CHAPTER VI

ATTEMPTS AT PEACE

1

The constitutional procedure which prevails in every parliamentary

state is ordered so that the minister is responsible to a body of

representatives. He is obliged to account for what he has done. His

action is subject to the judgment and criticism of the body of

representatives. If the majority of that body are against the

minister, he must go.

The control of foreign policy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was in

the hands of the delegations.

Besides which, however, there existed in the Hungarian Constitution a

regulation to the effect that the Hungarian Prime Minister was

responsible to the country for the foreign policy, and, consequently,

the "foreign policy of the Monarchy had to be carried out, in

conjunction, by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in office and

the Prime Minister."

It depended entirely on the personality of the Hungarian Prime

Minister how he observed the regulation. Under Burian's régime it had

become the custom for all telegrams and news, even of the most secret

nature, to be communicated at once to Count Tisza, who then brought

his influence to bear on all decisions and tactical events. Tisza

possessed a most extraordinary capacity for work. He always found time

to occupy himself very thoroughly with foreign policy, notwithstanding

his own numerous departmental duties, and it was necessary, therefore,

to gain his consent to every step taken. The control of our foreign

policy was, therefore, twofold--both by the delegation and the Prime

Minister.

Great as was my esteem and respect for Count Tisza and close the

friendship between us, still his constant supervision and

intervention put boundless difficulties in the way of the discharge of

business. It was not easy, even in normal times, to contend with, on

top of all the existing difficulties that confront a Minister for

Foreign Affairs; in war, it became an impossibility. The unqualified

presumption behind such twofold government would have been that the

Hungarian Prime Minister should consider all questions from the

standpoint of the entire Monarchy, and not from that of the Magyar

centre, a presumption which Tisza ignored like all other Hungarians.

He did not deny it. He has often told me that he knew no patriotism

save the Hungarian, but that it was in the interests of Hungary to

keep together with Austria; therefore, he saw most things with a

crooked vision. Never would he have ceded one single square metre of

Hungarian territory; but he raised no objection to the projected

cession of Galicia. He would rather have let the whole world be ruined

than give up Transylvania; but he took no interest whatever in the

Tyrol.

Apart from that, he applied different rules for Austria than for

Hungary. He would not allow of the slightest alteration in Hungary's

internal conditions, as they must not be effected through external

pressure. When I, forced thereto by the distress due to lack of

provisions, yielded to Ukrainian wishes and notified the Austrian

Ministry of the Ukrainian desire to divide Galicia in two, Tisza was

fully in accordance therewith. He went even further. He opposed any

expansion of the Monarchy as it might weaken Hungary's influence. All

his life he was an opponent of the Austro-Polish solution, and a

mortal enemy of the tripartist project; he intended that Poland at

most should rank as an Austrian province, but would prefer to make her

over to Germany. He did not even wish Roumania to be joined with

Hungary, as that would weaken the Magyar influence in Hungary. He

looked upon it as out of the question to grant the Serbians access to

the sea, because he wanted the Serbian agricultural products when he

was in need of them; nor would he leave an open door for the Serbian

pigs, as he did not wish the price of the Hungarian to be lowered.

Tisza went still further. He was a great stickler for equality in

making appointments to foreign diplomatic posts, but I could not pay

much heed to that. If I considered the Austrian X better fitted for

the post of ambassador than the Hungarian Y, I selected him in spite

of eventual disagreement.

This trait in the Hungarian, though legally well founded, was

unbearable and not to be maintained in war, and led to various

disputes between Tisza and myself; and now that he is dead, these

scenes leave me only a feeling of the deepest regret for many a hasty

word that escaped me. We afterwards made a compromise. Tisza promised

never to interfere except in cases of the greatest urgency, and I

promised to take no important step without his approval. Soon after

this arrangement he was dismissed by the Emperor for very different

reasons.

I greatly regretted his dismissal, in spite of the difficulties he had

caused me. To begin with, the Magyar-central standpoint was not a

speciality of Tisza's; all Magyar politicians upheld it. Secondly,

Tisza had one great point in his favour: he had no wish to prolong the

war for the purpose of conquest; he wished for a rectification of the

Roumanian frontier and nothing beyond that. If it had come to peace

negotiations, he would have supported me in taking as a basis the

_status quo ante_. His support--and that was the third reason--was of

great value, for he was a man who knew how to fight. He had become

hard and old on the battlefield of parliamentary controversy. He stood

in awe of nothing and nobody--and he was true as gold. Fourthly, this

upright man was one of the few who openly told the Emperor the truth,

and the Emperor made use of this, as we all did.

I was, therefore, convinced beforehand that a change would not improve

the situation for me. Esterhazy, who succeeded Tisza, certainly never

put obstacles in the way of my policy. At the same time, I missed the

strong hand that had kept order in Hungary, and the stern voice that

warned the Emperor, and I did not place the same reliance on Wekerle

as on Tisza, perhaps because I was not on the same terms of friendship

with him as with Tisza.

Although I had many disputes with Tisza, it is one of the dearest

reminiscences of my time of office that, up to the death of this

remarkable man, our friendship remained unchanged. For many years

Hungary and Stephen Tisza were as one. Tisza was a man whose brave and

manly character, stern and resolute nature, fearlessness and integrity

raised him high above the average man. He was a thorough man, with

brilliant qualities and great faults; a man whose like is rare in

Europe, in spite of those faults. Great bodies cast long shadows; and

he was great, and modelled out of the stuff from which the heroes of

old were made--heroes who understood how to fight and die. How often

did I reproach him with his unhappy "_puszta_" patriotism, that was

digging a grave for him and all of us. It was impossible to change

him; he was obstinate and unbending, and his greatest fault was that,

all his life, he was under the ban of a petty ecclesiastical policy.

Not a single square metre would he yield either to Roumania in her

day, nor to the Czechs or the Southern Slavs. The career of this

wonderful man contains a terrible tragedy. He fought and strove like

none other for his people and his country; for years he filled the

breach and protected his people and his Hungary with his powerful

personality, and yet it was his obstinate, unyielding policy that was

one of the chief reasons of Hungary's fall; the Hungary he so dearly

loved; the fall that he saw when he died, killed by the accursed hand

of some cowardly assassin.

Tisza once told me, with a laugh, that someone had said to him that

his greatest fault was that he had come into the world as a Hungarian.

I consider this a most pertinent remark. As a human being and as a

man, he was prominent; but all the prejudices and faults of the Magyar

way of thinking spoilt him.

Hungary and her Constitution--dualism--were one of our misfortunes in

the war.

Had the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had no other plan but that of doing

away with dualism, he would on that account alone have merited love

and admiration. In Aehrenthal's and Berchtold's time Hungarian policy

settled the Serbian disputes; it made an alliance with Roumania an

impossibility; it accomplished the food blockade in Austria during the

war; prevented all internal reforms; and, finally, at the last moment,

through Karolyi's petty shortsighted selfishness, the front was

beaten. This severe judgment on Hungary's influence on the war remains

true, in spite of the undoubtedly splendid deeds of the Magyar troops.

The Hungarian is of a strong, courageous, and manly disposition;

therefore, almost always an excellent soldier; but, unfortunately, in

the course of the last fifty years, Hungarian policy has done more

injury than the Hungarian soldier possibly could make good in the war.

Once, during the war, a Hungarian met my reproaches with the rejoinder

that we could be quite sure about the Hungarians, they were so firmly

linked to Austria. "Yes," said I; "Hungary is firmly linked to us, but

like a stone a drowning man has tied round his own neck."

If we had not lost the war a fight to the death with the Magyars would

have been inevitable, because it is impossible to conceive that any

sensible European _consortium_ would consent to be brought into

partnership with Magyar aspirations and plans for dominion.

But, of course, during the war an open fight with Budapest was

impossible.

Whether the nations that once composed the Habsburg Empire will ever

be reunited is an open question; should it come to pass, may a kind

fate preserve us from a return of dualism.

2

On December 26, 1916--four days after entering upon office--I received

a letter from Tisza in which he imparted to me his views on the

tactics to be observed:

All the European neutrals feel that they are more seriously

threatened by England than by us. The events in Greece, Roumania,

etc., as well as England's commercial tyranny, act in our favour,

and the difference of our attitude to the peace plans as compared

with that of the Entente--if consistently and cleverly carried

out--will secure neutral sympathy for our group of Powers.

From this point of view I see that the chief danger will be that

our necessarily cautious attitude as regards revealing our war

aims may give rise to the idea that we are merely trifling with a

plan for peace for tactical reasons and do not really earnestly

desire peace.

We must therefore furnish our representatives accredited to

neutrals (the most important being Spain and Holland) with the

necessary instructions, so that they may be able to account for

our cautious attitude and explain the reasons that keep us from

making a premature or one-sided announcement of our conditions.

An announcement of the conditions on both sides would expose the

belligerent parties in both camps to unfavourable criticism and

might easily make the situation more strained; _a one-sided

announcement of the war aims would simply afford the leader of the

belligerent enemy group the opportunity of undoing everything_.

It is therefore in the interests of peace that a communication of

the peace terms should only be made mutually and confidentially,

but we might be able to give the individual neutral various hints

concerning it, to show that our war aims coincide with the lasting

interests of humanity and the peace of the world, that our chief

aim, _the prevention of Russian world dominion on land and of the

English at sea_, is in the interests of the entire world, and that

our peace terms would not include anything that would endanger the

future peace of the world or could be objected to on the neutral

side.

I offer these views for your consideration, and remain in truest

friendship, your devoted

TISZA.

My predecessor, Burian, shortly before he left, had drawn up a peace

proposal together with Bethmann. The Entente's scornful refusal is

still fresh in everyone's memory. Since hostilities have ceased and

there have been opportunities of talking to members of the Entente, I

have often heard the reproach made that the offer of peace could not

have been accepted by the Entente, as it was couched in the terms of a

conqueror who "grants" peace terms to the enemy. Although I will not

attempt to deny that the tone of the peace proposal was very

arrogant--an impression which must have been enhanced by Tisza's

speeches in the Hungarian Parliament--I think, nevertheless, that even

had it been differently worded it had small prospect of success.

However that may be, the stern refusal on the part of the Entente only

strengthened the situation for the war-keen military party, who, with

increased vehemence, maintained the point that all talk of peace was a

mistake, and that the fighting must go on to the end.

In the winter of 1917, Italy made a slight advance. What territorial

concessions was the Monarchy prepared to make? This did not proceed

from the Italian Government, but was a step taken by a private

individual which was communicated to me through a friendly Government.

It is extremely difficult to judge of the true value of such a step. A

Government can make use of a private individual to take the first

step--it will probably do so when intercourse is desired; but it may

also be that a private person, without instructions from, or the

knowledge of, his Government, might do the same. Instances of the

latter occurred frequently during my term of office.

I always held the standpoint that any such tentative steps for peace,

even when a ministerial source could not be proved _a priori_, should

be treated with prudence, but in a friendly spirit. In the

above-mentioned case, however, the fact was that Italy neither could

separate from her Allies, nor did she wish to do so. Had that been her

purpose, it would have involved her in a conflict with England, whose

aim in war was the conquest of Germany and not any Italian

aspirations. A separate peace with Italy--her separation from her

Allies--was entirely out of the question, but a general peace would

have been possible if the Western Powers could have come to an

understanding with Germany.

