THE U-BOAT WARFARE
1
My appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs was thought by many to
indicate that the Emperor Charles was carrying out the political
wishes of his uncle, Ferdinand. Although it had been the Archduke's
intention to have made me his Minister for Foreign Affairs, my
appointment to the post by the Emperor Charles had nothing to do with
that plan. It was due, above all, to his strong desire to get rid of
Count Burian and to the lack of other candidates whom he considered
suitable. The Red Book that was published by Count Burian after the
outbreak of war with Roumania may have attracted the Emperor's
attention to me.
Although the Emperor, while still Archduke, was for several years my
nearest neighbour in Bohemia--he was stationed at Brandeis, on the
Elbe--we never became more closely acquainted. In all those years he
was not more than once or twice at my house, and they were visits of
no political significance. It was not until the first winter of the
war, when I went from Roumania to the Headquarters at Teschen, that
the then Archduke invited me to make the return journey with him.
During this railway journey that lasted several hours politics formed
the chief subject of conversation, though chiefly concerning Roumania
and the Balkan questions. In any case I was never one of those who
were in the Archduke's confidence, and my call to the Ballplatz came
as a complete surprise.
At my first audience, too, we conversed at great length on Roumania
and on the question whether the war with Bucharest could have been
averted or not.
The Emperor was then still under the influence of our first peace
offer so curtly rejected by the Entente. At the German Headquarters at
Pless, where I arrived a few days later, I found the prevailing
atmosphere largely influenced by the Entente's answer. Hindenburg and
Ludendorff, who were apparently opposed to Burian's _démarche_ for
peace, merely remarked to me that a definite victory presented a
possibility of ending the war, and the Emperor William said that he
had offered his hand in peace but that the Entente had given him a
slap in the face, and there was nothing for it now but war to the
uttermost.
It was at this time that the question of the unrestricted U-boat
warfare began to be mooted. At first it was the German Navy only, and
Tirpitz in particular, who untiringly advocated the plan.
Hohenlohe,[5] who, thanks to his excellent connections, was always
very well informed, wrote, several weeks before the fateful decision
was taken, that the German Navy was determined and bent on that aim.
Bethmann and Zimmermann were both decidedly against it. It was
entirely in keeping with the prudent wisdom of the former not to risk
such experiments; Bethmann was an absolutely dependable, honourable
and capable partner, but the unbounded growth of the military
autocracy must be imputed to his natural tendency to conciliate. He
was powerless against Ludendorff and little by little was turned aside
by him. My first visit to Berlin afforded me the opportunity of
thoroughly discussing the U-boat question with the Imperial
Chancellor, and we were quite agreed in our disapproval of that method
of warfare. At all events, Bethmann pointed out that such essentially
military matters should in the first instance be left to military
decision, as they alone were able to form a correct estimate of the
result, and these reflections made me fear from the very first that
all reasonable political scruples would be upset by military
arguments. On this my first visit to Berlin, when this question
naturally was the dominating one, the Chancellor explained to me how
difficult his position was, because the military leaders, both on land
and at sea, declared that if the unrestricted U-boat warfare were not
carried out they would not be able to guarantee the Western front.
They thus brought an iron pressure to bear on him, for how could he,
the Chancellor, undertake to guarantee that the Western front could
hold out? As a matter of fact, the danger of introducing the
unrestricted U-boat campaign became greater and greater, and the
reports sent by Hohenlohe left no doubt as to the further development
of affairs in Berlin.
On January 12 he reported as follows:
The question of the extension of the U-boat warfare, as Your
Excellency is aware from the last discussions in Berlin, becomes
daily more acute.
On the one hand, all leading military and naval authorities insist
on making use of this means as speedily as possible, as they
declare it will end the war much more rapidly; on the other hand,
all statesmen have grave fears as to what effect it will have on
America and other neutrals.
The Supreme Military Command declares that a new offensive on a
very large scale is imminent in the West and that the armies which
are to resist this attack will not be able to understand why the
navy should not do all that lies in its power to prevent, or at
any rate to decrease, the reserves and ammunition being sent to
our adversaries. The absence of co-operation on the part of the
navy in the terrible battles the troops on the Western front will
again have to face will have a most _injurious_ effect on their
_moral_.
The objections put forward as to the effect the proceeding might
have on America are met in military circles by the assumption that
America will take good care not to go to war; that she, in fact,
would not be able to do so. The unfortunate failure of the United
States military machine in the conflict with Mexico clearly proves
what is to be expected from America in that respect. Even a
possible breaking off relations with America does not necessarily
signify war.
