Before the British public could learn one single fact connected with the

landing of Sir James Outram or of the second division in Persia, they

were surprised by the announcement that Lord Cowley and Furukh Khan had

succeeded in coming to terms of pacification at Paris—the Persian

ambassador having received from his sovereign large powers for this

purpose. A provisional treaty was signed on the 4th of March, of which

the following is a condensed summary: Peace to be restored between

England and Persia—British troops to evacuate Persia as soon as certain

conditions should be complied with—All prisoners of war to be released

on both sides—The Shah to give an amnesty to any of his subjects who

might have been compromised by and during the war—The Shah to withdraw

all his troops from Herat and Afghanistan within three months after the

ratification of the treaty—The Shah to renounce all claim upon Herat or

any other Afghan state, whether for sovereignty or for tribute—In any

future quarrel between Persia and the Afghan khans, England to be

appealed to as a friendly mediator—England to display equal justice to

Persia and Afghanistan, in the event of any such appeal—Persia to have

the power of declaring and maintaining war against any Afghan state in

the event of positive insult or injury; but not to make such war a

pretext for annexation or permanent occupation—Persia to liberate all

Afghan prisoners, on condition of Persian prisoners being released by

Afghans—All trading arrangements between England and Persia, in relation

to consuls, ports, customs, &c., to be on an equal and friendly

footing—The British mission, on its return to Teheran, to be received

with due honours and ceremonials—Two commissioners to be named by the

two courts, to adjudicate on British pecuniary claims against Persia—The

British government to renounce all claim to any ‘protection’ over the

Shah’s subjects against the Shah’s consent, provided no such power be

given to [Russia or] any other court—England and Persia to aid each

other in suppressing the slave-trade in the Persian Gulf—A portion of

the English troops to remain on Persian soil until Herat should be

evacuated by the Persians, but without any expense, and with as little

annoyance as possible, to the Persian government—Ratifications to be

exchanged at Bagdad within three months.

This treaty—which, if faithfully carried out, would certainly debar

Persia from any undue interference with Afghan affairs—was signed at

Paris on the very day (March 4th) when Sir James Outram announced to his

troops at Bushire the intended attack on Mohamrah. Such was one of the

anomalies springing from diplomacy at one place and war at another many

thousand miles distant. Furukh Khan proceeded, on the 19th from Paris to

London, where he was received by Queen Victoria as plenipotentiary

extraordinary from the Shah of Persia, and where the arrangements for

the fulfilment of the treaty were further carried out. The treaty having

been forwarded to Teheran, was ratified by the Shah of Persia on the

14th of April, and the ratification arrived at Bagdad on the 17th. The

English nation was still, as it had been from the beginning, without the

means of judging whether the Persian war had been necessary or not; the

government still withheld the state papers, on the ground that, as the

ratification of the treaty would speedily be effected, it would be

better to wait until then. When, later in the year, the Chancellor of

the Exchequer asked the House of Commons for a vote of half a million

sterling, ‘on account of the expenses of the Persian war,’ many members

protested against the vote, on the ground that parliament had not been

consulted in any way concerning the war. On the 16th of July Mr Roebuck

moved a resolution—‘That the war with Persia was declared, prosecuted,

and concluded without information of such transactions being

communicated to parliament; while expensive armaments were equipped

without the sanction of a vote of this House; and that such conduct

tends to weaken its just authority, and to dispense with its

constitutional control over the finances of the country, and renders it

requisite for this House to express its strong reprobation of such a

course of proceeding.’ The government policy was censured on many

grounds by Mr Roebuck, Lord John Russell, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Disraeli;

the first of these speakers even went so far as to attribute the mutiny

in India to the withdrawal of troops for the Persian war. The House of

Commons agreed, however, pretty generally in the opinion, that although

the ministers might reasonably have been more communicative before they

commenced hostilities with Persia, there was ground sufficient for the

hostilities themselves; and the resolution was negatived by 352 to 38.

The question was reopened on the 17th, when the House granted the

half-million asked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer towards defraying

the expenses of this war; renewed attacks were made on the Asiatic

policy of the Palmerston government, but the vote was agreed to; and

nothing further occurred, during the remainder of the session, to

disturb the terms of the pacification.

It is unnecessary to trace the course of events in Persia after the

ratification of the treaty. The British officers, and the troops under

their charge, had no further glory or honour to acquire; they would be

called upon simply, either to remain quietly in Persia until Herat was

evacuated, or to go through the troublesome ordeal of re-shipment back

to Bombay. The troops all assembled in and near Bushire, where they

resumed their former camp-life. The officers, having little to do, took

occasional trips to Bassorah, Bagdad, and other places on the banks of

the Euphrates and Tigris; while the soldiers were employed in destroying

the fortifications of the encampment, now no longer needed. On the 9th

of May Sir James Outram issued a ‘Field-force Order’—thanking the troops

for their services during this brief and rather uneventful war, and

announcing the break-up of the force. Some of the regiments and corps

were to return to India, as rapidly as means of transport could be

obtained for them; while the rest, under Brigadier-general Jacob, were

to form a small compact army, to remain at Bushire until all the terms

of the treaty were fulfilled. Outram, Havelock, and a large number of

officers, embarked within a few days for India; and by the time they

reached Bombay and Madras, according to the place to which they were

bound, the startling news reached their ears that a military mutiny had

broken out at Meerut and Delhi. What followed, the pages of this volume

have shewn. As to Persia, much delay occurred in carrying out the terms

of the treaty, much travelling to and fro of envoys, and many months’

detention of British troops at Bushire; but at length the Persians

evacuated Herat, the British quitted the Gulf, and the singular ‘Persian

war,’ marked by so few battles, came to an end.

[Illustration:

BUSHIRE.

]

§ 2. THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE EXPEDITIONS, 1856-7-8.

The occurrences westward of India having thus been briefly narrated,

attention may now be directed to those on the east.

Viewed in relation to the circumstances which immediately preceded

hostilities, it might almost be said that England declared war against

China because a few persons went on board a small vessel to search for

certain offenders, and because a Chinese official would not civilly

receive visits from a British official. These trifling incidents,

however, were regarded as symptoms of something greater: symptoms which

required close diplomatic watching. To understand this matter, a brief

summary of earlier events is needed.

During the first thirty years of the present century, in like manner as

in earlier centuries, Europeans had no recognised right of residing in

China, or even of visiting its ports. Merchants were allowed to reside

at Canton, by official connivance rather than sanction; and even this

was possible only at certain times of the year—they being required in

other months to retire to Macao. They were liable to be expelled from

Canton at any time, with or without assigned cause; their trade was

liable to be stopped with equal suddenness; and, under the designation

of ‘barbarians,’ all negotiation was denied to them except through the

medium of a mercantile community called the Hong merchants. During many

years, Indian opium was the chief commodity sold by the English to the

Chinese, in exchange for tea and other produce. This opium-trade was

always declared illegal by the Chinese government, though always

covertly favoured by the Chinese officials. Quarrels frequently arose

concerning this trade, and the quarrels sometimes ended in violence. The

import of opium became so large that the exports were insufficient to

pay for it; and when silver was thus found necessary to make up the

balance, the imperial anger waxed stronger and stronger. The

‘barbarians’ were commanded not to bring any more opium; but, finding

the trade too profitable to be abandoned, they continued their dealings

in spite of the mandates of the celestial potentate.

The year 1831 may be said to have commenced the political or

international stage of this difficulty. The governor-general of India

wrote a letter to the governor of Canton, complaining of the conduct of

the Chinese authorities, and demanding explanations, &c. Why his

lordship, rather than any functionary in England, did this, was because

the East India Company in those days sold opium on its own account, and

made use of its political power to render that trade as profitable as

possible—one of the pernicious anomalies arising out of the Company’s

double functions. In 1832, the governor of Canton vouchsafed a partial

explanation, but only to the Hong merchants—refusing with superb scorn,

to communicate either with the Company’s merchants, or with the

governor-general. In 1833 an imperial edict forbade the introduction of

opium; but this, like many that preceded it, remained inoperative. In

1834 the Company’s trading monopoly ceasing, private merchants thereupon

engaged in the tea-trade with China. The English government sent three

commissioners—Lord Napier, Mr (afterwards Sir) J. F. Davis, and Sir G.

B. Robinson—as ‘superintendents of British commerce in China.’ The

Chinese authorities refused to acknowledge these commissioners in any

way, in spite of numerous invitations; while on the other hand the

commissioners refused to retire from Canton to Macao. These disputes led

to violence, and the violence brought a British ship-of-war up the

Canton river. A compromise was the result—the commissioners retiring to

Macao, and the Chinese authorities allowing the resumption of the

opium-traffic. Lord Napier died towards the close of the year, and was

succeeded as chief-superintendent by Mr Davis—Captain Elliot being

appointed secretary, and afterwards third superintendent. During the

next three years trade continued; but the Chinese officials were

uniformly rude and insulting. The British government would not permit

Captain Elliot to submit to these indignities; missives and

counter-missives passed to and fro; and the year 1837 ended with

threatening symptoms. In 1838 Admiral Maitland arrived in Canton river

with a ship of war, to protect British interests—by cannon-balls, if not

by friendly compact. The nearest approach to equality between the two

nations was in an interview between Admiral Maitland and the Chinese

Admiral Kwan; in which Maitland assured his brother-admiral that he

would remain peaceful—until provoked. In 1839, as in previous years, the

opium-trade was often violently interrupted by the Chinese authorities.

The officers of the English government, political and naval, were placed

in an embarrassing position in this matter; their duty was to protect

Englishmen; but they could not compel the Chinese to trade in opium—for

the Chinese government held the same power as all other despotic

governments, of prohibiting or encouraging trade with other countries.

In this year, when Maitland was absent, Elliot became powerless at

Canton; he and all the English were made prisoners, and could not obtain

release until they had destroyed all the opium in the English

stores—more than twenty thousand chests. This was done: Elliot

guaranteeing that the English government would repay the merchants.

Commissioner Lin saw that the opium was wholly destroyed; and by the end

of May almost every European had quitted Canton.

It was thus that commenced the first Chinese war—a war which had a bad

moral basis on the English side; since it arose more out of the forced

sale of an intoxicating drug, than out of any other circumstance. The

British government, finding themselves bound by Captain Elliot’s promise

to pay an enormous sum for the opium destroyed, and feeling the

importance of maintaining British supremacy in the east, resolved to

settle the quarrel by warlike means. Fighting and negotiating alternated

during 1840 and the two following years. At one time, Sir Gordon Bremer,

at another, Sir Hugh Gough, commanded troops on the Chinese coast,

acting in conjunction with ships-of-war; and according to the amount of

naval or military success, so did the Chinese authorities manifest or

not a disposition to treat. Commissioner Lin, then Commissioner Keshen,

and afterwards Commissioner Key-ing, conducted negotiations—a perilous

duty; for their imperial master did not scruple to punish, or even to

put to death, those diplomatists who made a treaty distasteful to him;

and nothing but the noise of cannon induced him to respect treaties when

made. The chief military and naval events of the three years, in

connection with this struggle, were the following: The British ship

_Hellas_ attacked by junks, and many of the crew killed; an attempt to

burn the British fleet by fire-rafts; Chusan taken by the English; naval

action near Macao; attack and capture of Chuen-pe and Tae-cok-tow;

Hong-kong taken by the English; the Bogue forts, with 460 guns, taken by

Sir Gordon Bremer; Canton attacked by the British, under Sir Hugh Gough,

and only spared on the prompt payment of five million dollars; Amoy,

with 300 guns, taken by the British; the cities of Ting-hae, Ching-hae,

Ning-po, and several others on the coast, captured; several military

engagements in the vicinity of the captured cities; an advance of a

powerful squadron up the Yang-tsze-kiang; and a threatening of the great

city of Nankin, which brought the emperor effectually to terms—all the

previous offers of negotiation on the part of the Chinese having been

mere expedients to save time.

The war ended thuswise. Sir Henry Pottinger arrived in the Chinese

waters in April 1842, with full power as representative of the British

Crown; and it was he who procured the important ‘Treaty of Nankin,’

signed by the respective plenipotentiaries in 1842, and the

ratifications exchanged by the respective sovereigns in 1843. This

treaty having had an important bearing on the later or second war with

China, we will epitomise a few of its chief conditions: Lasting peace

and friendship established between England and China—China to pay

21,000,000 dollars for the opium destroyed, and for the expenses of the

war; the payments to be spread over four years—The ports of Canton,

Amoy, Fuh-choo-foo, Ning-po, and Shang-hae, to be thrown open to British

merchants, with consular facilities, and just and regular tariffs—The

island of Hong-kong to become a permanent British possession—All British

subjects, at that time confined in China, to be at once and

unconditionally released—The Chinese emperor to give an amnesty to all

his own subjects, in respect of any proceedings on their part friendly

to the British—Correspondence in future to be conducted on terms of

perfect equality between the officers of the two governments—The islands

of Chusan and Kulangsoo to be held by the British until the fulfilment

of all the conditions of the treaty, and then given up.

