CHAPTER X

BREST-LITOVSK

1

In the summer of 1917 we received information which seemed to suggest

a likelihood of realising the contemplated peace with Russia. A report

dated June 13, 1917, which came to me from a neutral country, ran as

follows:

The Russian Press, bourgeois and socialistic, reveals the

following state of affairs:

At the front and at home bitter differences of opinion are rife as

to the offensive against the Central Powers demanded by the Allies

and now also energetically advocated by Kerenski in speeches

throughout the country. The Bolsheviks, as also the Socialists

under the leadership of Lenin, with their Press, are taking a

definite stand against any such offensive. But a great part of the

Mensheviks as well, _i.e._ Tscheidse's party, to which the present

Ministers Tseretelli and Skobeleff belong, is likewise opposed to

the offensive, and the lack of unanimity on this question is

threatening the unity of the party, which has only been maintained

with difficulty up to now. A section of the Mensheviks, styled

Internationalists from their trying to re-establish the old

_Internationale_, also called _Zimmerwalder_ or _Kienthaler_, and

led by Trotski, or, more properly, Bronstein, who has returned

from America, with Larin, Martow, Martynoz, etc., returned from

Switzerland, are on this point, as with regard to the entry of

Menshevik Social Democrats into the Provisional Government,

decidedly opposed to the majority of the party. And for this

reason Leo Deutsch, one of the founders of the Marxian Social

Democracy, has publicly withdrawn from the party, as being too

little patriotic for his views and not insisting on final victory.

He is, with Georgei Plechanow, one of the chief supporters of the

Russian "Social Patriots," which group is termed, after their

Press organ, the "Echinstvo" group, but is of no importance either

as regards numbers or influence. Thus it comes about that the

official organ of the Mensheviks, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_, is

forced to take up an intermediate position, and publishes, for

instance, frequent articles against the offensive.

There is then the Social Revolutionary party, represented in the

Cabinet by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow. This is,

perhaps, the strongest of all the Russian parties, having

succeeded in leading the whole of the peasant movement into its

course--at the Pan-Russian Congress the great majority of the

peasants' deputies were Social Revolutionaries, and no Social

Democrat was elected to the executive committee of the Peasants'

Deputies' Council. A section of this party, and, it would seem,

the greater and more influential portion, is definitely opposed to

any offensive. This is plainly stated in the leading organs of the

party, _Delo Naroda_ and _Zemlja i Wolja_. Only a small and

apparently uninfluential portion, grouped round the organ _Volja

Naroda_, faces the bourgeois Press with unconditional demands for

an offensive to relieve the Allies, as does the Plechanow group.

Kerenski's party, the Trudoviks, as also the related People's

Socialists, represented in the Cabinet by the Minister of Food,

Peschechonow, are still undecided whether to follow Kerenski here

or not. Verbal information, and utterances in the Russian Press,

as, for instance, the _Retch_, assert that Kerenski's health gives

grounds for fearing a fatal catastrophe in a short time. The

official organ of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' Council,

the _Isvestia_, on the other hand, frequently asserts with great

emphasis that an offensive must unquestionably be made. It is

characteristic that a speech made by the Minister of Agriculture,

Tschernow, to the Peasants' Congress, was interpreted as meaning

that he was opposed to the offensive, so that he was obliged to

justify himself to his colleagues in the Ministry and deny that

such had been his meaning.

While, then, people at home are seriously divided on the question

of an offensive, the men at the front appear but little inclined

to undertake any offensive. This is stated by all parties in the

Russian Press, the symptoms being regarded either with

satisfaction or with regret. The infantry in particular are

against the offensive; the only enthusiasm is to be found among

the officers, in the cavalry or a part of it, and the artillery.

It is characteristic also that the Cossacks are in favour of war.

These, at any rate, have an ulterior motive, in that they hope by

success at the front to be able ultimately to overthrow the

revolutionary régime. For there is this to be borne in mind: that

while most of the Russian peasants have no landed property

exceeding five deshatin, and three millions have no land at all,

every Cossack owns forty deshatin, an unfair distinction which is

constantly being referred to in all discussion of the land

question. This is a sufficient ground for the isolated position of

the Cossacks in the Revolution, and it was for this reason also

that they were formerly always among the most loyal supporters of

the Tsar.

Extremely characteristic of the feeling at the front are the

following details:

At the sitting on May 30 of the Pan-Russian Congress, Officers'

Delegates, a representative of the officers of the 3rd

Elizabethengrad Hussars is stated, according to the _Retch_ of May

1, to have given, in a speech for the offensive, the following

characteristic statement: "You all know to what extremes the

disorder at the front has reached. The infantry cut the wires

connecting them with their batteries and declare that the soldiers

will not remain _more than one month_ at the front, but will go

home."

It is very instructive also to read the report of a delegate from

the front, who had accompanied the French and English majority

Socialists at the front. This report was printed in the _Rabocaja

Gazeta_, May 18 and 19--this is the organ of the Mensheviks, i.e.

that of Tscheidse, Tseretelli and Skobeleff. These Entente

Socialists at the front were told with all possible distinctness

that the Russian army could not and would not fight for the

imperialistic aims of England and France. The state of the

transport, provisions and forage supplies, as also the danger to

the achievements of the Revolution by further war, demanded a

speedy cessation of hostilities. The English and French Socialist

delegates were said to be not altogether pleased at this state of

feeling at the front. And it was further demanded of them that

they should undertake to make known the result of their experience

in Russia on the Western front, i.e. in France. There was some

very plain speaking, too, with regard to America: representatives

from the Russian front spoke openly of America's policy of

exploitation towards Europe and the Allies. It was urged then that

an international Socialist conference should be convened at the

earliest possible moment, and supported by the English and French

majority Socialists. At one of the meetings at the front, the

French and English Socialists were given the following reply:

"Tell your comrades that we await definite declarations from your

Governments and peoples renouncing conquest and indemnities. We

will shed no drop of blood for Imperialists, whether they be

Russians, Germans or English. We await the speediest agreement

between the workers of all countries for the termination of the

war, which is a thing shameful in itself, and will, if continued,

prove disastrous to the Russian Revolution. We will not conclude

any separate peace, but tell your people to let us know their aims

as soon as possible."

According to the report, the French Socialists were altogether

converted to this point of view. This also appears to be the case,

from the statements with regard to the attitude of Cachin and

Moutet at the French Socialist Congress. The English, on the other

hand, were immovable, with the exception of Sanders, who inclined

somewhat toward the Russian point of view.

Private information reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

this country states that shots were fired at M. Thomas, the

Minister of Munitions, in the course of one of his war speeches at

the Russian front.

The disorganisation at the front is described by an officer or

soldier at the front in the same organ, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_ for

May 26, as follows:

"The passionate desire for peace, peace of whatever kind, aye,

even a peace costing the loss of ten governments (i.e. districts),

is growing ever more plainly evident. Men dream of it

passionately, even though it is not yet spoken of at meetings and

in revolutions, even though all conscious elements of the army

fight against this party that long for peace." And to paralyse

this, there can be but one way: let the soldiers see the democracy

fighting emphatically for peace and the end of the war.

The Pan-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates'

Councils and the Army Organisation at the front in St. Petersburg

June 1-14 took for its first point in the order of the day the

following: "The War, questions of defence and the struggle for

peace." At this time the Government would doubtless have to give a

declaration with regard to the answer already received at the

beginning of June from the Allies as to their war aims. This

congress will also probably decide definitely upon the nomination

for the Stockholm Conference and appoint delegates. Point 4 deals

with the question of nationality. An open conflict had broken out

between the Petersburg Workers' and Soldiers' Deputy Councils and

the Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress, sitting at Kieff, on account of

the formation of an Ukrainian army. The appointment of an

"Ukrainian Army General Committee" further aggravated the

conflict.

With regard to the increasing internal confusion, the growing

seriousness of the nationality dispute, the further troubles in

connection with agricultural and industrial questions, a detailed

report dealing separately with these heads will be forwarded

later.

Towards the end of November I wrote to one of my friends the following

letter, which I have given _in extenso_, as it shows faithfully my

estimate of the situation at the time:

_Vienna, November 17, 1917._

MY DEAR FRIEND,--After many days, full of trouble, annoyance and

toil, I write to you once more in order to answer your very

noteworthy observations; to be in contact with you again turns my

thoughts into other channels, and enables me, for the time at

least, to forget the wretchedness of every day.

You have heard, you say, that matters are not going so well

between the Emperor and myself, and you are sorry for this. I am

sorry myself, if for no other reason than that it increases the

friction of the daily working machine to an insupportable degree.

As soon as a thing of this sort leaks out--and it does so fast

enough--all enemies, male and female, rush in with renewed

strength, making for the vulnerable point, in the hope of securing

my overthrow. These good people are like carrion vultures--I

myself am the carrion--they can scent from afar that there is

something for them to do, and come flying to the spot. And the

lies they invent and the intrigues they contrive, with a view to

increasing existing differences--really, they are worthy of

admiration. You ask, who are these inveterate enemies of mine?

Well, first of all, those whom you yourself conjecture.

And, secondly, the enemies whom every Minister has, the numbers of

those who would fain be in his place. Finally, a crowd of

political mountebanks from the Jockey Club, who are disgusted

because they had hoped for some personal advantage through my

influence, and I have ignored them. No. 3 is a comfortingly

negligible quantity, No. 2 are dangerous, but No. 1 are deadly.

In any case, then, my days are numbered. Heaven be thanked, relief

is not far off. If only I could now settle things with Russia

quickly, and thus perhaps secure the possibility of a peace all

round. All reports from Russia seem to point to the fact that the

Government there is determined on peace, and peace as speedily as

possible. But the Germans are now full of confidence. If they can

throw their massed forces against the West, they have no doubt of

being able to break through, take Paris and Calais, and directly

threaten England. Such a success, however, could only lead to

peace if Germany could be persuaded to renounce all plans of

conquest. I at any rate cannot believe that the Entente, after

losing Paris and Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as _inter

pares_--it would at least be necessary to make every endeavour in

that direction. Up to now Hindenburg has done all that he

promised, so much we must admit, and the whole of Germany believes

in his forthcoming success in the West--always taking for granted,

of course, the freeing of the Eastern front; that is to say, peace

with Russia. The Russian peace, then, _may_ prove the first step

on the way to the peace of the world.

I have during the last few days received reliable information

about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews,

with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country

that is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the

most interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make

peace, and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for

they cannot carry on the war.

