POLAND
1
By letters patent November 5, 1916, both the Emperors declared
Poland's existence as a Kingdom.
When I came into office, I found the situation to be that the Poles
were annoyed with my predecessor because, they declared, Germany had
wanted to cede the newly created kingdom of Poland to us, and Count
Burian had rejected the offer. Apparently there is some
misunderstanding in this version of the case, as Burian says it is not
correctly rendered.
There were three reasons that made the handling of the Polish question
one of the greatest difficulty. The first was the totally different
views of the case held by competent individuals of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy. While the Austrian Ministry was in favour of the so-called
Austro-Polish solution, Count Tisza was strongly opposed to it. His
standpoint was that the political structure of the Monarchy ought not
to undergo any change through the annexation of Poland, and that Poland
eventually might be joined to the Monarchy as an Austrian province, but
never as a partner in a tripartite Monarchy.
A letter that he wrote to me from Budapest on February 22, 1917, was
characteristic of his train of thought. It was as follows:
YOUR EXCELLENCY,--Far be it from me to raise a discussion on
questions which to-day are without actual value and most probably
will not assume any when peace is signed. On the other hand, I
wish to avoid the danger that might arise from mistaken
conclusions drawn from the fact that I accepted without protest
certain statements that appeared in the correspondence of our
diplomatic representatives.
Guided exclusively by this consideration, I beg to draw the
attention of Your Excellency to the fact that the so-called
Austro-Polish solution of the Polish question has repeatedly (as
in telegram Nr. 63 from Herr von Ugron) been referred to as the
"tripartite solution."
With reference to this appellation I am compelled to point out the
fact that in the first period of the war, at a time when the
Austro-Polish solution was in the foreground, all competent
circles in the Monarchy were agreed that the annexation of Poland
to the Monarchy must on no account affect its _dualistic
structure_.
This principle was distinctly recognised by the then leaders in
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as also by both Prime Ministers;
it was also recognised and sanctioned by His late Majesty the
Emperor and King Francis Joseph. I trust I may assume that this
view is shared by Your Excellency; in any case, and to avoid
misunderstanding, I must state that the Royal Hungarian Government
considers this to be the ground-pillar of its entire political
system, from which, in no circumstances, would it be in a position
to deviate.
It would, in our opinion, be fatal for the whole Monarchy. The
uncertainty of the situation lies in the Austrian State, where the
German element, after the separation of Galicia, would be in a
very unsafe position, confronted by powerful tendencies that
easily might gain the upper hand should a relatively small number
of the Germans, whether from social-democratic,
political-reactionary or doctrinary reasons, separate from the
other German parties. The establishment of the new Polish element
as a third factor with Austria-Hungary in our constitutional
organism would represent an element so unsafe, and would be
combined with such risks for the further development of the policy
of the Habsburg Great Power, that, in view of the position of the
Monarchy as such, I should feel the greatest anxiety lest the new
and unreliable Russian-Polish element, so different from us in
many respects, should play too predominant a part.
The firm retention of dualism, according to which half the
political influence on general subjects rests with Hungary, and
_the Hungarian and German element in common furnish a safe
majority_ in the delegation, alone can secure for the dynasty and
the two States under its sceptre an adequate guarantee for the
future.
There is no other factor in the Monarchy whose every vital
interest is so bound up in the dynasty and in the position of the
Monarchy as a Great Power, as Hungary. The few people whose clear
perception of that fact may have become dulled during the last
peaceful decade must have been brought to a keener realisation of
it by the present war.
The preservation of the Danube Monarchy as a vigorous and active
Great Power is in the truest sense of the word a vital condition
for the existence of the Hungarian State. It was fatal for all of
us that this willing people, endowed with so many administrative
qualities, ready to sacrifice themselves for all State and
national aims, have for centuries past not been able to devote
themselves to the common cause. The striving for a solution of the
world racial problem and the necessity of combining the
responsibilities of a Great Power with the independence of the
Hungarian State have caused heavy trials and century-long friction
and fighting.
Hungary's longing for independence did not take the form of
efforts for dissolution. The great leaders in our struggle for
liberty did not attack the continuance of the Habsburg Empire as a
Great Power. And even during the bitter trials of the struggle
they never followed any further aim than to obtain from the Crown
a guarantee for their chartered rights.
Hungary, free and independent, wished to remain under the sceptre
of the Habsburgs; she did not wish to come under any foreign rule,
but to be a free nation governed by her own king and her own laws
and not subordinate to any other ruler. This principle was
repeatedly put forward in solemn form (in the years 1723 and
1791), and finally, in the agreement of 1867, a solution was found
which endowed it with life and ensured its being carried out in a
manner favourable for the position of a great nation.
