THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST
At Brest-Litovsk rumours had already spread that Roumania did not
intend to continue the war. These rumours assumed a very definite
character after peace was concluded with the Ukraine. That peace, as
well as Trotski's attitude, left no doubt in Bucharest that Roumania
could no longer reckon on further co-operation on the part of Russia
and gave rise to the idea in some circles that she would turn back. I
say in _some_ circles, for there was one group which, to the very last
moment, was all for war.
While at Brest-Litovsk I began to get into touch with the leaders of
the Hungarian Parliament in order to come to an agreement on the peace
aims relating to Roumania. It was evident that, as regards Roumania, a
peace without annexations would be more difficult to bring about than
with any other state, because the treacherous attack by the Roumanians
on the whole of Hungary had raised the desire for a better strategical
frontier. As might be expected, I met with violent opposition from
Hungary, where, under the name of strategical frontier rectifications,
as a matter of fact greater annexations were desired. The first person
with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great trouble, was
brought to modify his original standpoint and finally was led so far
as to admit that the fundamental ideas for peace were capable of
acceptance. On February 27, 1918, he handed me a _pro-memoria_ with
the request to show it to the Emperor, in which he explained his
already more conciliatory point of view, though, nevertheless, he very
distinctly showed his disapproval of my intentions. The _pro-memoria_
reads as follows:
Unfortunately, Roumania can withdraw from the war not as much
exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy
could wish.
The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains
in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us
are out of all proportion with Roumania's guilt and with her
military situation.
Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift
offered to vanquished Roumania and are _not at all to be made a
subject for negotiations_. In no case are these negotiations to
assume the character of trading or bargaining. If Roumania refuses
to conclude peace on the basis laid down by us our answer can only
be a resumption of hostilities.
I consider it highly probable that the Roumanian Government will
run that risk to prove her necessity in the eyes of the Western
Powers and her own population. But it is just as probable that
after breaking off negotiations she will just as quickly turn back
and give way before our superior forces.
At the worst a short campaign would result in the total collapse
of Roumania.
In all human probability it is almost certain that the development
of affairs will take a course similar to the last phase in the
peace with Northern Russia, and will lead to an easy and complete
success for the Central Powers. That we lay down the frontier
rectification as _conditio sine qua non_ forms a justifiable
measure to protect an important interest for the Monarchy of a
purely defensive nature. It is energetically demanded by the
entire patriotic public opinion of Hungary. It appears out of the
question that a Minister of Foreign Affairs, had he taken up
another attitude in the matter, would have been able to remain in
the Delegation.
And, besides, the procedure--to which the greatest importance must
be attached--is absolutely necessary in order not to compromise
the chances of a general peace.
It is obvious from the public statements of leading statesmen of
the Western Powers that they will not be prevailed upon to agree
to an acceptable peace, as they do not believe in our capacity and
firm resolve to carry it out. Whatever confirms their views in
this respect widens the distance between us and peace; the only
way to bring us really nearer to peace is to adopt an attitude
that will lead them to think differently.
This must constitute the line of action in our resolves and
undertakings. In connection with the Roumanian peace, it is
evident that to yield on the frontier question--even for fear of a
breakdown in the negotiations--must have a deplorable effect on
the opinion our enemies have of us. It would certainly be right
not to take advantage of Roumania's desperate situation, but to
grant her reasonable peace terms in accordance with the
principles embodied in our statements. But if we do not act with
adequate firmness on that reasonable basis we shall encourage the
Western Powers in the belief that it is not necessary to conclude
a peace with us on the basis of the integrity of our territory and
sovereignty, and fierce and bitter fighting may be looked for to
teach them otherwise.
TISZA.
_February 27, 1916._
Andrassy and Wekerle were also opposed to a milder treatment of
Roumania, and thus the whole Hungarian Parliament were of one accord
on the question. I am not sure what standpoint Karolyi held, and I do
not know if at that period the "tiger soul" which he at one time
displayed to Roumania, or the pacifist soul which he laid later at the
feet of General Franchet d'Esperey, dominated.
Thus at Brest-Litovsk, when the Roumanian peace appeared on the
horizon, I took up the standpoint that the party desirous of peace
negotiations must be supported.