Meanwhile all the leading naval authorities reassert that they may
be relied on, even though they are not considered capable of
crushing England, at least to be able, _before_ America can come
in, so to weaken the British Island Empire that only one desire
will be left to English politicians, that of seating themselves
with us at the Conference table.
To this the Chancellor asked who would give him a guarantee that
the navy was right and in what position should we find ourselves
in case the admirals were mistaken, whereupon the Admiralty
promptly asked what sort of position the Chancellor expected to
find when autumn arrived without having made a proper use of the
U-boats and we found ourselves, through exhaustion, compelled to
_beg_ for peace.
And thus the scales went up and down, weighing the chances for or
against the U-boat war, and there was no possibility of positively
determining which decision was the right one.
Doubtless the German Government in the near future will be
constrained to take up a definite standpoint respecting the
question, and it is obvious--whatever the decision may be--that we
also shall be largely involved. Nevertheless, it appears to me
that when the German Government does approach us in that
connection we should act with all possible reserve. As the matter
now stands, a positive decision as to which course is the right
one is not possible. I have, therefore, thought it inadvisable to
take side definitely with either party and thus remove much of the
responsibility from the German Government and render it possible
for them to lay it upon us.
The Imperial and Royal Ambassador,
G. HOHENLOHE, M.P.
The concluding passage of the above cited report had already been
anticipated by me in a telegraphic communication in which I begged the
ambassador with all possible energy to urge the political arguments
opposed to the unrestricted U-boat warfare, which is proved by a
telegram from Hohenlohe on January 13 as follows:
Reply to yesterday's telegram No. 15.
In accordance with the telegram mentioned, and after discussing it
with Baron Flotow, I went to the Secretary of State--not being
able to see the Chancellor to-day--and in conformity with Your
Excellency's intentions called his attention to the fact that we
should participate in the results of the U-boat war just as much
as Germany and that, therefore, the German Government is bound to
listen to us also. All the leading German statesmen know that Your
Excellency, during your stay here, expressed _yourself as opposed
to the movement_, but that I had come once more as Your
Excellency's representative to repeat the _warning against too
hasty action_. I further emphasised all the arguments against the
U-boat warfare, but will not trouble Your Excellency with a
repetition of them, nor yet with the counter-arguments, already
known to Your Excellency, that were put forward by the Secretary.
I gave a brief summary of both these standpoints in my yesterday's
report No. 6 P.
Herr Zimmermann, however, laid special stress on the fact that the
information he was receiving convinced him more and more that
America, especially after the Entente's answer to Mr. Wilson,
which was in the nature of an insult, would very probably not
allow it to come to a breach with the Central Powers.
I did all I possibly could to impress upon him the responsibility
Germany was taking for herself and for us by her decision in this
question, pointing out very particularly that before any decision
was arrived at our opinion from a nautical-technical standpoint
must also be heard, in which the Secretary of State fully
concurred.
I have the feeling that the idea of carrying out the U-boat
warfare is more and more favourably received, and Your Excellency
had the same impression also when in Berlin. The last word as to
the final attitude to be adopted by the German Government will no
doubt come from the military side.
In conformity with the instructions received, _I will nevertheless
uphold with all firmness the political arguments against the
U-boat warfare_.
Baron Flotow will have occasion to meet the Secretary of State
this afternoon.
I had sent Baron Flotow, a Chief of Department, to Berlin at the same
time, in order that he might support all Hohenlohe's efforts and spare
no pains to induce Germany to desist from her purpose.
Flotow sent me the following report on January 15:
After a two-days' stay in Berlin my impression is that the
question of the unrestricted U-boat warfare has again been brought
to the front by the leading men in the German Empire. This
question--according to Herr Zimmermann--under conditions of the
greatest secrecy where the public is concerned, is now under
debate between the heads of the Army and Navy and the Foreign
Office; they insist on a decision. For if the unrestricted U-boat
warfare is to be opened it must be at a time when, in view of the
vast impending Anglo-French offensive on the Western front, it
will make itself felt. The Secretary of State mentioned the month
of February.
I wish in the following account to summarise the reasons put
forward by the Germans for the justification of the unrestricted
U-boat warfare:
Time is against us and favours the Entente; if, therefore, the
Entente can keep up the desire for war there will be still less
prospect of our obtaining a peace on our own terms. The enemy's
last Note to Wilson is again a striking example of their war
energy.
It will be impossible for the Central Powers to continue the war
after 1917 with any prospect of success. Peace must, therefore,
unless it finally has to be proposed by the enemy, be secured in
the course of this year, which means that we must enforce it.