The only object gained by that appeal would have been to confirm the

extent of our exhaustion from the war. Had I answered that I was ready

to give up this or that province, it would have been interpreted as a

conclusive symptom of our increasing weakness, and would not have

brought peace any nearer, but rather kept it at a greater distance.

I answered, therefore, in friendly tone that the Monarchy did not aim

at conquests, and that I was ready to negotiate on the basis of

pre-war conditions of possession. No answer was sent.

After the downfall I was told by a person, certainly not competent to

judge, that my tactics had been mistaken, as Italy would have

separated from her Allies and concluded a separate peace. Further

accounts given in this chapter prove the injustice of the reproof. But

it is easy now to confirm the impression that there was not a single

moment while the war lasted when Italy ever thought of leaving her

Allies.

An extraordinary incident occurred at the end of February, 1917. A

person came to me on February 26 who was in a position to give

credentials showing him to be a recognised representative of a neutral

Power, and informed me on behalf of his Government that he had been

instructed to let me know that our enemies--or at least one of

them--were ready to conclude peace with us, and that the conditions

would be favourable for us. In particular, there was to be no question

of separating Hungary or Bohemia from the Empire. I was asked, if

agreeable to the proposition, to communicate my conditions through the

same agency, my attention being called, however, to the proviso that

_these proposals made by the enemy Government would become null and

void from the moment that another Government friendly to us or to the

hostile country heard of the step_.

The bearer of this message knew nothing beyond its contents. The final

sentence made it obvious that one of the enemy Powers was anxious to

negotiate unknown to the others.

I did not for a moment doubt that it was a question of Russia, and my

authority confirmed my conviction by stating distinctly that he could

not say so positively. I answered at once by telegram on February 27

through the agency of the intervening neutral Power that

Austria-Hungary was, of course, ready to put an end to further

bloodshed, and did not look for any gains from the peace, because, as

stated several times, we were engaged in a war of defence only. But I

drew attention to the rather obscure sense of the application, not

being able to understand whether the State applying to us wished for

peace _with us only_, or with the entire _group of Powers_, and I was

constrained to emphasise the fact that we did not intend to separate

from our Allies. I was ready, however, to offer my services as

mediator if, as presumed, the State making the advance was ready to

conclude peace with our entire group of Powers. I would guarantee

secrecy, as I, first of all, considered it superfluous to notify our

Allies. The moment for that would only be when the situation was made

clear.

This was followed on March 9 by a reply accepting, though not giving a

direct answer to the point of whether the proposal was for a peace

with us alone or together with our Allies. In order to have it made

clear as quickly as possible, and not to lose further time, I answered

at once requesting the hostile Power to send a confidential person to

a neutral country, whither I also would send a delegate, adding that I

hoped that the meeting would have a favourable result.

I never received any answer to this second telegram. A week later, on

March 16, the Tsar abdicated. Obviously, it was a last attempt on his

part to save the situation which, had it occurred a few weeks earlier,

would not only have altered the fate of Russia, but that of the whole

world.

The Russian Revolution placed us in an entirely new situation. After

all, there was no doubt that the East presented an obvious possibility

of concluding peace, and all our efforts were turned in that

direction, for we were anxious to seize the first available moment to

make peace with the Russian Revolutionary Party, a peace which the

Tsar, faced by his coming downfall, had not been able to achieve.

If the spring of 1917 was noted for the beginning of the unrestricted

U-boat warfare and all the hopes centred on its success and the

altered situation anticipated on the part of the Germans, the summer

of the same year proved that the proceeding did not fulfil all

expectations, though causing great anxiety to England. At that time

there were great fears in England as to whether, and how, the U-boat

could be paralysed. No one in London knew whether the new means to

counteract it would suffice before they had been tried, and it was

only in the course of the summer that the success of the

anti-submarine weapons and the convoy principle was confirmed.

In the early summer of 1917 very favourable news was received relative

to English and French conditions. Information was sent from Madrid,

which was always a reliable source, that some Spanish officers

returning to Madrid from England reported that the situation there

during the last few weeks had become very much worse, and that there

was no longer any confidence in victory. The authorities seized all

the provisions that arrived for the troops and the munition workers;

potatoes and flour were not to be obtained by the poorer classes; the

majority of sailors fit for service had been enrolled in the navy, so

that only inefficient crews were left in the merchant service, and

they were difficult to secure, owing to their dread of U-boats, and,

therefore, many British merchantmen were lying idle, as there was no

one to man them.

This was the tenor of the Spanish reports coming from different

sources. Similar accounts, though in slightly different form, came

from France. It was stated that in Paris great war-weariness was

noticeable. All hope of definite victory was as good as given up; an

end must certainly come before the beginning of winter, and many of

the leading authorities were convinced that, if war were carried on

into the winter, the result would be as in Russia--a revolution.

At the same time, news came from Constantinople that one of the enemy

Powers in that quarter had made advances for a separate peace. The

Turkish Government replied that they would not separate from their

Allies, but were prepared to discuss a general peace on a basis of

non-annexation. Talaat Pasha notified me at once of the request and

his answer. Thereupon nothing more was heard from the enemy Power. At

the same time news came from Roumania evincing great anxiety

concerning the increasing break-up in Russia, and acknowledging that

she considered the game was lost. The revolution and the collapse of

the army in Russia still continued.

Taken altogether, the outlook presented a more hopeful picture for us,

and justified the views of those who had always held that a little

more "endurance"--to use a word since become ominous--would lead to a

decision.

During a war every Minister of Foreign Affairs must attach an

important and adequately estimated significance to confidential

reports. The hermetic isolation which during the world war divided

Europe into two separate worlds made this doubly urgent. But it is

inevitable in regard to confidential reports that they must be

accepted, for various reasons, with a certain amount of scepticism.

Those persons who write and talk, not from any material, but from

political interests, from political devotion and sympathy, are, from

the nature of the case, above suspicion of reporting, for their own

personal reasons, more optimistically than is justified. But they are

apt to be deceived. Nations, too, are subject to feelings, and the

feelings of the masses must not be taken as expressing the tendencies

of the leading influences. France was tired of war, but how far the

leading statesmen were influenced by that condition, not to be

compared to our own war-weariness, was not proved.

In persons who make this _métier_ their profession, the wish is often

present, alongside the comprehensible mistakes they make, to give

pleasure and satisfaction by their reports, and not run any risk of

losing a lucrative post. I think it will be always well to estimate

confidential reports, no matter from what source they proceed, as

being 50 per cent. less optimistic than they appear. The more

pessimistic opinion that prevailed in Vienna, compared with Berlin,

was due, first and foremost, to the reliance placed on news coming

from the enemy countries. Berlin, too, was quite certain that we were

losing time, although Bethmann once thought fit in the Reichstag to

assert the contrary; but the German military leaders and the

politicians looked at the situation _among our opponents_ differently

from us.

When the Emperor William was at Laxenburg in the summer of 1917 he

related to me some instances of the rapidly increasing food trouble in

England, and was genuinely surprised when I replied that, though I was

convinced that the U-boats were causing great distress, there was no

question of a famine. I told the Emperor that the great problem was

whether the U-boats would actually interfere with the transport of

American troops, as the German military authorities asserted, or not,

but counselled him not to accept as very serious facts a few passing

incidents that might have occurred.

After the beginning of the unrestricted U-boat warfare, I repeat that

many grave fears were entertained in England. It is a well-known fact.

But it was a question of fears, not actualities. A person who knew how

matters stood, and who came to me from a neutral country in the summer

of 1917, said: "If the half only of the fears entertained in England

be realised, then the war will be over in the autumn"; but a wide

difference existed between London's fears and Berlin's hopes on the

one hand, and subsequent events on the other, which had not been taken

into account by German opinion.

However that may be, I consider there is no doubt that, in spite of

the announced intervention of America, the summer of 1917 represented

a more hopeful phase for us. We were carried along by the tide, and it

was essential to make the most of the situation. Germany must be

brought to see that peace must be made, in case the peace wave became

stronger.

I resolved, therefore, to propose to the Emperor that he should make

the first sacrifice and prove to Berlin that it was not only by words

that he sought for peace. I asked him to authorise me to state in

Berlin that, in the event of Germany coming to an agreement with

France on the Alsace-Lorraine question, Austria would be ready to cede

Galicia to Poland, which was about to be reorganised, and to make

efforts to ensure that this Great-Polish State should be attached to

Germany--not _incorporated_, but, say, some form of personal union.

The Emperor and I went to Kreuznach, where I first of all made the

proposal to Bethmann and Zimmermann, and subsequently, in the presence

of the Emperor Charles and Bethmann, laid it before the Emperor

William. It was not accepted unconditionally, nor yet refused, and the

conference terminated with a request from the Germans for

consideration of the question.

In making this proposal, I was fully aware of all that it involved. If

Germany accepted the offer, and we in our consequent negotiations with

the Entente did not secure any noteworthy alterations in the Pact of

London, we could count on war only. In that case, we should have to

satisfy not only Italy, Roumania, and Serbia, but would also lose the

hoped-for compensation in the annexation of Poland. The Emperor

Charles saw the situation very clearly, but resolved at once,

nevertheless, to take the proposed step.

I, however, thoroughly believed then--though wrongly--that in the

circumstances London and Paris would have been able to effect an

amendment in the Pact of London. It was not until much later that a

definite refusal of our offer was sent by Germany.

In April, before a decision had been arrived at, I sent a report to

the Emperor Charles explaining the situation to him, and requesting

that he would submit it to the Emperor William.

The report was as follows:--

Will Your Majesty permit me, with the frankness granted me from

the first day of my appointment, to submit to Your Majesty my

responsible opinion of the situation?

It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an

end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to

take up Your Majesty's time needlessly.

I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production

of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human material, and,

above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owing to

under-nourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of

the sufferings from the war.

Though I trust we shall succeed in holding out during the next few

months and carry out a successful defence, I am nevertheless

quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely

out of the question; in other words, that in the late summer or in

the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs.

Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace

negotiations at a moment when the enemy has not yet grasped the

fact of our waning strength. If we approach the Entente at a

moment when disturbances in the interior of the Empire reveal the

coming breakdown every step will have been in vain, and the

Entente will agree to no terms except such as would mean the

absolute destruction of the Central Powers. To begin at the right

time is, therefore, of extreme importance.

I cannot here ignore the subject on which lies the crux of the

whole argument. That is, the danger of revolution which is rising

on the horizon of all Europe and which, supported by England, is

demonstrating a new mode of fighting. Five monarchs have been

dethroned in this war, and the amazing facility with which the

strongest Monarchy in the world was overthrown may help to make us

feel anxious and call to our memory the saying: _exempla trahunt_.

Let it not be said that in Germany or Austria-Hungary the

conditions are different; let it not be contested that the firmly

rooted monarchist tendencies in Berlin and Vienna exclude the

possibility of such an event. This war has opened a new era in the

history of the world; it is without example and without precedent.

The world is no longer what it was three years ago, and it will be

vain to seek in the history of the world a parallel to the

happenings that have now become daily occurrences.

The statesman who is neither blind nor deaf must be aware how the

dull despair of the population increases day by day; he is bound

to hear the sullen grumbling of the great masses, and if he be

conscious of his own responsibility he must pay due regard to that

factor.

