had the keenest sense of the value of loyal integrity in times of
trouble, were anxious to see the day when some recognition should be
shewn of the services of three native rajahs, without whose co-operation
it would scarcely have been possible for Sir John Lawrence to have sent
those troops from the Punjaub which enabled Sir Archdale Wilson to
recapture Delhi. These were the Rajahs of Putialah, Jheend, and
Nabah—three small states which were at one time included within Sirhind,
then among the ‘Sikh protected states,’ and then among the ‘Cis-Sutlej
states.’ The rajahs were semi-independent, having most of the privileges
of independent rulers, but being at the same time under certain
engagements to the British government. If they had swelled the ranks of
the insurgents, it is difficult to see how Hindostan could have been
recovered; for these states intervene between Lahore and Umritsir on the
one side, and Delhi on the other. From first to last the rajahs not only
fulfilled their engagements, but more; and the government had abundant
reason to be glad that these three territories had not been ‘annexed;’
for annexation, if not the cause, was unquestionably one of the
aggravations to mutiny. Viscount Canning, in July, rewarded these three
Sikh chiefs (for they were Sikhs, though not exactly Punjaubees) with
estates and honours. The Rajah—or rather Maharajah, for he was of higher
grade than the other two—of Putialah received certain territories in
Jhujjur and Bhudour, on a certain military tenure in return for the
revenues. He also received the gift of a house at Delhi which, once
belonging to one of the begums of the imperial family, had been
confiscated on account of her complicity in the mutiny. Lastly, his
honorary titles were increased by the following: ‘Furzund Khan, Munsoor
Zuman, Ameer-ool-Omrah, Maharajah Dhurraj Rajahshur Sree Maharajah
Rajgan, Nirundur Singh Mahundur Bahadoor’—an accumulation, the weight of
which would be oppressive to any but an oriental prince. The translation
is said to be: ‘Special Son, Conqueror of the World, Chief of the
Chiefs, Maharajah of Rajahs’—and so on. The Rajah of Jheend received the
Dadree territory, thirteen villages in the Koolran Pergunnah, and a
confiscated royal house at Delhi. The additions were: That he be allowed
a salute of eleven guns; that his presents be increased from eleven to
fifteen trays; that his state visits to the governor-general be returned
by the secretary; and that his honorary titles be thus increased: ‘Most
cherished Son of true Faith, Rajah Surroop Singh Walee Jheend.’ The
Rajah of Nabah received similar presents, and the honorary appellations
of—‘Noble Son of good Faith, Berar Bunsee Sirmoor Rajah Bhurpoor Singh
Malindur Bahadoor.’ The revenues made over to these rajahs amounted—to
the first, about £20,000 per annum; to the second, £12,000; to the
third, £11,000.
[Illustration:
UMRITSIR.
]
We may smile at these extravagances of compliment, but the services
rendered deserved a solid reward as well as an addition to honorary
titles. For, it must be remembered, the Rajah of Putialah maintained a
contingent of 5000 troops—protected the stations of Umballa and Kurnaul
at the outbreak of the mutiny—guarded the grand trunk-road from Kurnaul
to Phillour, keeping it open for the passage of British and Punjaub
troops—co-operated with General Van Cortlandt in Hissar—lent money when
Sir John Lawrence’s coffers were running low—and encouraged others by
his own unswerving loyalty. Again: the Rajah of Jheend, whose contingent
was very small, did not hesitate to leave his own territory undefended,
and march towards Delhi—assisting to defend most of the stations between
that city and Kurnaul, and to keep open the communication across the
Jumna. Again: the Rajah of Nabah, at the very outset of the
disturbances, proceeded to aid Mr Commissioner Barnes in maintaining
Loodianah—supplied an escort for the siege-train—gallantly opposed the
Jullundur mutineers—provided carriage for stores—and made loans to the
Punjaub government in a time of monetary need. The districts given to
these rajahs, at the suggestion of Sir John Lawrence, were so chosen as
to furnish a prudent barrier of Sikhs between turbulent Mohammedans on
the one side and equally turbulent Rajpoots on the other.
Nor did the authorities neglect to recognise the services of humbler
persons, although, principally from the proverbial slowness of official
movements, the recognition was often delayed to an unreasonable extent.
Occasion has more than once presented itself, in former chapters, for
noticing the bestowal of the much-prized Victoria Cross on officers and
soldiers who had distinguished themselves by acts of personal valour.
Owing to the dilatory official routine just adverted to, it was not
until the 27th of July that Sergeant Smith and Bugler Hawthorne received
the Victoria Cross for their intrepid services at the siege of Delhi ten
months before. Their regiment, the 52d foot, was at Sealkote in the
Punjaub on that date; and Brigadier Stisted had the pleasure of giving
the honouring insignia to them. He told them that the Victoria Cross is
in reality more honourable than the Order of the Bath, seeing that no
one can obtain it except by virtue of well-authenticated acts of
heroism. He gracefully admitted that his own Order of the Bath was due
more to the pluck and bravery of his men than to his own individual
services; and in reference to the Victoria Cross he added: ‘I only wish
I had it myself.’ Another bestowal of this honour we will briefly
mention, to shew what kind of spirit is to be found within the breasts
of British troops. The award of the Cross, in this instance, was delayed
no less than fourteen months after the achievement for which it was
given; and the soldier may well have doubted whether he would ever
receive it. The instance was that of Gunner William Connolly, of the
Bengal horse-artillery; and the conduct for which his officer,
Lieutenant Cookes, recommended him for this distinction, was recorded in
a dispatch from which an extract is here given in a foot-note.[189]
A very unexpected event, in July, was the revolt of a regiment, or a
portion of a regiment, in that region of India which was believed to be
more vigorously governed and in better hands than any other—the Punjaub.
