurate with her sacrifices and efforts.

§12. Italy subscribes to the declaration issued by France, England and

Russia whereby _Arabia and the holy cities of the Mohammedans_ are to

be granted to _an independent Mohammedan Power_.

§13. In case of any extension of the French and English colonial

possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great

Britain acknowledge in principle the right of Italy to demand certain

compensation in respect of extension of Italian possessions in

Eritrea, Somaliland, in Lybia, and the colonial areas contiguous to

the colonies of France and England.

§14. England undertakes to facilitate the immediate realisation of _a

loan of not less than 50 million pounds sterling_ in the English

market on favourable conditions.

§15. France, England and Russia undertake to support Italy in

_preventing the representatives of the Holy See from taking any

diplomatic steps whatever in connection with the conclusion of a

peace_, or the regulation of questions connected with the present war.

§16. The present treaty to be _kept secret_. As regards Italy's

agreement to the declaration of September 5, 1914, this declaration

will be made public as soon as war is declared by Italy or against

Italy.

The foregoing points having been duly noted, the respective authorised

representatives of France, Great Britain and Russia, together with the

representative of Italy similarly authorised by his Government for

this purpose, are agreed: France, Great Britain and Russia declare

their full agreement with the foregoing notable points, as set before

them by the Italian Government. With regard to §§1, 2 and 3, referring

to the agreement upon military and naval undertakings of all four

Powers, _Italy undertakes to commence active operations at the

earliest possible date_, and in any case not later than one month

after the signing of the present document by the contracting parties.

The present agreement, in four copies, signed in London on the 26th

April, 1915, and sealed, by

Sir Edward Grey,

Cambon,

Marchese Imperiali,

Graf Benckendorff."

After the entry of Roumania into the war (September, 1916) this

programme was further extended.

2

=Note from Count Czernin to the American Government, dated March 5,

1917=

From the _aide-mémoire_ of the American Ambassador in Vienna, dated

February 18 of this year, the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign

Affairs understands that the Washington Cabinet entertains some doubt,

in view of the statements issued by the Imperial and Royal Government

on February 10 and January 11 of this year, as to what attitude

Austria-Hungary contemplates adopting for the future with regard to

submarine warfare, and whether the assurance given by the Austrian

Government to the Washington Cabinet in the course of the proceedings

with regard to the case of the vessels _Ancona_ and _Persia_ might not

be taken as altered or withdrawn by the statements mentioned.

The Austrian Government is most willing to meet the desire of the

United States Government that this doubt should be removed by a clear

and final declaration.

It should here be permitted first of all to touch very briefly on the

methods adopted by the Allied Powers in marine warfare, since these

form the starting-point of the aggravated submarine warfare put into

practice by Austria-Hungary and her allies, besides throwing a clear

light upon the attitude hitherto adopted by the Austrian Government in

the questions arising therefrom.

When Great Britain entered upon the war with the Central Powers, but a

few years had elapsed since the memorable time when Great Britain

itself, together with the remaining states, had commenced at the Hague

to lay the foundations of a modern code of law for marine warfare.

Shortly after that the English Government had brought about a meeting

of representatives of the principal naval Powers, assembling in

London, in order further to carry forward the work commenced at the

Hague, presumably in a spirit of reasonable compromise between the

interests of belligerents and those of neutrals. The unexpected

success of these endeavours, which aimed at nothing less than

concerted establishment of legal standards calculated to maintain the

freedom of the seas and the interests of neutrals even in time of war,

was not to be long enjoyed by the peoples concerned.

Hardly had the United Kingdom decided to take part in the war than it

also began to break through the barriers with which it was confronted

by the standards of international law. While the Central Powers

immediately on the outbreak of war had announced their intention of

observing the Declaration of London, which also bore the signature of

the British representative, England discarded the most important

points in that Declaration. In the endeavour to cut off the Central

Powers from all supplies by sea, England gradually extended the list

of contraband until it included everything now required by human

beings for the maintenance of life. Great Britain then placed all the

coasts of the North Sea--an important transit-way also for the

maritime trade of Austria-Hungary--under the obstruction of a

so-called "blockade," in order to prevent the entry into Germany of

all goods not yet inscribed on the contraband list, as also to bar all

neutral traffic with those coasts, and prevent any export from the

same. That this method of proceeding stands in the most lurid

contradiction to the standards of blockade law arrived at and

established by international congress has already been admitted by the

President of the United States in words which will live in the history

of the law of nations. By this illegally preventing export of goods

from the Central Powers Great Britain thought to be able to shut down

the innumerable factories and industries which had been set up by

industrious and highly-developed peoples in the heart of Europe; and

to bring the workers to idleness and thence to want and revolt. And

when Austria-Hungary's southern neighbour joined the ranks of the

enemies of the Central Powers her first step was to declare a

blockade of all the coasts of her opponent--following the example, of

course, of her Allies--in disregard of the legal precepts which Italy

had shortly before helped to lay down. Austria-Hungary did not fail to

point out to the neutral Powers at once that this blockade was void of

all legal validity.

For two years the Central Powers have hesitated. Not until then, and

after long and mature consideration for and against, did they proceed

to answer in like measure and close with their adversaries at sea. As

the only belligerents who had done everything to secure the observance

of the agreement which should provide for freedom of the seas to

neutrals, it was sorely against their wishes to bow to the need of the

moment and attack that freedom; but they took that step in order to

fulfil their urgent duty to their peoples and with the conviction that

the step in question must lead towards the freedom of the seas in the

end. The declarations made by the Central Powers on the last day of

January of this year are only apparently directed against the rights

of neutrals; as a matter of fact, they are working toward the

restitution of those rights which the enemy has constantly infringed

and would, if victorious, annihilate for ever. The submarines, then,

which circle round England's shores, announce to all peoples using and

needing the sea--and who does not need it?--that the day is not far

off when the flags of all nations shall wave over the seas in newly

acquired freedom.

It may doubtless be hoped that this announcement will find echo

wherever neutral peoples live, and that it will be understood in

particular by the great people of the United States of America, whose

most famous representative has in the course of the war spoken up with

ardent words for the freedom of the seas as the highway of all

nations. If the people and the government of the Union will bear in

mind that the "blockade" established by Great Britain is intended not

only to force the Central Powers to submission by starvation but

ultimately to secure undisputed mastery of the sea for itself, and

thereby ensure its supremacy over all other nations, while on the

other hand the blockading of England and its Allies only serves to

render possible _a peace with honour_ for these Powers and to

guarantee to all peoples the freedom of navigation and maritime trade,

thus ensuring their safe existence, then the question as to which of

the two belligerent parties has right on its side is already decided.

Though the Central Powers are far from wishing to seek for further

allies in their struggle, they nevertheless feel justified in claiming

that neutrals should appreciate their endeavours to bring to life

again the principles of international law and the equal rights of

nations.

Proceeding now to answer the questions set forth in the memorandum of

February 18 of this year, already referred to, the Austrian Government

would first of all remark that in the exchange of Notes in the cases

of the _Ancona_ and _Persia_ this Government restricted itself to

consideration of the concrete questions which had up to then arisen,

without setting forth the legal position in point of principle. In the

Note of December 29, 1915, however, regarding the _Ancona_ case it

reserved the right to bring up the intricate questions of

international law connected with the submarine warfare for discussion

at a later date. In reverting now to this point, and taking up the

question as to sinking of enemy ships, with which the memorandum is

concerned, for brief consideration, it is with the hope that it may be

made clear to the American Government that the Austrian Government now

as heretofore _holds immovably by the assurance already given_, and

with the endeavour to avoid any misunderstanding between the Monarchy

and the American Union by clearing up the most important question

arising out of the submarine warfare--most important as it rests on

the dictates of humanity.

First and foremost the Austrian Government wishes to point out that

the thesis advanced by the American Government and adopted in many

learned works--to the effect that enemy merchant vessels, save in the

event of attempted flight or resistance, should not be destroyed

without provision for the safety of those on board--is also, in the

opinion of the Austrian Government itself, the kernel, so to speak, of

the whole matter. Regarded from a higher point of view, this theory

can at any rate be considered in connection with possible

circumstances, and its application be more closely defined; from the

dictates of humanity, which the Austrian Government and the Washington

Cabinet have equally adopted as their guide, we can lay down the

general principle that, in exercising the right to destroy enemy

merchant shipping, loss of life should be avoided as far as possible.

This necessitates a warning on the part of the belligerent before

exercising the right of destruction. And he can here adopt the method

indicated by the theory of the Union Government referred to, according

to which _the commander of the warship himself issues a warning to the

vessel about to be sunk_, so that crew and passengers can be brought

into safety at the last moment; or, on the other hand, the Government

of the belligerent state can, when it is considered an imperative

necessity of war, give warning, with complete effect, _before the

sailing of the vessel_ to be sunk; or, finally, such Government can,

when preparing comprehensive measures against the enemy traffic at

sea, have recourse to _a general warning applicable to all enemy

vessels concerned_.

That the principle as to providing for the safety of persons on board

is liable to exceptions has been admitted by the Union Government

itself. The Austrian Government believes, however, that destruction

without warning is not only justifiable in cases of attempted escape

or resistance. It would seem, to take one instance only, that the

character of the vessel itself should be taken into consideration;

thus merchant ships or other private craft, placed in the service of

war operations, whether as transports or guardships, or with a

military crew or weapons on board for the purpose of any kind of

hostilities, should doubtless, according to general law, be liable to

destruction without notice. The Austrian Government need not go into

the question of how far a belligerent is released from any obligation

as to provision for safety of human life when his opponent sinks enemy

merchant vessels without such previous warning, as in the well-known

cases, previously referred to, of the _Elektra_, _Dubrovnik_,

_Zagreb_, etc., since, in this respect, despite its evident right, the

Austrian Government itself has never returned like for like.