The episode of the Roumanian peace must not be taken out of the great
picture of the war. Like the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Roumanian
peace was necessary from a military point of view, because it seemed
desirable to release troops in the East as quickly as possible and
transfer them to the Western front. It was urgently desired and
repeatedly demanded that we should come to a final settlement with
Roumania as soon as possible. In order to secure a speedy result I had
already, from Brest-Litovsk, advised the Emperor to send word
privately to King Ferdinand that he could reckon on an honourable
peace should he wish to enter into negotiations. The Emperor took my
advice, and Colonel Randa had one or two interviews with a member of
the immediate entourage of the King. But the German opinion was that
King Ferdinand must be "punished for his treachery" and no
negotiations entered into with him. For this reason, and to avoid
fruitless controversy, I first imparted to Herr von Kühlmann the
accomplished fact and informed him that we had put ourselves secretly
into communication with King Ferdinand. This event was quite in
accordance with the standard of equality in our Federation, by which
every member was privileged to act according to the best of his
ability and was merely bound to inform the friendly Powers of the
proceedings. It was not our duty to apply to Germany for permission to
take such a step.
There was a three-fold reason why I did not share Germany's opinion on
this question. In the first place, my point of view was that it was
not our duty to mete out divine justice and to inflict punishment,
but, on the contrary, to end the war as quickly as possible. Therefore
my duty was to seize every means possible to prevent a continuance of
the war. I must mention here that the idea prevailing in many circles
that the Roumanians were quite at the end of their strength, and were
compelled to accept all the conditions, is entirely false. The
Roumanians held very strong positions, the _moral_ in the army was
excellent, and in the last great attack on Maracesci, Mackensen's
troops had suffered very severely. This success turned the Roumanians'
heads, and there were many leading men in the ranks of the Roumanian
army who sided entirely with those who wished to carry on the war _à
l'outrance_. They did not count so much on an actual victory, but were
upheld by the hope that for some time to come they could maintain the
defensive and that, meanwhile, the decisive successes of their Allies
on the West would secure victory for them. They were probably afraid,
too, that a peace concluded with us would place them in permanent
disgrace with the Entente--that they would lose the friendship of the
Entente, fail to gain ours, and find themselves between two stools.
The second reason which decided me to insist on negotiating with the
King was that, from a dynastic point of view, I considered it most
unwise to dethrone a foreign king. There was already then a certain
fall in the value of kings on the European market, and I was afraid it
might develop into a panic if we put more kings off their thrones. The
third reason was that, in order to conclude peace, we must have a
competent representative in Roumania. If we were to depose the King we
should divide Roumania into two camps and would, at the best, only be
able to conclude a transitory peace with that party which accepted the
dethronement of the King. A rapid and properly-secured peace could
only be concluded with the legitimate head in Roumania.
In the introductory interviews which Colonel Randa had on February 4
and 5 with the confidential envoy from the King of Roumania, the envoy
asked whether all the Quadruple Alliance Powers were acting in the
step in question, and whether the occupied territory in Roumania would
be released. I was notified of this inquiry of the King, and replied
that I was persuaded that no refusal need be expected from the other
Central Powers should he, with the object of securing an honourable
peace, address them accordingly. As to the question of territorial
possessions, I stated that, for the present, I was not able to express
any opinion on the matter, as it would have to be a subject for the
introductory negotiations.
The view held by the German military leaders in agreement with
Hungarian politicians that Roumania should be treated differently
from, and in a much sterner manner than, any other state was, if the
question is considered from the point of view of retribution, quite
justified. Roumania's actions with regard to us were far more
treacherous than those of Italy. Italy, owing to her geographical
position and to the fact of her being totally dependent on the Western
Powers--a blockade by whom might finally have forced her to submit to
their demands--would have found it very difficult to remain neutral in
this world war. Roumania was not only perfectly independent, but was
amply provided for through her rich granaries. Apart from the fact
that Roumania alone was to blame for allowing things to go so far that
Russia was enabled finally to send her an ultimatum and so force her
into war, it must be admitted that Roumania was far less likely to be
influenced by the Entente than Italy. But neither would the Russian
ultimatum have taken effect if Roumania had not consciously and
willingly placed herself in a position in regard to military and
political matters that gave her into Russia's power. Bratianu said to
me in one of our last interviews: "Russia is exactly like a blackcock
dancing before the hens." In admitting the truth of this appropriate
comparison, it must be added that the female of the simile, longing to
be embraced, directly provoked violence.