The facts, as they afterwards came out (mostly, however, on hearsay
evidence), appear to have been nearly as follow: The 18th Punjaub
infantry, stationed at Dera Ismael Khan, on the western side of the
Indus, contained among its numbers about a hundred Malwaie Sikhs, a
peculiar tribe different from the other Sikhs of the Punjaub. These
Malwaies planned a mutiny. On a particular night, some of them were to
murder the officers of the station; the fort was to be seized; and the
39th Bengal native infantry, which had been disarmed some time
previously, was to be re-armed from the magazines and stores of the
fort. The two regiments of mutineers, perhaps joined by the Sikhs of
Renny’s regiment at Bunnoo, were then to embark in boats on the Indus,
taking with them the guns, ammunition, and treasure, and were to float
down to Dera Ghazee Khan; here they expected to be joined by the native
garrison, with whom they would cross the Indus to Moultan; and lastly,
with two regiments from the last-named place, they hoped to march upon
Lahore. Such was the account, probably magnified in some of its
particulars, obtained of the plans of the mutineers. So far as concerned
the actual facts, the plot was discovered in time to prevent its
execution. On the evening of the 20th, Major Gardiner of the 10th
Punjaub infantry, and Captain Smith of the artillery, having received
from some quarter a hint of what was intended, went down to the lines at
ten o’clock at night, and summoned two of the men to appear. One, a
sepoy, came first; he was ordered at once to be confined; but no sooner
did he hear the order, than he ran off. Just as the guard were about
re-capturing this man, a jemadar rushed out, cut down one of them, and
wounded another. The sepoy and the jemadar, who were the ringleaders in
the plot, escaped for a time, but were captured a few days afterwards.
As soon as Sir John Lawrence heard of this occurrence, he ordered the
disarmed 39th to be sent to Sealkote, where their movements could be
more carefully watched.
Still more serious, in its nature if not in its intention, was the
outbreak of the 62d and 69th Bengal native infantry, with a native troop
of horse-artillery, at Moultan. These disarmed regiments, like many
others in similar plight, were a source of embarrassment to the
authorities. They could not safely be re-armed, for their Hindustani
sympathies caused them to be suspected; while it was a waste of power to
employ English soldiers to watch these unarmed men in their lines. At
length it was determined to disband the two regiments, and let the men
depart, a few at a time, and under necessary precautions, to their own
homes. When this order was read out to them, they appeared satisfied;
but a rumour or suspicion spread that there was an intention of
destroying them piecemeal on the way. Whether this or any other motive
actuated them, is not fully known; but they broke out into rebellion on
the 31st of August. There were at Moultan at the time about 170 of the
royal artillery, a wing of the 1st Bengal Europeans, the 11th Punjaub
infantry, and the 1st Bengal irregular cavalry. Just as the mid-day gun
fired, the two disarmed mutinous regiments rose in mutiny, seized
anything they could find as weapons, and made a desperate assault on the
troops at the station not in their plot. The 62d made their attack on
the artillery stables and the European barracks; the 69th went at the
guns and the artillery barracks. As these mutineers had few weapons but
sticks, their attack appeared so strange, and was so wholly unexpected,
that the loyal troops at the station were at first hardly prepared to
resist them, and a few Europeans lost their lives; but when once the
real nature of the mad attempt was clearly seen, the result was fearful.
The misguided men were shot or cut down by all parties and in all
quarters. Of thirteen hundred mutineers, few lived to return to their
own Hindostan; three or four hundred were laid low in and near Moultan,
others were shot by villagers, others were captured and brought in for
military execution. It was the nearest approach to the utter
annihilation of two regiments, perhaps, that occurred throughout the
wars of the mutiny. The sepoys sometimes behaved more like madmen, at
others more like children, than rational beings. In the present case
they had scarcely a chance of success; for the Sikhs and Punjaubees
around them displayed no affection for Hindustanis; the soldiery shot
and cut them down, while the peasantry captured them for the sake of the
reward offered. They possibly reckoned on the support of the 1st Bengal
irregular cavalry; but this regiment remained loyal, and assisted in
cutting down the sepoys instead of befriending them.
This occurrence strongly attracted the attention of the government. The
disarmed sepoys, as has been more than once mentioned, were a source of
much perplexity; it was not decided in what way best to set them free;
and on the other hand, such an outbreak as this shewed that it would not
be safe to re-arm them. There was at the same time a necessity for
watching the Sikh and Punjaubee troops—now nearly 70,000 in number.
Hitherto they had behaved admirably, fighting manfully for the
government at times and places where the Hindustanis had been
treacherous. That they had done so, afforded a justification for the
confidence which Sir John Lawrence had placed in them; but that
sagacious man saw that recruiting had gone quite far enough in this
direction. It was just possible that the Punjaub army might become too
strong, and rejoice in its strength by means of insubordination.
One of the incidents in the Punjaub during the month of August related
to a physical rather than a moral outbreak—the overwhelming of a
military station by a river torrent. The Indus, when about to enter the
Punjaub from the Himalaya, passes through a narrow ravine in the Irhagan
Hills. The rocks on either side here, undermined by the action of the
water through unknown centuries, broke away and fell into the river.
Half the water of the stream still continued to find its way onward; but
the other half became dammed up, and accumulated into a vast lake. When
the pressure of this body of water had augmented to an irresistible
degree (which it did in fifteen days), it burst its barrier and rushed
down with indescribable force, sweeping away villages on its banks. At
Attock the level of the river rose fifty feet in one hour, carrying away
the bridge of boats which constituted the only roadway over the Indus,
and destroying workshops and timber-stores on the banks. The Cabool
river, coming from Afghanistan, and joining the Indus at Attock, had its
stream driven backwards or upwards with fearful rapidity; it speedily
overflowed its banks, and destroyed nearly all the houses at the
military station of Nowsherah. ‘The officers,’ said an eye-witness, ‘not
knowing when it would stop, but hoping the flood would soon subside, put
all their things on the tops of their houses; but the water still
continued rising, and house after house went down before it.... The
barracks were flooded and vacated by the troops; and all, gentle and
simple, had to pass the night on some sand-hills.’ The barracks, being
‘pucka-built’ (burnt bricks and mortar), were not destroyed, although
flooded; the other buildings, being ‘rutcha-built’ (unburnt bricks and
mud), were destroyed. The troops were at once removed to Peshawur; but
the destruction of the boat-bridge at Attock threatened a serious
interruption to military movements.