Your Majesty has seen the secret reports from the governor of the

town. Two things are obvious. The Russian Revolution affects our

Slavs more than it does the Germans, and the responsibility for

the continuation of the war is a far greater one for the Monarch

whose country is only united through the dynasty than for the one

where the people themselves are fighting for their national

independence. Your Majesty knows that the burden laid upon the

population has assumed proportions that are unbearable; Your

Majesty knows that the bow is strained to such a point that any

day it may be expected to snap. But should serious disturbances

occur, either here or in Germany, it will be impossible to conceal

the fact from the Entente, and from that moment all further

efforts to secure peace will be defeated.

I do not think that the internal situation in Germany is widely

different from what it is here. I am only afraid that the military

circles in Berlin are deceiving themselves in certain matters. I

am firmly convinced that Germany, too, like ourselves, has reached

the limit of her strength, and the responsible political leaders

in Berlin do not seek to deny it.

I am firmly persuaded that, if Germany were to attempt to embark

on another winter campaign, there would be an upheaval in the

interior of the country which, to my mind, would be far worse than

a peace concluded by the Monarchs. If the Monarchs of the Central

Powers are not able to conclude peace within the next few months,

it will be done for them by their people, and then will the tide

of revolution sweep away all that for which our sons and brothers

fought and died.

I do not wish to make any _oratio pro domo_, but I beg Your

Majesty graciously to remember that I, the only one to predict the

Roumanian war two years before, spoke to deaf ears, and that when

I, two months before the war broke out, prophesied almost the very

day when it would begin, nobody would believe me. I am just as

convinced of my present diagnosis as I was of the former one, and

I cannot too insistently urge you not to estimate too lightly the

dangers that I see ahead.

Without a doubt, the American declaration of war has greatly

aggravated the situation. It may be many months before America can

throw any noteworthy forces into the field, but the moral fact,

the fact that the Entente has the hope of fresh forces, brings the

situation to an unfavourable stage for us, because our enemies

have more time before them than we have and can afford to wait

longer than we, unfortunately, are able to do. It cannot yet be

said what course events will take in Russia. I hope--and this is

the vital point of my whole argument--that Russia has lost her

motive power for a long time to come, perhaps for ever, and that

this important factor will be made use of. I expect, nevertheless,

that a Franco-English, probably also an Italian, offensive will be

launched at the first opportunity, though I hope and trust that we

shall be able to repulse both attacks. If this succeeds--and I

reckon it can be done in two or three months--we must then, before

America takes any further military action to our disadvantage,

make a more comprehensive and detailed peace proposal and not

shrink from the probably great and heavy sacrifices we may have to

make.

Germany places great hopes on the U-boat warfare. I consider such

hopes are deceptive. I do not for a moment disparage the fabulous

deeds of the German sea heroes; I admit admiringly that the

tonnage sunk per month is phenomenal, but I assert that the

success anticipated and predicted by the Germans has not been

achieved.

Your Majesty will remember that Admiral Holtzendorff, when last in

Vienna, told us positively that the unrestricted U-boat warfare

would bring England to her knees within six months. Your Majesty

will also remember how we combated the prediction and declared

that, though we did not doubt the U-boat campaign would seriously

affect England, yet the looked-for success would be discounted by

the anticipated entry of America into the war. It is now two and a

half months (almost half the time stated) since the U-boat warfare

started, and all the information that we get from England is to

the effect that the downfall of this, our most powerful and most

dangerous adversary, is not to be thought of. If, in, spite of

many scruples, Your Majesty yielded to Germany's wish and

consented to allow the Austro-Hungarian Navy to take part in the

U-boat warfare, it was not because we were converted by the German

arguments, but because Your Majesty deemed it to be absolutely

necessary to act with Germany in loyal concert in all quarters and

because we were firmly persuaded that Germany, unfortunately,

would never desist from her resolve to begin the unrestricted

U-boat warfare.

To-day, however, in Germany the most enthusiastic advocates of the

U-boat warfare are beginning to see that this means to victory

will not be decisive, and I trust that the mistaken idea that

England within a few months will be forced to sue for peace will

lose ground in Berlin too. Nothing is more dangerous in politics

than to believe the things one wishes to believe; nothing is more

fatal than the principle not to wish to see the truth and to fall

a prey to Utopian illusions from which sooner or later a terrible

awakening will follow.

England, the motive power in the war, will not be compelled to lay

down her arms in a few months' time, but perhaps--and here I

concede a limited success to the U-boat scheme--perhaps England in

a few months will ask herself whether it is wise and sensible to

continue this war _à l'outrance_, or whether it would not be more

statesmanlike to set foot upon the golden bridges the Central

Powers must build for her, and then the moment will have come for

great and painful sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers.

Your Majesty has rejected the repeated attempts of our enemies to

separate us from our Allies, in which step I took the

responsibility because Your Majesty is incapable of any

dishonourable action. But at the same time, Your Majesty

instructed me to notify the statesmen of the German Empire that

our strength is at an end, and that after the close of the summer

Germany must not reckon on us any longer. I carried out these

commands and the German statesmen left me in no doubt that for

Germany, too, another winter campaign would be impossible. In this

one sentence may be summed up all that I have to say:

We can still wait some weeks and try if there is any possibility

of dealing with Paris or Petersburg. If that does not succeed,

then we must--and at the right time--play our last card and make

the extreme proposals I have already hinted at. Your Majesty has

proved that you have no selfish plans and that you do not expect

from your German Ally sacrifices that Your Majesty would not be

ready to make yourself. More than that cannot be expected.

Your Majesty, nevertheless, owes it to God and to your peoples to

make every effort to avert the catastrophe of a collapse of the

Monarchy; it is your sacred duty to God and to your peoples to

defend those peoples, the dynastic principle and your throne with

all the means in your power and to your very last breath.

On May 11 there came the following official answer from the Imperial

Chancellor, which was sent by the German Emperor to the Emperor

Charles, and then to me:--

In accordance with Your Majesty's commands I beg most humbly to

submit the following in answer to the enclosed _exposé_ from the

Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs of 12th ult.

Since the _exposé_ was drawn up, the French and English on the

Western front have carried out the predicted great offensive on a

wide front, ruthlessly sacrificing masses of men and an enormous

quantity of war material. The German army checked the advance of

the numerically superior enemy; further attacks, as we have every

reason to believe, will also be shattered by the heroism of the

men and the iron will of their leaders.

Judging from all our experiences hitherto in the war, we may

consider the situation of the Allied armies on the Isonzo with the

same confidence.

The Eastern front has been greatly reduced owing to the political

upheaval in Russia. There can be no question of an offensive on a

large scale on the part of Russia. A further easing of the

situation would release more men even if it were considered

necessary to have a strong barrier on the Russian frontier to

guard against local disturbances owing to the revolutionary

movement. With the additional forces, the conditions in the West

would become more favourable for us. The withdrawal of men would

also provide more troops for the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy for

the successful carrying out of the fighting on the Italian front

until the end of the war is reached.

In both Allied Monarchies there is an ample supply of raw material

for the manufacture of munitions. Our situation as regards

provisions is such that with the greatest economy we can hold out

until the new harvest. The same applies to Austria-Hungary,

especially if her share of the supplies from Roumania are taken

into consideration.

The deeds of our navy rank beside the successes of the army. When

Admiral von Holtzendorff was permitted to lay before His Apostolic

Majesty the plans for the U-boat warfare, the prospects of success

for this stringent measure had been thoroughly tested here and the

expected military advantages weighed against the political risk.

We did not conceal from ourselves that the infliction of a

blockade of the coasts of England and France would bring about the

entry into war of the United States and, consequently, a falling

off of other neutral states. We were fully aware that our enemies

would thus gain a moral and economic renewal of strength, but we

were, and still are, convinced that the disadvantages of the

U-boat warfare are far surpassed by its advantages. The largest

share in the world struggle which began in the East has now been

transferred to the West in ever increasing dimensions, where

English tenacity and endurance promote and strengthen the

resistance of our enemies by varied means. A definite and

favourable result for us could only be achieved by a determined

attack on the vital spot in the hostile forces; that is, England.

The success obtained and the effect already produced by the U-boat

warfare far exceed all calculations and expectations. The latest

statements of leading men in England concerning the increasing

difficulty in obtaining provisions and the stoppage of supplies,

as well as corresponding comments in the Press, not only include

urgent appeals to the people to put forth their utmost strength,

but bear also the stamp of grave anxiety and testify to the

distress that England is suffering.

The Secretary of State, Helfferich, at a meeting of the Head

Committee of the Reichstag on the 28th ult., gave a detailed

account of the effects of the U-boat warfare on England. The

review was published in the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of

the 1st inst. I beg herewith to refer to the enclosed.[8]

According to the latest news the Food Controller, Lord Rhondda,

owing to the inadequate supply of corn, has been compelled to

specify a new allotment of cargo space. This is already so

restricted that more room for corn can only be secured by

hindering the conduct of the war in other ways. Apart from

abandoning overseas traffic, vessels could only be released by

cutting down such imports as absorbed much space. England requires

not only great transport facilities for provisions but also for

the import of ore to keep up war industries, and also pit props to

enable the coal output to be kept at a high level. In the case of

the ore needed for England and the wood available in the country,

it is not possible to restrict the cargo space in these two

instances. Already, after three months of the U-boat warfare, it

is a fact that the shortage of cargo space caused by the U-boats

reduces the living conditions of the population to an unbearable

extent, and paralyses all war industries, so much so that the hope

of defeating Germany by superior stores of munitions and a greater

number of guns has had to be given up. The lack of transport

facilities will also prevent the larger output of war industries

in America making up for the lesser output in England. The speed

with which the U-boat warfare has destroyed vessels excludes the

possibility of building new vessels to furnish adequate cargo

space. More vessels have been destroyed in a month of U-boat

warfare than the English dockyards have turned out in the last

year. Even the thousand much-talked-of American wooden vessels, if

they were there, would only cover the losses of four months. But

they will not come before it is too late. English experts on the

subject have already said quite openly that there are only two

ways of counteracting the effect of the U-boats: either to build

vessels quicker than the Germans destroy them, or else to destroy

the U-boats quicker than the Germans can build them. The first has

proved to be impossible, and the U-boat losses are far less than

the new vessels building.

England will also have to reckon on a progressive rise in the loss

of tonnage.

The effects of the U-boat warfare on the people's provisions and

on all private and Government activities will be felt more and

more.

I anticipate, therefore, the final results of the U-boat warfare

with the greatest confidence.

According to secret but reliable information, the Prime Minister

Ribot recently stated to the Italian Ambassador in Paris that

France was faced with exhaustion. This opinion was expressed

before the beginning of the last Franco-English offensive. Since

then, France has sacrificed life to a terrible extent by keeping

up the intensity of the fighting until the offensive ceased.

The French nation is certainly doing marvellous things in this

war, but the Government cannot sustain the enormous burden after

it reaches a certain limit. A reaction in the temper of France,

which is kept up by artificial means, is inevitable.

As regards our own internal situation, I do not under-estimate the

difficulties presented by the inevitable results of the severe

fighting and the exclusion from the seas. But I firmly believe

that we shall succeed in overcoming these difficulties without

permanently endangering the nation's strength and general welfare,

without any further crises and without menace to Government

organisation.

