2. _Endowment of Idolatry and Mohammedanism by the Government._—In

British India, many small items of revenue are paid by the government

for the support of temples, priests, idols, and ceremonies pertaining to

the Hindoo and Mohammedan religions. Edwardes urged that these payments

should cease, as a disgrace to a Christian government. Lawrence pointed

out that this withdrawal could not be effected without a gross breach of

faith. The revenues in question belonged to those religious bodies

before England ‘annexed’ the states, and were recognised as such at the

time of the annexation. They are a property, a claim on the land, like

tithes in England, or like conventual lands in Roman Catholic countries.

They are not, and never have been, regarded as religious offerings or

gifts. We seized the lands; but if we were to withhold the revenues

derived from those lands, on the ground that the religious services are

heathen, it would be a virtual persecution of heathenism, and, as such,

repugnant to the mild principles of Christianity. Lawrence believed that

the payments might so be made as not to appear to encourage idolatry;

but he would not listen to any such breach of faith as withholding them

altogether.

3. _Recognition of Caste._—Colonel Edwardes, in common with many other

persons, believed that the British government had pandered too much to

the prejudices of caste, and that this system ought to be changed.

Lawrence pointed out that it was mainly in the Bengal army that this

prevailed, and that the custom arose out of very natural circumstances.

Brahmins and Rajpoots were preferred for military service, because they

were generally finer men than those of lower castes, because they were

(apparently) superior in moral qualifications, and because they were

descended from the old soldiers who had fought under Clive and our early

generals. Our officers became so accustomed to them, that at length they

would enlist no others. Being more easily obtained from Oude than from

any other province, it came to pass that the Bengal army gradually

assumed the character of a vast aggregate of brotherhoods and

cousinhoods—consisting chiefly of men belonging to the same castes,

speaking the same dialects, coming from the same districts, and

influenced by the same associations. It was the gradual growth of a

custom, which the Revolt suddenly put an end to. Lawrence denied that

the government had shewn any great encouragement to caste prejudices,

except in the Bengal army. He believed that an equal error would be

committed by discouraging the higher and encouraging the lower castes.

What is wanted is, a due admixture of all, from the haughty Brahmin and

Rajpoot castes, down to the humble Trading and Sweeper castes. Whether

all should be combined in one regiment, or different regiments be formed

of different castes, would depend much on the part of India under

notice. Christianised natives would probably constitute valuable

regiments, as soon as their number becomes sufficiently great. On all

these questions of caste, the two authorities differed chiefly

thus—Edwardes would beat down and humble the higher castes; Lawrence

would employ all, without especially encouraging any.

[Illustration:

Fort St George, Madras; in 1780.

]

4. _Observance of Native Holidays in State Departments._—Native servants

of the government were usually allowed to absent themselves on days of

festival or religious ceremony. Edwardes proposed to reform this, as

being a pandering to heathen customs, unworthy of a Christian

government. Lawrence contended that such a change would be a departure

from the golden rule of ‘doing unto others that which we would they

should do unto us.’ A Christian in a Mohammedan country would think it

cruel if compelled to work on Sunday, Good Friday, or Christmas-day; and

so would the Hindoo and Mussulman of India, if compelled to work on

their days of religious festival. Lawrence thought that the number might

advantageously be lessened, by restricting the list to such as were

especial religious days in the native faiths; but beyond this he would

not curtail the privilege of holiday (holy day). He adverted to the fact

that the Christian Sunday is made obvious to the natives by the

suspension of all public works.

5. _Administration by the British of Hindoo and Mohammedan

Laws._—Edwardes deemed it objectionable that England should to so great

an extent suffer native laws to be administered in India. Lawrence

replied that it is the policy of conquerors to interfere as little as

possible in those native laws which operate only between man and man,

and do not affect imperial policy. He drew attention to the fact that

Indian legislation had already made two important steps, by legalising

the re-marriage of Hindoo widows, and by removing all possible civil

disabilities or legal disadvantages from Christian converts; and he

looked forward to the time when it might perhaps be practicable to

abolish polygamy, and the making of contracts of betrothal by parents on

behalf of infant children; but he strenuously insisted on the importance

of not changing any such laws until the government can carry the

good-will of the natives with them.

6. _Publicity of Hindoo and Mohammedan Processions._—It was urged by

Edwardes that religious processions ought not to be allowed in the

public streets, under protection of the police. Lawrence joined in this

opinion—not, however, on religious grounds, but because the processions

led to quarrelling and fighting between rival communions, and because

the Hindoo idols and pictures are often of a character quite unfitted

for exhibition in public thoroughfares.

7. _Display of Prostitution in the Streets._—This aspect of social

immorality is far more glaring in many parts of India than in European

cities, bad as the latter may be. Edwardes recommended, and Lawrence

concurred in the recommendation, that the police arrangements should be

rendered more stringent in this matter.

8. _Restrictions on Marriage of European Soldiers._—Great restrictions

were, in bygone years, imposed by the Company on the marriage of

European soldiers; and a shameful disregard shewn for the homes of those

who were married. Edwardes condemned this state of things; and Lawrence

shared his views to a great extent. He asserted that men are not better

soldiers for being unmarried—rather the reverse; and that women and

children, in moderate numbers, need not be any obstruction to military

arrangements. Some change in this matter he recommended. He pointed out,

however, that in reference to the comfort of married soldiers, great

improvements had been introduced into the Punjaub, and improvements to a

smaller extent in other parts of British India. He fully recognised the

bounden duty of the government so to construct barracks as to provide

for the proper domestic privacy of married soldiers and their families.

9. _Connection of the Government with the Opium-trade._—Edwardes dwelt

on the objectionable character of this connection. Lawrence replied that

the English were not called upon to decide for the Chinese how far the

use of opium is deleterious; and that, until we checked our own

consumption of intoxicating liquors, we were scarcely in a position to

take a high moral tone on this point. He nevertheless fully agreed that

it was objectionable in any government to encourage the growth of this

drug, actively supervising the storing and selling, and advancing money

for this purpose to the cultivators. It was a revenue question,

defensive wholly on financial grounds. How to provide a substitute for

the £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 thus derived would be a difficult matter;

but he thought the best course would be to sever the connection between

the government and the opium-trade, and to lay a heavy customs duty on

the export of opium from India.

10. _Indian Excise Laws._—It was contended by Edwardes that the

government encouraged intemperance by farming out to monopolists the

right of manufacturing and selling intoxicating drugs and spirits.

Lawrence contested this point. He asserted that there is less

drunkenness in India, less spirit-drinking and drug-chewing, than under

the former native rule, when the trade was open to all. As a question of

morals, the Indian government does no more than that of the home

country, in deriving a revenue from spirituous liquors; as a question of

fact, the evils are lessened by the very monopoly complained of.

Sir John Lawrence, in a few concluding remarks, expressed a very strong

belief that Christian civilisation may be introduced gradually into

India if a temperate policy be pursued; but that rash zeal would produce

great disaster. ‘It is when unchristian things are done in the name of

Christianity, or when Christian things are done in an unchristian way,

that mischief and danger are occasioned.’ He recommended that as soon as

the supreme government had organised the details of a just and

well-considered policy, ‘it should be openly avowed and universally

acted on throughout British India; so that there may be no diversities

of practice, no isolated or conflicting efforts, which would be the

surest means of exciting distrust; so that the people may see that we

have no sudden or sinister designs; and so that we may exhibit that

harmony and uniformity of conduct which befits a Christian nation

striving to do its duty.’ Finally, he expressed a singularly firm

conviction that, so far as concerns the Punjaub, he could himself carry

out ‘all those measures which are really matters of Christian duty on

the part of the government:’ measures which ‘would arouse no danger,

would conciliate instead of provoking, and would subserve the ultimate

diffusion of the truth among the people.’

It wants no other evidence than is furnished by the above very

remarkable correspondence, to shew that the future government of India

must, if it be effective, be based on some system which has been well

weighed and scrutinised on all sides. The problem is nothing less than

that of governing a hundred and eighty millions of human beings, whose

characteristics are very imperfectly known to us. It is a matter of no

great difficulty to write out a scheme or plan of government,

plentifully bestrewed with personalities and accusations; there have

been many such; but the calm judgment of men filling different ranks in

life, and conversant with different aspects of Indian character, can

alone insure the embodiment of a scheme calculated to benefit both India

and England. Whether the abolition of the governing powers of the East

India Company will facilitate the solution of this great problem, the

future alone can shew; it will at any rate simplify the departmental

operations.

The Queen’s proclamation, announcing the great change in the mode of

government, and offering an amnesty to evildoers under certain easily

understood conditions, adverted cautiously to the future and its

prospects. Before, however, touching on this important document, it may

be well to say a few words concerning the military operations in the few

weeks immediately preceding its issue.

These operations, large as they were, had resolved themselves into the

hunting down of desperate bands, rather than the fighting of great

battles with a military opponent. Throughout the whole of India, in the

months of October and November, disturbances had been nearly quelled

except in two regions—Oude, with portions of the neighbouring provinces

of Rohilcund and Behar; and Malwah, with portions of Bundelcund and the

Nerbudda provinces. Of the rest—Bengal, Assam and the Delta of the

Ganges, Aracan and Pegu, the greater portion of Behar and the Northwest

Provinces, the Doab, Sirhind and the hill regions, the Punjaub, Sinde,

Cutch and Gujerat, Bombay and its vicinity, the Deccan under the Nizam,

the Nagpoor territory, the Madras region, Mysore, the South Mahratta

country, the south of the Indian peninsula—all were so nearly at peace

as to excite little attention. Of the two excepted regions, a few

details will shew that they were gradually falling more and more under

British power.