Nothing occurred in the Punjaub during September to need record here;
nor did Sinde depart from its usual peaceful condition. Both of these
large provinces, filling up the western belt of India from the Himalaya
to the ocean, were held well in hand by the civil and military
authorities.
Attention must now be transferred to those regions which, during many
months, had been disturbed by anarchy and rebellion—Bundelcund, the
Mahratta States, and Rajpootana. These large territories contained many
petty chieftains, among whom a considerable number were prone to seize
this opportunity to strengthen themselves by plundering their
neighbours. Of patriotism, there was little enough; men appeared in arms
for their own interests, or what they deemed their own interests, rather
than for any common cause involving nationality or affection to native
princes.
Bundelcund and the Saugor provinces were chiefly under the military
control of General Whitlock, who had advanced from Madras with a force
consisting chiefly of Madras troops, and had gradually established
regular government in districts long troubled by violence and confusion.
At the end of June, as the last chapter shewed, Whitlock’s force was
divided into a great many detachments, which overawed the turbulent at
as many different stations; and the same state of matters continued,
with slight variations, during the next three months. It must, however,
be mentioned here, in relation to military commands, that—as one mode of
facilitating the thorough discomfiture of the rebels—Viscount Canning
made a new arrangement affecting the Saugor and Gwalior territories.
That portion of India having been much disturbed during a period of more
than twelve months, it was determined to establish there two military
divisions instead of one, and to place in command of those divisions two
of the generals who by hard fighting had become accustomed to the
district and the class of inhabitants. General Whitlock was appointed to
the Saugor division, which was made to extend to the Jumna, and to
include the districts of Saugor, Jubbulpoor, Banda, Humeerpoor, and
Calpee, with Saugor as the military head-quarters. General Napier was
appointed to the Gwalior division, which was made to include Gwalior,
Sepree, Goonah, and Jhansi. This arrangement, organised about the end of
July, was to hold good whether any rebels should make a sudden outbreak,
or whether the troops were fortunate enough to have a period of repose
during the rainy season. Whitlock’s force, consisting of H.M. 43d foot,
the 1st and 19th Madras native infantry, with a proportion of cavalry
and artillery—was mainly in two brigades, under Brigadiers Macduff and
Rice.
Brief mention was made in the last chapter of a large capture of
treasure by General Whitlock. This matter must here be noticed a little
more fully, on account of its connection with the intricacies of
Mahratta dynastic changes. During the general’s operations in
Bundelcund, he marched from Banda towards Kirwee in two brigades,
intending to attack Narain Rao at the last-named place. This chieftain,
a descendant of the Peishwa of the Mahrattas, possessed a rabble army,
with which for a time he attempted to block up the roads of approach to
Kirwee. The resistance made, however, was very slight; and shortly
before Whitlock entered the place, Radha Govind, an adherent of Narain
Rao, escaped from the town in the opposite direction, taking with him
most of the armed men, and a large quantity of money and jewels, but no
guns. Narain Rao, and another Mahratta leader named Madhoo Rao, remained
at Kirwee. Their fears having been roused, they now resolved to
surrender as a means of obtaining forgiveness for their rebellious
proceedings. They came out to meet Whitlock, at a camping-ground a few
miles from Kirwee. Delivering up their swords, they were kept securely
for a time. Whitlock took possession of the town and palace, and found
that the rebels had been busily engaged in casting cannon, making
gunpowder, and enlisting men. In the palace and its precincts were
discovered forty pieces of cannon, an immense supply of shot and powder,
two thousand stands of arms, numerous swords and matchlocks,
accoutrements of many of the rebel sepoy regiments, elephants and
horses, and a vast store of wealth in cash and jewels. It was
conjectured that the jewels might possibly be those which, half a
century earlier, had mysteriously disappeared from Poonah, and were
supposed to be in possession either of Scindia or Holkar, the most
powerful of the Mahratta chiefs in those days; but the discovery now led
to an opinion that the jewels had been stolen or appropriated by Bajee
Rao, father of Narain Rao, and hidden by that family for half a century.
As to the quantity and value of cash and jewels captured, it will be
prudent to venture on no estimate. Some of the Anglo-Indian journals
spoke of ‘a hundred and forty cart-loads of gold ingots and nuggets, and
forty lacs of rupees,’ besides the jewels; but to whatever degree this
estimate may have been exaggerated, the largeness of the sum gave rise
to many inquiries concerning the history of the family to which it had
belonged, and of which Nena Sahib was an ‘adopted’ member. It then
transpired, that the first Peishwa of the Mahrattas, who died in 1720,
was succeeded by Balajee Rao Sahib; one of Balajee’s sons, Ragoba Dada,
died in 1784; and from him were descended Narain Rao and Madhoo Rao, by
one branch, and Nena Sahib by another—or rather, all these three
individuals were adopted sons of Ragoba’s descendants. According to the
loose principles of oriental heirship, therefore, it was not difficult
for any one among several Mahratta princes to set up a claim to the
enormous wealth which, at a time of discord at the Peishwa’s court,
somehow disappeared from the treasury at Poonah.
Throughout India, there was no province which more strikingly
illustrated than Bundelcund the misery which some of the villages must
have suffered during many months of anarchy, when predatory bands were
passing to and fro, and rebel leaders were forcing contributions from
all who had anything to lose. Writing early in July concerning the Banda
district, a British officer said: ‘This district has suffered very
extensively in the long interval of disorder to which it was abandoned;
the various bands of mutineers passing up from Dinapoor did great
mischief; various powerful villages preyed considerably upon their
weaker neighbours; and, lastly, the Nawab and Narain Rao’s officials
extracted by torture every farthing they could get. Many villages are
completely deserted, and many more have been burned to the ground, and
the people plundered of all the grain and cattle and other property
which they possessed. They have gained a very fair idea of what they are
to expect under a native government; and I firmly believe they generally
hail our return with delight.’