The military situation is unfavourable owing to the impending
Anglo-French offensive, which, it is presumed, will open with
great force, as in the case of the last offensive on the Somme. To
meet the attack, troops will have to be withdrawn from other
fronts. Consequently, an offensive against Russia with intent to
bring that enemy to his knees, which perhaps a year ago would have
been possible, can no longer be reckoned on.
If, therefore, the possibility of enforcing a decision in the East
becomes less and less, an effort must be made to bring it about in
the West, and to do it at a time when the unrestricted U-boat
warfare would affect the coming Anglo-French offensive by impeding
the transport of troops and munitions sailing under a neutral
flag.
In estimating the effect on England of the unrestricted U-boat
warfare, there will be not only the question of hindering the
transport of provisions, but also of curtailing the traffic to
such a degree as would render it impossible for the English to
continue the war. In Italy and in France this will be felt no less
severely. The neutrals, too, will be made to suffer, which,
however, might serve as a pretext to bring about peace.
America will hardly push matters further than breaking off
diplomatic relations; we need not, therefore, count for certain on
a war with the United States.
It must not be overlooked that the United States--as was the case
in regard to Mexico--are not well prepared for war, that their one
anxiety is Japan. Japan would not allow a European war with
America to pass unheeded.
But even if America were to enter the war it would be three to
four months before she could be ready, and in that space of time
peace must have been secured in Europe. According to the estimate
of certain experts (among others, some Dutch corn merchants),
England has only provisions sufficient for six weeks, or three
months at the outside.
It would be possible to carry on the U-boat warfare on England
from fifteen bases in the North Sea, so _that the passage of a
large vessel through to England would be hardly conceivable_.
Traffic in the Channel, even if not entirely stopped, would be
very limited, as travelling conditions in France exclude the
possibility of suitable connection.
And if the unrestricted U-boat warfare once were started, the
terror caused by it (the sinking of the vessels without warning)
would have such an effect that most vessels would not dare to put
to sea.
The above already hints at the rejoinder to be put forward to the
arguments advanced by us against the opening of the unrestricted
U-boat warfare, and also combats the view that the corn supply
from the Argentine is not at the present moment so important for
the United States as would be a prompt opening of the U-boat
campaign, which would mean a general stoppage of all traffic.
The fact that America would not be ready for war before the end of
three months does not exclude the possibility that it might even
be as long as six or eight months, and that she therefore might
join in the European war at a time when, without playing our last
card, it might be possible to end it in a manner that we could
accept. It must not be forgotten, however, that in America we have
to do with an Anglo-Saxon race, which--once it had decided on
war--will enter on it with energy and tenacity, as England did,
who, though unprepared for war as to military matters, can
confront to-day the Germans with an army of millions that commands
respect. I cannot with certainty make any statement as to the
Japanese danger to America at a time when Japan is bound up with
Russia and England through profitable treaties and Germany is shut
out from that part of the world.
Among other things I referred to the great hopes entertained of
the Zeppelins as an efficient weapon of war.
Herr Zimmermann said to me: "Believe me, our fears are no less
than yours; they have given me many sleepless nights. There is no
positive certainty as to the result; we can only make our
calculations. We have not yet arrived at any decision. Show me a
way to obtain a reasonable peace and I would be the first to
reject the idea of the U-boat warfare. As matters now stand, both
I and several others have almost been converted to it."
But whether, in the event of the ruthless U-boat warfare being
decided on, it would be notified in some way, has not yet been
decided.
Zimmermann told me he was considering the advisability of
approaching Wilson, and, while referring to the contemptuous
attitude of the Entente in the peace question, give the President
an explanation of the behaviour of the German Government, and
request him, for the safety of the life and property of American
citizens, to indicate the steamers and shipping lines by which
traffic between America and other neutrals could be maintained.
_Vienna, January 15, 1917._
FLOTOW, M.P.
On January 20 Zimmermann and Admiral Holtzendorff arrived in Vienna,
and a council was held, presided over by the Emperor. Besides the
three above-mentioned, Count Tisza, Count Clam-Martinic, Admiral Haus
and I were also present. Holtzendorff expounded his reasons, which I
recapitulate below. With the exception of Admiral Haus, no one gave
unqualified consent. All the arguments which appear in the official
documents and ministerial protocols were advanced but did not make the
slightest impression on the German representatives. The Emperor, who
took no part in the debate, finally declared that he would decide
later. Under his auspices a further conference was held in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 2 o'clock; the report is as follows:
Report of a conference held January 20, 1917, in the Imperial and
Royal Ministry of Home and Foreign Affairs. Members: Dr.