Throughout the entire course of the war Austro-Hungarian warships have

not destroyed a single enemy merchant vessel without previous warning,

though this may have been of a general character.

The theory of the Union Government, frequently referred to, also

admits of several interpretations; the question arises, for instance,

whether, as has frequently been maintained, only armed resistance can

be held to justify destruction of ship and persons on board, or

whether the same applies to resistance of another sort, as, for

example, when the crew purposely refrain from getting the passengers

into the boats (the case of the _Ancona_), or when the passengers

themselves decline to enter the boats. In the opinion of the Austrian

Government cases such as those last should also justify destruction of

the vessel without responsibility for the lives of those on board, as

otherwise it would be in the power of anyone on the vessel to deprive

the belligerent of his right to sink the ship. For the rest it should

also be borne in mind that there is no unanimity of opinion really as

to when the destruction of enemy merchant tonnage is justifiable at

all.

The obligation as to issuing a warning immediately before sinking a

vessel will, in the view of the Austrian Government on the one hand,

involve hardships otherwise avoidable, while, on the other, it may in

certain circumstances be calculated to prejudice the rightful

interests of the belligerent. In the first place it cannot be denied

that saving lives _at sea_ is nearly always a matter of blind

uncertainty, since the only alternatives are to leave them on board a

vessel exposed to the operations of the enemy, or to take them off in

small boats to face the dangers of the elements. It is, therefore,

far more in accordance with the dictates of humanity _to restrain

people from venturing upon vessels thus endangered by warning them

beforehand_. For the rest, however, the Austrian Government is not

convinced, despite careful consideration of all legal questions

concerned, that the subjects of neutral countries have any claim to

immunity when travelling on board enemy ships.

The principle that neutrals shall also in time of war enjoy the

freedom of the seas extends only to neutral vessels, not to neutral

persons on board enemy ships, since the belligerents are admittedly

justified in hampering enemy traffic at sea as far as lies in their

power. Granted the necessary military power, they can, if deemed

necessary to their ends, forbid enemy merchant vessels to sail the

sea, on pain of instant destruction, as long as they make their

purpose known beforehand so that all, whether enemy or neutral, _are

enabled to avoid risking their lives_. But even where there is doubt

as to the justification of such proceeding, and possible reprisals

threatened by the opposing side, the question would remain one to be

decided between the belligerents themselves alone, they being

admittedly allowed the right of making the high seas a field for their

military operations, of suppressing any interruption of such

operations and supremely determining what measures are to be taken

against enemy ships. The neutrals have in such case no legitimate

claims beyond that of demanding that due notice be given them of

measures contemplated against the enemy, in order that they may

refrain from entrusting their persons or goods to enemy vessels.

The Austrian Government may presumably take it for granted that the

Washington Cabinet agrees with the foregoing views, which the Austrian

Government is fully convinced are altogether unassailable. To deny the

correctness of these views would imply--and this the Union Government

can hardly intend--that neutrals have the right of interfering in the

military operations of the belligerents; indeed, ultimately to

constitute themselves the judges as to what methods may or may not be

employed against an enemy. It would also seem a crying injustice for a

neutral Government, in order merely to secure for its subjects the

right of passage on enemy ships when they might just as well, or

indeed with far greater safety, travel by neutral vessels, to grasp at

the arm of a belligerent Power, fighting perhaps for its very

existence. Not to mention the fact that it would open the way for all

kinds of abuses if a belligerent were forced to lay down arms at the

bidding of any neutral whom it might please to make use of enemy ships

for business or pleasure. No doubt has ever been raised as to the fact

that subjects of neutral states are themselves responsible for any

harm they may incur _by their presence in any territory on land where

military operations are in progress_. Obviously, there is no ground

for establishing another standard for naval warfare, particularly

since the second Peace Conference expressed the wish that, pending the

agreement of rules for naval warfare, the rules observed in warfare

upon land should be applied as far as possible at sea.

From the foregoing it appears that the rule as to warning being given

to the vessel itself before such vessel is sunk is subject to

exceptions of various kinds under certain circumstances, as, for

instance, the cases cited by the Union Government of flight and

resistance, the vessel may be sunk without any warning; in others

warning should be given before the vessel sails. The Austrian

Government may then assert that it is essentially in agreement with

the Union Government as to the protection of neutrals against risk of

life, whatever may be the attitude of the Washington Cabinet towards

some of the separate questions here raised. The Austrian Government

has not only put into practice throughout the war the views it holds

in this respect, but has gone even farther, regulating its actions

with the strictest care according to the theory advanced by the

Washington Cabinet, although its assurance as published only stated

that was "essentially in agreement" with the Union Government's views.

The Austrian Government would be extremely satisfied if the Washington

Cabinet should be inclined to assist it in its endeavours, which are

inspired by the warmest feelings of humanity, to save American

citizens from risk at sea by instructing and warning its subjects in

this direction.

Then, as regards the circular verbal note of February 10 of this year

concerning the treatment of armed enemy merchant vessels, the Austrian

Government must in any case declare itself to be, as indicated in the

foregoing, of the opinion that the arming of trading ships, even when

only for the purpose of avoiding capture, is not justified in modern

international law. The rules provide that a warship is to approach an

enemy merchant vessel in a peaceable manner; it is required to stop

the vessel by means of certain signals, to interview the captain,

examine the ship's papers, enter the particulars in due form and,

where necessary, make an inventory, etc. But in order to comply with

these requirements it must obviously be understood that the warship

has full assurance that the merchant vessel will likewise observe a

peaceable demeanour throughout. And it is clear that no such assurance

can exist when the merchant vessel is so armed as to be capable of

offering resistance to a warship. A warship can hardly be expected to

act in such a manner under the guns of an enemy, whatever may be the

purpose for which the guns were placed on board. Not to speak of the

fact that the merchant vessels of the Entente Powers, despite all

assurances to the contrary, have been proved to be armed for offensive

purposes, and make use of their armament for such purposes. It would

also be to disregard the rights of humanity if the crew of a warship

were expected to surrender to the guns of an enemy without resistance

on their own part. No State can regard its duty to humanity as less

valid in respect of men defending their country than in respect of the

subjects of a foreign Power.

The Austrian Government is therefore of opinion that its former

assurance to the Washington Cabinet could not be held to apply to

armed merchant vessels, since these, according to the legal standards

prevailing, whereby hostilities are restricted to organised military

forces, must be regarded as privateers (freebooters) which are liable

to immediate destruction. History shows us that, according to the

_general_ law of nations, merchant vessels have never been justified

in resisting the exercise by warships of the right of taking prizes.

But even if a standard to this effect could be shown to exist, it

would not mean that the vessels had the right to provide themselves

with guns. It should also be borne in mind that the arming of merchant

ships must necessarily alter the whole conduct of warfare at sea, and

that such alteration cannot correspond to the views of those who seek

to regulate maritime warfare according to the principles of humanity.

As a matter of fact, since the practice of privateering was

discontinued, until a few years back no Power has ever thought of

arming merchant vessels. Throughout the whole proceedings of the

second Peace Conference, which was occupied with all questions of the

laws of warfare at sea, not a single word was ever said about the

arming of merchant ships. Only on one occasion was a casual

observation made with any bearing on this question, and it is

characteristic that it should have been by a British naval officer of

superior rank, who impartially declared: "Lorsqu'un navire de guerre

se propose d'arrêter et de visiter un vaisseau marchand, le

commandant, avant de mettre une embarcation à la mer, fera tirer un

coup de canon. Le coup de canon est la meilleure garantie que l'on

puisse donner. _Les navires de commerce n'ont pas de canons à bord._"

(When a warship intends to stop and board a merchant vessel the

commander, before sending a boat, will fire a gun. The firing of a gun

is the best guarantee that can be given. _Merchant vessels do not

carry guns._)

Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary has in this regard also held by its

assurance; in the circular verbal note referred to neutrals were

cautioned beforehand against entrusting their persons or their goods

on board any armed ship; moreover, the measures announced were not put

into execution at once, but a delay was granted in order to enable

neutrals already on board armed ships to leave the same. And, finally,

the Austro-Hungarian warships are instructed, even in case of

encountering armed enemy merchant vessels, to give warning and to

provide for the safety of those on board, provided it seems possible

to do so in the circumstances.

The statement of the American Ambassador, to the effect that the armed

British steamers _Secondo_ and _Welsh Prince_ were sunk without

warning by Austrian submarines, is based on error. The Austrian

Government has in the meantime received information that no

Austro-Hungarian warships were at all concerned in the sinking of

these vessels.

The Austrian Government has, as in the circular verbal note already

referred to--reverting now to the question of aggravated submarine

warfare referred to in the memorandum--also in its declaration of

January 31 of this year issued a warning to neutrals with

corresponding time limit; indeed, _the whole of the declaration itself

is, from its nature, nothing more or less than a warning to the effect

that no merchant vessel may pass the area of sea expressly defined

therein_. Nevertheless, the Austrian warships have been instructed as

far as possible to warn such merchant vessels as may be encountered in

the area concerned and provide for the safety of passengers and crew.

And the Austrian Government is in the possession of numerous reports

stating that the crews and passengers of vessels destroyed in these

waters have been saved. But the Austrian Government cannot accept any

responsibility for possible loss of human life which may after all

occur in connection with the destruction of armed vessels or vessels

encountered in prohibited areas. Also it may be noted that the

Austro-Hungarian submarines operate only in the Adriatic and

Mediterranean Seas, and there is thus hardly any question as to any

action affecting American interests on the part of Austro-Hungarian

warships.

