CHAPTER XXXIII.

LAST DAYS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY’S RULE.

The demise of the great East India Company has now to be recorded—the

cessation of functions in the mightiest and most extraordinary

commercial body the world ever saw. The natives of India never did and

never could rightly understand the relations borne by the Company to the

crown and nation of England. They were familiar with some such name as

‘Koompanee;’ but whether this Koompanee was a king, a queen, a viceroy,

a minister, a council, a parliament, was a question left in a state of

ludicrous doubt. And no wonder. It has at all times been difficult even

for Englishmen, accustomed to the daily perusal of newspapers, to

understand the relations between the Crown and the Company. Men asked

whether the Punjaub was taken possession of by the Queen or by the

Company; and if by the Queen, why the Company was made to bear the

expense of the Punjaub war? So of the war in Persia, the annexation of

Oude, the disastrous campaign in Afghanistan, the Burmese war—were these

operations conducted by and for the Queen, or by and for the

Company?—who was to blame if wrong?—who to bear the cost whether right

or wrong?—who to reap the advantage? Even members of parliament gave

contradictory answers to these and similar questions; nay, the cabinet

ministers and the Court of Directors disputed on these very points. The

Company was gradually shorn of its trading privileges by statutes passed

in the years 1813, 1833, and 1853; and as its governing privileges had,

in great part, gone over to the Board of Control, it seemed by no means

clear for what purpose the Company continued to exist. There was a

guarantee of 10½ per cent. on £6,000,000 of India stock, secured out of

the revenues of India—the stock to be redeemable by parliament at cent.

per cent. premium after the year 1874; and it appeared as if the whole

machinery of the Indian government was maintained merely to insure this

dividend, and to obtain offices and emoluments for persons connected

with the Company. The directors always disowned this narrow view of the

Company’s position; and there can be no doubt that many of them and of

their servants had the welfare of the magnificent Indian empire deeply

at heart. Still, the anomaly remained, of a governing body whose

governing powers no one rightly understood.

When the Revolt began in 1857, the nation’s cry was at once against the

East India Company. The Company must have governed wrongly, it was

argued, or this calamity would never have occurred. Throughout a period

of six months did a storm of indignation continue, in speeches,

addresses, lectures, sermons, pamphlets, books, reviews, magazines, and

leading articles in newspapers. By degrees the inquiry arose, whether

the directors were free agents in the mode of governing India; whether

the Board of Control did not overrule them; and whether the disasters

were not traceable fully as much to the Board as to the directors? Hence

arose another question, whether the double government—by a Court sitting

in Leadenhall Street, and a Board sitting in Cannon Row—was not an evil

that ought to be abolished, even without reference to actual blame as

concerning the Revolt? The virulent abuse of the Company was gradually

felt to be unjust; but the unsatisfactory nature of the double

government became more and more evident as the year advanced.

There was a preliminary or short session of parliament held in that

year, during a few days before Christmas, for the consideration of

special business arising out of the commercial disasters of the autumn;

but as every one knew that India and its affairs must necessarily

receive some notice, the speech from the throne was looked for with much

eagerness. On the 3d of December, when parliament met, the ministers put

into the Queen’s mouth only this very brief allusion to projected

changes in the Indian government: ‘The affairs of my East Indian

dominions will require your serious consideration, and I recommend them

to your earnest attention.’ These vague words were useless without a

glossary; but the glossary was not forthcoming. Ministers, when

questioned and sounded as to their plans, postponed all explanations to

a later date.

The first public announcement of the intentions of the government was

made shortly before Christmas. A General Court of Proprietors of the

East India Company was held on the 23d of December, for the discussion

of various matters relating to India; and, in the course of the

proceedings, the chairman of the Company announced that, on the 19th, an

official interview had been held, by appointment, with Lord Palmerston.

On this occasion, the prime minister informed the Court of Directors

that it was the intention of the ministry, early in the approaching

year, to bring a bill into parliament for the purpose of placing the

government of British India under the direct authority of the crown. In

this interview, as in the royal speech, no matters of detail were

entered upon. The members of parliament in the one assembly, the

proprietors of East India stock in the other, were equally unable to

obtain information concerning the provisions of the intended measure.

All that could be elicited was, that the ‘double government’ of India

would cease; and a written notice or letter to this effect was

transmitted from the First Lord of the Treasury to the Court of

Directors on the 23d.

During the period of six or seven weeks between the preliminary and the

regular sessions, the journalists had full scope for their speculations.

Those who, from the first, had attributed the Revolt in India to the

Company’s misgovernment, rejoiced in the hoped-for extinction of that

body, and sketched delightful pictures of happy India under imperial

sway. Those who supported the Company and vested interests, predicted

the utter ruin of British influence in India if ‘parliamentary

government’ were introduced—a mode of government, as they alleged,

neither cared for nor understood by the natives of that region, and

utterly unsuited to oriental ideas. Those, the moderate thinkers, who

believed that on this as on other subjects the truth lies between two

extremes, looked forward hopefully to such a change as might throw new

vigour, and more advanced ideas, into the somewhat antiquated policy of

the East India Company, without destroying those parts of the system

which had been the useful growth of long experience. Many things had

transpired during the year, tending to shew that the Court of Directors

had been more prompt than the Board of Control, in matters requiring

urgent attention; and that, therefore, whatever might be the evils of

the double government, it would not be just to throw all the onus on the

Company.

Early in January 1858, on a requisition to that effect, a special Court

of Proprietors was summoned, to meet on the 15th, for considering ‘the

communication addressed to the Court of Directors from the government

respecting the continuance of the powers of this Company.’ At this

meeting, it transpired that the directors had written to Lord

Palmerston, just before the Christmas vacation; but as no cabinet

council had been held in the interim, and as no reply to that letter had

been received, it had been deemed most courteous towards the government

to withhold the publication of the letter for a time. A long debate

ensued. One of the proprietors brought forward a resolution to the

effect, ‘That the proposed transfer of the governing power of the East

India Company to the crown is opposed to the rights and privileges of

the East India Company, fraught with danger to the constitutional

interests of England, perilous to the safety of the Indian empire, and

calls for the resistance of this corporation by all constitutional

means.’ Many of the supporters of this resolution carried their

arguments to the verge of extravagance—asserting that ‘our Indian

empire, already tottering and shaking, will fall to the ground without

hope of recovery, if the East India Company should be abolished’—and

that ‘by means of the enormous patronage that would be placed in the

hands of the government, ministers would possess the power of corrupting

the people of this country beyond the hope of their ever recovering

their virtue or their patriotism.’ Most of the defenders of the Company,

however, adopted a more moderate tone. Colonel Sykes, speaking for

himself and some of his brother-directors, declared: ‘If we believed for

one moment that any change in the present administration of the

government of India would be advantageous to the people of India, would

advance their material interests, and promote their comforts, we should

gladly submit to any personal suffering or loss contingent upon that

change.’ He added, however, ‘By the indefeasible principles of justice,

and the ordinary usages of our courts of law, it is always necessary

that a bill of indictment with certain counts should be preferred before

a man is condemned; and I am curious to know what will be the counts of

the indictment in the case of this Company; for at present we have

nothing but a vague outline before us.’ Finally it was agreed to adjourn

the discussion, on the ground that, until the views of the government

had been further explained, it would be impossible to know whether the

words of the resolution were true, that the proposed change would be

‘fraught with danger to the constitutional interests of England, and

perilous to the safety of the Indian empire.’

On the renewal of the debate at the India House, on January 20th, the

directors presented a copy of a letter which they had addressed to the

government on the last day of the old year. In this letter they said:

‘The court were prepared to expect that a searching inquiry would be

instituted into the causes, remote as well as immediate, of the mutiny

in the Bengal native army. They have themselves issued instructions to

the government of India to appoint a commission in view to such an

inquiry; and it would have been satisfactory to them, if it had been

proposed to parliament, not only to do the same, but to extend the scope

of the inquiry to the conduct of the home government, for the purpose of

ascertaining whether the mutiny could, wholly or partially, be ascribed

to mismanagement on the part of the court acting under the control of

the Board of Commissioners. But it has surprised the court to hear that

her Majesty’s government—not imputing, so far as the court are informed,

any blame to the home authorities in connection with the mutiny, and

without intending any inquiry by parliament, or awaiting the result of

inquiry by the local government—should, even before the mutiny was

quelled, and whilst considerable excitement prevailed throughout India,

determine to propose the immediate supersession of the authority of the

East India Company; who are entitled, at least, to the credit of having

so administered the government of India, that the heads of all the

native states, and the mass of the population, amid the excitements of a

mutinous soldiery inflamed by unfounded apprehension of danger to their

religion, have remained true to the Company’s rule. The court would fail

in their duty to your lordship and to the country if they did not

express their serious apprehension that so important a change will be

misunderstood by the people of India.’ This letter failed to elicit any

explanatory response from the government. Lord Palmerston, in a reply

dated January 18th, after assuring the directors that their observations

would be duly considered by the government, simply added: ‘I forbear

from entering at present into any examination of those observations and

opinions; first, because any correspondence with you on such matters

would be most conveniently carried on through the usual official channel

of the president of the Board of Control; and, secondly, because the

grounds on which the intentions of her Majesty’s government have been

formed, and the detailed arrangements of the measure which they mean to

propose, will best be explained when that measure shall be submitted to

the consideration of parliament.’ The directors about the same time

prepared a petition to both Houses of Parliament, explanatory of the

reasons which induced them to deprecate any sudden transference of

governing power from the Company to the Crown. As this petition was very

carefully prepared, by two of the most eminent men in the Company’s

service; as it contains a considerable amount of useful information; and

as it presents in its best aspects all that could be said in favour of

the Company—it may fittingly be transcribed in the present work. To

prevent interruption to the thread of the narrative, however, it will be

given in the Appendix (A), as the first of a series of documents.[191]

When these various letters and petitions came under the notice of the

Court of Proprietors, they gave rise to an animated discussion. Most of

the proprietors admired the petition, as a masterly document; and many

of the speakers dwelt at great length on the benefits which the Company

had conferred upon India. One of the directors, Sir Lawrence Peel,

feeling the awkwardness of dealing with a government measure not yet

before them, said: ‘I have not signed the petition which you have just

heard read; and I will shortly state the reason why. I entirely concur

in the praises which have been bestowed upon that document. It is a most

ably reasoned and worded production; it does infinite credit to those

whose work it is; and it is much to the honour of this establishment

that it has talent capable of producing such a document. But I have not

signed the petition, because I have not thought it a prudent course to

petition against a measure, the particulars of which I am not acquainted

with.’ The debate was further adjourned from the 20th to the 27th, and

then to the 28th, when the speeches ran to great length. On one or other

of the four days of meeting, most of the directors of the Company

expressed their opinions—on the 13th, Mr Ross D. Mangles (chairman), and

Colonel Sykes; on the 20th, Sir Lawrence Peel and Captain Eastwick; on

the 27th, Mr Charles Mills, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Captain Shepherd, Mr

Macnaghten, and Sir F. Currie (deputy-chairman); on the 28th, Mr Prinsep

and Mr Willoughby. As might have been expected, a general agreement

marked the directors’ speeches; they were the arguments of men who

defended rights which they believed to be rudely assailed. Some of the

directors complained that the government notice was not explicit enough.

Some thought that, at any rate, it clearly foreshadowed the destruction

of the Company’s power. Some contended that, if the Company did not

speak out at once, it would in a few weeks be too late. Some insisted

that the government brought forward the proposed measure in order to

shift the responsibility for the mutiny to other shoulders. Some accused

the ministers of being influenced by a grasping for patronage, a desire

to appropriate the nominations to appointments. One of the few who

departed from the general tone of argument was Sir Henry Rawlinson, who

assented neither to the resolution nor to the petition. He dwelt at some

length on the two propositions mainly concerned—namely, ‘that the

transfer of the government of India to the Crown would be unjust to the

East India Company;’ and that such transfer ‘would be fatal to British

rule in India.’ Most of the other speakers had contended or implied that

the first clause of this statement involved the second; that the

transfer would be equally unjust to the Company, and injurious to India.

Sir Henry combated this. He contended that the connection was not a

necessary one. After a very protracted debate, the original resolution

was passed almost unanimously; and then the petition to both Houses of

Parliament was sanctioned as that of the Company generally.