In the Oude region the guiding spirit was still the Begum, one of the

wives of the deposed king. She had the same kind of energy and ability

as the Ranee of Jhansi, with less of cruelty; and was hence deserving of

a meed of respect. Camp-gossip told that, under disappointment at the

uniform defeat of the rebel troops whenever and wherever they

encountered the English, she sent a pair of bangles (ankle-ornaments) to

each of her generals or leaders—scoffingly telling him to wear those

trinkets, and become a woman, unless he could vanquish and drive out the

Feringhees. This had the effect of impelling some of her officers to

make attacks on the British; but the attacks were utterly futile. There

were many leaders in Oude who fought on their own account; a greater

number, however, acknowledged a kind of suzerainty in the Begum. If she

did not win battles, she at least headed armies, and carried on open

warfare; whereas the despicable Nena Sahib, true to his cowardice from

first to last, was hiding in jungles, and endeavouring to keep his very

existence unknown to the English. The military operations in Oude during

the month of October were not extensive in character. Sir Colin Campbell

(Lord Clyde), waiting for the cessation of the autumnal rains, was

collecting several columns, with a view of hemming in the rebels on all

sides and crushing them. That they would ultimately be crushed,

everything foretold; for in every encounter, large or small, they were

so disgracefully beaten as to shew that the leaders commanded a mere

predatory rabble rather than a brave disciplined soldiery. These

encounters were mostly in Oude, but partly in Behar and Rohilcund. In

the greater number of instances, however, the rebels ran instead of

fighting, even though their number was tenfold that of their opponents.

The skilled mutinied sepoys from the Bengal army were becoming daily

fewer in number, so many having been struck down by war and by

privation; their places were now taken by undisciplined ruffians, who,

however strong for rapine and anarchy, were nearly powerless on the

field of battle. Thousands of men in this part of India, who had become

impoverished, almost houseless, during a year and a half of anarchy, had

strong temptation to join the rebel leaders, from a hope of booty or

plunder, irrespective of any national or patriotic motive. Sir Colin,

when the month of November arrived, entered personally on his plan of

operations; which was to bar the boundaries of Oude on three sides—the

Ganges, Rohilcund, and Behar—and compel the various bodies of rebels

either to fight or to flee; if they fought, their virtual annihilation

would be almost certain; if they fled, it could only be to the jungle

region on the Nepaul frontier of Oude, where, though they might carry on

a hide-and-seek game for many months, their military importance as

rebels would cease. In the dead of the night, between the 1st and 2d of

November, the veteran commander-in-chief set forth from Allahabad with a

well-selected force, crossed the Ganges, and advanced into Oude. His

first work was to issue a proclamation,[203] sternly threatening all

evildoers. A few days earlier, at Lucknow, Mr Montgomery, as

chief-commissioner, had issued a proclamation for the disarming of

Oude—requiring all thalookdars to surrender their guns, all persons

whatever to surrender their arms, all leaders to refrain from building

and arming forts; and threatening with fine and imprisonment those who

should disobey. It was intended and believed that the three

proclamations should all conduce towards a pacification—the Queen’s

(presently to be noticed) offering pardon to mutineers who yielded; the

Commander-in-chief’s, threatening destruction to all towns and villages

which aided rebels; and the commissioners’, lessening the powers for

mischief by depriving the inhabitants generally of arms. With Sir Colin

advancing towards the centre of Oude by Pertabghur, troops from

Seetapoor, Hope Grant from Salone, and Rowcroft from the Gogra at

Fyzabad, the Begum and her supporters were gradually so hemmed in that

they began to avail themselves of the terms of the Queen’s proclamation

by surrender. It was to such a result that the authorities had from the

first looked; but never until now had all the conditions for it been

favourable. One of the first to surrender was Rajah Lall Madhoo Singh, a

chieftain of great influence and energy, and one whose character had not

been stained by deeds of cruelty.

In the Arrah or Jugdispore district, in like manner, the close of the

scene was foreshadowed. Ummer Singh and his confederates had long

baffled Brigadier Douglas; but now that troops were converging from all

quarters upon the jungle-haunt, the rebels became more and more isolated

from bands in other districts, their position more and more critical,

and their final discomfiture more certain. Sir H. Havelock, son of the

deceased general, and Colonel Turner, pressed them more and more with

new columns, until their hopes were desperate. One excellent expedient

was the cutting down of the Jugdispore jungle, 23 miles in length by 4

in breadth; this useful work was begun in November by Messrs Burn,

railway contractors.

In the other region of India above adverted to—comprising those

districts of Malwah, Bundelcund, &c., which are watered by the Betwah,

the Chumbul, the Nerbudda, and their tributaries—the leading rebel was

Tanteea Topee, one of the most remarkable men brought forward by the

Revolt. He had most of the qualities for a good general—except courage.

He would not fight if he could help it; but in avoiding the British

generals opposed to him, he displayed a cunning of plan, a fertility of

resource, and a celerity of movement, quite note-worthy. The truth seems

to have been, that he held power over an enormous treasure, in money and

jewels, which he had obtained by plundering Scindia’s palace at Gwalior;

this treasure he carried with him wherever he went; and he shunned any

encounters which might endanger it. He looked out for a strong city or

fort, where he might settle down as a Mahratta prince, with a large

store of available ready wealth at hand; but as the British did not

choose to leave him in quietude, he marched from place to place. Between

the beginning of June and the end of November he traversed with his army

an enormous area of country, seizing guns from various towns and forts

on the way, but usually escaping before the English could catch him.

Former chapters have shewn by what strange circumvolutions he arrived at

Julra Patteen; and a detail of operations would shew that his subsequent

movements were equally erratic. He went to Seronj, then to Esagurh, then

to Chunderee, then to Peshore, then arrived at the river Betwah, and

wavered whether he should go southward to the Deccan or northward

towards Jhansi. Everywhere he was either followed or headed, by columns

and detachments under Michel, Mayne, Parkes, Smith, and other officers.

Whenever they could bring him to an encounter, they invariably beat him

most signally; but when, as generally happened, he escaped by forced

marches, they tracked him. He picked up guns and men as he went; so that

the amount of his force was never correctly known; it varied from three

to fifteen thousand. One of the most severe defeats he received was at

Sindwah, on the 19th of October, at the hands of General Michel;

another, on the 25th, near Multhone, from the same active general. It

was felt on all sides that this game could not be indefinitely

continued. Tanteea Topee was like a hunted beast of prey, pursued by

enemies who would not let him rest. When it had been clearly ascertained

by General Roberts, in Rajpootana, that the fleet-footed and

unencumbered rebel soldiery could escape faster than British troops

could follow them, a new mode of strategy was adopted; columns from four

different directions began to march towards a common centre, near which

centre were Tanteea and his rebels; if one column could not catch him,

another could head him and drive him back. Thus it was considered a

military certainty that he must be run down at last. And if he fell, the

great work of pacification in that part of India would be pretty well

effected; for there was no rebel force of any account except that

commanded by Tanteea Topee. After his defeat at Multhone, Tanteea was in

great peril; Michel literally cut his army in two; and if he had pursued

the larger instead of the smaller of these two sections, he might

possibly have captured Tanteea himself. On the last day in October, the

rebel leader crossed the Nerbudda river, thereby turning his back on the

regions occupied by the columns of Roberts, Napier, Michel, Smith, and

Whitlock. During November, he made some extraordinary marches in the

country immediately southward of the Nerbudda—being heard of

successively at Baitool, the Sindwara hills, and other little-known

places in that region. He was no better off than before, however, for

forces were immediately sent against him from Ahmednuggur, Kamptee, and

other places; he had lost nearly all his guns and stores, his rebel

followers, though laden with wealth, were footsore and desponding; and,

for the first time, his companions began to look out for favourable

terms of surrender. The Queen’s proclamation was eminently calculated to

withdraw his misguided followers from him; and the Nawab of Banda, the

most influential among them, was the first to give himself up to General

Michel.

Not only was a large measure of forgiveness held out to those who would

return to their allegiance; but the British troops in India were

becoming so formidably numerous as to render still more certain than

ever the eventual triumph of order and good government. The Queen’s

troops in India at the beginning of November, those on the passage from

England, and those told off for further shipment, amounted altogether to

little short of one hundred thousand men. It affords a striking instance

of triumph over difficulties, that between November 1857 and November

1858 the Peninsular and Oriental Steam-navigation Company conveyed no

less than 8190 officers and soldiers to India by the overland route—in

spite of the forebodings that that route would be unsuitable for whole

regiments of soldiers; the burning Egyptian desert and the reef-bound

Red Sea were traversed almost without disaster, under the watchful care

of this company.

The 1st of November 1858 was a great day in India. On this day the

transference of governing power from the East India Company to Queen

Victoria was made known throughout the length and breadth of the empire.