In the Ministry here, three groups are represented: one declines

to take Lenin seriously, regarding him as an ephemeral personage,

the second does not take this view at all, but is nevertheless

unwilling to treat with a revolutionary of this sort, and the

third consists, as far as I am aware, of myself alone, and I

_will_ treat with him, despite the possibly ephemeral character of

his position and the certainty of revolution. The briefer Lenin's

period of power the more need to act speedily, for no subsequent

Russian Government will recommence the war--and I cannot take a

Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had.

The Germans are hesitating--they do not altogether like the idea

of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons

already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the

case. The German military party--which, as everyone knows, holds

the reins of policy in Germany entirely--have, as far as I can

see, done all they could to overthrow Kerenski and set up

"something else" in his place. Now, the something else is there,

and is ready to make peace; obviously, then, one must act, even

though the party concerned is not such as one would have chosen

for oneself.

It is impossible to get any exact information about these

Bolsheviks; that is to say, there is plenty of information

available, but it is contradictory. The way they begin is this:

everything in the least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture

must be destroyed, and the bourgeoisie exterminated. Freedom and

equality seem no longer to have any place on their programme; only

a bestial suppression of all but the proletariat itself. The

Russian bourgeois class, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly

as our own, and its members let themselves be slaughtered like

sheep.

True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we had

the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to

force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would

be better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to

march on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the

power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our

own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get

to Paris--and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front

is freed. That is the circle complete. All this the German

military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether

illogical of them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal

grounds.

I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this

to-day. Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter which

you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate

peace. I spoke to the Emperor about it, and told him that this

would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could

not take such a step myself, but would be willing to resign under

some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to

make the attempt. The conference of London has determined on a

division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would

avail to alter that. The Roumanians, Serbians and Italians are to

receive enormous compensation, we are to lose Trieste, and the

remainder is to be broken up into separate states--Czechish,

Polish, Hungarian and German. There will be very slight contact

between these new states; in other words, a separate peace would

mean that the Monarchy, having first been mutilated, would then be

hacked to pieces. But until we arrive at this result, we must

fight on, and that, moreover, _against_ Germany, which will, of

course, make peace with Russia at once and occupy the Monarchy.

The German generals will not be so foolish as to wait until the

Entente has invaded Germany through Austria, but will take care to

make _Austria itself the theatre of war_. So that instead of

bringing the war to an end, we should be merely changing one

opponent for another and delivering up provinces hitherto

spared--such as Bohemia and Tyrol--to the fury of battle, only to

be wrecked completely in the end.

On the other hand, we might perhaps, in a few months' time, secure

peace all round, with Germany as well--a tolerable peace of mutual

understanding--always provided the German offensive turns out

successful. The Emperor was more silent then. Among his entourage,

one pulls this way, another that--and we gain nothing in that

manner among the Entente, while we are constantly losing the

confidence of Berlin. If a man wishes to go over to the enemy,

then let him do it--_le remède sera pire que le mal_--but to be

for ever dallying with the idea of treachery and adopting the

pose without carrying it out in reality--this I cannot regard as

prudent policy.

I believe we could arrive at a tolerable peace of understanding;

we should lose something to Italy, and should, of course, gain

nothing in exchange. Furthermore, we should have to alter the

entire structure of the Monarchy--after the fashion of the

_fédération Danubienne_ proposed in France--and I am certainly

rather at a loss to see how this can be done in face of the

Germans and Hungarians. But I hope we may survive the war, and I

hope also that they will ultimately revise the conditions of the

London conference. Let but old Hindenburg once make his entry into

Paris, and then the Entente _must_ utter the decisive word that

they are willing to treat. But when that moment comes, I am firmly

determined to do the utmost possible, to appeal publicly to the

_peoples_ of the Central Powers and ask them if they prefer to

fight on for conquest or if they will have peace.

To settle with Russia as speedily as possible, then break through

the determination of the Entente to exterminate us, and then to

make peace--even at a loss--that is my plan and the hope for which

I live. Naturally, after the capture of Paris, all "leading"

men--with the exception of the Emperor Karl--will demand a "good"

peace, and that we shall never get in any case. The odium of

having "spoiled the peace" I will take upon myself.

So, I hope, we may come out of it at last, albeit rather mauled.

But the old days will never return. A new order will be born in

throes and convulsions. I said so publicly some time back, in my

Budapest speech, and it was received with disapproval practically

on all sides.

This has made a long letter after all, and it is late. _Lebe

wohl_, and let me hear from you again soon.--In friendship as of

old, yours

(Signed) CZERNIN.

With regard to the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, I will leave

my diary to speak for itself. Despite many erroneous views that may

appear in the following notes, and various unimportant details, I have

not abbreviated it at all, since it gives, in its present form, what I

believe will be a clear picture of the development.

"_December 19, 1917._--Departure from Vienna, Wednesday, 19th.

"Four o'clock, Nordbahnhof. Found the party already assembled there:

Gratz and Wiesner, Colloredo, Gautsch and Andrian, also Lieut.

Field-Marshal Csicserics, and Major Fleck, Baden.

"I took the opportunity on the journey to give Csicserics an idea of

my intentions and the tactics to be pursued. I told him that in my

opinion Russia would propose a _general_ peace, and that we must of

course accept this proposal. I hoped that the first steps for a

general peace would be taken at Brest, and not given up for a long

time. Should the Entente not accept, then at least the way would be

open for a separate peace. After that I had long discussions with

Gratz and Wiesner, which took up more or less the whole day.

"_December 20, 1917._--Arrived at Brest a few minutes past five. At

the station were the Chief of Staff, General Hoffmann, with some ten

of his suite, also the emissary Rosenberg and Merey with my party. I

greeted them on the platform, and after a few words Merey went into

the train with me to tell me what had happened during the past few

days. On the whole, Merey takes a not unfavourable view of the

situation, and believes that, unless something unforeseen crops up, we

should succeed within a reasonable time in arranging matters

satisfactorily.

"At six o'clock I went to pay my visit to General Hoffmann; he gave me

some interesting details as to the mentality of the Russian delegates,

and the nature of the armistice he had so fortunately concluded. I had

the impression that the General combined expert knowledge and energy

with a good deal of calm and ability, but also not a little Prussian

brutality, whereby he had succeeded in persuading the Russians,

despite opposition at first, to agree to very favourable terms of

truce. A little later, as arranged, Prince Leopold of Bavaria came in,

and I had some talk with him on matters of no importance.

"We then went to dinner, all together, including the whole staff of

nearly 100 persons. The dinner presented one of the most remarkable

pictures ever seen. The Prince of Bavaria presided. Next to the Prince

sat the leader of the Russian delegation, a Jew called Joffe,

recently liberated from Siberia; then came the generals and the other

delegates. Apart from this Joffe, the most striking personality in the

delegation is the brother-in-law of the Russian Foreign Minister,

Trotski, a man named Kameneff, who, likewise liberated from prison

during the Revolution, now plays a prominent part. The third delegate

is Madame Bizenko, a woman with a comprehensive past. Her husband is a

minor official; she herself took an early part in the revolutionary

movement. Twelve years ago she murdered General Sacharow, the governor

of some Russian city, who had been condemned to death by the

Socialists for his energy. She appeared before the general with a

petition, holding a revolver under her petticoat. When the general

began to read she fired four bullets into his body, killing him on the

spot. She was sent to Siberia, where she lived for twelve years, at

first in solitary confinement, afterwards under somewhat easier

conditions; she also owes her freedom to the Revolution. This

remarkable woman learned French and German in Siberia well enough to

read them, though she cannot speak them, not knowing how the words

should be pronounced. She is the type of the educated Russian

proletariat. Extremely quiet and reserved, with a curious determined

set of the mouth, and eyes that flare up passionately at times. All

that is taking place around her here she seems to regard with

indifference. Only when mention is made of the great principles of the

International Revolution does she suddenly awake, her whole expression

alters; she reminds one of a beast of prey seeing its victim at hand

and preparing to fall upon it and rend it.

"After dinner I had my first long conversation with Hr. Joffe. His

whole theory is based on the idea of establishing the right of

self-determination of peoples on the broadest basis throughout the

world, and trusting to the peoples thus freed to continue in mutual

love. Joffe does not deny that the process would involve civil war

throughout the world to begin with, but he believes that such a war,

as realising the ideals of humanity, would be justified, and its end

worth all it would cost. I contented myself with telling him that he

must let Russia give proof that Bolshevism was the way to a happier

age; when he had shown this to be so, the rest of the world would be

won over to his ideals. But until his theory had been proved by

example he would hardly succeed in convincing people generally to

adopt his views. We were ready to conclude a general peace without

indemnities or annexations, and were thoroughly agreed to leave the

development of affairs in Russia thereafter to the judgment of the

Russian Government itself. We should also be willing to learn

something from Russia, and if his revolution succeeded he would force

Europe to follow him, whether we would or not. But meanwhile there was

a great deal of scepticism about, and I pointed out to him that we

should not ourselves undertake any imitation of the Russian methods,

and did not wish for any interference with our own internal affairs:

this we must strictly forbid. If he persisted in endeavouring to carry

out this Utopian plan of grafting his ideas on ourselves, he had

better go back home by the next train, for there could be no question

of making peace. Hr. Joffe looked at me in astonishment with his soft

eyes, was silent for a while, and then, in a kindly, almost imploring

tone that I shall never forget, he said: 'Still, I hope we may yet be

able to raise the revolution in your country too.'

"We shall hardly need any assistance from the good Joffe, I fancy, in

bringing about a revolution among ourselves; the people will manage

that, if the Entente persist in refusing to come to terms.

"They are strange creatures, these Bolsheviks. They talk of freedom

and the reconciliation of the peoples of the world, of peace and

unity, and withal they are said to be the most cruel tyrants history

has ever known. They are simply exterminating the bourgeoisie, and

their arguments are machine guns and the gallows. My talk to-day with

Joffe has shown me that these people are not honest, and in falsity

surpass all that cunning diplomacy has been accused of, for to oppress

decent citizens in this fashion and then talk at the same time of the

universal blessing of freedom--it is sheer lying.

"_December 21, 1917._--I went with all my party to lunch at noon with

the Prince of Bavaria. He lives in a little bit of a palace half an

hour by car from Brest. He seems to be much occupied with military

matters, and is very busy.

