Another Austro-Hungarian demand which played some part in the

Bucharest negotiations was in connection with the plan of an

economical alliance between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. This was of

especial interest to the Austrian Government, whereas the frontier

question, albeit in some degree affecting Austria as well, was a

matter of indifference to this Government, which, as a matter of fact,

did not sympathise with the demands at all. The plan for an economical

alliance, however, met with opposition in Hungary. Immediately before

the commencement of the Bucharest negotiations an attempt was made to

overcome this opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government and

secure its adherence to the idea of an economical alliance with

Roumania--at any rate, conditionally upon the conclusion of a customs

alliance with Germany as planned. It proved impossible, however, at

the time to obtain this assent. The Hungarian Government reserved the

right of considering the question later on, and on March 8 instructed

their representatives at Bucharest that they must dissent from the

plan, as the future economical alliance with Germany was a matter

beyond present consideration. Consequently this question could play no

part at first in the peace negotiations, and all that could be done

was to sound the leading Roumanian personages in a purely private

manner as to the attitude they would adopt towards such a proposal.

The idea was, generally speaking, well received by Roumania, and the

prevalent opinion was that such an alliance would be distinctly

advisable from Roumania's point of view. A further attempt was

therefore made, during the pause in the peace negotiations in the

East, to overcome the opposition of the Hungarian Government; these

deliberations were, however, not concluded when the Minister for

Foreign Affairs resigned his office.

Germany had, even before the commencement of negotiations in

Bucharest, considered the question of imposing on Roumania, when

treating for peace, a series of obligations especially in connection

with the economical relations amounting to a kind of indirect war

indemnity. It was also contemplated that the occupation of Wallachia

should be maintained for five or six years after the conclusion of

peace. Roumania should then give up its petroleum districts, its

railways, harbours and domains to German companies as their property,

and submit itself to a permanent financial control. Austria-Hungary

opposed these demands from the first on the grounds that no friendly

relations could ever be expected to exist with a Roumania which had

been economically plundered to such a complete extent; and

Austria-Hungary was obliged to maintain amicable relations with

Roumania.

This standpoint was most emphatically set forth, and not without some

success, on February 5 at a conference with the Reichskansler. In the

middle of February the Emperor sent a personal message to the German

Emperor cautioning him against this plan, which might prove an obstacle

in the way of peace. Roumania was not advised of these demands until

comparatively late in the negotiations, after the appointment of

Marghiloman. Until then the questions involved gave rise to constant

discussion between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter throughout

endeavouring to reduce the German demands, not only with a view to

arriving at a peace of mutual understanding, but also because, if

Germany gained a footing in Roumania on the terms originally

contemplated, Austro-Hungarian economical interests must inevitably

suffer thereby. The demands originally formulated with regard to the

Roumanian railways and domains were then relinquished by Germany, and

the plan of a cession of the Roumanian harbours was altered so as to

amount to the establishment of a Roumanian-German-Austro-Hungarian

harbour company, which, however, eventually came to nothing. The

petroleum question, too, was reduced from a cession to a ninety years'

tenure of the state petroleum districts and the formation of a

monopoly trading company for petroleum under German management.

Finally, an economic arrangement was prepared which should secure the

agricultural products of Roumania to the Central Powers for a series of

years. The idea of a permanent German control of the Roumanian finances

was also relinquished owing to Austro-Hungarian opposition. The

negotiations with Marghiloman and his representatives on these

questions made a very lengthy business. In the economic questions

especially there was great difference of opinion on the subject of

prices, which was not disposed of until the last moment before the

drawing up of the treaty on March 28, and then only by adopting the

Roumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the differences

were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived at, in face of

the extreme views of the German economical representative on the one

hand and the Roumanian Foreign Minister, Arion, on the other, by a

compromise, according to which further negotiations were to be held in

particular with regard to the trade monopoly for petroleum, and the

original draft was only to apply when such negotiations failed to lead

to any result.

The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation for

five to six years after the general peace likewise played a great part

at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first stoutly

opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavoured to bring about an

arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace, Roumania should have

all legislative and executive power restored, being subject only to a

certain right of control in respect of a limited number of points, but

not beyond the general peace. In support of this proposal the Foreign

Minister pointed out in particular that the establishment of a

Roumanian Ministry amicably disposed towards ourselves would be an

impossibility (the Averescu Ministry was then still in power) if we

were to hold Roumania permanently under our yoke. We should far rather

use every endeavour to obtain what could be obtained from Roumania

through the medium of such politicians in that country as were

disposed to follow a policy of friendly relations with the Central

Powers. The main object of our policy to get such men into power in

Roumania, and enable them to remain in the Government, would be

rendered unattainable if too severe measures were adopted. We might

gain something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing

everything in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the

German Secretary of State, Kühlmann, of the inadvisability of the

demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by

the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement of

Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make it

impossible for him to form a Cabinet at all. And when he had been

informed, from German sources, that the German Supreme Army Command

insisted on these terms, he only agreed to form a Cabinet on the

assurance of the Austrian Foreign Minister that a solution of the

occupation problem would be found. In this question also we did

ultimately succeed in coming to agreement with Roumania.

One of the decisive points in the conclusion of peace with Roumania

was, finally, the cession of the Dobrudsha, on which Bulgaria insisted

with such violence that it was impossible to avoid it. The ultimatum

which preceded the preliminary Treaty of Buftea had also to be altered

chiefly on the Dobrudsha question, as Bulgaria was already talking of

the ingratitude of the Central Powers, of how Bulgaria had been

disillusioned, and of the evil effects this disillusionment would have

on the subsequent conduct of the war. All that Count Czernin could do

was to obtain a guarantee that Roumania, in case of cession of the

Dobrudsha, should at least be granted a sure way to the harbour of

Kustendje. In the main the Dobrudsha question was decided at Buftea.

When, later, Bulgaria expressed a desire to interpret the wording of

the preliminary treaty by which the Dobrudsha "as far as the Danube"

was to be given up in such a sense as to embrace the whole of the

territory up to the northernmost branch (the Kilia branch) of the

Danube, this demand was most emphatically opposed both by Germany and

Austria-Hungary, and it was distinctly laid down in the peace treaty

that only the Dobrudsha as far as the St. George's branch was to be

ceded. This decision again led to bad feeling in Bulgaria, but was

unavoidable, as further demands here would probably have upset the

preliminary peace again.

The proceedings had reached this stage when Count Czernin resigned his

office.

7

=Wilson's Fourteen Points=

I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall

be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy

shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial

waters alike in peace and in war except as the seas may be closed in

whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of

international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the

establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations

consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its

maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will

be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all

colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that

in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the

populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims

of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of

all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest

co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an

unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent

determination of her own political development and national policy,

and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations

under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome

assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself

desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the

months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their

comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests,

and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and

restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys

in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve

as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws

which they have themselves set and determined for the government of

their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole

structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions

restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the

matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world

for nearly 50 years, should be righted in order that peace may once

more be made secure in the interests of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along

clearly recognisable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we

wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first

opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied

territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the

sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another

determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of

allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the

political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the

several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be

assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are

now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life

and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development,

and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to

the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should

include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations,

which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose

political and economic independence and territorial integrity should

be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific

covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political

independence and territorial integrity to great and small States

alike.

8

=Ottokar Czernin on Austria's Policy During the War=

_Speech delivered December 11, 1918_

GENTLEMEN,--In rising now to speak of our policy during the war it is

my hope that I may thereby help to bring the truth to light. We are

living in a time of excitement. After four years of war, the bloodiest

and most determined war the world has ever seen, and in the midst of

the greatest revolution ever known, this excitement is only too easily

understood. But the result of this excitement is that all those rumours

which go flying about, mingling truth and falsehood together, end by

misleading the public. It is unquestionably necessary to arrive at a

clear understanding. The public has a right to know what has really

happened, it has the right to know why we did not succeed in attaining

the peace we had so longed for, it has a right to know whether, and if

so where, any neglect can be pointed out, or whether it was the

overwhelming power of circumstances which has led our policy to take

the course it did. The new arrangement of relations between ourselves

and Germany will make an end of all secret proceedings. The day will

come then when, fortunately, all that has hitherto been hidden will be

made clear. As, however, I do not know when all this will be made

public, I am grateful for the opportunity of lifting the veil to-day

from certain hitherto unknown events. In treating of this theme I will

refrain from touching upon those constitutional factors which once

counted for so much, but which do so no longer. I do so because it

seems to me unfair to import into the discussion persons who are now

paying heavily for what they may have done and who are unable to defend

themselves. And I must pay this honourable tribute to the

Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the whole sought to spare the

former Emperor as far as possible. There are, of course,

exceptions--_exceptiones firmant regulam_. There are in Vienna, as

everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to attack, the less if

those whom they are attacking are able to defend themselves. But,

believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are not the bravest, not

the best, nor the most reliable; and we may be glad that they form so

insignificant a minority.