After all that has been said in the preamble to this Memorandum, it

need hardly be said that the declaration of the waters in question as

a prohibited area is in no way intended as a measure aiming at the

destruction of human life, or even to endangering the same, but that

its object--apart from the higher aims of _relieving humanity from

further suffering by shortening the war_, is only to place Great

Britain and its Allies, who have--without establishing any legally

effective blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers--hindered

traffic by sea between neutrals and these Powers in a like position of

isolation, and render them amenable to a peace with some guarantee of

permanency. That Austria-Hungary here makes use of other methods of

war than her opponents is due mainly to circumstances beyond human

control. But the Austrian Government is conscious of having done all

in its power to avoid loss of human life. _The object aimed at in the

blockading of the Western Powers would be most swiftly and certainly

attained if not a single human life were lost or endangered in those

waters._

To sum up, the Austrian Government may point out that the assurance

given to the Washington Cabinet in the case of the _Ancona_, and

renewed in the case of the _Persia_, is neither withdrawn nor

qualified by its statements of February 10, 1916, and January 31,

1917. Within the limits of this assurance the Austrian Government

will, together with its Allies, continue its endeavours to secure to

the peoples of the world a share in the blessings of peace. If in the

pursuit of this aim--which it may take for granted has the full

sympathy of the Washington Cabinet itself--it should find itself

compelled to impose restrictions on neutral traffic by sea in certain

areas, it will not need so much to point to the behaviour of its

opponents in this respect, which appears by no means an example to be

followed, but rather to the fact that Austria-Hungary, through the

persistence and hatred of its enemies, who are determined upon its

destruction, is brought to a state of self-defence in so desperate

extreme as is unsurpassed in the history of the world. The Austrian

Government is encouraged by the knowledge that the struggle now being

carried on by Austria-Hungary tends not only toward the preservation

of its own vital interests, but also towards the realisation of the

idea of equal rights for all states; and in this last and hardest

phase of the war, which unfortunately calls for sacrifices on the part

of friends as well, it regards it as of supreme importance to confirm

in word and deed the fact that it is guided equally by the laws of

humanity and by the dictates of respect for the dignity and interests

of neutral peoples.

3

=Speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the Submarine

Warfare=

The _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of May 1, 1917, gives the

following speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the

economic effects of the submarine warfare delivered in the principal

committee of the Reichstag on April 28. The speech is here given

verbatim, with the exception of portions containing confidential

statements:

"In the sitting of yesterday a member rightly pointed out that the

technical and economic results of the submarine warfare have been

estimated with caution. In technical respects the caution observed in

estimating the results is plain; the sinkings have, during the first

month, exceeded by nearly a quarter, in the second by nearly half, the

estimated 600,000 tons, and for the present month also we may fairly

cherish the best expectations. The technical success guarantees the

economic success with almost mathematical exactitude. True, the

economic results cannot be so easily expressed numerically and set

down in a few big figures as the technical result in the amount of

tonnage sunk. The economic effects of the submarine warfare are

expressed in many different spheres covering a wide area, where the

enemy seeks to render visibility still more difficult by resorting, so

to speak, to statistical smoke-screens.

"The English statistics to-day are most interesting, one might almost

say, in what they wisely refrain from mentioning. The Secretary of

State for the Navy pointed out yesterday how rapidly the pride of the

British public had faded. The English are now suppressing our reports

on the successes of our submarines and our statements as to submarine

losses; they dare not make public the amount of tonnage sunk, but

mystify the public with shipping statistics which have given rise to

general annoyance in the English Press itself. The English Government

lets its people go on calmly trusting to the myth that instead of six

U-boats sunk there are a hundred at the bottom of the sea. It conceals

from the world also the true course of the entries and departures of

tonnage in British ports since the commencement of unrestricted

submarine warfare. And more than all, the English Government has since

February suppressed most strictly all figures tending to throw light

on the position of the grain market. In the case of the coal exports,

the country of destination is not published. The monthly trade report,

which is usually issued with admirable promptness by the tenth of the

next month or thereabouts, was for February delayed and incomplete;

and for March it has not yet appeared at all. It is to be regretted

that this sudden withdrawal of information makes it more difficult for

us to estimate the effect of our submarine operations, but there is a

gratifying side to the question after all. It is not to be supposed

that England should suddenly become reticent in order to avoid

revealing its strength.

"For the rest, what can be seen is still sufficient to give us an

idea.

"I will commence with the tonnage. You are aware that in the first two

months of the unrestricted submarine warfare more than 1,600,000 tons

were sunk, of which probably considerably over one million tons sailed

under the British flag.

"The estimates as to the quantity of English tonnage at present

available are somewhat divergent; in any case, whether we take the

higher or the lower figures, a loss of more than a million tons in two

months is a thing that England cannot endure for long. And to replace

it, even approximately, by new building, is out of the question. In

the year 1914 England's newly-built ships gave a tonnage increment of

1,600,000; in 1915 it was 650,000 tons, in 1916 only 580,000, despite

all efforts. And the normal loss of the British merchant fleet in

peace time amounts to between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. It is hopeless

to think of maintaining equilibrium by urging on the building of new

vessels.

"The attempts which are made to enlist the neutral tonnage in British

service by a system of rewards and punishments may here and there, to

the ultimate disadvantage of the neutrals themselves, have met with

some success, but even so, the neutrals must consider the need for

preserving a merchant fleet themselves for peace time, so that there

is a narrow limit to what can be attained in this manner. Even in

January of this year about 30 per cent. of the shipping entries into

British ports were under foreign flags. I have heard estimates brought

up to 80 per cent. in order to terrify the neutrals; if but 50 per

cent. of this be correct it means a decrease in British shipping

traffic of roughly one-sixth. Counting tonnage sunk and tonnage

frightened off, the arrivals at British ports have been reduced, at a

low estimate, by one-fourth, and probably by as much as one-third, as

against January. In January arrivals amounted to 2.2 million net tons.

I may supplement the incomplete English statistics by the information

that in March the arrivals were only 1.5 to 1.6 million tons net, and

leave it to Mr. Carson to refute this. The 1.5 to 1.6 million tons

represent, compared with the average entries in peace time, amounting

to 4.2 millions, not quite 40 per cent. This low rate will be further

progressively reduced. Lloyd George at the beginning of the war

reckoned on the last milliard. Those days are now past. Then he based

his plans on munitions. England has here, with the aid of America,

achieved extraordinary results. But the Somme and Arras showed that,

even with those enormous resources, England was not able to beat us.

Now, in his greeting to the American Allies, Lloyd George cries out:

'Ships, ships, and yet more ships.' And this time he is on the right

tack; it is on ships that the fate of the British world-empire will

depend.

"The Americans, too, have understood this. They propose to build a

thousand wooden vessels of 3,000 tons. But before these can be brought

into action they will, I confidently hope, have nothing left to save.

"I base this confidence upon the indications which are visible,

despite the English policy of suppression and concealment.

"Take the total British trade. The figures for March are still not yet

available, but those for February tell us enough.

"British imports amounted in January of this year to 90 million pounds

sterling, in February to only 70 million; the exports have gone down

from 46 to 37 millions sterling--imports and exports together showing

a decline of over 20 per cent. in the first month of the submarine

warfare. And again, the rise in prices all round has, since the

commencement of the U-boat war, continued at a more rapid rate, so

that the decline in the import quantity from one month to another may

fairly be estimated at 25 per cent. The figures for imports and

exports, then, confirm my supposition as to the decrease of tonnage in

the traffic with British ports.

"The British Government has endeavoured, by the strictest measures

rigorously prohibiting import of less important articles, to ward off

the decline in the quantity of vital necessaries imported. The attempt

can only partially succeed.

"In 1916, out of a total import quantity of 42 million tons, about 31

millions fall to three important groups alone, viz., foodstuffs and

luxuries, timber, and iron ore; all other goods, including important

war materials, such as other ores and metals, petroleum, cotton and

wool, rubber, only 11 million tons, or roughly one-fourth. A decline

of one-fourth, then, as brought about by the first month of

unrestricted submarine warfare, must affect articles indispensable to

life and to the purposes of war.

"The decline in the imports in February, 1917, as against February,

1916, appears as follows:

"Wool 17 per cent., cotton 27 per cent., flax 38 per cent., hemp 48

per cent., jute 74 per cent., woollen materials 83 per cent., copper

and copper ore 49 per cent., iron and steel 59 per cent. As to the

imports of iron ore I will give more detailed figures:

"Coffee 66 per cent., tea 41 per cent., raw sugar 10 per cent.,

refined sugar 90 per cent., bacon 17 per cent., butter 21 per cent.,

lard 21 per cent., eggs 39 per cent., timber 42 per cent.

"The only increases worth noting are in the case of leather, hides,

rubber and tin.

"As regards the group in which we are most interested, the various

sorts of grain, no figures for quantities have been given from

February onwards.

"The mere juxtaposition of two comparable values naturally gives no

complete idea of the facts. It should be borne in mind that the

commencement of the unrestricted U-boat campaign came at a time when

the economical position of England was not normal, but greatly

weakened already by two and a half years of war. A correct judgment

will, then, only be possible when we take into consideration the

entire development of the imports during the course of the war.

"I will here give only the most important figures.

"In the case of iron ore, England has up to now maintained its

position better than in other respects.

"Imports amounted in 1913 to 7.4 million tons.

"In 1916 to 6.9 million tons.

"January, 1913, 689,000 tons; February, 1913, 658,000 tons.

"January, 1916, 526,000 tons; February, 1916, 404,000 tons.

"January, 1917, 512,000 tons; February, 1917, 508,000 tons.

"Here again comparison with the peace year 1913 shows for the months

of January and February a not inconsiderable decrease, though the

imports, especially in February, 1917, were in excess of those for the

same month in 1916.

"Timber imports, 1913, 10.1 million loads.

" " 1916, 5.9 " "

" February, 1913, 406,000 loads.