Although we are justified in viewing the total situation in a

favourable light, I am nevertheless in complete agreement with

Count Czernin in pursuing the aim of bringing about as speedily as

possible an honourable and, in the interests of the Empire and of

our Allies, just peace. I also share his opinion that the

important factor of the weakening of Russia must be exploited, and

that a fresh tentative offer for peace must be put forward at a

time when both political and military initiative are still in our

hands. Count Czernin estimates a suitable time will be in two or

three months, when the enemy offensive will be at an end. As a

matter of fact, in view of the French and English expectations of

the decisive success for their offensive, and the Entente not

having lost all hopes of Russia resuming her activities, any too

pronounced preparations for peace would not only be doomed to

failure, but would put new life into the enemy by revealing the

hopeless exhaustion of the Central Powers' forces. At the present

moment a general peace could only be bought by our submission to

the will of the enemy. A peace of that nature would not be

tolerated by the people and would lead to fatal dangers for the

Monarchy. It appears to me that quiet determination and caution as

regards the outer world are more than ever an imperative

necessity. The development of affairs in Russia has hitherto been

favourable for us. Party disputes are kept more and more within

the narrow limits of peace and war questions by political,

economic and social exigencies, and the impression grows every day

that the party which makes for peace with the Central Powers will

be the one to remain in power. It is our solemn duty carefully to

follow and encourage the process of development and disruption in

Russia and to sound the country, not with too obvious haste, but

yet with sufficient expert skill to lead to practical peace

negotiations. The probability is that Russia will avoid any

appearance of treachery towards her Allies, and will endeavour to

find a method which will practically lead to a state of peace

between herself and the Central Powers, but outwardly will have

the appearance of the union of both parties as a prelude to the

general peace.

As in July, 1914, we entered regardlessly into a loyal alliance

with Austria-Hungary, in like manner when the world war is at an

end will a basis be found for terms which will guarantee a

prosperous peace to the two closely united Monarchies.

This optimistic reply of Bethmann's was obviously not only based on

the idea of infusing more confidence in the future in us, but was also

the true expression of a more favourable atmosphere prevailing, as

Berlin naturally received the same reports from the enemy countries as

we did.

I received about that time a letter from Tisza which contained the

following passage:--

The varied information received from the enemy countries leaves no

doubt that the war is drawing to a close. It is now above all

essential to keep a steady nerve and play the game to the end with

_sangfroid_. Let there be no signs of weakness. It is not from a

love of humanity in general that our enemies have become more

peacefully inclined, but because they realise that we cannot be

crushed.

I beg of you no longer to give vent to the sentiments in your

report of April 12. A pessimistic tendency evinced now by the

leader of our foreign affairs would ruin everything. I know that

you are prudent, but I beg you to use your influence so that both

His Majesty and his entourage may show a confident front to the

world. And again, no one will have anything to say to us if they

cease to believe in our powers of resistance--and are not

persuaded that our Alliance rests on a solid foundation.

It was evident that the only right tactics were to make the supremest

efforts at the front and throughout the country, on the one hand, in

order to hold the situation a little longer, and, on the other, to

persuade the enemy that, in spite of the favourable situation, we were

prepared for peace without conquest. To appoint Hebel to the German

military Commission to carry out this last procedure seemed devoid of

sense. Neither did I expect to gain much from recent intervention in

the Wilhelmstrasse, and endeavoured therefore to put myself in direct

touch with the German Reichstag.

One of my political friends who had numerous and excellent connections

with the German Reichstag put himself into communication with

different leaders in Berlin and explained to them the situation in the

Monarchy. It was understood that this gentleman was not acting for the

Ministry, but presenting his own impressions and views. He was

enjoined to be very cautious, as any indiscretion might have

incalculable consequences. If the Entente were to imagine that we were

thinking of ending the war, not for love of peace but because we

simply could not hold out any longer, all efforts would have been

vain. In that respect, Tisza was perfectly right. It was, therefore,

absolutely necessary that the person to whom this delicate mission had

been entrusted should act in such a manner as would keep it a secret

from the Entente, a manner devoid of weakness and uniting confidence

with reasonable war aims, but also in a manner which would enable the

Ministry eventually to disavow the advances.

My friend undertook the task with just as great zeal as efficiency

and, in brief, this is what he told the Berlin leaders, Erzberger[9]

and Südekum in particular. As far as he could judge, we had now

reached a turning point. The next few weeks would decide whether it

was to be peace or war _à l'outrance_. France was tired and not

anxious for America's entry into the war if it was not to be the

latter. If Germany forced the Entente to continue the war the

situation would be very grave. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Turkey

could do more. Germany, by herself, could not bring the war to a

successful end. Austria-Hungary's position was obvious to the whole

world. She was ready to make peace without annexations and without war

compensation, and to devote all her energies to preventing the

recurrence of a war. (Austria-Hungary's standpoint was that a

universal, equal, but extensive disarmament on sea and on land offered

the only means to restore the financial situation in Europe after the

war.)

Germany must publicly notify her position just as clearly as

Austria-Hungary had done and must declare the following:

(1) No annexations, no indemnities.

(2) Particularly the unconditional and total release of Belgium

(politically and economically).

(3) All territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary to be

evacuated as soon as both those States had had their

territories restored to them (including the German

colonies).

(4) Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, to work for a general

disarmament and guarantee that no further war be possible.

Such declaration to be a joint one from the German Government and the

Reichstag, and to be made public.

The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, was the result of this step.

The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann was the first victim. The Supreme

Military Command, by whom he always had been persecuted, now trying to

secure his dismissal, declared such resolution to be unacceptable.

When Bethmann had gone and Michaelis had been appointed, they were

satisfied.

Although the resolution in itself was satisfactory, it had one fault

at the start. It was no secret that everyone connected with

Pan-Germanism, especially the German generals, disagreed with the

decision, and would not accept the resolution as coming from the

entire country. Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them

per head, supported the resolution but the leading men, together with

a considerable following, were opposed to it. The "Starvation Peace,"

the "Peace of Renunciation," and the "Scheidemann Peace" were the

subjects of articles in the papers expressing the greatest disapproval

of the resolution. Neither did the German Government take up any

decided attitude. On July 19 the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis made a

speech approving the resolution, but adding "as I understand it."

The Imperial Chancellor wrote a letter to me in August confirming his

very optimistic views of the situation, and defining Germany's views

regarding Belgium. The phrase, "as I understand it," above alluded to

in his approval of the resolution, was explained in his letter, at any

rate, as to the Belgium question: "As Germany wishes to reserve to

herself the right to exercise a far-reaching military and economic

influence on Belgium." He wrote as follows:--

_Berlin, August 17, 1917._

DEAR COUNT CZERNIN,--According to our agreement, I take the

liberty briefly to lay before you my views of our discussions of

the 14th and 15th inst., and would be extremely grateful if Your

Excellency would be so kind as to advise me of your views on my

activities.

The internal economic and political situation in Germany justifies

me in the firm belief that Germany herself would be able to stand

a fourth year of war. The bread-corn harvest promises better than

we thought five or six weeks ago, and will be better than that of

the previous year. The potato harvest promises a considerably

higher yield than in 1916-17. Fodder is estimated to be much less

than last year; by observing a unified and well-thought-out

economic plan for Germany herself and the occupied territories,

including Roumania, we shall be in a position to hold out with

regard to fodder, as was also possible in the very dry year 1915.

There is no doubt that the political situation is grave. The

people are suffering from the war, and the longing for peace is

very great; however, there is no trace of any general and really

morbid exhaustion, and when food is controlled any work done will

be no worse than it was last year.

This economic and political prospect can only be altered if the

condition of the Allies, or of the neutrals, under pressure from

the Entente, should become very much worse. It would be a change

for the worse for us if our Allies or the neutral states, contrary

to our expectations and hopes, were to experience such shortage as

would cause them to turn to us. To a certain extent, this is

already the case; a further increase of their claims would greatly

prejudice our economic position and in certain cases endanger it.

It must be admitted that the situation in the fourth year of war

in general is more difficult than in the third year. The most

earnest endeavours, therefore, will be made to bring about a peace

as soon as possible.

Nevertheless, our genuine desire for peace must not lead us to

come forward with a fresh peace proposal. That, in my opinion,

would be a great tactical error. Our _démarche_ for peace last

December found sympathy in the neutral states, but it was answered

by our adversaries raising their demands. A fresh step of the kind

would be put down to our weakness and would prolong the war; any

peace advances must come now from the enemy.

The leading motive in my foreign policy will always be the

watchful care of our Alliance with Austria-Hungary that the storm

of war has made still stronger, and a trusting, friendly and loyal

co-operation with the leading men of the Allied Monarchy. If the

spirit of the Alliance--and in this I know Your Excellency

agrees--remains on the same high level as heretofore, even our

enemies would see that it was impossible for one of the Allies to

agree to any separate negotiations offered to him, unless he

states beforehand that the discussion would only be entered into

if the object were a general peace. If this were clearly laid down

there could be no reason why one of the Allies should not listen

to such proposal from the enemy and with him discuss preparations

for peace.

At present no decided line of action can be specified for such a

proceeding. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether the

reinstatement of the _status quo_ would be a suitable basis on

which to start negotiations. My standpoint in this matter is as

follows: I have already stated in the Reichstag that Germany is

not striving for any great changes in power after the war, and is

ready to negotiate provided the enemy does not demand the cession

of any German territory; with such a conception of the term

"reinstatement of the _status quo_," that form would be a very

suitable basis for negotiations. This would not exclude the

desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by

negotiating bring former enemy economic territory into close

economic and military conjunction with Germany--this would refer

to Courland, Lithuania and Poland--and thus secure Germany's

frontiers and give a guarantee for her vital needs on the

continent and overseas.

Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but

must reserve to herself the right, _by means of the peace

negotiations, to the economic exploitation of the territory of

Longwy and Briey_, if not through direct incorporation, by a legal

grant to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any

noteworthy districts in Alsace-Lorraine.

I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the

matter of _connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and

economic sense_. The terms that I read out, taken from notes at

the Kreuznach negotiations--the military control of Belgium until

the conclusion of a defensive and offensive Alliance with Germany,

the acquisition of Liége (or a long-term rental thereof)--were

the maximum claims of the Supreme Military and Naval Command. The

Supreme Military Command agrees with me that these terms or

similar ones can only be secured if peace can be enforced on

England. But we are of opinion that a vast amount of economic and

military influence must be brought to bear in Belgium in the

matter of the negotiations and would perhaps not meet with much

resistance, because Belgium, from economic distress, will come to

see that her being joined to Germany is the best guarantee for a

prosperous future.

As regards Poland, I note that the confidential hint from Your

Excellency to give up Galicia and enrol it in the new Polish State

is subject to the ceding of portions of Alsace-Lorraine to France,

which was to be as a counter-sacrifice, but must be considered as

out of the question. The development of Poland as an independent

State must be carried out in the sense of the proclamation of

November 5, 1916. Whether this development will prove to be an

actual advantage for Germany or will become a great danger for the

future will be tested later. There are already many signs of

danger, and what is particularly to be feared is that the

Austro-Hungarian Government cannot notify us now during the war of

her complete indifference to Poland and leave us a free hand in

the administration of the whole state.

It will also remain to be seen whether, in view of the danger

caused to Germany and also to her relations with Austria-Hungary

through Poland's unwillingness to accept the situation, it would

not be more desirable politically for Germany, while retaining the

frontier territory as being necessary for military protection, to

grant to Poland full right of self-determination, also with the

possibility of being joined to Russia.

The question of the annexation of Roumania, according to the

Kreuznach debate of May 1, must be treated further and solved in

connection with the questions that are of interest to Germany

respecting Courland, Lithuania and Poland.

It was a special pleasure to me to meet you, dear Count Czernin,

here in Berlin and to discuss openly and frankly with you the

questions that occupy us at present. I hope in days to come there

may be an opportunity for a further exchange of thoughts enabling

us to solve problems that may arise, and carry them out in full

agreement.