A royal proclamation[204] was issued, which many regarded as the Magna

Charta of native liberty in India. At Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Lahore,

Kurachee, Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Nagpoor, Mysore, Rangoon, and other

great cities, this proclamation was read with every accompaniment of

ceremonial splendour that could give dignity to the occasion in the eyes

of the natives; and at every British station, large or small, it was

read amid such military honours as each place afforded. It was

translated into most of the languages, and many of the dialects of

India. It was printed in tens of thousands, and distributed wherever

natives were wont most to congregate—in order that all might know that

Queen Victoria was now virtually Empress of India; that the

governor-general was now her viceroy; that the native princes might rely

on the observance by her of all treaties made with them by the Company;

that she desired no encroachment on, or annexation of, the territories

of those princes; that she would not interfere with the religion of the

natives, or countenance any favouritism in matters of faith; that creed

or caste should not be a bar to employment in her service; that the

ancient legal tenures and forms of India should, as far as possible, be

adhered to; and that all mutineers and rebels, except those whose hands

were blood-stained by actual murder, should receive a full and gracious

pardon on abandoning their acts of insurgency. When these words were

uttered aloud at Bombay (and the ceremony was more or less similar at

the other cities named) the spectacle was such as the natives of India

had never before seen. The governor and all the chief civilians; the

military officers and the troops; the clergy of all the various

Christian denominations; the merchants, shipowners, and traders; the

Mohammedans, Hindoos, Mahrattas, Parsees—all were represented among the

throng around the spot from whence the proclamation was read, first in

English, and then in Mahratta. And then the shouting, the music of

military bands, the firing of guns, the waving of flags, the

illuminations at night, the fireworks in the public squares, the

blue-lights and manning of the ships, the banquets in the chief

mansions—all rendered this a day to be borne in remembrance. Sir

Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, the Parsee baronet, vied with the Christians in the

munificence of rejoicing; and indeed, so little did religious

differences mar the harmony of the scene, that Catholic chapels,

Mohammedan mosques, Hindoo pagodas, and Parsee temples were alike

lighted up at night. It may not be that every one was enabled to assign

good reasons for his rejoicing; but there was certainly a pretty general

concurrence of opinion that the declared sovereignty of Queen Victoria,

as a substitute for the ever-incomprehensible ‘raj’ of the East India

Company, was a presage of good for British India. At Calcutta, the

proclamation had the singular good-fortune of winning the approval of a

community always very difficult to please. The Europeans consented to

lay aside all minor considerations, in order to do honour to the great

principles involved in the proclamation. The natives, too, took their

share in the rejoicing. A public meeting was held early in the month, at

which an influential Hindoo, Baboo Ramgopal Ghose, made an animated

speech. He said, among other things: ‘If I had power and influence, I

would proclaim through the length and breadth of this land—from the

Himalayas to Cape Comorin, from the Brahmaputra to the Bay of

Cambay—that never were the natives more grievously mistaken than they

have been in adopting the notion foisted on them by designing and

ambitious men—that their religion was at stake; for that notion I

believe to have been at the root of the late rebellion.’ Some of the

more intelligent natives rightly understood the nature of the great

change made in the government of India; but among the ignorant, it

remained a mystery—rendered, however, very palatable by the open avowal

of a Queen regnant, and of a proclamation breathing sentiments of

justice and kindness.

[Illustration]

-----

Footnote 194:

Chapter xiii., p. 211.

Footnote 195:

_Account of the Mutinies in Oudh._

Footnote 196:

_Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow._

Footnote 197:

_Eight Months’ Campaign against the Bengal Sepoy Army._

Footnote 198:

_British India; its Races and its History._

Footnote 199:

_The Sepoy Revolt; its Causes and its Consequences._

Footnote 200:

_Notes on the Revolt in the Northwest Provinces._

Footnote 201:

_Letters of Indophilus to the ‘Times.’_

Footnote 202:

_The Indian Rebellion: its Causes and Results._

Footnote 203:

‘The Commander-in-chief proclaims to the people of Oude that, under

the order of the Right Hon. the Governor-general, he comes to enforce

the law.

‘In order to effect this without danger to life and property,

resistance must cease on the part of the people.

‘The most exact discipline will be preserved in the camps and on the

march; and when there is no resistance, houses and crops will be

spared, and no plundering allowed in the towns and villages. But

wherever there is resistance, or even a single shot fired against the

troops, the inhabitants must expect to incur the fate they have

brought on themselves. Their houses will be plundered, and their

villages burnt.

‘This proclamation includes all ranks of the people, from the

thalookdars to the poorest ryots.

‘The Commander-in-chief invites all the well-disposed to remain in

their towns and villages, where they will be sure of his protection

against all violence.’

Footnote 204:

See Appendix.

APPENDIX.

_East India Company’s Petition to Parliament, January 1858._—(See p.

563.)

To the Right Honourable the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the

Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland in Parliament assembled; The humble Petition of the East India

Company, Sheweth:

That your petitioners, at their own expense, and by the agency of their

own civil and military servants, originally acquired for this country

its magnificent empire in the East.

That the foundations of this empire were laid by your petitioners, at

that time neither aided nor controlled by parliament, at the same period

at which a succession of administrations under the control of parliament

were losing to the Crown of Great Britain another great empire on the

opposite side of the Atlantic.

That during the period of about a century, which has since elapsed, the

Indian possessions of this country have been governed and defended from

the resources of those possessions, without the smallest cost to the

British exchequer, which, to the best of your petitioners’ knowledge and

belief, cannot be said of any other of the numerous foreign dependencies

of the Crown.

That it being manifestly improper that the administration of any British

possession should be independent of the general government of the

empire, parliament provided in 1783 that a department of the imperial

government should have full cognizance of, and power of control over,

the acts of your petitioners in the administration of India; since which

time the home branch of the Indian government has been conducted by the

joint counsels and on the joint responsibility of your petitioners and

of a minister of the Crown.

That this arrangement has at subsequent periods undergone

reconsideration from the legislature, and various comprehensive and

careful parliamentary inquiries have been made into its practical

operation; the result of which has been, on each occasion, a renewed

grant to your petitioners of the powers exercised by them in the

administration of India.

That the last of these occasions was so recent as 1853, in which year

the arrangements which had existed for nearly three-quarters of a

century were, with certain modifications, re-enacted, and still subsist.

That, notwithstanding, your petitioners have received an intimation from

her Majesty’s ministers of their intention to propose to parliament a

bill for the purpose of placing the government of her Majesty’s East

Indian dominions under the direct authority of the Crown: a change

necessarily involving the abolition of the East India Company as an

instrument of government.

That your petitioners have not been informed of the reasons which have

induced her Majesty’s ministers, without any previous inquiry, to come

to the resolution of putting an end to a system of administration which

parliament, after inquiry, deliberately confirmed and sanctioned less

than five years ago, and which, in its modified form, has not been in

operation quite four years, and cannot be considered to have undergone a

sufficient trial during that short period.

That your petitioners do not understand that her Majesty’s ministers

impute any failure to those arrangements, or bring any charge, either

great or small, against your petitioners. But the time at which the

proposal is made, compels your petitioners to regard it as arising from

the calamitous events which have recently occurred in India.

That your petitioners challenge the most searching investigation into

the mutiny of the Bengal army, and the causes, whether remote or

immediate, which produced that mutiny. They have instructed the

government of India to appoint a commission for conducting such an

inquiry on the spot; and it is their most anxious wish that a similar

inquiry may be instituted in this country by your [lordships’]

honourable House, in order that it may be ascertained whether anything,

either in the constitution of the home government of India, or in the

conduct of those by whom it has been administered, has had any share in

producing the mutiny, or has in any way impeded the measures for its

suppression; and whether the mutiny itself, or any circumstance

connected with it, affords any evidence of the failure of the

arrangements under which India is at present administered.

That were it even true that these arrangements had failed, the failure

could constitute no reason for divesting the East India Company of its

functions, and transferring them to her Majesty’s government. For, under

the existing system, her Majesty’s government have the deciding voice.

The duty imposed upon the Court of Directors is, to originate measures

and frame drafts of instructions. Even had they been remiss in this

duty, their remissness, however discreditable to themselves, could in no

way absolve the responsibility of her Majesty’s government; since the

minister for India possesses, and has frequently exercised, the power of

requiring that the Court of Directors should take any subject into

consideration, and prepare a draft-dispatch for his approval. Her

Majesty’s government are thus in the fullest sense accountable for all

that has been done, and for all that has been forborne or omitted to be

done. Your petitioners, on the other hand, are accountable only in so

far as the act or omission has been promoted by themselves.

That under these circumstances, if the administration of India had been

a failure, it would, your petitioners submit, have been somewhat

unreasonable, to expect that a remedy would be found in annihilating the

branch of the ruling authority which could not be the one principally in

fault, and might be altogether blameless, in order to concentrate all

powers in the branch which had necessarily the decisive share in every

error, real or supposed. To believe that the administration of India

would have been more free from error, had it been conducted by a

minister of the Crown without the aid of the Court of Directors, would

be to believe that the minister, with full power to govern India as he

pleased, has governed ill because he has had the assistance of

experienced and responsible advisers.

That your petitioners, however, do not seek to vindicate themselves at

the expense of any other authority; they claim their full share of the

responsibility of the manner in which India has practically been

governed. That responsibility is to them not a subject of humiliation,

but of pride. They are conscious that their advice and initiative have

been, and have deserved to be, a great and potent element in the conduct

of affairs in India. And they feel complete assurance, that the more

attention is bestowed, and the more light thrown upon India and its

administration, the more evident it will become, that the government in

which they have borne a part, has been not only one of the purest in

intention, but one of the most beneficent in act, ever known among

mankind; that during the last and present generations in particular, it

has been, in all departments, one of the most rapidly improving

governments in the world; and that, at the time when this change is

proposed, a greater number of important improvements are in a state of

rapid progress than at any former period. And they are satisfied that

whatever further improvements may be hereafter effected in India, can

only consist in the development of germs already planted, and in

building on foundations already laid, under their authority, and in a

great measure by their express instructions.

That such, however, is not the impression likely to be made on the

public mind, either in England or in India, by the ejection of your

petitioners from the place they fill in the Indian administration. It is

not usual with statesmen to propose the complete abolition of a system

of government of which the practical operation is not condemned. It

might therefore be generally inferred from the proposed measures, if

carried into effect at the present time, that the East India Company

having been intrusted with an important portion of the administration of

India, have so abused their trust, as to have produced a sanguinary

insurrection, and nearly lost India to the British empire; and that

having thus crowned a long career of misgovernment, they have, in

deference to public indignation, been deservedly cashiered for their

misconduct.