" " 1916, 286,000 "

" " 1917, 167,000 "

"As regards mining timber especially, the import of which fell from

3.5 million loads in 1913 to 2.0 million in 1916, we have here

December, 1916, and January, 1917, with 102,000 and 107,000 loads as

the lowest import figures given since the beginning of 1913; a

statement for the import of mining timber is missing for February.

"Before turning to the import of foodstuffs a word may be said as to

the export of coal.

"The total export of coal has decreased from 78 million tons in 1913

to 461/2 million tons in 1915; in 1916 only about 42 million tons were

exported. In December, 1916, the export quantity fell for the first

time below 3 million tons, having remained between 3.2 and 3.9 million

tons during the months from January to November, 1916. In January,

1917, a figure of 3.5 million tons was again reached; it is the more

significant, therefore, that the coal export, which from the nature of

the case exhibits only slight fluctuations from month to month, falls

again in February, 1917, to 2.9 million tons (as against 3.4 million

tons in February of the year before), thus almost reaching once more

to the lowest point hitherto recorded--that of December, 1916. And it

should be remembered that here, as in the case of all other exports,

sunk transports are included in the English statistics.

"Details as to the destination of exported coal have since the

beginning of this year been withheld. England is presumably desirous

of saving the French and Italians the further distress of reading for

the future in black and white the calamitous decline in their coal

supply. The serious nature of this decline, even up to the end of

1916, may be seen from the following figures:

"England's coal export to France amounted in December, 1916, to only

1,128,000 tons, as against 1,269,000 tons in January of the same year;

the exports to Italy in December, 1916, amounted only to 278,000 tons,

as against 431,000 tons in January, and roughly 800,000 tons monthly

average for the peace year 1913.

"As to the further development since the end of February, I am able to

give some interesting details. Scotland's coal export in the first

week of April was 103,000 tons, as against 194,000 tons the previous

year; from the beginning of the year 1,783,000 tons, as against

2,486,000 tons the previous year. From this it is easy to see how the

operations of the U-boats are striking at the root of railway and war

industries in the countries allied with England.

"Lloyd George, in a great speech made on January 22 of this year,

showed the English how they could protect themselves against the

effects of submarine warfare by increased production in their own

country. The practicability and effectiveness of his counsels are more

than doubtful. He makes no attempt, however, to instruct his Allies

how they are to protect themselves against the throttling of the coal

supply.

"I come now to the most important point: _the position of England with

regard to its food supply_.

"First of all I would give a few brief figures by way of calling to

mind the degree to which England is dependent upon supplies of

foodstuffs from overseas.

"The proportion of imports in total British consumption averaged

during the last years of peace as follows:

"Bread-corn, close on 80 per cent.

"Fodder-grain (barley, oats, maize), which can be utilised as

substitutes for, and to supplement, the bread-corn, 50 per cent.;

meat, over 40 per cent.; butter, 60-65 per cent. The sugar

consumption, failing any home production at all, must be entirely

covered by imports from abroad.

"I would further point out that our U-boats, inasmuch as concerns the

food situation in England, are operating under quite exceptionally

favourable conditions; the world's record harvest of 1915 has been

followed by the world's worst harvest of 1916, representing a loss of

45-50 million tons of bread and fodder-grain. The countries hardest

hit are those most favourably situated, from the English point of

view, in North America. The effects are now--the rich stocks from the

former harvest having been consumed--becoming more evident every day

and everywhere. The Argentine has put an embargo on exports of grain.

As to the condition of affairs in the United States, this may be seen

from the following figures:

"The Department of Agriculture estimates the stocks of wheat still in

the hands of the farmer on March 1, 1917, at 101 million bushels, or

little over 21/2 million tons. The stocks for the previous year on that

date amounted to 241 million bushels. Never during the whole of the

time I have followed these figures back have the stocks been so low or

even nearly so. The same applies to stocks of maize. Against a supply

of 1,138,000 bushels on March 1, 1916, we have for this year only

789,000 bushels.

"The extraordinary scarcity of supplies is nearing the panic limit.

The movement of prices during the last few weeks is simply fantastic.

Maize, which was noted in Chicago at the beginning of January, 1917,

at 95 cents, rose by the end of April to 127 cents, and by April 25

had risen further to 148 cents. Wheat in New York, which stood at 871/4

cents in July, 1914, and by the beginning of 1917 had already risen to

1911/2 cents, rose at the beginning of April to 229 cents, and was noted

at no less than 281 on April 2. This is three and a half times the

peace figure! In German currency at normal peace time exchange, these

281 cents represent about 440 marks per ton, or, at present rate of

exchange for dollars, about 580 marks per ton.

"That, then, is the state of affairs in the country which is to help

England in the war of starvation criminally begun by itself!

"In England no figures are now made public as to imports and stocks of

grain. I can, however, state as follows:

"On the last date for which stocks were noted, January 13, 1917,

England's visible stocks of wheat amounted to 5.3 million quarters, as

against 6.3 and 5.9 million quarters in the two previous years. From

January to May and June there is, as a rule, a marked decline in the

stocks, and even in normal years the imports during these months do

not cover the consumption. In June, 1914 and 1915, the visible stocks

amounted only to about 2 million quarters, representing the

requirements for scarcely three weeks.

"We have no reason to believe that matters have developed more

favourably during the present year. This is borne out by the import

figures for January--as published. The imports of bread-corn and

fodder-grain--I take them altogether, as in the English regulations

for eking out supplies--amounted only to 12.6 million quarters, as

against 19.8 and 19.2 in the two previous years.

"For February the English statistics show an increase in the import

value of unstated import quantity of all grain of 50 per cent., as

against February, 1916. This gives, taking the distribution among the

various sorts of grain as similar to that of January, and reckoning

with the rise in prices since, about the same import quantity as in

the previous year. But in view of the great decrease in American grain

shipments and the small quantity which can have come from India and

Australia the statement is hardly credible. We may take it that March

has brought a further decline, and that to-day, when we are nearing

the time of the three-week stocks, the English supplies are lower than

in the previous years.

"The English themselves acknowledge this. Lloyd George stated in

February that the English grain supplies were lower than ever within

the memory of man. A high official in the English Ministry of

Agriculture, Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, speaking in April at an agricultural

congress, added that owing to the submarine warfare, which was an

extremely serious peril to England, the state of affairs had grown far

worse even than then.

"Captain Bathurst, of the British Food Controller's Department

(_Kriegsernährungsamt_), stated briefly on April 19 that the then

consumption of breadstuffs was 50 per cent. in excess of the present

_and prospective_ supplies. It would be necessary to reduce the

consumption of bread by fully a third in order to make ends meet.

"Shortly before, Mr. Wallhead, a delegate from Manchester, at a

conference of the Independent Labour Party in Leeds had stated that,

according to his information, England would in six to eight weeks be

in a complete state of famine.

"The crisis in which England is placed--and we can fairly call it a

crisis now--is further aggravated by the fact that the supplies of

other important foodstuffs have likewise taken an unfavourable turn.

"The import of meat in February, 1917, shows the lowest figures for

many years, with the single exception of September, 1914.

"The marked falling off in the butter imports--February, 1917, showing

only half as much as in the previous year--is not nearly

counterbalanced by the margarine which England is making every effort

to introduce.

"The import of lard also, most of which comes from the United States,

shows a decline, owing to the poor American crops of fodder-stuffs.

The price of lard in Chicago has risen from 151/2 cents at the beginning

of January, 1917, to 211/2 cents on April 25, and the price of pigs in

the same time from 9.80 to 16.50 dollars.

"Most serious of all, however, is the shortage of potatoes, which at

present is simply catastrophic. The English crop was the worst for a

generation past. The imports are altogether insignificant. Captain

Bathurst stated on April 19 that in about four weeks the supplies of

potatoes in the country would be entirely exhausted.

"The full seriousness of the case now stares English statesmen in the

face. Up to now they have believed it possible to exorcise the danger

by voluntary economies. Now they find themselves compelled to have

recourse to compulsory measures. I believe it is too late."

The Secretary of State then gives a detailed account of the measures

taken up to date in England for dealing with the food question, and

thereafter continues:

"On March 22 again the English food dictator, Lord Devonport, stated

in the House of Lords that a great reduction in the consumption of

bread would be necessary, but that it would be _a national disaster_

if England should have to resort to compulsion.

"His representative, Bathurst, stated at the same time: 'We do not

wish to introduce _so un-English a system_. In the first place,

because we believe that the patriotism of the people can be trusted to

assist us in our endeavours towards economy, and, further, because, as

we can see from the example of Germany, the compulsory system promises

no success; finally, because such a system would necessitate a too

complicated administrative machinery and too numerous staffs of men

and women whose services could be better employed elsewhere.'

"Meantime the English Government has, on receipt of the latest

reports, decided to adopt this un-English system which has proved a

failure in Germany, declaring now that the entire organisation for the

purpose is in readiness.

"I have still something further to say about the vigorous steps now

being taken in England to further the progress of agriculture in the

country itself. I refrain from going into this, however, as the

measures in question cannot come to anything by next harvest time, nor

can they affect that harvest at all. The winter deficiency can hardly

be balanced, even with the greatest exertions, by the spring. Not

until the 1918 crop, if then, can any success be attained. And between

then and now lies a long road, a road of suffering for England, and

for all countries dependent upon imports for their food supply.

"Everything points to the likelihood that the universal failure of the

harvest in 1916 will be followed by a like universal failure in 1917.

In the United States the official reports of acreage under crops are

worse than ever, showing 63.4, against 78.3 the previous year. The

winter wheat is estimated at only 430 million bushels, as against 492

million bushels for the previous year and 650 million bushels for

1915.

"The prospects, then, for the next year's harvest are poor indeed, and

offer no hope of salvation to our enemies.