Just at this period, the directors caused to be prepared, and published

at a cheap price, an elaborate ‘_Memorandum of the Improvements in the

Administration of India during the last Thirty Years_.’ It was evidently

intended to fall into the hands of such members of parliament as might

be disposed to take up the cause of the Company in the forthcoming

debates, and to supply them with arguments in favour of the Company,

derived from a recital of the marked improvements introduced in Indian

government. To this extent, it was simply a brief placed in the hands of

counsel; but the _Memorandum_ deserves to be regarded also in a

historical light; for nothing but a very narrow prejudice could blind an

observer to the fact that vast changes had been introduced into the

legislative and administrative rule of India, during the period

indicated, and that these changes had for the most part been conceived

in an enlightened spirit—corresponding in direction, if not in

intensity, with the improved state of public opinion at home on

political subjects.

Parliament reassembled for the regular session on the 4th of February,

fully alive to the importance of attending to all matters bearing on the

welfare of India. Earl Grey, on the 11th, presented to the House of

Lords the elaborate petition from the East India Company, lately

adverted to. Characterising this as a ‘state paper deserving the highest

commendation,’ the earl earnestly deprecated the abolition of the Court

of Directors, and the transfer of their authority to the ministry of the

day; grounding his argument on the assumption that the interposition of

an independent body, well informed on Indian affairs, between the

government and the natives of that country, was essential to the general

welfare. He admitted the need for reform, but not abolition. The Duke of

Argyll, on the part of the government, admitted that the Company’s

petition was temperate and dignified, but denied that its reasoning was

conclusive. The Earl of Ellenborough, agreeing that the Queen’s name

would be powerfully influential as the direct ruler of India, at the

same time doubted whether any grand or sweeping reform ought to be

attempted while India was still in revolt. The Earl of Derby joined in

this opinion, and furthermore complained of discourtesy shewn by the

ministers toward the directors, in so long withholding from them a

candid exposition of the provisions of the intended measure.

On the following day, the 12th of the month, the long-expected bill was

introduced to the House of Commons by Lord Palmerston—or rather, leave

to bring in the bill was moved. The first minister of the Crown, in his

speech on the occasion, disowned any hostility to the Company, in

reference either to the Revolt or to matters of general government. He

based the necessity for the measure on the anomaly of the Company’s

position. When the commercial privileges were withdrawn, chiefly in

1833, the Company (he urged) became a mere phantom of what it had been,

and subsided into a sort of agency of the imperial government, without,

however, responsibility to parliament. Admitting the advantages of

checks as securities for honesty and efficiency in administrative

affairs, he contended that check and counter-check had been so

multiplied in the ‘double government’ of India, as to paralyse action.

He considered that complete authority should vest where complete

responsibility was expected, and not in an irresponsible body of

merchants. His lordship concluded by giving an outline of the bill by

which the proposed changes were to be effected.

As the Palmerston Bill, or ‘India Bill, No. 1,’ as it was afterwards

called, was not passed into a law, it will not be necessary to reprint

it in this work; nevertheless, to illustrate its bearing on the

subsequent debates, the pith of its principal clauses may usefully be

given here: The government of the territories under the control of the

East India Company, and all powers in relation to government vested in

or exercised by the Company, to become vested in and exercised by the

sovereign—India to be henceforth governed in the Queen’s name—The real

and personal property of the Company to be vested in Her Majesty for the

purposes of the government of India—The appointments of governor-general

of India, with ordinary members of the Council of India, and governors

of the three presidencies, now made by the directors of the Company with

the approbation of her Majesty, and other appointments, to be made by

the Queen under her royal sign-manual—A council to be established, under

the title of ‘The President and Council for the Affairs of India,’ to be

appointed by her Majesty—This council to consist of eight persons,

exclusive of its president—In the first nomination of this council, two

members to be named for four years, two for six, two for eight, and two

for ten years—The members of council to be chosen from among persons who

had been directors of the East India Company, or ten years at least in

the service of the Crown or Company in India, or fifteen years simply

resident in India—Members of council, like the judges, only to be

removable by the Queen, on an address from both Houses of Parliament—The

president of the council eligible to sit in the Commons House of

Parliament—Four members of council to form a quorum—Each ordinary member

to receive a yearly salary of £1000; and the president to receive the

salary of a secretary of state—The council to exercise the power now

vested in the Company and the Board of Control; but a specified number

of cadetships to be given to sons of civil and military servants in

India—Appointments hitherto made in India to continue to be made in that

country—Military forces, paid out of the revenues of India, not to be

employed beyond the limits of Asia—Servants of the Company to become

servants of the crown—The Board of Control to be abolished.

Such was the spirit of the bill which Lord Palmerston asked leave to

introduce. Mr T. Baring moved as an amendment, ‘That it is not at

present expedient to legislate for the government of India.’ Thereupon a

debate arose, which extended through three evenings. The government

measure was supported by speeches from Lord Palmerston, Sir Erskine

Perry, Mr Ayrton, Sir Cornwall Lewis, Mr Roebuck, Mr Lowe, Mr Slaney,

Sir W. Rawlinson, Mr A. Mills, Sir Charles Wood, and Lord John Russell;

while it was opposed on various grounds by Mr T. Baring, Mr Monckton

Milnes, Sir J. Elphinstone, Mr Ross D. Mangles, Mr Whiteside, Mr

Liddell, Mr Crawford, Colonel Sykes, Mr Willoughby, Sir E. B. Lytton,

and Mr Disraeli. The reasonings in favour of the government measure were

such as the following: That the proper time for legislation had come,

when the attention of the country was strongly directed to Indian

affairs; that all accounts from India shewed that some great measure was

eagerly expected; that it was dangerous any longer to maintain an

effete, useless, and cumbrous machine, which the Court of Directors had

virtually become; that the Company’s ‘traditionary policy’ unfitted it

to march with the age in useful reforms; that as the Board of Control

really possessed the ruling power, the double government was a sham as

well as an obstruction; that the princes of India felt themselves

degraded in being the vassals and tributaries of a mere mercantile body;

that, such was the anomaly of the double government, it was possible

that the Company might be at war with a power with which her Majesty was

at peace, thus involving the nation in inextricable embarrassment; that,

with the exception of a very small section of the covenanted civil

servants, the European community and the officers of the Indian army

would prefer the government of the crown to that of the Company; that

the natives of India having been thrown into doubt concerning the

intentions of the Company to interfere with their religion, some

authoritative announcement of the Queen’s respect for their views on

that subject would be very satisfactory; and that as the native Bengal

army had disappeared, as India must in future be garrisoned by a large

force of royal troops, and as the military power would then belong to

the crown, it was desirable that the political power should go with it.

Among the pleas urged on the opposite side were such as follow: That the

natives of India would anticipate an increased stringency of British

power, under the proposed _régime_; that the ministerial influence and

patronage, in Indian matters, would be dangerous to England herself;

that as the Whig and Conservative parties had both supported the system

of double government in the India Bill of 1853, there was no reason for

making this sudden change in 1858; that before any change of government

was effected, it was imperatively necessary that an inquiry should be

made into the causes and circumstances of the Revolt; that the direct

exercise of governing power by a queen, formally designated ‘Defender of

the Faith,’ could not be agreeable either to the Hindoos or the

Mohammedans of India, whose ideas of ‘faith’ were so widely different

from those of Christians; that, as all previous organic changes in the

administration of the government of India had been preceded by an

inquiry into the character of that government, so ought it in fairness

to be in the present case; that if the proposed change were effected,

European theories and novelties, owing to the pressure of public opinion

on the ministry, would be attempted to be grafted on Asiatic prejudices

and immobility, without due regard to the inherent antagonism of the two

systems; and that the enormous extent, population, revenue, and commerce

of India ought not to be imperiled by a measure, the consequences of

which could not at present be foreseen.

This debate ended on the 18th; the House of Commons, by a majority of

318 to 173, granting leave for the introduction of the bill—it being

understood that a considerable time would elapse before the second

reading, in order that the details of the measure might be duly

considered by all who took an interest in the matter.

Before, however, any very great attention could be given to the subject,

either in or out of parliament, a most unexpected change took place in

the political relations of the government. The same minister who, on the

18th of February, obtained leave to bring in the India Bill, was placed

on the 19th in a minority which led to the resignation of himself and

his colleagues. Circumstances connected with an attempted assassination

of the Emperor of the French induced the Palmerston government to bring

in a measure which proved obnoxious to the House of Commons; the measure

was rejected by 234 against 219, and the government accordingly

resigned. So far as concerned the immediate effect, the most important

fact connected with India was the offer by the Earl of Derby, the new

premier, of the presidency of the India Board to the Earl of

Ellenborough. This nobleman had long been in collision with the East

India Company and its civil servants. Twice already had he been

president of the Board of Control, and in 1842-3-4 he had filled the

responsible office of governor-general of India. In both offices, and at

all times, he had cherished as much as possible the royal influence in

India against the Company’s, the military against the civil. As a

consequence, his enemies were bitter, his friends enthusiastic. The

author of an anonymous ‘red pamphlet,’ which attracted much notice

during the Revolt, spoke of the Earl of Ellenborough as the one great

man who could alone be the saviour of India—as the chivalrous knight who

would shiver to atoms the ‘vested rights’ and ‘traditionary policy’ of

the Court of Directors. It was natural, therefore, that the accession of

the earl to the new government should be regarded as an important

matter, either for good or evil.

It speedily became apparent that the new president of the Board of

Control would find difficulty in framing a line of proceeding on Indian

affairs. His own predilections were quite as much against the Company,

as those of his predecessor; but many of his colleagues in the Derby

government had committed themselves, when out of office, to a defence of

the Company, and to a condemnation of any immediate alteration in the

Indian government. Either he must change his opinions, or they belie

their own words. The Court of Directors would fain have expected

indulgent treatment from the Derby administration, judging from the

speeches of the two preceding months; but their past experience of the

Earl of Ellenborough threw a damp over their hope.

Three weeks after the vote which occasioned the change of government,

Lord Palmerston proposed the postponement of the second reading of his

India Bill until the 22d of April—a further lapse of six weeks; and this

was agreed to. He would not withdraw the bill, because he still adhered

to its provisions; he would not at once proceed with it, because his

opponents were now in office, and he preferred to see what course they

would adopt. The fate of India was thus placed in suspense for several

weeks, simply through a party struggle arising out of French affairs;

the great question—’Who shall govern India?’—was made subservient to

party politics.

Although Lord Palmerston had named the 22d of April as the day for

reconsidering his India Bill, this did not tie down the Derby ministry

to the adoption of any particular line of policy. After many discussions

in the cabinet, it was resolved that the ministers should ‘eat their

words’ by legislating for India, although it had before been declared a

wrong time for so doing; and that, throwing Lord Palmerston’s bill

aside, a new India Bill should be introduced.

Accordingly, on the 26th of March, Mr Disraeli, the new Chancellor of

the Exchequer, moved for leave to bring in that which was afterwards

called the ‘India Bill No. 2.’ As in a former instance, this bill may be

most usefully rendered intelligible by a condensed summary: A secretary

of state for India, to be appointed by the Queen—This secretary to be

president of a Council of India—The council to consist of eighteen

persons, nine nominated and nine elected—The nominated councillors to be

appointed under the royal sign-manual by the crown, and to represent

nine distinct interests—Those nine interests to be represented as

follow: the first councillor to have belonged for at least ten years to

the Bengal civil service; the second to the Madras service; the third to

the Bombay service; and the fourth to the Upper or Punjaub provinces,

under similar conditions; the fifth to have been British resident at the

court of some native prince; the sixth to have served at least five

years with the Queen’s troops in India; the seventh, to have served the

Company ten years in the Bengal army; and the eighth and ninth,

similarly in the Madras and Bombay armies—The nine nominated members to

be named in the bill itself, so as to give them parliamentary as well as

royal sanction—The remaining eight members of the council to be chosen

by popular election—Four of such elected members to be chosen from among

persons who had served the Crown or the Company at least ten years in

any branch of the Indian service, or had resided fifteen years in India;

and to be chosen by persons who had been ten years in the service of the

Crown or the Company, or possessed £1000 of India stock, or possessed

£2000 of capital in any Indian railway or joint-stock public works—The

other five of such elected members to be chosen from among persons who,

for at least ten years, had been engaged in the commerce of India, or in

the export of manufactured articles thither; and to be chosen by the

parliamentary constituencies of five large centres of commerce and

manufactures in the United Kingdom, namely, London, Liverpool,

Manchester, Glasgow, and Belfast—the Secretary of State for India to

have the power of dividing the council, thus constituted, into

committees, and to exercise a general supervision over these

committees—The secretary alone, or six councillors in union, to have

power to summon a meeting of the council—The councillors not to be

eligible to sit in parliament, but to have each £1000 per annum for

their services—The patronage heretofore exercised by the East India

Company to be now exercised by the Council—The army of India not to be

directly affected by the bill—The revenues of India to bear the expenses

of the government of India—A royal commission to be sent to India, to

investigate all the facts and conditions of Indian finance.