In the period of preparation for the agreement of 1867 Hungary was
a poor and, comparatively speaking, small part of the then
Monarchy, and the great statesmen of Hungary based their
administrative plan on dualism and equality as being the only
possible way for ensuring that Hungarian independence, recognised
and appealed to on many occasions, should materialise in a
framework of modern constitutional practice.
A political structure for the Monarchy which would make it
possible for Hungary to be outvoted on the most important
questions of State affairs, and therefore subject to a foreign
will, would again have nullified all that had been achieved after
so much striving and suffering, so much futile waste of strength
for the benefit of us all, which even in this war, too, would have
brought its blessings. All those, therefore, who have always stood
up firmly and loyally for the agreement of 1867 must put their
whole strength into resisting any tripartite experiments.
I would very much regret if, in connection with this question,
differences of opinion should occur among the present responsible
leaders of the Monarchy. In view of this I considered it
unnecessary to give publicity to a question that is not pressing.
At all events, in dealing with the Poles, all expressions must be
avoided which, in the improbable, although not impossible, event
of a resumption of the Austro-Polish solution, might awaken
expectations in them which could only lead to the most complicated
consequences.
The more moderate Poles had made up their minds that the dualistic
structure of the Monarchy would have to remain intact, and that
the annexation of Poland by way of a junction with the Austrian
State, with far-reaching autonomy to follow, would have to be the
consequence. It would therefore be extremely imprudent and
injurious to awaken fresh aspirations, the realisation of which
seems very doubtful, not only from a Hungarian point of view but
from that which concerns the future of the Monarchy.
I beg Your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest
esteem.
TISZA.
_Budapest, February 22, 1917._
The question as to what was to be Poland's future position with regard
to the Monarchy remained still unsolved. I continued to press the
point that Poland should be annexed as an independent state. Tisza
wanted it to be a province. When the Emperor dismissed him, although
he was favoured by the majority of the Parliament, it did not alter
the situation in regard to the Polish question, as Wekerle, in this as
in almost all other questions, had to adopt Tisza's views; otherwise,
he would have been in the minority.
The actual reason of Tisza's dismissal was not the question of
electoral reforms, as his successors could only act according to
Tisza's instructions. For, as leader of the majority, which he
continued to be even after his dismissal, no electoral reforms could
be carried out in opposition to his will. Tisza thought that the
Emperor meditated putting in a coalition majority against him, which
he considered quite logical, though not agreeable.
The next difficulty was the attitude of the Germans towards Poland. At
the occupation of Poland we were already unfairly treated, and the
Germans had appropriated the greater part of the country. Always and
everywhere, they were the stronger on the battlefield, and the
consequence was that they claimed the lion's share of all the
successes gained. This was in reality quite natural, but it greatly
added to all diplomatic and political activities, which were
invariably prejudiced and hindered by military facts. When I entered
upon office, Germany's standpoint was that she had a far superior
right to Poland, and that the simplest solution would be for us to
evacuate the territory we had occupied. It was, of course, obvious
that I could not accept such a proposal, and we held firmly to the
point that under no circumstances would our troops leave Lublin. After
much controversy, the Germans agreed, _tant bien que mal_, to this
solution. The further development of the affair showed that the German
standpoint went through many changes. In general, it fluctuated
between two extremes: either Poland must unite herself to Germany--the
German-Polish solution, or else vast portions of her territory must be
ceded to Germany to be called frontier adjustments, and what remained
would be either for us or for Poland herself. Neither solution could
be accepted by us. The first one for this reason, that the Polish
question being in the foreground made that of Galicia very acute, as
it would have been quite impossible to retain Galicia in the Monarchy
when separated from the rest of Poland. We were obliged to oppose the
German-Polish solution, not from any desire for conquest, but to
prevent the sacrifice of Galicia for no purpose.
The second German suggestion was just as impossible to carry out,
because Poland, crippled beyond recognition by the frontier
readjustment, even though united with Galicia, would have been so
unsatisfactory a factor that there would never have been any prospect
of harmonious dealings with her.
The third difficulty was presented by the Poles themselves, as they
naturally wished to secure the greatest possible profit out of their
release by the Central Powers, even though it did not contribute much
to their future happiness so far as military support was concerned.
There were many different parties among them: first of all, one for
the Entente; a second, Bilinski's party; above all, one for the
Central Powers, especially when we gained military successes.
On the whole, Polish policy was to show their hand as little as
possible to any particular group, and in the end range themselves on
the side of the conquerors. It must be admitted that these tactics
were successful.
In addition to these difficulties, there prevailed almost always in
Polish political circles a certain nervous excitement, which made it
extremely difficult to enter into any calm and essential negotiations.