"As to our own outlook, this is well known to those present: short,

but safe--for we can manage by ourselves. And to-day we can say that

the war of starvation, that crime against humanity, has turned against

those who commenced it. We hold the enemy in an iron grip. No one can

save them from their fate. Not even the apostles of humanity across

the great ocean, who are now commencing to protect the smaller nations

by a blockade of our neutral neighbours through prohibition of

exports, and seeking thus to drive them, under the lash of starvation,

into entering into the war against us.

"Our enemies are feeling the grip of the fist that holds them by the

neck. They are trying to force a decision. England, mistress of the

seas, is seeking to attain its end by land, and driving her sons by

hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation. Is this the England

that was to have sat at ease upon its island till we were starved into

submission, that could wait till their big brother across the Atlantic

arrived on the scene with ships and million armies, standing fast in

crushing superiority until the last annihilating battle?

"No, gentlemen, our enemies have no longer time to wait. Time is on

our side now. True, the test imposed upon us by the turn of the

world's history is enormous. What our troops are doing to help, what

our young men in blue are doing, stands far above all comparison. But

they will attain their end. For us at home, too, it is hard; not so

hard by far as for them out there, yet hard enough. Those at home must

do their part as well. If we remain true to ourselves, keeping our own

house in order, maintaining internal unity, then we have won existence

and the future for our Fatherland. Everything is at stake. The German

people is called upon now, in these weeks heavy with impending

decision, to show that it is worthy of continued existence."

4

=Speech by Count Czernin to the Austrian Delegation, January 24,

1918.=

"Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a true picture of the peace

negotiations, to set forth the various phases of the results obtained

up to now, and to draw therefrom such conclusions as are true, logical

and justifiable.

"First of all it seems to me that those who consider the progress of

the negotiations too slow cannot have even an approximate idea of the

difficulties which we naturally had to encounter at every step. I will

in my remarks take the liberty of setting forth these difficulties,

but would like first to point out a cardinal difference existing

between the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and all others which

have ever taken place in the history of the world. Never, so far as I

am aware, have peace negotiations been conducted with open windows. It

would be impossible that negotiations of the depth and extent of the

present could from the start proceed smoothly and without opposition.

We are faced with nothing less than the task of building up a new

world, of restoring all that the most merciless of all wars has

destroyed and cast down. In all the peace negotiations we know of the

various phases have been conducted more or less behind closed doors,

the results being first declared to the world when the whole was

completed. All history books tell us, and indeed it is obvious enough,

that the toilsome path of such peace negotiations leads constantly

over hill and dale, the prospects appearing often more or less

favourable day by day. But when the separate phases themselves, the

details of each day's proceedings, are telegraphed all over the world

at the time, it is again obvious that nervousness prevailing

throughout the world must act like an electric current and excite

public opinion accordingly. We were fully aware of the disadvantage of

this method of proceeding. Nevertheless we at once agreed to the wish

of the Russian Government in respect of this publicity, desiring to

meet them as far as possible, and also because we had nothing to

conceal on our part, and because it would have made an unfavourable

impression if we had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of

secrecy until completion. _But the complete publicity in the

negotiations makes it insistent that the great public, the country

behind, and above all the leaders, must keep cool._ The match must be

played out in cold blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the

peoples of the Monarchy support their representatives at the

conference.

"It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which

Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-constituted Russian

states is that of 'no indemnities and no annexations.' That is the

programme which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Minister,

I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated

to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace.

And I have not deviated from that programme. Those who believe that I

am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to follow are

poor psychologists. I have never left the public in the slightest

doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never allowed

myself to be turned aside so much as a hair's breadth from that way,

either to right or left. And I have since become far from a favourite

of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who follow the

Pan-German ideas. I have at the same time been hooted as an inveterate

partisan of war by those whose programme is peace at any price, as

innumerable letters have informed me. Neither has ever disturbed me;

on the contrary, the double insults have been my only comfort in this

serious time. I declare now once again that I ask not a single

kreuzer, not a single square metre of land from Russia, and that if

Russia, as appears to be the case, takes the same point of view, then

peace must result. Those who wish for peace at any price might

entertain some doubt as to my 'no-annexation' intentions towards

Russia if I did not tell them to their faces with the same complete

frankness that I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going

beyond the lines just laid down. If the Russian delegates demand any

surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall

continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as

they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek.

"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground

for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since

the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations

or indemnities--and nothing but new instructions from the various

Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis--I

then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the

reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all

wished.

"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with _a single_

Russian peace delegation, but with various newly-formed Russian

states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely

fixed or explained among themselves. We have to reckon with the

following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St.

Petersburg; secondly, our new neighbour proper, the great State of

Ukraine; thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus.

"With the first two of these states we are treating directly; that is

to say, face to face; with the two others it was at first in a more or

less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative to

Brest-Litovsk. We have then four Russian parties, and four separate

Powers on our own side to meet them. The case of the Caucasus, with

which we ourselves have, of course, no direct questions to settle, but

which, on the other hand, is in conflict with Turkey, will serve to

show the extent of the matter to be debated.

"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is that

of the great newly-established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine. In

the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead with this

delegation. We are agreed upon the aforementioned basis of no

indemnities and no annexations, and have in the main arrived at a

settlement on the point that trade relations are to be re-established

with the new republic, as also on the manner of so doing. But this

very case of the Ukraine illustrates one of the prevailing

difficulties. While the Ukraine Republic takes up the position of

being entirely autonomous and justified in treating independently with

ourselves, the Russian delegation insists that the boundaries between

their territory and that of the Ukraine are not yet definitely fixed,

and that Petersburg is therefore able to claim the right of taking

part in our deliberations with the Ukraine, which claim is not

admitted by the members of the Ukraine delegation themselves. This

unsettled state of affairs in the internal conditions of Russia,

however, gave rise to very serious delays. We have got over these

difficulties, and I hope that in a few days' time we shall be able

once more to resume negotiations.

"As to the position to-day, I cannot say what this may be. I received

yesterday from my representative at Brest-Litovsk the following two

telegrams:

"'Herr Joffe has this evening, in his capacity as President of the

Russian Delegation, issued a circular letter to the delegations of the

four allied Powers in which he states that the Workers' and Peasants'

Government of the Ukrainian Republic has decided to send two delegates

to Brest-Litovsk with instructions to take part in the peace

negotiations on behalf of the central committee of the workers',

soldiers' and peasants' councils of Pan-Ukraine, but also to form a

supplementary part of the _Russian_ delegation itself. Herr Joffe adds

with regard to this that the Russian delegation is prepared to receive

these Ukrainian representatives among themselves. The above statement

is supplemented by a copy of a "declaration" dated from Kharkov,

addressed to the President of the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest,

and emanating from the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the

Ukrainian Republic, proclaiming that the Central Rada at Kiev only

represents the propertied classes, and is consequently incapable of

acting on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian

Workers' and Peasants' Government declares that it cannot acknowledge

any decisions arrived at by the delegates of the Central Rada at Kiev

without its participation, but has nevertheless decided to send

representatives to Brest-Litovsk, there to participate as a

supplementary fraction of the Russian Delegation, which they recognise

as the accredited representatives of the Federative Government of

Russia.'

"Furthermore: 'The German translation of the Russian original text of

the communication received yesterday evening from Herr Joffe regarding

the delegates of the Ukrainian Government at Kharkov and the two

appendices thereto runs as follows:

"'To the President of the Austro-Hungarian Peace Delegation.

"'Sir,--In forwarding you herewith a copy of a declaration received by

me from the delegates of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the

Ukrainian Republic, W.M. Schachrai and J.G. Medwjedew, and their

mandates, I have the honour to inform you that the Russian Delegation,

in full agreement with its frequently repeated acknowledgment of the

right of self-determination among all peoples--including naturally the

Ukrainian--sees nothing to hinder the participation of the

representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the

Ukrainian Republic in the peace negotiations, and receives them,

according to their wish, among the personnel of the Russian Peace

Delegation, as accredited representatives of the Workers' and

Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. In bringing this to

your knowledge, I beg you, sir, to accept the expression of my most

sincere respect.--The President of the Russian Peace Delegation:

A. JOFFE.'

"'Appendix 1. To the President of the Peace Delegation of the Russian

Republic. Declaration.

"'We, the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of

the Ukrainian Republic, People's Commissary for Military Affairs, W.M.

Schachrai, and the President of the Pan-Ukrainian Central Executive

Committee of the Council of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants'

Deputation, J.G. Medwjedew, delegated to proceed to Brest-Litovsk for

the purpose of conducting peace negotiations with the representatives

of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, in full agreement

with the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of

the Russian Federative Republic, thereby understood the Council of

People's Commissaries, hereby declare as follows: The General

Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada can in no case be

acknowledged as representing the entire Ukrainian people. In the name

of the Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants, we declare

categorically that all resolutions formed by the General Secretariat

without our assent will not be accepted by the Ukrainian people,

cannot be carried out, and can in no case be realised.

"'In full agreement with the Council of People's Commissaries, and

thus also with the Delegation of the Russian Workers' and Peasants'

Government, we shall for the future undertake the conduct of the peace

negotiations with the Delegation of the four Powers, together with the

Russian Peace Delegation.

"'And we now bring to the knowledge of the President the following

resolution, passed by the Central Executive Committee of the

Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies,

on the 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918:

"'The Central Committee has decided: To delegate Comrade Medwjedew,

President of the Central Executive Committee, and People's Secretary

Satonski and Commissary Schachrai, to take part in the peace

negotiations, instructing them at the same time to declare

categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central Rada to act

in the name of the Ukrainian people are to be regarded as _arbitrary

steps_ on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian population,

against the will and interests of the working classes of the Ukraine,

and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada will be

acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet Government or by the

Ukrainian people; that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government

regards the Council of People's Commissaries as representatives of the

Pan-Russian Soviet Government, and as accordingly entitled to act on

behalf of the entire Russian Federation; and that the delegation of

the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government, sent out for the

purpose of exposing the arbitrary steps of the Ukrainian Central Rada,

will act together with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian

Delegation.