Under the influence of this Treaty of Nankin, trade rapidly extended

between England and China. Instead of being confined to Canton, and

conducted in a stealthy and undignified manner, it was openly carried on

at five ports. The British government did not undertake to protect the

opium-trade more than that in any other commodity; on the contrary, the

representatives of the English government would gladly have seen that

trade diminish; but in truth, the East India Company realised several

millions sterling a year profit by it, and English merchants reaped many

additional millions: insomuch that a very powerful influence was brought

to back up this trade.

A ‘Supplementary Treaty’ was signed in October 1843, for regulating the

terms of commercial intercourse at the five ports, and providing for the

courteous reception of British representatives by the Chinese officials,

in matters relating to mutual trade. During the thirteen years following

the signature of the Treaty of Nankin, the trade between England and

China gradually increased, though not at so rapid a rate as had been

hoped by British manufacturers and merchants. The English had trading

establishments, with consuls and other officials, at the five ports, and

a colony or military settlement at Hong-kong; while there were always a

few ships-of-war in the Chinese waters. The relations, however, were not

wholly peaceful. The inhabitants of Canton had a general ill-will

towards the English; so had the imperial viceroy; and violence arising

out of this ill-will led to a brief period of hostilities. In April

1847, the English seized the Bogue Forts, in the Canton river, in order

to obtain redress for various insults; this seizure was followed by a

new convention.

Thus matters continued until October 1856. On the 8th of that month, an

incident occurred, trivial in itself, which gave rise to the ‘Second War

with China.’ Sir John Bowring was at that time chief representative of

British interests in China, with Hong-kong as his head-quarters; Admiral

Sir Michael Seymour commanded the royal ships in those seas; Commodore

Elliot was under Seymour in the Canton and Hong-kong district; and Mr

Parkes was consul at Canton. These were the English officials more

immediately concerned in the matter. On the day here named, a Chinese

officer and a party of soldiers boarded a _lorcha_ or small vessel

called the _Arrow_, anchored off Canton; and then seized twelve out of

fourteen of the crew, bound them, and carried them away. The _Arrow_ had

a colonial register from the governor of Hong-kong, which placed it

under British protection; the master, an Englishman, protested against

the seizure, but was not listened to. The British flag, too, was hauled

down from the lorcha. This was the statement on the part of the British.

Most of the accusations, however, were stoutly denied by the officials

of Canton, who asserted that the lorcha was Chinese, that the owner was

Chinese, that the crew were Chinese, and that the boarding was effected

simply to take into custody men who had committed some offence against

Chinese laws.

When the seizure of the men from the _Arrow_ became known, Mr Parkes

remonstrated with the Chinese officer, on the ground that the crew were

under British protection. No notice being taken of this remonstrance, Mr

Parkes communicated with the highest dignitary in that part of China,

whose name was Yeh Mingchin, and whose office was variously designated

imperial commissioner, governor, and viceroy. The letter sent by Parkes

to this functionary demanded that the twelve men should be brought back

to the lorcha by the same officer who had taken them away, that an

apology should be made, and an assurance given that the British flag

should in future be respected. The men were sent back, after much

negotiation; but Mr Parkes complained that the return ‘was not made in

the public manner which had marked the seizure, and that all appearance

of an apology was pointedly avoided.’ The facts were communicated to Sir

John Bowring, and by him to Admiral Seymour. No real injury had been

done, for the men had been reinstated; but there was an insult, which

the English representatives conceived themselves bound to resent. They

had often been piqued at the absence of respect shewn by the officers of

the Celestial Empire, and were willing to avail themselves of any

reasonable opportunity for bringing about a more diplomatic state of

affairs.

The first act of war occurred on the part of the British. Sir John

Bowring recommended to the admiral the seizure of a Chinese junk or

war-boat, as a probable mode of bringing an apology. Sir Michael

accordingly directed Commodore Elliot, of the _Sybille_, to carry out

Bowring’s instructions; and placed at his disposal the _Burracouta_

steam-sloop and the _Coromandel_ tender. A junk was seized; but this was

a profitless adventure; for, being found to be private property, the

junk was given up again. The admiral next sent the steam-frigates

_Encounter_ and _Sampson_ up the Canton river; ‘in the hope that the

presence of such an imposing force would shew the high-commissioner the

prudence of complying with our demands.’ The Chinese viceroy remained,

nevertheless, immovable; he made no apology. Mr Parkes thereupon went

from Canton to Hong-kong, to consult with Bowring and Seymour as to the

best course to be adopted. They all agreed that the seizure of the

defences of the city of Canton would be the most judicious, both as a

display of power without the sacrifice of life, and of the determination

of the English to enforce redress—‘experience of the Chinese character

having proved that moderation is considered by the officials only as an

evidence of weakness.’

Then commenced the second stage in the proceedings. On the 23d of

October, Sir Michael Seymour went in person up to Canton, with the

_Coromandel_, _Sampson_, and _Barracouta_, and accompanied by the

marines and boat-crews of the _Calcutta_, _Winchester_, _Bittern_, and

_Sybille_. He captured four forts a few miles below Canton, spiked the

guns, destroyed the ammunition, and burned the buildings. Another, the

Macao fort, in the middle of the river, mounting 86 guns, he retained

and garrisoned for a time. Mr Parkes was then sent to announce to Yeh

that the British admiral had come to enforce redress for insults

received, and would remain in the river until redress was obtained. The

high-commissioner sent a reply which was not deemed satisfactory. On the

morning of the 24th, marines and sailors were sent to capture the

‘Bird’s Nest Fort,’ the Shamin Fort, and others near Canton; this they

did, spiking the guns and destroying the ammunition. On the afternoon of

the same day, strong reinforcements were sent to the British factory, or

trading-station of the merchants, to protect it from any sudden attack,

and to guard against the floating of fire-rafts by the Chinese on the

river.

‘Apology’ was the demand made by the British representatives; but no

apology came; and thereupon the siege of Canton was proceeded with. On

the 25th, a fort called the Dutch Folly, immediately opposite the city,

was captured. The 26th being Sunday, nothing was done on that day. On

the 27th, the admiral heightened his demands. He caused Consul Parkes to

write to the Chinese commissioner, to the effect that as the required

apology and reparation had not been given, the terms should be made more

stringent. Henceforward, the field of contest was widened; it was no

longer the lorcha and the flag alone that constituted the grievance. Sir

John Bowring probably thought that the same amount of threat and of

fighting, if fighting there must be, might be made to settle other

annoyances, as well as those more immediately under notice. No reply

being sent to Parkes’s letter, the guns of the _Encounter_ and

_Barracouta_ were brought to bear upon the Chinese commissioner’s

residence, and upon some troops posted on the hills behind a fort named

by the English Gough’s Fort. This enraged Yeh Mingchin, who issued a

proclamation, offering a reward of thirty dollars for every Englishman’s

head.

Sir Michael, resolved to punish this obstinate viceroy, made

preparations for a much more serious attack. He sent Captain Hall on

shore, to warn the inhabitants of Canton to remove their persons and

property from the vicinity of a certain portion of the city; this they

did during the night of the 27th. On the 28th, a bombardment was kept up

from the Dutch Folly, with a view of opening a clear passage to the wall

of the city; and when this passage was opened by noon on the 29th, a

storming-party was sent in under Commodore Elliot. Marines and sailors,

with two field-pieces, advanced to the wall, and speedily obtained

possession of the defences between two of the city-gates. One of the

gates was then blown to pieces by gunpowder, and another body of seamen

advanced to that spot under Captain Hall. Soon afterwards, Seymour,

Parkes, and Elliot entered the city through this shattered gate, went to

the high-commissioner’s house, inspected it, remained there some time,

and then returned to the ships. The motive for this visit was a singular

one, unusual in European warlike politics, but having a significance in

dealing with so peculiar a people as the Chinese; it was simply (in the

words of the admiral’s dispatch) ‘to shew his excellency that I had the

power to enter the city.’

The month of November opened ominously. The British were determined to

humble the pride of the Chinese officials; whereas, these officials

shewed no signs of yielding. Admiral Seymour now addressed a letter in

his own name to the high-commissioner, adverting to the case of the

_Arrow_; pointing threateningly to the fact that Canton was at the mercy

of cannon-balls, and inviting him to terminate the unsatisfactory state

of affairs by a personal interview. He claimed credit, rather than the

reverse, for his conduct towards the city. ‘It has been wholly with a

view to the preservation of life, that my operations have hitherto been

so deliberately conducted. Even when entering the city, no blood was

shed, save where my men were assailed; and the property of the people

was in every way respected.’ Commissioner Yeh’s reply to this letter was

not deficient in courtesy or dignity; whether or not he believed his own

assertions, he at least put them forth in temperate language. He

maintained, as he had before asserted to Consul Parkes, that the seizure

of the twelve men on board the _Arrow_ was perfectly legal; that some of

them had been released on their innocence of an imputed crime being

proved; that the other three were given up when Parkes demanded them;

that the _Arrow_ was a Chinese vessel; that the authorities had no means

of knowing that she had passed into the hands of an Englishman; that no

flag was flying when the vessel was boarded, and, therefore, no flag

could have been insultingly hauled down. The non-admission of English

representatives into Canton was defended on the plea that, the less the

two nations came in contact, the less were they likely to quarrel. Again

was a letter written, and in more threatening terms than before. Sir

Michael refused to discuss in writing the case of the _Arrow_, and

insisted that nothing short of a personal interview between himself and

Yeh, either on shipboard, or in Canton city, could settle the quarrel.

Nothing daunted, Commissioner Yeh replied on the 3d, reiterating his

assertions of the justice of his cause, and acceding to no propositions

for a personal interview.

On the 6th a naval engagement took place on the river. The Chinese

collected twenty-three war-junks in one spot, under the protection of

the French Folly fort, mounted with twenty-six heavy guns. This fort was

a little lower down the river than the Dutch Folly. Seymour resolved to

disperse this junk-fleet at once. Commodore Elliot headed an attack by

the guns, the crews, and the boats of the _Barracouta_ and _Coromandel_.

A fierce exchange of firing took place: the Chinese having no less than

a hundred and fifty guns in the junks and the fort. The fort was taken,

the guns spiked, and the ammunition destroyed; the Chinese were driven

out of the junks, and twenty-two of those vessels were burned. No

fighting took place on the 7th. On the 8th the Chinese made a bold

attempt to burn the British ships by fire-rafts; but the intended

mischief was frustrated. The commissioner still being immovable, Bowring

now suggested to Seymour that the next step ought to be the capture and

destruction of the Bogue Forts—four powerfully armed defences on which

the Chinese much relied. This was done after more fruitless negotiation.

[Illustration:

Chinese War-junks.

]

Admiral Seymour had thus, by the middle of November, obtained full

command of the Canton river; and he then stayed his operations for a

while. The original cause of dispute, comparatively trifling, had now

given place to a very grave state of affairs; and it remained to be seen

whether the Palmerston ministry would lay all the blame on the obstinacy

of Commissioner Yeh, or whether Bowring and Seymour would be considered

to have exceeded their powers and their duties. So far as concerns the

attitude of the Cantonese themselves, three deputations from the

principal merchants and gentry waited on Mr Parkes between the 8th and

12th of November, to express their wishes that an amicable termination

of the quarrel could be brought about; but at the same time to assert

their conviction that, such was the inflexibility of the

high-commissioner’s character, he would never alter his expressed

determination to refuse the English representatives admission into the

city.

It may be well to remark in this place that the opium difficulty, which

was unquestionably paramount above all others in the first war with

China, had now lost much of its importance. The imperial government had

in later years issued very few edicts against the traffic in this drug.

Perhaps the quietness in this matter was mainly due to the fact that the

export of silver to pay for the Indian opium was no longer needed—the

increased sale of tea and silk being sufficient to make up an

equivalent.

On the 26th of the month, other armed forts in the Canton river were

taken by the English. The Chinese, in revenge for these proceedings,

burned and destroyed almost all the European factories, mercantile

buildings, and banks at Canton—leaving so little but ruins that Admiral

Seymour could hardly find a roof to cover the seamen and marines when

they afterwards landed. The commercial losses might be repaired; but an

irreparable consequence of the incendiarism was the destruction of Dr

Williams’s printing establishment; including the large founts of Chinese

type with which Morrison’s Dictionary was printed; and comprising also

more than 10,000 unsold volumes of books.

In this sort of piecemeal war, each successive attack irritated in its

turn the opposite party; but the burning of the factories determined

Bowring and Seymour to the adoption of a sterner policy than had

hitherto been displayed. They resolved to bombard Canton itself, and to

send an application to the governor-general of India for military

aid—trusting that the home-government would hold them justified in

adopting this course under difficulties and responsibilities of no light

kind.