With the expression of my highest esteem, I remain your very

devoted

MICHAELIS.

I replied to the Chancellor that I welcomed, as a matter of course,

the agreement to maintain complete frankness, but remarked that I

could not share his optimism. I explained that the increasing

war-weariness, both in Germany and in Austria-Hungary, rendered it

imperative to secure peace in good time, that is, before any

revolutionary signs appeared, for any beginning of disturbances would

spoil the chance of peace. The German point of view in the case of

Belgium seemed to me quite mistaken, as neither the Entente nor

Belgium would ever consent to the terms. I could not, therefore,

conceal from him that his point of view was a serious obstacle to

peace; that it was also in direct opposition to the Reichstag view,

and I failed to understand it.

I then spoke of the necessity of coming to an understanding as to the

minimum of the war aims in which an important part is played by the

question whether and how we can achieve a voluntary and peaceable

annexation of Poland and Roumania by the Central Powers.

I finally again pointed out that I interpreted the views of the German

Reichstag as demanding a peace without annexation or indemnity, and

that it would be out of the question for the German Government to

ignore the unanimous decision of the Reichstag. It was not a question

of whether we _wished_ to go on fighting, but whether we _could_, and

it was my duty to impress upon him in time that we were bound to end

the war.

Dr. Michaelis was more given to Pan-Germanism than his predecessor.

It was astonishing to what degree the Pan-Germans misunderstood the

situation. They disliked me so intensely that they avoided me, and I

had very few dealings with them. They were not to be converted. I

remember one instance, when a representative of that Party called on

me in Vienna to explain to me the conditions under which his group was

prepared to conclude peace: the annexation of Belgium, of a part of

east France (Longwy and Briey), of Courland and Lithuania, the cession

of the English Fleet to Germany, and I forget how many milliards in

war indemnity, etc. I received this gentleman in the presence of the

Ambassador von Wiesner, and we both agreed that it was purely a case

for a doctor.

There was a wide breach between the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis's

ideas and our own. It was impossible to bridge it over. Soon after he

left office to make way for the statesmanlike Count Hertling.

About this time very far-reaching events were being enacted behind the

scenes which had a very pronounced influence on the course of affairs.

Acts of great indiscretion and interference occurred on the part of

persons who, without being in any important position, had access to

diplomatic affairs. There is no object here in mentioning names,

especially as the responsible political leaders themselves only heard

the details of what had happened much later, and then in a very

unsatisfactory way--at a time when the pacifist tendencies of the

Entente were slackening.[10]

It was impossible then to see clearly in such a labyrinth of confused

and contradictory facts. The truth is that in the spring or early

summer of 1917 leading statesmen in the countries of the Allies and of

the Entente gathered the impression that the existence of the

Quadruple Alliance was at an end. At the very moment when it was of

the utmost importance to maintain secrecy concerning the conditions of

our Alliance the impression prevailed, and, naturally, the Entente

welcomed the first signs of disruption in the Quadruple Alliance.

I do not know if the opportunity will ever occur of throwing a clear

light on all the proceedings of those days. To explain the further

development it will suffice to confirm what follows here. This is what

happened. In the spring of 1917 connecting links were established with

Paris and London. The first impressions received were that the Western

Powers were ready to make use of us as a bridge to Germany and to a

general peace. At a somewhat later stage the wind veered and the

Entente endeavoured to make a separate peace with us.

Several important details only came to my knowledge later, some at the

time of my resignation in the spring of 1918, and some not until the

collapse in the winter of 1918-19. There was no lack of voices to

blame me for a supposed double policy, which the public also

suspected, and to accuse me of having made different statements to

Berlin from those I made in Paris. These charges were brought by

personal enemies who deliberately slandered me, which tales were

repeated by others who knew nothing about the affair. The fact is that

when I heard of the episode I immediately _possessed myself of

documents proving that not only did I know nothing whatever about the

matter_, but could not possibly have known.

Astronomical causes sometimes give rise to disturbances in the

universe, the reason of which cannot be understood by the observer. I

felt in the same way, without being able to prove anything definite,

from certain signs that I noticed, that in those worlds on the other

side of the trenches events were happening that were inexplicable to

me. I felt the effect, but could not discover the cause. In the spirit

of the Entente, now more favourably disposed for peace, an undertone

was distinctly audible. There was anxiety and a greater inclination

for peace than formerly, but again probably only in view of the

alleged laxity of our Alliance conditions and the hopes of the

downfall of the Quadruple Alliance. A friend of mine, a subject of a

neutral state, wrote to me from Paris in the summer and told me he had

heard from a reliable source that apparently at the Quai d'Orsay they

expected the Monarchy to separate from Germany, which, as a matter of

course, would alter the entire military situation.

Soon afterwards very secret information was received from a neutral

country that a Bulgarian group was negotiating with the Entente behind

the back and without the knowledge of Radoslawoff. As soon as

suspicion of a breach in the Alliance had been aroused in our Allies,

the Bulgarian party hastened to forestall the event. We felt as safe

about Radoslawoff as about Talaat Pasha; but in both countries other

forces were at work.

The suspicions aroused in our friends concerning our plans were a

further disadvantage, certainly only of a technical nature, but yet

not to be underestimated. Our various agents worked splendidly, but it

lay in the nature of the case that their dealings were more protracted

than those carried out by the Foreign Minister himself. According to

the course taken by the conversations, they were obliged to seek fresh

instructions; they were more tied, and therefore forced to assume a

more halting attitude than a responsible leader would have to do. In

the summer of 1917, therefore, I suggested going to Switzerland

myself, where negotiations were proceeding. But my journey could not

have been kept secret, and if an effort had been made to do so it

would have been all the more certain to arouse suspicion, owing to the

mistrust already awakened. But not in Berlin. I believe I still held

the confidence of the leading men in Berlin sufficiently to avert

that. I should have explained the situation to the Imperial

Chancellor, and that would have sufficed. In Turkey and Bulgaria the

case was different.

One party in Bulgaria favoured the Entente. If Bulgaria was under the

impression that our group was falling asunder she would have staked

everything to try and save herself by a separate peace. In

Constantinople, too, there was an Entente group. Talaat and Enver were

as reliable as they were strong. But a journey undertaken by me to

Switzerland in the conditions described might prove to be the alarm

signal for a general _sauve qui peut_. But the very suggestion that

the two Balkan countries would act as they supposed we should do would

have sufficed to destroy any attempt at peace in Paris and London.

The willingness to prepare for peace on the part of the enemy declined

visibly during the summer. It was evident from many trifling signs,

separately of small import, collectively of much. In the summer of

1917, too, the first horror of the U-boat warfare began to grow less.

It was seen by the enemy that it could not accomplish what he had

first feared, and that again put life into the desire for a final

military victory.

These two facts together probably contributed to fan back the peace

wind blowing from the West. Among other things, the Armand-Revertera

negotiations were proceeding the whole time. It is not yet the moment

to speak of the negotiations which in the spring of 1918, together

with the letters of the Emperor to Prince Sixtus, created such a

sensation. But this much must be stated: that Revertera in the

negotiations proved himself to be an equally correct as efficient

agent who acted exactly according to the instructions he received from

the Ballplatz. Our various attempts to take up the threads of peace

when emanating from the Ballplatz were always intended for our entire

group of Powers.

Naturally, it was not in the interests of the Entente to _prevent_ us

from separating from Germany, and when the impression was produced in

London and Paris unofficially that we were giving Germany up, we

ourselves thus used _sabotage_ in the striving for a general peace;

for it would, of course, have been pleasing to the Entente to see

Germany, her chief enemy, isolated.

There was a twofold and terrible mistake in thus trifling with the

idea of a separate peace. First of all, it could not release us from

the terms of the Pact of London, and yet it spoiled the atmosphere for

negotiating a general peace. At the time when these events were being

enacted, I presumed, but only knew for certain later, that Italy, in

any case, would claim the promises made to her.

In the spring of 1917 Ribot and Lloyd George conferred with Orlando on

the subject, when at St. Jean de Maurienne, and endeavoured to modify

the terms in case of our separating from Germany. Orlando refused, and

insisted on his view that, even in the event of a separate peace, we

should still have to yield up Trieste and the Tyrol as far as the

Brenner Pass to Italy, and thus have to pay an impossible price. And

secondly, these separatist tactics would break up our forces, and had

already begun to do so.

When a person starts running away in a fight he but too easily drags

others with him. I do not doubt that the Bulgarian negotiations,

opened with the purpose of taking soundings, were connected with the

foregoing events.

The effect of this well-meant but secret and dilettante policy was

that we suggested to the Entente a willingness to separate from our

Allies, and lost our position in the struggle for a separate peace.

For we saw that in separating from Germany we could not escape being

crippled; that, therefore, a separate peace was impossible, and that

we had dealt a death-blow at the still intact Quadruple Alliance.

Later I had information from England relating to the official view of

the situation there, which differed very much from the optimistic

confidential reports, and proved that the desire for peace was not so

strong. It will easily be understood that for us the English policy

was always the most interesting. England's entry into the war had made

the situation so dangerous that an understanding arrived at with

her--that is, an understanding between England and Germany through our

intervention--would have put an end to the war.

This information was to the effect that England was less than ever

inclined to confer with Germany until the two cardinal points had been

guaranteed--the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and the abolition of German

militarism. The former was a French claim, and England must and would

support France in this to her very utmost; the second claim was

necessary in the interests of the future peace of the world. Germany's

military strength was always estimated very highly in England, but the

army's deeds in this war had surpassed all expectations. The military

successes had encouraged the growth of the military spirit. The peace

resolution passed in the Reichstag proved nothing, or at any rate, not

enough, for the Reichstag is not the real exponent of the Empire in

the outside world; it became paralysed through an unofficial

collateral Government, the generals, who possessed the greater power.

Certain statements made by General Ludendorff--so the Entente

said--proved that Germany did not wish for an honourable peace of

understanding. Besides this the Wilhelmstrasse did not associate

itself with the majority in the Reichstag. The war was not being waged

against the German nation, but against its militarism, and to conclude

peace with the latter would be impossible. It appeared, further, that

in no circumstances would England restore Germany's colonies. So far

as the Monarchy was concerned, England appeared to be ready to

conclude a separate peace with her, though subject to the promises

made to her own Allies. According to the latter there was much

territory to be given up to Italy, Serbia and Roumania. But in

exchange we might reckon on a sort of annexation of newly made states

like Poland.

This information left no doubt that England was not then thinking of

making advances to Germany; the fear of Prussian militarism was at the

bottom of her reasons for refusing. My impression was that, through a

more favourable continuous development, a settlement and understanding

might be feasible on the territorial but not on the military

questions. On the contrary, the stronger Germany's military power

proved itself to be, the more did the Entente fear that their enemy's

power of defence would be invincible unless it was broken then.

Not only the period preceding war and the outbreak of war, but the

actual course of the war has been full of many and disturbing

misunderstandings. For long it was not understood here what England

meant by the term militarism. It was pointed out that the English Navy

was jealously defending the dominion of the seas, that France and

Russia stood ready armed for the attack, and that Germany was only in

a similar position to any other state; that every state strengthened

and equipped its defensive forces as thoroughly as possible.