But, to come to the point. Before passing on to a consideration of the

various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point out two

things: firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Roumania into the

war, and especially since the entry of America, a "victorious peace"

on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which, unfortunately,

was throughout cherished by the German military party; and, secondly,

that we have never received any offer of peace from the Entente. On

several occasions peace feelers were put forward between

representatives of the Entente and our own; unfortunately, however,

these never led to any concrete conditions. We often had the

impression that we might conclude a separate peace without Germany,

but we were never told the concrete conditions upon which Germany, on

its part, could make peace; and, in particular, we were never informed

that Germany would be allowed to retain its possessions as before the

war, in consequence of which we were left in the position of having to

fight a war of defence for Germany. We were compelled by our treaty to

a common defence of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente

never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished

for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its

intention of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany,

and our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult.

We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be

allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire

for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial

concessions if we had been able thereby to secure general peace. This,

however, was not the case. Take Italy, for instance, which was

primarily at war with ourselves and not with Germany. If we had

offered Italy concessions however great, if we had offered all that

Italy has now taken possession of, even then it could not have made

peace, being bound by duty to its Allies and by circumstances not to

make peace until England and France made peace with Germany.

When, then, peace by sacrifice was the only peace attainable,

obviously, as a matter of principle, there were two ways of reaching

that end. One, a general peace, i.e. including Germany, and the other,

a separate peace. Of the overwhelming difficulties attending the

former course I will speak later; at present a few words on the

question of separate peace.

I myself would never have made a separate peace. I have never, not

even in the hour of disillusionment--I may say of despair at my

inability to lead the policy of Berlin into wiser channels--even in

such hours, I say, I have never forgotten that our alliance with the

German Empire was no ordinary alliance, no such alliance as may be

contracted by two Emperors or two Governments, and can easily be

broken, but an alliance of blood, a blood-brotherhood between the ten

million Austro-Germans and the seventy million of the Empire, which

could not be broken. And I have never forgotten that the military

party in power at that time in Germany were not the German people, and

that we had allied ourselves with the German people, and not with a

few leading men. But I will not deny that in the moments when I saw my

policy could not be realised I did ventilate the idea of suggesting to

the Emperor the appointment, in my stead, of one of those men who saw

salvation in a separation from Germany. But again and again I

relinquished this idea, being firmly convinced that separate peace was

a sheer impossibility. The Monarchy lay like a great block between

Germany and the Balkans. Germany had great masses of troops there from

which it could not be cut off, it was procuring oil and grain from the

Balkans; if we were to interpose between it and the Balkans we should

be striking at its most sensitive vital nerve. Moreover, the Entente

would naturally have demanded first of all that we joined in the

blockade, and finally our secession would automatically have involved

also that of Bulgaria and Turkey. Had we withdrawn, Germany would have

been unable to carry on the war. In such a situation there can be no

possibility of doubt but that the German Army Command would have flung

several divisions against Bohemia and the Tyrol, meting out to us the

same fate which had previously befallen Roumania. The Monarchy,

Bohemia in particular, would at once have become a scene of war. But

even this is not all. Internally, such a step would at once have led

to civil war. The Germans of Austria would never have turned against

their brothers, and the Hungarians--Tisza's Hungarians--would never

have lent their aid to such a policy. _We had begun the war in common,

and we could not end it save in common._ For us there was no way out

of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany against

the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany until

Germany herself gave way. A slight foretaste of what would have

happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by Andrassy

at the last moment. This utterly defeated, already annihilated and

prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops toward the Tyrol,

and had not the revolution overwhelmed all Germany like a

conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am not sure but that the

Tyrol might at the last moment have been harried by war. And,

gentlemen, I have more to say. The experiment of separate peace would

not only have involved us in a civil war, not only brought the war

into our own country, but even then the final outcome would have been

much the same. The dissolution of the Monarchy into its component

national parts was postulated throughout by the Entente. I need only

refer to the Conference of London. But whether the State be dissolved

by way of reward to the people or by way of punishment to the State

makes little difference; the effect is the same. In this case also a

"German Austria" would have arisen, and in such a development it would

have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take up an attitude

which rendered them allies of the Entente. In my own case, as Minister

of the Imperial and Royal Government, it was my duty also to consider

dynastic interests, and I never lost sight of that obligation. But I

believe that in this respect also the end would have been the same. In

particular the dissolution of the Monarchy into its national elements

by legal means, against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians,

would have been a complete impossibility. And the Germans in Austria

would never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with

Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering the

powerful Republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would have been

in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the South-Slav

question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente than the

Habsburgers. And, finally, the Hungarians would never have forgiven

the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive territories to Bohemia

and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then, that in this confusion

the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in fact. _A separate peace

was a sheer impossibility._ There remained the second way: to make

peace jointly with Germany. Before going into the difficulties which

rendered this way impossible I must briefly point out wherein lay our

great dependence upon Germany. First of all, in military respects.

Again and again we were forced to rely on aid from Germany. In

Roumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and in Russia we were victorious with

the Germans beside us. We were in the position of a poor relation

living by the grace of a rich kinsman. But it is impossible to play

the mendicant and the political adviser at the same time, particularly

when the other party is a Prussian officer. In the second place, we

were dependent upon Germany owing to the state of our food supply.

Again and again we were here also forced to beg for help from Germany,

because the complete disorganisation of our own administration had

brought us to the most desperate straits. We were forced to this by

the hunger blockade established, on the one hand, by Hungary, and on

the other by the official authorities and their central depots. I

remember how, when I myself was in the midst of a violent conflict

with the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk, I received orders from

Vienna to bow the knee to Berlin and beg for food. You can imagine,

gentlemen, for yourselves how such a state of things must weaken a

Minister's hands. And, thirdly, our dependence was due to the state of

our finances. In order to keep up our credit we were drawing a hundred

million marks a month from Germany, a sum which during the course of

the war has grown to over four milliards; and this money was as

urgently needed as were the German divisions and the German bread.

And, despite this position of dependence, the only way to arrive at

peace was by leading Germany into our own political course; that is to

say, persuading Germany to conclude a peace involving sacrifice. _The

situation all through was simply this: that any momentary military

success might enable us to propose terms of peace which, while

entailing considerable loss to ourselves, had just a chance of being

accepted by the enemy._ The German military party, on the other hand,

increased their demands with every victory, and it was more hopeless

than ever, after their great successes, to persuade them to adopt a

policy of renunciation. I think, by the way, that there was a single

moment in the history of this war when such an action would have had

some prospect of success. I refer to the famous battle of Görlitz.

Then, with the Russian army in flight, the Russian forts falling like

houses of cards, many among our enemies changed their point of view.

I was at that time still our representative in Roumania. Majorescu was

then not disinclined to side with us actively, and the Roumanian army

moved forward toward Bessarabia, could have been hot on the heels of

the flying Russians, and might, according to all human calculations,

have brought about a complete débâcle. It is not unlikely that the

collapse which later took place in Russia might have come about then,

and after a success of that nature, with no "America" as yet on the

horizon, we might perhaps have brought the war to an end. Two things,

however, were required: in the first place, the Roumanians demanded,

as the price of their co-operation, a rectification of the Hungarian

frontier, and this first condition was flatly refused by Hungary; the

second condition, which naturally then did not come into question at

all, would have been that we should even then, after such a success,

have proved strong enough to bear a peace with sacrifice. We were not

called upon to agree to this, but the second requirement would

undoubtedly have been refused by Germany, just as the first had been

by Hungary. I do not positively assert that peace would have been

possible in this or any other case, but I do positively maintain that

during my period of office _such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost

we and Germany could have attained_. The future will show what

superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That

all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was

it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the

leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous

power in the country. Everyone in Wilhelmstrasse, from Bethmann to

Kühlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it simply because the

military party got rid of everyone who ventured to act otherwise than

as they wished. This also applies to Bethmann and Kühlmann. The

Pan-Germanists, under the leadership of the military party, could not

understand that it was possible to die through being victorious, that

victories are worthless when they do not lead to peace, that

territories held in an iron grasp as "security" are valueless

securities as long as the opposing party cannot be forced to redeem

them. There were various shades of this Pan-Germanism. One section

demanded the annexation of parts of Belgium and France, with an

indemnity of milliards; others were less exorbitant, but all were

agreed that peace could only be concluded with an extension of German

possessions. It was the easiest thing in the world to get on well with

the German military party so long as one believed in their fantastic

ideas and took a victorious peace for granted, dividing up the world

thereafter at will. But if anyone attempted to look at things from

the point of view of the real situation, and ventured to reckon with

the possibility of a less satisfactory termination of the war, the

obstacles then encountered were not easily surmounted. We all of us

remember those speeches in which constant reference was always made to

a "stern peace," a "German peace," a "victorious peace." For us, then,

the possibility of a more favourable peace--I mean a peace based on

mutual understanding--I have never believed in the possibility of a

victorious peace--would only have been acute in the case of Poland and

the Austro-Polish question. But I cannot sufficiently emphasise the

fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way

of peace and could never have been so. There was only the idea that

Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be united and

attached to the Monarchy. It was never suggested that such a step

should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or against the

will of the Entente. There was a time when it looked as if not only

Poland but also certain sections among the Entente were not

disinclined to agree to such a solution.