The difficulty of supplying English troops, or reliable native troops,
to the numerous points where insurgents were known to be lurking, led
occasionally to rebel successes little looked for by the authorities.
Thus, on the first of August, a party of mutinous sepoys, headed by a
subadar, took possession of the town of Jaloun, near the frontier of
Scindia’s territory; this they were enabled to do by the connivance of
some of the inhabitants, who opened the gates for them. They were,
however, speedily driven out by a small force from Calpee, under
Brigadier Macduff. A slight but brilliant cavalry affair occurred about
the middle of August, in a district of the Saugor territory placed under
General Whitlock’s care. A body of a thousand rebels, under Indur Goshun
and other chiefs, had for some time been committing great havoc in the
district, plundering the villages, and ill-using all the inhabitants who
would not yield to their demands. After having thus treated Shahpoor,
they advanced to Garrakotah with similar intent. To prevent this, a
small force was sent from Saugor under Captain Finch. He made a forced
march; and when within a few miles of them, seeing his infantry were
tired out, he rushed forward with only sixty-seven troopers. So
impetuous was the charge made by these horsemen on the rebels, that they
killed a hundred and fifty, took many wounded prisoners, and brought
away three hundred matchlocks and swords. The leader of the rebels,
Indur Goshun, was among the slain. In another part of Bundelcund,
between Banda and Rewah, about the middle of August, were three groups
of rebels—one under Baboo Radha Govind and Gulabraee, a second under
Runmunt Singh, and a third under Punjah Singh and Dere Singh. They were
supposed to amount, in all, to six thousand men; but only three hundred
of these were regular sepoys, and two hundred horsemen, the rest being
adventurers and rabble. After ravaging many villages, they approached
the station of Kirwee on the 13th. Brigadier Carpenter at once went out
to meet them with a small force from Kirwee; he found Runmunt Singh’s
band drawn up as if for battle, but a few shots sent them fleeing. About
the same time Punjab Singh and Dere Singh were defeated by a small force
under Captain Griffin. Early in August, Captain Ashburner set out from
Jhansi with five hundred men, on the duty of dispersing a few Bundela
chiefs who had been engaged in rebellious machinations. The weather
being very heavy, and the rebels swift of foot, a long period elapsed
before anything decisive could be effected; but on the 1st of September,
he came up with a body of rebels, occupying Mahoni and Mow Mahoni, two
villages on the opposite banks of the small river Pooj, both surrounded
by deep and difficult ravines, which rendered them strong places. After
a little skirmishing, the rebels were driven by shot and shell out of
Mahoni, and Ashburner crossed to attack a fort at Mow Mahoni. Symptoms
soon appeared that the rebels were making off. Ashburner despatched
fifty cavalry, all he had to spare at the moment, under Lieutenant
Moore, to gallop after and cut them up in retreat. Moore effected this
in dashing style.
We now turn to a region further west, in which the operations were more
important than those of Bundelcund.
Referring to former chapters for the details of Sir Hugh Rose’s victory
over the Gwalior mutineers, and of his retirement to Bombay after a long
season of incessant activity; we proceed to notice the operations of the
troops after he parted company from them. His small but famous army, the
‘Central India Field-force,’ was broken up into detachments about the
middle of July. The hope entertained was, that the fatigued soldiers
might be able to go into quarters during the rainy season, as a means of
recruiting their strength for any operations that might be necessary
when the cooler and more tranquil weather of the autumn arrived. To
understand this, it may be well to bear in mind that the rains of
Britain furnish no adequate test of those of India, which fall in
enormous abundance at certain seasons, rendering field-operations,
whether for industry or war, very difficult. The detachments above
adverted to could only in part obtain cessation of duties during the
rainy season of 1858. At Jhansi were General Napier and Colonel Liddell;
with a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, a wing of the 3d Bombay
cavalry, the 3d Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay native infantry, a
company of Bombay Sappers, and three guns of the late Bhopal Contingent.
At Gwalior, under Brigadier Stuart, were three squadrons of the 14th
Light Dragoons, Meade’s Horse, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, the 86th
foot, the 95th foot, the 25th Bombay native infantry, a company of
Bombay artillery, a company of royal engineers, and a light
field-battery. At Seepree, under Brigadier Smith, were two squadrons of
the 8th Hussars, two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, the 10th Bombay native
infantry, and a troop of Bombay horse-artillery. Lastly, at Goonah, were
Mayne’s irregular horse. Sir Hugh Rose himself was at that time at
Bombay receiving the well-won congratulations of all classes, and
resting for a while from his exhausting labours.
At Gwalior, where the rainy season soon began to shew symptoms, General
Napier made preparations for the comfortable housing of his troops. The
Maharajah, now more firmly knit than ever in bonds of amity with the
British, lent his aid in this matter. Sir Robert Hamilton again took up
his permanent residence in the city, gradually re-establishing political
relations with the various petty states around. During July there was
scarcely any fighting in Scindia’s territory; and the component elements
of the now-dissolved Central India Field-force were allowed to remain
pretty well at peace.
Before tracing the Central India operations of August, it may be well to
see what was doing in Rajpootana during July.