That if the character of the East India Company were alone concerned,

your petitioners might be willing to await the verdict of history. They

are satisfied that posterity will do them justice. And they are

confident that, even now, justice is done to them in the minds, not only

of her Majesty’s ministers, but of all who have any claim to be

competent judges of the subject. But though your petitioners could

afford to wait for the reversal of the verdict of condemnation which

will be believed throughout the world to have been passed on them and

their government by the British nation, your petitioners cannot look

without the deepest uneasiness at the effect likely to be produced on

the minds of the people of India. To them—however incorrectly the name

may express the fact—the British government in India is the government

of the East India Company. To their minds, the abolition of the Company

will, for some time to come, mean the abolition of the whole system of

administration with which the Company is identified. The measure,

introduced simultaneously with the influx of an overwhelming British

force, will be coincident with a general outcry, in itself most alarming

to their fears, from most of the organs of opinion in this country, as

well as of English opinion in India, denouncing the past policy of the

government on the express ground that it has been too forbearing, and

too considerate towards the natives. The people of India will at first

feel no certainty that the new government, or the government under a new

name, which it is proposed to introduce, will hold itself bound by the

pledges of its predecessors. They will be slow to believe that a

government has been destroyed, only to be followed by another which will

act on the same principles, and adhere to the same measures. They cannot

suppose that the existing organ of administration would be swept away

without the intention of reversing any part of its policy. They will see

the authorities, both at home and in India, surrounded by persons

vehemently urging radical changes in many parts of that policy.

Interpreting, as they must do, the change in the instrument of

government as a concession to these opinions and feelings, they can

hardly fail to believe that, whatever else may be intended, the

government will no longer be permitted to observe that strict

impartiality between those who profess its own creed and those who hold

the creeds of its native subjects, which hitherto characterised it; that

their strongest and most deeply rooted feelings will henceforth be

treated with much less regard than heretofore; and that a directly

aggressive policy towards everything in their habits, or in their usages

and customs, which Englishmen deem objectionable, will be no longer

confined to individuals and private associations, but will be backed by

all the power of government.

And here your petitioners think it important to observe, that in

abstaining as they have done from all interference with any of the

religious practices of the people of India, except such as are abhorrent

to humanity, they have acted not only from their own conviction of what

is just and expedient, but in accordance with the avowed intentions and

express enactments of the legislature, framed ‘in order that regard

should be had to the civil and religious usages of the natives,’ and

also ‘that suits, civil or criminal, against the natives,’ should be

conducted according to such rules ‘as may accommodate the same to the

religion and manners of the natives.’ That their policy in this respect

has been successful, is evidenced by the fact that, during a military

mutiny, said to have been caused by unfounded apprehensions of danger to

religion, the heads of the native states and the masses of the

population have remained faithful to the British government. Your

petitioners need hardly observe, how very different would probably have

been the issue of the late events if the native princes, instead of

aiding in the suppression of the rebellion, had put themselves at its

head, or if the general population had joined in the revolt; and how

probable it is that both these contingencies would have occurred if any

real ground had been given for the persuasion that the British

government intended to identify itself with proselytism. It is the

honest conviction of your petitioners, that any serious apprehension of

a change of policy in this respect would be likely to be followed, at no

distant period, by a general rising throughout India.

That your petitioners have seen with the greatest pain, the

demonstrations of indiscriminate animosity towards the natives of India

on the part of our countrymen in India and at home, which have grown up

since the late unhappy events. They believe these sentiments to be

fundamentally unjust; they know them to be fatal to the possibility of

good government in India. They feel that if such demonstrations should

continue, and especially if weight be added to them by legislating under

their supposed influence, no amount of wisdom and forbearance on the

part of the government will avail to restore that confidence of the

governed in the intentions of their rulers, without which it is vain

even to attempt the improvement of the people.

That your petitioners cannot contemplate without dismay the doctrine now

widely promulgated, that India should be administered with an especial

view to the benefit of the English who reside there—or that in its

administration any advantages should be sought for her Majesty’s

subjects of European birth, except that which they will necessarily

derive from their superiority of intelligence, and from the increased

prosperity of the people, the improvement of the productive resources of

the country, and the extension of commercial intercourse. Your

petitioners regard it as the most honourable characteristic of the

government of India by England, that it has acknowledged no such

distinction as that of a dominant and a subject race; but has held that

its first duty was to the people of India. Your petitioners feel that a

great portion of the hostility with which they are assailed, is caused

by the belief that they are peculiarly the guardians of this principle,

and that, so long as they have any voice in the administration of India,

it cannot easily be infringed; and your petitioners will not conceal

their belief that their exclusion from any part in the government is

likely, at the present time, to be regarded in India as a first

successful attack on that principle.

That your petitioners, therefore, most earnestly represent to your

[lordships’] honourable House that even if the contemplated change could

be proved to be in itself advisable, the present is a most unsuitable

time for entertaining it; and they most strongly and respectfully urge

on your [lordships’] honourable House the expediency of at least

deferring any such change until it can be effected at a period when it

would not be, in the minds of the people of India, directly connected

with the recent calamitous events, and with the feelings to which those

events have either given rise, or have afforded an opportunity of

manifestation. Such postponement, your petitioners submit, would allow

time for a more mature consideration than has yet been given, or can be

given in the present excited state of the public mind, to the various

questions connected with the organisation of a government for India; and

would enable the most competent minds in the nation calmly to examine

whether any new arrangement can be devised for the home government of

India uniting a greater number of the conditions of good administration

than the present, and if so, which, among the numerous schemes which

have been or may be proposed, possesses those requisites in the greatest

degree.

That your petitioners have always willingly acquiesced in any changes

which, after discussion by parliament, were deemed conducive to the

general welfare, although such changes may have involved important

sacrifices to themselves. They would refer to their partial

relinquishment of trade in 1813; to its total abandonment, and the

placing of their commercial charter in abeyance in 1833; to the transfer

to India of their commercial assets, amounting to £15,858,000, a sum

greatly exceeding that ultimately repayable to them in respect of their

capital, independent of territorial rights and claims; and to their

concurrence, in 1853, in the measure by which the Court of Directors was

reconstructed, and reduced to its present number. In the same spirit,

your petitioners would most gladly co-operate with her Majesty’s

government in correcting any defects which may be considered to exist in

the details of the present system; and they would be prepared, without a

murmur, to relinquish their trust altogether, if a better system for the

control of the government of India can be devised. But as they believe

that, in the construction of such a system, there are conditions which

cannot, without the most dangerous consequences, be departed from, your

petitioners respectfully and deferentially submit to the judgment of

your [lordships’] honourable House their view of those conditions, in

the hope that if your [lordships’] honourable House should see reason to

agree in that view, you will withhold your legislative sanction from any

arrangement for the government of India which does not fulfil the

conditions in question in at least an equal degree with the present.

That your petitioners may venture to assume that it will not be proposed

to vest the home portion of the administration of India in a minister of

the Crown, without the adjunct of a council composed of statesmen

experienced in Indian affairs. Her Majesty’s ministers cannot but be

aware that the knowledge necessary for governing a foreign country, and

in particular a country like India, requires as much special study as

any other profession, and cannot possibly be possessed by any one who

has not devoted a considerable portion of his life to the acquisition of

it.

That in constituting a body of experienced advisers, to be associated

with the Indian minister, your petitioners consider it indispensable to

bear in mind that this body should not only be qualified to advise the

minister, but also, by its advice, to exercise, to a certain degree, a

moral check. It cannot be expected that the minister, as a general rule,

should himself know India; while he will be exposed to perpetual

solicitations from individuals and bodies, either entirely ignorant of

that country, or knowing only enough of it to impose on those who know

still less than themselves, and having very frequently objects in view

other than the interests or good government of India. The influences

likely to be brought to bear on him through the organs of popular

opinion will, in the majority of cases, be equally misleading. The

public opinion of England, itself necessarily unacquainted with Indian

affairs, can only follow the promptings of those who take most pains to

influence it; and these will generally be such as have some private

interest to serve. It is, therefore, your petitioners submit, of the

utmost importance that any council which may form a part of the home

government of India should derive sufficient weight from its

constitution, and from the relation it occupies to the minister, to be a

substantial barrier against those inroads of self-interest and ignorance

in this country from which the government of India has hitherto been

comparatively free, but against which it would be too much to expect

that parliament should of itself afford a sufficient protection.

That your petitioners cannot well conceive a worse form of government

for India, than a minister with a council whom he should be at liberty

to consult or not at his pleasure, or whose advice he should be able to

disregard without giving his reasons in writing, and in a manner likely

to carry conviction. Such an arrangement, your petitioners submit, would

be really liable to the objections in their opinion erroneously urged

against the present system. Your petitioners respectfully represent that

any body of persons associated with the minister, which is not a check,

will be a screen. Unless the council is so constituted as to be

personally independent of the minister; unless it feels itself

responsible for recording an opinion on every Indian subject, and

pressing that opinion on the minister, whether it is agreeable to him or

not; and unless the minister, when he overrules their opinion, is bound

to record his reasons—its existence will only serve to weaken his

responsibility, and to give the colourable sanction of prudence and

experience to measures in the framing of which those qualities have had

no share.

That it would be vain to expect that a new council could have as much

moral influence, and power of asserting its opinion with effect, as the

Court of Directors. A new body can no more succeed to the feelings and

authority which their antiquity and their historical antecedents give to

the East India Company, than a legislature, under a new name, sitting in

Westminster, would have the moral ascendency of the Houses of Lords and

Commons. One of the most important elements of usefulness will thus be

necessarily wanting in any newly constituted Indian Council, as compared

with the present.

That your petitioners find it difficult to conceive that the same

independence, in judgment and act, which characterises the Court of

Directors will be found in any council all of whose members are

nominated by the crown. Owing their nomination to the same authority,

many of them probably to the same individual minister whom they are

appointed to check, and looking to him alone for their re-appointment,

their desire of recommending themselves to him, and their unwillingness

to risk his displeasure by any serious resistance to his wishes, will be

motives too strong not to be in danger of exercising a powerful and

injurious influence over their conduct. Nor are your petitioners aware

of any mode in which that injurious influence could be guarded against,

except by conferring the appointments, like those of the judges, during

good behaviour; which, by rendering it impossible to correct an error

once committed, would be seriously objectionable.