By the term "Prussian militarism" England did not only mean the

strength of the German army. She understood it to be a combination of

a warlike spirit bent on oppressing others, and supported by the best

and strongest army in the world. The first would have been innocuous

without the second; and the splendid German army was in England's

eyes the instrument of a domineering and conquest-loving autocrat.

According to England's view, Germany was exactly the counterpart of

France under Bonaparte--if for Napoleon be substituted a many-headed

being called "Emperor, Crown Prince, Hindenburg, Ludendorff"--and just

as little as England would treat with Napoleon would she have any

dealings with the individual who to her was the personification of the

lust for conquest and the policy of violence.

The notion of the existence of German militarism seems to be quite

justified, although the Emperor and the Crown Prince played the

smallest part in it. But it seems to me an altogether wrong conception

that militarism is a speciality of Germany. The negotiations at

Versailles must now have convinced the general public that it is not

only on the banks of the Spree that militarism reigns.

Germany in former days was never able to understand that on the enemy

continent, by the side of morally unjustified envy, fear and anxiety

as to Germany's plans practically reigned, and that the talk about the

"hard" and "German" peace, about "victory and triumph" was like

throwing oil on the flames of their fears; that in England and France,

too, at one time, there was a current of feeling urging for a peace of

settlement, and that such expressions as the foregoing were highly

detrimental to all pacifist tendencies.

In my opinion the air raids on England may be ranked in the same

category as these expressions. They were carried out with the greatest

heroism by the German fliers, but no other object was gained but to

irritate and anger England and rouse to the utmost resistance all who

otherwise had pacifist tendencies. I said this to Ludendorff when he

called on me at the Ballplatz in the summer of 1917, but it made not

the slightest impression on him.

The _démarche_ for peace made by the Pope and our reply have been

published in the European Press. We accepted the noble proposals made

by the Holy Father. I have therefore nothing to add on that matter.

In the early part of the summer of 1917 the Socialist Conference at

Stockholm had become a practical question. I issued passports to the

representatives of our Social Democrats, and had several difficulties

to overcome in connection therewith. My own standpoint is made clear

by the following letter to Tisza.

(_Not dated._)

DEAR FRIEND,--I hear that you do not approve of the delegation of

Socialists for Stockholm. To begin with, it is not a delegation.

The men came to me of their own accord and applied for permission

to travel, which I granted. Adler, Ellenbogen and Seitz were

there, Renner as well. The two first are capable men, and I value

them in spite of the differences that exist between us. The two

last are not well known to me. But all are genuinely desirous of

peace, and Adler in particular does not wish the downfall of the

Empire.

If they secure peace it will be a socialistic one, and the Emperor

will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear

friend, that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor

will have to pay still more; you may be sure of that.

Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my

prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved

to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service

but the conditions surrounding it that must be blamed for the war

not coming to an end.

If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they

would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been

allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace.

Everyone is indignant with me here, particularly in the

Herrenhaus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to

"buy" the Socialists by promising to lower the Customs dues if

they returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but

that has no connection with Stockholm, "Sozie" and peace.

I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the

death-blow to the Customs dues--but I felt rather like Daniel in

the lions' den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very

indignant. The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside

Trnka is the Prime Minister Clam.

Consequently, this contention that they have been deprived of the

octroi owing to my love for the "Sozies" angers them still more,

but the contention is false.

You, my dear friend, are doubly wrong. In the first place, we

shall be forced to have Socialist policy after the war whether it

is welcome or not, and I consider it extremely important to

prepare the Social Democrats for it. Socialist policy is the

valve we are bound to open in order to let off the superfluous

steam, otherwise the boiler will burst. In the second place, none

of us Ministers can take upon ourselves the false pretence of

using _sabotage_ with regard to peace. The nations may perhaps

tolerate the tortures of war for a while, but only if they

understand and have the conviction that it cannot be

otherwise--that a _vis major_ predominates; in other words, that

peace can fail owing to circumstances, but not owing to the ill

will or stupidity of the Ministers.

The German-Bohemian Deputy, K.H. Wolf, made a scene when the

speech from the throne was read in the "Burg"; he declared that we

were mad and would have to account for it to the delegation, and

made many other equally pleasant remarks, but he had also come to

a wrong conclusion about the Customs dues and Stockholm.

You are quite right in saying that it is no concern of Germany's

what we do in the interior. But they have not attempted the

slightest interference with the dues. If they are afraid of an

anti-German rate of exchange and, therefore, are in favour of the

dues, we are to a certain extent to blame. The Berlin people are

always afraid of treachery. When a vessel answers the starboard

helm it means she turns to the right, and in order to check this

movement the steersman must put the helm to larboard as the only

way to keep a straight course--he must hold out. Such is the case

of statecraft in Vienna--it is always carried out of the course of

the Alliance.

It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought

feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully.

Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not

carrying it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing

either in London or Paris. But why should I write all this--_you_

share my opinions; I do not need to convert you. We will talk

about Stockholm again.--In true friendship, your old

CZERNIN.

As a matter of fact, Tisza in this instance allowed himself to be

quite converted, and raised no objections as to the Hungarian Social

Democrats. The negative result of the Stockholm Congress is known.

As already mentioned, it is at present still impossible to discuss in

detail the various negotiations and attempts at peace. Besides the

negotiations between Revertera and Armand, other tentative efforts

were made. For instance, the interviews already alluded to between the

Ambassador Mennsdorff and General Smuts, which were referred to in

the English Parliament. I do not consider it right to say more about

the matter here. But I can and will repeat the point of view which was

at the bottom of all our peace efforts since the summer of 1917, and

which finally wrecked them all.

The last report cited reflected the views of the Entente quite

correctly. With Germany there was at present no possibility of

intercourse. France insisted on the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine,

and the entire Entente demanded the abolition of German militarism.

Neither would Germany be allowed to retain her colonies. But Germany

was not yet "ripe" for this demand to be made. In the opinion of the

Entente, therefore, any debate on the subject would be useless. For us

the case was different. The impression prevailed that we could

conclude a separate peace providing we were ready to make sacrifices.

The London terms had created a situation which must be accepted.

Concessions to Roumania, the cession of Trieste and the Trentino, as

well as the German South Tyrol, to Italy, and concessions to the

Southern Slav state would be unavoidable, besides reforms in the

Monarchy on a federal basis. Our answer was that a one-sided

concession of Austro-Hungarian and German territory in that form was,

naturally, not possible. But still we thought that, under certain

premises in the territorial questions, an agreement might perhaps not

meet with insurmountable difficulties. As a matter of course, however,

the Entente were not in a position to make terms such as could only be

laid down by the victor to the vanquished, as we were anything but

beaten, but, in spite of that, we did not cling so firmly to the

frontier posts in the Monarchy.

It might be thought, therefore, that, the Entente being willing, a

settlement of the various interests would be possible; but proposals

such as the giving up of Trieste, Bozen, and Meran were impossible, as

was also the suggestion to make peace behind Germany's back. I

referred to the military situation and the impossibility of anyone

accepting these views of the Entente. I was full of confidence in the

future, and even if that were not the case I could not conclude a

peace in the present situation which the Entente could not dictate in

other terms, even if we were beaten. To lose Trieste and access to the

Adriatic was a totally unacceptable condition, just as much as the

unconditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.

Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the Entente demands were

not couched in the terms of a peace of understanding, but of victory.

Opinion in neutral countries was quite clear on the subject. But in

England especially there were various currents of thought; not

everyone shared Lloyd George's views. The main point was, however, to

lead up to a debate which would tend to clear up many matters, and I

seized the idea eagerly. The greatest difficulty, I was assured by

some, lay in the Entente's assertion that Germany had shown remarkable

military strength, but yet had not been adequately prepared for war;

she had not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or

provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats. The Entente's idea

was that if peace were made now, Germany might perhaps accept even

unfavourable conditions, but it would only be to gain time and make

use of the peace to draw breath before beginning a fresh war. She

would make up for loss of time and "hit out again." The Entente,

therefore, considered the preliminary condition of any peace, or even

of a discussion of terms, to be the certainty of the abolition of

German militarism. I replied that nobody wished for more war, and that

I agreed with the Entente that a guarantee in that connection must be

secured, but that a one-sided disarmament and disbanding of men by

Austria-Hungary and Germany was an impossibility. It might be imagined

what it would be like if one fine day an army, far advanced in the

enemy country, full of confidence and hope and certain of victory, had

to lay down arms and disappear. No one could accept such a proposal.

Meanwhile, a general disarmament of all the Powers was both possible

and necessary. Disarmament, the establishment of courts of arbitration

under international control: that, according to my idea, would present

an acceptable basis. I mentioned my fears that the Entente rulers in

this, as in the territorial question, would not mete out the same

measure to themselves as they intended for us, and unless I had some

guarantee in the matter I should not be in a position to carry the

plan through here and with our Allies; anyhow, it would be worth a

trial.

Long and frequent were the debates on the Central European question,

which was the Entente's terror, as it implied an unlimited increase in

Germany's power. In Paris and London it would presumably be preferred

that the Monarchy should be made independent of Germany, and any

further advances to Berlin on the part of Vienna checked. We rejoined

that to us this was not a new Entente standpoint, but that the

mutilation caused by the resolutions of the Pact of London forced us

to investigate the matter. Apart from the question of honour and duty

to the Alliance, as matters now stood, Germany was fighting almost

more for us than for herself. If Germany to-day, and we knew it,

concluded peace, she would lose Alsace-Lorraine and her military

superiority on land; but we, with our territory, would have to pay the

Italians, Serbians, and Roumanians for their part in the war.

I heard it said on many sides that there were men in the Entente who

readily understood this point of view, but that the Entente nations

would do what they had intended. Italy had based her entry into the

war on promises from London. Roumania also had been given very solid

assurances, and heroic Serbia must be compensated by Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Many, both in Paris and London, regretted the situation

that had arisen through the conference in London, but a treaty is a

treaty, and neither London nor Paris could forsake their Allies.

Meanwhile, it was thought likely in Entente circles that both the new

Serbian and Polish states, probably Roumania as well, would have

certain relations with the Monarchy. Further details respecting such

relations were still unknown. Our reply was: we would not give up

Galicia to Poland, Transylvania and the Bukovina to Roumania, and

Bosnia together with Herzegovina to Serbia, in return for a vague

promise of the closer relations of those states with the pitiful

remains left to us of the Monarchy. We were not impelled thereto by

dynastic interests. I myself had persuaded the Emperor to sacrifice

Galicia to Poland; but in Transylvania there lived so many Germans and

Magyars who simply could not be made a present of, and above all the

concessions, to Italy! I once asked a neutral statesman if he could

understand what was meant by making Austria voluntarily give up the

arch-German Tyrol as far as the Brenner Pass. The storm that would be

let loose by such a peace would uproot more than merely the Minister

who had made the peace. I told my visitor that there were certain

sacrifices which on no conditions could be expected of any living

being. I would not give up German Tyrol, not even though we were still

more unfavourably situated. I reminded him of a picture that

represented wolves chasing a sledge. One by one the driver threw out

fur, coat, and whatever else he had to the pack to check them and save

himself--but he could not throw his own child to them: rather would he

suffer to the last gasp. That was how I felt about Trieste and the

German Tyrol. We were not in the position of the man in the sledge,

for, thank God, we had our arms and could beat off the wolves; but

even in the extremest emergency, never would I accept a peace that

deprived us of Bozen and Meran.