"'Herewith: The mandate issued by the People's Secretariat of the

Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, 30th December, 1917.

"'Note: People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir

Petrowitch Satonski, was taken ill on the way, and did not therefore

arrive with us.

"'January, 1918.

"'The President of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian

Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, E. Medwjedew.

"'The People's Commissary for Military Affairs, Schachrai.

"'A true copy of the original.

"'The Secretary of the Peace Delegation, Leo Karachou.'

"Appendix 2.

"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council

of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina, the People's

Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints, in the name of

the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina, the President of the

Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and

Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the

People's Secretary for Military Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch

Schachrai, and the People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People,

Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, in the name of the Ukrainian People's

Republic, to take part in the negotiations with the Governments of

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace

between the mentioned states and the Russian Federative Republic. With

this end in view the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch

Medwjedew, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai and Wladimir Petrowitch

Satonski are empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to

issue declarations and to sign documents in the name of the Workers'

and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited

representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government are

bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions of the

accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of

the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is understood the Council of

People's Commissaries.

"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the

Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for International

Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, Works,

Commissariat.

"'The Manager of the Secretariat.

"'Kharkov, 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918.

"'In accordance with the copy.

"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.'

"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not

interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficulties

to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian Republic

determine that _the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary and the

former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves and the

Ukraine._

=Poland=

"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have not yet

been exactly determined, _we want nothing at all from this new state_.

Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall choose its own

fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the _form_ of the

people's vote in this respect; _the more surely it expresses the

general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased_. For I

desire only the _voluntary_ attachment of Poland; only in the express

_wish_ of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guarantee for

lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that _the Polish

question must not be allowed to delay the signing of peace by a single

day_. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach

us, we will not reject its advances--_the Polish question must not and

shall not endanger the peace itself_.

"I should have been glad if _the Polish Government had been able to

take part in the negotiations_, since in my opinion Poland is _an

independent state_. The Petersburg Government, however, takes the

attitude that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak

in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as competent

to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on this point in

order to avoid possible conflict. The question is certainly one of

importance, but it is more important still in my opinion _to set aside

all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations_.

=German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas=

"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been

most widely echoed in the Press, is the _difference of opinion between

our German allies and the Petersburg Government_ anent the

interpretation of _the right of self-determination among the Russian

peoples_; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops.

Germany maintains that it _does not aim at any annexation of territory

by force_ from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion

is a double one.

"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that _the numerous

expressions of desire for independence_ on the part of _legislative

corporations, communal representations_, etc., in the occupied areas

should be taken as the _provisional_ basis for the will of the people,

to be _later_ tested by _plebiscite on a broader foundation_, a point

of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree

to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in Courland

and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any more than in

the case of Poland.

"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take

place _after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from

the occupied provinces_, while Germany, in reply to this, points out

that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would

create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state

of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should here be noted

that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the

life of a state at all is _German property_. Railways, posts and

telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire

administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands.

The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a

condition of things which seems _practically impossible to maintain_.

"In both cases it is a question of finding a _middle way_, which

moreover _must be found_.

"_The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion

not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations_.

"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they

take time.

"_If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the

general peace cannot be long delayed_, despite all efforts on the part

of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some are unable

to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of

negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general

peace, but of a _separate peace with Russia_. This was the necessary

recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted

without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would

have been on a different footing--that is to say, _in a more limited

sphere_--if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of

treating for a general peace.

"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of

general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced

that the fruit _has begun to ripen_, and that it is now only a

question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable

peace or not.

=Wilson's Message=

"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put

forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole

world. This is _an offer of peace_, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson

sets forth the principles upon which he seeks to establish a general

peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be expected to

furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that were the case,

then negotiations would be superfluous altogether, and peace could be

arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single assent. This, of course,

is not so.

"_But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals on

the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the

Austro-Hungarian point of view_, and that there are among his

proposals some which we can even agree to _with great pleasure_.

"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must,

to begin with, point out two things:

"So far as the proposals are concerned with _our Allies_--mention is

made of the German possession of _Belgium_ and of the _Turkish

Empire_--I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am

firmly determined _to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very

last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally

with our own_. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete

reciprocity with ourselves.

"In the second place, I have to point out that I must _politely but

definitely decline_ to consider the Point dealing with our internal

Government. We have in Austria _a parliament elected by general,

equal, direct and secret ballot_. There is not a more democratic

parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other

constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon

matters of _Austrian internal affairs_. I speak of _Austria_ only,

because I do not refer to _Hungarian_ internal affairs in the

_Austrian Delegation_. I should not consider it constitutional to do

so. _And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other

hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state

whatever._ Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the

remaining Points, to state as follows:

"As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and

the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing

to say. From my point of view I have _no objection to such public

negotiations so long as full reciprocity_ is the basis of the same,

though I do entertain _considerable doubt_ as to whether, all things

considered, _it is the quickest and most practical method_ of arriving

at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business.

But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of

commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be

advisable _to publish incomplete results beforehand_ to the world. In

such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their

demands as high as possible in order to climb down gradually, using

this or that expressed demand as matter for _compensation in_ other

ways until finally an _equilibrium of the opposing interests is

arrived at_, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is

to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with

full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from

passionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any

concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced

_for tactical reasons_. And when the public takes up any such point

with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered

impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as

in itself _a defeat_, possibly by both sides. And this would not

conduce to peaceable relations thereafter; it would, on the contrary,

_increase the friction_ between the states concerned. And as in the

case of commercial treaties, so also with _political_ negotiations,

which deal with political matters.

"If the abolition of secret diplomacy is to mean that _no secret

compacts are to be made_, that no agreements are to be entered upon

without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the

introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realised and

adherence thereto ensured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted

that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always be

able to make a secret compact without the public being aware of the

fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick by

formalities, and _a question of more or less formal nature will never

prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement_.

"Point 1, then, is one that can be discussed.

"Point 2 is concerned with the _freedom of the seas_. In this

postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can here

_fully and completely share America's desire_, the more so as the

President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters'--that is to

say, we are to understand the freedom of _the open sea_, and there is

thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the

sovereign rights of our faithful _Turkish_ Allies. Their standpoint in

this respect will be ours.

"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any _future economic

war_, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by

ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark.

"Point 4, which demands _general disarmament_, sets forth in

particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this

present war the free competition in armaments to a footing sufficient

for the _internal security_ of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly

and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ventured to

express the same idea; it forms _part of my political creed_, and I

am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same thought.

"As regards the _Russian clause_, we are already showing in deeds that

we are endeavouring to bring about friendly relations with our

neighbours there.

"With regard to _Italy, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro_, I can only

repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation.

"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures of our

enemies.

"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our enemies,

who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on until

the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by such

concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advantage of

being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk.

(_Applause._)

"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses among

his Allies to persuade them on their part to declare _on what

conditions they are willing to treat_; he will then have rendered the

enormous service of having set on foot the _general peace

negotiations_. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and

I will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for

themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that _time, and the

continuation of the war, cannot but affect the situations here

concerned_.

"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example.

Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial

acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into

the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war

expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery upon its

own population, and all this _only to lose for ever an advantage which

it might have won_.

"Finally, as regards Point 13, it is an open secret that we are

adherents to the idea of establishing 'an independent Polish State to

include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.' On this

point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson. And if the

President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal _League of

Nations_ he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto on the part

of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr.

Wilson, we are not only _agreed in essentials as to the great

principles_ for rearrangement of the world after this war, but _our

ideas as to several concrete questions bearing on the peace are

closely allied_.

"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but that a

discussion of these points might lead to a clearer understanding and

bring us closer still.

"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary on the one

hand, and the United States of America on the other, are the two Great

Powers in the hostile groups of states whose interests are least

opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that

_an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might form the

natural starting point for a conciliatory discussion_ between all

those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations.

(_Applause._) So much for Wilson's proposals.

=Petersburg and the Ukraine=

"And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. But this conclusion is

perhaps the most important of all I have to say; I am endeavouring to

bring about peace between the Ukraine and Petersburg.

"The conclusion of peace with Petersburg alters nothing in our

definitive situation. Austro-Hungarian troops are nowhere opposed to

the Petersburg Government--we have the Ukrainian against us--and it is

impossible to export anything from Petersburg, since they have nothing

there themselves but _revolution and anarchy, goods which the

Bolshevists, no doubt, would be glad to export, but which I must

politely decline to receive_.

"In spite of this, I wish to make peace with Petersburg as well, since

this, like any other cessation of hostilities, brings us nearer to the

_general peace_.

"It is otherwise with Ukraine. For the Ukraine has supplies of

provisions which they will export if we can agree on commercial terms.

The question of food is to-day a matter of anxiety throughout the

world; among our opponents, and also in the neutral countries, it is a

burning question. I wish to profit by the conclusion of peace with

those Russian states which have food to export, in order to help our

own population. _We could and would hold out without this assistance._

But I know my duty, and my duty bids me do all that can be done to

lighten the burden of our suffering people, and I will not, therefore,

from any hysterical nervousness about getting to final peace a few

days or a few weeks earlier, throw away this possible advantage to our

people. Such a peace takes time and cannot be concluded in a day. For

such a peace must definitely state whether, what and how the Russian

party will deliver to us, for the reason that the Ukraine on its part

wishes to close the business not after, but at the signing of peace.

"I have already mentioned that the unsettled conditions in this newly

established state occasion great difficulty and naturally considerable

delay in the negotiations.