At the very beginning, misunderstandings occurred between the Polish
leaders and myself with regard to what I proposed to do;
misunderstandings which, toward the end of my term of office,
developed into the most bitter enmity towards me on the part of the
Poles. On February 10, 1917, a whole year before Brest-Litovsk, I
received the news from Warsaw that Herr von Bilinski, apparently
misunderstanding my standpoint, evolved from the facts, considered
that hopes represented promises, and in so doing raised Polish
expectations to an unwarranted degree. I telegraphed thereupon to our
representative as follows:
_February 16, 1917._
I have informed Herr von Bilinski, together with other Poles, that
it is impossible in the present unsettled European situation to
make, on the whole, any plans for the future of Poland. I have
told them that I sympathise with the Austro-Polish solution longed
for by all our Poles, but that I am not in the position to say
whether this solution will be attainable, though I am equally
unable to foretell the opposite. Finally, I have also declared
that our whole policy where Poland is concerned can only consist
in our leaving a door open for all future transactions.
I added that our representative must quote my direct orders in
settling the matter.
In January, 1917, a conference was held respecting the Polish
question: a conference which aimed at laying down a broad line of
action for the policy to be adopted. I first of all referred to the
circumstances connected with the previously-mentioned German request
for us to evacuate Lublin, and explained my reasons for not agreeing
to the demand. I pointed out that it did not seem probable to me that
the war would end with a dictated peace on our side, and that, with
reference to Poland, we should not be able to solve the Polish
question without the co-operation of the Entente, and that there was
not much object so long as the war lasted in endeavouring to secure
_faits accomplis_. The main point was that we remain in the country,
and on the conclusion of peace enter into negotiations with the
Entente and the Allies to secure a solution of the Austro-Polish
question. That should be the gist of our policy. Count Tisza spoke
after me and agreed with me that we must not yield to the German
demand for our evacuation of Lublin. As regards the future, the
Hungarian Prime Minister stated that he had always held the view that
we should cede to Germany our claim to Poland in exchange for economic
and financial compensation; but that, at the present time, he did not
feel so confident about it. The conditions then prevailing were
unbearable, chiefly owing to the variableness of German policy, and
he, Count Tisza, returned to his former, oft-repeated opinion that we
should strive as soon as possible to withdraw with honour out of the
affair; impose no conditions that would lead to further friction, but
the surrendering to Germany of our share in Poland in exchange for
economic compensation.
The Austrian Prime Minister, Count Clam, opposed this from the
Austrian point of view, which supported the union of all the Poles
under the Habsburg sceptre as being the one and only desirable
solution.
The feeling during the debate was that the door must be closed against
the Austro-Polish proposals, and that, in view of the impossibility of
an immediate definite solution, we must adhere firmly to the policy
that rendered possible the union of all the Poles under the Habsburg
rule.
After Germany's refusal of the proposal to accept Galicia as
compensation for Alsace-Lorraine, this programme was adhered to
through various phases and vicissitudes until the ever-increasing
German desire for frontier readjustment created a situation which made
the achievement of the Austro-Polish project very doubtful. Unless we
could secure a Poland which, thanks to the unanimity of the great
majority of all Poles, would willingly and cheerfully join the
Monarchy, the Austro-Polish solution would not have been a happy one,
as in that case we should only have increased the number of
discontented elements in the Monarchy, already very high, by adding
fresh ones to them. As it proved impossible to break the resistance
put up by General Ludendorff, the idea presented itself at a later
stage to strive for the annexation of Roumania instead of Poland. It
was a return to the original idea of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the
union of Roumania with Transylvania, closely linked to the Monarchy.
In that case we should have lost Galicia to Poland, but a certain
compensation would have been conceded to us in Roumania with her corn
and oil springs, and for the Monarchy, as for the Poles, it appeared
better to unite the latter collectively with Germany rather than to
divide them, as suggested in the Vienna-Berlin dispute.
The plan for the annexation of Roumania presented wellnigh
insurmountable internal difficulties. Owing to her geographical
position, Roumania ought naturally to be annexed to Hungary. Tisza,
who was not in favour of the plan, would, nevertheless, have agreed to
it if the annexed country had been administered from Budapest and in
the Magyar spirit, which meant that it would be incorporated in
Hungary. This, for obvious reasons, would involve the failure of the
plan, for the Roumanians would gain no advantage from the annexation
if it was to be at the sacrifice of their national independence. On
the other hand, the Austrian Ministry raised quite justifiable
objections to the suggestion of a future combination that would add a
rich and vast country to Hungary, while Austria would be reduced in
proportion, and compensation in one or other form was demanded.
Another, but tentative, plan was to make over Bosnia and the
Herzegovina definitely by way of compensation to Austria. All these
ideas and plans, however, were of a transitory nature, evoked by the
constantly recurring difficulties in Berlin and Warsaw, and they
invariably fell through when it was seen that the obstacles arising
from dualism were not to be overcome. The original Austro-Polish
solution was taken up again, although it was impossible to extort
from the Germans a definite statement as to a reasonable western
frontier for Poland. In the very last term of my office the Roumanian
plan again came up, partly owing to the bitter feelings of the Poles
on the Cholm question, and partly owing to the claims made by Germany,
which rendered the Austro-Polish solution impossible.