That your petitioners are equally unable to perceive how, if the

controlling body is entirely nominated by the minister, that happy

independence of parliamentary and party influence which has hitherto

distinguished the administration of India, and the appointment to

situations of trust and importance in that country, can be expected to

continue. Your petitioners believe that in no government known to

history have appointments to offices, and especially to high offices,

been so rarely bestowed on any other considerations than those of

personal fitness. This characteristic, but for which, in all

probability, India would long since have been lost to this country, is,

your petitioners conceive, entirely owing to the circumstance that the

dispensers of patronage have been persons unconnected with party, and

under no necessity of conciliating parliamentary support; that

consequently the appointments to offices in India have been, as a rule,

left to the unbiassed judgment of the local authorities; while the

nominations to the civil and military services have been generally

bestowed on the middle classes, irrespective of political

considerations, and in a large proportion on the relatives of persons

who had distinguished themselves by their services in India.

That your petitioners therefore think it essential that at least a

majority of the council which assists the minister for India with its

advice, should hold their seats independently of his appointment.

That it is, in the opinion of your petitioners, no less necessary that

the order of the transaction of business should be such as to make the

participation of the council in the administration of India a

substantial one. That to this end it is, in the opinion of your

petitioners, indispensable that the dispatches to India should not be

prepared by the minister, and laid before the council, but should be

prepared by the council, and submitted to the minister. This would be in

accordance with the natural and obvious principle, that persons, chosen

for their knowledge of a subject, should suggest the mode of dealing

with it, instead of merely giving their opinion on suggestions coming

from elsewhere. This is also the only mode in which the members of the

council can feel themselves sufficiently important, or sufficiently

responsible, to secure their applying their minds to the subjects before

them. It is almost unnecessary for your petitioners to observe, that the

mind is called into far more vigorous action, by being required to

propose, than by merely being called on to assent. The minister has

necessarily the ultimate decision. If he has also the initiative, he has

all the powers which are of any practical moment. A body whose only

recognised function is to find fault, would speedily let that function

fall into desuetude. They would feel that their co-operation in

conducting the government of India was not really desired; that they

were only felt as a clog on the wheels of business. Their criticism on

what had been decided, without their being collectively consulted, would

be felt as importunate as a mere delay and impediment; and their office

would probably be seldom sought, but by those who were willing to allow

its most important duties to become nominal.

That, with the duty of preparing the dispatches to India would naturally

be combined the nomination and control of the home establishments. This

your petitioners consider absolutely essential to the utility of the

council. If the officers through whom they work are in direct dependence

upon an authority higher than theirs, all matters of importance will in

reality be settled between the minister and the subordinates, passing

over the council altogether.

That a third consideration to which your petitioners attach great

importance, is, that the number of the council should not be too

restricted. India is so wide a field, that a practical acquaintance with

every part of its affairs cannot be found combined in any small number

of individuals. The council ought to contain men of general experience

and knowledge of the world, also men specially qualified by financial

and revenue experience, by judicial experience, diplomatic experience,

military experience; it ought to contain persons conversant with the

varied social relations, and varied institutions of Bengal, Madras,

Bombay, the Northwestern Provinces, the Punjaub, and the native states.

Even the present Court of Directors, reduced as it is in numbers by the

act of 1853, does not contain all the varieties of knowledge and

experience desirable in such a body; neither, your petitioners submit,

would it be safe to limit the number to that which would be strictly

sufficient, supposing all the appointments to be the best possible. A

certain margin should be allowed for failures, which, even with the most

conscientious selection, will sometimes occur. Your petitioners,

moreover, cannot overlook the possibility, that if the nomination takes

place by ministers at the head of a political party, it will not always

be made with exclusive reference to personal qualifications; and it is

indispensable to provide that such errors or faults in the nominating

authority, so long as they are only occasional, shall not seriously

impair the efficiency of the body.

That while these considerations plead strongly for a body not less

numerous than the present, even if only regarded as advisers of the

minister; their other office, as a check on the minister, forms, your

petitioners submit, a no less forcible objection to any considerable

reduction of the present number. A body of six or eight will not be

equal to one of eighteen in that feeling of independent self-reliance

which is necessary to induce a public body to press its opinion on a

minister to whom that opinion is unacceptable. However unobjectionably

in other respects so small a body may be constituted, reluctance to give

offence will be likely, unless in extreme cases, to be a stronger

habitual inducement in their minds than the desire to stand up for their

convictions.

That if, in the opinion of your [lordships’] honourable House, a body

can be constituted which unites the above enumerated requisites of good

government, in a greater degree than the Court of Directors, your

petitioners have only to express their humble hope that your endeavours

for that purpose may be successful. But if, in enumerating the

conditions of a good system of home government for India, your

petitioners have, in fact, enumerated the qualities possessed by the

present system, then your petitioners pray that your [lordships’]

honourable House will continue the existing powers of the Court of

Directors.

That your petitioners are aware that the present home government of

India is reproached with being a double government; and that any

arrangement by which an independent check is provided to the discretion

of the minister, will be liable to a similar reproach. But they conceive

that this accusation originates in an entire misconception of the

functions devolving on the home government of India, and in the

application to it of the principles applicable to purely executive

departments. The executive government of India is, and must be, seated

in India itself. The Court of Directors is not so much an executive as a

deliberative body. Its principal function, and that of the home

government generally, is not to direct the details of administration,

but to scrutinise and revise the past acts of the Indian government—to

lay down principles and issue general instructions for their future

guidance—and to give or refuse sanction to great political measures,

which are referred home for approval. These duties are more analogous to

the functions of parliament than to those of an executive board; and it

might almost as well be said that parliament, as that the government of

India, should be constituted on the principles applicable to executive

boards. It is considered an excellence, not a defect in the constitution

of parliament, to be not merely a double but a triple government. An

executive authority, your petitioners submit, may often with advantage

be single, because promptitude is its first requisite. But the function

of passing a deliberate opinion on past measures, and laying down

principles of future policy, is a business which, in the estimation of

your petitioners, admits of and requires the concurrence of more

judgments than one. It is no defect in such a body to be double, and no

excellence to be single, especially when it can only be made so by

cutting off that branch of it which, by previous training, is always the

best prepared—and often the only one which is prepared at all—for its

peculiar duty.

That your petitioners have heard it asserted that, in consequence of

what is called the double government, the Indian authorities are less

responsible to parliament and the nation than other departments of the

government of the empire, since it is impossible to know on which of the

two branches of home government the responsibility ought to rest. Your

petitioners fearlessly affirm that this impression is not only

groundless, but the very reverse of the truth. The home government of

India is not less, but more responsible than any other branch of the

administration of the state; inasmuch as the president of the Board of

Commissioners, who is the minister for India, is as completely

responsible as any other of her Majesty’s ministers; and, in addition,

his advisers also are responsible. It is always certain, in the case of

India, that the president of the Board of Commissioners must have either

commanded or sanctioned all that has been done. No more than this, your

petitioners would submit, can be known in the case of the head of any

department of her Majesty’s government. For it is not, nor can it

rationally be supposed, that any minister of the Crown is without

trusted advisers; and the minister for India must, for obvious reasons,

be more dependent than any other of her Majesty’s ministers, upon the

advice of persons whose lives have been devoted to the subject on which

their advice has been given. But in the case of India such advisers are

assigned to him by the constitution of the government, and they are as

much responsible for what they advise, as he for what he ordains; while,

in other departments, the minister’s only official advisers are the

subordinates in his office, men often of great skill and experience, but

not in the public eye, often unknown to the public even by name;

official reserve precludes the possibility of ascertaining what advice

they give, and they are responsible only to the minister himself. By

what application of terms this can be called responsible government, and

the joint government of your petitioners and the India Board an

irresponsible government, your petitioners think it unnecessary to ask.

That, without knowing the plan on which her Majesty’s ministers

contemplate the transfer to the Crown of the servants of the Company,

your petitioners find themselves unable to approach the delicate

question of the Indian army, further than to point out that the high

military qualities of the officers of that army have unquestionably

sprung, in a great degree, from its being a principal and substantive

army, holding her Majesty’s commissions, and enjoying equal rank with

her Majesty’s officers; and your petitioners would earnestly deprecate

any change in that position.

That your petitioners having regard to all these considerations, humbly

pray your [lordships’] honourable House that you will not give your

sanction to any change in the constitution of the Indian government

during the continuance of the present unhappy disturbances, nor without

a full previous inquiry into the operation of the present system. And

your petitioners further pray, that this inquiry may extend to every

department of Indian administration. Such an inquiry your petitioners

respectfully claim, not only as a matter of justice to themselves, but

because, when, for the first time in this century, the thoughts of every

public man in the country are fixed on India, an inquiry would be more

thorough, and its results would carry much more instruction to the mind

of parliament and of the country, than at any preceding period.

_E. I. Company’s Objections to the First and Second India Bills: April

1858._ (See p. 567.)

It is the duty of your Directors to lay before the Proprietors the two

bills which have been introduced into parliament by the late and by the

present ministry, for divesting the East India Company of all

participation in the government of India, and for framing a new scheme

of administrative agency.

On former occasions, when the ministers of the Crown have submitted

measures to parliament for altering, in any manner, the constitution of

the Indian government, the substance of the measures has been officially

communicated to the Court of Directors, and an opportunity allowed to

them of offering such remarks as their knowledge and experience in

Indian affairs might suggest. The correspondence being afterwards laid

before the Court of Proprietors, formed the most appropriate report

which the Directors could make to their constituents on the measures

under consideration by the legislature. In the present instance, this

opportunity not having been afforded to them, it appears desirable that

they should adopt the present mode of laying before the proprietary body

the observations which it is entitled to expect from its executive

organ, on the bills now before parliament, and on the present posture of

the Company’s affairs.