But to return to the German military party. This had attained a degree

of power in the State rarely equalled in history, and the rarity of

the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of its terrible

collapse. The most striking personality in this group was General

Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a great man, a man of genius, in

conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts. But this man

required a political brake, so to speak, a political element in the

Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence, and this was never

found. It must fairly be admitted that the German generals achieved

the gigantic, and there was a time when they were looked up to by the

people almost as gods. It may be true that all great strategists are

much alike; they look to victory always and to nothing else. Moltke

himself, perhaps, was nothing more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain

equilibrium. We had no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it

was not the fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for

him, that he was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of

Germany, and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was

directed into military channels. Ludendorff was a great patriot,

desiring nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his

country; a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless--and for all

that a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam

glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every attempt

at peace which was not a peace by victory. Those very people who

worshipped Ludendorff when he spoke of a victorious peace stone him

now for that very thing; Ludendorff was exactly like the statesmen of

England and France, who all rejected compromise and declared for

victory alone; in this respect there was no difference between them.

The peace of mutual understanding which I wished for was rejected on

the Thames and on the Seine just as by Ludendorff himself. I have said

this already. According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to

carry on a defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the

integrity of the State. It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could

never publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to

declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were for

Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the Entente

so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a

step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in

this latter direction. And I may here in parenthesis remark that our

military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the

German generals, and interfering in politics themselves. It is

undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to

such interference appeared he quashed it at once. But in particular I

should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity

solely to the task of bringing about peace. He has rendered most

valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at

favourable relations with Germany.

Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with the

German Government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware of the

serious nature of the situation. In April, 1917--eighteen months

ago--I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles, which he

forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that he was entirely

of my opinion.

[This report is already printed in these pages. See p. 146.]

This led to a reply from the German Government, dated May 9, again

expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the submarine

campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle to

take steps towards peace, but reprehending any such steps as might be

calculated to give an impression of weakness.

As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was not

to be thought of.

As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine

ourselves to words alone. In 1917 we declared in Berlin that the

Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with

Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that State to

Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the West in

order to secure peace. But we were met with a _non possumus_ and the

German answer that territorial concessions to France were out of the

question.

The whole of Galicia was here involved, but I was firmly assured that

if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the Ukraine;

and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not have

restrained me had it been a question of the highest value--of peace

itself.

When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our views

steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The journey of the

Socialist leaders to Stockholm will be remembered. It is true that the

Socialists were not "sent" by me; they went to Stockholm of their own

initiative and on their own responsibility, but it is none the less

true that I could have refused them their passes if I had shared the

views of the Entente Governments and of numerous gentlemen in our own

country. Certainly, I was at the time very sceptical as to the

outcome, as I already saw that the Entente would refuse passes to

their Socialists, and consequently there could be nothing but a "rump"

parliament in the end. But despite all the reproaches which I had to

bear, and the argument that the peace-bringing Socialists would have

an enormous power in the State to the detriment of the monarchical

principle itself, I never for a moment hesitated to take that step,

and I have never regretted it in itself, only that it did not succeed.

It is encouraging to me now to read again many of the letters then

received criticising most brutally my so-called "Socialistic

proceedings" and to find that the same gentlemen who were then so

incensed at my policy are now adherents of a line of criticism which

maintains that I am too "narrow-minded" in my choice of new means

towards peace.

It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 1917, the majority

of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the numerically

weaker but, from their relation to the German Army Command, extremely

powerful minority on the question of the reply to the Papal Note. Here

again I was no idle spectator. One of my friends, at my instigation,

had several conversations with Südekum and Erzberger, and encouraged

them, by my description of our own position, to pass the well known

peace resolution. It was owing to this description of the state of

affairs here that the two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry

the Reichstag's resolution in favour of a peace by mutual

understanding--the resolution which met with such disdain and scorn

from the Pan-Germans and other elements. I hoped then, for a moment,

to have gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag

against the German military plans of conquest.

And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of

that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning

of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many

other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our

own convictions. Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of

unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds. The

principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of

the former _Reichskansler_, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was

long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to

dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the end he

was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came

in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral Holtzendorff

came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point

of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My then ministerial

colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in

agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only

one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus. It

should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time

was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the

suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American

munition transports were sunk--that is to say, the case for the

submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of _technical

military importance_ and nothing else. I myself earnestly considered

the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point;

with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but

little difference had we on our part refrained. But another point had

here to be considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the

northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the

Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports would

have been sent via Italy, France and Dover to England, and the northern

U-boat campaign would have been paralysed. But in order to carry

on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have to give the Germans

access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro and Trieste, and by so doing

we were _de facto_ partaking in the submarine campaign ourselves. If we

did not do it, then we were attacking Germany in the rear by hindering

their submarine campaign--that is to say, it would bring us into direct

conflict with Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we

agreed, not convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise.

And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. I have but a few words to

say as to the present. From time to time reports have appeared in the

papers to the effect that certain gentlemen were preparing

disturbances in Switzerland, and I myself have been mentioned as one

of them. I am doubtful whether there is any truth at all in these

reports; as for myself, I have not been outside this country for the

last nine months. As, however, my contradiction on this head itself

appears to have given rise to further misunderstandings, I will give

you my point of view here briefly and, as I hope, clearly enough. I am

most strongly opposed to any attempt at revolt. I am convinced that

any such attempt could only lead to civil war--a thing no one would

wish to see. I am therefore of opinion that the Republican Government

must be maintained untouched until the German-Austrian people as a

whole has taken its decision. But this can only be decided by the

German people. Neither the Republic nor the Monarchy is in itself a

dogma of democracy. The Kingdom of England is as democratic as

republican Switzerland. I know no country where men enjoy so great

freedom as in England. But it is a dogma of democracy that the people

itself must determine in what manner it will be governed, and I

therefore repeat that the final word can only be spoken by the

constitutional representative body. I believe that I am here entirely

at one with the present Government. There are two methods of

ascertaining the will of the people: either each candidate for the

representative body stands for election on a monarchical or a

republican platform, in which case the majority of the body itself

will express the decision; or the question of Monarchy or Republic can

be decided by a plebiscite. It is matter of common knowledge that I

myself have had so serious conflicts with the ex-Kaiser that any

co-operation between us is for all time an impossibility. No one can,

therefore, suspect me of wishing on personal grounds to revert to the

old régime. But I am not one to juggle with the idea of democracy, and

its nature demands that the people itself should decide. I believe

that the majority of German-Austria is against the old régime, and

when it has expressed itself to this effect the furtherance of

democracy is sufficiently assured.

And with this, gentlemen, I have finished what I proposed to set

before you. I vainly endeavoured to make peace together with Germany,

but I was not unsuccessful in my endeavours to save the

German-Austrians from ultimately coming to armed conflict with

Germany. I can say this, and without exaggeration, that I have

defended the German alliance as if it had been my own child, and I do

not know what would have happened had I not done so. Andrassy's "extra

turn" at the last moment showed the great mass of the public how

present a danger was that of war with Germany. Had the same

experiment been made six months before it would have been war with

Germany; would have made Austria a scene of war.

There are evil times in store for the German people, but a people of

many millions cannot perish and will not perish. The day will come

when the wounds of this war begin to close and heal, and when that day

comes a better future will dawn.