My listener did not disagree with my argument, but could see no end to

the war in that way. England was ready to carry on the war for another

ten years and, in any case, would crush Germany. Not the German

people, for whom no hatred was felt--always the same repetition of

that deceptive argument--but German militarism. England was in a

condition of constraint. Repeatedly it had been said that if Germany

were not defeated in this war she would continue with still more

extensive armaments. That was the firm belief in London; she would

then, in a few years, have not 100, but 1,000, U-boats, and then

England would be lost. Then England was also fighting for her own

existence, and her will was iron. She knew the task would be a hard

one, but it would not crush her. In London they cite again the

example of the wars of Napoleon, and conclude with: "What man has done

man can do again."

This fear of Prussian militarism was noticeable on all occasions, and

the suggestion constantly was put forward that if we were to declare

ourselves satisfied with a general disarmament, that in itself would

be a great advantage and an important step towards peace.

My speech on October 2, 1917, at Budapest, on the necessity of

securing a reorganised world was prompted by the argument that

militarism was the greatest obstacle in the way of any advance in that

direction.

At Budapest on that occasion I was addressing an audience of party

leaders. I had to take into consideration that too pacifist a tone

would have an effect at home and abroad contrary to my purpose. At

home the lesser powers of resistance would be still further paralysed,

and abroad it would be taken as the end of our capacity for fighting,

and would further check all friendly intentions.

The passage in my speech relating to the securing of a new world

organisation is as follows:--

The great French statesman, Talleyrand, is supposed to have said:

words are merely to conceal thoughts. It may be that it was true

respecting the diplomacy of his century, but I cannot imagine a

maxim less suited to the present day. The millions who are

fighting, whether in the trenches or behind the lines, wish to

know why and wherefore they are fighting. They have a right to

know why peace, which all the world is longing for, has not yet

been made.

When I entered upon office I seized the first opportunity openly

to state that we should commit no violence, but that we should

tolerate none, and that we were ready to enter into peace

negotiations as soon as our enemies accepted the point of view of

a peace of understanding. I think I have thus clearly explained,

though on broad lines only, the peace idea of the Austro-Hungarian

Monarchy. Many at home and also in friendly countries abroad have

reproached me for speaking so openly. The arguments of the said

critical gentlemen have only confirmed my belief in the justness

of my views. I take nothing back of what I said, convinced as I am

that the great majority of people here and in Austria approve my

attitude. Following on these introductory remarks, I feel called

upon to-day to tell the public how the Imperial and Royal

Government will deal with the further development of the utterly

distorted European conditions.

Our programme for the reconstruction of the world organisation,

preferably to be called the building of a new world organisation,

is given in our answer to the peace Note of the Holy Father. It,

therefore, only remains for me to-day to complete the programme

and, above all, to state what were the considerations that decided

us to accept the principles that overthrow the former system. It

will come as a surprise to many, and perhaps appear

incomprehensible, that the Central Powers, and especially

Austria-Hungary, should be willing to desist from future military

armament, as it is only their military power that has protected

them through these trying years against vastly superior forces.

Not only has the war created new factors and conditions, but it

has also led to new conceptions which have shattered the

foundations of former European policy. Among many other political

theses, the one which held that Austria-Hungary was an expiring

state has vanished. The dogma of the impending collapse of the

Monarchy was what made our position in Europe more difficult and

caused all the misunderstanding concerning our vital needs. But

having shown ourselves in this war to be thoroughly sound and, at

any rate, of equal standing, it follows that we can reckon now on

a proper understanding of our vital needs in Europe and that no

hopes are left of being able to beat us down by force of arms.

Until the moment had arrived when this could be proved, we could

not do without the protection of armaments nor expose ourselves to

unfavourable treatment in the matters vital to us produced by the

legend of our impending collapse. But from that moment, we have

been in the position simultaneously with our enemies to lay down

arms and settle our difficulties peacefully and by arbitration.

This being recognised by the world affords us the possibility of

not only accepting the plan of disarmament and a court of

arbitration, but, as you, gentlemen, are aware, of working with

all our energy for its realisation, as we have for some time past.

After this war Europe must without doubt be placed on a new

political basis, the permanency of which can be guaranteed. This

basis will, I believe, be of a fourfold nature:

In the first place, it must furnish a guarantee that there shall

be no war of revenge on any side; we must make sure that we can

bequeath to our children's children the knowledge that they will

be spared the horrors of a time similar to that which we have

undergone. No shifting of power in the belligerent states can

achieve that. The only manner by which it can be attained is

international disarmament throughout the world and acceptance of

the principle of arbitration. It is needless to say that these

measures for disarmament must not be confined to one separate

state or to a single group of Powers, and that they apply equally

to land, water and air. War as a factor in policy must be

combated. A general, uniform and progressive disarmament of all

states in the world must be established on an international basis

and under international control, and the defensive forces limited

to the utmost. I am well aware that this object will be difficult

to achieve and that the path that leads thereto is long and thorny

and full of difficulties. And yet I am firmly convinced it is a

path that must be trodden and will be trodden, no matter whether

it is approved of individuals or not. It is a great mistake to

imagine that after such a war the world can begin from where it

left off in 1914. A catastrophe such as this war does not pass by

and leave no trace, and the most terrible misfortune that could

happen to us would be if the race for armaments were to continue

after the conclusion of peace, for it would mean the economic ruin

of all states. Before the war began the military burdens to be

borne were heavy--though we specially note that Austria-Hungary

was far from being on a high level of military preparedness when

we were surprised by the outbreak of war, and it was only during

the war that she resumed her armaments--but after this war an open

competition in armaments would render state burdens all round

simply intolerable. In order to keep a high standard of armaments

in open competition all the states would have to secure a tenfold

supply of everything--ten times the artillery, munition factories,

vessels and U-boats of former days, and also many more soldiers to

work the machinery. The annual military budget of all the Great

Powers would comprise many milliards--it would be impossible with

all the other burdens which the belligerent states will have to

bear after peace is concluded. This expense, I repeat, would mean

the ruin of the nations. To return, however, to the relatively

limited armaments in existence previous to 1914 would be quite

impossible for any individual state, which would be so far behind

that its military strength would not count. The expense incurred

would be futile. But were it possible to return to the relatively

low level of armaments in 1914, that in itself would signify an

international lowering of armaments. But then there would be no

sense in not going further and practically disarming altogether.

There is but one egress from this narrow defile: the absolute

international disarmament of the world. There is no longer any

object in such colossal fleets if the states of the world

guarantee the freedom of the seas, and armies must be reduced to

the lowest limit requisite for the maintenance of order in the

interior. This will only be possible on an international basis;

that is, under international control. Every state will have to

cede some of its independence to ensure a world peace. The present

generation will probably not live to see this great pacifist

movement fully completed. It cannot be carried out rapidly, but I

consider it our duty to put ourselves at the head of the movement

and do all that lies in human power to hasten its achievement. The

conclusion of peace will establish the fundamental principles.

If the first principle be laid down as the compulsory

international arbitration system as well as general disarmament on

land, the second one must be that of the freedom of the high seas

and disarmament at sea. I purposely say the high seas, as I do not

extend the idea to straits or channels, and I readily allow that

special rules and regulations must be laid down for the connecting

sea routes. If these first two factors have been settled and

assured, any reason for territorial adjustments on the plea of

ensuring national safety is done away with, and this forms the

third fundamental principle of the new international basis. This

idea is the gist of the beautiful and sublime Note that His

Holiness the Pope addressed to the whole world. We have not gone

to war to make conquests, and we have no aggressive plans. If the

international disarmament that we so heartily are longing for be

adopted by our present enemies and becomes a fact, then we are in

no need of assurances of territorial safety; in that case, we can

give up the idea of expanding the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,

provided, of course, that the enemy has entirely evacuated our own

territory.

The fourth principle to enforce in order to ensure a free and

peaceful development of the world after the hard times we have

experienced is the free economic participation by everyone and the

unconditional avoidance of an economic war; a war of that nature

must be excluded from all future contingencies. Before we conclude

peace we must have the positive assurance that our present enemies

have given up that idea.

Those, my honourable friends, are the principles of the new world

organisation as it presents itself to me, and they are all based

on general disarmament. Germany, in her answer to the Papal Note,

has also positively recognised the idea of a general disarmament.

Our present enemies have likewise, partly at any rate, adopted

these principles. I differ from Lloyd George in most points, but

agree thoroughly on one--that there nevermore should be a war of

revenge.

The impression made by my speech on the Entente surpassed the most

pessimistic expectations. In order not to approach too closely the

subject of their own disarmament, my propositions were said to be

hypocritical and a peace trap. This needs no comment.

Had the Entente replied that I must obtain the support of and secure a

guarantee from Germany that she would disarm, it would have been an

opportunity for me, with the help of the nations, to exercise the

greatest possible pressure on Germany's leaders. But the sword was

knocked out of my hand by the Entente themselves, for the retort came

from Berlin: Here is the proof that the Entente rejects our offer of

disarmament as they reject everything coming from us. There is only

one way out of it--a fight to the end and then victory.

Again did the Entente force the peoples of the Central Powers to side

unconditionally with the generals.

Never in the whole term of my office did I receive so many letters as

after my speech--both for and against, with both sides equally

impetuous. "Death sentences" from Germany were showered on me; scorn

and contempt alternated with genuine sympathy and agreement.

In the autumn of 1917 the peace movement diminished visibly. The

U-boat fiasco was very obvious. England saw that she was able to

overcome the danger. The German military leaders still spoke of the

positively expected successes of their submarines, but the tenor of

their predictions became very different. There was no longer any talk

of the downfall of England within a few months. A new winter campaign

was almost a certainty, and yet the Germans insisted that though

mistakes occurred in the term fixed, this was not so respecting the

ultimate effect of the U-boats and that England would collapse. The

U-boat warfare had achieved this amount of success, that the Western

front remained intact, though it would otherwise have fallen.

The military situation underwent a change in the autumn. The end of

the war in the East was within sight, and the possibility of being

able to fling the enormous masses of troops from the East into the

line in the West, and at last break through there, greatly improved

the situation.

It was not on the sea that the U-boat campaign had brought about a

decision, but it enabled a final decision on land to be made; such was

the new military opinion. Paris and Calais could not be taken.

In these different phases of military hopes and expectation we floated

like a boat on a stormy sea. In order to land in the haven of peace,

we needed a military wave to carry us nearer to the land; then only

could we unfurl the sail of understanding that would help us to reach

the saving shores. As long as the enemy persisted only in dealing with

the crushed and depopulated Central Powers all was in vain.

I never believed in the success of the U-boat warfare. I believed in a

break-through on the Western front, and during the winter of 1917-1918

lived in the hope that by such means we might break the obstinate love

of destruction in our enemies.

As long as our adversaries' peace terms remained the same peace was

impossible, as was also the bringing of any outside pressure to bear

on Germany, for it was true that "the German army was fighting more to

support Austria-Hungary than it was for its own existence."

Threatening and breathing disaster, the decisions of the Pact of

London confronted us. They forced us always to take up arms again, and

drove us back into the field.

* * * * *

At the time of writing these lines, in June, 1919, Austria has long

ceased to exist. There is only left now a small, impoverished,

wretched land called German-Austria, a country without army or money;

helpless, starving, and wellnigh in despair. This country has been

told of the peace terms at St. Germain. It has been told it must give

up the Tyrol as to be handed over to Italy. And defenceless and

helpless as it is, it sends up a cry of despair and frantic grief. One

voice only is heard--such peace is impossible!