The Directors cannot but advert with feelings of satisfaction to the

altered tone which public discussion has assumed in regard to the

character of the East India Company, and the merits of the

administration in which the Company has borne so important a part. The

intention of proposing the abolition of the Company’s government was

announced in the midst of, and it may be surmised in deference to, a

clamour, which represented the government of India by the Company as

characterised by nearly every fault of which a civilised government can

be accused, and the Company as the main cause of the recent disasters.

But in the parliamentary discussions which have lately taken place,

there has been an almost universal acknowledgment that the rule of the

Company has been honourable to themselves and beneficial to India; while

no political party, and few individuals of any consideration, have

alleged anything seriously disparaging to the general character of the

Company’s administration. So far, therefore, the stand made by the

Company against the calumnies with which they have been assailed, may be

considered to have been successful.

But the admission generally made, and made explicitly by the proposers

of both the bills, that the existing system works well, has not had the

effect of inducing doubt of the wisdom of hastily abolishing it. Neither

does it seem to have been remembered, that if the system has worked

well, there must be some causes for its having done so, and that it

would be worth while to consider what these are, in order that they

might be retained in any new system. If the constitution which has made

the Indian government what it is, must be abolished, because it is

thought defective in theory, what is substituted should at least be

theoretically unobjectionable. But the constitution of the East India

Company, however anomalous, is far more in accordance with the

acknowledged principles of good government than either of the proposed

bills.

The nature of the case is, indeed, itself so anomalous, that something

anomalous was to be expected in the means by which it could be

successfully dealt with.

All English institutions and modes of political action are adapted to

the case of a nation governing itself. In India, the case to be provided

for is that of the government of one nation by another, separated from

it by half the globe; unlike it in everything which characterises a

people; as a whole, totally unacquainted with it; and without time or

means for acquiring knowledge of it or its affairs.

History presents only two instances in which these or similar

difficulties have been in any considerable degree surmounted. One is the

Roman Empire; the other is the government of India by the East India

Company.

The means which the bills provide for overcoming these difficulties

consist of the unchecked power of a minister. There is no difference of

moment in this respect between the two bills. The minister, it is true,

is to have a council. But the most despotic rulers have councils. The

difference between the council of a despot and a council which prevents

the ruler from being a despot is, that the one is dependent on him, the

other independent; that the one has some power of its own, the other has

not. By the first bill, the whole council is nominated by the minister;

by the second, one-half of it is nominated by him. The functions to be

intrusted to it are left, in both, with some slight exceptions, to the

minister’s own discretion.

The minister is indeed subject to the control of parliament and of the

British nation. But though parliament and the nation exercise a salutary

control over their own affairs, it would be contrary to all experience

to suppose that they will exercise it over the affairs of a hundred

millions of Hindoos and Mohammedans. Habitually, they will doubtless be

hereafter, as they have been heretofore, indifferent and inattentive to

Indian affairs, and will leave them entirely to the minister. The

consequence will be, that in the exceptional cases in which they do

interfere, the interference will not be grounded on knowledge of the

subject, and will probably be, for the most part, confined to cases

where an Indian question is taken up from party motives, as the means of

injuring a minister; or when some Indian malcontent, generally with

objects opposed to good government, succeeds in interesting the

sympathies of the public in his favour. For it is not the people of

India, but rich individuals and societies representing class interests,

who have the means of engaging the ear of the public through the press,

and through agents in parliament. And it is important to remark, that by

the provisions of either of the bills, the House of Commons will be

rendered even less competent, in point of knowledge of Indian affairs,

than at present, since by both bills all the members of the Council of

India will be excluded from it.

The government of dependencies by a minister and his subordinates, under

the sole control of parliament, is not a new experiment in England. That

form of colonial government lost the United States, and had nearly lost

all the colonies of any considerable population and importance. The

colonial administration of this country has only ceased to be a subject

of general condemnation since the principle has been adopted of leaving

all the important colonies to manage their own affairs—a course which

cannot be followed with the people of India. If the control of

parliament has not prevented the habitual mismanagement of countries

inhabited by Englishmen like ourselves, who had every facility for

representing and urging their grievances, it is not likely to be any

effectual protection to Mussulmans and Hindoos.

All governments require constitutional checks; but the constitutional

checks applicable to a case of this peculiar kind must be found within

the governing body itself.

Though England, as a whole, while desiring nothing but to govern India

well, is necessarily ignorant of India, and feels, under ordinary

circumstances, no particular interest in its concerns, there are in

England a certain number of persons who possess knowledge of India, and

feel an interest in its affairs. It seems, therefore, very desirable,

for the sake of India, that England should govern it through, and by

means of, these persons. This would be the case if the organ of

government principally consisted of persons who have passed a

considerable portion of their lives in India, or who feel that habitual

interest in its affairs which is naturally acquired by having aided in

administering them; and if this body, or a majority of it, were

periodically elected by a constituency composed of persons in England

who have served the government for a certain length of time in India, or

whose interests are connected with that country by some permanent tie.

It would be an additional advantage if this constituency had the power

of requiring information, and compelling a public discussion of Indian

questions. These are conditions which, to a considerable extent, the

existing constitution of the East India Company fulfils.

The other great constitutional security for the good government of India

lies in the forms of business. This is a point to which sufficient

importance is not generally attached. The forms of business are the real

constitution of India.

From the necessity of the case, recognised in both the proposed

measures, the administration must be shared, in some proportion, between

a minister and a council. The council may consist of persons possessing

knowledge of India. The minister, except in very rare cases, can possess

little or none. He is placed in office by the action of political party,

which is governed by considerations totally unconnected with India; and,

in the common course of politics, he is removed from office by the time

he has been able to learn his duty. Even in the unusual case, of which

present circumstances are an example, when the minister has made himself

acquainted with India through the discharge of high functions in India

itself, his knowledge is but the knowledge of one man; and one man’s

knowledge of a subject like India, until corrected and completed by that

of other men, is, it may safely be affirmed, wholly insufficient, and if

implicitly trusted, even dangerous. The good government, therefore, of

India, by a minister and a council, depends upon the amount of influence

possessed by the council; and their influence depends upon the forms of

business.

However experienced may be the council, and however inexperienced the

minister, he will have the deciding voice. The power will rest with one

who may know less of the subject than any member of the council, and is

sure to know less than the council collectively, if they are selected

with ordinary judgment. The council will have no substantive power, but

only moral influence. It is, therefore, all-important that this

influence should be upheld. Unless the forms of business are such as to

insure that the council shall exercise its judgment on all questions;

that all matters requiring decision shall be considered by them, and

their views recorded in the initiatory stage, before the minister has

committed himself to an opinion—they will possess no more weight or

influence than the same number of clerks in his office, whom also he can

consult if he pleases; and the power of the minister will be practically

uncontrolled.

In both the bills these considerations are entirely disregarded. The

first bill does not establish any forms of business, but leaves them to

be determined by the minister and his council; in other words, by the

minister. Even, therefore, if the minister first appointed should be

willing to establish forms which would be any restraint upon himself, a

subsequent minister would have it in his power to alter the forms in any

manner he pleased.

The second bill, unlike the first, does establish forms of business; but

such alone as would effectually prevent the council from being a

reality, and would render it a useless pageant.

To make the council a merely consultative body, without initiative,

before whom subjects are only brought after the minister has made up his

mind, is already a fatal inroad upon its usefulness. But by the second

bill the council are not even a consultative body. The minister is under

no obligation to consult them. They are not empowered to hold any

regular meetings. They are to meet only when the minister convenes them,

or on a special requisition by six members. He may send orders to India

without their knowledge when the case is urgent, of which urgency he is

the sole judge. When it is not urgent, his orders must be placed in the

council-room for the perusal of the members for seven days, during which

they are not required, but permitted, to give their opinion, not

collectively, but individually. Their only power, therefore, is that of

recording dissent from a resolution not only taken, but embodied in a

dispatch. And as if this was not enough, provision is made that an

office, always invidious, shall be incapable of being fulfilled in any

but the most invidious manner. The members of council must come forward

individually in declared opposition to the minister, by volunteering a

protest against his announced intentions, or signing a requisition for a

meeting of council to oppose them. Such a council is fitted to serve as

a shield for the minister’s responsibility when it may suit him to seek,

and them to accord, their adhesion; rather than as a restraint on his

power to administer India according to his individual pleasure.

The Directors are bound to admit, that the first of the bills contains

several provisions indicative of a wish to assure to the council a

certain, though small, amount of influence. The administration is to be

carried on in the name of the president in council, and not, as by the

second bill, in that of the Secretary of State alone. The council, as

well as the president, has a voice in the appointment of the home

establishment; while in the second bill all promotions and all

appointments to the principal offices under the council, rest with the

Secretary of State, exclusively; a provision which divests the council

of all control or authority over their own establishment. Again, by

Section XII. of the first bill, no grant involving increase of

expenditure, and no appointment to office or admission to service, can

be made without the concurrence of half the council. This, as far as it

goes, is a real power; but its value is much diminished by the

consideration that those by whom it is to be exercised are the nominees

of the minister, dependent on him for their continuance in office after

a few years.

In some other points the provisions of the second bill seem to have the

advantage. Its council is more numerous; to which, however, little

importance can be attached, if the council has no substantial power. It

also recognises that the whole of the council ought not to be nominated

by the minister, and that some part of it should be elected by a

constituency specially qualified by a knowledge of India. But even in

these, the best points of the bill, it is, in the opinion of the

Directors, very far from unexceptionable. The nomination of even half

the council by the minister, takes away all security for an independent

majority. It may, indeed, be doubted whether there is any sufficient

reason for the minister’s nominating any portion, except the supposed

reluctance of some eligible persons to encounter a canvass. The

proportion of one-third, whom the minister now nominates to the Court of

Directors, seems the largest which, consistently with full security for

independence, can be so appointed.