The Austrian armies went forth in the hour of war to save Austria.

They have not availed to save it. But if out of this ocean of blood

and suffering a better, freer and nobler world arise, then they will

not have died in vain, all those we loved who now lie buried in cold

alien earth; they died for the happiness, the peace and the future of

the generations to come.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] Translated from the German text given by Count Czernin, no English

text being available.

INDEX

Adler, Dr. Victor, a discussion with, 27

and the Socialist Congress at Stockholm, 168

and Trotski, 234, 235

Adrianople, cession of, 268

Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand and, 40

policy of expansion, 5

Air-raids on England, cause of, 16

their effect, 167

Albania, and the Peace of Bucharest, 6

Queen Elizabeth of Roumania and, 92

Albrecht von Würtemberg, 39

Alsace-Lorraine, Bethmann on, 74

cession of, demanded by Entente, 165

conquest of, a curse to Germany, 15

Emperor Charles's offer to Germany, 75

France insists on restoration of, 170

Germany and, 71, 158, 159

Ambassadors and their duties, 97, 110

America and the U-boat campaign, 116, 119, 120

enters the war, 17, 148

rupture with Germany, 127

shipbuilding programme of, 291

unpreparedness for war, 122

(_Cf._ United States)

American Government, Count Czernin's Note to, 279 _et seq._

Andrassy, Count, and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260

declares a separate peace, 24, 25

German Nationalist view of his action, 25

Andrian at Nordbahnhof, 219

Anti-Roumanian party and its leader, 77

Arbitration, courts of, 171, 176, 177

Arion, Roumanian Foreign Minister, 322

Armaments, pre-war fever for, 3

Armand-Revertera negotiations, the, 164, 169

Asquith, a warlike speech by, 181

Austria-Hungary, a rejected proposal decides fate of, 2

and Albania, 6

and cession of Galicia, 145

and question of separate peace, 27, 164, 170

and the U-boat campaign, 124, 125, 149, 334

ceases to exist, 179

consequences of a separate peace, 24

death-blow to Customs dues, 168

declaration on submarine warfare, 279

democratic Parliament of, 306

enemy's secret negotiations for peace, 141, 162

food troubles and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314

her army merged into German army, 21

her position before and after the ultimatum, 13

heroism of her armies, 336

impossibility of a separate peace for, 19, 21 _et seq._

maritime trade obstructed by blockade, 280

mobilisation and its difficulties, 8, 9

obstinate attitude after Sarajevo tragedy, 8

parlous position of, in 1917, 188

peace negotiations with Roumania, 259, 318

peace terms to, 179

policy during war, Count Czernin on, 325

racial problems in, 190

separatist tactics in, 164

Social Democracy in, 21, 31

terms on which she could make peace, 29

the Archdukes, 22

views on a "tripartite solution" of Polish question, 201

Austrian Delegation, Count Czernin's speech to, 298 _et seq._

Austrian Government and the Ukrainian question, 242, 245

Austrian Navy, the, Franz Ferdinand and, 50

Austrian Ruthenians, leader of, 247

Austro-Hungarian demands at Bucharest negotiations, 319

Austro-Hungarian army, General Staff of, 22

inferiority of, 21

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the, and foreign policy, 134

peace idea of, 174

Austro-Polish question, the, and the Ukrainian demands, 242

no bar to peace, 331

solution of, 200 _et seq._

Avarescu, interview with, 263

retirement of, 323

=B=

Baernreither, his views of a separate peace, 230

Balkan Wars, the, 6

Balkans, the, troubles in: attitude of German Emperor, 68

_Baralong_ episode, the, 133

Bathurst, Captain, and consumption of breadstuffs, 295

on an "un-English" system, 296

Bauer, Dr., German-Austrian Secretary of State, 18

Bauer, Herr, houses Trotski's library, 235

Bavarian troops enter into the Tyrol, 27

Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, 14

Belgian question, the, Germany ready for negotiations with England on, 180

Belgium, England's promise to, 14

German entry into, 14

Germany's views regarding, 157, 158

Belgium, invasion of, changes England's policy, 2

Benckendorff, Count, at London Conference, 275

Benedict XV, Pope, Austria's answer to peace Note of, 175

German reply to, 333

proposals for peace by, 167, 177

Berchtold, Count, and Franz Ferdinand, 43, 44

and the Roumanian question, 77

criticised by pro-war party at Vienna, 33

ultimatum to Serbia, 7

vacillation of, 10

Berlin, Byzantine atmosphere of, 62, 66

the English Ambassador demands his passport, 14

Bessarabia, Bolshevism in, 265

Bethmann-Hollweg, and Austria's willingness to cede Galicia, 146

and the Supreme Military Command, 156

draws up a peace proposal, 139

opposes U-boat warfare, 115, 334

optimistic view of U-boat campaign, 151 _et seq._

replies to author's _exposé_, 150

requests Vienna Cabinet to accept negotiations, 8

visits Western front, 73

Bilinski, Herr von, and the future of Poland, 205

Bismarck, Prince, and the invincibility of the army, 17

and William II., 52

dealings with William I., 65

heritage of, becomes Germany's curse, 15

his policy of "blood and iron," 15

Bizenko, Madame, murders General Sacharow, 220

Blockade, enemies feeling the grip of, 297

of Germany, 280

why established by Great Britain, 281

Bohemia as a possible theatre of war: author's reflections on, 24

Bolsheviks and the Kieff Committee, 245

Bolsheviks, dastardly behaviour of, 249

destruction wrought in Ukraine, 252

enter Kieff, 248, 249

Bolshevism, Czernin on, 216, 221

in Bessarabia, 265

in Russia, 211, 216, 229

terrorism of, 226

the Entente and, 273

Bosnia, as compensation to Austria, 207

Bozen, proposals for cession of, 170, 173

Bratianu, a tactless proceeding by, 112

apprises author of Sarajevo tragedy, 86

collapse of, 99

Ministry of, 88

on Russia, 263

reproaches author, 96

"Bread peace," origin of the term, 257

Brest-Litovsk, a dejected Jew at, 225

a victory for German militarism, 193

answer to Russian peace proposals, 224

arrival of Trotski at, 232

conflict with Ukrainians at, 235

episode of Roumanian peace, 260

evacuation of occupied areas: difficulties of, 312

first peace concluded at, 249

frontier question, 208

further Ukrainian representation at, 300

heated discussions at, 228

object of negotiations at, 305

peace negotiations at, 218 _et seq._, 311

Russians threaten to withdraw from, 227

territorial questions at, 235, 236, 245

Ukrainian delegation and their claims, 208, 231, 314

Briand, peace negotiations with, 182

Brinkmann, Major, transmits Petersburg information to German

delegation, 230

British losses by submarines, 290

trade, and result of submarine warfare, 291

Bronstein and Bolshevism, 211

_Brotfrieden_ ("Bread peace"), 257

Bucharest, fall of, 99

report of peace negotiations at, 318

Zeppelin attacks on, 101 et seq.

Bucharest, Peace of, 6, 82, 100, 258 _et seq._, 270

Budapest, author's address to party leaders at, 174

demonstrations against Germany in, 233

Buftea, Treaty of, 323

Bulgaria, a dispute with Turkey, 268

and the Dobrudsha question, 263, 323

her relations with America, 125

humiliation of, 6

negotiations with the Entente, 162, 163, 269

question of her neutrality, 10

secession of, 183

Bulgarian representatives at Brest, 223

Bülow, Prince, exposes William II., 54

Burian, Count, 106, 200

and the division of Galicia, 244

draws up a peace proposal, 139

his Red Book on Roumania, 98, 114

succeeded by author, 114

visits German headquarters, 210

Busche, von dem, and territorial concessions, 107

=C=

Cachin, his attitude at French Socialist Congress, 214

Cambon, M., attends the London Conference, 275

Capelle and U-boats, 132

Carmen Sylva (_see_ Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania)