Zimmermann, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Affairs
Department; Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Naval
Staff; Count Czernin, Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Count Tisza, Royal Hungarian Prime Minister; Count
Clam-Martinic, Imperial and Royal Prime Minister; Admiral Haus,
the German naval attaché in Vienna; Baron von Freyburg, the
Imperial and Royal naval attaché in Berlin; Count B.
Colloredo-Mannsfeld.
On January 20 a discussion took place in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on the question of establishing unrestricted U-boat
warfare.
As evidenced by Admiral v. Holtzendorff's statements, the German
naval authorities hold the standpoint that there exists an
absolute necessity for the quickest possible inauguration of an
unrestricted U-boat campaign. The arguments employed in support of
this thesis are known from the reports of the Imperial and Royal
Ambassador in Berlin (report of 12/1/17 Nr. 6/P, and telegram of
13/1 Nr. 22), and may be summarised in the following sentences:
Lack of time, decreasing human material in the Central Powers,
progressive deterioration of the harvest, impending Anglo-French
offensive on the Western front with improved and increased means
for fighting, and the necessity arising therefrom to prevent or at
least check the reinforcements required for such undertaking, the
impossibility of obtaining a decision on land, the necessity of
raising the _moral_ of the troops by ruthlessly obtained results
and the use of every available means in war, certainty of the
success of an unrestricted U-boat warfare in view of provisions
in England only being sufficient for two to three months, as well
as the stoppage of the munitions output and industrial production
owing to the lack of raw material, the impossibility of supplying
coal to France and Italy, etc., etc.
Concerning the carrying out of the plan, the German Navy owns at
present for that purpose 120 U-boats of the latest type. In view
of the great success achieved by the U-boats at the beginning of
the war, when there were only 19 of an antiquated type, the
present increased numbers of the vessels offer a safe guarantee of
success.
February 1 is suggested on the part of the Germans as the date on
which to start the unrestricted U-boat warfare and also to
announce the blockade of the English coast and the west coast of
France. Every vessel disobeying the order will be torpedoed
without warning. In this manner it is hoped to bring England to
reason within four months, and it must here be added that Admiral
von Holtzendorff _expressis verbis_ guaranteed the results.
As regards the attitude to be taken by the neutrals, leading
German circles, although aware of the danger, hold optimistic
views. It is not thought that either the Scandinavian countries or
Holland will interfere with us, although, in view of the
possibility of such happening, military precautions have been
taken. The measures taken on the Dutch and Danish frontiers will,
in the opinion of the Germans, hold those countries in check, and
the possibility of sharing the fate of Roumania will frighten
them. Indeed, it is expected that there will be a complete
stoppage of all neutral shipping, which in the matter of supplies
for England amounts to 39 per cent. of the cargo space. Meanwhile
concessions will be granted to the neutrals by fixing a time limit
for the withdrawal of such of their vessels as may be at sea on
the opening day of the U-boat warfare.
With regard to America, the Germans are determined, if at all
possible, to prevent the United States from attacking the Central
Powers by adopting a friendly attitude towards America (acting
upon the proposals made at the time of the _Lusitania_ incident),
but they are prepared for and await with calmness whatever
attitude America may adopt. The Germans are, nevertheless, of the
opinion that the United States will not go so far as making a
breach with the Central Powers. If that should occur, America
would be too late and could only come into action after England
had been beaten. America is not prepared for war, which was
clearly shown at the time of the Mexican crisis; she lives in fear
of Japan and has to fight against agricultural and social
difficulties. Besides which, Mr. Wilson is a pacifist, and the
Germans presume that after his election he will adopt a still
more decided tendency that way, for his election will not be due
to the anti-German Eastern States, but to the co-operation of the
Central and Western States that are opposed to war, and to the
Irish and Germans. These considerations, together with the
Entente's insulting answer to President Wilson's peace proposal,
do not point to the probability of America plunging readily into
war.
These, in brief, are the points of view on which the German demand
for the immediate start of the unrestricted U-boat warfare is
based, and which caused the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign
Affairs Department to revise their hitherto objective views.
Both the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian
Prime Minister pointed out what disastrous consequences would
ensue from America's intervention, in a military, moral,
agricultural and financial sense, and great doubt was expressed of
the success of a blockade of England. Count Czernin held that the
Germans overlooked the possibility of lowering the consumption in
England, taking into consideration the fact that since the war
consumption in the countries of the Central Powers had been
reduced by half. Further, Count Czernin referred to the very vague
and by no means convincing data of the German naval authorities.