The provision that each of the members nominated by the Crown shall be

selected as the representative of some particular branch of the service

in India, is still more objectionable. Not only would it preclude the

nomination of the most distinguished man, if the seat in council

appropriated to the department in which he had served were not at the

time vacant, but it would introduce a principle which cannot be too

strongly deprecated—that of class legislation. The council should

comprise the greatest attainable variety of knowledge and experience;

but its members should not consider themselves as severally the

representatives of a certain number of class interests.

The clause which continues to the Proprietors the power of electing some

portion of the council is, so far, deserving of support; and the

principle of enlarging the constituency by the addition of persons of a

certain length of Indian service and residence is, in itself,

unexceptionable; but unless guarded by provisions, such as have never

yet been introduced into any electoral system, so large and scattered a

constituency as that proposed would greatly add to the inconvenience of

canvass: especially as it is not certain that the new electoral body

would adopt, from the old, the salutary custom of re-electing, as the

general practice, whoever has been once chosen, and has not, by

misconduct or incapacity, deserved to forfeit their confidence. The

duties of a member of council would be entirely incompatible with a

continually-recurring canvass of the constituency.

Respecting the proposition for giving the choice of five members of

council to the parliamentary constituencies of five great towns, the

Court of Directors can only express a feeling of amazement. It is not

the mere fact of election by a multitude that constitutes the benefits

of the popular element in government. To produce those benefits, the

affairs of which the people are enabled to control the management must

be their own affairs. Election by multitudinous bodies, the majority of

them of a very low average of education, is not an advantage of popular

government, but, on the contrary, one of its acknowledged drawbacks. To

assign to such a constituency the control, not of their own affairs, but

of the affairs of other people on the other side of the globe, is to

incur the disadvantages of popular institutions without any of the

benefits. The Court of Directors willingly admit the desirableness, if

not necessity, of some provision for including an English element in the

Council of India; but a more objectionable mode than the one proposed of

attaining the object, could scarcely, in their opinion, be devised.

Besides the provisions which relate to the organ of government in

England, the bills contain provisions relating to India itself, which

are open to the strongest objection.

The appointments to the councils at Calcutta and at the subordinate

presidencies, which are now made by the Court of Directors, with the

approbation of the Crown, are transferred by both bills to the

governor-general, and to the governors of Madras and Bombay. The Court

of Directors are convinced that this change would greatly impair the

chances of good government in India. One of the causes which has most

contributed to the many excellences of Indian administration is, that

the governor-general and governors have always been associated with

councillors selected by the authorities at home from among the most

experienced and able members of the Indian service, and who, not owing

their appointments to the head of the government, have generally brought

to the consideration of Indian affairs an independent judgment. In

consequence of this, the measures of a government, necessarily absolute,

have had the advantage, seldom possessed in absolute governments, of

being always preceded by a free and conscientious discussion; while, as

the head of the government has the power, on recording his reasons, to

act contrary to the advice of his council, no public inconvenience can

ever arise from any conflict of opinion. These important officers, who,

by their participation in the government, form so salutary a restraint

on the precipitancy of an inexperienced, or the wilfulness of a

despotically tempered, governor-general or governor, are henceforth to

be appointed by the great functionary whom they are intended to check.

And this restraint is removed, when the necessity for an independent

council will be greater than ever; since the power of appointing the

governor-general, and of recalling him, is taken away from the Company,

and from the body which is to be their substitute. It may be added that

the authorities at home have had the opportunity of being acquainted

with the conduct and services of candidates for council from the

commencement of their career. The governor-general or governor would

often have to nominate a councillor soon after their arrival in India,

when necessarily ignorant of the character and merits of candidates, and

would be entirely dependent on the recommendation of irresponsible

advisers.

Another most objectionable provision demands notice, which is to be

found only in the second bill. A commission, appointed in England, is to

proceed to India, for the purpose of inquiring and reporting on the

principles and details of Indian finance, including the whole revenue

system, and, what is inseparably involved in it, the proprietary rights

and social position of all the great classes of the community. The Court

of Directors cannot believe that such a project will be persisted in. It

would be a step towards the disorganisation of the fabric of government

in India. A commission from England, independent of the local government

of the country, deriving its authority directly from the higher power to

which the local government is subordinate, and instructed to carry back

to the higher power information on Indian affairs which the local

government is not deemed sufficiently trustworthy to afford, would give

a most serious shock to the influence of the local authorities, and

would tend to impress all natives with the belief that the opinions and

decisions of the local government are of small moment, and that the

thing of real importance is the success with which they can contrive

that their claims and objects shall be advocated in England. Up to the

present time, it has been the practice of the home government to uphold

in every way the authority of the governments on the spot; even when

reversing their acts, to do so through the governments themselves, and

to employ no agency except in subordination to them.

From this review of the chief provisions of the bills, which embody the

attempts of two great divisions of English statesmen to frame an organ

of government for India, it will probably appear to the proprietors,

that neither of them is grounded on any sufficient consideration of past

experience, or of the principles applicable to the subject; that the

passing of either would be a calamity to India; and that the attempt to

legislate while the minds of leading men are in so unprepared a state,

is altogether premature.

The opinion of your Directors is, that by all constitutional means the

passing of either bill should be opposed; but that if one or the other

should be determined on for the purpose of transferring the

administration, in name, from the East India Company to the Crown, every

exertion should be used in its passage through committee to divest it of

the mischievous features by which both bills are now deformed, and to

maintain, as at present, a really independent council, having the

initiative of all business, discharging all the duties, and possessing

all the essential powers of the Court of Directors. And it is the

Court’s conviction, that measures might be so framed as to obviate

whatever may be well founded in the complaints made against the present

system—retaining the initiative of the council, and that independence of

action on their part which should be regarded as paramount and

indispensable.

_E. I. Company’s Objections to the Third India Bill: June 1858._ (See p.

570.)

1. Although the bill which has been newly brought in by her Majesty’s

ministers ‘for the better government of India,’ has not yet been

formally communicated to the Court of Directors, the Court, influenced

by the desire which they have already expressed to give all aid in their

power towards rendering the scheme of government, which it is the

pleasure of parliament to substitute for the East India Company, as

efficient for its purposes as possible, have requested us[205] to lay

before your lordship,[206] and through you before her Majesty’s

government, a few observations on some portions of the bill.

2. Having in documents which have been presented to parliament expressed

their sentiments fully on all the general features of the subject, the

Court refrain from offering any further arguments on points upon which

the government and the House of Commons seem to have pronounced a

decided opinion. The joint government of a minister and a council,

composed in majority of persons of Indian experience, deriving their

appointments only partially from ministerial nomination, and all of them

holding office on a tenure independent of the minister, is a combination

which fulfils to a considerable extent the conditions of a good organ of

government for India. The Court would have much preferred that in the

constitution of the council more extensive recourse had been had to the

elective principle. But if they cannot hope that this course will be

adopted, they see many advantages in the provision by which one-half the

number, instead of being named by the government, will be selected by a

responsible body, intimately connected with India, to whom the

qualification of candidates will in general be accurately known, and who

will be under strong inducements to make such a choice as will tend to

increase the credit and consideration of the body.

3. With regard to the qualifications prescribed for members of council,

the Court desire to offer a suggestion. Her Majesty’s present government

have, on many occasions, expressed a desire to secure the Crown

appointments against the evils of abuse of patronage. The security

against such abuse has hitherto consisted in the strict limitation of

the appointments to persons who have served a considerable number of

years in India. While the Court fully agree with her Majesty’s

government in recognising the desirableness of an English element, it

does not seem to them advisable that this element should extend to

nearly half the council, only a bare majority being reserved for persons

of Indian experience. Knowledge of India is, after all, the most

important requisite for a seat in the Indian Council; while it is

chiefly in the English nominations that there is any present danger lest

appointments should be obtained through political or parliamentary

influence—from which influence, unless introduced through that channel,

the council, like the Court of Directors, may be expected to be

altogether free. The Court, therefore, recommend that the qualification

of ten years’ Indian service or residence be made imperative on at least

two-thirds instead of a mere majority of the fifteen members of council.

They also think it questionable if the interests of India will be

promoted by the exclusion of the whole of the members of the council

from seats in parliament. These are the only modifications which we are

requested to suggest in the provisions respecting the composition of the

council.

[The remaining objections made by the Directors were little more than a

repetition of those made against the first and second bills (given _in

extenso_ in a preceding page); and need not be reproduced here. The

Directors expressed a dislike or apprehension of the subordinate

position in which the Council would be placed; of the autocratic power

to be possessed by the Secretary for India; of the transference of the

powers of the Secret Committee wholly and solely to him; of the proposed

mode of making appointments and exercising patronage; of any disturbance

in the mode of auditing accounts; and of the appointment of any

Commission of Inquiry in India which should appear derogatory to the

dignity of the local governments. Many of these objections were listened

to, and were productive of modifications during the discussion of the

bill. The result will be seen in the next article of this Appendix.]

_Abstract of Act for the Better Government of India—21 and 22 Vict. cap.

106.—Received Royal Assent August 2, 1858._ (See p. 573.)

_Transfer of Governing Powers._

I. Governing powers transferred from the East India Company to the

Crown.

II. All rights, territories, revenues, and liabilities similarly

transferred.

III. A Secretary of State to exercise all the governing powers

heretofore exercised by Court of Directors, Court of Proprietors, and

Board of Control.

IV. Provision concerning sitting of secretary and under-secretary in

House of Commons.

V. Concerning re-election of secretaries to House of Commons.

VI. Secretary of State for India to receive salary equal to those of

other secretaries of state.

_Council of India._

VII. A Council of India, of 15 persons, to be formed.

VIII. Court of Directors to elect 7 members of this Council, from among

persons possessing certain qualifications; and the Crown to appoint the

other 8.

IX. Vacancies among the 8 to be filled up by the Crown; and among the

other 7, by election by the Council.

X. Nine members of the Council, at least, must have had not less than

ten years’ experience in India.