Carol, King, a fulfilled prophecy of, 88

and Serbia, 12

last days of, 90

peculiar policy of Government of, 81

tactfulness of, 79

Tsar's visit to, 88

urges acceptance of ultimatum, 90

visited by Franz Ferdinand, 79

Carp, 82, 87, 94

Catarau, and the crime at Debruzin, 89

Central-European question, the, 209

the terror of the Entente, 172

Central Powers and the Bratianu Ministry, 97

enemy blockade of, 132

favourable news in 1917, 143

why they adopted submarine warfare, 281 _et seq._

Charles VIII., Emperor, and Franz Ferdinand, 41

and problem of nationality, 192

and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56

and the Ukrainian question, 244

apprised by author of critical condition of food supply, 237, 239

cautions the Kaiser, 321

communicates with King Ferdinand on Roumanian peace, 260

confers a title on eldest son of Franz Ferdinand, 45

correspondence with Prince Sixtus, 164

frequent absences from Vienna, 61

his ever friendly demeanour, 57, 58

invites Crown Prince to Vienna, 75

opposes U-boat warfare, 334

reinstates Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61

rejoices at peace with Ukraine, 249

submits author's _exposé_ to William II., 146, 332

suggests sacrifices for ending World War, 75

visits South Slav provinces, 59

Clam-Martinic, Count, and the customs question, 168

and U-boat campaign, 121

attends conference on Polish question, 206

opposes submarine warfare, 334

Clemenceau, M., and Germany, 182

and the Peace of Versailles, 272

dominant war aim of, 184, 186

Colloredo-Mannsfield, Count, at Brest-Litovsk, 236

attends conference on U-boat question, 121

meets author, 219

Compulsory international arbitration, 171, 176, 177

Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, 44

Constantinople, an Entente group in, 163

Corday, Charlotte, cited, 227

Cossacks, the, 212

Courland demanded by Germany, 249

Crecianu, Ambassador Jresnea, house damaged in Zeppelin attack

on Bucharest, 103

Csatth, Alexander, mortally wounded, 89

Csicserics, Lieut. Field-Marshal, 219

at Brest-Litovsk, 236

Czechs, the, attitude of, regarding a separate peace, 24

Czernin, Count Ottokar, a candid chat with Franz Ferdinand, 43

a hostile Power's desire for peace, 141

a scene at Konopischt, 39

abused by a braggart and brawler, 83

acquaints Emperor of food shortage, 237, 239

activities for peace with Roumania, 258 _et seq._

ambassador to Roumania, 7

an appeal for confidence, 310

and American intervention, 123

and the reinstatement of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61

and the Ukrainian question (_see_ Ukrainian)

answers explanation of an American request, 128

appeals to Germany for food, 238, 239, 329

appointed Ambassador to Bucharest, 77

apprises Berchtold of decision of Cabinet Council, 12

attends conference on U-boat warfare, 121

avoided by Pan-Germans, 160

becomes Minister for Foreign Affairs, 114

breakfasts with Kühlmann, 230

confers with Tisza, 27, 28

conflicts with the Kaiser, 335

conversation with Trotski, 248

converses with Crown Prince, 74

criticises Michaelis, 160

decorated by King Carol, 88

disapproves of U-boat warfare, 115

dismissal of, 183, 194, 266

extracts bearing on a trip to Western front, 72

friction with the Emperor, 210, 215

his hopes of a peace of understanding, 20 _et seq._, 174,

209, 217, 331, 333

imparts peace terms to Marghiloman, 266

informs Emperor of proceedings at Brest, 229

interviews King Ferdinand, 264

issues passports for Stockholm Conference, 168, 333

journeys to Brest-Litovsk, 218

learns of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, 86

loss of a dispatch-case, 98

loyalty to Germany, 327

lunches with Prince of Bavaria, 222

meets the Emperor William II., 54

misunderstandings resulting from a speech by, 19, 23

nominated to the Herrenhaus, 46

note to American Government, 279

obtains a direct statement from William II., 57

on a separate peace, 327

on Austria's policy during war, 325

on Bolshevism, 216, 221

on President Wilson's programme, 192

on U-boat warfare, 148, 179, 334

passages of arms with Ludendorff, 247

peace programme of, 299

persecution of, 208

Polish leaders and, 205

President Wilson on, 193

private talk with the Emperor, 124

sends in his resignation, 23

sets interned prisoners at liberty, 95, 96

speech to Austrian Delegation, 298 _et seq._

threatens a separate peace with Russia, 228

unfounded charges against, 162

urges sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71

William II.'s gift to, 64

with Emperor Charles visits Eastern front, 57

=D=

Danube Monarchy, the, a vital condition for existence of

Hungarian State, 202

dangers of a political structure for, 202

Debruzin, sensational crime at, 88

Declaration of London, the, 280

D'Esperey, General Franchet, and Karolyi, 260

Deutsch, Leo, and the Marxian Social Democrats, 211

Devonport, Lord, on the food question, 296

Disarmament, negotiations respecting, 4

international, 171, 176, 177, 308

question of, 181

Divorces in Roumania, 85

Dobrudsha, the, acquisition of, 82

assigned to Bulgaria, 268, 269

cession of, at peace with Roumania, 323

King Ferdinand and, 265

Marghiloman's view on, 266

question discussed with Avarescu, 263

Turkish attitude concerning, 268

Dualism, the curse of, 137

=E=

East Galicia, cession of, demanded by Ukrainians, 240 _et seq._

"Echinstvo" group, the, 211

Edward VII., King, and Emperor Francis Joseph, 1, 2

and William II., 63

encircling policy of, 1, 63

Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania, a word-picture by, 91

an operation for cataract, 93

her devotion to King Carol, 92

Ellenbogen, Dr., and Socialist Conference at Stockholm, 168

plain speaking by, 26

England, an effort at _rapprochement_ with Germany and its failure, 180

and dissolution of military power in Germany, 184

and the elder Richthofen, 246

attitude of, at beginning of World War, 15, 16

blockade of, by U-boats, 142, 151

bread shortage in, 295

declares war on Germany, 14

discards Declaration of London, 280

distress in, from U-boat warfare, 145

distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185

dread of gigantic growth of Germany in, 1

Flotow's tribute to, 120

food supply of, 293

freedom in, 335

her desire to remain neutral at opening of war, 2

negotiates with Germany on naval disarmament, 4

public opinion in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 8

refusal to restore German colonies, 166, 170

shortage of potatoes in, 296

the Pacifist party in, 167

"unbending resolve" of, to shatter Germany, 31, 32, 71

English mentality, a typical instance of, 4

English Socialists, 214

Entente, the, adheres to Pact of London, 209, 217

and arming of merchant vessels, 286

and Italy, 27

and the trial of William II., 66

answers President Wilson, 118, 120

as instruments in a world revolution, 273

Austria pressed to join, 2

demands abolition of German militarism, 165, 170, 171, 173

desire of final military victory, 164

exterminates Prussian militarism, 273

impression on, of author's speech at Budapest, 178

mine-laying by, 130

peace proposals to, 19, 20

rejects first peace offer, 115

suspicious of Germany's plans, 3

their "unbending resolve" to shatter Germany, 31, 326

views as to peace, 170

Enver Pasha, his influence in Turkey, 233, 269

Erzberger, Herr, agrees with "Czernin scheme", 185, 333

and author's secret report to the Emperor, 155 (note)

Espionage in Roumania, 97

Esterhazy succeeds Tisza, 136

Esthonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317

Eugen, Archduke, 22

Europe after the war, 175

European tension, beginnings of, 1

=F=

Fasciotti, Baron, and Austro-Hungarian action in Belgrade, 12

Fellowes, Sir Ailwyn, admits success of U-boats, 295

Ferdinand, King of Roumania, author's interview with, 264

German opinion of, 260

Queen Elizabeth's fondness for, 93

Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, anti-Serbian policy of, 51

Filippescu, Nikolai, a proposal by, 80

Fleck, Major, at Nordbahnhof, 219

Flotow, Baron, interview with Hohenlohe, 117

reports on German attitude on U-boat warfare, 118

Fourteen Points, Wilson's, 190 _et seq._, 271, 305, 306, 323 _et seq._

France, and Austria: effect of Vienna troubles, 250

Bethmann's tribute to, 153

distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185

insists on restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, 170

opening of war a surprise to, 2

the Pacifist party in, 167

Francis Joseph, Emperor, a tribute to, 47

advised to accept negotiations, 8

and Franz Ferdinand, 42, 46

and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56

author's audience with, 12

death of, 48

gives audience to author, 47

King Edward VII. and, 1, 2

on the Peace of Bucharest, 6

opposes Filippescu's scheme, 81

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, a fortune-teller's prediction concerning, 44

anti-Magyar point of view of, 38, 50

antipathy to Hungary, 35, 37, 38

as gardener, 35

as husband and father, 44, 45

dislike for the Germans of, 50

false rumours concerning, 43

fearlessness of, 45

friendships of, 39

Goluchowski and, 36

Great-Austrian programme of, 41, 49

his high opinion of Pallavicini, 5

his sense of humour, 41

makes advances to the Kaiser, 42

marriage of, 41, 44

mentality of, 35

personality of, 34

pro-Roumanian proclivities of, 77, 78, 79

tragic end of, 49 (_see also_ Sarajevo tragedy)