"I spent the first night in the train, and while we were at breakfast

our people moved in with the luggage to our residence. We are in a

small house, where I live with all the Austro-Hungarian party, quite

close to the officers' casino, and there is every comfort that could

be wished for here. I spent the afternoon at work with my people, and

in the evening there was a meeting of the delegates of the three

Powers. This evening I had the first talk with Kühlmann alone, and at

once declared positively that the Russians would propose a _general_

peace, and that we must accept it. Kühlmann is half disposed to take

my view himself; the formula, of course, will be 'no party to demand

annexations or indemnities'; then, if the Entente agree, we shall have

an end of all this suffering. But, alas! it is hardly likely that they

will.

"_December 22, 1917._--The forenoon was devoted to the first

discussion among the Allies, the principles just referred to as

discussed with Kühlmann being then academically laid down. In the

afternoon the first plenary sitting took place, the proceedings being

opened by the Prince of Bavaria and then led by Dr. Kühlmann. It was

decided that the Powers should take it in turns to preside, in order

of the Latin alphabet as to their names, i.e. Allemagne, Autriche,

etc. Dr. Kühlmann requested Hr. Joffe to tell us the principles on

which he considered a future peace should be based, and the Russian

delegate then went through the six main tenets already familiar from

the newspapers. The proposal was noted, and we undertook to give a

reply as early as possible after having discussed the matter among

ourselves. These, then, were the proceedings of the first brief

sitting of the peace congress.

"_December 23, 1917._--Kühlmann and I prepared our answer early. It

will be generally known from the newspaper reports. It cost us much

heavy work to get it done. Kühlmann is personally an advocate of

general peace, but fears the influence of the military party, who do

not wish to make peace until definitely victorious. But at last it is

done. Then there were further difficulties with the Turks. They

declared that they must insist on one thing, to wit, that the Russian

troops should be withdrawn from the Caucasus immediately on the

conclusion of peace, a proposal to which the Germans would not agree,

as this would obviously mean that they would have to evacuate Poland,

Courland, and Lithuania at the same time, to which Germany would never

consent. After a hard struggle and repeated efforts, we at last

succeeded in persuading the Turks to give up this demand. The second

Turkish objection was that Russia had not sufficiently clearly

declared its intention of refraining from all interference in internal

affairs. But the Turkish Foreign Minister agreed that internal affairs

in Austria-Hungary were an even more perilous sphere for Russian

intrigues than were the Turkish; if I had no hesitation in accepting,

he also could be content.

"The Bulgarians, who are represented by Popow, the Minister of

Justice, as their chief, and some of whom cannot speak German at all,

some hardly any French, did not get any proper idea of the whole

proceedings until later on, and postponed their decision until the

24th.

"_December 24, 1917._--Morning and afternoon, long conferences with

the Bulgarians, in the course of which Kühlmann and I on the one hand

and the Bulgarian representatives on the other, were engaged with

considerable heat. The Bulgarian delegates demanded that a clause

should be inserted exempting Bulgaria from the no-annexation

principle, and providing that the taking over by Bulgaria of Roumanian

and Serbian territory should not be regarded as annexation. Such a

clause would, of course, have rendered all our efforts null and void,

and could not under any circumstances be agreed to. The discussion was

attended with considerable excitement at times, and the Bulgarian

delegates even threatened to withdraw altogether if we did not give

way. Kühlmann and my humble self remained perfectly firm, and told

them we had no objection to their withdrawing if they pleased; they

could also, if they pleased, send their own answer separately to the

proposal, but no further alteration would be made in the draft which

we, Kühlmann and I, had drawn up. As no settlement could be arrived

at, the plenary sitting was postponed to the 25th, and the Bulgarian

delegates wired to Sofia for fresh instructions.

"The Bulgarians received a negative reply, and presumably the snub we

had expected. They were very dejected, and made no further difficulty

about agreeing to the common action. So the matter is settled as far

as that goes.

"In the afternoon I had more trouble with the Germans. The German

military party 'fear' that the Entente may, perhaps, be inclined to

agree to a general peace, and could not think of ending the war in

this 'unprofitable' fashion. It is intolerable to have to listen to

such twaddle.

"If the great victories which the German generals are hoping for on

the Western front should be realised, there will be no bounds to their

demands, and the difficulty of all negotiations will be still further

increased.

"_December 25, 1917._--The plenary sitting took place to-day, when we

gave the Russians our answer to their peace proposals. I was

presiding, and delivered the answer, and Joffe replied. _The general

offer of peace is thus to be made, and we must await the result._ In

order to lose no time, however, the negotiations on matters concerning

Russia are being continued meanwhile. We have thus made a good step

forward, and _perhaps_ got over the worst. It is impossible to say

whether yesterday may not have been a decisive turning point in the

history of the world.

"_December 26, 1917._--The special negotiations began at 9 A.M. The

programme drawn up by Kühlmann, chiefly questions of economical matters

and representation, were dealt with so rapidly and smoothly that by 11

o'clock the sitting terminated, for lack of further matter to discuss.

This is perhaps a good omen. Our people are using to-day to enter the

results of the discussion in a report of proceedings, as the sitting

is to be continued to-morrow, when territorial questions will be

brought up.

"_December 26, 1917._--I have been out for a long walk alone.

"On the way back, I met an old Jew. He was sitting in the gutter,

weeping bitterly. He did not beg, did not even look at me, only wept

and wept, and could not speak at first for sobs. And then he told me

his story--Russian, Polish, and German, all mixed together.

"Well, he had a store--heaven knows where, but somewhere in the war

zone. First came the Cossacks. They took all he had--his goats and his

clothes, and everything in the place--and then they beat him. Then the

Russians retired, beat him again, _en passant_ as it were, and then

came the Germans. They fired his house with their guns, pulled off his

boots, and beat him. Then he entered the service of the Germans,

carrying water and wood, and received his food and beatings in return.

But to-day he had got into trouble with them in some incomprehensible

fashion; no food after that, only the beatings; and was thrown into

the street.

"The beatings he referred to as something altogether natural. They

were for him the natural accompaniment to any sort of action--but he

could not live on beatings alone.

"I gave him what I had on me--money and cigars--told him the number of

my house, and said he could come to-morrow, when I could get him a

pass to go off somewhere where there were no Germans and no Russians,

and try to get him a place of some sort where he would be fed and not

beaten. He took the money and cigars thankfully enough; the story of

the railway pass and the place he did not seem to believe. Railway

travelling was for soldiers, and an existence without beatings seemed

an incredible idea.

"He kept on thanking me till I was out of sight, waving his hand, and

thanking me in his German-Russian gibberish.

"A terrible thing is war. Terrible at all times, but worst of all in

one's own country. We at home suffer hunger and cold, but at least we

have been spared up to now the presence of the enemy hordes.

"This is a curious place--melancholy, yet with a beauty of its own. An

endless flat, with just a slight swelling of the ground, like an ocean

set fast, wave behind wave as far as the eye can see. And all things

grey, dead grey, to where this dead sea meets the grey horizon. Clouds

race across the sky, the wind lashing them on.

"This evening, before supper, Hoffmann informed the Russians of the

German plans with regard to the outer provinces. The position is this:

As long as the war in the West continues, the Germans cannot evacuate

Courland and Lithuania, since, apart from the fact that they must be

held as security for the general peace negotiations, these countries

form part of the German munition establishment. The railway material,

the factories, and, most of all, the grain are indispensable as long

as the war lasts. That they cannot now withdraw from there at once is

clear enough. If peace is signed, then the self-determination of the

people in the occupied territory will decide. But here arises the

great difficulty: how this right of self-determination is to be

exercised.

"The Russians naturally do not want the vote to be taken while the

German bayonets are still in the country, and the Germans reply that

the unexampled terrorism of the Bolsheviks would falsify any election

result, since the 'bourgeois,' according to Bolshevist ideas, are not

human beings at all. My idea of having the proceedings controlled by a

_neutral_ Power was not altogether acceptable to anyone. During the

war no neutral Power would undertake the task, and the German

occupation could not be allowed to last until the ultimate end. In

point of fact, both sides are afraid of terrorisation by the opposing

party, and each wishes to apply the same itself.

"_December 26, 1917._--There is no hurry apparently in this place. Now

it is the Turks who are not ready, now the Bulgarians, then it is the

Russians' turn--and the sitting is again postponed or broken off

almost as soon as commenced.

"I am reading some memoirs from the French Revolution. A most

appropriate reading at the present time, in view of what is happening

in Russia and may perhaps come throughout Europe. There were no

Bolsheviks then, but men who tyrannised the world under the battle-cry

of freedom were to be found in Paris then as well as now in St.

Petersburg. Charlotte Corday said: 'It was not a man, but a wild beast

I killed.' These Bolsheviks in their turn will disappear, and who can

say if there will be a Corday ready for Trotski?

"Joffe told me about the Tsar and his family, and the state of things

said to exist there. He spoke with great respect of Nicolai

Nicolaievitch as a thorough man, full of energy and courage, one to be

respected even as an enemy. The Tsar, on the other hand, he considered

cowardly, false, and despicable. It was a proof of the incapacity of

the bourgeois that they had tolerated such a Tsar. Monarchs were all

of them more or less degenerate; he could not understand how anyone

could accept a form of government which involved the risk of having a

degenerate ruler. I answered him as to this, that a monarchy had first

of all one advantage, that there was at least one place in the state

beyond the sphere of personal ambition and intrigues, and as to

degeneration, that was often a matter of opinion: there were also

degenerates to be found among the uncrowned rulers of states. Joffe

considered that there would be no such risk when the people could

choose for themselves. I pointed out that Hr. Lenin, for instance, had

not been 'chosen,' and I considered it doubtful whether an impartial

election would have brought him into power. Possibly there might be

some in Russia who would consider him also degenerate.

"_December 27, 1917._--The Russians are in despair, and some of them

even talked of withdrawing altogether. They had thought the Germans

would renounce all occupied territory without further parley, or hand

it over to the Bolsheviks. Long sittings between the Russians,

Kühlmann, and myself, part of the time with Hoffmann. I drew up the

following:--

"1. As long as general peace is not yet declared, we cannot give up

the occupied areas; they form part of our great munition works

(factories, railways, sites with buildings, etc.).

"2. After the general peace, a plebiscite in Poland, Courland, and

Lithuania is to decide the fate of the people there; as to the form in

which the vote is to be taken, this remains to be further discussed,

in order that the Russians may have surety that no coercion is used.

