WILSON
Through the dwindling away of the inclination for peace in the enemy
camp we were faced in the autumn of 1917 by the prospect either of
concluding separate peace and accepting the many complicated
consequences of a war with Germany and the ensuing mutilation of the
Monarchy under the terms of the Pact of London, or else fighting on
and, aided by our Allies, breaking the will for destruction of our
enemies.
If Russia was the one to let loose war, it was Italy who perpetually
stood in the way of a peace of understanding, insisting upon obtaining
under all circumstances the whole of the Austrian territory promised
to her in 1915. The Entente during the war assigned the several parts
to be enacted. France was to shed the most blood; England, besides her
fabulous military action, to finance the war, together with America,
and diplomatic affairs to be in Italy's hands. Far too little is known
as yet, and will only later be public knowledge, as to the extent to
which Italian diplomacy dominated affairs during the war. Our
victories in Italy would only have changed the situation if the
defeats that were suffered had led to an Italian revolution and a
complete overthrow of the régime existing there. In other words, the
Royal Government would not be influenced in its attitude by our
victories. Even had our armies advanced much farther than they did, it
would have held to its standpoint in the expectation that, perhaps not
Italy herself, but her Allies, would secure final victory.
Such was the situation in the autumn of 1917 when Wilson came forward
with his Fourteen Points.
The advantage of the Wilson programme in the eyes of the whole world
was its violent contrast to the terms of the Pact of London. The right
of self-determination for the nations had been utterly ignored in
London by the allotment of German Tyrol to Italy. Wilson forbade this
and declared that nations could not be treated against their will and
moved hither and thither like the pieces in a game of chess. Wilson
said that every solution of a territorial question arising out of this
war must be arrived at in the interests and in favour of the peoples
concerned, and not as a mere balancing or compromise of claims from
rival sources; and further, that all clearly stated national claims
would receive the utmost satisfaction that could be afforded them,
without admitting new factors or the perpetuation of old disputes or
oppositions, which in all probability would soon again disturb the
peace of Europe and the whole world. A general peace, established on
such a basis could be discussed--and more in the same strain.
The publication of this clear and absolutely acceptable programme
seemed from day to day to render possible a peaceful solution of the
world conflict. In the eyes of millions of people this programme
opened up a world of hope. A new star had risen on the other side of
the ocean, and all eyes were turned in that direction. A mighty man
had come forward and with one powerful act had upset the London
resolutions and, in so doing, had reopened the gates for a peace of
understanding.
From the first moment the main question was, so it seemed, what hopes
were there of Wilson's programme being carried out in London, Paris
and, above all, in Rome?
Secret information sent to me from the Entente countries seemed to
suggest that the Fourteen Points were decidedly not drawn up in
agreement with England, France and Italy. On the other hand I was, and
still am, fully persuaded that Wilson had spoken honestly and
sincerely and, as a matter of fact, believed that his programme could
be carried out.
Wilson's great miscalculation was his mistaken estimate of the actual
distribution of power in the Entente on the one hand, and his
surprising ignorance of national relationships in Europe, and
especially in Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, which would greatly
weaken his position and his influence on his Allies. There would be
no difficulty in the Entente's cleverly introducing Wilson into the
international labyrinth and there bewildering him with wrong
directions, so that he could not find his way out again. To begin
with, therefore, Wilson's theory brought us not a step further.
The '67 settlement was proposed by a leading German-Magyar magnate in
Austria-Hungary. Fifty years ago nationalism was much less developed
than it is now. Nations were still sleeping--the Czechs, Slovaks and
Southern Slavs, the Roumanians and Ruthenians had barely awakened to
national life. Fifty years ago it was possible to distinguish between
what was deceptive and what gave promise of lasting. The union between
Italians and Germans only took effect with the coming of--or was
perhaps the first sign of--the world-movement. At all events it was in
the second half of the last century that we came within the radius of
international politics.
The world's racial problems found a centre in Austria-Hungary, whose
affairs, therefore, became very prominent. A chemist can enclose in
his retorts different substances and observe how, following the
eternal laws of nature, the processes of nature take place. In a
similar way during past decades the effect of unsolved racial
antagonisms might have been studied within the Habsburg Monarchy and
the inevitable explosion anticipated, instead of its being allowed to
culminate in the world war.
In putting forward his Fourteen Points Mr. Wilson obviously felt the
necessity of settling the world problem of nationality and recognised
that the Habsburg Monarchy, once arranged and settled, could serve as
a model to the world, as hitherto it had afforded a terrifying
example. But to begin with, he overlooked the fact that in the
settling of national questions there must be neither adversary nor
ally, as those reflect passing differences, whereas the problem of
nationality is a permanent one. He also ignored the fact that what
applies to the Czechs applies also to Ireland, that the Armenians as
well as the Ukrainians desire to live their own national life, and
that the coloured peoples of Africa and India are human beings with
the same rights as white people. He also failed to see that good will
and the desire for justice are far from being sufficient in themselves
to solve the problem of nationality. Thus it was that under his
patronage, and presumably on the basis of the Fourteen Points, the
question of nationality was not solved but simply turned round where
not actually left untouched. If Germans and Magyars had hitherto been
the dominating races they would now become the oppressed. By the terms
settled at Versailles they were to be handed over to states of other
nationality. Ten years hence, perhaps sooner, both groups of Powers as
they exist at present will have fallen. Other constellations will have
appeared and become dominant. The explosive power of unsolved
questions will continue to take effect and within a measurable space
of time again blow up the world.