After the siege and capture of Gwalior by Sir Hugh Rose, as we have
already narrated, the rebels made a hasty flight northwestward, across
the river Chumbul, into Rajpootana; where a victory was gained over them
by General Napier, who had been despatched after them for that purpose
by Sir Hugh Rose. They appear to have separated, after that, into three
bodies. The most important section, under Tanteea Topee and Rao Sahib,
received the especial watchfulness of General Roberts, as comprising
some of the best of the mutinied troops, and possessing a large amount
of Scindia’s property. Roberts took up the work which Rose had laid
down. His ‘Rajpootana Field-force,’ now that detachments had been
separated from it for service in various quarters, was by no means a
large one. It comprised H.M. 83d foot, a wing of the 72d Highlanders,
wings of the 12th and 13th Bombay native infantry, a few squadrons of
the 8th Hussars and 1st Bombay Lancers, 400 Belooch horse, a light
field-battery, and a siege-train of six pieces. The chief body of
rebels, under Tanteea Topee and Rao Sahib, made their appearance, a few
days after their defeat at Gwalior, at a point more than a hundred miles
to the northwest, threatening Jeypoor. Roberts at once marched from
Nuseerabad, to check these fugitives. He reached Jeypoor without
opposition on the 2d of July; and there he learned news of Tanteea’s
miscellaneous force of about ten thousand men. The rebel leader was
reported to have with him Scindia’s crown-jewels and treasure, the
former estimated at one million sterling value, and the latter at two
millions. The treasure, being mostly in silver, was of enormous weight;
and Tanteea had been endeavouring to exchange it for gold, on terms that
would have tempted any money-changer in more peaceful times: seeing that
fifty shillings’ worth of silver was offered for gold mohurs worth only
thirty shillings each. On the 5th Tanteea and his troops were at
Dowlutpore, thirty-four miles south of Jeypoor; and it thereupon became
a problem whether Roberts could overtake them before they reached the
more southern states of Rajpootana; for he was on that day at Sanganeer,
near Jeypoor. During the next few days, large bodies of rebels were
seen, or reported to have been seen, at places whose names are not
familiar to English readers—such as Chatsoo, Lalsoont, Tongha, Gureasa,
Karier, Madhopore, Jullanee, Tonk, Bursoonie, Bhoomgurh, &c.—all
situated in the northeast part of Rajpootana, and separated from the
Gwalior region by the river Chumbul. We also find that General Roberts
marched through or halted at many places whose names are equally
unfamiliar—Sherdoss, Gurbroassa, Glooloussee, Donghur, Kukkor, Rumpore,
and Bhugree. In fact, the rebels marched wherever they thought they
could capture a stronghold which might serve them as a citadel; while
Roberts tried every means to intercept them in their progress. On the
9th, the rebels took possession of the town of Tonk—situated on the
river Bunnas, nearly due east of Nuseerabad, and about one-third of the
distance from that station to Gwalior; they plundered it, captured three
brass guns and a little ammunition, and besieged the Nawab in the
neighbouring fort of Bhoomgurh. Roberts immediately sent on a detachment
under Major Holmes, in advance of his main force; and the enemy hastily
departed as soon as they heard of this. To enable him to keep up the
pursuit more effectually, the general sent to Seepree for Colonel
Smith’s brigade. There was strong reason to suspect that the rebels
wished to penetrate into Mewar and Malwah, provinces far to the south of
Gwalior and Jeypoor, and in which the Mahrattas and Rajpoots counted
many leaders who were ripe for mischief. To prevent this southward
progress was one of the objects which General Roberts held well in view;
this was the more necessary, because the country here indicated affords
many mountain fastnesses from which it would be difficult to expel
insurgent bands. Roberts was disappointed in not being able to come up
with the Gwalior rebels at Tonk; but a few days’ sojourn at that town
greatly relieved his troops, who had suffered severely during a
fortnight’s marching in sultry weather, losing many of their number by
sun-stroke.
By the 23d of the month, when Major Holmes was still in pursuit of the
enemy, who were reported to be approaching the fortress of Mandulghur in
Mewar, Roberts broke up his temporary camp at Tonk, and recrossed the
river Bunnas—his movements being greatly retarded by the swollen state
of the stream and the swampy condition of the fields and roads. After
wading for a whole week through an almost continuous slimy swamp, he
came within twenty-four miles of Nuseerabad on the 1st of August.
Sending all his sick to that station, he prepared to continue a pursuit
of Tanteea Topee towards the south, with as great a rapidity as the
state of the country would permit.
We now turn again to the Gwalior territory, to trace such operations as
took place in the month of August.
About the middle of the month, there were no fewer than five detachments
of the late Central India Field-force marching about the country on and
near the confines of Scindia’s Gwalior territory. Sir Hugh Rose’s wish
and expectation, that his exhausted troops would be able to remain
quietly at quarters during the rainy season, were not realised; the
state of affairs rendered active service still necessary. One
detachment, under General Napier, had set out from Gwalior, and was on
the way to Paoree, on an expedition presently to be mentioned; a second
was at Burwa Saugor, on the river Betwah; a third at Nota, sixty miles
from Jhansi, on the Calpee road; a fourth at Fyzabad (one of many places
of that name), fifty miles from Jhansi on the Saugor road; and a fifth,
consisting of Sappers and Miners, were preparing a bridge over the
Betwah, ten miles from Jhansi. Colonel Liddell, at that period
commandant of the Jhansi district, was on the alert to supply small
detachments of troops to such places in the vicinity as appeared to need
protection; and he himself started off to Burwa Saugor, near which place
a rebel chieftain was marching about with three thousand men and two or
three guns.
A circumstance occurred, early in August, which led to an expedition in
a new direction, and to an eventual co-operation of General Napier with
General Roberts in a pursuit of the rebels. This occurrence was an
outbreak which required immediate attention. A petty Mahratta chieftain,
Man Singh (not Maun Singh of Oude), who had conceived himself aggrieved
by Scindia, put himself at the head of 2000 men, and on the 3d of the
month, attacked and captured the strong fort of Paoree, southwest of
Gwalior, and about eighteen miles from Seepree. Brigadier Smith, on
hearing of this, started off on the 5th from the last-named station,
with a force consisting of four squadrons of the 8th Hussars, the 1st
Bombay Lancers, a wing of H.M. 95th foot, and three field-guns. On
nearing Paoree, Man Singh sent a messenger to inquire what was the
purpose of the brigadier, seeing that the quarrel was with Scindia and
not with the English; he obtained an interview, and stated that his
grievance arose from the refusal of Scindia to recognise his (Man
Singh’s) right to succeed his father in the principality of Nerwar and
the country adjacent; and he further declared that he had no connection
with the mutineers and rebels who were fighting against the English.