The year 1856 came to a close. The new year was ushered in with an

attack by the Chinese on Dutch Folly on the 1st of January. Six guns

mounted on the Canton shore, and four on the opposite shore, fired into

the Folly; but the small English force there stationed soon quelled this

attack. On the 4th, a fleet of war-junks opened fire on the _Comus_ and

_Hornet_ at the barrier in Macao Passage. No sooner did news of this

attack reach Admiral Seymour, than he hastened forward in the

_Coromandel_, towing all the available boats of the other ships. On

nearing the junks, some of them undauntedly attacked the _Coromandel_,

the boats, and a fort called the Teetotum Fort, which the English had

before captured. The junks were heavily armed, and some of them had long

snake-boats lashed to each side to row them along. A third fleet came

down Sulphur Creek, and attacked the _Niger_ and the _Encounter_. This

was altogether a new aspect of the quarrel; the Chinese, not in the

least humbled by the demands of Bowring and Seymour, became the

assailants in the Canton river, and fought with a resolution hardly

expected by their opponents. The attacks were not attended with very

definite results. Not one junk was taken; they retired and collected

into a somewhat formidable fleet of nearly four hundred.

The state of affairs was in every sense unsatisfactory to the English

authorities. Commissioner Yeh was as firm as ever, and severely reproved

the Canton gentry and merchants who had sent deputations to Sir Michael.

He issued proclamations, denouncing the ‘barbarians’ in fiercer terms

than before. Cruel massacres took place, whenever an isolated Englishman

chanced to fall into the hands of the Chinese. Proclamations in the

native language found their way to Hong-kong, inviting the seventy

thousand Chinese residing in that island to rise against their English

employers. Some of these Chinese were detected in attempts to introduce

poison into the bread made for and sold to the English residents by the

Chinese bakers. Against all this Bowring and Seymour could do little;

and yet something, it was felt, must be attempted; for British trade at

Canton was for a time ruined; and if matters were allowed to remain in

their present state, the triumph of the Chinese would be most

humiliating and pernicious to the English.

During the month of January (1857), while no progress was made in

settling the differences at Canton, the spirit of the Chinese at

Hong-kong became more and more hostile to the British; nor were those at

Singapore unaffected by the taint. The warlike movements of the month—so

far as that can be called war where no war had yet been

declared—exasperated the Chinese, without making any impression on the

obstinacy of Yeh. They consisted in the destruction of a portion of the

city of Canton. Early on the morning of the 12th, bodies of marines and

sailors set forth, armed with fireballs, torches, steeped oakum, &c.;

they were conveyed in ships’ boats, and landed on different parts of the

suburbs of the city. The boats then retired a little way from the shore,

while the _Barracouta_, _Encounter_, and _Niger_, kept watch in the

middle of the river. The men advanced into the outer streets of the

city, and commenced the work of destruction. The houses being mostly

built of wood, they were easily ignited, and the breeze within an hour

united all the fires into one vast sheet of flame. To increase the

destruction, shot and shell were poured into the city from the ships and

the fort. Throughout the whole of the day, did this miserable work

continue—miserable in so far as it inflicted much suffering on the

inhabitants, without hastening the capture of the city. On the 13th the

attack ceased; Sir Michael Seymour made what arrangements he could to

retain command of the passage of the Canton river; while the Cantonese

provided for their houseless towns-people in hastily built structures.

The British naval force under Sir Michael Seymour, comprising all the

ships in the India and China seas, was by this time very formidable. It

comprised the _Calcutta_ (84), _Raleigh_ (50), _Nanking_ (50), _Sybille_

(40), _Pique_ (40), eight other sailing-vessels varying from 12 to 26

guns, twelve war-steamers, and seven steam gun-boats. These could have

wrought great achievements in action at sea, with their 5000 seamen and

marines; but there were scarcely any regular troops to conduct

operations on land.

During February, the English consuls and traders could not but observe

the increasing hostility of the Chinese. Dastardly assassinations

occasionally took place; piracy was more rampant than ever; war-junks

made their appearance wherever an English boat appeared to be

insufficiently guarded; and proclamations were issued in the name of the

emperor, applauding the firmness of Yeh. The merchants wished either

that the affair of the _Arrow_ had never been taken notice of by the

British authorities, or else that the warlike operations had been

carried on with more resolute effect. All the commercial relations had

become disturbed, without any perceptible prospect of a return to

peaceful trade. One of the worst features in the state of affairs was

this—that as the English throughout the whole of the China seas were at

all times few in number, they were obliged to employ Chinese servants

and helpers; and these Chinamen were found now to be very little

trustworthy. On the 23d of the month, the passenger-steamer _Queen_ was

on its way from Hong-kong to Macao; when suddenly the Chinese passengers

joined with the Chinese crew in a murderous attack on the English

passengers and officers, by which several lives were lost.

March arrived, but with it no solution of the Chinese difficulty. Even

supposing Sir John Bowring, by this time, to have received instructions

from home, warlike or otherwise, there had been no time to send him

reinforcements of troops; and until such arrived, any extensive

operations on land would be impracticable. Sir John and his colleagues

waited until their hands were strengthened.

In April, Seymour as well as Bowring remained quietly at Hong-kong,

effecting nothing except the destruction of some junks. On the 6th,

Commodore Elliot, with a fleet of armed boats from the _Sampson_,

_Hornet_, _Sybille_, and _Nanking_, captured and destroyed eleven

war-junks and two well-armed lorchas, after a chase and an engagement

which lasted all day. Documents fell into the hands of the authorities

at Hong-kong, tending to prove the complicity of the mandarins and many

inhabitants of Canton in the various plots of incendiarism, kidnapping,

and assassination, which had imperiled the persons and property of the

English at that island. There were no present means of punishing these

conspirators; but the discovery led to increased watchfulness.

The month of May witnessed no advance towards a settlement of Chinese

difficulties. A great rebellion was distracting many inland provinces of

the gigantic empire; but it did not appear that this could in any way

help the English. Commissioner Yeh remained in his official residence at

Canton, promising nothing, yielding nothing, and endeavouring to

strengthen the city against the English. The Chinese, on the 3d, made an

attempt to blow up the _Acorn_ sloop-of-war in the Canton River, by

means of a large iron tank filled with gunpowder, which was exploded

close to the sloop; and a similar tank was afterwards found close to the

_Hornet_—the first was exploded with little damage; the second was

discovered before explosion.

Now occurred the sudden and startling outbreak in India, which wrought a

most signal influence on the progress of affairs in China. Before this

influence can usefully be traced, it will be necessary to glance briefly

at the proceedings in England having reference to the Chinese quarrel.

It will be remembered that Sir John Bowring had incurred the heavy

responsibility of commencing hostilities in October 1856, without

special Foreign-office instructions; and that Sir Michael Seymour was

equally without Admiralty instructions. These officers could not

possibly receive an expression either of approval or condemnation, of

advice or command, from England, until four or five months after the

commencement of the troubles. It was near the close of the year when the

British government received particulars of the first operations against

Canton; and it was about the beginning of 1857 when the British

newspapers and the nation took up the subject in earnest.

Immediately on the opening of the session of parliament in February

1857, ministers were eagerly pressed for information concerning the

hostilities in China; because there was a general impression that an

unduly severe punishment had been inflicted by Bowring and Seymour on

the Chinese for a very small offence. On the 5th of February, the Earl

of Ellenborough asked for the production of papers which might throw

light on the affair of the lorcha _Arrow_, and prove whether it was an

English or a Chinese vessel. The Earl of Clarendon, after promising the

production of all the needful documents, stated that Sir John Bowring

had not received any special instructions to demand admission into

China; but that his general instructions authorised him ‘to bear in mind

the desirableness of obtaining that free access to Chinese ports which

was mentioned in the treaty, and more particularly as regarded Canton.’

Whether the means adopted by Bowring to obtain this free access were

commendable, was a question on which the Houses of Parliament soon

became fiercely engaged. Sir George Bonham, Bowring’s predecessor, had

not thought the admission into Canton a matter of great moment; and as

Bowring was appointed by the Whigs, the Conservatives soon contrived to

make a party question of it. Among the papers made public by the

government about this time, was a dispatch written by the Earl of

Clarendon to Sir John Bowring on the 10th of December 1856. The earl had

just learned all that occurred at Canton between the 8th and the 15th of

October; and he expressed an approval of the course pursued by Bowring

and Parkes. Referring to voluminous documents which had been transmitted

to him, he declared his opinions that the lorcha _Arrow_ had a British

master, British flag, and British papers, and was therefore a British

vessel under the terms of the existing treaty; that if the Chinese

authorities suspected there were pirates among the crew, they should

have applied to the English consul, and not have taken the law into

their own hands by boarding and violence—in short, he approved of what

the British officials had done, so far as concerned the single week’s

proceedings which had alone come to his knowledge. Another mail brought

over news of the seizure of the junks, and of the forcible entry of Sir

Michael Seymour into Commissioner Yeh’s house. This conduct met with the

marked and clearly expressed commendation of the Earl of Clarendon, who,

in a dispatch written on the 10th of January, complimented Seymour,

Bowring, and Parkes on the moderation they had displayed under difficult

circumstances.

On the 24th of February, the Earl of Derby moved a series of resolutions

in the House of Lords: ‘That this House has heard with deep regret of

the interruption of amicable relations between her Majesty’s subjects

and the Chinese authorities at Canton; arising out of the measures

adopted by her Majesty’s chief-superintendent of trade to obtain

reparation for alleged infractions of the Supplementary Treaty of the

8th of October 1843. That, in the opinion of this House, the occurrence

of differences on this subject rendered the time peculiarly unfavourable

for pressing on the Chinese authorities a claim for the admittance of

British subjects into Canton, which had been left in abeyance since

1849; and for supporting the same by force of arms. That, in the opinion

of this House, operations of actual hostilities ought not to have been

undertaken without the express instructions, previously received, of her

Majesty’s government; and that neither of the subjects adverted to in

the foregoing resolutions afforded sufficient justification for such

operations.’ These resolutions at once threw the whole blame on Sir John

Bowring; his ‘measures adopted’ caused the ‘interruption of amicable

relations,’ and the House ‘heard with deep regret’ this news. Of course,

the ministers could not sanction the resolutions; they had already sent

over approval of Bowring’s conduct, and now they must manfully defend

him. Hence arose a most exciting debate. The Treaty of 1842, the

Supplementary Treaty of 1843, the Convention of 1847—all came into

discussion, as well as the documents which had passed between the

British and Chinese authorities. It became a party battle. All or nearly

all the Whigs defended Sir John; all or nearly all the Conservatives

attacked him. The judicial peers on the one side declared that the

papers proved the _Arrow_ to be a British vessel; those on the other

asserted that the registry of that vessel at Hong-kong had not been so

conducted as to render this fact certain. The statesmen on the one side

argued that Bowring was right to insist on being admitted into Canton by

virtue of the treaty; those on the other contended that the right was

not such as to justify him in bombarding the city. The general adherents

of the one party believed the statement that the flag of the _Arrow_ had

been insultingly hauled down by the Chinese; those of the other credited

the Chinese statement that the flag had not been hauled down. And so

throughout the debate. It was quite as much a contest of Conservative

against Whig, as of Bowring against Yeh. The Earl of Derby made a

vehement appeal to the peers, for their condemnation of Sir John’s

conduct in going to war without express orders from home; and an earnest

exhortation to the bishops ‘to come forward on this occasion and

vindicate the cause of religion, humanity, and civilisation from the

outrage which had been inflicted upon it by the British representatives

in Canton.’ He declared that ‘he should be disappointed indeed if the

right reverend bench did not respond to this appeal.’ The legal argument

was very strongly contested against the government; Lords Lyndhurst, St

Leonards, and Wensleydale all contending that, owing to some

irregularities in the registry, the _Arrow_ was virtually a Chinese

vessel in October 1856, and that the Chinese authorities had a right to

board it in search of pirates. On a division, the resolutions were

negatived by 146 against 110—the bishops, notwithstanding the Earl of

Derby’s appeal, being as much divided as the other peers.

[Illustration:

CANTON.