Apparently, this suits neither party. Situation much worse.

"_Afternoon._--Matters still getting worse. Furious wire from

Hindenburg about "renunciation" of everything; Ludendorff telephoning

every minute; more furious outbursts, Hoffmann very excited, Kühlmann

true to his name and 'cool' as ever. The Russians declare they cannot

accept the vague formulas of the Germans with regard to freedom of

choice.

"I told Kühlmann and Hoffmann I would go as far as possible with them;

but should their endeavours fail, then I would enter into separate

negotiations with the Russians, since Berlin and Petersburg were

really both opposed to an uninfluenced vote. Austria-Hungary, on the

other hand, desired nothing but final peace. Kühlmann understands my

position, and says he himself would rather _go_ than let it fail.

Asked me to give him my point of view in writing, as it 'would

strengthen his position.' Have done so. He has telegraphed it to the

Kaiser.

"_Evening._--Kühlmann believes matters will be settled--or broken off

altogether--by to-morrow.

"_December 28, 1917._--General feeling, dull. Fresh outbursts of

violence from Kreuznach. But at noon a wire from Bussche: Hertling had

spoken with the Kaiser, who is perfectly satisfied. Kühlmann said to

me: 'The Kaiser is the only sensible man in the whole of Germany.'

"We have at last agreed about the form of the committee; that is, a

committee _ad hoc_ is to be formed in Brest, to work out a plan for

the evacuation and voting in detail. _Tant bien que mal_, a

provisional expedient. All home to report; next sitting to be held

January 5, 1918.

"Russians again somewhat more cheerful.

"This evening at dinner I rose to express thanks on the part of the

Russians and the four Allies to Prince Leopold. He answered at once,

and very neatly, but told me immediately afterwards that I had taken

him by surprise. As a matter of fact, I had been taken by surprise

myself; no notice had been given; it was only during the dinner itself

that the Germans asked me to speak.

"Left at 10 P.M. for Vienna.

"From the 29th to the morning of the 3rd I was in Vienna. Two long

audiences with the Emperor gave me the opportunity of telling him what

had passed at Brest. He fully approves, of course, the point of view

that peace must be made, if at all possible.

"I have dispatched a trustworthy agent to the outer provinces in order

to ascertain the exact state of feeling there. He reports that _all_

are against the Bolsheviks except the Bolsheviks themselves. The

entire body of citizens, peasants--in a word, everyone with any

possessions at all--trembles at the thought of these red robbers, and

wishes to go over to Germany. The terrorism of Lenin is said to be

indescribable, and in Petersburg all are absolutely _longing_ for the

entry of the German troops to deliver them.

"_January 3, 1918._--Return to Brest.

"On the way, at 6 P.M., I received, at a station, the following

telegram, in code, from Baron Gautsch, who had remained at Brest:

"'Russian delegation received following telegram from Petersburg

this morning: To General Hoffmann. For the representatives of the

German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish delegations. The

Government of the Russian Republic considers it necessary to carry

on the further negotiations on neutral ground, and proposes

removing to Stockholm. Regarding attitude to the proposals as

formulated by the German and Austro-Hungarian delegation in Points

1 and 2, the Government of the Russian Republic and the

Pan-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Councils of

Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies consider, in entire

agreement with the view expressed by our delegation, that the

proposals are contrary to the principle of national

self-determination, even in the restricted form in which it

appears in Point 3 of the reply given by the Four Powers on the

12th ult. President of the Russian Delegation, A. Joffe." Major

Brinkmann has communicated this by telephone to the German

delegation, already on the way here. Herr von Kühlmann has sent a

telephone message in return that he is continuing the journey, and

will arrive at Brest this evening.'

"I also went on of course, considering this manoeuvre on the part of

the Russians as rather in the nature of bluffing. If they do not come,

then we can treat with the Ukrainians, who should be in Brest by now.

"In Vienna I saw, among politicians, Baernreither, Hauser, Wekerle,

Seidler, and some few others. The opinion of almost all may be summed

up as follows: 'Peace _must_ be arranged, but a separate peace without

Germany is _impossible_.'

"No one has told me how I am to manage it if neither Germany nor

Russia will listen to reason.

"_January 4, 1918._--Fearful snowstorm in the night; the heating

apparatus in the train was frozen, and the journey consequently far

from pleasant. On awaking early at Brest the trains of the Bulgarians

and Turks were standing on adjacent sidings. Weather magnificent now:

cold, and the air as at St. Moritz. I went across to Kühlmann, had

breakfast with him, and talked over events in Berlin. There seems to

have been desperate excitement there. Kühlmann suggested to Ludendorff

that he should come to Brest himself and take part in the

negotiations. After long discussion, however, it appeared that

Ludendorff himself was not quite clear as to what he wanted, and

declared spontaneously that he considered it superfluous for him to go

to Brest; he would, at best, 'only spoil things if he did.' Heaven

grant the man such gleams of insight again, and often! It seems as if

the whole trouble is more due to feeling against Kühlmann than to

anything in the questions at issue; people do not want the world to

have the impression that the peace was gained by 'adroit diplomacy,'

but by military success alone. General Hoffmann appears to have been

received with marked favour by the Kaiser, and both he and Kühlmann

declare themselves well satisfied with the results of their journey.

"We talked over the reply to the Petersburg telegram, declining a

conference in Stockholm, and further tactics to be followed in case of

need. We agreed that if the Russians did not come, we must declare the

armistice at an end, and chance what the Petersburgers would say to

that. On this point Kühlmann and I were entirely agreed. Nevertheless,

the feeling, both in our party and in that of the Germans, was not a

little depressed. Certainly, if the Russians do break off

negotiations, it will place us in a very unpleasant position. The only

way to save the situation is by acting quickly and energetically with

the Ukrainian delegation, and we therefore commenced this work on the

afternoon of the same day. There is thus at least a hope that we may

be able to arrive at positive results with them within reasonable

time.

"In the evening, after dinner, came a wire from Petersburg announcing

the arrival of the delegation, including the Foreign Minister,

Trotski. It was interesting to see the delight of all the Germans at

the news; not until this sudden and violent outbreak of satisfaction

was it fully apparent how seriously they had been affected by the

thought that the Russians would not come. Undoubtedly this is a great

step forward, and we all feel that peace is really now on the way.

"_January 5, 1918._--At seven this morning a few of us went out

shooting with Prince Leopold of Bavaria. We went for a distance of 20

to 30 kilometres by train, and then in open automobiles to a

magnificent primeval forest extending over two to three hundred square

kilometres. Weather very cold, but fine, much snow, and pleasant

company. From the point of view of sport, it was poorer than one could

have expected. One of the Prince's aides stuck a pig, another shot two

hares, and that was all. Back at 6 P.M.

"_January 6, 1918._--To-day we had the first discussions with the

Ukrainian delegates, all of whom were present except the leader. The

Ukrainians are very different from the Russian delegates. Far less

revolutionary, and with far more interest in their own country, less

in the progress of Socialism generally. They do not really care about

Russia at all, but think only of the Ukraine, and their efforts are

solely directed towards attaining their own independence as soon as

possible. Whether that independence is to be complete and

international, or only as within the bounds of a Russian federative

state, they do not seem quite to know themselves. Evidently, the very

intelligent Ukrainian delegates intended to use us as a springboard

from which they themselves could spring upon the Bolsheviks. Their

idea was that we should acknowledge their independence, and then, with

this as a _fait accompli_, they could face the Bolsheviks and force

them to recognise their equal standing and treat with them on that

basis. Our line of policy, however, must be either to bring over the

Ukrainians to our peace basis, or else to drive a wedge between them

and the Petersburgers. As to their desire for independence, we

declared ourselves willing to recognise this, provided the Ukrainians

on their part would agree to the following three points: 1. The

negotiations to be concluded at Brest-Litovsk and not at Stockholm. 2.

Recognition of the former political frontier between Austria-Hungary

and Ukraine. 3. Non-interference of any one state in the internal

affairs of another. Characteristically enough, no answer has yet been

received to this proposal!

"_January 7, 1918._--This forenoon, all the Russians arrived, under

the leadership of Trotski. They at once sent a message asking to be

excused for not appearing at meals with the rest for the future. At

other times also we see nothing of them. The wind seems to be in a

very different quarter now from what it was. The German officer who

accompanied the Russian delegation from Dunaburg, Captain Baron

Lamezan, gave us some interesting details as to this. In the first

place, he declared that the trenches in front of Dunaburg are entirely

deserted, and save for an outpost or so there were no Russians there

at all; also, that at many stations delegates were waiting for the

deputation to pass, in order to demand that peace should be made.

Trotski had throughout answered them with polite and careful

speeches, but grew ever more and more depressed. Baron Lamezan had the

impression that the Russians were altogether desperate now, having no

choice save between going back with a bad peace or with no peace at

all; in either case with the same result: that they would be swept

away. Kühlmann said: 'Ils n'ont que le choix à quelle sauce ils se

feront manger.' I answered: 'Tout comme chez nous.'

"A wire has just come in reporting demonstrations in Budapest against

Germany. The windows of the German Consulate were broken, a clear

indication of the state of feeling which would arise if the peace were

to be lost through our demands.

"_January 8, 1918._--The Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, arrived

during the night, and has just been to call on me. He seems

emphatically in favour of making peace; but I fancy he would like, in

case of any conflict arising with Germany, to push me into the

foreground and keep out of the way himself. Talaat Pasha is one of the

cleverest heads among the Turks, and perhaps the most energetic man of

them all.

"Before the Revolution he was a minor official in the telegraph

service, and was on the revolutionary committee. In his official

capacity, he got hold of a telegram from the Government which showed

him that the revolutionary movement would be discovered and the game

be lost unless immediate action were taken. He suppressed the message,

warned the revolutionary committee, and persuaded them to start their

work at once. The coup succeeded, the Sultan was deposed, and Talaat

was made Minister of the Interior. With iron energy he then turned his

attention to the suppression of the opposing movement. Later, he

became Grand Vizier, and impersonated, together with Enver Pasha, the

will and power of Turkey.

"This afternoon, first a meeting of the five heads of the allied

delegations and the Russian. Afterwards, plenary sitting.

