OF THE CIVIC PRINCIPALITY
But we now come to the case where a citizen becomes prince not
through crime or intolerable violence, but by the favour of his
fellow-citizens, which may be called a civic principality. To arrive
at this position depends not entirely on worth or entirely on fortune,
but rather on cunning assisted by fortune. One attains it by help of
popular favour or by the favour of the aristocracy. For in every city
these two opposite parties are to be found, arising from the desire
of the populace to avoid the oppression of the great, and the desire
of the great to command and oppress the people. And from these two
opposing interests arises in the city one of three effects: either
absolute government, liberty, or license. The former is created either
by the populace or the nobility depending on the relative opportunities
of the two parties; for when the nobility see that they are unable to
resist the people they unite in creating one of their number prince,
so as to be able to carry out their own designs under the shadow of
his authority. The populace, on the other hand, when unable to resist
the nobility, endeavour to create a prince in order to be protected
by his authority. He who becomes prince by help of the nobility has
greater difficulty in maintaining his power than he who is raised by
the populace, for he is surrounded by those who think themselves his
equals, and is thus unable to direct or command as he pleases. But one
who is raised to the leadership by popular favour finds himself alone,
and has no one or very few who are not ready to obey him. Besides
which, it is impossible to satisfy the nobility by fair dealing and
without inflicting injury on others, whereas it is very easy to satisfy
the mass of the people in this way. For the aim of the people is more
honest than that of the nobility, the latter desiring to oppress, and
the former merely to avoid oppression. It must also be added that the
prince can never insure himself against a hostile populace on account
of their number, but he can against the hostility of the great, as
they are but few. The worst that a prince has to expect from a hostile
people is to be abandoned, but from hostile nobles he has to fear not
only abandonment but their active opposition, and as they are more
farseeing and more cunning, they are always in time to save themselves
and take sides with the one who they expect will conquer. The prince
is, moreover, obliged to live always with the same people, but he can
easily do without the same nobility, being able to make and unmake them
at any time, and increase their position or deprive them of it as he
pleases. And to throw further light on this part, I would say, that the
nobles are to be considered in two different manners; that is, they are
either to be ruled so as to make them entirely depend on your fortunes,
or else not. Those that are thus bound to you and are not rapacious,
must be honoured and loved; those who are not bound must be considered
in two ways, they either do this through pusillanimity and natural
want of courage, and in this case you ought to make use of them, and
especially such as are of good counsel, so that they may honour you in
prosperity and in adversity you have not to fear them. But when they
are not bound to you of set purpose and for ambitious ends, it is a
sign that they think more of themselves than of you; and from such men
the prince must guard himself and look upon them as secret enemies,
who will help to ruin him when in adversity. One, however, who becomes
prince by favour of the populace, must maintain its friendship, which
he will find easy, the people asking nothing but not to be oppressed.
But one who against the people's wishes becomes prince by favour of
the nobles, should above all endeavour to gain the favour of the
people; this will be easy to him if he protects them. And as men, who
receive good from those they expected evil from, feel under a greater
obligation to their benefactor, so the subject populace will become
even better disposed towards him than if he had become prince through
their favour. The prince can win their favour in many ways, which vary
according to circumstances, for which no certain rule can be given, and
will therefore be passed over.
I will only say, in conclusion, that it is necessary for a prince to
possess the friendship of the people; otherwise he has no resource in
times of adversity. Nabis, prince of the Spartans, sustained a siege by
the whole of Greece and a victorious Roman army, and defended against
them his country and maintained his own position. It sufficed when the
danger arose for him to make sure of a few, which would not have been
enough if the populace had been hostile to him. And let no one oppose
my opinion in this by quoting the trite proverb, "He who builds on the
people, builds on mud"; because that is true when a private citizen
relies upon the people and persuades himself that they will liberate
him if he is oppressed by enemies or by the magistrates; in this case
he might often find himself deceived, as happened in Rome to the
Gracchi and in Florence to Messer Georgio Scali.
But when it is a prince who founds himself on this basis, one who
can command and is a man of courage, and does not get frightened in
adversity, and does not neglect other preparations, and one who by his
own courage and measures animates the mass of the people, he will not
find himself deceived by them, and he will find that he has laid his
foundations well. Usually these principalities are in danger when the
prince from the position of a civil ruler changes to an absolute one,
for these princes either command themselves or by means of magistrates.
In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, for
they are at the mercy of those citizens who are appointed magistrates,
who can, especially in times of adversity, with great facility deprive
them of their position, either by acting against them or by not obeying
them. The prince is not in time, in such dangers, to assume absolute
authority, for the citizens and subjects who are accustomed to take
their orders from the magistrates are not ready in these emergencies
to obey his, and he will always in doubtful times lack men whom he can
rely on. Such a prince cannot base himself on what he sees in quiet
times, when the citizens have need of the state; for then every one is
full of promises and each one is ready to die for him when death is
far off; but in adversity, when the state has need of citizens, then
he will find but few. And this experience is the more dangerous, in
that it can only be had once. Therefore a wise prince will seek means
by which his subjects will always and in every possible condition
of things have need of his government, and then they will always be
faithful to him.