It will be seen that this remarkable scheme was based on the idea of

conciliating as many different interests as possible, in England and in

India. Mr Disraeli, in the course of his speech, mentioned the names of

the nine gentlemen whom it was proposed to nominate to the council on

the part of the crown; and in relation to the vast powers of the

secretary and council, he said: ‘To establish a British minister with

unrestricted authority, subject to the moral control of a body of men

who by their special knowledge, their independence, their experience,

their distinction, and their public merit, are, nevertheless, invested

with an authority which can control even a despotic minister, and which

no mere act of parliament can confer upon them, is, I admit, no ordinary

difficulty to encounter; and to devise the means by which it may be

accomplished is a task which only with the indulgence of this House and

with the assistance of parliament we can hope to perform.’

Criticisms were much more numerous and contradictory on this than on

Lord Palmerston’s bill. It was no longer a contest of Conservatives

against Whigs. The new bill was examined on its merits. The friends of

the East India Company, expecting something favourable from the change

of government, were much disappointed; they analysed the clauses of the

bill, but found not what they sought. True, the old Indian interests

were to be represented in the new council; but just one-half of the

members were to be nominees of the crown, and five others were to be

elected by popular constituencies over which the Company possessed no

control. Even those who cared little whether the Company lived or died,

provided India were well governed, differed among themselves in opinion

whether the popular element would be usefully introduced in the manner

proposed. The objections were more extensively urged out of parliament

than within; for after the first reading of the bill, on the 26th of

March, the further consideration of it was postponed to the 19th of

April.

The Conservatives had reproved the Whigs for discourtesy to the East

India Company, in not giving due notice of the provisions of ‘Bill No.

1;’ but now equal discourtesy (if discourtesy it were) was shewn by the

first-named party in reference to ‘Bill No. 2.’ On the 24th of March, at

a quarterly meeting of the Company, and only two days before Mr Disraeli

introduced his measure—or rather the Ellenborough measure—into the House

of Commons, the chairman of the Court of Directors was asked whether he

knew aught concerning the provisions of a bill so nearly touching the

interests of the Company; to which he replied: ‘I know no more about the

forthcoming bill than I knew of the last before its introduction into

parliament.’ On the 7th of April, however, at a special Court of

Proprietors, the directors presented copies of the bills, ‘No. 1’ and

‘No. 2;’ and at the same time presented a Report against both. In the

debate, on the 7th and 13th, arising out of the presentation of the

Report, there was a pretty general opinion among the proprietors, that

if Lord Palmerston’s India Bill was bad, Mr Disraeli’s was not one whit

better, in reference to the interests of the Company; and there was a

final vote for the following resolution: ‘That this court concur in the

opinion of the Court of Directors, that neither of the bills now before

parliament is calculated to secure good government to India; and they

accordingly authorise and request the Court of Directors to take such

measures as may appear to them desirable for resisting the passing of

either bill through parliament, and for introducing into any bill for

altering the constitution of the government of India such conditions as

may promise a system of administration calculated to promote the

interests of the people of India, and to prove conducive to the general

welfare.’ One of the proprietors having expressed an opinion that the

directors ought to prepare a third bill, more just than either of the

other two, the chairman very fairly pointed out that it was not the

Company’s duty so to do.

Under somewhat unfavourable circumstances did the Derby ministry renew

the consideration of Indian affairs after the Easter recess. Parliament,

it is true, had not yet had time or opportunity to criticise ‘Bill No.

2;’ but that measure had been very unfavourably received both by the

East India Company and by the newspaper press; and it became generally

known that the ministers would gladly accept any decent excuse for

abandoning or at least modifying the bill. This excuse was furnished to

them by Lord John Russell. On the 12th of April, when the Commons

resumed their sittings after the Easter vacation, his lordship expressed

an opinion that the bill was ill calculated to insure the desired end;

that its discussion was likely to be disfigured by a party contest; and

that it would be better to agree to a set of resolutions in committee,

on which a new bill might be founded. Mr Disraeli accepted this

suggestion with an eagerness which led many members to surmise that a

private compact had been made in the matter. He suggested that Lord John

Russell should draw up the resolutions; but as his lordship declined

this task, Mr Disraeli undertook it on the part of the government.

Hereupon a new phase was presented by the debate. One member expressed

his astonishment that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be so ready

to hand over the functions of government to the care of a private

member. Another declared he could not see what advantage was to be

gained by a resolution in committee in lieu of a bill in the whole

House. The members of the late Whig government all condemned the plan

suggested by Lord John and accepted by Mr Disraeli; but, pending the

introduction of the proposed resolutions, they would not frustrate the

plan. Mr Mangles, on the part of the East India Company, expressed an

earnest hope that all party feeling would be excluded from the debates

on India. The East India Company, he remarked, could hardly be expected

to acquiesce in a measure for their own extinction; nevertheless, if

such should be proved to be inevitable, the directors would give their

best assistance to the perfecting of any measure which the House might

think proper to adopt. Mr Disraeli finally promised to prepare a set of

resolutions, and to bring them in for discussion on the 26th.

The state, then, to which this intricate discussion had been brought was

this—the ‘Bill No. 1,’ proposed by Lord Palmerston, stood over for a

second reading on the 22d of April; the ‘Bill No. 2,’ proposed by Mr

Disraeli, was placed in abeyance for a time; while the ‘resolutions,’ to

be prepared by Mr Disraeli on the suggestion of Lord John Russell, and

intended as a means of improving ‘Bill No. 2,’ or perhaps of leading to

a ‘Bill No. 3,’ were to be introduced on the 26th of April. It was

pretty generally felt, both within and without the walls of parliament,

that the whole subject was in great confusion, and that the ministers

themselves had no definite notion of the best course to pursue. At the

meeting of the East India Company on the 13th, Mr Mangles, who was a

member of parliament as well as chairman of the Company, said: ‘After

the extraordinary occurrences we have witnessed within the last six

weeks, in which we have seen a minister ousted who was supposed to have

the support of a most commanding majority, and another minister placed

in power without having a majority, or even a considerable minority, he

would be a very bold man who would prophesy what the fate of any new

measure in the House of Commons would be.’

On the 23d of April, Mr Disraeli announced his intention of abandoning

‘Bill No. 2’ altogether, and of postponing the preparation of ‘Bill No.

3’ until the House should have agreed to any ‘resolutions’ bearing on

the subject. Lord Palmerston would not withdraw his ‘Bill No. 1;’ he

simply held it in abeyance for a time, to watch the course of pending

events. On the 26th, Mr Disraeli craved four days more for the

preparation of his resolutions. He made a speech, in which he praised

his own ‘Bill No. 2’ at the expense of his antagonist’s ‘Bill No. 1;’

but, as he had ‘voluntarily stifled his own baby’—to use the

illustration of another speaker—his arguments fell with little force.

The illustration, in truth, was so tempting, that it was long made use

of both in and out of parliament. Lord Palmerston said: ‘The measure,

upon which the right honourable gentleman has pronounced so unbounded a

funeral panegyric, has been murdered by himself. If he thought so well

of the merits of the bill, why did he kill it?’ Mr Gregory, wishing, by

getting rid of the proposed ‘resolutions,’ to postpone all legislation

on the subject until another year, moved as an amendment—‘That at this

moment it is not expedient to pass any resolutions for the future

government of India.’ A general desire prevailed in the House, however,

that some measure or other should be passed into a law, to strengthen

and render more definite the governing authority in India; and the

amendment was withdrawn.

At length, on the 30th of April, the resolutions were proposed. They

departed very widely from ‘Bill No. 2.’ The members of the council,

instead of being definitely eighteen in number, were to be ‘not less

than twelve and not more than eighteen.’ The scheme for representing

classes, services, presidencies, and commercial communities in the

council was given up; as was likewise the election of a portion of the

members by parliamentary constituencies. As the whole of the fourteen

resolutions, if agreed to, would require a separate agreement for each,

and as every member would be allowed to speak on every resolution if he

so chose, there were the materials presented for a very lengthened

debate. There was a preliminary discussion, moreover, on a motion

intended to extinguish the resolutions altogether. Lord Harry Vane

moved—‘That the change of circumstances since the first proposal by her

Majesty’s late advisers, to transfer the government of India from the

East India Company to the Crown, renders it inexpedient to proceed

further with legislation on the subject during the present session.’

This proposal, however, was negatived by 447 to 57.

It would scarcely be possible, and scarcely worth while if possible, to

follow all the intricacies of the debate on the ‘resolutions.’ Every

part of the India question was opened again and again; every speaker

considered himself at liberty to wander from principles to details, and

back again; and hence the amount of speaking was enormous. Should there

be a secretary of state for India, or only a president of a council?

Should there be a council at all, or only a secretary with his

subordinates, as in the home, foreign, colonial, and war departments? If

a council, should it be wholly nominated, wholly elective, or part of

each? Who should nominate, and who elect, and under what conditions?

Should the secretary or president possess any power without his council,

and how much? Should the East India Company, or not, be represented in

the new council? By whom should the enormous patronage of the Court of

Directors be hereafter exercised? What would become of the ‘vested

rights’ of the Company, such as the receipt of dividends on the East

India stock? In what relation would the governor-general of India stand

to the new council? Would the local governments of the three

presidencies be interfered with? Who would organise and support the

Indian army? What would be done in relation to missionaries, idolatrous

practices, caste, education, public works, manufactures, commerce, &c.,

in India?—These were some of the questions which were discussed, not

once merely, but over and over again. Owing to the strange ministerial

changes, the independent members in the House had had but few

opportunities of fully expressing their sentiments; they did so now, at

ample length. Many long nights of debate were spent over the

resolutions; many amendments proposed; many alterations assented to by

the ministers. It occupied three evenings—April 30, May 3, and May 7—to

settle the first three resolutions; or rather, to agree to the first, to

modify the second, and to withdraw the third. At this period occurred

the exciting episode concerning the Oude proclamation, the censure of

Viscount Canning, and the resignation of the Earl of Ellenborough.[192]

As there was now no president of the Board of Control, the India

resolutions could not conveniently be proceeded with; and therefore

everything remained for a time at a dead-lock. Soon afterwards Lord

Stanley, son of the Earl of Derby, accepted the seals of the office

vacated by the Earl of Ellenborough. He had every claim to the

indulgence of the House, in the difficulty of his new position; and this

indulgence was willingly shewn to him; he was permitted to choose his

own time, after the ceremony of his re-election, to bring the great

question of India once again before the Commons House, in the hope of

arriving at some practicable solution. For a period of one full month

did the further consideration of the resolutions remain in abeyance,

while these party tactics and ministerial changes were engaging public

attention.

At length, on the 7th of June, when the subject was resumed, and when

Lord Stanley took the lead on Indian affairs in the House of Commons, it

began to be apparent that the resolutions were less valued by the

government than they had before been. The debate concerning them,

however, continued. When the time came for deciding how many members

should compose the new Council of India, Mr Gladstone reopened the whole

question by moving as an amendment, ‘That, regard being had to the

position of affairs in India, it is expedient to constitute the Court of

Directors of the East India Company, by an act of the present session,

to be a council for administering the government of India in the name of

her Majesty, under the superintendence of such responsible minister,

until the end of the next session of parliament.’ Mr Gladstone proposed

this amendment under a belief that it was not practicable, during the

existing session of parliament, to perfect a scheme of government for

India that would be worthy of the nation. The problem to be solved was

one of the most formidable ever presented to any nation or any

legislature in the history of the world, and the evils of delay would be

insignificant in comparison with those of crude and hasty legislation.