]

On the 26th the Commons took up the subject, in connection with a

resolution proposed by Mr Cobden—‘That this House has heard with concern

of the conflicts which have occurred between the British and Chinese

authorities in the Canton river; and, without expressing an opinion as

to the extent to which the government of China may have afforded this

country cause of complaint respecting the non-fulfilment of the treaty

of 1842, this House considers that the papers which have been laid upon

the table fail to establish satisfactory grounds for the violent

measures resorted to at Canton in the late affair of the _Arrow_; and

that a select committee be appointed to inquire into the state of our

commercial relations with China.’ This motion was more important than

the one in the Lords, since it led to a dissolution of parliament. The

debates extended through four evenings. Sir John Bowring was attacked by

Mr Cobden, Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, Lord John Russell, Mr Warren, Mr

Whiteside, Lord Goderich, Sir John Pakington, Sir F. Thesiger, Mr Sidney

Herbert, Mr Roundell Palmer, Mr Milner Gibson, Mr Henley, Mr Roebuck, Mr

Gladstone, and Mr Disraeli; while he was defended by Mr Labouchere, Mr

Lowe, the Lord Advocate, Admiral Sir Charles Napier, Admiral Sir Maurice

Berkeley, the Attorney-general, Sir George Grey, Sir Fenwick Williams

‘of Kars,’ Mr Serjeant Shee, Mr Bernal Osborne, and Lord Palmerston. It

was not merely a contest between Liberals and Conservatives; for the

Derby party were joined here by the small but influential Peel party;

while the names of Russell, Cobden, Goderich, Milner Gibson, and Roebuck

will shew to how large an extent the Liberals were dissatisfied with the

proceedings in China. The arguments employed were such as have been more

than once adverted to—that the _Arrow_ was rather a Chinese than an

English vessel; that the Chinese authorities had a right to board it, to

search for pirates; that no British flag was hauled down, because none

was flying on the lorcha at the time; that the return of the crew by the

authorities ought to have satisfied Mr Parkes; that as Commissioner Yeh

gave explanations, a demand ought not to have been made upon him for an

apology also; that Sir John Bowring ought not to have extended the

quarrel so as to include the question of his admission into Canton; that

the seizure of the junks was illegal; and that the bombardment of Canton

was not only illegal, but ferocious and unbefitting Christian men. Every

one of these positions was disputed by the government; nevertheless the

House of Commons sanctioned them, or the resolutions which implied them,

by a majority of 263 over 247. This vote, arrived at on the 3d of March,

determined Lord Palmerston to appeal to the country by dissolving the

existing parliament and assembling a new one.

During the interregnum between the two parliaments, public opinion was

much divided concerning Chinese affairs. Lord Palmerston was at that

time in much favour, and his courage was admired in defending an absent

subordinate when fiercely attacked; still it was not without a painful

feeling that the nation heard of a great city being bombarded for

trivial reasons. Those who most warmly defended Sir John Bowring were

those who best knew the faithlessness of the Chinese authorities. By a

combination of various causes, direct and indirect, a new House of

Commons was elected more devoted to Lord Palmerston than the one which

preceded it; and the Chinese war then became a settled question, so far

as that branch of the legislature was concerned. During the interval of

more than two months, between the adverse vote on the 3d of March and

the assembling of the new parliament on the 7th of May, the government

were making arrangements for bringing the Chinese difficulty to a

satisfactory termination. They told off certain regiments to be sent to

China; they appointed General Ashburnham to command them; they sent over

the Earl of Elgin with large powers to control the whole of the

proceedings; and they arranged with the French government a joint plan

of action for obtaining, if possible, free commerce at all the Chinese

ports. This scheme of policy was formed and partially put in execution;

but the various portions of it were only by degrees made publicly known.

When parliament reassembled in May, numerous questions were put to the

ministers in both Houses—concerning the appointment of General

Ashburnham; the poisonings at Hong-kong; the treatment of Chinese

prisoners; the relations between the East India Company and China in

reference to the opium trade; the condition of Hong-kong as a British

colony; the emigration of Chinese coolies—and other matters bearing upon

the state of affairs in the Chinese seas. It speedily transpired that

the French government had appointed Baron Gros, to act with the Earl of

Elgin in the political negotiations with the Chinese; that the United

States government would also send out a plenipotentiary; and that the

Russian governor of the sterile provinces on the banks of the Amoor

would be intrusted with similar powers by the court of St Petersburg. If

peaceful efforts should fail to bring the Chinese government to amicable

relations, war was to be carried on more energetically than before. In

addition to the regiments of troops, the British government sent out the

_Furious_ steam-frigate, the _Surprise_ and _Mohawk_ dispatch-boats,

thirteen steam gun-boats, and a steam transport. The Earl of Elgin left

England on the 21st of April; General Ashburnham had started two or

three weeks earlier; and the troops had gradually been shipped off as

transport for them could be obtained. Certain regiments had been

assigned to India, to relieve other regiments which had been long

stationed there; but it was now proposed to send them first to China,

whence, after settling the troubles, they might be transferred to India.

Little did the English government foresee how strangely their plans

would be overturned by the formidable Revolt in India. In the earlier

half of the month of June, the English nation directed no particular

attention to the affairs of the east. The Persian war had come to a

close; the Chinese difficulty was languidly waiting for a solution; and

news of the Indian Revolt had not yet arrived. But the close of the

month witnessed a different state of things. The terrible tragedies at

Meerut and Delhi were now known; and legislators and the press alike

demanded that the comparatively unimportant Chinese expedition should

not be allowed to absorb the services of Queen’s troops so much needed

in India. On the 29th, in the House of Lords, the Earl of Ellenborough

said: ‘We have sent to China that naval force which should, in my

opinion, be left upon the shores of England, to give security to this

country even under the auspices of the most profound peace. That naval

force has been despatched to the Chinese waters—for what?—to carry on a

contest between Sir John Bowring and Commissioner Yeh! Six battalions of

troops have been sent out there for the same purpose; but I cannot help

thinking that those six battalions will be found insufficient to bring

under our control the numerous population of Canton. The consequence

will be, that we shall find ourselves under the necessity of sending out

further reinforcements. But are we, with India in danger, to fight the

battle of the government? Are we, my lords, determined, happen what may,

to persevere in that fatal policy which her Majesty’s ministers have

adopted?’ Similar animadversions were made in the House of Commons by Mr

Disraeli. The ministers, while announcing the immediate dispatch of more

troops to India, did not promise that the Chinese expedition should be

diverted from its purpose; for they underrated at that time the serious

import of the sepoy revolt. Soon afterwards, however, when the news from

India became more and more gloomy, orders were issued that some of the

troops not yet embarked should be sent to India instead of China. As no

such catastrophe as a mutiny in India could reasonably be anticipated

when the Earl of Elgin was sent out, the ministers could not tell how

far that plenipotentiary might accede to any application made to him by

the governor-general of India for the use of the troops already

approaching or in the Indian seas.

Such being the progress of opinion and of preparation in England in

reference to the Chinese quarrel, we may resume the rapid sketch of

operations in China itself.

When, at about the middle of May 1857, Viscount Canning received news at

Calcutta of the disasters at Meerut and Delhi, he instantly, as we have

seen in a former chapter,[194] transmitted telegraphic messages to

Bombay, Ceylon, and Madras. He inquired whether the Earl of Elgin and

General Ashburnham had arrived at either of those stations, on their way

to China; and made earnest applications that the troops sent from

England to China might be diverted from that route, and despatched to

Calcutta instead. Canning and Elgin had both been intrusted by their

sovereign with extensive powers; both, when they came to communicate,

saw that the events in India were more critical than those in China; and

both were of opinion that the Queen’s troops were more wanted on the

Jumna and Ganges than on the Canton or Pekin rivers. Hence arose an

almost entire stoppage of the operations in the China seas till towards

the close of the year. The slight events that marked the summer and

autumn may be noticed in a few brief paragraphs.

Towards the close of May, before any considerable reinforcements could

reach China, an attack was made by the British on a fleet of Chinese

war-junks with very considerable effect. One of the many channels which

the Canton river presents, called by the English Escape Creek, being

known to contain a large fleet of junks, Commodore Elliot was ordered to

make a vigorous demonstration in that quarter. On the 25th he entered

the creek, with the _Hong-kong_, _Bustard_, _Staunch_, _Starling_, and

_Forbes_, towing boats filled with men from the _Inflexible_, _Hornet_,

and _Tribune_. He found forty-one mandarin junks, all heavily armed,

moored across the creek; a brisk engagement ensued; and it was not until

after the loss of many men, on the 25th and two following days, that the

junks were destroyed.

The month of June opened with an engagement of more importance—the

battle of Fatshan. This city is about seven miles distant in a straight

line from Canton, but lying upon a different affluent of the Canton

river. The expedition was not so much against Fatshan itself, as against

a fleet of junks lying in the Fatshan branch or channel. Sir Michael

Seymour himself accompanied this expedition. The channel was too narrow

to admit any except small-craft; and therefore the work was to be done

by gun-boats and row-boats. At three in the morning of the 1st of June

the expedition started forth, the _Coromandel_ towing three hundred

marines in open boats. Many heavily armed forts line the Fatshan creek

near the city, and these speedily opened fire as the boats advanced.

When the _Coromandel_ had nearly reached the town, the _Hong-kong_,

_Haughty_, _Bustard_, _Forester_, _Plover_, _Opossum_, and other

gun-boats, steamed up, each having its few but formidable guns, and each

towing ships’ boats full of ‘blue-jackets.’ The men landed at the foot

of a hill which was crowned with a fort mounting twenty large guns, and

which from that day was called Fort Seymour. The rush up the hill was

exciting; commodores, captains, lieutenants, seamen, marines, all ran

up, equally regardless of danger; and after a few rounds from the fort’s

guns, the Chinese, dismayed at the boldness of the English, took flight,

and ran away from their guns. The assailants then hastened to attack the

junks, which, mounting twelve guns each, were able to pour forth a

tremendous fire of shot and shell. How the British escaped with so

little loss in this encounter is a marvel. The seamen were in ecstasies

at the boldness of the duty assigned to them. The boats’ crews baffled

the shots from so many hundred guns by rowing right up to the junks,

_beneath_ the line of fire of the guns; and when there, they did not

cease till they had set fire to the junks, from which the crews escaped

precipitately over the opposite sides. Out of the seventy-two junks,

sixty-seven were destroyed.

Anxious were the speculations whether these renewed successes would or

would not lead to any decisive termination of the struggle. Bowring and

Parkes among the civilians, Seymour and Elliot among the naval

commanders, knew well enough that without a military force this could

not be done. They knew, moreover, that until the Earl of Elgin should

arrive, they could not be placed fully in possession of the views of the

home-government. They anxiously counted the days before the new arrivals

would be announced. The Earl of Elgin and General Ashburnham were at

Bombay on the day when the disastrous news from Meerut and Delhi reached

that city. The general went on to Hong-kong, where he arrived on the

10th of June; but the earl, after reaching Singapore, gave orders that

two of the approaching regiments should be diverted from the Chinese

expedition to the service of Viscount Canning. This was ominous of the

cessation of any effective operations on the China coast. Elgin,

moreover, issued orders that, if Canning should make pressing

application for more aid, other regiments should be similarly diverted

to Calcutta. Meanwhile, at Canton, Yeh remained as impassable as ever;

he did not yield an inch. The rich were flying from the city, the poor

were half starved by the stoppage of all trade; nevertheless these

miseries, bad enough to the Chinese themselves, did not improve the

position of the English.

Early in July the Earl of Elgin arrived in the _Shannon_ war-steamer. A

large staff of military officers had now assembled at Hong-kong; but

there was nothing for them to do, seeing that the regiments had not

arrived, nor did it appear probable how soon Canning could spare them. A

fleet and a staff of military officers were now in the Canton river

almost in a state of idleness. The active correspondent of the _Times_,

having no fighting to witness, made those rambling visits to Shang-hae

and elsewhere which enabled him to give so graphic an account of the

Chinese in their homes and shops and places of amusement. On the 13th

the French admiral arrived at Hong-kong, to confer with Elgin on the

policy to be pursued. At first there was an intention of steaming up to

the Pei-ho river, on which the imperial city of Pekin stands, to bring

the emperor to a conference. Within a few days, however, an urgent

dispatch arrived from Viscount Canning, announcing that the revolt was

spreading widely in India, and asking for further aid. The Earl of Elgin

at once changed his plan. He set off to Calcutta, taking with him a

force of fifteen hundred seamen and marines, mostly belonging to the

_Shannon_ and _Pearl_ war-steamers. It was these hardy men who

constituted the ‘Naval Brigades’ so often mentioned in past chapters of

this work, and in service with which the gallant Captain Sir William

Peel met his death. Elgin’s determination was arrived at in part from

this circumstance—that Baron Gros, the French high-commissioner or

plenipotentiary, was not expected at Hong-kong until September; and that

any negotiations at Pekin would be weakened in force unless the two

countries acted in conjunction through their respective representatives.

August found the English officers and seamen very little satisfied with

their position and duties in the Chinese waters. An occasional junk-hunt

was all that occurred to break the monotony. Of fighting, such as

men-of-war’s men would dignify by the name, there was little or none.

Yeh continued to govern Canton; the Cantonese continued to suffer by the

suspension of their trade with the British. The four northern ports

managed to retain a trade which was very lucrative to them—selling tea

and silk to the English, and buying opium, which the Chinese dealers

sold again at an enormous profit in the upper or inner provinces. As for

the emperor at Pekin, the English authorities at Hong-kong had no means

of determining to what extent he was cognizant of affairs in the south,

nor how far he sanctioned the immovable line of policy followed by his

viceroy at Canton.