"The sitting postponed again, as the Ukrainians are still not ready

with their preparations. Late in the evening I had a conversation with

Kühlmann and Hoffmann, in which we agreed fairly well as to tactics. I

said again that I was ready to stand by them and hold to their demands

as far as ever possible, but in the event of Germany's breaking off

the negotiations with Russia I must reserve the right to act with a

free hand. Both appeared to understand my point of view, especially

Kühlmann, who, if he alone should decide, would certainly not allow

the negotiations to prove fruitless. As to details, we agreed to

demand continuation of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in the form

of an ultimatum.

"_January 9, 1918._--Acting on the principle that attack is the best

defence, we had determined not to let the Russian Foreign Minister

speak at all, but to go at him at once with our ultimatum.

"Trotski had prepared a long speech, and the effect of our attack was

such that he at once appealed for adjournment, urging that the altered

state of affairs called for new resolutions. The removal of the

conference to Stockholm would have meant the end of matters for us,

for it would have been utterly impossible to keep the Bolsheviks of

all countries from putting in an appearance there, and the very thing

we had endeavoured with the utmost of our power to avoid from the

start--to have the reins torn from our hands and these elements take

the lead--would infallibly have taken place. We must now wait to see

what to-morrow brings: either a victory or the final termination of

the negotiations.

"Adler said to me in Vienna: 'You will certainly get on all right with

Trotski,' and when I asked him why he thought so, he answered: 'Well,

you and I get on quite well together, you know.'

"I think, after all, the clever old man failed to appreciate the

situation there. These Bolsheviks have no longer anything in common

with Adler; they are brutal tyrants, autocrats of the worst kind, a

disgrace to the name of freedom.

"Trotski is undoubtedly an interesting, clever fellow, and a very

dangerous adversary. He is quite exceptionally gifted as a speaker,

with a swiftness and adroitness in retort which I have rarely seen,

and has, moreover, all the insolent boldness of his race.

"_January 10, 1918._--The sitting has just taken place. Trotski made a

great and, in its way, really fine speech, calculated for the whole of

Europe, in which he gave way entirely. He accepts, he says, the

German-Austria 'ultimatum,' and will remain in Brest-Litovsk, as he

will not give us the satisfaction of being able to blame Russia for

the continuance of the war.

"Following on Trotski's speech, the Committee was at once formed to

deal with the difficult questions of territory. I insisted on being on

the Committee myself, wishing to follow throughout the progress of

these important negotiations. This was not an easy matter really, as

the questions involved, strictly speaking, concern only Courland and

Lithuania, i.e., they are not our business, but Germany's alone.

"In the evening I had another long talk with Kühlmann and Hoffmann, in

the course of which the General and the Secretary of State came to

high words between themselves. Hoffmann, elated at the success of our

ultimatum to Russia, wished to go on in the same fashion and 'give the

Russians another touch of the whip.' Kühlmann and I took the opposite

view, and insisted that proceedings should be commenced quietly,

confining ourselves to the matters in hand, clearing up point by point

as we went on, and putting all doubtful questions aside. Once we had

got so far, in clearing up things generally, we could then take that

which remained together, and possibly get telegraphic instructions

from the two Emperors for dealing therewith. This is undoubtedly the

surest way to avoid disaster and a fresh breach.

"A new conflict has cropped up with the Ukrainians. They now demand

recognition of their independence, and declare they will leave if this

is not conceded.

"Adler told me at Vienna that Trotski had his library, by which he set

great store, somewhere in Vienna, with a Herr Bauer, I fancy. I told

Trotski that I would arrange to have the books forwarded to him, if

he cared about it. I then recommended to his consideration certain

prisoners of war, as L. K. and W., all of whom are said to have been

very badly treated. Trotski noted the point, declared that he was

strongly opposed to ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and promised to

look into the matter; he wished to point out, however, that in so

doing he was not in the least influenced by the thought of his

library; he would in any case have considered my request. He would be

glad to have the books.

"_January 11, 1918._--Forenoon and afternoon, long sittings of the

Committee on territorial questions. Our side is represented by

Kühlmann, Hoffmann, Rosenberg, and a secretary, in addition to myself,

Csicserics, Wiesner, and Colloredo. The Russians are all present, but

without the Ukrainians. I told Kühlmann that I only proposed to attend

as a second, seeing that the German interests were incomparably more

affected than our own. I only interpose now and again.

"Trotski made a tactical blunder this afternoon. In a speech rising to

violence, he declared that we were playing false; we aimed at

annexations, and were simply trying to cover them with the cloak of

self-determination. He would never agree to this, and would rather

break off altogether than continue in that way. If we were honest, we

should allow representatives from Poland, Courland, and Lithuania to

come to Brest, and there express their views without being influenced

in any way by ourselves. Now it should here be noted that from the

commencement of the negotiations it has been a point of conflict

whether the legislative bodies at present existing in the occupied

territories are justified in speaking in the name of their respective

peoples, or not. We affirm that they are; the Russians maintain they

are not. We at once accepted Trotski's proposal, that representatives

of these countries should be called, but added that, when we agreed to

accept their testimony, then their judgment if in our favour should be

taken as valid.

"It was characteristic to see how gladly Trotski would have taken back

what he had said. But he kept his countenance, fell in with the new

situation at once, and requested that the sitting be adjourned for

twenty-four hours, as our reply was of such far-reaching importance

that he must confer with his colleagues on the matter. I hope Trotski

will make no difficulty now. If the Poles could be called, it would be

an advantage. The awkward thing about it is that Germany, too, would

rather be without them, knowing the anti-Prussian feeling that exists

among the Poles.

"_January 12, 1918._--Radek has had a scene with the German chauffeur,

which led to something more. General Hoffmann had placed cars at the

disposal of the Russians in case they cared to drive out. On this

occasion it happened that the chauffeur was not there at the proper

time, and Radek flew into a rage with the man and abused him

violently. The chauffeur complained, and Hoffmann took his part.

Trotski seems to consider Hoffmann's action correct, and has

_forbidden_ the entire delegation to go out any more. That settled

them. And serve them right.

"No one ventured to protest. They have indeed a holy fear of Trotski.

At the sittings, too, none of them dare to speak while he is there.

"_January 12, 1918._--Hoffmann has made his unfortunate speech. He has

been working at it for days, and was very proud of the result.

Kühlmann and I did not conceal from him that he gained nothing by it

beyond exciting the people at home against us. This made a certain

impression on him, but it was soon effaced by Ludendorff's

congratulations, which followed promptly. Anyhow, it has rendered the

situation more difficult, and there was certainly no need for that.

"_January 15, 1918._--I had a letter to-day from one of our mayors at

home, calling my attention to the fact that disaster due to lack of

foodstuffs is now imminent.

"I immediately telegraphed the Emperor as follows:

"'I have just received a letter from Statthalter N.N. which

justifies all the fears I have constantly repeated to Your

Majesty, and shows that in the question of food supply we are on

the very verge of a catastrophe. The situation _arising out of the

carelessness and incapacity of the Ministers_ is terrible, and I

fear it is already too late to check the total collapse which is

to be expected in the next few weeks. My informant writes: "Only

small quantities are now being received from Hungary, from

Roumania only 10,000 wagons of maize; this gives then a decrease

of at least 30,000 wagons of grain, without which we must

infallibly perish. On learning the state of affairs, I went to the

Prime Minister to speak with him about it. I told him, as is the

case, that in a few weeks our war industries, our railway traffic,

would be at a standstill, the provisioning of the army would be

impossible, it must break down, and that would mean the collapse

of Austria and therewith also of Hungary. To each of these points

he answered yes, that is so, and added that all was being done to

alter the state of affairs, especially as regards the Hungarian

deliveries. But no one, not even His Majesty, has been able to get

anything done. We can only hope that some _deus ex machina_ may

intervene to save us from the worst.'"

"To this I added:

"'I can find no words to describe properly the apathetic attitude

of Seidler. How often and how earnestly have I not implored Your

Majesty to intervene forcibly for once and _compel_ Seidler, on

the one hand, and Hadik, on the other, to set these things in

order. Even from here I have written entreating Your Majesty to

act while there was yet time. But all in vain.'

"I then pointed out that the only way of meeting the situation would

be to secure temporary assistance from Germany, and then to

requisition by force the stocks that were doubtless still available in

Hungary; finally, I begged the Emperor to inform the Austrian Prime

Minister of my telegram.

"_January 16, 1918._--Despairing appeals from Vienna for food

supplies. Would I apply at once to Berlin for aid, otherwise disaster

imminent. I replied to General Landwehr as follows:

"'Dr. Kühlmann is telegraphing to Berlin, but has little hope of

success. The only hope now is for His Majesty to do as I have

advised, and send an urgent wire at once to Kaiser Wilhelm. On my

return I propose to put before His Majesty my point of view, that

it is impossible to carry on the foreign policy if the food

question at home is allowed to come to such a state as now.

"'Only a few weeks back your Excellency declared most positively

that we could hold out till the new harvest.'

"At the same time I wired the Emperor:

"'Telegrams arriving show the situation becoming critical for us.

Regarding question of food, we can only avoid collapse on two

conditions: first, that Germany helps us temporarily, second, that

we use this respite to set in order our machinery of food supply,

which is at present beneath contempt, and to gain possession of

the stocks still existing in Hungary.

"'I have just explained the entire situation to Dr. Kühlmann, and

he is telegraphing to Berlin. He, however, is not at all sanguine,

as Germany is itself in straitened circumstances. I think the only

way to secure any success from this step would be for Your Majesty

to send at once, through military means, a Hughes telegram to

Kaiser Wilhelm direct, urgently entreating him to intervene

himself, and by securing us a supply of grain prevent the outbreak

of revolution, which would otherwise be inevitable. I must,

however, emphatically point out that the commencement of unrest

among our people at home will have rendered conclusion of peace

here absolutely impossible. As soon as the Russian representatives

perceive that we ourselves are on the point of revolution, they

will not make peace at all, since their entire speculation is

based on this factor.'

"_January 17, 1918._--Bad news from Vienna and environs: serious

strike movement, due to the reduction of the flour rations and the

tardy progress of the Brest negotiations. The weakness of the Vienna

Ministry seems to be past all understanding.

"I have telegraphed to Vienna that I hope in time to secure some

supplies from the Ukraine, if only we can manage to keep matters quiet

at home for the next few weeks, and I have begged the gentlemen in

question to do their utmost not to wreck the peace here. On the same

day, in the evening, I telegraphed to Dr. von Seidler, the Prime

Minister:

"'I very greatly regret my inability to counteract the effect of

all the errors made by those entrusted with the food resources.

"'Germany declares categorically that it is unable to help us,

having insufficient for itself.