His suggestion, he contended, would not be inconsistent with the

appointment of a new council in the following year, if it should be

deemed desirable to make such appointment. Lord Stanley opposed this

amendment—on the grounds that it had all the evils of a temporary and

provisional measure; that the directors, as a council merely for one

year, would be placed in an inconvenient position; that having been told

that they were doomed, and that nothing could save them as a permanent

body, they would slacken their zeal and energy, and impair the

confidence of the public; that the much-condemned delays would still

continue; and that the public service would derive no advantage. The

friends of the East India Company supported this amendment; but it was

rejected by 265 against 116. Mr Roebuck then made an attempt to

extinguish the council both in theory and in fact. He contended that a

Secretary of State, alone responsible for all his acts, relying upon his

own mind for guidance and counsel, and having a more direct interest in

doing right, was morally and mentally the best governor for India; he

feared that a council would render the governing body practically

irresponsible to the nation. Lord Stanley, on the other hand, insisted

that it was quite impossible for any minister to act efficiently in such

a difficult office without the aid of advisers possessing special

information on Indian affairs; and as the House generally concurred in

this view, Mr Roebuck’s amendment was negatived without a division. Two

evenings, June 7th and 11th, were spent in discussing two resolutions.

On the 14th the House was engaged many hours in considering whether the

council should be elective, or nominated, or both; great diversity of

opinion prevailed; and the speakers, tempted by the peculiarity of the

subject, wandered very widely beyond the limits of the immediate

question. Lord John Russell thought that the members of the council

ought to be wholly appointed by the Crown, on the responsibility of the

minister; Sir James Graham thought that the Court of Directors ought to

be _ex officio_ members of the council, to insure practical knowledge on

Indian affairs; but Lord Stanley contended that the advantages of two

systems would be combined if one half of the council were nominated by

the Crown, and the other half elected by a constituency of seven or

eight thousand persons interested in or connected with Indian affairs;

and the House, agreeing with this view, voted a resolution accordingly.

Midsummer was approaching. The House of Lords had not yet had an

opportunity of discussing the Indian question either in principle or in

detail; and it began now to be strongly felt that, as the resolutions

really did not bind the Commons to any particular clauses in the

forthcoming bill, their value was doubtful. Accordingly, on the 17th of

June, after a long discussion on desultory topics, Lord Stanley

proposed, amid some laughter in the House, to withdraw all the remaining

resolutions—a proposition that was assented to with great alacrity,

shewing that the legislators were by no means satisfied with the wisdom

of their past proceedings.

Thus was completed the third stage in this curious legislative

achievement. Lord Palmerston’s ‘India Bill No. 1’ was laid aside,

because he was expelled from office; Mr Disraeli’s ‘India Bill No. 2’

was abandoned, because it was ridiculed on all sides; and now the

‘resolutions’ were given up when half-finished, because they were found

to be inoperative and non-binding. Some of the supporters of the East

India Company claimed, and not illogically, a little more respect for

the Company than had lately been given; the difficulty of framing a new

government for India shewed, by implication, that the old _régime_ was

not so bad as had been customarily asserted.

The ‘India Bill No. 3’ was brought in by Lord Stanley on the

evening (June 17th) which witnessed the withdrawal of the

resolutions. The bill comprised sixty-six clauses—of the more

important of which a brief outline may be given here, to furnish

means of comparison with bills ‘No. 1’ and ‘No. 2:’ The government

of India to revert from the Company to the Crown—A Secretary of

State to exercise all the powers over Indian affairs hitherto

exercised by the Court of Directors, the Secret Committee, and the

Board of Control—The Crown to determine whether to give these

powers to one of the four existing secretaries of state, or to

appoint a fifth—The Secretary to be assisted by a ‘Council of

India,’ to consist of fifteen persons—The Court of Directors to

elect seven of those members from among its own body, or from

among persons who had at any time been directors; the remaining

eight to be nominated by the Queen—Vacancies in the council to be

filled up alternately by the Crown and by the council assembled

for that purpose—A majority of all the members to be chosen from

among persons who had served or resided at least ten years in

India—Every councillor to be irremovable during good behaviour, to

be prohibited from sitting in the House of Commons, to receive

twelve hundred pounds a year as salary, to be allowed to resign

when he pleases, and to be entitled to a retiring pension varying

in amount according to the length of service—Compensation to be

given to such secretaries or clerks of the Company as do not

become officers of the new department—The Secretary of State to be

president of the ‘Council of India,’ to divide the council into

committees for the dispatch of business, and to appoint any member

as vice-president—Council meetings to be called by the Secretary,

or by any five members; and five to be a quorum—Questions to be

decided in the council by a majority, but the Secretary to have a

_veto_ even over the majority—The Secretary may send and receive

‘secret’ dispatches, without consulting his council at all—Most of

the appointments in India to be made as heretofore—Patronage of

cadetships to be exercised partly by the council, but principally

by the Secretary of State, and to be given in a certain ratio to

sons of persons who have filled military or civil offices in

India—The property, credits, debits, and liabilities of the

Company, except India stock and its dividends, to be transferred

from the Company to the Crown; and the council to act as trustees

in these matters—The council to present annual accounts to

parliament of Indian finance and all matters relating thereto—The

council to guarantee the legalised dividend on India stock, out of

the revenues of India.

The ‘Bill No. 3,’ of which the above is a slight programme, came on for

second reading on the 24th of June. Lord Stanley—who, as admitted by

opponents as well as supporters, entered with great earnestness upon the

duties of his office—stated that he had endeavoured to avail himself of

all the opinions expressed during the various debates, to prepare a

measure that should meet the views of a majority of the House. In the

discussion that ensued, Mr Bright wandered into subjects that could not

possibly be treated in the bill; he reopened the whole topic of Indian

misgovernment—disapproved of governor-generals—condemned

annexations—suggested new presidencies and new tribunals—and told the

Commons how he would govern India if he were minister. The speech was

vigorous, but inapplicable to the subject-matter in hand. The bill was

read a second time without a division.

The East India Company were not silent at this critical period in their

history. A meeting of proprietors on the 23d was made special for the

consideration of ‘Bill No. 3,’ which was to be read a second time in the

Commons on the following day; and at this meeting there was a general

expression of disappointment that the Company had been treated as such a

nullity. The only source of consolation was in the fact that seven

members of the new council were to be chosen by the Court of Directors,

from persons who then belonged or had formerly belonged to that court.

The opinions of the Company were embodied in a letter addressed to Lord

Stanley by the chairman and deputy-chairman, and presented to the House

of Commons.

On the 25th, the House went into committee on the bill. Lord Palmerston

proposed two amendments—that the members should be twelve in number

instead of fifteen, and that all should be appointed by the Crown; but

both amendments were rejected by large majorities as being inconsistent

with the recent expression of opinion. At a further sitting on the 1st

of July, the ministers shewed they had obtained a considerable hold on

the House; for they succeeded in obtaining the rejection of amendments

proposed by Lord Palmerston, Mr Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and Mr

Vernon Smith. Lord Stanley, however, proposed many amendments himself on

the part of the government; and these amendments were accepted in so

friendly a spirit, that a large number of clauses were got through by

the end of a long sitting on the 2d of July. One of the most interesting

of the questions discussed bore relation to the Secret Committee of the

past, and the proposed exercise of similar powers by the Secretary of

State. Lord John Russell and Mr Mangles advocated the abolition of those

powers altogether; while Sir G. C. Lewis recommended great caution in

their exercise, if used. Mr Mangles, the late chairman of the Court of

Directors, stated that the powers of the Secret Committee had been much

more extensive than was generally supposed. ‘During many years after the

conquest of Sinde, the whole government of that province was conducted

by the Secret Committee, and the Court of Directors knew nothing about

it. He believed that much mischief had arisen from the Secret Committee

undertaking to transact business with which it had no right to

interfere. The real fact was, that nine-tenths of that which came before

the Secret Committee might with safety be communicated to the whole

world. He wished, therefore, that there should be no Secret Committee in

future. It was a mere delusion and snare. The Court of Directors had

shewn themselves to be as competent to keep a secret, when there was

one, as the cabinet of her Majesty; and he had no reason to think

otherwise of the proposed Indian Council.’ The ministers, however,

received the support of Lord Palmerston in this matter; and the

continuance of the secret powers was sanctioned, although by a small

majority only. On the 5th and 6th, the remaining clauses and amendments

were gone through. Mr Gladstone proposed a clause enacting, ‘That,

except for repelling actual invasion, or under sudden or urgent

necessity, her Majesty’s forces in India shall not be employed in any

military operation beyond the external frontier of her Indian

possessions, without the consent of parliament.’ Lord Palmerston opposed

this clause; but Lord Stanley assented to it as a wholesome declaration

of parliamentary power; and it was agreed to.

At length, on the 8th of July—five months after ‘Bill No. 1’ had been

introduced by Lord Palmerston, and three or four months after the

introduction of ‘Bill No. 2’ by Mr Disraeli—‘Bill No. 3’ was passed by

the House of Commons, after a vehement denunciation by Mr Roebuck, who

predicted great disaster from the organisation of the ‘Council of

India.’ Lord Palmerston’s bill was withdrawn on the next day: it never

came on for a second reading.

The House of Lords justly complained of the small amount of time left to

them for the discussion of the bill; but there was now no help for it,

short of abandoning the measure for the session; and therefore they

entered at once on the discussion. On the 9th, the bill was brought in

and read a first time. Between that time and the second reading, the

East India Company made one more attempt to oppose the measure. They

agreed to a petition for presentation to the House of Lords. It was in

part a petition, in part a protest. The propriety of adopting the

petition was urged by such considerations as these: ‘If we do not

protest, every wrong that may be done for years to come will be laid at

our doors; but with this protest upon record, history will do us the

justice of stating that we have been deprived of our power without

inquiry.’ The Court of Proprietors also discussed whether counsel should

be employed to represent the Company before the House of Lords. Many of

the directors assented to this—but only so far as concerned technical

and legal points; for, they urged, it would be very undignified to

employ any hired counsel to argue the moral and political question, or

to defend the conduct of the Company and the rights of India. It

remained yet, however, an unsettled point whether counsel would be

permitted to appear at all.

On the 13th of July, after a feeble attempt to attach importance to the

Company’s petition and protest, the bill was read a second time in the

Lords. The most remarkable speech made on this occasion was that of the

Earl of Ellenborough, Lord Stanley’s predecessor at the Board of

Control. He declared that, whether in or out of office, he could not

approve of the measure, the parentage of which he gave to the House of

Commons rather than to the government. He disapproved of the abandonment

of popular election in the proposed council; disapproved of the strong

leaven of ‘Leadenhall Street’ in its composition; disapproved of

competitive examinations for the Indian artillery and engineers; and

expressed a general belief that the scheme would not work well. When the

bill went into committee on the 16th, the earl proposed that the members

of the council should be appointed for five years only, instead of for

life; but this amendment was negatived without a division. Lord

Broughton, who, as Sir John Cam Hobhouse, had once been president of the

India Board, opposed the whole theory of a council in the strongest

terms. He described in anticipation the inconveniences he believed would

flow from it. ‘The council would only embarrass the minister with

useless suggestions and minutes on the most trifling questions; and, if

they were rejected, the minority would always be able to furnish weapons

of attack against the Secretary in the House of Commons. The minister

would gain no advice or knowledge from the council he could not obtain

from others without the embarrassment of having official councillors.’

The Earl of Derby contested these assertions simply by denying their

truth; and they had no effect on the decision of the House. All the

clauses were examined during three sittings, on the 16th, 19th, and 20th

of the month, and were adopted with a few amendments. During the

discussions, the Earl of Derby appeared as the friend of the ‘middle

classes.’ The Earl of Ellenborough having repeated his objection to

competitive examination for the engineers and artillery of the Indian

army, on the ground that it would lower the ‘gentlemanly’ standard of

those services, the premier replied that, ‘He was not insensible to the

advantages of birth and station: but he could not join with his noble

friend in saying that because a person happened to be the son of a

tailor, a grocer, or a cheesemonger, provided his mental qualifications

were equal to those of his competitors, he was to be excluded from

honourable competition for an appointment in the public service.’