Mr. Wilson, who evidently was acquainted with the programme of the
Pact of London, though not attaching sufficient importance to the
national difficulties, probably hoped to be able to effect a
compromise between the Italian policy of conquest and his own ideal
policy. In this connection, however, no bridge existed between Rome
and Washington. Conquests are made by right of the conqueror--such was
Clemenceau's and Orlando's policy--or else the world is ruled on the
principles of national justice, as Wilson wished it to be. This ideal,
however, will not be attained--no ideal is attainable; but it will be
brought very much nearer. Might or Right, the one alone can conquer.
But Czechs, Poles and others cannot be freed while at the same time
Tyrolese-Germans, Alsatian-Germans and Transylvanian-Hungarians are
handed over to foreign states. It cannot be done from the point of
view of justice or with any hope of its being permanent. Versailles
and St. Germain have proved that it can be done by might, and as a
temporary measure.
The solution of the question of nationality was the point round which
all Franz Ferdinand's political interests were centred during his
lifetime. Whether he would have succeeded is another question, but he
certainly did try. The Emperor Charles, too, was not averse to the
movement. The Emperor Francis Joseph was too old and too conservative
to make the experiment. His idea was _quieta non movere_. Without
powerful help from outside any attempt during the war against the
German-Magyar opposition would not have been feasible. Therefore, when
Wilson came forward with his Fourteen Points, and in spite of the
scepticism with which the message from Washington was received by the
German public and here too, I at once resolved to take up the thread.
I repeat that I never doubted the honourable and sincere intentions
entertained by Wilson--nor do I doubt them now--but my doubts as to
his powers of carrying them out were from the first very pronounced.
It was obvious that Wilson, when conducting the war, was much stronger
than when he took part in the Peace Conference. As long as fighting
proceeded Wilson was master of the world. He had only to call back his
troops from the European theatre of war and the Entente would be
placed in a most difficult position. It has always been
incomprehensible to me why the President of the United States did not
have recourse to this strong pressure during this time in order to
preserve his own war aims.
The secret information that I received soon after the publication of
the Fourteen Points led me to fear that Wilson, not understanding the
situation, would fail to take any practical measures to secure respect
for the regulations he had laid down, and that he underestimated
France's, and particularly Italy's, opposition. The logical and
practical consequences of the Wilson programme would have been the
public annulment of the Pact of London; it must have been so for us to
understand the principles on which we could enter upon peace
negotiations. Nothing of that nature occurred, and the gap between
Wilson's and Orlando's ideas of peace remained open.
On January 24, 1918, in the Committee of the Austrian Delegation, I
spoke publicly on the subject of the Fourteen Points and declared them
to be--in so far as they applied to us and not to our Allies--a
suitable basis for negotiations. Almost simultaneously we took steps
to enlighten ourselves on the problem of how in a practical way the
fourteen theoretical ideas of Wilson could be carried out. The
negotiations were then by no means hopeless.
Meanwhile the Brest negotiations were proceeding. Although that
episode, which represented a victory for German militarism, cannot
have been very encouraging for Wilson, he was wise enough to recognise
that we were in an awkward position and that the charge brought
against Germany that she was making hidden annexations did not apply
to Vienna. On February 12--thus, _after_ the conclusion of the Brest
peace--the President, in his speech to Congress, said:
Count Czernin appears to have a clear understanding of the peace
foundations and does not obscure their sense. He sees that an
independent Poland composed of all the undeniably Polish
inhabitants, the one bordering on the other, is a matter for
European settlement and must be granted; further, that Belgium
must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and
concessions it may involve; also that national desires must be
satisfied, even in his own Empire, in the common interests of
Europe and humanity.
Though he is silent on certain matters more closely connected with
the interests of his Allies than with Austria-Hungary, that is
only natural, because he feels compelled under the circumstances
to defer to Germany and Turkey. Recognising and agreeing with the
important principles in question and the necessity of converting
them into action, he naturally feels that Austria-Hungary, more
easily than Germany, can concur with the war aims as expressed by
the United States. He would probably have gone even further had he
not been constrained to consider the Austro-Hungarian Alliance and
the country's dependence on Germany.
In the same speech the President goes on to say:
Count Czernin's answer referring mainly to my speech of January 8
is couched in very friendly terms. He sees in my statements a
sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own
Government to justify his belief that they afford a basis for a
thorough discussion by both Governments of the aims.
And again:
I must say Count Hertling's answer is very undecided and most
confusing, full of equivocal sentences, and it is difficult to say
what it aims at. It certainly is written in a very different tone
from that of Count Czernin's speech and obviously with a very
different object in view.
There can be no doubt that when the head of a State at war with us
speaks in such friendly terms of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he
has the best intentions of coming to an understanding. My efforts in
this connection were interrupted by my dismissal.
In these last weeks during which I remained in office the Emperor had
definitely lost faith in me. This was not due to the Wilson question,
nor yet was it the direct consequence of my general policy. A
difference of opinion between certain persons in the Emperor's
entourage and myself was the real reason. The situation became so
strained as to make it unbearable. The forces that conspired against
me convinced me that it would be impossible for me to gain my
objective which, being of a very difficult nature, could not be
obtained unless the Emperor gave me his full confidence.
In spite of all the rumours and stories spread about me I do not
intend to go into details unless I should be compelled to do so by
accounts derived from reliable sources. I am still convinced to this
day that morally I was perfectly right. I was wrong as to form,
because I was neither clever nor patient enough to _bend_ the
opposition, but would have _broken_ it, by reducing the situation to a
case of "either--or".