In the early part of September, Yeh took advantage of the lull in

warlike operations; he built more junks, cast more cannon, raised up

several guns which had been sunk by the English, and collected a fleet

of two hundred war-junks in the Canton and Fatshan waters, ready to

encounter the ‘barbarians’ again in time of need. As a means of

ascertaining what was in progress in this quarter, Commodore Elliot set

forth from Hong-kong to make a reconnaissance. He started up the Canton

river on the 9th, taking with him the gun-boats _Starling_, _Haughty_,

and _Forester_, and the heavy boats of the _Sybille_ and _Highflyer_. He

steamed through some of the channels, which are so numerous as to

convert the banks of the river into a veritable archipelago, difficult

to explore on account of the shallowness of the water in the channels.

He met with a vast array of trading-junks, which he did not molest

because they were engaged in peaceful commerce; and a few war-junks,

which he destroyed; but he did not reach any spot where war-junks in

large numbers were congregated. One event of this month was the

appearance of Russia on the scene. Admiral Count Putiatine, who had been

appointed governor of the Russian province of Amoor, and who had made a

rapid overland journey from St Petersburg to the mouth of the Amoor in

seventy days, steamed from that river to the Pei-ho on a diplomatic

mission. The purport of this mission was not revealed to the English;

but there were many at Hong-kong who surmised that Russia, like the

United States, was secretly planning that a goodly share of any

contingent advantages arising from the struggle should fall to

her—leaving all the odium of hostilities on the shoulders of England and

France.

When October arrived, the stormy state of the China seas rendered it

doubtful how soon the Earl of Elgin’s diplomatic expedition to Pekin

would take place. The British community at Hong-kong rather rejoiced at

this; for they had all along advocated the simple formula—take Canton

first, and negotiate with the emperor afterwards. The earl’s intention

to postpone his visit becoming clearly known, many of the staff-officers

who had been in enforced idleness at Hong-kong took their departure—some

to Calcutta, some to other places. When Baron Gros arrived in the

_Audacieuse_, which was not until the middle of October, the talk of the

fleet was that Canton would be really and effectually besieged, as a

preliminary to any proceedings further north. The _Imperador_ arrived

towards the close of the month, bringing five hundred marines direct

from England; and large accessions of warlike stores denoted a

resolution on the part of the government to bring about some definite

termination of this Chinese quarrel.

In November, General Ashburnham, apparently tired of doing nothing in

China, gave up the military command and went to India, where a proffer

of his services was courteously declined by Lord Canning and Sir Colin

Campbell. His sudden return to England, without leave, gave rise to much

comment in and out of parliament. General Straubenzee now became

military commander in China, that is, commander of the British troops

whenever they should arrive. Captain Sherard Osborne was collecting

gun-boats from various quarters. Baron Gros undertook that France would

operate in the capture of Canton, with three frigates, two corvettes,

and four gun-boats, containing altogether about a thousand men. Mr Reed

arrived in the _Minnesota_, as American commissioner to represent the

interests of his country, but without any intention of taking part in

the hostile demonstration. Throughout the whole affair, indeed, the

United States ‘fraternised’ much more freely with Russia than with

England and France.

At length the month arrived (December 1857) which was to witness the

conquest of Canton. At the beginning of this month the European

war-vessels in Chinese waters were really formidable in number. Besides

the _Calcutta_ (80), there were, including everything from

steam-frigates down to gun-boats, a total of 70 European and American

war-vessels, of which no less than 49 were British. On the 12th of the

month, the Earl of Elgin sent a formal letter to Commissioner

Yeh—announcing his arrival as ambassador extraordinary from Queen

Victoria to the Emperor of China, and as plenipotentiary to settle all

existing differences; expressing the pleasure which England would feel

in being on friendly terms with China; enumerating the causes of

complaint against the Chinese authorities; demanding ‘the complete

execution at Canton of all treaty engagements, including the free

admission of British subjects into the city,’ and ‘compensation to

British subjects and persons entitled to British protection for losses

incurred in consequence of the late disturbances;’ threatening a seizure

of Canton if these terms were not acceded to; and hinting that the terms

would in that case be rendered much more severe. On the 14th Yeh sent a

reply, very tortuous and cunning, justifying the conduct of himself and

his countrymen, but evading any direct notice of Elgin’s demand and

threat. On the 24th the British plenipotentiary wrote to announce that,

as his desire for a peaceful termination of the dispute had not been

properly met, he should at once prepare for war. The next day

(Christmas-day) brought a second letter from Yeh, repeating his former

arguments in a very discursive fashion, but evading everything in the

way of concession.

When December had brought what few troops the home-government and Lord

Canning thought they could spare for China, the available numbers

appeared as follow—800 men of various services, principally of the 59th

foot, from the garrison of Hong-kong; 2500 marines belonging to the

various ships; 1500 naval brigade formed from the ships’ crews for

service on shore; and 900 French troops and seamen—making a total of

5700 men. These were aided by about 1000 Chinese and Malay coolies, as

carriers and labourers—men who readily sold their patriotism for silver

and copper. On the 16th, while the attempt at negotiation with Yeh was

still going on, the English and French took possession of Honan, as a

measure of precaution. This is an island just opposite Canton; its shore

forms the Southwark of the great city. The merchants and traders were

allowed all possible facilities for removing their families and goods

from such buildings as the captors chose to appropriate—the wish being

to inflict as small an amount of suffering as possible on the Chinese

people, whom the Earl of Elgin carefully distinguished from the Chinese

government. From the 16th to the 23d, steamers and gun-boats were daily

arriving, and taking up positions mostly between Canton and the island.

On the 22d a council was held, at which the Earl of Elgin and Baron

Gros, having virtually declared war against China, gave up the command

of the operations to the general and the two admirals—namely, General

Straubenzee, Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, and Admiral R. de Genouilly.

On the 23d, several military and naval officers steamed in gun-boats

past the whole length of the city, landed at a point beyond its

northwestern extremity, walked a mile and a half under the escort of a

party of marines and sailors, mounted a hill, made accurate observations

on a series of forts north of the city, and returned without the loss of

a man. On the 24th there was a similar reconnaissance east and northeast

of the city. These examinations satisfied the officers that the capture

of the northern forts must be made from the east rather than the west.

Christmas-day and the two following days were spent in making

preparations for the bombardment; and in distributing papers along the

shore, announcing to the Cantonese what calamity was in store for their

city if Yeh did not yield before midnight on the 27th. The viceroy

remained as immovable as ever, and so the terrible work began.

At daylight on the morning of the 28th of December the guns opened fire.

Their number was enormous—some in war-steamers, some in gun-boats, some

on Honan Island, some in the captured forts. The general orders were to

fire at various parts of the city-wall, and over the city to the

northern forts, but to work as little mischief as possible to the

inhabited streets. Meanwhile the troops, marines, and naval brigade

gradually effected a landing at about a mile from the eastern extremity

of the city; they landed guns and vast quantities of stores and

ammunition, and then proceeded by regular siege-operations to capture

all the forts on the northern side of the city—the bombardment of the

southern and western wall still continuing. These fearful operations

continued throughout the last four days of the year, during which an

immense number of fragile wooden buildings were burned—not purposely,

but of necessity. The Chinese soldiers did not shew in any vast numbers,

nor did they display much heroism; the assailants conquered one fort

after another, until they held the whole of the eastern and northern

margin of the city—having free communication with their ships by a line

of route to their unmolested landing-place. Great as was the amount of

burning of wooden tenements, the loss of life was very small; the allied

killed and wounded were less than 150, and the Chinese loss was believed

to be not more than double that number—so careful had the soldiers and

sailors been to avoid bringing slaughter into a place containing a

million of human beings.

Rarely has a city been held under a more singular tenure than Canton was

held by the English and French on New-year’s Day 1858. They were masters

of all the defences, and naturally inferred that the city would formally

yield. Nothing of the kind, however, took place. The Cantonese resumed

trade in their streets and shops, but Yeh and his officers kept wholly

out of sight. The ordinary usages of war were ignored by this singular

people. Elgin, Gros, Straubenzee, Seymour, Genouilly—all came to the

captured forts on the northern heights, and all were perplexed how to

deal with these impassible Cantonese. On the 2d of January and two

following days the captors lived in much discomfort on the heights; but

on the 5th a very decided advance was made. Mr Parkes, and a few other

Englishmen who were familiar with the Chinese language, had been busily

engaged collecting information concerning the hiding-places of the

dignitaries within the city; and, acting on the information thus

obtained, Straubenzee sent several strongly armed parties into different

districts of the city. The results were very important. The explorers

captured Commissioner Yeh, the lieutenant-governor Peh-kwei, the Tatar

general of the Chinese forces in and near Canton, fifty-two boxes of

dollars in the treasury, and sixty-eight packages of silver ingots.

From the 5th of January to the 10th of February the city was placed

under very anomalous government. In the first place, Yeh was sent as a

sort of prisoner to Calcutta. In the next place, Yeh’s palace became the

head-quarters of the allied authorities; while other large buildings

were appropriated as barracks. The Earl of Elgin decided that the Tatar

general and the lieutenant-governor of Canton should be liberated. The

general, Tseang-keun, was obliged to disarm and disband his troops, as a

condition of his liberation. Elgin thought it prudent that Peh-kwei

should be formally made governor of the city, to save it from pillage.

On the 9th the installation of this functionary took place, in the

presence of Elgin, Gros, Bowring, Parkes, Straubenzee, Seymour,

Genouilly, and other officials. Colonel Holloway, Captain Martineau, and

Mr Parkes were appointed commissioners, or a council of three, to assist

Peh-kwei in his municipal duties. The city now became safely traversable

by the English and French without much danger; the Chinese soldiers were

disbanded; and the citizens were willing enough to go on with such trade

as was left to them. The council of three insisted on organising an

efficient street-police; on expediting the administration of justice; on

visiting all the prisons; and on liberating such wretched captives as

appeared to have been unjustly incarcerated. Although Peh-kwei protested

loudly against this interference with his supreme authority, he was

obliged to submit. This period was a saturnalia for pirates; the regular

government being subverted, thousands of lawless men on the river

carried on with impunity that system of piracy and plunder which the

numerous creeks around Canton rendered so practicable. When this became

fully known to the authorities now in the ascendant, Sir Michael Seymour

put in force a severe measure of attack and reprisal against them.

How far the objects of the war had been attained, remained still a

problem. Canton, it is true, was seized; but the imperial court at Pekin

was invisible and inaccessible, and much evidently remained yet to be

done. On the 10th of February the blockade was raised. The Canton river

was speedily swarming with trading junks; the Honan warehouses were

reopened and refilled; British merchants resumed their dealings with

Chinese merchants; and within a few days many million pounds of tea were

on their way to England. Shortly after the removal of the blockade, the

Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros opened communications with Count Putiatine

and Mr Reed; they proposed, in the names of England and France, that

Russia and the United States should take part in the demands still

necessary to be made upon the Emperor of China. These overtures were

promptly met; but it must in justice be stated that, in the subsequent

operations and negotiations for obtaining treaties, the Russian and

American plenipotentiaries adopted a more secret and selfish policy than

comported with the liberal offer made on the part of England and France.

Elgin and Gros determined that Canton should remain in their power until

full and satisfactory treaties had been obtained from the emperor. It

affords a curious illustration of the indomitable perseverance of the

English newspaper press, that the _Times_ correspondent, Mr Wingrove

Cooke, after seeing all the fighting in the Canton waters, and incurring

as much hazard as his colleague Mr Russell had incurred in similar

duties in the Crimea, contrived to obtain a passage in the ship (the

_Inflexible_) which conveyed Yeh to Calcutta, and to draw forth many

peculiarities in the character of that redoubtable Chinaman—a personage

who, through the columns of that newspaper, soon became familiarly known

in nearly every part of the globe; a man whose shipboard life was thus

summed up, ‘he eats a great deal, sleeps a great deal, and washes very

little.’

Early in March, after the forwarding to Pekin of official dispatches

under such circumstances as to render probable their receipt by the

emperor, Elgin and Gros moved towards the north. This conveyance of

letters was, as is usual in the Celestial Empire, a most complicated

affair. Mr Lawrence Oliphant, the Earl of Elgin’s private secretary, and

Viscount de Contades, secretary of legation to Baron Gros, went from

Canton to Shang-hae, bearing letters from the English and French

plenipotentiaries, and also from those of America and Russia. After

reaching Shang-hae, and being joined by the British, French, and

American consuls, they pushed on in boats up the river, on whose banks

stands the city of Soo-choo, the capital of that part of China. The

governor endeavoured by every means to avoid an interview; but as the

messengers would not be refused, he received them with an unwilling

courtesy, and undertook to forward their letters to Pekin. The envoys

then returned to Shang-hae. Certain arrangements were now made for the

safety of Canton and Hong-kong, and vast stores were sent up to

Shang-hae, in preparation for any contingencies. The Earl of Elgin and

his suite, on their way to Shang-hae, sojourned for a while at

Fuh-choo-foo. All the plenipotentiaries arrived at Shang-hae during the

latter half of the month. They received answers from the court of Pekin

to their several letters. The Chinese authorities endeavoured so to

treat the subject as to keep the plenipotentiaries as far away from

Pekin as possible. They alleged that, whether Yeh had or had not misused

his authority at Canton, he was now dismissed, and was replaced by a

viceroy who would be ready to listen to any reasonable representations;

they recommended that the English and French plenipotentiaries had

better return to the south, there to resume their superintendence of

peaceful commerce; that the Russians should return to the north, and the

Americans remain quietly at the trading ports. These replies did not

purport to come from the emperor, who was too lofty a personage to

recognise the plenipotentiaries; they came through the governor of the

Shang-hae province, and were worded in the customary style of Chinese

magniloquence.