On the 23d of July the India Bill was read a third time and passed by

the House of Lords, with only a few observations bearing collaterally on

Indian affairs. The Archbishop of Canterbury and some of the bishops

made an appeal for the more direct encouragement of Christianity in

India; but the Earl of Derby made a very cautious response. ‘Due

protection ought to be given to the professors of all religions in

India, and nothing should be done to discourage the efforts of Christian

missionaries. On the other hand, he deemed it essential to the

interests, the peace, the well-being of England, if not also to the very

existence of her power in India, that the government should carefully

abstain from doing anything except to give indiscriminate and impartial

protection to all sects and all creeds; and that nothing could be more

inconvenient or more dangerous on the part of the state than any open or

active assistance to any attempt to convert the native population from

their own religions, however false or superstitious.’ The Earls of

Shaftesbury and Ellenborough joined in deploring the vindictive feeling

which had sprung up between the Europeans and natives in India, and

which, if continued, would neutralise all attempts at improvement. The

Anglo-Indian press was severely reproved for the share it had taken in

originating or fostering this feeling.

The Lords having introduced a few amendments in the India Bill, these

amendments required the sanction of the Commons before they could be

adopted. One of these affected the secret service of the new council;

another, the mode of appointing the higher officials in India; a third,

the principle of competitive examinations; a fourth, the application of

Indian revenues; and so on. The Commons rejected some of these

amendments, and accepted the rest, on the 27th. On the 29th the Lords

met to consider whether they would abandon the amendments objected to by

the Commons. This they agreed to do except in one instance—relating to

competitive examinations for the Indian artillery and engineers; they

still thought that commissions in these two services should be given

only to ‘gentlemen,’ in the conventional sense of the term. The

government, rather than run into collision with the Lords, recommended

the Commons to assent to the slight amendment which had been made; and

this was agreed to—but not without many pungent remarks on the course

which the Upper House had thought proper to pursue. Sir James Graham

adverted to a supercilious allusion by the Earl of Ellenborough to the

‘John Gilpin class,’ and added—‘Where is hereditary wisdom found? In

what consists the justice of the tenet that India must henceforward be

governed by gentlemen, to the exclusion of the middle classes—a

gentleman being defined to be something between a peer and those who buy

and sell. Is this, I would ask, the only argument that can be advanced

against the system of competitive examinations? Who, let me ask,

founded, who won our Indian empire?—Those who bought and sold. Who

extended it?—Those who bought and sold. Who now transfer that empire to

the Crown?—Those who bought and sold; a company of merchants—merchants,

forsooth, whose sons are now not thought worthy to have even inferior

offices in India committed to their hands. But are not the sons of those

who buy and sell entitled to the appellation of gentlemen? Definitions

are dangerous; but I should, nevertheless, like to know what it is that

constitutes a gentleman. Why, sir, it appears to me that if a man be

imbued with strong Christian principles, if he have received an

enlightened and liberal education, if he be virtuous and honourable—it

appears to me that such a man as that is entitled to the appellation.

And who will tell me that among the sons of those who buy and sell may

not be found men possessing literary attainments and a refinement of

mind which place them in a position to bear comparison with the highest

born gentlemen in India? Who, let me ask, were the conquerors of the

country? From what class have they sprung? Who was Clive?—The son of a

yeoman. Who was Munro?—The son of a Glasgow merchant. Who was

Malcolm?—The son of a sheep-farmer upon the Scotch border. These, sir,

are the men who have won for us our Indian empire; and I entertain no

fear that the sons of those who buy and sell, and who enter the Indian

service by means of this principle of open competition, will fail to

maintain a high position in our army, or that they will do anything to

dishonour the English name.’

When the India Bill finally passed the Lords, the Earl of Albemarle

recorded a protest against it—on the grounds that the home government

established by it would be inefficient and unconstitutional; that the

council would be too numerous; that it would be nearly half composed of

the very directors who were supposed to be under condemnation; that

those directors, by self-election to the council, would establish a

vicious principle; that the members of the council would be

irresponsible for the use of the great amount of patronage held by them;

that the change in the mode of government was too slight to insure those

reforms which India so much needed; that it was pernicious, and contrary

to parliamentary precedent, to allow the members of the council to hold

other offices, or to engage in commercial pursuits; that the practical

effect of the council would be merely to thwart the Secretary of State

for India, or else to screen him from censure; and that efficient and

experienced under-secretaries would be far better than any council.

The bill received the royal assent, and became an act of parliament, on

the 2d of August, under the title of ‘An Act for the Better Government

of India;’ 21st and 22d of Victoria, cap. 106. A brief and intelligible

abstract of all the provisions of this important statute will be found

in the Appendix.

One clause in the new act provided that the Court of Directors should

elect seven members to the new council of India, either out of the

existing court, or from persons who had formerly been directors of the

Company. On the 7th of August they met, and chose the following seven of

their own number—Sir James Weir Hogg, Mr Charles Mills, Captain John

Shepherd, Mr Elliot Macnaghten, Mr Ross Donelly Mangles, Captain William

Joseph Eastwick, and Mr Henry Thoby Prinsep. Many of the public journals

severely condemned this selection, as having been dictated by the merest

selfish retention of power in the directors’ own hands; but on the other

side, it was urged that these seven gentlemen possessed a large amount

of practical knowledge on Indian affairs; and, moreover, that the

Company, owing the legislature no thanks for recent proceedings, were

not bound to be disinterested in the matter.

A remarkable meeting was held by the East India Company on the 11th of

August, to consider the state of affairs produced by the new act. The

directors and proprietors met as if no one clearly knew what to think on

the matter. They asked—What _is_ the East India Company now? What does

it possess? What can it do, or what has it got to do? Has it any further

interest in the affairs of India? Is there now any use in a Court of

Directors, or a Court of Proprietors, further than to distribute the

dividends on India stock handed over by the new Council of India out of

Indian revenues? Is the regular payment of that dividend well secured?

Are the _trading_ powers of the Company abolished; and if not, is there

any profitable trade that can be entered upon? Are they to lose their

house in Leadenhall Street, their museum, their library, their archives;

and if so, why? If the Company at any time become involved in

law-proceedings, will the costs come out of the dividends, or out of

what other fund? The answers to these various questions were so very

conflicting, and the state of doubt among all the proprietors so

evident, that it was agreed—‘That a committee of proprietors be

appointed to act in concert with the chairman and deputy-chairman of the

Court of Directors, for the purpose of obtaining counsel’s opinion as to

the present legal position of the Company under previous acts of

parliament, as well as the present act—more especially as to the

parliamentary guarantee of the Company’s stock, and the position of the

Company’s creditors, Indian as well as European.’

The 1st of September 1858 was a day to be recorded in English annals—it

witnessed the death of the once mighty East India Company as a governing

body. ‘On this day,’ said one of the able London journals, ‘the Court of

Directors of the East India Company holds its last solemn assembly.

To-morrow, before the shops and the counting-houses of our great

metropolis shall have received their accustomed inmates, the greatest

corporate body the world has ever seen will have shrivelled into an

association of receivers of dividends. The great house in Leadenhall

Street will stand as it has stood for long years, and well-nigh the same

business will be done by well-nigh the same persons; but the government

of the East India Company will have passed into a tradition. Thousands

and tens of thousands, including many of the greatest and wisest in the

land, intent upon pleasure at this pleasure-seeking period of the year,

will, in all human probability, not give the great change a thought. But

the first and second days of September 1858, which witness the

extinction of the old and the inauguration of the new systems of Indian

government, constitute an epoch in our national history—nay, in the

world’s history, second in importance to few in the universal annals of

mankind. On this day the East India Company, which hitherto, through

varied changes and gradations, has directed the relations of Great

Britain with the vast continent of India, issues its last instructions

to its servants in the east. On this day the last dispatches written by

the authoritative “we” to our governor-general, or governors in council,

will be signed by their “affectionate friends.” To-morrow the _egomet_

of her Majesty’s Secretary of State will be supreme in the official

correspondence of the Indian bureau. It may or may not be for the good

of India, it may or may not be for the good of England, that the

government of the East India Company should on this day cease to exist;

but we confess we do not envy the feelings of the man who can

contemplate without emotion this great and pregnant political change.’

There was a disposition, on this last day of the Company’s power, to

look at the bright rather than the dark side of its character. ‘It has

the great privilege of transferring to the service of her Majesty such a

body of civil and military officers as the world has never seen before.

A government cannot be base, cannot be feeble, cannot be wanting in

wisdom, that has reared two such services as the civil and military

services of the East India Company. To those services the Company has

always been just, has always been generous. In those services lowly

merit has never been neglected. The best men have risen to the highest

place. They may have come from obscure farmhouses or dingy places of

business; they may have been roughly nurtured and rudely schooled; they

may have landed in the country without sixpence or a single letter of

recommendation in their trunks; but if they have had the right stuff in

them, they have made their way to eminence, and have distanced men of

the highest connections and most flattering antecedents.... Let her

Majesty appreciate the gift—let her take the vast country and the

teeming millions of India under her direct control; but let her not

forget the great corporation from which she has received them, nor the

lessons to be learned from its success.’

[Illustration:

Old East India House, Leadenhall Street.

]

The last special General Court of the Company was held, as we have said,

on the 1st of September. The immediate purpose was a generous one: the

granting of a pension to the distinguished ruler of the Punjaub, Sir

John Lawrence; and this was followed by an act at once dignified and

graceful. It was an earnest tender of thanks, on the part of the East

India Company generally, to its servants of every rank and capacity, at

home and in India, for their zealous and faithful performance of duties;

an assurance to the natives of India that they would find in Queen

Victoria ‘a most gracious mistress;’ an expression of hearty belief that

the home-establishment, if employed by the Crown, would serve the Crown

well as it had served the Company; a declaration of just pride in the

sterling civilians and noble soldiers at that moment serving unweariedly

in India; and an earnest hope and prayer ‘That it may please Almighty

God to bless the Queen’s Indian reign by the speedy restoration of

peace, security, and order; and so to prosper her Majesty’s efforts for

the welfare of her East Indian subjects that the millions who will

henceforth be placed under her Majesty’s direct as well as sovereign

dominion, constantly advancing in all that makes men and nations great,

flourishing, and happy, may reward her Majesty’s cares in their behalf

by their faithful and firm attachment to her Majesty’s person and

government.’

The East India House in Leadenhall Street was chosen by Lord Stanley as

the office of the new Council for India, on account of its internal

resources for the management of public business. During more than two

centuries and a half, the city of London had contained the head-quarters

of those who managed Anglo-Indian affairs. The first meeting of London

merchants in 1599, on the subject of East India trade, was held at

Founders’ Hall. The early business of the Company, when formed, was

transacted partly at the residences of the directors, partly in the

halls of various incorporated companies. In 1621 the Company occupied

Crosby Hall for this purpose. In 1638 a removal was made to Leadenhall

Street, to the house of Sir Christopher Clitheroe, at that time governor

of the Company. In 1648 the Company took the house of Lord Craven,

adjoining Clitheroe’s, and on the site of the present India House. In

1726 the picturesque old front of this mansion was taken down, and

replaced by the one represented in the above cut. Finally, in 1796, the

present India House was built,[193] and remained the head-quarters of

the Company. Acquiring skill by gradual experience, the Company had

rendered this one of the most perfectly organised establishments that

ever existed. Ranged in racks and shelves, in chambers, corridors, and

cellars, were the records of the Company’s administration; prepared by

governor-generals, judges, magistrates, collectors, paymasters,

directors, secretaries, and other officials abroad and at home. These

documents, tabulated and indexed with the greatest nicety, related to

the whole affairs of the Company, small as well as great, and extended

back to the earliest period of the Company’s history. Declarations of

war, treaties of peace, depositions of native princes, dispatches of

governor-generals, proceedings of trials, appeals of natives, revenue

assessments, army disbursements—all were fully recorded in some mode or

other. The written documents relating to a hundred and fifty-five years

of the Company’s history, from 1704 to 1858, filled no less than a

hundred and sixty thousand huge folio volumes. These documents were so

thoroughly indexed and registered that any one could be found by a very

brief search. It was mentioned with pride by the staff of the India

House, that when Lord Stanley, in his capacity as Secretary of State for

India, made his first official visit to Leadenhall Street, he was

invited to test the efficiency of this registration department, by

calling for any particular dispatch, or for any document bearing upon

any act or policy of the Court of Directors, throughout a period of a

century and a half; a promise was given that any one of these documents

should be forthcoming in five minutes. His lordship thereupon asked for

a report on the subject of some occurrence which took place under his

own observation while on a tour in India. The document was speedily

produced, and was found to contain all the details of the transaction

minutely described.