"'Had your Excellency or your department called attention to the

state of things _in time_, it might still have been possible to

procure supplies from Roumania. As things are now, I can see no

other way than that of brute force, by requisitioning Hungarian

grain for the time being, and forwarding it to Austria, until the

Roumanian, and it is to be hoped also Ukrainian, supplies can come

to hand.'

[Illustration: GENERAL HOFFMANN (on right) WITH MAJ. BRINKMANN]

"_January 20, 1918._--The negotiations have now come to this: that

Trotski declares his intention of laying the German proposals before

Petersburg, though he cannot accept them himself; he undertakes, in

any case, to return here. As to calling in representatives from the

outer provinces, he will only do this provided he is allowed to choose

them. We cannot agree to this. With the Ukrainians, who, despite their

youth, are showing themselves quite sufficiently grown to profit by

the situation, negotiations are proceeding but slowly. First they

demanded East Galicia for the new 'Ukrainia.' This could not be

entertained for a moment. Then they grew more modest, but since the

outbreak of trouble at home among ourselves they realise our position,

and know that we _must_ make peace in order to get corn. Now they

demand a separate position for East Galicia. The question will have to

be decided in Vienna, and the Austrian Ministry will have the final

word.

"Seidler and Landwehr again declare by telegram that without supplies

of grain from Ukraine the catastrophe is imminent. There _are_

supplies in the Ukraine; if we can get them, the worst may be avoided.

"The position now is this: Without help from outside, we shall,

according to Seidler, have thousands perishing in a few weeks. Germany

and Hungary are no longer sending anything. All messages state that

there is a great surplus in Ukraine. The question is only whether we

can get it in time. I hope we may. But if we do not make peace _soon_,

then the troubles at home will be repeated, and each demonstration in

Vienna will render peace here most costly to obtain, for Messrs.

Sewrjuk and Lewicky can read the degree of our state of famine at

home from these troubles as by a thermometer. If only the people who

create these disturbances know how they are by that very fact

increasing the difficulty of procuring supplies from Ukraine! And we

were all but finished!

"The question of East Galicia I will leave to the Austrian Ministry;

it must be decided in Vienna. I cannot, and dare not, look on and see

hundreds of thousands starve for the sake of retaining the sympathy of

the Poles, so long as there is a possibility of help.

"_January 21, 1918._--Back to Vienna. The impression of the troubles

here is even greater than I thought, and the effect disastrous. The

Ukrainians no longer treat with us: they _dictate_!

"On the way, reading through old reports, I came upon the notes

relating to the discussions with Michaelis on August 1. According to

these, Under-Secretary of State von Stumm said at the time:

"'The Foreign Ministry was in communication with the Ukrainians, and

the separatist movement in Ukrainia was very strong. In furtherance of

their movement, the Ukrainians demanded the assurance that they should

be allowed to unite with the Government of Cholm, and with the areas

of East Galicia occupied by Ukrainians. So long as Galicia belongs to

Austria, the demand for East Galicia cannot be conceded. It would be

another matter if Galicia were united with Poland; then a cession of

East Galicia might be possible.'

"It would seem that the unpleasant case had long since been prejudged

by the Germans.

"On January 22 the Council was held which was to determine the issue

of the Ukrainian question. The Emperor opened the proceedings, and

then called on me to speak. I described first of all the difficulties

that lay in the way of a peace with Petersburg, which will be apparent

from the foregoing entries in this diary. I expressed my doubt as to

whether our group would succeed in concluding general peace with

Petersburg. I then sketched the course of the negotiations with the

Ukrainians. I reported that the Ukrainians had originally demanded the

cession of East Galicia, but that I had refused this. With regard to

the Ruthenian districts of Hungary also they had made demands which

had been refused by me. At present, they demanded the division of

Galicia into two parts, and the formation of an independent Austrian

province from East Galicia and Bukovina. I pointed out the serious

consequences which the acceptance of the Ukrainian demands would have

upon the further development of the Austro-Polish question. The

concessions made by the Ukrainians on their part were to consist in

the inclusion in the peace treaty of a commercial agreement which

should enable us to cover our immediate needs in the matter of grain

supplies. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary would insist on full

reciprocity for the Poles resident in Ukraine.

"I pointed out emphatically that I considered it my duty to state the

position of the peace negotiations; that the decision could not lie

with me, but with the Ministry as a whole, in particular with the

Austrian Prime Minister. The Austrian Government would have to decide

whether these sacrifices could be made or not, and here I could leave

them in no doubt that if we declined the Ukrainian demands we should

probably come to no result with that country, and should thus be

compelled to return from Brest-Litovsk without having achieved any

peace settlement at all.

"When I had finished, the Prime Minister, Dr. von Seidler, rose to

speak. He pointed out first of all the necessity of an immediate

peace, and then discussed the question of establishing a Ukrainian

crown land, especially from the parliamentary point of view. Seidler

believed that despite the active opposition which was to be expected

from the Poles, he would still have a majority of two-thirds in the

House for the acceptance of the bill on the subject. He was not blind

to the fact that arrangement would give rise to violent parliamentary

conflicts, but repeated his hope that a two-thirds majority could be

obtained despite the opposition of the Polish Delegation. After

Seidler came the Hungarian Prime Minister, Dr. Wekerle. He was

particularly pleased to note that no concessions had been made to the

Ukrainians with regard to the Ruthenians resident in Hungary. A clear

division of the nationalities in Hungary was impracticable. The

Hungarian Ruthenians were also at too low a stage of culture to enable

them to be given national independence. Dr. Wekerle also laid stress

on the danger, alike in Austria, of allowing any interference from

without; the risk of any such proceeding would be very great, we

should find ourselves on a downward grade by so doing, and we must

hold firmly to the principle that no interference in the affairs of

the Monarchy from without could be tolerated. In summing up, however,

Wekerle opposed the point of view of the Austrian Prime Minister.

"I then rose again to speak, and declared that I was perfectly aware

of the eminent importance and perilous aspects of this step. It was

true that it would bring us on to a down-grade, but from all

appearances, we had been in that position already for a long time,

owing to the war, and could not say how far it might lead us. I put

the positive question to Dr. Wekerle, what was a responsible leader of

our foreign policy to do when the Austrian Prime Minister and both the

Ministers of Food unanimously declared that the Hungarian supplies

would only suffice to help us over the next two months, after which

time a collapse would be absolutely unavoidable, unless we could

secure assistance from somewhere in the way of corn? On being

interrupted here by a dissentient observation from Dr. Wekerle, I told

him that if he, Wekerle, could bring corn into Austria I should be the

first to support his point of view, and that with pleasure, but so

long as he stood by his categorical denial, and insisted on his

inability to help us, we were in the position of a man on the third

floor of a burning house who jumps out of the window to save himself.

A man in such a situation would not stop to think whether he risked

breaking his legs or not; he would prefer the risk of death to the

certainty of the same. If the position really were as stated, that in

a couple of months we should be altogether without food supplies, then

we must take the consequences of such a position. Dr. von Seidler

here once more took up the discussion, and declared himself entirely

in agreement with my remarks.

"During the further course of the debate, the probability of a

definitive failure of the Austro-Polish solution in connection with

the Ukrainian peace was discussed, and the question was raised as to

what new constellation would arise out of such failure. Sektionschef

Dr. Gratz then took up this question. Dr. Gratz pointed out that the

Austro-Polish solution must fail even without acceptance of the

Ukrainian demands, since the German postulates rendered solution

impossible. The Germans demanded, apart from quite enormous

territorial reductions of Congress-Poland, the restriction of Polish

industry, part possession of the Polish railways and State domains, as

well as the imposition of part of the costs of war upon the Poles. We

could not attach ourselves to a Poland thus weakened, hardly, indeed,

capable of living at all, and necessarily highly dissatisfied with its

position. Dr. Gratz maintained that it would be wiser to come back to

the programme already discussed in general form; the project, by which

United Poland should be left to Germany, and the attachment of

Roumania to the Monarchy in consequence. Dr. Gratz went at length into

the details of this point of view. The Emperor then summed up the

essence of the opinions expressed to-day as indicating that it was

primarily necessary to make peace with Petersburg and the Ukrainians,

and that negotiations should be entered upon with Ukrainia as to the

division of Galicia. The question as to whether the Austro-Polish

solution should be definitely allowed to drop was not finally settled,

but shelved for the time being.

"In conclusion, Dr. Burian, the Minister of Finance, rose to speak,

and pointed out, as Dr. Wekerle had done, the danger of the Austrian

standpoint. Burian declared that, while the war might doubtless change

the internal structure of the Monarchy, such alteration must be made

from within, not from without, if it were to be of any benefit to the

Monarchy at all. He further pointed out that if the Austrian principle

of the division of Galicia were to be carried through, the _form_ of

so doing would be of great importance. Baron Burian advised that a

clause referring to this should be inserted, not in the instrument of

peace itself, but in a secret annexe. This form was, in his, Burian's,

view, the only possible means of diminishing the serious consequences

of the steps which the Austrian Government wished to take."

Thus the notes in my diary relative to this Council. The Austrian

Government was thus not only agreed as to the proposed arrangement

with the Ukraine; it was indeed at the direct wish of the Government,

by its instigation and on its responsibility, that it was brought

about.

"_January 28, 1918._--Reached Brest this evening.

"_January 29, 1918._--Trotski arrived.

"_January 30, 1918._--The first plenary session has been held. There

is no doubt that the revolutionary happenings in Austria and in

Germany have enormously raised the hopes of the Petersburgers for a

general convulsion, and it seems to me altogether out of the question

now to come to any peace terms with the Russians. It is evident among

the Russians themselves that they positively expect the outbreak of a

world-revolution within the next few weeks, and their tactics now are

simply to gain time and wait for this to happen. The conference was

not marked by any particular event, only pin-pricks between Kühlmann

and Trotski. To-day is the first sitting of the Committee on

territorial questions, where I am to preside, and deal with our

territorial affairs.

"The only interesting point about the new constellation seems to be

that the relations between Petersburg and Kieff are considerably worse

than before, and the Kieff Committee is no longer recognised at all by

the Bolsheviks as independent.

"_February 1, 1918._--Sitting of the Territorial Committee, I myself

presiding, with the Petersburg Russians. My plan is to play the

Petersburgers and the Ukrainians one against the other, and manage at

least to make peace with one of the two parties. I have still some

slight hope that a peace with one may so affect the other that

possibly peace with both may be attained.