The month of April found the Chinese quarrel apparently as far from

solution as ever. The advice of the imperial authorities, that they

should keep away from Pekin, and attend to their trading affairs, was

not likely to be followed by the plenipotentiaries—one of whom, at any

rate, had come from Europe for a far different purpose. Affairs did not

progress very favourably at Canton. Pirates continued to infest the

river; while an army of rebels—equally hostile to the imperialists and

to the ‘barbarians’—was marching towards the city from the interior.

Many of the inhabitants, rendered uneasy by the strange confusion in the

government and ownership of their city, fled from Canton. The English

merchants found their trading arrangements sadly checked by these

sources of disquietude; and they sighed for the return of those times

when opium, and tea, and silk brought them large profits. Finding, as

they had all along surmised, that nothing effectual could be done except

in the immediate vicinity of Pekin, the plenipotentiaries took their

departure from Shang-hae, and steamed northward. Count Putiatine, in the

_America_ steamer, anchored off the Pei-ho river on the 14th; a few

hours afterwards arrived the _Furious_ and the _Leven_, in the former of

which was the Earl of Elgin; Mr Reed, in the _Mississippi_, made his

appearance on the 16th; Baron Gros, in the _Audaiceuse_, joined his

brother-plenipotentiaries on the 23d; and Admirals Seymour and Genouilly

arrived on the 24th. Letters were now sent off to Pekin, demanding the

appointment of an official of high rank to meet the representatives of

the four courts, to confer on the matters in dispute; and allowing six

days for the return of an answer. This decisive step produced a more

immediate effect than any course yet adopted; the emperor, unless wholly

deceived by those around him, had now ample means of knowing that a

formidable armament was at the mouth of the river on whose banks the

imperial city is situated, and that Russia and America had joined

England and France in this demonstration. Before the six days had

expired, a messenger arrived to announce that Tao, or Tān,

governor-general of the province, had been appointed as envoy to meet

the plenipotentiaries. Meanwhile, the month of May was a troubled one in

Canton. The new governor Hwang, and the lieutenant-governor Peh-kwei,

were frequently detected in manœuvres not quite satisfactory to the

English and French officers left in charge of the city. Many of the

Cantonese themselves believed that Hwang had received secret orders from

Pekin to retake Canton while the allies were engaged in the northern

waters. There were machinations at Pekin, rebel armies in the inner

provinces, restless Tatars in the Canton province, pirates in the river,

and unreliable Chinese authorities everywhere; insomuch that the

continuance of quietude in the city was very problematical. During the

month, about 1200 sepoys arrived from Calcutta; they had belonged to the

47th and 65th Bengal native infantry, disarmed in India as a matter of

precaution, but not implicated in actual mutiny; the 70th had preceded

them, and had behaved steadily in China.

The Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros experienced the customary difficulty in

bringing the Chinese to anything like a candid agreement or

understanding. The new envoy, Tao, was long in making his appearance;

and when he did appear, his powers of treating were found to be so

limited, and his attempts at evasion so many, that the aid of

cannon-balls was again found to be necessary. Steamers were quickly sent

down to Shang-hae, Hong-kong, and Canton, for reinforcements; and on the

20th of May hostile operations began. The banks of the Pei-ho being

defended by forts, these forts were attacked one by one, and captured.

The plenipotentiaries were by this means enabled to advance higher up

the river, increasing their chance of a direct communication with the

authorities at Pekin. The Chinese had not been idle; for throughout the

month they had been seen drilling their troops in the forts, and sinking

junks to bar the navigation of the river; but the gun-boats which the

English and French had now brought up, and the boats of the war-ships,

made light of these obstructions. The Russian and American ambassadors

were pretty well satisfied with the trading concessions offered to them

by the Chinese authorities; but the English and French were determined

to be satisfied with nothing less than a definite settlement of all the

points in dispute; and hence the attack on the forts, which evidently

produced an immense excitement higher up the river.

June began with a battle, or at least, a skirmish, outside

Canton—shewing that a peaceful occupation of that city was not readily

to be looked for. A military force of ‘braves’ or Chinese soldiers

having gradually been approaching from the north, General Straubenzee

deemed it necessary to encounter and crush or disperse them at once. On

the 2d, accompanied by Mr Parkes, he started off to the hills on the

north of the city, having with him about a thousand men supplied with

three days’ rations. The braves, who were soon met with, kept up a

skirmishing fight all day on the 3d, and then retired without much loss.

Straubenzee returned to Canton on the 4th, also without much loss in

actual fighting; but his soldiers had been stricken down in considerable

number by the terrible heat of the sun. The expedition was scarcely to

be considered satisfactory; for the braves were still hovering among the

hills, very little disheartened by their defeat. As the month advanced,

the state of affairs at Canton became worse and worse. Rockets were

frequently fired at night into the posts held by the allies; the suburbs

were full of armed ruffians ready for any mischief; the streets became

unsafe to Europeans unless armed or guarded; occasional attacks were

made on the police, and even on the sentries; headless bodies of

Europeans were sometimes found in the river; two or three sailors were

waylaid, cut down, and carried off; and placards were posted up about

the city, couched in the most ferocious language against the ‘foreign

devils.’ One of these placards designated the British consul as ‘the

red-haired barbarian Parkes.’

The state of affairs further north, during this month of June, was more

favourable. The destruction of the forts on the banks of the Pei-ho had

the effect of bringing the Chinese authorities again into a disposition

for negotiation. The river was carefully examined from Ta-koo up to

Tien-sing—a city of 300,000 inhabitants, situated on the high road to

Pekin, at a point where the Great Canal of China enters the Pei-ho. The

four plenipotentiaries steamed up to Tien-sing, where they were allowed

to remain: seeing that the Chinese government, paralysed by the capture

of the forts, no longer made an attempt to obstruct them. Governor Tao

was dismissed, for having managed matters badly; and two mandarins of

high rank, Kwei-liang and Hwa-sha-na, were appointed to negotiate with

the barbarians. The plenipotentiaries took up their abode on shore, in a

house provided by the mandarins; and a renewed series of negotiations

commenced. Meanwhile, all hostilities were suspended; the war-junks and

the gun-boats remained peacefully at anchor, and the trading-junks were

allowed to pass up and down the river. About the middle of the month,

some of the inhabitants of Tien-sing manifested a disposition to molest

the plenipotentiaries and their suites; whereupon Sir Michael Seymour

ordered up a few seamen and marines—who, perambulating the walls and

streets of the city for a few hours, gave such a check to the citizens

as to induce a more peaceful demeanour. One of the first definite

results of the conferences which now ensued, was a treaty between China

and the United States, signed on the 18th of June by Mr Reed and the two

Chinese mandarins. America had from the first sought to obtain the best

terms for herself, without much consideration for the other powers; and

as her demeanour was more courteous than threatening, more submissive

than dignified; as, moreover, her demands were not so extensive as those

of England—she found less difficulty in settling the terms of a

commercial treaty, which would open up a door for increased American

trading with China; and with this Mr Reed was well satisfied. Count

Putiatine about the same date signed a treaty as the representative of

Russia. The policy of his court was to keep the other great powers as

far from Pekin as possible, in order that nothing might check the

gradual growth of Russian influence on the northern frontier of the

Chinese empire. The terms of the Russian treaty were far more important

than those of the American; they included the cession to Russia of a

large area of country near the mouth of the great river Amoor, and of an

amount of trading privileges such as had never before been conceded by

China to any other country whatever.

[Illustration:

HONG-KONG.

]

The English and French treaties, especially the former, being more

comprehensive in their character, could not be settled so readily as the

American. Commissioner Key-ing, who had concluded the treaty of Nankin

with Sir Henry Pottinger in 1842, was sent from Pekin to Tien-sing to

assist Kwei-hang and Hwa-sha-na in the present instance; but the Earl of

Elgin, seeing that Key-ing was disposed for a course of cunning and

trickery, refused to treat with him; and the negotiations were left to

the other two commissioners. All difficulties being gradually removed by

three weeks of negotiation, treaties were at length signed on the 26th

and 27th of June respectively by the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros, with

the two Chinese commissioners. The provisions were nearly the same for

England and for France, except an indemnity to be given to the former

nation for the expenses of the war and for certain losses incurred by

the merchants. The more important clauses of the English treaty may be

thus thrown into a summary: Confirmation of the former Treaty of

Nankin—Agreement to appoint British ambassador at Pekin, and Chinese

ambassador at London—Family and suite of British ambassador to have

residence and security at Pekin, and facilities for travelling,

transaction of business, and transmission of letters—British ambassador

to correspond on terms of equality with the Chinese minister for foreign

affairs—Christianity, whether Protestant or Catholic, to be tolerated,

and Christian missionaries protected throughout the Chinese

Empire—British subjects permitted to trade and to travel in the

interior—Chin-kiang, on the great river Yang-tsze-kiang; Niuchwang, in

Manchooria; Tang-choo, in the Gulf of Pe-che-lee; Tae-wan, in the island

of Formosa; Swatow and Kiung-choo, in the island of Hainan, to be

declared free ports; in addition to Canton, Amoy, Fuh-choo-foo, Ning-po,

and Shang-hae, the five already opened; and in addition, also, to three

other ports on the Yang-tsze-kiang, as soon as they should be freed from

rebels—An Anglo-Chinese commission to prepare a commercial tariff, which

is to be revised every ten years—Inland transit dues to be commuted for

an _ad valorem_ rate—Official correspondence to be conducted in English

as the text or original, with a Chinese translation as an

accompaniment—The Chinese character or symbol denoting ‘barbarian’ to be

in future omitted in Chinese official documents relating to

foreigners—British ships-of-war permitted to visit any ports in the

empire, and their commanders to be treated on terms of equality by the

Chinese officials—Both nations to assist in suppressing piracy in

Chinese waters—Amount of indemnity to be settled by a separate article.

The Earl of Elgin would not quit Tien-sing until he had clearly

ascertained that the emperor understood and accepted the terms of the

treaty: this done, he returned on the 6th of July to Shang-hae.

It is impossible to avoid seeing that such a treaty, if faithfully

carried out, would greatly revolutionise the commercial and social

institutions of China. If British ships-of-war be permitted to visit any

of the ports, and trading-ships have free entry to nearly a dozen of the

number; if the great Yang-tsze-kiang be made a channel up which British

manufactures may penetrate; if Christian missionaries may teach and

preach, print and distribute, without opposition from the government; if

a British official may reside at the imperial city, and the Chinese

emperor condescend to appoint an ambassador to London; finally, if the

vain assumption of superiority be discontinued in Chinese official

documents relating to the English—an immense advance will have been made

towards bringing China into the fraternity of nations. The great doubt

was, whether so vast a change would not be too extensive to be made at

once—too humiliating, in the Chinese view, for the imperial government

to adopt in its integrity: especially as the British did not offer to

assist the emperor against the rebels who ravaged his dominions. It was

not expected that the formalities of ratification could all be completed

before the summer of 1859. The Hon. Mr Bruce, brother to the Earl of

Elgin, conveyed the treaty to England. No sooner was the tenor of the

treaty known, than English merchants began to make inquiries and

calculations concerning increased exports, of salt and other

commodities, to the China seas. The indemnity question was felt to be

one which could not be settled without long delay, in treating with so

peculiar a people as the Chinese. Commissioners on both sides were to

decide how much should be paid by China, for injury inflicted on British

property at Canton, and for the expenses of the British expedition; they

were also to decide on the revised tariff for imports and exports.

While the terms of this treaty were being settled at Tien-sing, the

state of Canton became more and more disturbed. Street-murders were very

frequent; bags of gunpowder were exploded in the streets, at moments

when patrols were expected to pass; and missiles were hurled, from

unseen quarters, into all parts of the city where Europeans resided.