After the Court of Directors had elected seven members to the new

council, the government nominated the other eight. The greatest name on

the list was Sir John Laird Muir Lawrence, who was expected to return to

England, and for whom a place at the council-board was kept vacant. The

other seven nominated members were Sir Henry Conyngham Montgomery, Sir

Frederick Currie, Major-general Sir Robert John Hussey Vivian, Colonel

Sir Proby Thomas Cautley, Lieutenant-colonel Sir Henry Creswicke

Rawlinson, Mr John Pollard Willoughby, and Mr William Arbuthnot. It was

considered that the fifteen members, in reference to their past

experience of Indian affairs, might fairly represent the following

interests:

Bengal Civil Service, Prinsep, Mangles.

Madras Civil Service, Montgomery.

Bombay Civil Service, Willoughby.

Bengal Army, Cautley.

Madras Army, Vivian.

Bombay Army, Eastwick.

The Punjaub, Lawrence.

Afghan Frontier, Rawlinson.

Native States, Currie.

Indian Law, Hogg, Macnaghten.

Shipping Interests, Shepherd.

Finance, Mills.

Indian Commerce, Arbuthnot.

This classification, however, was not official; it was only useful in

denoting the kind of knowledge likely to be brought to the council by

each member. When, in the early days of September, Lord Stanley presided

at the first meetings of the new council, he grouped the members into

certain committees, for the more convenient dispatch of business. This

grouping was based in part on the previous practice of the East India

Company, and in part on suggested improvements. The committees were

three in number, of five members each—partly nominated, and partly

elected. The functions and composition of the committees were as follow:

FINANCE, HOME, AND PUBLIC WORKS.

Sir Proby Cautley, }

Mr Arbuthnot, } Nominated.

Mr Mills, }

Mr Macnaghten, } Elected.

Captain Shepherd, }

POLITICAL AND MILITARY.

Sir John Lawrence, }

Sir R. Vivian, }

Sir H. Rawlinson, } Nominated.

Mr Willoughby, }

Captain Eastwick, Elected.

REVENUE, JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE.

Sir H. Montgomery, }

Sir F. Currie, } Nominated.

Sir J. W. Hogg, }

Mr Mangles, } Elected.

Mr Prinsep, }

Lord Stanley appointed Sir G. R. Clerk and Mr Henry Baillie to be

under-secretaries of state for India; and Mr James Cosmo Melvill, late

deputy-secretary to the East India Company, to be assistant

under-secretary. Mr John Stuart Mill, one of the most distinguished of

the Company’s servants in England, was earnestly solicited by Lord

Stanley to assist the new government with his services; but he declined

on account of impaired health. With a few exceptions, the valued and

experienced servants of the Company became servants of the new council,

as secretaries, clerks, examiners, auditors, record-keepers, &c.; for

the rest, arrangements were to be gradually made in the form of

compensations, pensions, or retiring allowances.

One of the first proceedings under the new _régime_ was the appointment

of a commission to investigate the complicated relations of the Indian

army. The heads of inquiry on which the commission was to enter included

almost everything that could bear upon the organisation and efficiency

of the military force in the east, under a system where the anomalous

distinction between ‘Company’s’ troops and ‘Queen’s’ troops would no

longer be in force. Such an inquiry would necessarily extend over a

period of many months, and would need to be conducted partly in India

and partly in England.

In closing this narrative of the demise of the powerful East India

Company as a political or governing body, it may be remarked that all

the well-wishers of India felt the change to be a great and signal one,

whether for good or harm. There were not wanting prophets of disaster.

The influence of parliament being so much more readily brought to bear

upon a government department than upon the East India Company, many

persons entertained misgivings concerning the effect of the change upon

the well-being of India. Before any long period could elapse, submarine

cables would probably have been sunk in so many seas, and land-cables

stretched across so many countries, that a message would be flashed from

London to Calcutta in a few hours. Lord Palmerston once jocularly made a

prediction, ten years before the Indian mutiny broke out, to the effect

that the day would come when, if a minister were asked in parliament

whether war had broken out in India, he would reply: ‘Wait a minute;

I’ll just telegraph to the governor-general, and let you know.’ A war in

India did indeed come, before the period for the fulfilment of this

prediction; but the time was assuredly approaching when the

‘lightning-post,’ as the natives of India felicitously call it, would be

in operation. What would be the results? Some of the foreboders of

disaster said: ‘In any great crisis, it is true, which demands prompt

action on the part of the governing country, this rapid

intercommunication will be a source of strength; the resources of

England will be brought to bear upon any part of India four or five

weeks sooner than under existing circumstances. But, on the other hand,

the ordinary work of government, at either end of the wire, will be

greatly complicated and embarrassed by this frequent intercommunication

of ideas. The Council of India will probably not be overanxious to

fetter the movements of the governor-general; nor will the Secretary of

State for India be necessarily prone to send curt sentences of advice or

remonstrance to the distant viceroy; but it is doubtful whether

parliament would suffer the council or the Secretary to exercise this

wise forbearance. There would be a tendency to govern India by the House

of Commons through the medium of the electric telegraph. A sensitive

governor-general would be worried to death in a few months by the

interference of the telegraph with his free action; and an irritable one

might be stung into indignant resignation in a much shorter time.’ All

such fears are groundless. If a message from England were perilous in

its tendency through its ease and quickness of transmission, a message

from India pointing out this perilous tendency would be equally easy and

quick. The electric messenger does its work as rapidly in one direction

as the other. A governor-general, worthy of the name, would take care

not instantly to obey an order which he believed to be dangerous to the

welfare of the country under his charge; the wire would enable him to

converse with the authorities at home in a few hours, or, at any rate, a

few days, and to explain circumstances which would probably lead to a

modification of the order issued. The electric telegraph being one of

the greatest boons ever given by science to mankind, it will be strange

indeed if England does not derive from it—in her government of India, as

in other matters—an amount of benefit that will immeasurably outweigh

any temporary inconveniences.

[Illustration:

Calcutta.—Company’s Troops early in the Nineteenth Century.

]

-----

Footnote 191:

Some of the documents here adverted to will be given _verbatim_;

others in a condensed form.

Footnote 192:

See Chap, xxvii., p. 451.

Footnote 193:

See Engraving, p. 452.

[Illustration:

W. & R. CHAMBERS LONDON & EDINBURGH

]

[Illustration:

ORMUZ—Entrance to the Persian Gulf.

]

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.

§ 1. THE PERSIAN EXPEDITION, 1856-7.

§ 2. THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE EXPEDITIONS, 1856-7-8.

§ 3. ENGLISH PROSPECTS IN THE EAST.

Not the least among the many extraordinary circumstances connected with

the Revolt in India was this—that England, at the very time when the

Revolt began, had two Asiatic wars on her hands, one eastward and the

other westward of her Indian empire. True, the Shah of Persia had

consented to a treaty of peace before that date; true, the Emperor of

China had not yet actually received a declaration of war; but it is

equally true that British generals and soldiers were still holding

conquered positions in the one country, and that hostilities had

commenced in the other. We have seen in former chapters, and shall have

occasion to refer to the fact again, that Viscount Canning was most

earnestly desirous, when the troubles in India began, to obtain the aid

of two bodies of British troops—those going to China, and those

returning from Persia. It must ever remain an insoluble problem how the

Revolt would have fared if there had been no Persian and Chinese

expeditions. On the one hand, several additional regiments of the

Company’s army, native as well as European, would have been in India,

instead of in or near Persia. On the other hand, there would not have

been so many disciplined British troops at that time on the way from

England to the east. Whether these two opposing circumstances would have

neutralised each other, can only be vaguely guessed at.

There are other considerations, however, than that which concerns the

presence or absence of British troops, tending to give these two

expeditions a claim to some brief notice in the present work. The

Persian war, if the short series of hostilities deserve that name,

arose, mainly and in the first instance, out of apprehensions for the

future safety of British India on the northwest. The Chinese war arose,

mainly and in the first instance, out of that opium-traffic which had

put so many millions sterling into the coffers of the East India

Company. Other events, it is true, had tended to give a different colour

and an intricate complication to the respective quarrels; but it can

hardly be doubted that the India frontier-question in the one case, and

the India opium-question in the other, were the most powerful

predisposing causes in bringing about the two wars. Two sections of the

present chapter are appropriated to such an outline of these two warlike

expeditions as will shew how far they were induced by India, and how far

they affected India, before and during the Revolt. Any detailed

treatment of the operations would be beyond the scope of the present

volume. The expedition to Japan will claim a little notice as a peaceful

episode in the Chinese narrative.

§ 1. THE PERSIAN EXPEDITION, 1856-7.

Examining a map of Asia, we shall see that the country, called in its

widest extent Afghanistan, is bounded on the east by India, on the west

by Persia, and on the north by the territories of various Turcoman

tribes. Whatever may be the fruitfulness or value of Afghanistan in

other respects, it includes and possesses the only practicable route

from Central Asia to the rich plains of India. So far as Persia,

Bokhara, and Khiva are concerned, England would never for a moment think

of doubting the safety of India; but when, in bygone years, it was known

that Russia was increasing her power in Central Asia, acquiring a great

influence over the Shah of Persia, and sending secret agents to

Afghanistan, a suspicion arose that the eye of the Czar was directed

towards the Indus as well as towards the Bosphorus, to India as well as

to Turkey. Alarmists may have coloured this probability too highly, but

the symptoms were not on that account to be wholly neglected. About

midway between the Punjaub and the Caspian Sea is the city of Herat,

near the meeting-point of Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkistan or

Independent Tatary. It was this city, rather than any other, which

caused the war with Persia. To what state does Herat belong, Persia or

Afghanistan? The answer to this question is of great political

importance; for as Russia has more influence in the first-named state

than in the second, any aggressive schemes of the court of St Petersburg

against India would be favoured by a declaration or admission that Herat

belonged to Persia. In the course of twenty centuries Afghanistan has

been in succession under Persian, Bactrian, Scythian, Hindoo, Persian,

Saracenic, Turcoman, Khorasan, Mongol, Mogul, Persian, and Afghan rule;

until at length, in 1824, three Afghan princes divided the country

between them—one taking the Cabool province, another that of Candahar,

and another that of Herat. There are therefore abundant excuses for

Persians and Turcomans, Afghans and Hindoos, laying claim to this

region, if they think themselves strong enough to enforce their claims.

It is just such a complication as Russia would like to encourage,

supposing her to have any designs against India—just such a

complication, we must in justice add, as would lead England to seize

Afghanistan, if she thought it necessary for the safety of her Indian

empire. When Lord Auckland was governor-general of India, in 1837, he

interfered in Afghan politics, in order to insure the throne of Cabool

to a prince friendly to England and hostile to Russia and Persia; this

interference led to the first Afghan war in 1838, the disastrous

termination of which brought on the second Afghan war of 1842. Since the

year last named, the Cabool and Candahar territories have remained in

the hands of princes who were bound, by treaties of alliance, to

friendly relations with England. Herat, however, further west and more

inaccessible, became a prey to contentions which brought on the Persian

war in 1856.

About the year 1833, disputes arose between Herat and Persia which have

never since been wholly healed. The Shah claimed, if not the ownership

of Herat, at least a tribute that would imply a sort of protective

superiority. This tribute was suddenly withdrawn by Kamran Mirza, Khan

of Herat, in or about the year just named; and certain clauses of a

treaty were at the same time disregarded by him. Thence arose a warlike

tendency in the court of Teheran—encouraged by Count Simonich, Russian

ambassador; and discouraged by Mr Ellis, British ambassador.