views on foreign policy of, 51

Freedom of the seas, 177

attacked by Entente, 280, 281

neutrals and, 284

President Wilson on, 281, 307

French Socialistic Congress, 214

Freyburg, Baron von, attends conference on U-boat question, 121

Friedrich, Archduke, a tribute to, 22

tact of, 72

Frontier rectifications, Hungary and, 258, 266, 319, 330

Fürstenberg, Karl, a request of, refused at Vienna, 112

report on Roumanian question by, 77

=G=

Galicia, proposed cession of, 20, 75, 145, 159, 173, 332

partition of, 209

Tisza and, 135

Gas attacks, reason for Germany's use of, 16

Gautsch, Baron, a code telegram from, 229

at Nordbahnhof, 219

George, Lloyd, admits grave state of grain supplies, 295

and the Peace of Versailles, 272

author in agreement with, 177-8

confers with Orlando, 164

Dr. Helfferich's allusions to, 290

his desire to crush Germany, 186

influence of, 184

on disarmament, 184

George V., King, his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, 9

German army, the General Staff, 22

German-Austria, 179

population of, 31

German Empire, the, creation of, 15, 66

German Government, _versus_ German Diplomacy, 10

German mentality, a typical instance of, 4

military party refuse peace, 32

German Nationalists and Count Andrassy, 25, 26

German policy founders on heritage left by Bismarck, 15

German-Russian differences as to occupied areas, 304

German Supreme Command and evacuation question, 312

Germans and a friendly attitude towards America, 122

at Brest conference, 224

attitude of, towards Poland, 203

inferior mentality of, 69

"insatiable appetite" of, 267

Lenin and, 216

oppose peace negotiations with Roumania, 260

refuse to renounce occupied territory, 226

the dynastic fidelity of, 52

Germany, a moral coalition against, 3

advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115 _et seq._

and Alsace-Lorraine, 71

and Austro-Hungarian military action in Ukraine, 254

answers the Papal Note, 177

blind faith in invincibility of her army, 17

blockade of, and her retaliatory measures, 16

confident of victory, 23, 71

culpability of, in matter of peace, 185

decides on U-boat campaign, 124

declares Armistice with Russia at an end, 318

disillusionment of, 31

dissatisfaction in, over peace resolution in Reichstag, 156

England declares war on, 14

evil times in store for, 336

her dream of a victorious peace, 326, 331

her hopes of food shortage in England, 145

Michaelis on internal economic and political situation in, 157

military party of, 19, 327, 330, 331

negotiations respecting naval disarmament, 4

post-war intentions of, 185

restricts building of U-boats, 131

revolution in, 328

rupture with America, 127

unsuccessful effort at _rapprochement_, 180

violates neutrality of Belgium, 14

Goluchowski, Count, vacillation of, 36

Görlitz, battle of, 96, 107, 329

Gratz, Dr., a good suggestion by, 248

author's discussion with, 219

on Austro-Polish solution of Polish question, 244

Great-Roumania, question of, 80

Great War, the, psychology of various cities, 197

(_See_ World War)

Grey, Sir Edward, an interview with Lichnowsky, 7

at London Conference, 275

proposes negotiations, 8

=H=

Habsburgs, Empire of, the Treaty of London and, 21, 29, 33

Hadik, apathetic attitude of, 238

Hague Convention, the, 280

Haus, Admiral, favours submarine warfare, 334

in Vienna, 121

Hauser, and the question of separate peace, 230

Hebel, appointment for, 154

Helfferich, Dr., disclosures by, 161 (note)

on attitude of William II. during Balkan troubles, 68

speech on submarine warfare, 151, 288 _et seq._

Henry of Prussia, Prince, a telegram

from King George to, 9

Hertling, Count, advised to suppress "Der Kaiser im Felde," 64

becomes Imperial Chancellor, 198

President Wilson on, 193

succeeds Michaelis, 161

Herzegovina as compensation to Austria, 207

Hindenburg, Field-Marshal, modesty of, 126

popularity of, in Germany, 17

Hoffmann, General, an unfortunate speech by, 237

and plans for outer provinces, 226

high words with Kühlmann, 235

received by the Kaiser, 230

receives a telegram from Petersburg, 229

visited by author, 219

Hohenberg, Duchess of, 41

welcomed in Roumania, 79

Hohendorf, General Conrad von, and his responsibility for

the war, 18 (note)

Hohenlohe, Prince, and settlement of Wedel's request, 127

free speech with William II., 65

report on U-boat campaign, 116, 126

Holtzendorff, Admiral, and submarine campaign, 149

arrives in Vienna, 121

guarantees results of U-boat campaign, 122, 334

Hungarian Ruthenians, Wekerle on, 243

Social Democrats, 168

Hungary and cession of her territory, 106

and Roumanian intervention, 77, 106, 107

and the alliance with Roumania, 77 _et seq._

demands of, at Bucharest, 319

frontier rectification question, 258, 266, 319, 330

her influence on the war, 138

indignation in, at author's appointment to Bucharest, 77

"just punishment" of, 97

opposes economical alliance with Roumania, 266, 320

question of a separate peace, 27

repellent attitude of, 107

struggle for liberty in, 202

why her army was neglected, 22

=I=

Imperiali, Marchese, points submitted to London Conference by, 275

International arbitration (_see_ Arbitration)