Many of the more peaceful citizens left Canton, and their houses were at

once seized by ruffians, who posted up proclamations of most

ultra-Chinese character. One of these proclamations was to the effect

that, ‘We have ascertained that there are only two or three thousand

English and French dogs in the city; but our numbers are thousands on

thousands; and if every one of us carry but a sword to kill every

foreigner that we meet, we shall soon kill them all. If any one trade or

supply provisions to the foreign dogs, we shall arrest and punish him

according to the village regulations. All those who are in the employ of

the foreign dogs must leave their employment in one month’—and terrible

denunciations were hurled against all those who should disobey these

behests. General Straubenzee and the other officials were much perplexed

how to deal with this state of things; they began to fear that nothing

less than a bombardment of the city would drive out the ‘braves,’ and

restore peaceful trade; and yet it would be an anomaly to use cannon and

muskets, beheading and imprisonment, against the subjects of an emperor

with whom we had just made a treaty of peace. In this exigency, Sir John

Bowring caused large posting-bills to be printed in Chinese—announcing

that a treaty of peace had been signed between the two countries; that

all animosity ought now to cease; that many Chinese, hitherto residing

at Hong-kong as servants and traders, had been frightened away by

threatening proclamations from some of the authorities on the mainland;

that surreptitious attempts had been made to check the supply of

provisions to Hong-kong; and that many inconveniences had thence arisen.

The placard proceeded to warn all persons and communities against any

interference with the peaceful resumption of commerce between the two

nations. An attempt to distribute this placard or proclamation was

clumsily made, and led to disaster. Two British officers, knowing the

Chinese language, went with a few seamen in the gun-boat _Starling_, to

the coast of the mainland nearly opposite the island of Hong-kong. Some

difficulty being experienced in obtaining an interview with the official

authorities, the sailors landed under a flag of truce, and attempted to

post up the placards in the water-side suburbs of the town of Namtow;

they were, however, attacked by Chinese soldiery, and driven back to the

gun-boat, with the loss of one of their number and the wounding of

another.

This untoward failure of course led to further fighting. As the attack

made by the Chinese on the sailors was in defiance of a flag of truce,

Sir John Bowring deemed himself justified in inflicting a punishment on

the town. He made a requisition to General Straubenzee, who thereupon

organised a small expeditionary force. He selected 700 men—59th foot,

artillery, engineers, marines, and naval brigade—who were commanded by

himself and Commodore Keith Stewart. They landed near Namtow on the 11th

of August, and gave notice to the inhabitants that no injury would be

done to them if they remained neutral; the attack being intended against

the ‘braves’ or Chinese soldiers, who had originated the contest. Within

a few hours a fort was attacked, the Chinese troops driven out, the fort

destroyed, and two large brass guns brought away as trophies. The object

in view was, not to injure the town or the inhabitants, but to prove to

the authorities that any disregard of a flag of truce would subject them

to a hostile demonstration.

Throughout these strange operations, in which war and peace were so

oddly mingled—the one prevailing at Namtow, the other at Tien-sing—the

city of Canton continued in a disturbed state. On the 21st of July, the

‘braves’ outside the city went so far as to plan an attack for the

expulsion of the English and French altogether from the place. They were

speedily beaten off. As before, however, it was a discomfiture, not a

suppression; for the braves settled down in an encampment about four

miles from Canton, ready for any exigencies. During a considerable time

after the signing of the treaty at Tien-sing, Governor Whang either did

not know of it, or else disregarded it; but in the course of the month

of August, evidence gradually appeared that he had been officially

informed of the treaty. He forbade the braves to make any further

attacks. Many Chinese traders, who had been driven in disquietude from

Canton, now returned; and Hong-kong began again to look out for Chinese

servants and work-people. Governor Whang’s proclamation, dated August

17th, contained a statement which bore an aspect of considerable

probability: ‘There are, both within and without the city, many villains

and thieves who, pretending they are braves, take advantage of the state

of affairs to create disturbances in order to plunder and rob, and from

whose hands the citizens have suffered much. If such rascality be not

speedily suppressed, how can the minds of the people be set at ease, or

tranquillity restored? And unless the villains be apprehended, how can

the districts be purged?’ Wherefore he gave orders for the suppression

of violence and hostile manifestations.

During the months of September and October—with the exception of a

stroke of diplomacy at Japan, presently to be adverted to—Lord Elgin

remained in the China seas, chiefly at Shang-hae, waiting for the

Chinese commissioners who were to settle with him the minor details

supplementary to the treaty. Former experience having shewn that the

Chinese authorities viewed the obligations of a treaty somewhat lightly,

it was not deemed prudent either to give up Canton, or to withdraw the

powerful naval force from the China coast, until all the conditions of

the treaty had been put in a fair train for fulfilment. Canton gradually

recovered its trade and quietude; Hong-kong gradually got back its

Chinese servants and artisans; and the English fleet vigorously put in

operation that clause of the treaty which related to the suppression of

piracy. Expeditions were fitted out from Hong-kong, which captured and

destroyed hundreds of piratical junks.

One of the most remarkable episodes in this remarkable Chinese war bore

relation to Japan—an empire consisting of many islands, lying

northeastward of China. Until a few years ago, the Japanese traded only

with the Chinese and the Dutch. The Dutch were allowed to establish a

trading station on the small island of Desima, which was connected with

the larger island of Kiusiu or Kioosioo by a bridge. At the Kiusiu end

of the bridge was the city of Nagasaki or Nangasaki, with the

inhabitants of which only the Dutch were allowed to trade. One ship

annually, and one only, was permitted to come to Desima from Java,

bringing sugar, ivory, tin, lead, bar-iron, fine chintzes, and a few

other commodities, and conveying away in exchange copper, camphor,

lackered-wood ware, porcelain, rice, soy, &c. The Chinese, like the

Dutch, were confined to the little island opposite Nagasaki, but their

trading privileges were greater; at three different periods of the year

they were wont to send laden junks from Amoy, Ning-po, and Shang-hae,

and exchange Chinese commodities for Japanese. Such was the state of

matters until a short time previous to the Russo-Turkish war; when the

United States, taking advantage of an insult offered to American ships,

induced or compelled the Japanese government to permit intercourse

between the two countries, to be conducted at certain ports under

certain regulations. Some time afterwards, similar privileges were

accorded to Russia and England. The convention with England, signed at

Nagasaki on the 9th of October 1855, provided for very little more than

this—that British ships might resort to the three ports of Nagasaki,

Simoda, and Hakodadi, for the purpose of effecting repairs, and

obtaining fresh water, provisions, and such supplies as they might

absolutely need. It was a denial of such aid to distressed ships that

had led the United States to threaten the Japanese. France, not to be

left behind by other nations, sent an expedition to obtain shipping

privileges similar to those conceded to America, England, and Russia. On

the 25th of May 1856, M. de Montravel presented himself before the

governor of Nagasaki, accompanied by rather an imposing array of

officers; he had no difficulty in procuring the desired concession. On

the 11th of December in the same year, two British merchant-ships, about

to enter the harbour at Nagasaki, to purchase certain supplies, were

refused admission; whereupon the two captains sailed up close to the

town, landed, and marched with a strong escort to the residence of the

governor. He declined to receive them, but undertook that any letter

from them should be conveyed to the emperor at Jedo or Yedo, the capital

of Japan. This letter obtained the desired result; an imperial edict

being issued on January 26, 1857, that ships from any of the four

nations might enter Nagasaki as well as the other two ports—provided

that none of the crews attempted to penetrate into the interior. This

letter was, in fact, nothing more than the carrying out of an agreement,

which the governor of Nagasaki had on a former occasion evaded. On the

17th of June 1857, Mr Townshend Harris, acting under the United States

consul at Hong-kong, signed a treaty at Simoda with two Japanese

commissioners. This treaty was a great advance, in commercial

liberality, on anything previously known in that region.

Thus matters remained until the autumn of 1858; when, expeditions to

China having been sent from England, France, Russia, and America,

advantage was taken of the proximity of Japan to obtain by and for the

first three countries the same trading privileges as had been granted to

America. It was, throughout, a very singular race between four great

nations, in which America obtained the first start. The Japanese had,

during three or four years, seen much more of Europeans and Americans

than at any former period, and had begun to acquire enlarged notions of

international commerce; moreover, they had lately heard of the powerful

armaments on the Canton and Pei-ho rivers, and of the treaties which

those armaments had enforced; from whence the Earl of Elgin inferred

that he might probably meet with success in an attempt to obtain an

improved treaty of commerce. On the 3d of August he entered the port of

Nagasaki, with the _Furious_, _Retribution_, and _Lee_—taking with him a

steam-yacht as a present from Queen Victoria to the Emperor of Japan. On

the following day he was joined by Sir Michael Seymour, with the

_Calcutta_ and _Inflexible_. It being deemed best that the yacht should

be presented at Jedo if possible, the expedition set forth again, and

proceeded to Simoda. Here it was ascertained that Mr Townshend Harris,

United States consul, had just returned from Jedo with a new and very

advantageous treaty of commerce between America and Japan; that Count

Putiatine was at that very moment negotiating for a similar treaty

between Russia and Japan; and that Mr Donker Curtius, Dutch consul, had

been trying in a similar direction for Holland. The Earl at once saw

that no time was to be lost, or he would be distanced by the other

diplomatists. Procuring the aid of a Dutch interpreter, through the

courtesy of Mr Harris, his lordship proceeded from Simoda towards Jedo

on the 12th. Disregarding the rules laid down by the Japanese government

concerning the anchoring-places of ships, the squadron, led by Captain

Sherard Osborne, boldly pushed on to the vicinity of the city—to the

utter astonishment of the natives, official and nonofficial. Boats

approached, containing Japanese officers, who earnestly begged the

British representative not to approach the great city, which had never

yet been visited by a foreign ship; but as he was deaf to their

entreaties, they prepared to give him a courteous reception on shore.

Although the city was strongly protected by forts, there was no

indication of a hostile repulsion of the strangers. During eight days

did Elgin reside within the great city of Jedo, treated with every

attention—possibly because there were British ships-of-war and a

gun-boat just at hand. All the naval officers had opportunity of

traversing the city during this interval, and met with signs of

civilisation such as induced them to write home very glowing

descriptions. The earl at first met with difficulties, arising from the

circumstance that a conservative had just supplanted a liberal ministry

(to use English terms) at Jedo, strengthening the prejudice against

foreigners. Indeed, this change of ministry had arisen two or three days

before, in consequence of the signing of the liberal treaty with

America. Elgin, however, triumphed over this and all other difficulties;

he arrived at Shang-hae again on the 3d of September, bringing with him

a treaty of commerce between England and Japan, signed at Jedo on the

26th of August.

The treaty thus obtained was written in Dutch as the original, with

English and Japanese translations. The chief clauses comprised the

following provisions: England may appoint an ambassador to Jedo, and

Japan an ambassador to London—The ambassadors to be free to travel in

the respective empires—Each power may appoint consuls at the ports of

the other—The ports of Hakodadi, Nanagawa, Nagasaki, Nee-e-gata, Hiogo,

Jedo, and Osaca, to be opened to British traders at various times by the

year 1863—British traders may lease ground and build dwellings and

warehouses at those ports—The British may travel to distances within a

certain radius of each port—In any dispute between British and Japanese,

the British consuls to act as friendly arbitrators—If arbitration fail,

British offenders to be tried by British laws, and Japanese by those of

Japan—British residents may employ Japanese as servants or

workmen—British may freely exercise their religion—Foreign and Japanese

coin may be used indifferently for commercial purposes—Supplies for

British vessels may be stored at certain ports free of duty—Japanese

authorities to render aid to stranded British vessels—British captains

may employ Japanese pilots—Goods may be imported at an _ad valorem_

duty, without any transit or other dues, and may be re-exported duty

free—British and Japanese to aid each other in preventing

smuggling—Money, apparel, and household furniture of British subjects

residing in Japan to be imported duty free—Munitions of war to be

prohibited—All other articles to pay an _ad valorem_ import-duty,

varying from 5 to 35 per cent., according to a tariff to be specially

prepared—Any trading privileges, granted hereafter to any other nation,

to be granted equally to England.

This very important treaty—even more liberal in its provisions than that

concluded with China—was to be ratified by the two courts, and the

ratifications exchanged, within one year from the signature.

[Illustration:

SIR EDWARD LUGARD.

]

§ 3. ENGLISH PROSPECTS IN THE EAST.

When, by the month of October 1858, it was known that the object of the

Persian expedition had been fulfilled by the complete withdrawal of the

Persians from Herat; that the purpose of the Chinese expedition had been

even more than fulfilled, supposing the advantageous treaty made by the

Earl of Elgin to be faithfully observed; and that a remarkable

commercial treaty had been signed with Japan—the English nation felt,

not unjustly, that their prospects of advancement in the east were

greatly heightened. All depended, however, or would depend, on the

result of the struggle in India; if that ended satisfactorily, the power

of England in Asia would be greater than ever. That the Indian struggle

_would_ have a favourable termination, few doubted. There was much to be

done; but as the whole empire cheerfully supported the government in the

preparations for doing it, and as those preparations had been widely

spread and deeply considered, success was very confidently looked

forward to.