Brigadier Smith, responsible for a time for the peace of that district,
could not admit such a plea in justification of the maintenance of an
armed force against the sovereign of the country; it would have been
dangerous. Man Singh, thereupon, increasing the number of his retainers
within the fort of Paoree to three or four thousand, prepared to defend
himself. Scindia had some time before stored the fort with six months’
provisions, in case he should deem it at any time necessary to defend
the place from the rebels; but this proved to be an unlucky precaution,
for Man Singh captured the place in a single night, and then had the six
months’ supplies to count upon. Brigadier Smith, finding his eleven
hundred men too few to capture the fort, sent to Gwalior for a
reinforcement and for a few siege-guns. In accordance with this
requisition, a force of about 600 horse and foot, with five guns and
four mortars, set out from Gwalior on the 11th. General Napier, feeling
the importance of settling this matter quickly, resolved to attend to it
in person; he started from Gwalior, reached Mahona on the 14th, and
Seepree on the 17th, and joined Smith on the 19th. On the 23d, this
demonstration had its effect on Man Singh, who, with another chieftain,
Ajheet Singh, had been holding Paoree. Napier poured a vertical fire
into the fort for twenty-four hours, and then commenced using his
breaching-batteries. But the enemy did not await the result; they
evacuated the place, and fled through a jungle country towards the
south. Napier entered Paoree, garrisoned it, and hastily made up a
column, with which Colonel Robertson started off in pursuit of the
rebels. Robertson, after many days’ rapid march, came up nearly to the
rear of Man Singh’s fleeing force; but that active leader, scenting the
danger, made his rebels separate into three parties, with instructions
to recombine at an appointed place; and for the present pursuit was
unavailable. When August closed, Man Singh was at Sirsee, north of
Goonah, with (it was supposed) about sixteen hundred men, but no guns.
General Napier, having destroyed the fortifications at Paoree, and burst
the guns, retired to Seepree, where he was encamped at the end of the
month, making arrangements for a further pursuit of Man Singh in
September.
While the forces in the Gwalior territory were thus employed, General
Roberts was engaged in a more important series of operations in
Rajpootana. On the 1st of August, as we have seen, Roberts was
sufficiently near Nuseerabad to send his sick to that station, where
they could be better attended to than on the march; while he himself
would be more free to make a rapid advance southward. Major Holmes, many
days before, had been sent from Tonk by Roberts, with a force consisting
of 120 Bombay Lancers, 220 of H.M. 72d foot, four companies of the 12th
Bombay N.I., and four guns—to pursue the retreating rebels in a certain
(or rather an uncertain) direction. The duty was a most harassing one.
It was difficult to obtain reliable information of the route taken by
the rebels; and even when the route was known, they never once allowed
him to overtake them—so rapid were their movements. So important was it
considered to catch these Gwalior mutineers, that the Bombay government
(with whom the operations in Rajpootana rested) sent out small
expeditionary forces from various places, according as probabilities
offered for intercepting the mutineers. Thus, on the 1st of August,
Major Taylor started from Neemuch with a force, consisting of 300 of
H.M. 72d Highlanders, 400 of the 13th Bombay N.I., 180 of the 2d Light
Cavalry, a few engineers, four guns, and a military train. It was
believed that, on that day, about seven thousand of the Gwalior
mutineers were somewhere between Chittore and Rampoora, a few miles
distant from Neemuch; and Major Taylor entertained a hope that he might
intercept and defeat them. We have already seen that General Roberts had
had a most harassing duty, attended with very little success, seeing
that he could seldom manage to reach a town or village in which the
rebels had halted, until after they had taken their departure; and it
was now Major Taylor’s turn to share the same ill-luck. He returned to
Neemuch on the 7th, disappointed. His advance-guard had seen the rebels
near Rampoora in great force; yet the latter, though many times stronger
than himself in troops, would not stand the chance of an engagement. The
rebels escaped, and Taylor returned with his mission unfulfilled.
[Illustration:
JEYPOOR.
]
One advantage, at any rate, the British could count upon at this
period—the fidelity of many native rajahs, who would have terribly
complicated the state of affairs if they had joined the rebels. Tanteea
Topee sounded the Rajah of Jeypoor, then the Rajah of Kotah, next the
Rajah of Ulwar, all of them native princes of Rajpootana; and it was on
account of the refusal of those rajahs to receive or countenance him,
that the rebel made such strangely circuitous marches from one state to
another. Whither he went, however, thither did Roberts follow him. The
general, after sending his sick to Nuseerabad, marched to Champaneer on
the 4th, and to Deolia on the 5th. At that time, it was believed that
the rebels, checked in some of their plans by the floods, had turned
aside from Mandulghur to Deekodee, in the direction of Odeypore. On the
8th—after a forced march with 500 of H.M. 83d, 200 Bombay infantry, 60
Gujerat horse, and three guns—General Roberts came up with a body of
rebels near Sunganeer (not Sauganeer near Jeypoor), where they occupied
a line on the opposite side of the river Rotasery. He speedily routed
them; but as usual, they fled too rapidly for him to overtake them; they
made towards the Odeypore road. Roberts, again disappointed of his prey,
was forced to rest his exhausted troops for a while.