How could an Austrian Government accept the dictates of London at a

time when our armies stood far advanced in enemy country, unvanquished

and unbroken, when we had for Ally the strongest land Power in the

world, and when the greatest generals of the war so firmly believed in

the break-through and in final victory?

To demand that in 1917 or 1918 I should have accepted peace terms

which in 1919 were rejected by the whole of the German-Austrian people

is sheer madness. But it may be there is method in such madness. The

method of using every means to discredit the "old régime."

* * * * *

In the beginning of August, 1917, an effort was made at a

_rapprochement_ between England and Germany which, unfortunately,

almost immediately broke down.

At the suggestion of England a neutral Power had sounded Germany with

regard to Belgium. Germany replied that she was ready for direct

verbal negotiations with England on the Belgian question. In

transmitting this favourable answer, Germany did not entrust it to the

same neutral Power that had brought the message, but for some unknown

reason confided it to a trusted messenger from another neutral

country. This latter appears to have been guilty of some indiscreet

dealings, and when rumours of the affair reached Paris it caused some

anxiety. It was probably thought there that England was more

interested in the Belgian than in the Alsace-Lorraine question.

The messenger sent from Berlin thought that his task had failed, and

sent word to Berlin that, owing to his errand having been made known,

the opinion among the Entente was that every step taken by Germany was

condemned beforehand to failure.

The Government which had employed the messenger took up the case on

its own initiative, and transmitted the German reply to London. No

answer was ever received from England.

This is the account as given to me _post festum_ by Berlin, and

doubtless reflects Berlin's views. Whether the incident in detail was

exactly as described, or whether many more hitherto unknown events

took place, has not been proved.

During the war all happenings on the other side of the trenches were

looked upon with dim and gloomy eyes as through a veil, and, according

to news received by me later, it was not clear whether England had

sent an answer. Whether it was dispatched and held up on the way, or

what became of it I never knew. It is said never to have reached

Berlin.

A warlike speech by Asquith on September 27 appears to be connected

with this unsuccessful attempt, and served to calm the Allies.

It appears extremely doubtful to me, however, whether this advance

would have led to anything, had the occasion been more favourable. The

previously mentioned letter of the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis dates

from those August days, a letter referring to Belgian projects which

were very far removed from the English ideas on the subject. And even

if it had been possible to settle the Belgian question, there would

have been that of Alsace-Lorraine, which linked France and England

together, and, first and foremost, the question of disarmament. The

chasm that divided the two camps would have grown so wide that no

bridge could possibly have spanned it.

Not until January, 1918, did I learn the English version. According to

that, the Germans are said to have taken the first steps, and the

English were not disinclined to listen, but heard nothing further. It

was stated in _Vorwärts_ that the suggestion was made at the

instigation of the Cabinet Council, but that subsequently military

influence gained the upper hand. The episode did not tend to improve

the frame of mind of the leading men in England.

In the early summer of 1917 conditions seemed favourable for peace and

the hope of arriving at an understanding, though still far distant,

was not exactly a Utopian dream. How far the hope of splitting our

group and the failure of the U-boat warfare may have contributed to

stiffen the desire for war in the Entente countries cannot definitely

be stated. Both factors had a share in it. Before we came to a

deadlock in the negotiations, the position was such that even in case

of a separate peace we should have been compelled to accept the terms

of the conference of London. Whether the Entente would have abandoned

that basis if we had not veered from the straight course, and by

unofficial cross-purposes become caught in the toils of separatist

desires, but had quickly and consistently carried out our task, is not

proved, and never will be. After the débâcle in the winter of 1918-19

it was intimated to me as a fact that when Clemenceau came into power

a peace of understanding with Germany became out of the question. His

standpoint was that Germany must be definitely vanquished and crushed.

Our negotiations, however, had begun under Briand, and Clemenceau only

came into power when the peace negotiations had become entangled and

were beginning to falter.

With regard to Austria-Hungary, both France and England would have

welcomed a separate peace on our part, even during Clemenceau's period

of office; but in that case we should have had to accept the terms of

the London conference.

Such was the peace question then. How it would have developed if no

misleading policy had come into being naturally cannot be stated.

I am not putting forward suppositions but confirming facts. And the

fact remains that the failure of the U-boat campaign on the one hand,

and a policy carried on behind the backs of the responsible men on the

other hand, were the reasons why the favourable moment passed and the

peace efforts were checked. And I herewith repeat that this fact does

not in itself prove that peace negotiations would not also have failed

later if the two reasons mentioned above had not existed.

It became quite clear in the autumn that the war would have to

continue. In my speeches to delegations I endeavoured to leave no

doubt that we were faithful to our Allies. When I said "I see no

difference between Strassburg and Trieste," I said it chiefly for

Sofia and Constantinople, for the overthrow of the Quadruple Alliance

was the greatest danger. I still hoped to be able to prop the

trembling foundations of the Alliance policy, and either to secure a

general peace in the East, where the military opposition was giving

way, or to see it draw nearer through the anticipated German

break-through on the Western front.

Several months after my dismissal in the summer of 1918 I spoke in the

Herrenhaus on foreign policy, and warned everyone present against

trying to undermine the Quadruple Alliance. When I declared that

"honour, duty to the Alliance, and the call for self-preservation

compel us to fight by the side of Germany," I was misunderstood. It

did not seem as though the public realised that the moment the Entente

thought the Quadruple Alliance was about to break up, from that moment

our cause was lost. Had the public no knowledge of the London

agreement? Did they not know that a separate peace would hand us over

totally defenceless to those cruel conditions? Did they not realise

that the German army was the shield that afforded us the last and only

possibility of escaping the fate of being broken up?

My successor steered the same course as I had done, doubtless from the

same reasons of honour and the call for self-preservation. I have no

particulars as to what occurred in the summer of 1918.

Afterwards events followed in rapid succession. First came our

terrible defeat in Italy, then the Entente break-through on the

Western front, and finally the Bulgarian secession, which had

gradually been approaching since the summer of 1917.

3

As is the case in all countries, among the Entente during the war

there were many and varied currents of thought. When Clemenceau came

into office the definite destruction of Germany was the dominant war

aim.

To those who neither see nor hear the secret information which a

Foreign Minister naturally has at his disposal, it may appear as

though the Entente, in the question of crushing Germany's military

strength, had sometimes been ready to make concessions. I think that

this may have been the case in the spring of 1917, but not later, when

any such hope was deceptive. Lansdowne in particular spoke and wrote

in a somewhat friendly tone, but Lloyd George was the determining

influence in England.

When sounding England on different occasions, I endeavoured to

discover by what means the dissolution of the military power in

Germany was to be or could be guaranteed--and I invariably came to an

_impasse_. It was never explained how England intended to carry out

the proposal.

The truth is that there is no way of disarming a strong and determined

people except by defeating them, but such an aim was not to be openly

admitted to us in the preliminary dealings. The delegates could not

suggest any suitable mode of discussion, and no other proposals could

lead to a decision.

Lansdowne, and perhaps Asquith as well, would have been content with a

parliamentary régime which would have deprived the Emperor of power

and given it to the Reichstag. Not so Lloyd George; at least, not

later. The English Prime Minister's well-known speech, "A disarmament

treaty with Germany would be a treaty between a fox and many geese,"

conveyed what he really thought.

After my Budapest speech, which was treated with such scorn and

contempt in the Press and by public opinion on the other side of the

Channel, word was sent to me from an English source that it was said

the "Czernin scheme" might settle the question. But again it was not

Lloyd George who said that.

Owing to the extreme distrust that Clemenceau, the English Prime

Minister, and with them the great majority in France and England, had

of Germany's intentions, no measure could be devised that would have

given London and Paris a sufficient guarantee for a future peaceful

policy. From the summer of 1917, no matter what Germany had proposed,

Lloyd George would always have rejected it as inadequate.

In consequence of this it was quite immaterial later to the course of

the war that Germany not only did nothing whatever to allay English

fears, but, on the contrary, poured oil in the fire and fanned the

flames.

Germany, the leading military Power in the war, never for one moment

thought of agreeing to disarmament under international control. After

my speech in Budapest I was received in Berlin not in an unfriendly

manner, but with a sort of pity, as some poor insane person might be

treated. The subject was avoided as much as possible. Erzberger alone

told me of his complete agreement with me.

Had Germany been victorious her militarism would have increased

enormously. In the summer of 1917 I spoke to several generals of high

standing on the Western front, who unanimously declared that after the

war armaments must be maintained, but on a very much greater scale.

They compared this war with the first Punic War. It would be continued

and its continuation be prepared for; in short, the tactics of

Versailles. The standard of violence must be planted, and would be the

banner of the generals, the Pan-Germans, the Fatherland Party, etc.

etc. They thought as little about a reconciliation of the nations

after the war as did the Supreme Council of Four at Versailles, and

Emperor, Government and Reichstag floundered helplessly in this

torrent of violent purpose.

The military spirit flourished on the Spree as it is doing now on the

Seine and the Thames. Lloyd George and Unter den Linden in Berlin.

The only difference between Foch and Ludendorff is that the one is a

Frenchman and the other a German; as men they are as like as two peas.

The Entente is victorious, and many millions are delighted and declare

that the policy of Might is justified. The future only can show

whether this is not a terrible mistake. The lives of hundreds of

thousands of young, hopeful men who have fallen might have been saved

if in 1917 peace had been made possible for us. The triumph of victory

cannot call them back to life again. It appears to me that the Entente

has conquered too much, too thoroughly. The madness of expiring

militarism, in spite of all its orgies, has perhaps celebrated its

last triumph at Versailles.

Postscript.

Taking it altogether, the real historical truth concerning the peace

movement is that, in general, neither the Entente nor the ruling,

all-powerful military party in Germany wished for a peace of

understanding. They both wished to be victorious and to enforce a

peace of violence on the defeated adversary. The leading men in

Germany--Ludendorff above all--never had a genuine intention of

releasing Belgium in an economic and political sense; neither would

they agree to any sacrifices. They wished to conquer in the East and

the West, and their arbitrary tendencies counteracted the pacifist

leaning of the Entente as soon as there were the slightest indications

of it. On the other hand, the leading men in the Entente--Clemenceau

from the first and Lloyd George later--were firmly resolved to crush

Germany, and therefore profited by the continuous German threats to

suppress all pacifist movements in their own countries, always ready

to prove that a peace of understanding with Berlin would be a "pact

between the fox and the geese."

Thanks to the attitude of the leading Ministers in Germany, the

Entente was fully persuaded that an understanding with Germany was

quite out of the question, and insisted obstinately on peace terms

which could not be accepted by a Germany still unbeaten. This closes

the _circular vitiosus_ which paralysed all negotiating activities.

_We_ were wedged in between these two movements and unable to strike

out for ourselves, because the Entente, bound by their promises to

their Allies, had already disposed of us by the Pact of London and the

undertakings to Roumania and Serbia. We therefore _could_ not exercise

extreme pressure on Germany, as we were unable to effect the annulment

of those treaties.

In the early summer of 1917 the possibility of an understanding

_seemed_ to show itself on the horizon, but it was wrecked by the

previously mentioned events.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] Helfferich's _exposé_ is reproduced in the Appendix. (See p. 288.)

[9] At this time I did not know that my secret report to the Emperor

was handed over to Herr Erzberger and not kept secret by him. (Later it

was made public through the revelations of Count Wedel.)

[10] The disclosures made by Count Wedel and Helfferich concerning

Erzberger are only a link in the chain.