For two years Bratianu had stirred up public opinion against us in his
own country. Had he not done so, and had he not finally bared his
Russian frontier of all troops, the Russian ultimatum would have had
no effect.
In Roumania the Avarescu Ministry was in power. On February 24
Kühlmann and I had our first interview alone with Avarescu at the
castle of Prince Stirbey, at Buftia. At this interview, which was very
short, the sole topic was the Dobrudsha question. The frontier
rectifications, as they stood on the Austro-Hungarian programme, were
barely alluded to, and the economic questions, which later played a
rather important part, were only hinted at. Avarescu's standpoint was
that the cession of the Dobrudsha was an impossibility, and the
interview ended with a _non possumus_ from the Roumanian general,
which was equivalent to breaking off negotiations. As regards the
Dobrudsha question, our position was one of constraint. The so-called
"old" Dobrudsha, the portion that Roumania in 1913 had wrested from
Bulgaria, had been promised to the Bulgarians by a treaty in the time
of the Emperor Francis Joseph as a reward for their co-operation, and
the area that lies between that frontier and the Constanza-Carnavoda
railway line was vehemently demanded by the Bulgarians. They went much
further in their aspirations: they demanded the whole of the
Dobrudsha, including the mouth of the Danube, and the great and
numerous disputes that occurred later in this connection show how
insistently and obstinately the Bulgarians held to their demands. At
the same time, as there was a danger that the Bulgars, thoroughly
disappointed in their aspirations, might secede from us, it became
absolutely impossible to hand over the Dobrudsha to the Roumanians.
All that could be effected was to secure for the Roumanians free
access to Constanza, and, further, to find a way out of the
difficulty existing between Turkey and Bulgaria in connection with the
Dobrudsha.
In order not to break off entirely all discussion, I suggested to
Avarescu that he should arrange for his King to meet me. My plan was
to make it clear to the King that it would be possible for him now to
conclude a peace, though involving certain losses, but still a peace
that would enable him to keep his crown. On the other hand, by
continuing the war, he could not count on forbearance on the part of
the Central Powers. I trusted that this move on my part would enable
him to continue the peace negotiations.
I met the King on February 27 at a little station in the occupied
district of Moldavia.
We arrived at Focsani at noon and continued by motor to the lines,
where Colonel Ressel and a few Roumanian officers were waiting to
receive me. We drove past positions on both sides in a powerful German
car that had been placed at my disposal, and proceeded as far as the
railway station of Padureni. A saloon carriage in the train had been
reserved for me there, and we set off for Rasaciuni, arriving there at
5 o'clock.
The Roumanian royal train arrived a few minutes later, and I at once
went across to the King.
Incidentally my interview with King Ferdinand lasted twenty minutes.
As the King did not begin the conversation I had to do so, and said
that I had not come to sue for peace but purely as the bearer of a
message from the Emperor Charles, who, in spite of Roumania's
treachery, would show indulgence and consideration if King Ferdinand
would _at once_ conclude peace under the conditions mutually agreed on
by the Quadruple Alliance Powers.
Should the King not consent, then a continuance of the war would be
unavoidable and would put an end to Roumania and the dynasty. Our
military superiority was already very considerable, and now that our
front would be set free from the Baltic to the Black Sea, it would be
an easy matter for us, in a very short space of time, to increase our
strength still more. We were aware that Roumania would very soon have
no more munitions and, were hostilities to continue, in six weeks the
kingdom and dynasty would have ceased to exist.
The King did not oppose anything but thought the conditions terribly
hard. Without the Dobrudsha Roumania would hardly be able to draw
breath. At any rate, there could be further parley as to ceding "old"
Dobrudsha again.
I said to the King that if he complained about hard conditions I could
only ask what would his conditions have been if his troops had reached
Budapest? Meanwhile, I was ready to guarantee that Roumania would not
be cut off from the sea, but would have free access to Constanza.
Here the King again complained of the hard conditions enforced on him,
and declared he would never be able to find a Ministry who would
accept them.
I rejoined that the forming of a Cabinet was Roumania's internal
business, but my private opinion was that a Marghiloman Cabinet, in
order to save Roumania, would agree to the conditions laid down. I
could only repeat that no change could be made in the peace terms laid
before the King by the Quadruple Alliance. If the King did not accept
them, we should have, in a month's time, a far better peace than the
one which the Roumanians might consider themselves lucky to get
to-day.