The general, when Major Holmes had rejoined him after a fruitless
pursuit of the mutineers, again considered anxiously the conditions and
possibilities of this extraordinary chase. He had, each day, to
endeavour to discover the locality of the rebels, then to guess at their
probable future movements, and, lastly, to lay plans for overtaking or
intercepting them. On the 11th, they were supposed to be at Lawah; and
on the 12th, they marched to the crest of the Chutterbhoog Ghaut, with a
view of passing from Mewar into Marwar. Captain Hall, commanding at
Erinpoora, held a post at the foot of this ghaut, with a small force
sufficient to deter the rebels. They thereupon changed their plan,
retraced their steps to some distance, and marched over a rocky country
to Kattara or Katario, a village near the Nathdwara Hills; here they
encamped on the 13th. Meanwhile General Roberts, with his force
strengthened by that of Major Holmes, started from the vicinity of
Sunganeer on the 11th, and by the evening of the 13th had marched
sixty-seven miles. On that night he was at Kunkrowlee, within eight
miles of the rebels; but his troops were too much exhausted to proceed
further without a little rest. On the forenoon of the 14th he descried
the enemy defiling through a very hilly country covered with rocks and
loose stones; he had, in fact, reached Kattara, the village mentioned
above. They took up an excellent position on a line of rocky hills, on
the crest of which they planted four guns, which they began to work
actively. Roberts thereupon sent Major Holmes by a detour into that
region; for, even if the rebels were not overtaken, it would be
desirable to give them no rest to consolidate their plans. At length the
general had the gratification of overtaking and defeating these
insurgents, in search of whom he had been so long engaged. He advanced
his troops through the defile, his horse-artillery beating off the enemy
until the infantry could form into line. After a brief period, the
rebels shewed symptoms of retiring. On mounting the crest, the infantry
saw them endeavouring to carry away two of their guns with a small
escort; a volley soon set them to flight, and rendered the guns an easy
capture. The flight soon became a rout; the rebels escaped in various
directions, and the victors came upon a camp covered with arms and
accoutrements. The cavalry and horse-artillery followed the fugitives
for ten miles, cutting down great numbers. Roberts captured all the guns
which the enemy had brought from Tonk, four elephants, a number of
camels, and much ammunition—with surprisingly little loss to himself.
It was at this time regarded, by some of the authorities, as a hopeful
symptom that the rebels were now descending to a part of India inhabited
by Bheels and other half-civilised tribes, who would think much more of
the wealth than of the so-called patriotism of the mutineers. Most of
Tanteea Topee’s men were laden with silver coin, their share of the
booty from Gwalior; this cash they carried with them, although in food
and clothing they were ill provided; and there was a probability that,
if once they ceased to be a compact army, they would individually be
robbed by the Bheel villagers. Nevertheless, whatever may have been the
hope or expectation in this respect, Roberts and his officers could
never intercept the treasure which Tanteea Topee was known to have with
him. This treasure, consisting of jewels and money (except the share of
plunder distributed among the men) was carried on elephants; and so well
were those elephants guarded, whether during fighting or fleeing, that
the British could never capture them.
Few of the troops in British service had had harder work with little
brilliant result than those in General Roberts’s Rajpootana Field-force.
The country is wild and rugged, the weather was rainy and hot at the
same time, and the duty intrusted to the troops was to chase an enemy
who would not fight, and who were celebrated for their fleetness in
escaping. Hence it was with more than usual pleasure that the
hard-worked men regarded their victory at Kattara; they felt they had a
fair claim to the compliment which their commander paid them, in a
general order issued the day after the battle.[190]
After the victory at Kattara, Roberts left the further pursuit of the
rebels for a time to Brigadier Parkes. This officer had started from
Neemuch on the 11th with a miscellaneous force of about 1300 men,
comprising 72d Highlanders, native infantry, Bombay cavalry, royal
engineers, royal artillery, Bheels, and Mewar troopers. By a series of
forced marches, Parkes headed the rebels in such a way as greatly to aid
General Roberts at Kattara. A few days’ sojourn having refreshed them,
the troops were again brought into action. Tanteea Topee, by amazing
quickness of movement, traversed a wide belt of country eastward to the
river Chumbul, which he crossed near Sagoodar on the 20th. Continuing
his route, he arrived at Julra Patteen, a town on the main road from
Agra to Indore; it was on the confines of the Rajpoot and Mahratta
territories, and was held by a petty chieftainess or Rana. After a brief
conflict, in which he was assisted by a few of the troops of the Rana,
who broke their allegiance, he captured the place, levied contributions
on the inhabitants, and took possession of all the guns, treasure, and
ammunition he could find. Here, then, this extraordinary conflict took a
new turn; a new region had to be attended to, although against the same
offender as before; and new columns had to be despatched in pursuit. The
flooding of the river Chumbul cut off Roberts and Parkes for a time from
a further pursuit of Tanteea Topee; and therefore two new columns were
sent, one from Indore under Colonel Hope, and one from Mhow under
Colonel Lockhart. The great point now was to prevent Tanteea from
getting into Malwah, and thence crossing the Nerbudda into the Deccan.
Before treating of the operations against this leader in September, it
may be well to see what progress was made in checking the rebel leader
who had appeared in Scindia’s territory—Man Singh. General Napier made
up a new force, comprising certain regiments from his own and Brigadier
Smith’s brigades, and placed it under the command of Colonel Robertson,
with baggage and vehicles so arranged as to facilitate rapid movement.
Setting out from Paoree on the 27th of August, the colonel marched
eighteen miles to Bhanore; on the 28th, nineteen miles to Gunneish; and
so on for several days, until he reached Burrumpore, near the river
Parbuttee. Here, on the 2d of September, he learned that a body of
rebels, under Man Singh, were a few miles ahead, endeavouring to reach a
fort which they might seize as a stronghold. Pushing on rapidly,
Robertson came up with them on the 5th, near the village of Bujeepore.
They had not kept a good look-out; they had no suspicion that an active
British officer was at their heels; consequently, when Robertson came
suddenly upon them with horse and foot, while they were preparing their
morning meal, their panic was extreme. They fled through the village,
over a hill, across a river, and into a jungle; but the pursuers were so
close behind them that the slaughter was very considerable. These rebels
were nearly all good troops, from Scindia’s body-guard and from the
Gwalior Contingent; they were supposed to have been among the fugitives
from Gwalior with Tanteea Topee, but at what time or in what locality
they had separated from that leader, and joined Man Singh, was not
clearly known. About the middle of the month, Colonel Robertson was at
Goonah; Brigadier Smith was searching for Man Singh; while General
Napier was watching for any symptoms of the approach of the last-named
leader towards Gwalior or its vicinity.