Negotiations failing, a Persian army began to march, and the Shah

formally declared Herat to be a province of the Persian empire. The

fortress of Ghorian fell, and after that the city of Herat was invested

and besieged. Russia proposed a treaty in 1838, whereby Herat was to be

given to the Khan of Candahar, on the condition that both of these

Afghan states should acknowledge the suzerainty of Persia: the

fulfilment of the conditions being guaranteed by Russia. This alarmed

Sir John M’Neill, at that time British representative at Teheran; he

suggested to Lord Palmerston that the British should send an army to

support Herat, as a means of preventing the falling of the whole of

Afghanistan into the clutches of Russia. Herat was defending itself

bravely, and there might yet be time to save it. The Shah refusing to

listen to M’Neill’s representations, and various petty matters having

given England an excuse to ‘demand satisfaction,’ an expedition was sent

from India to the Persian Gulf in the summer of 1838. Nominally a

dispute about Herat, it was really a struggle whether England or Russia

should acquire most ascendency over the Shah of Persia. Three years of

negotiation, on various minor grievances and differences, led to a

treaty between England and Persia in 1841. There then followed many

years of peace—not, however, unalloyed by troubles. Persia, urged on

secretly by Russia, continually endeavoured to obtain power in the Herat

territory; while the oriental vanity of the officials led them into many

breaches of courtesy towards English envoys, consuls, and merchants. In

1851, it came to the knowledge of Colonel Sheil, at that time British

minister at the court of Teheran, that Persia was quietly preparing for

another attack on Herat. In spite of Sheil’s remonstrances, the Shah

sent an army against that city in 1852, captured the place, set up a

dependent as subsidiary chief or khan, coined money with his own effigy,

imprisoned and tortured many Afghan chiefs, and formally annexed the

Herat territory as part of the great Persian empire. Colonel Sheil,

failing in all his endeavours to counteract the policy of the Persian

court, sent home to recommend that the British should despatch an

expedition to the Persian Gulf. Under the influence of English pressure,

the Shah signed another treaty in 1853—engaging to give up Herat; not to

attack it again unless an attack came previously from the side of Cabool

or Candahar; and to be content with the merely nominal suzerainty which

existed in the time of the late Khan. The Persians, nevertheless, threw

numberless obstacles in the way of carrying out this treaty; insomuch

that Colonel Sheil was engaged in a perpetual angry correspondence with

them. Faith in treaties is very little understood in Asia; and the court

of Persia is thoroughly Asiatic in this matter. While this wrangle was

going on, another embarrassment arose, out of the employment by the Hon.

A. C. Murray, British representative, of a Persian named Mirza Hashem

Khan, against the Shah’s orders. A seizure of Hashem’s wife by the

authorities was converted by Mr Murray into a national insult, on the

ground that Hashem was now in the service, and under the protection, of

the British crown. Murray struck his flag from the embassy house, until

the matter should be settled. A most undignified quarrel took place

during the winter of 1855, and far into 1856—Mr Murray insisting on the

supreme rights of the British protectorate; and the Persian authorities

disseminating scandalous stories as to the motives which induced him to

protect the lady in question.

The scene was next transferred to Constantinople; where, early in 1856,

the Persian minister discussed the matter with Lord Stratford de

Redcliffe, deploring the rupture, and laying all the blame on Mr Murray

and the other British officials. In a memorandum drawn up at Teheran,

for circulation in the different European courts, M’Neill, Sheil,

Murray—all were stigmatised as mischief-makers, bent on humiliating

Persia, and on disturbing the friendly relations between the Shah and

Queen Victoria. In an autograph document from the Shah himself, Mr

Murray was designated ‘stupid, ignorant, and insane; one who has the

audacity and impudence to insult even kings.’

Before this Murray quarrel was ended, hostilities broke out again at

Herat. There were rival parties in that city; there was an attack

threatened by Dost Mohammed of Cabool; an appeal was made to Persia for

aid, by the Khan who at this time ruled Herat; and Persia marched an

army of 9000 men in that direction. The British government, regarding

this march as an infringement of the treaty of Herat, demanded the

withdrawal of the troops, and threatened warlike proceedings if the

demand were not attended to. The Persians, whether emboldened by secret

encouragement from Russia, or actuated by any other motive, made a

pretence of negotiating, but nevertheless proceeded with their

expedition, captured Ghorian, and laid siege to Herat. Hereupon

instructions were sent out to the governor-general of India, to prepare

a warlike force for service in the Persian Gulf. Before those

instructions could reach Bombay, Ferukh Khan arrived at Constantinople

with full powers from the Shah to settle all points of difference

between Persia and England. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was empowered to

treat with this plenipotentiary; they made great advances towards the

settlement of the terms of a treaty; but while they were discussing (in

November), news arrived that the Persians had captured the city of Herat

after a long siege. This strange confusion between diplomacy at

Constantinople and war at Herat, stringent orders from London and

warlike alacrity at Bombay, totally disarranged the negotiations of

Ferukh Khan and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; those ministers could do

nothing further. The governor-general declared war against Persia on the

1st of November, and the Persian plenipotentiary left Constantinople for

Teheran in December.

Thus arose the Persian expedition—out of circumstances so complicated,

that it is difficult to bear in mind the relations of one to another.

The existence of intrigues among contending parties in the state of

Herat; the frequent strife between the Afghans of Cabool and Candahar

and those of Herat; the well-remembered and never-abandoned claims of

Persia upon the last-named state; the open desire of Russia to obtain a

hold over the Persian court; the concealed desire of the same astute

power to approach nearer and nearer to the gates of India; the anxiety

of England to see Afghanistan remain as a barrier between India and the

centre of Asia; the tendency of Persia to disregard those courtesies to

western nations which oriental potentates have never willingly

conceded—all were concurrent causes in bringing about the British

expedition to the Persian Gulf in 1856. The most powerful incentive,

probably, although never acknowledged in diplomatic correspondence, was

the wish to keep Russia as far as possible away from India.

But, it may be asked, what had the East India Company to do with this

war? Why was India put to the expense of providing an armament for

invading Persia? This, in truth, was one of the anomalies connected with

the ‘double government’ of India. It was a war declared by Lord

Palmerston’s cabinet; but as it was founded on considerations relating

to the safety of India, it was treated as an India war, to be conducted

by the authorities in British India.

The providing of the army for the Persian Gulf devolved chiefly upon

Lord Elphinstone, as governor of Bombay. The army was in two divisions,

one of which left Bombay several weeks before the other. Numerous

transport-vessels were chartered, besides many of the large

mail-steamers, to carry troops, guns, and stores to the Persian Gulf.

The commissariat and quarter-masters’ departments had to make great

preparations—a thousand baggage-cattle; fodder for these, for

draught-bullocks, and for cavalry and artillery horses; framework for

fifteen hospitals; hutting for many thousand soldiers, &c. Means of

transport had to be provided for most of these, as it would not be safe

to rely on supplies obtained in an enemy’s country.

Gradually, as the troops, guns, and stores reached the shores of Persia,

the organisation of the force proceeded. It was thus constituted:

FIRST DIVISION.

{ H.M. 64th foot.

1st Infantry Brigade, { 20th Bombay N.I.

{ 2d Bombay Europeans.

2d Infantry Brigade, { 4th Bombay Rifles.

{ 3d Bombay native cavalry.

Cavalry Brigade, { Poonah Horse.

Artillery Brigade, Various detachments.

SECOND DIVISION.

{ H.M. 78th Highlanders.

1st Infantry Brigade, { 26th Bombay N.I.

{ 23d Bombay N.I.

2d Infantry Brigade, { Light Batt. B.N.I.

{ H.M. 14th Dragoons.

Cavalry Brigade, { Jacob’s Sinde Horse.

{ Troop horse-artillery.

Artillery Brigade, { Two field-batteries.

The several divisions and brigades were thus commanded: The first

division was placed under Major-general Stalker; and the four brigades

of which it consisted were commanded by Brigadiers Wilson, Honner, Tapp,

and Trevelyan. The second division was under Brigadier-general

Havelock—who lived to become so famous in connection with the wars of

the Indian mutiny; and the four brigades which it comprised were

commanded by Brigadiers Hamilton, Hale, Steuart, and Hutt.

Brigadier-general Jacob commanded in chief the cavalry of both

divisions; while Major-general Sir James Outram held supreme command of

the whole force.

The first division, as we have said, preceded the second by several

weeks. General Stalker took his departure from Bombay on the 26th of

November, with a fleet of nearly forty vessels under Admiral Sir Henry

Leeke—a few of them war-steamers, but chiefly steam and sailing

transports, carrying 10,000 soldiers, sailors, and men of all grades and

employments. Stalker and Leeke, having brought all the troops and stores

past Ormuz and up the Persian Gulf, captured the island of Karrack as a

military depôt, and then effected a landing at Hallila Bay, about twelve

miles south of Bushire. Although the opposition, from a few hundred

Persian troops, was very insignificant, the landing was nevertheless a

slow process, occupying three days and two nights—owing chiefly to the

absence of any other boats than those belonging to the ships. There

being no draught-cattle landed at that time, the troops were without

tents or baggage of any kind; they therefore carried three days’ rations

in their haversacks. After being thus engaged on the 7th of December and

two following days, Stalker and Leeke advanced towards Bushire—the one

with the troops along the shore, the other with the fleet at easy

distance. Bushire is an important commercial town on the northeast side

of the gulf; whoever commands it, commands much of the trade of Persia.

Stalker found the defences to be far stronger than he had anticipated.

On the 9th he dislodged a body of Persian troops from a strong position

they occupied in the old Dutch fort of Reshire. On the 10th, after a

short bombardment, Bushire itself surrendered—with a promptness which

shewed how few soldierly qualities were possessed by the garrison; for

the place contained sixty-five guns, with a large store of warlike

supplies. The governor of the city, and the commander of the troops,

came out and delivered up their swords. The troops of the garrison,

about two thousand in number, having marched out and delivered up their

arms, were escorted by cavalry to a distance, and then set free. By the

evening of the 11th the tents and cooking-utensils were landed; and an

intrenched camp was formed outside Bushire as a temporary resting-place

for the force—sufficient detachments being told off to hold the city and

fort safely. So entirely had the expedition been kept secret from the

Persians, that when, on the 29th of November, the first vessels of the

fleet hove in sight, the governor of Bushire sent to Mr Consul Jones to

ask what it meant; and he only then learned that our army and navy had

come to capture the city. This plan was adopted, to obtain a ‘material

guarantee’ sufficiently serious to influence the double-dealing Persian

government.

Here the troops remained for several weeks. The second division, and the

real head of the force, had not arrived; and General Stalker was not

expected or authorised to undertake anything further at present. His

camp, about a mile from Bushire, assumed every day a more orderly

appearance; and steady trading transactions were carried on with the

towns-people. The transport ships went to and fro between Bushire and

Bombay, bringing guns and supplies of various kinds.

The political relations between the two countries, meanwhile, remained

as indefinite as before. Mr Murray came from Bagdad to Bushire, to

confer with the military and naval leaders on all necessary matters, and

to negotiate with the Shah’s government if favourable opportunity for so

doing should offer. Herat remained in the hands of its conquerors, the

Persians. Sir John Lawrence, in his capacity as chief authority in the

Punjaub, held more than one interview with Dost Mohammed, Khan of

Cabool, in order to keep that wily leader true to his alliance with

England; and it was considered a fair probability that if Persia did not

yield to England’s demands, a second expedition would be sent from the

Punjaub and Sinde through Afghanistan to Herat.

It was not until the last week in January, 1857, that Sir James Outram

and his staff reached the Persian Gulf; nearly all the infantry had

preceded him, but much of the artillery and cavalry had yet to come. Sir

James sighted Bushire on the 30th; and General Stalker, long encamped

outside the town, made prompt preparations for his reception. Outram was

desirous of instant action. Stalker had been stationary, not because

there was nothing to do, but because his resources were inadequate to

any extensive operations. Shiraz, the most important city in that part

of Persia, lying nearly due east of Bushire, is connected with it by two

roads, one through Ferozabad, and the other through Kisht and Kazeroon;

the Persians were rumoured to have 20,000 men guarding the first of

these two roads, and a smaller number guarding the second. These reports

were afterwards proved to be greatly exaggerated; but Sir James

determined that, at any rate, there should be no longer sojourn at

Bushire than was absolutely needed.

Information having arrived that a large body of Persians was at the foot

of the nearest hills, Outram resolved to dislodge them. The troops were

under Soojah-ool-Moolk, governor of Shiraz, and formed the nucleus of a

larger force intended for the recapture of Bushire. Leaving the town to

be guarded by seamen from the ships, and the camp by about 1500 soldiers

under Colonel Shephard, with the _Euphrates_ so moored that her guns

could command the approaches—Outram started on the 3d of February, with

about 4600 men and 18 guns. He took no tents or extra clothing; but gave

to each soldier a greatcoat, a blanket, and two days’ rations; while the

commissariat provided three more days’ rations. He marched round the

head of Bushire creek to Char-kota, and on the 5th came suddenly upon

the enemy’s camp, which they had precipitately abandoned when they heard

of his approach. This was near the town of Borasjoon, on the road to

Shiraz. On the next two days he secured large stores of ammunition,

carriages, camp-equipage, stores, grain, rice, horses, and

cattle—everything but guns; these had been safely carried off by the

enemy to the difficult pass of Mhak, in the mountains lying between

Bushire and Shiraz; and as Sir James had not made any extensive

commissariat arrangements, he did not deem it prudent to follow them at

that time.