=Appeal to the Country=

"_If you fall on me from behind, if you force me to come to terms at

once in headlong fashion, we shall gain no economic advantage at all_,

and our people will then be forced to renounce the alleviation which

they should have gained from the peace.

"A surgeon conducting a difficult operation with a crowd behind him

standing watch in hand may very likely complete the operation in

record time, but in all probability the patient would not thank him

for the manner in which it had been carried out.

"If you give our present opponents the impression that we must have

_peace at once, and at any price_, we shall not get so much as a

single measure of grain, and the result will be more or less platonic.

It is no longer by any means a question principally of terminating the

war on the Ukrainian front; neither we nor the Ukrainians themselves

intend to continue the war now that we are agreed upon the

no-annexation basis. It is a question--I repeat it once again--not of

'imperialistic' annexation plans and ideas, but of securing for our

population at last the merited reward of their endurance, and

procuring them those supplies of food for which they are waiting. Our

partners in the deal are good business men and are closely watching to

see _whether you are forcing me to act or not_.

"_If you wish to ruin the peace_, if you are anxious to renounce the

supply of grain, then it would be logical enough to force my hand by

speeches and resolutions, strikes and demonstrations, but not

otherwise. And there is not an atom of truth in the idea that we are

now at such a pass that we must prefer a bad peace without economic

gain rather than a good peace with economic advantages to-morrow.

"The difficulties in the matter of food of late are not due solely to

lack of actual provisions; it is the crises in coal, transport and

organisation which are increasing. _When you at home get up strikes

you are moving in a vicious circle; the strikes increase and aggravate

the crises concerned and hinder the supplies of food and coal._ You

are cutting your own throats in so doing, and all who believe that

peace is accelerated thereby are terribly mistaken.

"It is believed that men in the country have been circulating rumours

to the effect that the Government is instigating the strikes. I leave

to these men themselves to choose whether they are to appear as

_criminal slanderers or as fools_.

"If you had a Government desirous of concluding a peace different

from that desired by the majority of the population, if you had a

Government seeking to prolong the war for purposes of conquest, one

might understand a conflict between the Government and the country.

_But since the Government desires precisely the same as the majority

of the people--that is to say, the speedy settlement of an honourable

peace without annexationist aims--then it is madness to attack that

Government from behind, to interfere with its freedom of action and

hamper its movements._ Those who do so are fighting, not against the

Government, they are fighting blindly against the people they pretend

to serve and against themselves.

"As for yourselves, gentlemen, it is not only your right, but your

duty, to choose between the following alternatives: either you trust

me to proceed with the peace negotiations, and in that case you must

help me, or you do not trust me, and in that case you must depose me.

I am confident that I have the support of the majority of the

Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian Committee has given me a vote of

confidence. If there is any doubt as to the same here, then the matter

is clear enough. The question of a vote of confidence must be brought

up and put to the vote; if I then have the majority against me I shall

at once take the consequences. No one of those who are anxious to

secure my removal will be more pleased than myself; indeed far less

so. Nothing induces me now to retain my office but the sense of duty,

which constrains me to remain as long as I have the confidence of the

Emperor and the majority of the delegations. A soldier with any sense

of decency does not desert. But no Minister for Foreign Affairs could

conduct negotiations of this importance unless he knows, and all the

world as well, that he is endowed with the confidence of the majority

among the constitutional representative bodies. There can be no half

measures here. You have this confidence or you have not. You must

assist me or depose me; there is no other way. I have no more to say."

5

=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk=

The Austro-Hungarian Government entered upon the peace negotiations at

Brest-Litovsk with the object of arriving as quickly as possible at a

peace compact which, if it did not, as we hoped, lead to a general

peace, should at least secure order in the East. The draft of a

preliminary peace was sent to Brest containing the following points:

1. Cessation of hostilities; if general peace should not be

concluded, then neither of the present contracting parties to afford

any support to the enemies of the other.

2. No surrender of territory; Poland, Lithuania and Courland retaining

the right of determining their own destiny for the future.

3. No indemnity for costs of war or damages due to military

operations.

4. Cessation of economic war and reparation of damages sustained by

private persons through the economic war.

5. Resumption of commercial intercourse and the same provisionally on

the basis of the old commercial treaty and twenty years' preference

subject to restriction in respect of any Customs union with

neighbouring countries.

6. Mutual assistance in raw materials and industrial articles.

A further point was contemplated, dealing with the evacuation of the

occupied areas, but the formulation of this had to be postponed until

after consultation with the German Supreme Military Command, whose

co-operation was here required owing to the mingling of German and

Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian front. The Army Command has

indicated a period of at least six months as necessary for the

evacuation.

In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in

particular were found to present great difficulty. One was that of

evacuation. The German Army Command declared categorically that no

evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until after

conclusion of the general peace. The second difficulty arose in

connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied

districts. Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it

should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples within

its territory the right of self-determination, and that the nations in

question had already availed themselves of that right. The plain

standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry through,

although it was shared by the other Allies. However, in formulating

the answer sent on December 25, 1916, to the Russian peace proposals a

compromise was, after persistent efforts on our part, ultimately

arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption of the divergent

German point of view on these two points. In the matter of evacuation

the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of certain bodies of troops

before the general peace might be discussed.

In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating this

was found, making it applicable only in the event of general peace.

Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace the principle of "no

annexations" would have succeeded throughout.

Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our endeavours

to this answer by the four Powers to the Russian proposals, the German

Headquarters evinced extreme indignation. Several highly outspoken

telegrams from the German Supreme Command to the German delegates

prove this. The head of the German Delegation came near to being

recalled on this account, and if this had been done it is likely that

German foreign policy would have been placed in the hands of a firm

adherent of the sternest military views. As this, however, could only

have had an unfavourable effect on the further progress of the

negotiations, we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr

Kühlmann. With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise

Berlin that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary

would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia. This

declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not

fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely

responsible for the fact that Kühlmann was able to remain.

Kühlmann's difficult position and his desire to strengthen it rendered

the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first

officially touched upon on December 27, but had been already taken up

in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly awkward

matter. Germany insisted that the then Russian front was not to be

evacuated until six months after the general peace. Russia was

disposed to agree to this, but demanded on the other hand that the

fate of Poland was not to be decided until after evacuation. Against

this the Germans were inclined to give up its original standpoint to

the effect that the populations of occupied territories had already

availed themselves of the right of self-determination conceded, and

allow a new inquiry to be made among the population, but insisted that

this should be done during the occupation. No solution could be

arrived at on this point, though Austria-Hungary made repeated efforts

at mediation. The negotiations had arrived at this stage when they

were first interrupted on December 29.

On resuming the negotiations on January 6 the situation was little

changed. Kühlmann's position was at any rate somewhat firmer than

before, albeit only at the cost of some concessions to the German

military party. In these circumstances the negotiations, in which

Trotski now took part as spokesman for the Russians, led only to

altogether fruitless theoretical discussions and the right of

self-determination, which could not bring about any lessening of the

distance between the two firmly maintained points of view. In order to

get the proceedings out of this deadlock further endeavours were made

on the part of Austria to arrive at a compromise between the German

and Russian standpoints, the more so as it was generally, and

especially in the case of Poland, desirable to solve the territorial

question on the basis of complete self-determination. Our proposals to

the German delegates were to the effect that the Russian standpoint

should so far be met as to allow the plebiscite demanded by the

Russians, this to be taken, as the Germans insisted should be the

case, during the German occupation, but with extensive guarantees for

free expression of the will of the people. On this point we had long

discussions with the German delegates, based on detailed drafts

prepared by us.

Our endeavours here, however, were again unsuccessful. Circumstances

arising at the time in our own country were responsible for this, as

also for the result of the negotiations which had in the meantime been

commenced with the Ukrainian delegates. These last had, at the first

discussion, declined to treat with any Polish representatives, and

demanded the concession of the entire Cholm territory, and, in a more

guarded fashion, the cession of Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian part

of North-Eastern Hungary, and in consequence of which the negotiations

were on the point of being broken off. At this stage a food crisis

broke out in Austria to an extent of which the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs was hitherto unaware, threatening Vienna in particular with

the danger of being in a few days devoid of flour altogether. Almost

immediately after this came a strike movement of threatening

proportions. These events at home weakened the position of the Foreign

Minister both as regards his attitude towards the German Allies and

towards the opposing parties in the negotiations--with both of which

he was then in conflict--and this, at a most critical moment, to a

degree that can hardly be appreciated from a distance. He was required

to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely to ask,

but to entreat Germany's aid in sending supplies of food, or Vienna

would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe. With the

enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the situation at

home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be favourable to

Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation and our labour

troubles were well known to that enemy.

This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis and

tactics of the Foreign Minister's proceedings. He had to obtain the

supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish

political pressure on that country; but at the same time he had to

persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally to

arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable conditions

possible with the Ukraine, which would put an end to the still serious

difficulties of the food situation.

In these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the German

delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary's concluding a separate peace

with Russia, as this would have imperilled the chance of food supplies

from Germany--the more so as the representative of the German Army

Command had declared that it was immaterial whether Austria-Hungary

made peace or not. Germany would in any case march on Petersburg if

the Russian Government did not give way. On the other hand, however,

the Foreign Minister prevailed on the leader of the Russian delegation

to postpone the carrying out of the intentions of his Government--to

the effect that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on

the part of German-Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled.

At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation were

continued. By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences we succeeded

in bringing their demands to a footing which might just possibly be

acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause whereby Ukraine

undertook to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of grain by August, 1918.