We were ready to give our diplomatic support to Roumania that she
might obtain Bessarabia, and she would, therefore, gain far more than
she would lose.
The King replied that Bessarabia was nothing to him, that it was
steeped in Bolshevism, and the Dobrudsha could not be given up;
anyhow, it was only under the very greatest pressure that he had
decided to enter into the war against the Central Powers. He began
again, however, to speak of the promised access to the sea, which
apparently made the cession of the Dobrudsha somewhat easier.
We then entered into details, and I reproached the King for the
dreadful treatment of our people interned in Roumania, which he said
he regretted.
Finally, I requested that he would give me a clear and decided answer
within forty-eight hours as to whether he would negotiate on the basis
of our proposals or not.
The result of the interview was the appointment of the Marghiloman
Ministry and the continuation of the negotiations.
Before Marghiloman consented to form a Cabinet, he approached me to
learn the exact terms.
He declared himself to be in agreement with the first and hardest of
the conditions--the cession of the Dobrudsha, because he was quicker
than the King in seeing that in consequence of our binding obligation
to Bulgaria in this connection, it could not be otherwise. As to our
territorial demands, I told Marghiloman that I laid chief stress on
entering into friendly and lasting relations with Roumania after peace
was concluded, and, therefore, desired to reduce the demands in such
measure as Roumania, on her part, would consider bearable. On the
other hand, he, Marghiloman, must understand that I was bound to
consider the Hungarian aspirations to a certain degree, Marghiloman,
who was an old and tried parliamentarian, fully saw in what a
constrained position I was placed. We finally agreed that the cession
of the populated districts and towns like Turn-Saverin and Okna should
not take place, and, altogether the original claims were reduced to
about half. Marghiloman said he accepted the compromise.
My desire to enter into a lasting economic union with Roumania played
an important part in the negotiations. It was clear to me that this
demand was in Austrian, but not in Hungarian interests; but I still
think that, even so, it was my duty, although joint Minister for both
countries, to work for Austria, as the shortage of provisions made the
opening of the Roumanian granaries very desirable. As was to be
expected, this clause in the negotiations met with the most violent
opposition in Hungary, and it was at first impossible to see a way out
of the difficulty. I never took back my demand, however, and was
firmly resolved that peace should not be signed if my plan was not
realised. I was dismissed from office in the middle of the
negotiations, and my successor did not attach the same importance to
that particular item as I did.
On the German side there was at once evidence of that insatiable
appetite which we had already noticed at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans
wished to have a species of war indemnity by compelling Roumania to
cede her petroleum springs, her railways and harbours to German
companies, and placing the permanent control of her finances in German
hands. I opposed these demands in the most decided manner from the
very first, as I was convinced that such terms would preclude all
possibility of any friendly relations in future. I went so far as to
ask the Emperor Charles to telegraph direct to the Emperor William in
that connection, which met with a certain amount of success. In the
end the German claims were reduced by about fifty per cent., and
accepted by Marghiloman in the milder form. With regard to the
petroleum question, a ninety years' lease was agreed on. In the matter
of the corn supply, Roumania was to bind herself to deliver her
agricultural produce to the Central Powers for a certain number of
years. The plan for Germany to be in the permanent control of
Roumanian finances was not carried out. In the question of price, the
Roumanian views held good. The most impossible of the German demands,
namely, the occupation of Roumania for five to six years after the
conclusion of peace, gave rise to great difficulties. This was the
point that was most persistently and energetically insisted on by the
German Supreme Military Command, and it was only with great trouble
and after lengthy explanations and discussions that we settled the
matter on the following lines: That on the conclusion of peace the
entire legislative and executive power of the Roumanian Government
would be restored in principle, and that we should content ourselves
with exercising a certain control through a limited number of agents,
this control not to be continued after the general peace was made. I
cannot say positively whether this standpoint was adhered to by my
successor or not, but certain it is that Marghiloman only undertook
office on condition that I gave him a guarantee that the plan would be
supported by me.
As already mentioned, the question of the Dobrudsha had prepared great
difficulties for us in two respects. First of all there was the
relinquishing of their claim which, for the Roumanians, was the
hardest term of all, and imparted to the peace the character of a
peace of violence; and secondly, the matter had precipitated a dispute
between Turkey and Bulgaria.