It was also debated whether a continuation of the U-boat war to
the present extent (the destruction on an average of 400,000 tons
per month) would not be more likely to achieve the desired end,
and if it were not more advisable not to play our last and best
card until all other means had been tried. The possibility of
being able to start a ruthless U-boat warfare hung like a
Damocles' sword over the heads of our adversaries, and would
perhaps be a more effectual means of ending the war than the
reckless use of the U-boat as a weapon of war, carrying with it
the danger of an attack by the neutrals. If the effect expected by
Germany was not realised, which was within the bounds of
possibility, we must be prepared to see the desire for war in the
enemy greatly intensified. However that may be, the vanishing of
the desire for peace must be accepted as an established fact.
Finally, it was pointed out that the arguments recently put
forward by the Germans show a complete _novum_, namely, the danger
on the Western front in view of the great Anglo-French offensive
that is expected. Whereas formerly it was always said that the
attacks of the enemy would be repulsed, it is now considered
necessary to relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy
into the line of action. If these fears are justified, then most
certainly should all other considerations be put on one side and
the risk ensuing from the ruthless employment of the U-boats be
accepted. Both Count Czernin and Count Tisza expressed their
grave doubts in this connection.
To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out the
necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the
neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the
Central Powers' political methods and aims would be presented to
them in a proper light; and then later, after introducing
unrestricted U-boat warfare, it would be seen that no other choice
was left to the peaceful tendencies of the Quadruple Alliance as
the means for a speedy ending of the struggle between the nations.
The leaders of the foreign policy agreed to take the necessary
steps in that direction, and remarked that certain arrangements
had already been made.
Admiral Haus agreed _unreservedly_ with the arguments of the
German Navy, as he declared that _no great anxiety need be felt_
as to the likelihood of America's joining in with military force,
and finally pointed out that, on the part of the Entente, a
ruthless torpedoing of hospital and transport ships had been
practised for some time past in the Adriatic. The Admiral urged
that this fact be properly recognised and dealt with, to which the
Foreign Affairs leaders on both sides gave their consent.
The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conclusion, said
that the definite decision to be taken must be left to the
conclusions arrived at by both sovereigns, whereupon the 26th
inst. was fixed for a meeting to be held for that purpose.
After the general discussion, I had a private talk with the Emperor,
and found that he still had the same aversion to that means of warfare
and the same fears as to the result. We knew, however, that Germany
had definitely made up her mind to start the campaign in any case, and
that all our arguments would be of no practical value. It remained to
be decided whether we should join them or not. Owing to the small
number of our U-boats, our holding aside would not have had any great
effect on the final issue of the experiment, and for a moment I
entertained the idea of proposing to the Emperor that we should
separate from Germany on that one point, although I was aware that it
might lead to the ending of our alliance. But the difficulty was that
the U-boat effort would also have to be carried on in the
Mediterranean in order that it should not lose its effect in the
North Sea. If the Mediterranean remained exempt, the transports would
take that route and proceed by land via Italy, France, and Dover, and
thus render the northern U-boat warfare of no effect. But in order to
carry it on in the Mediterranean, Germany would need our support in
the Adriatic from Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro. If we allowed her at
those places it involved us in the campaign, and if we refused to let
our few U-boats go out, it would be attacking Germany in the rear and
we should become embroiled with her, which would lead to the definite
severance of the Alliance.
This was again one of those instances that prove that when a strong
and a weak nation concert in war, the weak one cannot desist unless it
changes sides entirely and enters into war with its former ally. None
who were in the Government would hear of that, and with a heavy heart
we gave our consent. Bulgaria, who was not affected by this phase of
the war, and had kept up diplomatic relations with America, was
differently situated, being able to stand aside without paralysing the
German plans. Apart from this, I was already persuaded then that
Bulgaria's not joining in would make a bad impression on the outside
world, and would not help her in any way. Although her relations with
America were maintained up to the last, they did not, as a matter of
fact, make her fate easier.
Had we been able to make Germany desist from the unrestricted U-boat
warfare, the advantage would have been very great; whether we joined
in or not was a matter of indifference viewed from the standpoint of
our treatment by the Entente, as is proved by the instance of
Bulgaria. As soon as America had declared war on Germany, a conflict
with us was inevitable in any case, as Austro-Hungarian troops and
artillery were then on the Western front facing Americans. We were
compelled to go to war with America, seeing that Germany was already
at war with her.