XI. Members to hold office for life, or during good behaviour.

XII. Members not to sit in parliament.

XIII. Annual salary of £1200 to each member.

XIV. Members may resign; if after ten years’ service, on a pension of

£500, subject to certain conditions.

XV. Secretaries and other officers of Company to become officers of

Council of India—subject to any changes afterwards made by Privy Council

and sanctioned by parliament.

XVI. Secretary in Council to make all subsequent appointments in the

home establishment.

XVII. Compensation to such officers of the Company as are not retained

permanently by the Council.

XVIII. Any officer of the Company, transferred to the service of the

Council, to have a claim to the same pension or superannuation allowance

as if the change of government had not taken place.

_Duties and Proceedings of the Council._

XIX. Council to conduct affairs of India in England; but all

correspondence to be in the name of the Secretary of State.

XX. Secretary of State may divide the Council into committees.

XXI. Secretary of State to sit and vote as president, and appoint

vice-president.

XXII. Five to be a quorum; meetings convened by Secretary of State not

fewer than one each week.

XXIII. Secretary of State to decide questions on which members differ.

Any dissentient member may require his opinion to be placed upon record.

XXIV. Secretary’s proceedings to be open to all the Council, except in

‘secret service’ dispatches.

XXV. Secretary to give reasons for any exercise of his veto against the

decision of the majority.

XXVI. Secretary allowed to overrule the two preceding clauses in urgent

cases.

XXVII. Functions of the ‘secret committee’ transferred to Secretary of

State.

XXVIII. Dispatches marked ‘secret’ not to be opened by members of

Council.

_Appointments and Patronage._

XXIX. Of the high appointments in India, some to be made by the Crown,

some by the Council, and some by the Governor-general.

XXX. Inferior appointments to be made as heretofore, except transference

of patronage from Court of Directors to Council.

XXXI. Special provision for civil service in India.

XXXII. Secretary in Council to make rules for examination of persons

intended for junior situations in civil service of India.

XXXIII. Appointments to naval and military cadetships to vest in the

Crown.

XXXIV. Competitive examinations for engineers and artillery of the

Indian army.

XXXV. A certain ratio of cadetships to be given to the sons of persons

who have served in India.

XXXVI. All the other cadetships to be in the gift of the members of the

Council, subject to approval; the Secretary of State to have twice as

many nominations as an ordinary member.

XXXVII. In all unchanged rules concerning appointments, power of Court

of Directors to be vested in Council.

XXXVIII. The same in reference to any dismissal from service.

_Transfer of Property._

XXXIX. Company’s property, credits, and debits, to revert to the

Crown—except the _East India Stock_ and the dividends thereon.

XL. Secretary in Council may buy, sell, or borrow, in the name of the

Crown, for the service of India.

_Revenues._

XLI. Expenditure of revenues in India wholly under Secretary in Council.

XLII. Liabilities of Company, and dividends on India stock, to be borne

by Secretary in Council out of revenues of India.

XLIII. Secretary in Council to keep a cash account with the Bank of

England, and to be responsible for all payments in relation to India

revenue.

XLIV. Transfer of cash balance from the Company to the Council.

XLV. A stock account to be opened at Bank of England.

XLVI. Transfer of stock accounts.

XLVII. Mode of managing Council’s finances at the Bank.

XLVIII. Transfer of Exchequer bills, &c., from Company to Council.

XLIX. Power of issuing bonds, debentures, &c.

L. Provisions concerning forgery.

LI. Regulations of audit department.

LII. The Crown to appoint auditor of Indian accounts, to whom all

needful papers are to be sent by Secretary in Council.

LIII. Annual accounts to be furnished to parliament of the revenue and

expenditure of India; accompanied by reports on the moral and material

progress of the several presidencies.

LIV. War in India to be made known to parliament within a specified

period.

LV. India revenues not to pay for wars unconnected with India.

_Existing Establishments._

LVI. Company’s army and navy transferred to the Crown, but with all

existing contracts and engagements holding good.

LVII. Future powers as to conditions of service.

LVIII. All commissions held under the Company to be valid as under the

Crown.

LIX. Regulations of service to be subject to future change, if deemed

necessary.

LX. Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors cease to hold power in

reference to government of India.

LXI. Board of Control abolished.

LXII. Records and archives of Company to be given up to Council—except

stock and dividend books.

LXIII. Powers of Governor-general, on assuming duties of that office.

LXIV. Existing enactments and provisions to remain in force, unless

specially repealed.

_Actions and Contracts._

LXV. Secretary in Council may sue and be sued as a body corporate.

LXVI. And may take the place of the Company in any still-pending

actions.

LXVII. Treaties and covenants made by the Company to remain binding.

LXVIII. Members not _personally_ liable for such treaties or covenants.

LXIX. A Court of Directors still to exist, but in smaller number than

before, and having powers relating only to the management of the

Company’s dividend and a few minor subjects.

LXX. Quarterly courts not in future obligatory.

LXXI. Company’s liability ceases, on all matters now taken under the

care of the Council.

_Saving of Certain Rights of the Company._

LXXII. Secretary in Council to pay dividends on India stock out of India

revenue.

LXXIII. Dividends to constitute a preferential charge.

_Commencement of the Act._

LXXIV. Commences thirty days after day of receiving royal assent.

LXXV. Company’s orders to be obeyed in India until the change of

government shall have been proclaimed in the several presidencies.

_The Indian Mutiny Relief Fund._ (See p. 226.)

This noble manifestation of kind feeling towards the sufferers in India,

which originated in a public meeting held in London on the 25th of

August 1857, assumed munificent proportions during the next following

year, when the colonists and Englishmen residing abroad had had time to

respond to the appeal made to them. In a report prepared by the

Committee, on the 1st of November 1858, it was announced that the sum

placed in their charge amounted, up to that time, to £434,729. They had

remitted £127,287 to India, there to be distributed by auxiliary local

committees; they had assisted sufferers after their return to, or during

their residence in, the home country, to the extent of £35,757; and

their management expenses had amounted to £6224. There remained,

invested at interest, the sum of £265,461, applicable to further cases

of need. It is interesting to notice the kind of persons to whom relief

was afforded, on account of the varied privations to which the mutiny

had subjected them. The sum of £35,757 expended in England, was mostly

in donations to the following numbers and classes of persons:

32 Military officers.

86 Widows and children of officers.

25 Wives of officers.

25 Orphans of officers.

51 Other relatives of officers.

13 Disabled soldiers.

298 Widows of soldiers.

423 Children of soldiers.

82 Other relatives of soldiers.

10 Clergymen and missionaries.

6 Widows of Clergymen.

1 Wife of missionary.

23 Widows and orphans of civilians.

75 Planters, railway officials, &c.

_Queen Victoria’s Proclamation to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of

India.—Read in the principal Cities of India, November 1, 1858._ (See p.

612.)

VICTORIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe,

Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by and with the

advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in

Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the government of the

territories in India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the

Honourable East India Company:

Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the

advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said

government; and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said

territories to be faithful and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs

and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom

we may hereafter from time to time see fit to appoint to administer the

government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.

And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability,

and judgment of our right trusty and well-beloved cousin and councillor,

Charles John Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the

said Viscount Canning, to be our first Viceroy and Governor-general in

and over our said territories, and to administer the government thereof

in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf: subject

to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive

from us through one of our principal Secretaries of State.

And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military,

all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India

Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and

regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

We hereby announce to the native Princes of India that all treaties and

engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable

East India Company, are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously

maintained; and we look for the like observance on their part.

We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while

we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be

attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of

others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native

princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own

subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which

can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the

same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects; and

those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully

and conscientiously fulfil.

Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging

with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and

the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare

it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured,

none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or

observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial

protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those

who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference

with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of

our highest displeasure.

And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of

whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in

our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their

education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.

We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of

India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we

desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the

equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing

and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights,

usages, and customs of India.

We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India

by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by

false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been

shewn by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to

shew our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus

misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.

Already in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of

blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our

Viceroy and Governor-general has held out the expectation of pardon, on

certain terms, to the great majority of those who in the late unhappy

disturbances have been guilty of offences against our government; and

has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose

crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and

confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-general, and do further

announce and proclaim as follows:

Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those

who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the

murder of British subjects.

With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of

mercy.

To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to

be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt,

their lives alone can be guaranteed; but in appointing the penalty due

to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances

under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance; and

large indulgence will be shewn to those whose crimes may appear to have

originated in a too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated

by designing men.

To all others in arms against the government, we hereby promise

unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offences against

ourselves, our crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and

peaceful pursuits.

It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be

extended to all those who comply with their conditions before the first

day of January next.

When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be

restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of

India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to

administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects resident

therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment

our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of

all power grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength to

carry out these our wishes for the good of our people.

_Viscount Canning’s Proclamation.—Issued at Allahabad, November 1,

1858._ (See p. 612.)

Her Majesty the Queen having declared that it is her gracious pleasure

to take upon herself the government of the British territories in India,

the Viceroy and Governor-general hereby notifies that from this day all

acts of the government of India will be done in the name of the Queen

alone.

From this day, all men of every race and class who, under the

administration of the Honourable East India Company, have joined to

uphold the honour and power of England, will be the servants of the

Queen alone.

The Governor-general summons them, one and all, each in his degree, and

according to his opportunity, and with his whole heart and strength, to

aid in fulfilling the gracious will and pleasure of the Queen, as set

forth in her royal proclamation.

From the many millions of her Majesty’s native subjects in India, the

Governor-general will now, and at all times, exact a loyal obedience to

the call which, in words full of benevolence and mercy, their Sovereign

has made upon their allegiance and faithfulness.

[Illustration]

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Footnote 205:

The chairman and deputy-chairman.

Footnote 206:

Lord Stanley, president of the Board of Control.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

Events in India.

1857.