On the evening of the 7th, Outram began his march back to Bushire—after

destroying nearly twenty tons of powder, and vast quantities of shot and

shell; and after securing as booty such flour, grain, rice, and stores

as belonged to the government rather than to the villagers. But now

occurred a most unexpected event. The Persian cavalry, which retreated

while Outram had been advancing, resolved to attack while he was

retreating. They approached soon after midnight; and the British were

soon enveloped in a skirmishing fire with an enemy whom they could not

see. Outram fell from his horse, and Stalker had to take the command for

a time. The enemy having brought four guns within accurate range, the

position was for a time very serious. Stalker was enabled by degrees to

get the regiments into array, so as to grapple with the enemy as soon as

daylight should point out their position. When at length, on the morning

of the 8th, the British saw the Persians, seven or eight thousand

strong, drawn up in order near the walled village of Khoosh-aub, they

dashed at them at once with cavalry and horse-artillery, so irresistibly

that the plain was soon strewed with dead bodies; the enemy fled

panic-stricken in all directions; and if Outram’s cavalry had been more

numerous (he had barely 500 sabres), he could almost have annihilated

the Persian infantry. By ten o’clock all was over, the Persians leaving

two guns and all their ammunition in the hands of the British. In the

evening Outram resumed his march, and re-entered Bushire during the

night of the 9th. His troops had marched ninety miles over ground

converted into a swamp by heavy rains, and had seized a camp and won a

battle, in a little more than six days. In a ‘Field-force Order,’ issued

on February 10th, and signed by Colonel (afterwards Sir Edward) Lugard

as chief of the staff, Outram warmly complimented his troops on this

achievement.

After this dashing affair at Khoosh-aub, the patience of Sir James was

sorely tried by a long period of comparative inactivity—occasioned in

part by the rainy state of the weather, and in part by the non-arrival

of some of the artillery and cavalry, without which his further

operations would necessarily be much impeded. Brigadier-general Havelock

arrived about this time, and took command of the second division, which

had hitherto been under a substitute. The feeding of the army had become

a difficult matter; for the Persian traders came in less readily after

the battle of Khoosh-aub. Rumours gradually spread in the camp that an

expedition was shortly to be sent out to Mohamrah, a town near the

confluence of the Euphrates and the Karoon, about three days’ sail up

from Bushire; these rumours gave pleasurable excitement to the troops,

who were becoming somewhat wearied of their Bushire encampment. Much had

yet to be done, however, before the expedition could start; the

northwest winds in the gulf delayed the arrival of the ships containing

the cavalry and artillery. On the 4th of March, Sir James made public

his plan. General Stalker was to remain at Bushire, with Brigadiers

Wilson, Honner, and Tapp, in command of about 3000 men of all arms;

while Outram and Havelock, with several of the brigadiers, at the head

of 4000 troops, were to make an expedition to Mohamrah, where many

fortifications were reported to have been recently thrown up, and where

10,000 or 12,000 Persian troops were assembled. During many days

troop-ships were going up the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates—some

conveying the troops already at Bushire; and others conveying cavalry

and artillery as fast as they arrived from Bombay. The enemy eagerly

watched these movements from the shore, but ventured on no molestation.

During the three weeks occupied by these movements, events of an almost

unprecedented character occurred at Bushire—the suicide of two British

officers who dreaded the responsibility of the duties devolving upon

them. These officers were—Major-general Stalker, commanding the first

division of the army; and Commodore Ethersey, who had been placed in

command of the Indian navy in the Persian Gulf when Sir Henry Leeke

returned to Bombay. Stalker shot himself on the 14th of March. On that

morning, Sir James Outram and Commander Jones had breakfasted with him

in his tent. He displayed no especial despondency; but it had been

before remarked how distressed he appeared on the subject of the want of

barrack-accommodation for his troops—fearing lest he should be held

responsible if the soldiers, during the heat of the approaching summer,

suffered through want of shelter. On one or two other subjects he

appeared unable to bear the burden of command; he dreaded lest Outram,

by exposing himself to danger in any approaching conflict, might lose

his life, and thereby leave the whole weight of the duty and

responsibility on him (Stalker). Shortly after breakfast, a shot was

heard in the tent, and the unfortunate general was found weltering in

his blood. Commodore Ethersey followed this sad example three days

afterwards. For three months he had been labouring under anxiety and

despondency, haunted by a perpetual apprehension that neither his mental

nor physical powers would bear up under the weight of responsibility

incurred by the charge of the Indian navy during the forthcoming

operations. Memoranda in his diary afforded full proof of this. An entry

on the day after Stalker’s suicide ran thus: ‘Heard of poor Stalker’s

melancholy death. His case is similar to my own. He felt he was unequal

to the responsibility imposed on him.... I have had a wretched night.’

So deep had been his despondency for some time, and so frequently

expressed to those around him, that the news of his suicide on the 17th

excited less surprise than pain.

It had been Outram’s intention to proceed against Mohamrah directly

after his return from Borasjoon and Khoosh-aub; but the unexpected and

vexing delays above adverted to prevented him from setting forth until

the 18th of March. He was aware that the Persians had for three months

been strengthening the fortifications of that place; he knew that the

opposite bank of the river was on Turkish ground (Mesopotamia), on which

he would not be permitted to erect batteries; and he therefore

anticipated a tough struggle before he could master Mohamrah. His plan

was, to attack the enemy’s batteries with armed steamers and

sloops-of-war; and then, when the fire had slackened, to tow up the

troops in boats by small steamers, land them at a selected point, and at

once proceed to attack the enemy’s camp. The Persian army, 13,000

strong, was commanded by the Shahzada, Prince Mirza. Outram’s force was

rather under 5000, including only 400 cavalry: the rest having been left

to guard Bushire and the encampment. Outram and Havelock arrived near

Mohamrah on the 24th, and immediately began to place the war-ships in

array, and to plant mortars on rafts in the river. On the 26th, the

ships and mortars opened a furious fire; under cover of which the troops

were towed up the river, and landed at a spot northward of the town and

its batteries. The Persians, who had felt the utmost confidence that the

landing of a British force, in the face of thirteen thousand men and a

formidable array of batteries, would be an impossibility, were

panic-stricken at this audacity. When, at about two o’clock, Outram

advanced from the landing-place through date-groves and across a plain

to the enemy’s camp, the Persians fled precipitately, after exploding

their largest magazine—leaving behind them all their tents, several

magazines of ammunition, seventeen guns, baggage, and a vast amount of

public and private stores. As Outram had, at that hour, been able to

land not even one hundred cavalry, he could effect little in the way of

pursuit; the Persians made off, strewing the ground with arms and

accoutrements which they abandoned in their hurry. Commodore Young

commanded the naval portion of this expedition, having succeeded the

unfortunate Ethersey.

This action of Mohamrah scarcely deserved the name of a battle; for as

soon as the ships and mortars had, by their firing, enabled the troops

to land, the enemy ran away. Outram had scarcely any cavalry, and his

infantry had no fighting—rather to their disappointment. The Persians

having retreated up the river Karoon towards Ahwaz, Outram resolved to

send three small armed steamers after them, each carrying a hundred

infantry. Captain Rennie started on the 29th, in command of this

flotilla: his instructions being, ‘to steam up to Ahwaz, and act with

discretion according to circumstances.’ He proceeded thirty miles that

day, anchored at night, landed, and found the remains of a bivouac. On

the 30th he reached Ismailiyeh, and on the 31st Oomarra. Arriving near

Ahwaz on the 1st of April, Rennie came up with the Persian army which

had retreated from Mohamrah. Nothing daunted, he landed his little force

of 300 men, advanced to the town, entered it, and allayed the fears of

the inhabitants; while the Persians, thirty or forty times his number,

retreated further northward towards Shuster, with scarcely any attempt

to disturb him—such was the panic into which the affair at Mohamrah had

thrown them. Captain Rennie, having had the satisfaction of putting to

flight a large Persian army with a handful of 300 British, and having

given to the inhabitants of Ahwaz such stores of government grain and

flour as he could seize, embarked a quantity of arms, sheep, and mules,

which he had captured, and steamed back to Mohamrah—earning and

receiving the thanks of the general for his management of the

expedition.

Just at this period a most sudden and unexpected event put an end to the

operations. Captain Rennie’s expedition returned to Mohamrah on the 4th

of April; and on the 5th arrived news that peace had been signed between

England and Persia. Outram’s army, European and native, was rapidly

approaching 14,000 men; such a force, under such a leader, might have

marched from one end of Persia to the other; and both officers and

soldiers had begun to have bright anticipations of honour, and perhaps

of prize-money. It was with something like disappointment, therefore,

that the news of the treaty was listened to; there had not been fighting

enough to whet the appetites of the heroic; while soldiers generally

would fain make a treaty at the sword’s point, rather than see it done

in the bureaux of diplomatists. Captain Hunt of the 78th Highlanders,

who was concerned in the operations at Mohamrah and Ahwaz, and who wrote

a volume descriptive of the whole campaign, told very frankly of the

dissatisfaction in the camp: ‘The news of peace with Persia having been

signed at Paris on the 4th of March damped the elation of all, and

considerable disgust was felt at this abrupt termination to what had

promised to prove a brilliant campaign.’

How and where the treaty of peace was concluded, we must now shew, in

connection with the proceedings of ministers, legislators, and

ambassadors.

When the Persian expedition was determined on, parliament was not

sitting, and no legislative sanction for the war could be obtained; but

when the session opened in February 1857, the policy of the government

was severely canvassed. Ministers were charged with involving the

country in a war, without the nation itself being acquainted with the

causes, or even consulted at all in the matter. The Earl of Clarendon

explained the course of events at considerable length. He went into the

case of Mr Murray, and the quarrel with the Persian government on

matters of diplomatic etiquette—justifying that envoy in all that he had

done. But the earl was particular in his assertions that the Murray

dispute was not the cause of the war. The siege and capture of Herat

furnished the _casus belli_. He dwelt on the immense value of that city

as a military station. ‘Herat is altogether a most important place for

military operations; and an enemy once in possession of it is completely

master of the position. Every government of this country has desired

that Afghanistan should be protected; and it clearly cannot be protected

if Herat remains in the power of Persia.’ He expressed a conviction that

‘the Russian government and the whole of the Russian people are under a

belief that their destiny is to go forward, to conquer, and to hold new

territory;’ and that this disposition would be greatly tempted if

Persia, backed up by Russia, were permitted to seize Herat. He stated

finally that the Persian ambassador at Paris had recently expressed a

wish to renew negotiations for peace, and that the British government

would willingly listen to any overtures for that purpose. Lord

Palmerston gave similar explanations in the House of Commons. The Earls

of Derby and Malmesbury, Earl Grey, Lord John Russell, Mr Gladstone, and

Mr Disraeli, all spoke disparagingly of the Persian expedition—either

because it was not necessary; or because, if necessary, parliamentary

permission for it ought to have been obtained. The latter was the strong

point of opposition; many members asserted, not only that the nation was

involved in a new war without its own consent, but that no one could

understand whether war had been declared by the Crown or by the East

India Company. Earl Grey moved an amendment condemnatory of the

ministerial policy; but this was negatived. The ministers declined to

produce the diplomatic correspondence at that time, because there was a

hope of renewed negotiations with Furukh Khan at Paris.

At the close of February it became known to the public that the East

India Company had, not unnaturally, demurred to the incidence of the

expenses of the Persian war on their revenues. It appeared that, so

early as the 22d of October the Court of Directors had written to the

president of the Board of Control—adverting to ‘the expedition for

foreign service preparing at Bombay, under the orders (it is presumed)

of her Majesty’s government, communicated through the Secret Committee;’

and suggesting for his consideration ‘how far it may be just and proper

to subject India to the whole of the charges consequent on those

orders.’ The directors, as a governing body, had no voice whatever in

determining on the Persian war; and yet their soldiers and sailors were

to take part in it, and the Indian revenues to bear all or part of the

burden. It was ultimately decided that England should pay one-half of

the expenses, the other half being borne by the Company out of the

revenues of India.