It was not possible, therefore, for us to remain in a state of even
nominally peaceful relations with America, such as existed between her
and Bulgaria to the very end of the war.
It is not quite clear when Germany really recognised the fact that
the unrestricted U-boat warfare had no effect, and was thus a terrible
mistake. To the public, as well as to the Allied Cabinets, the German
military authorities continued to profess the greatest optimism, and
when I left my post in April, 1918, the standpoint held in Berlin was
still that England would be defeated by the naval war. Writing on
December 14, 1917, Hohenlohe reported that in competent German circles
the feeling was thoroughly optimistic. I, however, certainly perceived
definite signs of doubt beginning in some German minds, and Ludendorff
in replying to the reproaches I made to him said: "Everything is risky
in war; it is impossible before an operation to be sure of the
results. I admit that the time limit was a mistake, but the final
result will show that I was right." In order to exculpate themselves
all the leaders in Germany declared that America would, in any case,
have gone to war, and that the U-boat had merely given the last
impetus. Whether this is quite true appears doubtful; it cannot either
be asserted or denied positively.
The world has become used to looking upon Hindenburg and Ludendorff as
one; they belonged together. Together they rose to highest power, to
be forcibly separated in their fall. In all business transactions
Ludendorff was in the foreground. He was a great speaker, but always
in a sharp tone, suggestive of the Prussian military system. It
usually aroused a scene, but he seemed to take nothing amiss, and his
anger vanished as rapidly as it broke out. Hindenburg's retiring
modesty made him attractive. Once when we were speaking of the
photographers who besieged every conference in Berlin, the old
gentleman remarked: "I have lived to be seventy, and nobody ever
thought there was anything wonderful about me; now they seem all at
once to have discovered that I have such an interesting head." He was
much more staid and quiet than Ludendorff, nor was he so sensitive to
public opinion as the latter. I remember once how Ludendorff, when I
exhorted him to yield on the peace question, rejoined with vigour:
"The German people wishes for no peace of renunciation, and I do not
intend to end by being pelted with stones. The dynasty would never
survive such a peace." The dynasty has departed, the stones have been
thrown, and the peace of renunciation has become a reality, and is
certainly more terrible than the gloomiest pessimist could ever have
believed!
2
The rupture between America and Germany occurred on February 3, 1917.
The Ambassador, Count Tarnowski, remained in Washington, but was not
received by Wilson, and had intercourse with Lansing only. I still
hoped to maintain these semi-official relations with America, in case
America, in breaking off relations with Germany, might be content with
that and not declare war on her. The German Government would have
preferred our breaking off diplomatic relations simultaneously with
them.
On February 12 Count Wedel called on me, and his request and my
settlement of it appear in the following telegram to Hohenlohe:
_Vienna, Feb. 12, 1917._
To notify Your Excellency.
Count Wedel has been instructed to submit to me the following
three requests from his Government:
(1) Count Tarnowski is not to hand over his credentials until the
situation between Germany and America is clear.
(2) Count Tarnowski must protest to Mr. Wilson against his having
tried to make the neutrals turn against Germany.
(3) On the outbreak of war with Germany Count Tarnowski must be
recalled.
I have refused the first two items and accepted the last.
As we should not have been able to prevent Germany from beginning the
U-boat warfare, the only alternative for us was to use all means in
our power to maintain our relations with America, and thus enable us
later to play the part of mediator, although this could only be for
that period during which America, having broken off relations, had not
yet declared war. My answer of March 5, 1917, to America's request
for an explanation of our standpoint was sent with the object of
preventing America from breaking off relations with us, and also to
keep from the public the knowledge of our divergence from Germany.
This will be found noted in the appendix.[6] It met with success so
far that America continued diplomatic relations with us until April 9,
1917.
[Illustration: COUNT TISZA. _Photo: Stanley's Press Agency._]
I had a very lively correspondence with Stephen Tisza in consequence
of my answer. I received the following letter on March 3:
DEAR FRIEND,--In the interests of the cause I can only greatly
regret that I had no opportunity of appreciating the definite
sense of our _aide-mémoire_ before it was dispatched. Apart from
other less important matters, I cannot conceal my painful surprise
that we repeatedly and expressly admit having given a promise in
our _Ancona_ Note. I am afraid that we have placed ourselves in a
very awkward position with Wilson, which so easily could have been
avoided, as it was not in accordance with my views that we had
given a promise.
An expression of opinion is not a promise. Without wishing to
detract from its moral value, it has nevertheless a different
legal character, and from the point of view of a third person has
no legal authority in favour of that person as a promise.