The Bulgarians' view was that the entire Dobrudsha, including the
mouth of the Danube, must be promised to them, and they insisted on
their point with an obstinacy which I have seldom, if ever, come
across. They went so far as to declare that neither the present
Government nor any other would be able to return to Sofia, and allowed
it clearly to be seen that by refusing their claims we could never
again count on Bulgaria. The Turks, on the other hand, protested with
equal vehemence that the Dobrudsha had been conquered by two Turkish
army corps, that it was a moral injustice that the gains chiefly won
by Turkish forces should be given exclusively to the Bulgarians, and
that they would never consent to Bulgaria receiving the whole of the
Dobrudsha unless compensation was given to them. By way of
compensation, they asked not only for that stretch of land which they
had ceded to Bulgaria on their entry into the war (Adrianople), but
also a considerable area beyond.
In the numerous conferences at which the question was discussed,
Kühlmann and I played the part of honest mediators who were making
every effort to reconcile the two so divergent standpoints. We both
saw clearly that the falling off of the Bulgars or Turks might be the
result if a compromise was not effected. Finally, after much trouble,
we succeeded in drawing up a programme acceptable to both sides. It
took this form: That "old" Dobrudsha should at once be given back to
Bulgaria, and the other parts of the area to be handed over as a
possession to the combined Central Powers, and a definite decision
agreed upon later.
Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria was quite satisfied with the decision, nor
yet averse to it; but, in the circumstances, it was the only possible
way of building a bridge between the Turks and the Bulgars.
Just as England and France secured the entry into the war of Italy
through the Treaty of London, so did the Emperor Francis Joseph and
Burian, as well as the Government in Berlin, give binding promises to
the Bulgars to secure their co-operation, and these promises proved
later to be the greatest obstacles to a peace of understanding.
Nevertheless, no sensible person can deny that it is natural that a
state engaged in a life-and-death struggle should seek an ally without
first asking whether the keeping of a promise later will give rise to
important or minor difficulties. The fireman extinguishing flames in a
burning house does not first ask whether the water he pumps on it has
damaged anything. When Roumania attacked us in the rear the danger was
very great, the house was in flames, and the first act of my
predecessor was naturally, and properly, to avert the great danger.
There was no lack of promises, and the Dobrudsha was assigned to the
Bulgarians. Whether and in what degree the Turks had a right, through
promises, to the territory they, on their part, had ceded to the
Bulgars I do not know. But they certainly had a moral right to it.
On the occasion of the Roumanian peace in the spring of 1918, too
severe a test of the loyalty of Bulgars and Turks to the alliance was
dangerous. For some time past the former had been dealing in secret
with the Entente. The alliance with Turkey rested mainly on Talaat and
Enver. Talaat told me in Bucharest, however, quite positively that he
would be forced to send in his resignation if he were to return
empty-handed, and in that case the secession of Turkey would be very
probable.
We tried then at Bucharest to steer our way through the many shoals;
not mortally to offend the Roumanians, to observe as for as possible
the character of a peace of understanding, and yet to keep both Turks
and Bulgars on our side.
The cession of the Dobrudsha was a terribly hard demand to make on the
Roumanians, and was only rendered bearable for them when Kühlmann and
I, with the greatest difficulty and against the most violent
opposition from the Bulgarians, obtained for them free access to the
Black Sea.
When later, in one breath, we were reproached with having enforced a
peace of violence on the Roumanians and with not having treated the
Bulgarian claims and wishes with sufficient consideration--the answer
to the charge is obvious. _Because_ we were compelled to consider both
Bulgaria and Turkey we were forced to demand the Dobrudsha from the
Roumanians and treat them with greater severity than we should have
done otherwise, in order finally to gain the Turks and the Bulgars for
our negotiation plans. Judged according to the Versailles standard,
the Peace of Bucharest would be a peace of understanding, both as
regards form and contents.
The Central Powers' mediators, both at Versailles and St. Germain,
would have been glad had they been treated in the same way as the
Marghiloman Ministry was treated.
The Roumanians lost the Dobrudsha, but acquired safe and guaranteed
access to the sea; they lost a district of sparsely populated
mountainous country to us, and through us they acquired Bessarabia.
They gained far more than they lost.