Simultaneously with these efforts, a plan for the future organisation
of the Monarchy was being considered. The Emperor adhered to the
correct standpoint, as I still consider it to be, that the structure
of the Monarchy, after an endurable issue from the war, would have to
be altered, and reconstruction on a far more pronounced national basis
be necessary. As applied to the Poles, this project would entail the
dividing of East and West Galicia, and an independent position for the
Ruthenian Poles.
When at Brest-Litovsk, under the pressure of the hunger riots that
were beginning, I refused to agree to the Ukrainian demands, but
consented to submit the question of the division of Galicia to the
Austrian Crown Council. I was impelled thereto by the conviction that
we were adhering strictly to the programme as it had been planned for
the Monarchy.
I will give fuller details respecting this question in the next
chapter, but will merely relate the following incident as an example
to show the degree of hostile persecution to which I was exposed. The
rumour was spread on all sides that the Emperor had told the Poles
that "I had concluded peace with the Ukraine without his knowledge and
against his will." It is quite out of the question that the Emperor
can have made such a statement, as the peace conditions at Kieff were
a result of a council convoked _ad hoc_, where--as the protocol
proves--the Emperor and Dr. von Seidler were responsible for the
terms.
The great indignation of the Poles at my conduct at Brest-Litovsk was
quite unfounded. I never promised the Poles that they were to have the
Cholm district, and never alluded to any definite frontiers. Had I
done so the capable political leaders in Poland would never have
listened to me, as they knew very well that the frontiers, only in a
very slight degree, depended on the decisions at Vienna. If we lost
the war we had nothing more to say in the matter; if a peace of
agreement was concluded, then Berlin would be the strongest side,
having occupied the largest portion of the country; the question would
then have to be decided at the general Conference.
I always told the Polish leaders that I hoped to secure a Poland
thoroughly satisfied, also with respect to her frontier claims, and
there were times when we seemed to be very near the accomplishment of
such an aim; but I never concealed the fact that there were many
influences at work restricting my wishes and keeping them very much
subdued.
The partition of Galicia was an internal Austrian question. Dr. von
Seidler took up the matter most warmly, and at the Council expressed
the hope of being able to carry out these measures by parliamentary
procedure and against the opposition of the Poles.
I will allude to this question also in my next chapter.
Closely connected with the Polish question was the so-called
Central-European project.
For obvious and very comprehensible reasons Germany was keenly
interested in a scheme for closer union. I was always full of the idea
of turning these important concessions to account at the right moment
as compensation for prospective German sacrifices, and thus promoting
a peace of understanding.
During the first period of my official activity, I still hoped to
secure a revision of the Pact of London. I hoped, as already
mentioned, that the Entente would not keep to the resolution adopted
for the mutilation of the Monarchy, and I did not, therefore, approach
the Central-European question closer; had I raised it, it would
greatly have complicated our position with regard to Paris and London.
When I was compelled later to admit that the Entente kept firmly to
the decision that we were to be divided in any case, and that any
change in their purpose would only be effected, if at all, by military
force, I endeavoured to work out the Central-European plan in detail,
and to reserve the concessions ready to be made to Germany until the
right moment had arrived to make the offer.
In this connection it seemed to me that the Customs Union was
unfeasible, at any rate at first; but on the other hand, a new and
closer commercial treaty would be desirable, and a closer union of the
armies would offer no danger; it was hoped greatly to reduce them
after the war. I was convinced that a peace of understanding would
bring about disarmament, and that the importance of military
settlements would be influenced thereby. Also, that the conclusion of
peace would bring with it different relations between all states, and
that, therefore, the political and military decisions to be determined
in the settlement with Germany were not of such importance as those
relating to economic questions.
The drawing up of this programme was met, however, by the most violent
opposition on the part of the Emperor. He was particularly opposed to
all military _rapprochement_.
When the attempt to approach the question failed through the
resistance from the crown, I arranged on my own initiative for a
debate on the economic question. The Emperor then wrote me a letter in
which he forbade any further dealings in the matter. I answered his
letter by a business report, pointing out the necessity of continuing
the negotiations.
The question then became a sore point between the Emperor and myself.
He did not give his permission for further negotiations, but I
continued them notwithstanding. The Emperor knew of it, but did not
make further allusion to the matter. The vast claims put forward by
the Germans made the negotiations extremely difficult, and with long
intervals and at a very slow pace they dragged on until I left office.
Afterwards the Emperor went with Burian to the German Headquarters.
Following that, the Salzburg negotiations were proceeded with and,
apparently, at greater speed.