By unnecessarily having admitted that we gave the Americans a
promise we admit the existence of obligations on our side to them.
In spite of the fine and clever argument in our Note, it will be
easy for the Americans to prove that our present procedure cannot
be reconciled with the previous statement; if the statement was a
promise, then the American Government has the right to look for
the fulfilment of it, and we will then be in an awkward
predicament. I remarked in my notification that I would prefer to
omit the admission that we had made any promise; there would have
been the possibility of recurring to it. By placing this weapon in
their hands we have exposed ourselves to the danger of a
checkmate, and I very much fear that we shall greatly regret it.
Naturally this remains between us. But I was constrained to pour
out my heart to you and justify my request that the text of all
such important State documents which involve such far-reaching
consequences may be sent to me in time for me to study and
comment on them. Believe me, it is really in the interest of the
cause and in every respect can only be for the best. In sincere
friendship, your devoted
TISZA.
_Enclosure._
It may be presumed with some semblance of truth that the peace
wave in America is progressing, and that President Wilson,
influenced thereby, may perhaps be able at any rate to postpone a
decision of a warlike nature. Even though I may be wrong in my
presumption, it lies in our interests to avoid for as long as
possible the rupture of our diplomatic relations with America.
Therefore the answer to the American _aide-mémoire_, to be
dispatched as late as possible, should be so composed as to give
it the appearance of a meritorious handling of the theme put
forward on the American side without falling into the trap of the
question put forward in the _aide-mémoire_.
If we answer yes, then President Wilson will hardly be able to
avoid a breach with the Monarchy. If we give a negative answer we
shall abandon Germany and the standpoint we took up on January 31.
The handle wherewith to grasp evasion of a clear answer is
provided by the _aide-mémoire_ itself, as it identifies our
statements in the _Ancona_ and _Persia_ question with the attitude
of the German Note of May 4, 1916. We should, therefore, be quite
consistent if we, as we did in our Note of December 14, 1915, were
to declare that we should be governed by our own ideas of justice.
In our correspondence with the American Government respecting the
_Ancona_, _Persia_ and _Petrolite_ questions we treated the
concrete case always without going deeper into the individual
principles of legal questions. In our Note of December 29, 1915,
which contains the expression of opinion cited in the
_aide-mémoire_ (it may also be noted that our expression of
opinion was no pledge, as we had promised nothing nor taken any
obligation upon ourselves), the Austrian Government distinctly
stated that they would refer later to the difficult international
questions connected with the U-boat warfare.
Present war conditions did not appear suited to such a discussion.
In consequence, however, of the dealings of our enemies, events
have occurred and a state of things been brought about which, on
our side also, renders a more intense application of the U-boat
question unavoidable. Our merchantmen in the Adriatic, whenever
attainable, were constantly torpedoed without warning by the
enemy. Our adversaries have thus adopted the standard of the most
aggravated and unrestricted U-boat warfare without the neutrals
offering any resistance.
The Entente when laying their minefields displayed the same
ruthlessness towards free shipping and the lives of neutrals.
Mines are considered as a recognised weapon for the definite
protection of the home coast and ports, also as a means of
blockading an enemy port. But the use made of them as an
aggressive factor in this war is quite a new feature, for vast
areas of open sea on the route of the world's traffic were
converted into minefields impassable for the neutrals except at
the greatest danger of their lives.
There is no question but that that is a far greater check to the
freedom of movement and a greater obstacle to neutral interests
than establishing the unrestricted U-boat warfare within a limited
and clearly marked-out zone, leaving open channels for neutral
shipping, and by other measures giving due consideration to the
interests of the neutrals.
Just at the moment when the President's appeal to the entire
belligerent world coincided with the spontaneous statement of our
group, in which we gave a solemn proof of our willingness to
conclude a just peace and one acceptable by our enemies, a fresh
and larger minefield was laid down in the North Sea on the route
of the world's traffic, and, casting ridicule on the noble
initiative of the United States, a war of destruction against our
groups of Powers was announced by the Entente.
We urge the great aims that inspired the action of the American
Government: the quickest possible cessation of the fearful
slaughter of men and the founding of an honourable, lasting and
blessed peace by combating with the greatest energy our enemies'
furious war for conquest. The course we pursue leads to the common
aims of ourselves and the American Government, and we cannot give
up the hope of finding understanding in the people and the
Government of the United States.
TISZA.
I answered as follows:
_March 5._
DEAR FRIEND,--I cannot agree with you. After the first _Ancona_
Note you veered round and declared in a second Note that "we
agreed with the German standpoint in the main"--that was an
obvious yielding and contained a hidden promise.