International disarmament, 171, 176, 177

International law, Germany's breach of, in adoption of U-boat

warfare, 280, 281

Internationalists, Russian, 211

Ischl, an audience with Emperor Francis Joseph at, 12

Iswolsky, 11

Italy, Allied defeat in, 183

and Albania, 6

and the Peace of Versailles, 272

Czernin on, 308

declares a blockade, 281

points submitted to London Conference, 275

stands in way of a peace of understanding, 188

ultimatum to, 12

why she entered the war, 3

=J=

Jaczkovics, Vicar Michael, tragic death of, 89

Jagow, Herr von, a frank disclosure by, 14

Joffe, Herr, a circular letter to Allies, 300

conversation with, at Brest, 220

criticisms on the Tsar, 227

Jonescu, Take, and the Sarajevo tragedy, 86

Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, 22

appointed Chief of Air Force, 62

reinstatement of, 61

relinquishes his command, 62

the Luck episode, 61

=K=

Kameneff at Brest, 220, 316

Karachou, Leo, secretary of Peace Delegation, 303

Karl, Emperor, peace proposals to the Entente, 20

Karl of Schwarzenberg, Prince, Franz Ferdinand and, 39, 40

Karolyi and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260

his attitude before the Roumanian declaration of war, 28

Kerenski and the offensive against Central Powers, 211

newspaper report of condition of his health, 212

Kiderlen-Waechter, a satirical remark by, 63

Kieff, a mission to, 251

entered by Bolsheviks, 248, 249

in danger of a food crisis, 252

peace conditions at, 208

Kieff Committee and the Bolsheviks, 245

Kiel Week, the, 62

_Kienthaler_ (Internationalists), 211

Konopischt and its history, 34 _et seq._

Kreuznach, a conference at, 145

Kriegen, Dr. Bogdan, a fulsome work by, 64

Kühlmann, Dr., and the food shortage, 238, 239

author's talk with, 222

difficult position of, 313

high words with Hoffman, 235

his influence, 198, 199

informed of Roumanian peace overtures, 260

on the Kaiser, 228

returns to Brest, 230

=L=

Lamezan, Captain Baron, at Brest-Litovsk, 233

Landwehr, General, and the food shortage, 238, 240

Lansdowne, Lord, conciliatory attitude of, 184

Larin and Menshevik Socialists, 211

League of Nations, the, 308

Lenin, author on, 216

opposed to offensive against Central Powers, 211

Leopold of Bavaria, Prince, a day's shooting with, 231

chats with author, 219

Lewicky, M., 240

Lichnowsky interviews Sir Edward Grey, 7

Liége taken by Ludendorff, 22

Lithuania, Germany and, 249

Livonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317

London, Declaration of, discarded by England, 280

London, Pact of, 20, 170, 172, 179, 328

desired amendments to, 146

text of, 21, 275 _et seq._

Lublin, German demand for evacuation of, 204, 205, 206

Luck episode, the, 22, 106

Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and, 61

Ludendorff and Belgium, 186

and the Polish question, 207

candid admission by, 247

compared with enemy statesmen, 19

confident of success of U-boat warfare, 126

congratulates Hoffmann, 237

displays "a gleam of insight", 230

dominating influence of, 79, 115, 126

German hero-worship of, 17

his independent nature, 60

how he captured Liége, 22

personality of, 331

Lueger and Franz Ferdinand, 50

Luxembourg, German invasion of, 16

=M=

Mackensen, a fleet of Zeppelins at Bucharest, 101

failure at Maracesci, 261

headquarters at Bucharest, 105

Magyars, the, and Franz Ferdinand, 38, 50

author and, 78

Majorescu and Austria's policy, 330

and territorial concessions, 97, 206

forms a Ministry, 81

Mandazescu, arrest and extradition of, 89

Maracesci, attack on, 261

Marghiloman and co-operation of Roumania, 106

forms a Cabinet, 266, 320

Marie, Queen of Roumania, English sympathies of, 98, 99

Marne, the, first battle of, 17

Martow and the Menshevik party, 211

Martynoz, and the Russian Internationalists, 211

Medwjedew, J.G., Ukrainian delegate to Brest, 301

Mennsdorff, Ambassador, interviews General Smuts, 169

Menshevik party, the, 211

Meran, the Entente's proposals regarding, 170, 173

Merchant vessels, arming of, author on, 285

Merey meets Czernin at Brest, 219

Michaelis, Dr., appointed Imperial Chancellor, 156

defines Germany's views regarding Belgium, 157

on peace proposals, 157

Pan-Germanism of, 160

"Might before Right," Bismarckian principle of, 15

Miklossy, Bishop Stephan, marvellous escape of, 89

Militarism, German faith in, 17

England's idea of German, 166

Monarchists _v._ Republicans, 52

Monarchs, hypnotic complacency of, 58 _et seq._

Moutet, attitude of, at French Socialist conference, 214

=N=

Nationality, problem of, 190

Franz Ferdinand and, 191

Naval disarmament, negotiations on, 4

Nicholas, Grand Duke, and the military party in Russia, 2

Nicolai, Tsar, Joffe on, 227

North Sea, the, blockade of, 280

Noxious gas, why used by Germany, 16

=O=

Odessa, in danger of a food crisis, 252

Orlando confers with Ribot and Lloyd George, 164

Otto, Archduke, brother of Franz Ferdinand, 36

=P=

Pallavicini, Markgraf, discusses the political situation with author, 5

Pan-Germans, 330

conditions on which they would conclude peace, 160

Pan-Russian Congress, the, 212, 213, 214

Papal Note, the, 167, 177

Austria's reply to, 175

German reply to, 333

Paris, negotiations _in camera_ at, 271

Peace by sacrifice, 327

Peace Congress at Brest-Litovsk, 218 _et seq._

Peace movement, real historical truth concerning, 186

Peace negotiations, Count Czernin on, 298 _et seq._

deadlock in, 182

the Pope's proposals, 167, 175, 177, 333

Peace resolution, a, and its consequences, 156

Penfield, Mr., American Ambassador to Vienna, 131

People's Socialists, the, 212

Peschechonow, Minister of Food, 212

Petersburg and the Ukraine, 309

Plechanow, Georgei, and the Russian Social Patriots, 211

Poklewski, Russian Ambassador to Roumania, 86

Poland, a conference on question of, 205

becomes a kingdom, 200

conquest of, 106

Count Czernin on, 304

Emperor Charles's offer regarding, 75

future position of, 203

German standpoint on, 203

Michaelis on, 159

re-organisation of, 145

the German demands, 244

unrepresented at Brest, and the reason, 304, 315

Poles, the, and Brest-Litovsk negotiations, 208

party divisions among, 204

Polish question, and the Central-European project, 209

difficulties of, 200

Popow, Bulgarian Minister of Justice, 223

Pro-Roumanian party and its head, 77

Prussian militarism, England's idea of, 166

extermination of, 273

fear of, 174

(_See also_ German military party)

=Q=

Quadruple Alliance, the, dissension in, 250

Germany as shield of, 183

peace terms to Roumania, 262

=R=

Radek, a scene with a chauffeur, 237

Radoslawoff, ignorant of negotiations with Entente, 162

Randa, Lieut.-Col. Baron, a telling remark by, 104

and Roumanian peace overtures, 260, 262, 319

Reichstag, the, a peace resolution passed in, 156

demands peace without annexation, 156, 160

Renner and the Stockholm Congress, 168

Republicans _v._ Monarchists, 52

Ressel, Colonel, 264

Revertera negotiates for peace, 164, 169

Revolution, danger of, 147

Rhondda, Lord, British Food Controller, 151

Ribot confers with Orlando, 164

statement by, 152

Richthofen brothers, the, 246

Rosenberg meets author at Brest, 219

Roumania, 77 _et seq._

a change of Government in, 81

a land of contrasts, 84

affairs in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 86

and the Peace of Bucharest, 6

author's negotiations for peace, 258

between two stools, 261

declares war, 100, 279

espionage in, 97

freedom of the Press in, 84

Germany and, 262, 267

her treachery to Central Powers, 262

how news of Sarajevo tragedy was received in, 86

Marghiloman forms a Cabinet, 266

negotiations for peace, 318

out of action, 23

peace concluded with, 323

question of annexations of, 159, 207

question of her neutrality, 12, 95

Russian gold in, 111

social conditions in, 85

ultimatum to, 12, 262

why she entered the war, 3

Roumanian invasion of Transylvania, 108

Roumanians, mistaken views of strength of, 261

their love of travel, 85

Rudolf, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, 37

Russia, a contemplated peace with, 211

abdication of the Tsar, 142

an appeal to German soldiers, 249

begins military operations without a declaration of war, 3

Bolshevism in, 211, 216, 229

declares for cessation of hostilities, 318

differences of opinion in, as to continuance of war, 211 _et seq._

enters the war, 7

Francis Joseph's inquiry as to a possible revolution in, 105

her responsibility for Great War, 10

incites German army to revolt, 317

negotiations for peace, 298

out of action, 23

peace treaty signed, 318

prepared for war, 112

the military party in, 2, 9

ultimatum to Roumania, 262

Russian Revolution, the, 142, 147, 211 _et seq._

Russians, their fear of Trotski, 237

Ruthenian districts of Hungary, Ukrainian demands, 242

=S=

Sacharow, General, murder of, 220

St. Mihiel, author at, 73

St. Privat, reminiscences of, 74

Salzburg negotiations, the, 210

Sarajevo, the tragedy of, 6, 49

sounds death knell of the Monarchy, 32

Sassonoff, a momentous statement by, 88

attitude of, after declaration of war, 8

visits Bucharest, 112

Satonski, Wladimir Petrowitch, 302

Schachrai, W.M., at Brest, 301

Schonburg, Alvis, and the Emperor Charles, 61

Schönerer, Deputy, Franz Ferdinand and, 50

Secret diplomacy, abolition of: author's views, 306-7

Sedan, a house with a history at, 74

Seidler, Dr. von, a _faux pas_ by, 56

and the food shortage, 240

and the partition of Galicia, 209

and the Ukrainian question, 208, 242, 243

apathetic attitude of, 238, 239

author's meeting with, 230

visits South Slav provinces, 59

Seitz, and the Stockholm Conference, 168

Serbia, arrogance of, 6

ultimatum to, 7

Sewrjuk, M., 240

Sixtus, Prince, letters from Emperor Charles to, 164

Skobeleff and the Mensheviks, 211

Skrzynski, Herr von, 250

Slapowszky, Johann, tragic death of, 89

Slav provinces, a visit by the Emperor to, 59

Smuts, General, interview with Mennsdorff, 170

Social Democrats and the question of peace, 26, 30

and the Stockholm Conference, 168, 333

Hungarian, 243

opposed to sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71

"Social Patriots," Russian, 211

Social Revolutionary Party, the, 212

Socialists and offensive against Central Powers, 211

Spanish reports of war-weariness in England and France, 143

Stirbey, Prince, 263

Stockholm, a Socialist Conference at, 168, 333

Russians ask for a conference at, 229

Stockholm Congress, negative result of, 169

Strikes and their danger, 310

Stumm, von, on Ukrainian claims, 241

Sturdza, Lieut.-Col., extraordinary behaviour of, 83

Stürgkh, Count, 18 (note)

recollections of, 46

Submarine warfare, author's note to American Government on, 279

Czernin on, 334

destruction without warning justified, 283

enemy losses in, 290

enemy's "statistical smoke-screens" as to, 289

question of safety of passengers and crew, 282

speech by Dr. Helfferich on, 288

why adopted by Central Powers, 281 _et seq._

(_See also_ U-boats)