"As was to be expected, Trotski replied to my question, whether he

admitted that the Ukrainians should treat with us alone on questions

dealing with their frontiers, with an emphatic denial. I then, after

some exchange of words, proposed that the sitting be adjourned, and a

plenary sitting convened, in order that the matter might be dealt with

by the Kieff and Petersburg parties together.

"_February 2, 1918._--I have tried to get the Ukrainians to talk over

things openly with the Russians, and succeeded almost too well. The

insults hurled by the Ukrainians to-day against the Russians were

simply grotesque, and showed what a gulf is fixed between these two

Governments, and that it is not our fault that we have not been able

to bring them together under one hat on the question of peace. Trotski

was so upset it was painful to see. Perfectly pale, he stared fixedly

before him, drawing nervously on his blotting paper. Heavy drops of

sweat trickled down his forehead. Evidently he felt deeply the

disgrace of being abused by his fellow-citizens in the presence of the

enemy.

"The two brothers Richthofen were here a little while ago. The elder

has shot down some sixty, the younger 'only' some thirty enemy

airmen. The elder's face is like that of a young and pretty girl. He

told me 'how the thing is done.' It is very simple. Only get as near

to the enemy as possible, from behind, and then keep on shooting,

when the other man would fall. The one thing needful was to 'get over

your own fright,' and not be shy of getting quite close to your

opponent.--Modern heroes.

"Two charming stories were told about these two brothers. The English

had put a price on the head of the elder Richthofen. When he learned

of this, he sent down broadsheets informing them that to make matters

easier for them, he would from the following day have his machine

painted bright red. Next morning, going to the shed, he found all the

machines there painted bright red. One for all and all for one.

"The other story is this: Richthofen and an English airman were

circling round each other and firing furiously. They came closer and

closer, and soon they could distinctly see each other's faces.

Suddenly something went wrong with Richthofen's machine-gun, and he

could not shoot. The Englishman looked across in surprise, and seeing

what was wrong, waved his hand, turned and flew off. Fair play! I

should like to meet that Englishman, only to tell him that he is

greater, to my mind, than the heroes of old.

"_February 3, 1918._--Started for Berlin. Kühlmann, Hoffmann,

Colloredo.

"_February 4, 1918._--Arrived Berlin. Nothing this afternoon, as the

Germans are holding council among themselves.

"_February 5, 1918._--Sitting all day. I had several violent passages

of arms with Ludendorff. Matters seemed to be clearing up, though this

is not yet altogether done. Apart from deciding on our tactics for

Brest, we have at last to set down _in writing_ that we are only

obliged to fight for the pre-war possessions of Germany. Ludendorff

was violently opposed to this, and said, 'If Germany makes peace

without profit, then Germany has lost the war.'

"The controversy was growing more and more heated, when Hertling

nudged me and whispered: 'Leave him alone, we two will manage it

together without him.'

"I am now going to work out the draft at once and send it in to

Hertling.

"Supper this evening at Höhenlohe.

"_February 6, 1918._--Arrived Brest this evening. Wiesner has been at

it untiringly and done excellent work; the situation, too, is easier

now. The leader of the Austrian Ruthenians, Nikolay Wassilko, arrived

yesterday, and albeit evidently excited by the part his

Russian-Ukrainian comrades are playing at Brest, speaks nationally,

far more chauvinistically than when I thought I knew him in Vienna,

and we have at last agreed on the minimum of the Ukrainian demands. I

gave as my advice in Berlin that we should try to finish with the

Ukrainians as soon as possible. I could then in the name of Germany

commence negotiations with Trotski, and try if I could not get speech

with him privately, and find out whether any agreement were possible

or not. It is Gratz's idea. After some opposition we agreed.

"_February 7, 1918._--My conversation with Trotski took place. I took

Gratz with me; he has far exceeded all my expectations of him. I began

by telling Trotski that a breach of the regulations and a resumption

of hostilities were imminent, and wished to know if this could not be

avoided before the fatal step were definitely taken. I therefore

begged Herr Trotski to inform me openly and without reserve what

conditions he would accept. Trotski then declared very frankly and

clearly that he was not so simple as we appeared to think, that he

knew well enough force was the strongest of all arguments, and that

the Central Powers were quite capable of taking away the Russian

provinces. He had several times tried to bridge a way for Kühlmann

during the conference, telling him it was not a question of the right

of self-determination of the peoples in the occupied districts, but of

sheer brutal annexation, and that he must give way to force. He would

never relinquish his principles, and would never give his consent to

this interpretation of the right of self-determination. The Germans

must say straight out what were the boundaries they demanded, and he

would then make clear to all Europe that it was a brutal annexation

and nothing else, but that Russia was too weak to oppose it. Only the

Moon Sound Islands seemed to be more than he could swallow. Secondly,

and this is very characteristic, Trotski said he could never agree to

our making peace with the Ukraine, since the Ukraine was no longer in

the hands of its Rada, but in the hands of his troops. It was a part

of Russia, and to make peace with it would be interfering in the

internal affairs of Russia itself. The fact of the matter seems to be

that about nineteen days ago the Russian troops really did enter

Kieff, but were subsequently driven out, the Rada once more coming

into power as before. Whether Trotski was unaware of this latter

development or purposely concealed the truth I cannot say for certain,

but it seems as if the former were the case.

"The last hope of coming to an understanding with Petersburg has

vanished. An appeal from the Petersburg Government to the German

soldiers has been discovered in Berlin, inciting them to revolt, to

murder the Kaiser and their generals, and unite with the soviets.

Following on this came a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm to Kühlmann

ordering him to terminate negotiations at once, by demanding, besides

Courland and Lithuania, also the unoccupied territories of Livonia and

Esthonia--all without regard to the right of self-determination of the

peoples concerned.

"The dastardly behaviour of these Bolsheviks renders negotiation

impossible. I cannot blame Germany for being incensed at such

proceedings, but the instructions from Berlin are hardly likely to be

carried out. We do not want to drag in Livonia and Esthonia.

"_February 8, 1918._--This evening the peace with Ukraine is to be

signed. The first peace in this terrible war. I wonder if the Rada is

still really sitting at Kieff? Wassilko showed me a Hughes message

dated 6th inst. from Kieff to the Ukrainian delegation here, and

Trotski has declined my suggestion to dispatch an officer of the

Austrian General Staff to the spot, in order to bring back reliable

information. Evidently, then, his assertion that the Bolsheviks were

already masters of Kieff was only a ruse. Gratz informs me, by the

way, that Trotski, with whom he spoke early this morning, is much

depressed at our intention of concluding peace with Ukraine to-day

after all. This confirms me in my purpose of having it signed. Gratz

has convened a meeting with the Petersburgers for to-morrow; this will

clear matters up, and show us whether any agreement is possible, or if

we must break off altogether. In any case, there can be no doubt that

the intermezzo at Brest is rapidly nearing its end."

After conclusion of peace with Ukraine, I received the following

telegram from the Emperor:

"'_Court train, February 9, 1918._

"'Deeply moved and rejoiced to learn of the conclusion of peace

with Ukraine. I thank you, dear Count Czernin, from my heart for

your persevering and successful endeavours.

"'You have thereby given me the happiest day of my hitherto far

from happy reign, and I pray God Almighty that He may further

continue to aid you on your difficult path--to the benefit of the

Monarchy and of our peoples.

KARL.'

"_February 11, 1918._--Trotski declines to sign. The war is over, but

there is no peace.

"The disastrous effects of the troubles in Vienna will be seen clearly

from the following message from Herr von Skrzynski, dated Montreux,

February 12, 1918. Skrzynski writes:

"'I learn from a reliable source that France has issued the

following notification: We were already quite disposed to enter

into discussion with Austria. Now we are asking ourselves whether

Austria is still sound enough for the part it was intended to give

her. One is afraid of basing an entire policy upon a state which

is perhaps already threatened with the fate of Russia.' And

Skrzynski adds: 'During the last few days I have heard as follows:

It has been decided to wait for a while.'"

Our position, then, during the negotiations with Petersburg was as

follows: We could not induce Germany to resign the idea of Courland

and Lithuania. We had not the physical force to do so. The pressure

exerted by the Supreme Army Command on the one hand and the shifty

tactics of the Russians made this impossible. We had then to choose

between leaving Germany to itself, and signing a separate peace, or

acting together with our three Allies and finishing with a peace

including the covert annexation of the Russian outer provinces.

The former alternative involved the serious risk of making a breach in

the Quadruple Alliance, where some dissension was already apparent.

The Alliance could no longer stand such experiments. We were faced

with the final military efforts now, and the unity of the Allies must

not in any case be further shaken. On the other hand, the danger that

Wilson, the only statesman in the world ready to consider the idea of

a peace on mutual understanding, might from the conclusion of such a

peace obtain an erroneous impression as to our intentions. I hoped

then, and I was not deceived, that this eminently clever man would

see through the situation and recognise that we were forced to act

under pressure of circumstances. His speeches delivered after the

peace at Brest confirmed my anticipation.

The peace with Ukraine was made under pressure of imminent famine. And

it bears the characteristic marks of such a birth. That is true. But

it is no less true that despite the fact of our having obtained far

less from Ukraine than we had hoped, we should, without these

supplies, have been unable to carry on at all until the new harvest.

Statistics show that during the spring and summer of 1918 42,000

wagon-loads were received from the Ukraine. It would have been

impossible to procure these supplies from anywhere else. Millions of

human beings were thus saved from death by starvation--and let those

who sit in judgment on the peace terms bear this in mind.

It is also beyond doubt that with the great stocks available in

Ukraine, an incomparably greater quantity could have been brought into

Austria if the collecting and transport apparatus had worked

differently.

The Secretary of State for Food Supplies has, at my request, in May,

1919, furnished me with the following statistical data for

publication:

Brief survey of the organisation of corn imports from Ukraine (on

terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace) and the results of same:

When, after great efforts, a suitable agreement had been arrived

at with Germany as to the apportionment of the Ukrainian supplies,

a mission was dispatched to Kieff, in which not only Government

officials but also the best qualified and most experienced experts

which the Government could procure were represented.

Germany and Hungary had also sent experts, among them being

persons with many years of experience in the Russian grain

business, and had been in the employ of both German and Entente

grain houses (as, for instance, the former representative of the

leading French corn merchants, the house of Louis Dreyfuss).