I do not think that any legal wiles will dupe the Americans, and
if we were to deny the promise it would not advance us any
further.
But, secondly and principally, it is altogether impossible with
words to make the Americans desist from war if they wish it;
either they will make straight for war and then no Notes will
avail, or they will seek a pretext to escape the war danger and
will find it in our Note.
So much for the merits of the matter.
What you demand is technically impossible. The Note was not easy
to compile. I had to alter it entirely as time went on; His
Majesty then wished to see it, made some alterations and
sanctioned it. Meanwhile Penfield[7] importuned me and telegraphed
even a week ago to America to reassure his people; the Germans,
too, had to be won over for that particular passage.
You know how ready I am to discuss important matters with you, but
_ultra posse nemo tenetur_--it was physically impossible to upset
everything again and to expect His Majesty to alter his views.
In true friendship, your
CZERNIN.
I thereupon, on March 14, received the following answer from Tisza:
DEAR FRIEND,--I also note with genuine pleasure the success of
your American _aide-mémoire_ (meaning thereby America's resolve
not to break off relations with us). But it does not alter my
opinion that it was a pity to admit that a pledge had been given.
It may be requited at a later stage of the controversy, and it
would have been easy not to broach the subject for the moment.
Do you think me very obstinate? I have not suppressed the final
word in our retrospective controversy so that you should not think
me better than I am.
Au revoir, in true friendship, your
TISZA.
Tisza was strongly opposed to the U-boat warfare, and only tolerated
it from reasons of _vis major_, because we could not prevent the
German military leaders from adopting the measure, and because he, and
I too, were convinced that "not joining in" would have been of no
advantage to us.
Not until very much later--in fact, not until after the war--did I
learn from a reliable source that Germany, with an incomprehensible
misunderstanding of the situation, had restricted the building of more
U-boats during the war. The Secretary of State, Capelle, was
approached by competent naval technical experts, who told him that, by
stopping the building of all other vessels, a fivefold number of
U-boats could be built. Capelle rejected the proposal on the pretext
"that nobody would know what to do with so many U-boats when the war
was at an end." Germany had, as mentioned, 100 submarines; had she
possessed 500, she might have achieved her aims.
I only heard this in the winter of 1918, but it was from a source from
which I invariably gleaned correct information.
Seldom has any military action called forth such indignation as the
sinking, without warning, of enemy ships. And yet the observer who
judges from an objective point of view must admit that the waging war
on women and children was not begun by us, but by our enemies when
they enforced the blockade. Millions have perished in the domains of
the Central Powers through the blockade, and chiefly the poorest and
weakest people--the greater part women and children--were the victims.
If, to meet the argument, it be asserted that the Central Powers were
as a besieged fortress, and that in 1870 the Germans starved Paris in
similar fashion, there is certainly some truth in the argument. But it
is just as true--as stated in the Note of March 5--that in a war on
land no regard is ever paid to civilians who venture into the war
zone, and that no reason is apparent why a war at sea should be
subject to different moral conditions. When a town or village is
within the range of battle, the fact has never prevented the artillery
from acting in spite of the danger to the women and children. But in
the present instance, the non-combatants of the enemy States who are
in danger can easily escape it by not undertaking a sea voyage.
Since the débâcle in the winter of 1918, I have thoroughly discussed
the matter with English friends of long standing, and found that their
standpoint was--that it was not the U-boat warfare in itself that had
roused the greatest indignation, but the cruel nature of the
proceedings so opposed to international law. Also, the torpedoing of
hospital ships by the Germans, and the firing on passengers seeking to
escape, and so on. These accounts are flatly contradicted by the
Germans, who, on their part, have terrible tales to tell of English
brutality, as instanced by the _Baralong_ episode.
There have, of course, been individual cases of shameful brutality in
all the armies; but that such deeds were sanctioned or ordered by the
German or English Supreme Commands I do not believe.
An inquiry by an international, but neutral, court would be the only
means of bringing light to bear on the matter.
Atrocities such as mentioned are highly to be condemned, no matter who
the perpetrators are; but in itself, the U-boat warfare was an
allowable means of defence.
The blockade is now admitted to be a permissible and necessary
proceeding; the unrestricted U-boat warfare is stigmatised as a crime
against international law. That is the sentence passed by might but
not by right. In days to come history will judge otherwise.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] The Ambassador, Gottfried, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst.
[6] See p. 279.
[7] Mr. Penfield, American Ambassador to Vienna.