As to the demand for the Cholm territory, which we had wished to have

relegated to the negotiations with Poland, the Ukrainian delegates

refused to give way on this point, and were evidently supported by

General Hoffmann. Altogether the German military party seemed much

inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to

accede to Polish claims, so that we were unable to obtain the

admission of Polish representatives to the proceedings, though we had

frequently asked for this. A further difficulty in the way of this was

the fact that Trotski himself was unwilling to recognise the Polish

party as having equal rights here. The only result obtainable was that

the Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to

those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority and accept a revision of

the frontier line, as yet only roughly laid down, according to the

finding of a mixed commission and the wishes of the population, i.e.

the principle of national boundaries under international protection.

The Ukrainian delegates renounced all territorial claims against the

Monarchy, but demanded from us on the other hand a guarantee as to the

autonomous development of their co-nationals in Galicia. With regard

to these two weighty concessions, the Foreign Minister declared that

they could only be granted on the condition that the Ukraine fulfilled

the obligation it had undertaken as to delivery of grain, the

deliveries being made at the appointed times; he further demanded that

the obligations on both sides should be reciprocal, i.e. that the

failure of one party to comply therewith should release the other.

The formulation of these points, which met with the greatest

difficulties on the part of Ukraine, was postponed to a later date.

At this stage of the proceedings a new pause occurred to give the

separate delegates time to advise their Governments as to the results

hitherto attained and receive their final instructions. The Foreign

Minister returned to Vienna and reported the state of the negotiations

to the proper quarters. In the course of these deliberations his

policy of concluding peace with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the

concessions proposed was agreed to. Another question dealt with at the

same time was whether the Monarchy should, in case of extreme

necessity, conclude a separate peace with Russia if the negotiations

with that state should threaten to come to nothing on account of

Germany's demands. This question was, after full consideration of all

grounds to the contrary, answered _in thesi_ in the affirmative, as

the state of affairs at home apparently left no alternative.

On resuming the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk further endeavours were

made to persuade Germany to give way somewhat by pointing out what

would be the consequence of its obstinate attitude. In the course of

the deliberations on this point with Herr Kühlmann we succeeded after

great difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the German delegates to

a final attempt at compromise, to be undertaken by the Foreign

Minister. The proposals for this compromise were based on the

following considerations:

For months past conflicting views had been expressed as to:

1. Whether in the territories where constitutional alterations were to

be made owing to the war the right of self-determination should be

taken as already exercised, or whether a plebiscite should be taken

first;

2. Whether such plebiscite, if taken, should be addressed to a

constituent body or in the form of a referendum to the people direct;

3. Whether this should be done before or after evacuation; and

4. In what manner it was to be organised (by general franchise, by a

vote of the nobles, etc.). It would be advisable, and would also be in

accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to leave the

decision on all these points to the people themselves, and deliver

them over to the "temporary self-administrative body," which should,

also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff), be introduced at

once. The whole of the peace negotiations could then be concentrated

upon a single point: the question as to the composition of this

temporary body. Here, however, a compromise could be arrived at, as

Russia could agree that the already existent bodies set in the

foreground by Germany should be allowed to express a part of the will

of the people, Germany agreeing that these bodies should, during the

occupation, be supplemented by elements appointed, according to the

Russian principles, by free election.

On February 7, immediately after Herr Kühlmann had agreed to mediation

on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of the Russian

delegation, Trotski, and had a series of conversations with him. The

idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was little to Trotski's

taste, and he declared that he would in any case protest against the

handling of the self-determination question by the Four Powers. On the

other hand, the discussion did lead to some result, in that a new

basis for disposing of the difficulties which had arisen was now

found. There was to be no further continuance of the conflict as to

whether the territorial alterations involved by the peace should be

termed "annexations," as the Russian delegates wished, or "exercise of

the right of self-determination," as Germany wished; the territorial

alterations were to be simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes

that ..."). Trotski, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion

of such a compact subject to two conditions: one being that the Moon

Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the

other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any

separate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose Government

was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, according to some

reports, already overthrown by them. The Foreign Minister was now

anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question also, in which he

had to a certain degree the support of Herr von Kühlmann, while

General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed any further concession.

All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their end

owing to the fact that Herr Kühlmann was forced by the German Supreme

Army Command to act promptly. Ludendorff declared that the

negotiations with Russia must be concluded within three days, and when

a telegram from Petersburg was picked up in Berlin calling on the

German Army to rise in revolt Herr von Kühlmann was strictly ordered

not to be content with the cessions already agreed to, but to demand

the further cession of the unoccupied territories of Livonia and

Esthonia. Under such pressure the leader of the German delegation had

not the power to compromise. We then arrived at the signing of the

treaty with Ukraine, which had, after much trouble, been brought to an

end meanwhile. It thus appeared as if the efforts of the Foreign

Minister had proved fruitless. Nevertheless he continued his

discussions with Trotski, but these still led to no result, owing to

the fact that Trotski, despite repeated questioning, persisted in

leaving everything vague till the last moment as to whether he would,

in the present circumstances, conclude any peace with the Four Powers

at all or not. Not until the plenary session of February 10 was this

cleared up; Russia declared for a cessation of hostilities, but signed

no treaty of peace.

The situation created by this declaration offered no occasion for

further taking up the idea of a separate peace with Russia, since

peace seemed to have come _via facta_ already. At a meeting on

February 10 of the diplomatic and military delegates of Germany and

Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of what was now to be done it

was agreed unanimously, save for a single dissentient, that the

situation arising out of Trotski's declarations must be accepted. The

one dissentient vote--that of General Hoffmann--was to the effect that

Trotski's statement should be answered by declaring the Armistice at

an end, marching on Petersburg, and supporting the Ukraine openly

against Russia. In the ceremonial final sitting, on February 11, Herr

von Kühlmann adopted the attitude expressed by the majority of the

peace delegations, and set forth the same in a most impressive speech.

Nevertheless, a few days later, as General Hoffmann had said, Germany

declared the Armistice at an end, ordered the German troops to march

on Petersburg, and brought about the situation which led to the

signing of the peace treaty. Austria-Hungary declared that we took no

part in this action.

6

=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Bucharest=

The possibility of entering upon peace negotiations with Roumania was

considered as soon as negotiations with the Russian delegations at

Brest-Litovsk had commenced. In order to prevent Roumania itself from

taking part in these negotiations Germany gave the Roumanian

Government to understand that it would not treat with the present King

and the present Government at all. This step, however, was only

intended to enable separate negotiations to be entered upon with

Roumania, as Germany feared that the participation of Roumania in the

Brest negotiations would imperil the chances of peace. Roumania's idea

seemed then to be to carry on the war and gain the upper hand. At the

end of January, therefore, Austria-Hungary took the initiative in

order to bring about negotiations with Roumania. The Emperor sent

Colonel Randa, the former Military Attaché to the Roumanian

Government, to the King of Roumania, assuring him of his willingness

to grant Roumania honourable terms of peace.

In connection with the peace negotiations a demand was raised in

Hungarian quarters for a rectification of the frontier line, so as to

prevent, or at any rate render difficult, any repetition of the

invasion by Roumania in 1916 over the Siebenbürgen, despite opposition

on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The strategical

frontier drawn up by the Army Command, which, by the way, was

influenced by considerations not conducive to peace, followed a line

involving the cession to Hungary of Turnu-Severin, Sinaia and several

valuable petroleum districts in Moldavia. Public opinion in Hungary

voiced even further demands. The Hungarian Government was of opinion

that the Parliament would offer the greatest hindrances to any peace

not complying with the general desire in this respect, and leading

Hungarian statesmen, even some among the Opposition parties, declared

the rectification of the frontier to be a condition of peace _sine qua

non_. Wekerle and Tisza in particular took this view. Despite this

serious difference of opinion, the Foreign Minister, in entire

agreement with the Emperor, even before the commencement of the

negotiations in the middle of February, took up the position that

demands connected with the frontier line should not offer any obstacle

to the conclusion of peace. The rectification of the frontier should

only seriously be insisted on as far as could be done on the basis of

a loyal and, for the future, amicable relations with Roumania. Hungary

regarded this lenient attitude on the part of the Foreign Minister

with increasing disapproval. We pointed out that a frontier line

conceding cities and petroleum districts to Hungary would be

unfortunate in every respect. From the point of view of internal

politics, because the number of non-Hungarian inhabitants would be

thereby increased; from the military point of view, because it would

give rise to frontier conflicts with unreliable Roumanian factions;

and, finally, from the point of view of foreign policy, because it

would mean annexations and the transference of population this way and

that, rendering friendly relations with Roumania an impossibility.

Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a time to hold fast by the

frontier line as originally conceived, so that the point could be used

to bring about the establishment in Roumania of a régime amicably

disposed toward the Central Powers. The Foreign Minister was

particularly anxious to see a Marghiloman Cabinet formed, inaugurating

a policy friendly to ourselves. He believed that with such a Cabinet

it would be easier to arrive at a peace of mutual understanding, and

was also resolved to render possible such a peace by extensive

concessions, especially by giving his diplomatic support in the

Bessarabian question. He informed Marghiloman also in writing that he

would be prepared to grant important concessions to a Cabinet of which

he, Marghiloman, was the head, in particular as regards the cession of

inhabited places such as Turnu-Severin and Ocna, on which points he

was willing to give way. When the Marghiloman Cabinet was formed the

Austro-Hungarian demands in respect of the frontier line would,

despite active opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government, be

reduced almost by half. The negotiations with Roumania were

particularly difficult in regard to the question of two places, Azuga

and Busteni. On March 24 Count Czernin prepared to terminate these

negotiations, declaring that he was ready to renounce all claim to

Azuga and Busteni and halve his demands as to the much-debated Lotru

district, provided Marghiloman were willing to arrange the frontier

question on this basis. Marghiloman declared himself satisfied with

this compromise. On the next day, however, it was nevertheless

rejected by the Hungarian Government, and not until after further

telegraphic communication with the Emperor and Wekerle was the assent

of all competent authorities obtained. This had, indeed, been widely

considered in Hungarian circles as an impossibility.