HOW THE STRENGTH OF ALL STATES SHOULD BE MEASURED
In examining the character of these principalities it is necessary to
consider another point, namely, whether the prince has such a position
as to be able in case of need to maintain himself alone, or whether he
has always need of the protection of others. The better to explain this
I would say, that I consider those capable of maintaining themselves
alone who can, through abundance of men or money, put together a
sufficient army, and hold the field against any one who assails them;
and I consider to have need of others, those who cannot take the
field against their enemies, but are obliged to take refuge within
their walls and stand on the defensive. We have already discussed the
former case and will speak in future of it as occasion arises. In
the second case there is nothing to be said except to encourage such
a prince to provision and fortify his own town, and not to trouble
about the country. And whoever has strongly fortified his town and,
as regards the government of his subjects, has proceeded as we have
already described and will further relate, will be attacked with great
reluctance, for men are always averse to enterprises in which they
foresee difficulties, and it can never appear easy to attack one who
has his town well guarded and is not hated by the people. The cities
of Germany are extremely liberal, have little surrounding country, and
obey the emperor when they choose, and they do not fear him or any
other potentate that they have about them. They are fortified in such
a manner that every one thinks that to reduce them would be tedious
and difficult, for they all have the necessary moats and bastions,
sufficient artillery, and always keep in the public storehouses food
and drink and fuel for one year. Beyond which, to keep the lower
classes satisfied, and without loss to the public, they have always
enough means to give them work for one year in these employments which
form the nerve and life of the town, and in the industries by which the
lower classes live; military exercises are still held in reputation,
and many regulations are in force for maintaining them. A prince,
therefore, who possesses a strong city and does not make himself hated,
cannot be assaulted; and if he were to be so, the assailant would
be obliged to retire shamefully; for so many things change, that it
is almost impossible for any one to hold the field for a year with
his armies idle. And to those who urge that the people, having their
possessions outside and seeing them burnt, will not have patience, and
the long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince,
I reply that a powerful and courageous prince will always overcome
those difficulties by now raising the hopes of his subjects that the
evils will not last long, now impressing them with fear of the enemy's
cruelty, now by dextrously assuring himself of those who appear too
bold. Besides which, the enemy would naturally burn and ruin the
country on first arriving and in the time when men's minds are still
hot and eager to defend themselves, and therefore the prince has still
less to fear, for after some days, when people have cooled down, the
damage is done, the evil has been suffered, and there is no remedy, so
that they are the more ready to unite with their prince, as it appears
that he is under an obligation to them, their houses having been burnt
and their possessions ruined in his defence.
It is the nature of men to be as much bound by the benefits that they
confer as by those they receive. From which it follows that, everything
considered, a prudent prince will not find it difficult to uphold the
courage of his subjects both at the commencement and during a state of
siege, if he possesses provisions and means to defend himself.