The official mission arrived at Kieff by the middle of March, and

commenced work at once. A comparatively short time sufficed to

show that the work would present quite extraordinary difficulties.

The Ukrainian Government, which had declared at Brest-Litovsk that

very great quantities, probably about one million tons, of

surplus foodstuffs were ready for export, had in the meantime

been replaced by another Ministry. The Cabinet then in power

evinced no particular inclination, or at any rate no hurry, to

fulfil obligations on this scale, but was more disposed to point

out that it would be altogether impossible, for various reasons,

to do so.

Moreover, the Peace of Brest had provided for a regular exchange

system, bartering load by load of one article against another. But

neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary was even approximately in a

position to furnish the goods (textiles especially were demanded)

required in exchange.

We had then to endeavour to obtain the supplies on credit, and the

Ukrainian Government agreed, after long and far from easy

negotiations, to provide _credit valuta_ (against vouchers for

mark and krone in Berlin and Vienna). The arrangements for this

were finally made, and the two Central Powers drew in all 643

million karbowanez.

The Rouble Syndicate, however, which had been formed under the

leadership of the principal banks in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest,

was during the first few months only able to exert a very slight

activity. Even the formation of this syndicate was a matter of

great difficulty, and in particular a great deal of time was lost;

and even then the apparatus proved very awkward to work with.

Anyhow, it had only procured comparatively small sums of roubles,

so that the purchasing organisation in Ukraine, especially at

first, suffered from a chronic lack of means of payment.

But, in any case, a better arrangement of the money question would

only have improved matters in a few of the best supplied

districts, for the principal obstacle was simply _the lack of

supplies_. The fact that Kieff and Odessa were themselves

continually in danger of a food crisis is the best indication as

to the state of things.

In the Ukraine, the effects of four years of war, with the

resulting confusion, and of the destruction wrought by the

Bolsheviks (November, 1917, to March, 1918) were conspicuously

apparent; cultivation and harvesting had suffered everywhere, but

where supplies had existed they had been partly destroyed, partly

carried off by the Bolsheviks on their way northward. Still, the

harvest had given certain stocks available in the country, though

these were not extensive, and the organisation of a purchasing

system was now commenced. The free buying in Ukraine which we and

Germany had originally contemplated could not be carried out in

fact, since the Ukrainian Government declared that it would itself

set up this organisation, and maintained this intention with the

greatest stubbornness. But the authority in the country had been

destroyed by the Revolution, and then by the Bolshevist invasion;

the peasantry turned Radical, and the estates were occupied by

revolutionaries and cut up. The power of the Government, then, in

respect of collecting supplies of grain, was altogether

inadequate; on the other hand, however, it was still sufficient

(as some actual instances proved) to place serious, indeed

insuperable, obstacles in our way. It was necessary, therefore, to

co-operate with the Government--that is, to come to a compromise

with it. After weeks of negotiation this was at last achieved, by

strong diplomatic pressure, and, accordingly, the agreement of

April 23, 1918, was signed.

This provided for the establishment of a German-Austro-Hungarian

Economical Central Commission; practically speaking, a great firm

of corn merchants, in which the Central Powers appointed a number

of their most experienced men, familiar, through years of activity

in the business, with Russian grain affairs.

But while this establishment was still in progress the people in

Vienna (influenced by the occurrences on the Emperor's journey to

North Bohemia) had lost patience; military leaders thought it no

longer advisable to continue watching the operations of a _civil_

commercial undertaking in Ukraine while that country was occupied

by the military, and so finally the General Staff elicited a

decree from the Emperor providing that the procuring of grain

should be entrusted to Austro-Hungarian army units in the

districts occupied by them. To carry out this plan a general, who

had up to that time been occupied in Roumania, was dispatched to

Odessa, and now commenced independent military proceedings from

there. For payment kronen were used, drawn from Vienna. The War

Grain Transactions department was empowered, by Imperial

instructions to the Government, to place 100 million kronen at the

disposal of the War Ministry, and this amount was actually set

aside by the finance section of that department.

This military action and its execution very seriously affected the

civil action during its establishment, and also greatly impaired

the value of our credit in the Ukraine by offering kronen notes to

such an extent at the time. Moreover, the kronen notes thus set in

circulation in Ukraine were smuggled into Sweden, and coming thus

into the Scandinavian and Dutch markets undoubtedly contributed to

the well-known fall in the value of the krone which took place

there some months later.

The Austro-Hungarian military action was received with great

disapproval by the _Germans_, and when in a time of the greatest

scarcity among ourselves (mid-May) we were obliged to ask Germany

for temporary assistance, this was granted only on condition that

independent military action on the part of Austria-Hungary should

be suppressed and the whole leadership in Ukraine be entrusted to

Germany.

It was then hoped that increased supplies might be procured,

especially from Bessarabia, where the Germans have established a

collecting organisation, to the demand of which the Roumanian

Government had agreed. This hope, however, also proved vain, and

in June and July the Ukraine was still further engaged. The

country was, in fact, almost devoid of any considerable supplies,

and in addition to this the collecting system never really worked

properly at all, as the arrangement for maximum prices was

frequently upset by overbidding on the part of our own military

section.

Meantime everything had been made ready for getting in the harvest

of 1918. The collecting organisation had become more firmly

established and extended, the necessary personal requirements were

fully complied with, and _it would doubtless have been possible to

bring great quantities out of the country_. But first of all the

demands of the Ukrainian cities had to be met, and there was in

many cases a state of real famine there; then came the Ukrainian

and finally the very considerable contingents of German and

Austro-Hungarian armies of occupation. Not until supplies for

these groups had been assured would the Ukrainian Government allow

any export of grain, and to this we were forced to agree.

It was at once evident that the degree of cultivation throughout

the whole country had seriously declined--owing to the entire

uncertainty of property and rights after the agrarian revolution.

The local authorities, affected by this state of things, were

little inclined to agree to export, and it actually came to local

embargoes, one district prohibiting the transfer of its stocks to

any other, exactly as we had experienced with ourselves.

In particular, however, the agitation of the Entente agents (which

had been frequently perceptible before), under the impression of

the German military defeats, was most seriously felt. The position

of the Government which the Germans had set up at Kieff was

unusually weak. Moreover, the ever-active Bolshevik elements

throughout the whole country were now working with increasing

success against our organisation. All this rendered the work more

difficult in September and October--and then came the collapse.

The difficulties of transport, too, were enormous; supplies had

either to be sent to the Black Sea, across it and up the Danube,

or straight through Galicia. For this we often lacked sufficient

wagons, and in the Ukraine also coal; there were, in addition,

often instances of resistance on the part of the local railways,

incited by the Bolsheviks, and much more of the same sort.

However great the lack of supplies in Ukraine itself, however much

the limitations of our Russian means of payment may have

contributed to the fact that the hopes entertained on the signing

of peace at Brest-Litovsk were far from being realised, we may

nevertheless maintain that _all that was humanly possible_ was

done to overcome the unprecedented difficulties encountered. And

in particular, by calling in the aid of the most capable and

experienced firms of grain merchants, the forces available were

utilised to the utmost degree.

Finally it should perhaps be pointed out that the import

organisation--apart from the before-mentioned interference of the

military department and consequent fluctuations of the system--was

largely upset by very extensive smuggling operations, carried on

more particularly from Galicia. As such smuggling avoided the high

export duty, the maximum prices appointed by the Ukrainian

Government were constantly being overbid. This smuggling was also

in many cases assisted by elements from Vienna; altogether the

nervousness prevailing in many leading circles in Vienna, and

frequently criticising our own organisation in public, or

upsetting arrangements before they could come into operation, did

a great deal of damage. It should also be mentioned that Germany

likewise carried on a great deal of unofficially assisted

smuggling, with ill effects on the official import organisation,

and led to similar conditions on our own side.

Despite all obstacles, the machinery established, as will be seen

from the following survey, nevertheless succeeded in getting not

inconsiderable quantities of foodstuffs into the states concerned,

amounting in all to about 42,000 wagons, though unfortunately the

quantities delivered did not come up to the original expectations.

SURVEY OF THE IMPORTS FROM UKRAINE DATING FROM COMMENCEMENT OF

IMPORTATION (SPRING, 1918) TO NOVEMBER, 1918.

I. Foodstuffs obtained by the War Grain Transactions Department

(corn, cereal products, leguminous fruits, fodder, seeds):

Total imported for the contracting states

(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) 113,421 tons

Of which Austria-Hungary received 57,382 "

Grain and flour amounting to 46,225 "

II. Articles obtained by the Austrian Central Purchasing Company:

Of which

Austria-Hungary

Total received:

Butter, fat, bacon 3,329,403 kg. 2,170,437 kg.

Oil, edible oils 1,802,847 " 977,105 "

Cheese, curds 420,818 " 325,103 "

Fish, preserved fish, herrings 1,213,961 " 473,561 "

Cattle 105,542 head 55,421 head

(36,834,885 kg.) (19,505,760 kg.)

Horses 98,976 head 40,027 head

(31,625,172 kg.) (13,165,725 kg.)

Salted meat 2,927,439 " 1,571,569 "

Eggs 75,200 boxes 32,433 boxes

Sugar 66,809,969 kg. 24,973,443 kg.

Various foodstuffs 27,385,095 " 7,836,287 "

------------- -------------

Total 172,349,556 " 61,528,220 "

and 75,200 boxes and 32,433 boxes

eggs eggs

(Total, 30,757 wagons) (Total, 13,037 wagons)

The goods imported under II. represent a value of roughly 450

_million kronen_.

The quantities _smuggled_ unofficially into the states concerned

are estimated at about 15,000 wagons (about half the official

imports).

So ended this phase, a phase which seemed important while we were

living through it, but which was yet nothing but a phase of no great

importance after all, since it produced no lasting effect.

The waves of war have passed over the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, washing

it away as completely as a castle of sand on the shore is destroyed by

the incoming tide.

Long after I was reproached by the Polish element in the Herrenhaus,

who asserted that I had proved my incapability by my own confession

that the Peace of Brest had not withstood the test of subsequent

events. But should I have shown more capability by asserting, after

the collapse of the Central Powers, that the peace still existed?

The term "bread peace" (_Brotfrieden_) was not coined by me, but by

Burgemeister Weisskirchner on the occasion of my reception by the

Gemeinderat of Vienna at the Nordbahnhof. The millions whose lives

were saved by those 42,000 wagon-loads of food may repeat the words

without a sneer.