Südekum, Herr, and Austria-Hungary's peace proposals, 155, 333

Supreme Military and Naval Command, conditions of, for peace

negotiations, 159

Switzerland, reported disturbances in: author's disclaimer, 335

Sycophancy in high places, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64

Sylvester, Dr., and the German-Austrian National Assembly, 26

=T=

Talaat Pasha arrives at Brest, 233

influence of, 143

threatens to resign, 269

Talleyrand, a dictum of, 174

Tarnowski, Count, author's opinion of, 110

German Ambassador to Washington, 127

Thomas, M., war speech on Russian front, 214

Tisza, Count Stephen, 18 (note)

a characteristic letter from, 200

advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115, 334

and American intervention, 123

and author's appointment to Bucharest, 78

and cession of Hungarian territory, 135

and control of foreign policy, 134

and the Stockholm Conference, 168

assassination of, 137

at a U-boat campaign conference, 121

author's conference with, 27, 28

defends Count Czernin, 108

dismissal of, 136, 203

Franz Ferdinand and, 38

his influence in Hungary, 27

leads anti-Roumanian party, 77

lively correspondence with author, 128

on dangers of pessimism, 154

on the Treaty of London, 28

opposes annexation of Roumania, 207

opposes the war, 10

opposes U-boat warfare, 131, 334

peace proposal of, 139

_pro-memoria_ of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, 258

question of frontier rectifications, 319

refuses cession of Hungarian territory, 107

speech at conference on Polish question, 206

tribute to, 137

views regarding Poland, 200

visits the Southern Slavs, 30

Transylvania, 173

opposition to cession of, 107

proposed cession of, 28, 50

Roumanian invasion of, 108

Trentino, the, offered to Italy, 75

Trieste, Entente proposals regarding, 170, 173

"Tripartite solution" of Polish question, Tisza on, 201

Trnka and the Customs dues, 168

Trotski, a tactical blunder by, 236

accepts the German-Austria ultimatum, 235

and the Internationalist party, 211

arrives at Brest, 232

declines to sign, 250

his brother-in-law Kameneff, 220

his library, 235, 236

negotiations with, 247

opposed to ill-treatment of war prisoners, 236

ultimatum to, 234

Trudoviks, the, 212

Tscheidse, and the Mensheviks, 211, 213

Tschernow, speaks at Peasants' Congress, 212

Tschirsky, Herr von, a momentous communication to Berchtold, 7

and a telegram from King George, 9

his desire for war, 32

untactful diplomacy of, 10

Tseretelli and the Menshevik party, 211

Turkey, a dispute with Bulgaria, 268

asks for munitions, 95

how the Sultan was deposed, 233

probable secession of, 269

Turkish Grand Vizier arrives at Brest, 233

Turks, a reported advance by a hostile Power for a separate peace, 143

at Brest Conference, 223

Tyrol, the, German troops in, 24

=U=

U-boat warfare, 114 _et seq._

a conference in Vienna on, 121

"a terrible mistake", 126

and America's entry into the war, 126

and why adopted by Germany, 16

Czernin on, 148

political arguments against, 117, 118

what it achieved, 178

(_See also_ Submarine warfare)

Ugron, Herr von, and the "tripartite" solution of Polish question, 201

Ukraine and Petersburg, 309

Bolshevik destruction in, 252

food supplies from, 251 _et seq._, 315

military action in, and the consequences, 253

peace concluded with, 249

revolution in, 253

survey of imports from, 255

treaty signed, 317

Ukrainian Army General Committee appointed, 214

delegates at Brest, 231, 300

Workers' and Peasants' Government, a declaration from, 301

Ukrainians and their demands, 208, 240, 314

dictatorial attitude of, 241

negotiations with, 315

United States, the, scarcity of supplies in, 294

(_See also_ America)

=V=

Versailles, opening of Peace Congress at, 196

the Council of Four at, 271

the Peace of, 18, 19, 271

terrible nature of, 273

triumph of Entente at, 186

Vienna, a council in, 121

differences of opinion in, 77

disastrous effects of troubles in, 250

disturbances in, 58

food shortage and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314

politicians' views on peace proposals, 230

psychology of, 197

warlike demonstrations at, after Sarajevo tragedy, 33

Vredenburch, Herr von, Dutch Ambassador to Roumania, 104

=W=

Wales, Prince of (_see_ Edward VII., King)

Wallachia, occupation of, 99, 105

Wallhead, Mr., 295

Washington Cabinet, and Austria-Hungary's attitude to submarine

warfare, 279

Wassilko, Nikolay, leader of Austrian Ruthenians, 247, 249

Wedel, Count, calls on Count Czernin, 127

disclosures of, 161 (note)

revelations of, 155 (note)

Weisskirchner, Burgemeister, coins the term "bread peace," 257

Wekerle, Dr., and the Polish question, 203

author and, 136, 230

on the Ukrainian question, 242

standpoint of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, 260, 319

Western front, an Entente break-through on, 183

Western Powers, the, and Germany's ambitions, 2

Wiesner, Ambassador, von, and a Pan-German, 161

at Brest-Litovsk, 236

author discusses Russian peace with, 219

Wilhelm, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, 43

anxious for peace, 72

author's conversation with, 74

his quarters at Sedan, 74

William I. and Bismarck, 65

William II., Emperor, and Bismarck, 52

and Franz Ferdinand, 42

and the German Supreme Military Command, 17

as _causeur_, 66

as the "elect of God," 52, 53

cause of his ruin, 62 _et seq._

demonstrations against, in the Reichstag, 54

desires to help deposed Tsar, 70

difficulties of his political advisers, 60

fails to find favour in England, 63

his projected division of the world, 67

impending trial of: author's protest, 66

informed of serious nature of situation for Allies, 332

instructions to Kühlmann, 249

long years of peaceful government, 68

longs for peace, 70

on food troubles in England, 145

on impending attack on Italian front, 71

presents author with "Der Kaiser im Felde," 64

Prince Hohenlohe and, 65

question of his abdication, 75

the Press and, 65

warlike speeches of, 68

Wilson, President, advantages of his "Fourteen Points," 188

as master of the world, 192

author on his Message, 305

Count Andrassy's Note to, 25

Count Czernin on, 192

Entente's reply to his peace proposal, 118, 120, 123

his Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles, 271

on the freedom of the seas, 281

ready to consider peace, 250

reopens hopes of a peace of understanding, 189

speech to Congress, 193

text of the Fourteen Points, 323

Wolf, K.H., a scene in the "Burg," 169

World-domination, Germany's dream of, 1, 2

World organization, a new, principles of, 174 _et seq._

World War, the, an important phase of, 107

attempts at peace, 134 _et seq._

author's impressions and reflections on, 195 _et seq._, 271 _et seq._

by whom started, 18 (note)

causes of, 3

President Wilson and, 188 _et seq._

questions of responsibility for outbreak of, 2

World War, the, U-boat warfare in, 114 _et seq._

(_see also_ Submarine warfare and U-boat)

violent measures adopted by Germany in, 16

=Z=

Zeppelin raids on Bucharest, 100

Zimmermann, Herr, and author's peace proposals, 146

opposes unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115, 120

_Zimmerwalder_ (Russian Internationalists), 211

PRINTED BY CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED, LA BELLE SAUVAGE, LONDON, E.C. 4

* * * * *

+------------------------------------------------------------------+

| Typographical errors corrected in text: |

| |

| Table of Contents: Appendix is listed as 257, changed to 275 |

| Page 47: 'and and in doing so' replaced with 'and in doing so' |

| Page 81: 'to made room' replaced with 'to make room' |

| Page 107: session replaced with cession |

| Page 196: perdera replaced with perdra |

| Page 201: Nr 63 replaced with Nr. 63 |

| Page 251: official replaced with officials |

| Page 286: 'Les navir' replaced with 'Les navires' |

| Page 293: persumably replaced with presumably |

| Page 333: Sudekum replaced with Südekum |

| Page 334: 'would have have been' replaced with 'would have been' |

| Page 343: Gouluchowski replaced with Goluchowski |

| Page 344: Gorlitz replaced with Görlitz |

| Page 346: Lubin replaced with Lublin |

| |

| The surname Colloredo-Mannsfield/Colloredo-Mannsfeld appears |

| once each way, on page 121, and in the index |

+------------------------------------------------------------------+

* * * * *

End of Project Gutenberg's In the World War, by Count Ottokar Czernin