The arrangements for the final discomfiture (if not extinction) of the

mutineers, and for bringing back a misguided peasantry to habits of

order and of industry, will be noticed presently; but it may be

desirable first to glance at two important subjects which much occupied

the attention of thoughtful men—namely, the probable causes of the

Revolt; and, consequent on those causes, the general character of the

reforms proper to be introduced into the government of India, as an

accompaniment to the change from the Company’s _régime_ to that of the

Queen.

The complexity of Indian affairs was very remarkable; and in no instance

more so than with reference to the first of the above two subjects of

speculation. Down to the closing scene, men could not agree in their

answers to the question—‘What was the cause of the mutiny?’ Military

officers, cabinet ministers, commissioners, magistrates, missionaries,

members of parliament, pamphleteers, writers in newspapers, as they had

differed at first, so did they differ to the end. This discrepancy

offers strong proof that the causes were many in number and varied in

kind—that the Revolt was a resultant of several independent forces, all

tending towards a common end. It may not be without value to shew in

what directions public men sought for these causes. The following

summaries present the views of a few among many who wrote on the

subject:

Mr Gubbins,[195] who was financial commissioner of Oude (or Oudh) when

the mutiny began, was requested by Mr Colvin, lieutenant-governor of the

Northwest Provinces, to express his opinions concerning the causes of

that catastrophe. He wrote out his opinions; and stated that Sir Henry

Lawrence, shortly before his death, concurred mainly with them. In the

first place, he did not attribute the mutiny to Russian intrigue—an

explanation that had occurred to the minds of some persons. In the

second place, he disbelieved that the mutiny was due to a Mohammedan

conspiracy; the movement began among soldiers, of whom four-fifths or

more were Hindoos; and certain Mohammedan sovereigns and leaders only

joined it when they saw a probable chance of recovering dominion for

their race and their religion. In the third place, Mr Gubbins equally

denied that it was a national rebellion, a rising of a nation against

its rulers; for, he urged, the villagers were throughout more disposed

to remain neutral than to aid either side; we had no right to expect any

great loyalty from them; and we received all that could fairly be looked

for—the sympathy of some, the hostility of others, but the neutrality of

the greater number. In the fourth place, he denied that the annexation

of Oude caused the mutiny; there were certain persons—courtiers of the

deposed king, shopkeepers at Lucknow, soldiers of the late king’s army,

and budmashes—who had suffered by the change; but the mass of the

population, he contended, had been benefited by us, and had neither

ground nor wish for insurrection. Having thus expressed his dissent from

many modes of explanation, Mr Gubbins proceeded to give his own views,

which traced the mutiny to three concurrent causes: ‘I conceive that the

native mind had been gradually alarmed on the vital subjects of caste

and religion, when the spark was applied by the threatened introduction

of the greased cartridge; that this spark fell upon a native army most

dangerously organised, subject to no sufficient bonds of discipline, and

discontented; and, above all, that this occurred at a time when Bengal

and the Northwestern Provinces were so denuded of European troops as to

leave the real power in the hands of the natives.’

Mr Rees,[196] confining his observations to the province with which he

was best acquainted, attributed the mutiny to the mode of governing Oude

by the English, superadded to the fierce hostility of the Mussulmans to

Christians in general. Thousands of natives had been thrown out of

employ by the change of government, and with them their retainers and

servants; all alike were rendered impoverished and discontented. The

shopkeepers of Lucknow, who had made large profits by supplying the

palaces and harem of the king before his deposition, lost that advantage

when an English commissioner took the king’s place. New taxes and duties

were imposed, as a means of substituting a regular for an irregular

revenue; and these taxes irritated the payers. The Mohammedan teachers

and fanatics, he urged, enraged at the substitution of a Christian for a

Moslem government, were ready for any reactionary measures. Lastly,

there were innumerable vagabonds, bravos, and beggars in the city, who

had found bread in it under native rule, but who nearly starved under

the more systematic English government. Hence, Mr Rees contended, the

great city of Lucknow had for a year or more been ripe for rebellion,

come from what quarter and in what way it might.

Colonel Bourchier,[197] like many military officers, sought for no other

origin of the mutiny than that which was due to the state of the native

army. The enormous increase in that army—by the contingents raised to

guard the newly acquired territories in Central India, the Punjaub, and

Oude—with no corresponding increase in the European force, encouraged a

belief on the part of many of the natives that they had a fair chance of

being able to drive the English altogether from the country. The colonel

quoted an opinion expressed by the gallant and lamented Brigadier

Nicholson, who possessed an intimate knowledge of the native

character—‘Neither greased cartridges, the annexation of Oude, nor the

paucity of European officers, was the cause of the mutiny. For years I

have watched the army, and felt sure they only wanted an opportunity to

try their strength with us.’

Mr Ludlow[198] ridiculed the idea of the mutiny being sudden and

unexpected. He pointed to the fact that Munro, Metcalfe, Napier, and

other experienced men, had long ago predicted an eventual outbreak,

arising mainly from the defective organisation of the military force. Mr

Ludlow himself attributed the mutiny to many concurrent causes. The

Brahmins were against us, because we were gradually sapping the

foundations of their religion and power; the Mussulman leaders were

against us, because we had reduced the Mogul rule to a shadow, and most

of the nawabships likewise; the Mahrattas were against us, because we

had gradually lessened the power of Scindia, Holkar, the Guicowar, the

Peishwa, the Nena, and other leading men of their nation; the Oudians

were against us, because, in addition to having deposed their king, we

had greatly lessened the privileges and emoluments of the soldiery who

had heretofore served him; and lastly, the Hindoo sepoys were turned

against us, because they believed the rumour that the British government

intended to degrade their caste and religion by the medium of greased

cartridges. Mr Ludlow treated the cartridge grievance as the spark that

had directly kindled the flame; but he believed there were sufficient

inflammable materials for the outbreak even if this particular panic had

not arisen.

Mr Mead,[199] who, in connection with the press of India, had been one

of the fiercest assailants of the Company in general, and of Viscount

Canning in particular, insisted that the mutiny was a natural result of

a system of government wrong in almost every particular—cruel to the

natives, insulting to Europeans not connected with the Company, and

blind even in its selfishness. More especially, however, he referred it

to ‘the want of discipline in the Bengal army; the general contempt

entertained by the sepoys for authority; the absence of all power on the

part of commanding officers to reward or punish; the greased cartridges;

and the annexation of Oude.’ The ‘marvellous imbecility’ of the Calcutta

government—a sort of language very customary with this writer—he

referred to, not as a cause of the mutiny, but as a circumstance or

condition which permitted the easy spread of disaffection.

Mr Raikes,[200] who, as judge of the Sudder Court at Agra, had an

intimate knowledge of the Northwest Provinces, contended that, so far as

concerned those provinces, there was one cause of the troubles, and one

only—the mutiny of the sepoys. It was a revolt growing out of a military

mutiny, not a mutiny growing out of a national discontent. Ever since

the disasters at Cabool taught the natives that an English army _might_

be annihilated, Mr Raikes had noticed a change in the demeanour of the

Bengal sepoys. He believed that they indulged in dreams of ambition; and

that they made use of the cartridge grievance merely as a pretext, in

the beginning of 1857. The outbreak having once commenced, Mr Raikes

traced all the rest as consequences, not as causes.—The villagers in

many districts wavered, because they thought the power of England was

really declining; the Goojurs, Mewatties, and other predatory tribes

rose into activity, because the bonds of regular government were

loosened; the Mussulman fanatics rose, because they deemed a revival of

Moslem power just possible; but Mr Raikes denied that there was anything

like general disaffection or national insurrection in the provinces with

which he was best acquainted.

‘Indophilus’[201]—the _nom de plume_ of a distinguished civilian, who

had first served the Company in India, and then the imperial government

in England—discountenanced the idea of any general conspiracy. He

believed that the immediate exciting cause of the mutiny was the greased

cartridges; but that the predisposing causes were two—the dangerous

constitution of the Bengal sepoy army, and the Brahmin dread of reforms.

On the latter point he said: ‘In the progress of reform, we are all

accomplices. From the abolition of suttee, to the exemption of native

Christian converts from the forfeiture of their rights of inheritance;

from the formation of the first metalled road, to covering India with a

network of railways and electric telegraphs—there is not a single good

measure which has not contributed something to impress the military

priests with the conviction that, if they were to make a stand, they

must do so soon, else the opportunity would pass away for ever.’

The Rev. Dr Duff,[202] director of the Free Church Scotch Missions in

India, differed, on the one hand, from those who treated the outbreak

merely as a military revolt, and, on the other, from those who regarded

it as a great national rebellion. It was, he thought, something between

the two—a political conspiracy. He traced it much more directly to the

Mohammedan leaders than to the Hindoos. He believed in a long-existing

conspiracy among those leaders, to renew, if possible, the splendour of

the ancient Mogul times by the utter expulsion of the Christian English;

the Brahmins and Rajpoots of the Bengal army were gradually drawn into

the plot, by wily appeals to their discontent on various subjects

connected with caste and religion; while the cartridge grievance was

used simply as a pretext when the conspiracy was nearly ripe. The

millions of India, he contended, had no strong bias one way or the

other; there was no such nationality or patriotic feeling among them as

to lead them to make common cause with the conspirators; but on the

other hand they displayed very little general sympathy or loyalty

towards their English masters. Viewing the subject as a missionary, Dr

Duff strongly expressed his belief that we neither did obtain, nor had a

right to obtain, the aid of the natives, seeing that we had done so

little as a nation to Christianise them.

Without extending the list of authorities referred to, it will be seen

that nearly all these writers regarded the ‘cartridge grievance’ as

merely the spark which kindled inflammable materials, and the state of

the Bengal army as one of the predisposing causes of the mutiny; but

they differed greatly on the questions whether the revolt was rather

Mohammedan or Hindoo, and whether it was a national rebellion or only a

military mutiny. It is probable that the affirmative opinions were

sounder than the negative—in other words, that every one of the causes

assigned had really something to do with this momentous outbreak.

We now pass to the second of the two subjects indicated above—the views

of distinguished men, founded in part on past calamities, on the reforms

necessary in Indian government. And here it will suffice to indicate the

chief items of proposed reforms, leaving the reader to form his own

opinions thereon. During the progress of the Revolt, and in reference to

the future of British India, a most valuable and interesting

correspondence came to light—valuable on account of the eminence of the

persons engaged in it. These persons were Sir John Lawrence and Colonel

Herbert Edwardes—the one chief-commissioner of the Punjaub, the other

commissioner of the Peshawur division of that province. Both had the

welfare of India deeply at heart; and yet they differed widely in

opinion concerning the means whereby that welfare could be best

secured—especially in relation to religious matters. Early in the year

1858, Colonel Edwardes published a _Memorandum on the Elimination of all

unchristian Principles from the Government of British India_. About the

same time Mr MacLeod, financial commissioner, published a letter on the

same subject; as did also, some time afterwards, Mr Arnold,

director-general of public instruction in the Punjaub. Sir John

Lawrence, on the 21st of April, addressed a dispatch to Viscount

Canning, explanatory of his views on the matters treated by these three

gentlemen, especially by Colonel Edwardes. The colonel had placed under

ten distinct headings the ‘unchristian elements’ (as he termed them) in

the Indian government; and it will suffice for the present purpose to

give here brief abstracts of the statements and the rejoinders—by which,

at any rate, the subject is rendered intelligible to those who choose to

study it:

1. _Exclusion of the Bible and of Christian Teaching from the Government

Schools and Colleges._—Edwardes insisted that the Bible ought to be

introduced in all government schools, and its study made a part of the

regular instruction. Lawrence was favourable to Bible diffusion, but

pointed out certain necessary limits. He would not teach native

religions in government schools; he would teach Christianity only (in

addition to secular instruction), but would not make it compulsory on

native children to attend that portion of the daily routine. He would

wish to see the Bible in every village-school throughout the empire—with

these two provisoes: that there were persons able to teach it, and

pupils willing to hear it. Who the teachers should be—whether clergymen,

missionaries, lay Bible-readers, or Christianised natives—is a problem

that can only very gradually receive its solution. Lawrence insisted

that there must be no compulsion in the matter of studying Christianity;

it must be an invitation to the natives, not a command. The four

authorities named in the last paragraph all differed in opinion on this

Bible question. Colonel Edwardes advocated a determined and compulsory

teaching of the Bible. Mr MacLeod joined him to a considerable extent,

but not wholly. Mr Arnold strongly resisted the project of teaching the

Bible at all—on the grounds that it would infringe the principle of

religious neutrality; that it would not be fair to the natives unless

native religions were taught also; that it would seem to them a

proselyting and even a persecuting measure; that it might be politically

dangerous; and that we should involve ourselves in the sea of

theological controversy, owing to the diversities of religious sects

among Christians. Sir John Lawrence, as we have seen, adopted a medium

between these extremes.