While affairs were thus progressing in the Mahratta country during
September, new efforts were made to meet the existing state of things a
little further to the west. When Tanteea Topee crossed the Chumbul
towards Julra Patteen, and when that river began to swell, General
Roberts’s Rajpootana Field-force was unable conveniently to continue the
pursuit of the rebel; and, therefore, arrangements were made from the
south. As a means of hemming in the rebels as much as possible, and
preventing them from carrying their mischief into other regions, a
‘Malwah Field-force’ was sent up from Mhow, under General Michel.
Tanteea Topee does not appear to have regarded Julra Patteen as a
stronghold in which it was worth his while to remain; he plundered the
place of some treasure and many guns, and then took his departure. He
must, however, have wavered considerably in his plans; for he took a
fortnight in reaching Rajghurh—a place only sixty miles distant. He was
probably seeking for any rajah or chieftain who would join his standard.
At Rajghurh, Tanteea Topee was joined by some of the beaten followers of
Man Singh, probably by Man Singh himself, and seemed to be meditating an
attack upon Bhopal. Tanteea and Michel were now both contending which
should reach a particular station first, on the Bhopal and Seronj road,
as the possession of that station (Beora) would give the holder a
powerful command over the district—especially as it was one of the
telegraph stations, by which Calcutta and Bombay held communication with
each other. Michel came up with Tanteea Topee on the 15th of September,
before he reached Beora. The rebels would not meet him openly in the
field, but kept up a running-fight. When they saw defeat awaited them,
they thought more of their elephant-loads of treasure than of their
guns; they escaped with the former, and abandoned the latter, which they
had brought from Julra Patteen. At the expense, of one killed and three
wounded, General Michel gained a victory which cost the enemy three
hundred men, twenty-seven guns, a train of draught bullocks, and much
ammunition.
Towards the close of September, Tanteea Topee was in this remarkable
position. He was near Seronj, on the high road from Gwalior to Bhopal,
looking for any outlet that might offer, or for any chieftain who would
join his standard. Roberts was on the west of him; Napier, Smith, and
Robertson were on his north; Michel, Hope, and Lockhart, on the south;
and Whitlock on the east. Active he assuredly had been; for since the
fall of Gwalior he and his mutineers and budmashes had traversed a vast
area of the Rajpoot and Mahratta territories; but he was now within the
limits of a cordon, from which there was little chance of his ultimate
escape.
Of the other parts of India, it is scarcely necessary here to say
anything. The course of peaceful industry had been little disturbed, and
the civil government had been steadily in the ascendant. All round the
west and south of Rajpootana did this state of things continue, and so
downward into the long-established districts of Surat, Poonah, Bombay,
&c. It is well to observe, however, that even in the Bombay presidency,
slight occurrences shewed from time to time that the leaven of
Hindustani ‘pandyism’ was working mischief. The safety of that army
depended on an admixture of different creeds and castes in its ranks;
there were in it Rajpoots and Brahmins, as in the (late) Bengal native
army, and these elements were sometimes worked upon by fermenters of
mischief. Generally speaking, however, these, as well as the other
components of the Bombay army, behaved well. Their faithfulness was
shewn in the month of August, in connection with a circumstance which
might else have been productive of disaster. Among the troops quartered
at Gwalior after its reconquest by Sir Hugh Rose was the 25th Bombay N.
I., containing, like other regiments of the same army, a small
proportion of Hindustani Oudians. A non-commissioned officer of this
regiment, a havildar-major, went to the adjutant, and told him that a
Brahmin pundit, one Wamun Bhut, was endeavouring to tamper with the
Hindustanis of the regiment, and, through them, with the regiment
generally; he also expressed an opinion that there were persons in the
city of Gwalior concerned in this conspiracy. Captain Little, when
informed by the adjutant of this communication, laid a plan for
detecting the plotters. He found Havildar-major Koonjul Singh, Naik
Doorga Tewarree, and private Sunnoo Ladh ready to aid him. These three
native soldiers, pretending to bend to the Brahmin’s solicitations,
gradually learned many particulars of the conspiracy, which they
faithfully revealed to the captain. A purwannah or written order was
produced, from no less a personage than Nena Sahib, making magnificent
promises if the regiment, or any portion of it, would join his standard;
they were to kill all their officers, and as many Europeans as possible,
and then depart to a place appointed. At length, on the 29th, the naik
made an appointment to meet the two chief conspirators, a Brahmin and a
Mahratta chief, under a large tree near the camp; where the
havildar-major would expect to have an opportunity of reading the
purwannah. Captain Little, with the adjutant and the quartermaster,
arranged to move suddenly to the spot at the appointed time: they did
so; the conspirators were seized, and the document taken from them. Two
other leaders in the plot were afterwards seized: all four were blown
from guns on the 7th of September; and many others were placed in
confinement on evidence furnished by the purwannah itself. It became
evident that Nena Sahib, a Mahratta, had many emissaries at work in this
Mahratta territory, although he himself was hiding in inglorious
security far away.
[Illustration:
POONAH.
]
Lord Elphinstone, governor of Bombay, with his commander-in-chief, Sir
Henry Somerset, established several new corps, as means of gradually
increasing the strength of the Bombay army. Two Belooch regiments, a 2d
regiment of South Mahratta Horse, and a Bombay Naval Artillery Brigade,
were among the new components of the army.
The South Mahratta country, lower down the peninsula than Bombay, had
quite recovered from the disturbances which marked it in earlier months.
Satara, Kolapore, Sawuntwaree, Belgaum—all were peaceful. On the eastern
or Madras side of the peninsula, too, troubles were few. It is true,
there was a repetition in September of a dispute which had occurred
three months before, between natives who wished to bring up their
children in their own faith, and missionaries who wished to convert
those children to Christianity; but this was a source of discord which
the governor, if firm, could readily allay. Lord Harris had not an
Indian reputation like that of Lawrence or Elphinstone; but he had tact
and decision enough for the duties of his office—the maintenance of
peace in a presidency where there were few or no Hindustani sepoys.
Of the large country of the Deccan, Hyderabad, or the Nizam’s dominions,
nothing disastrous has to be told. A pleasant proof was afforded of the
continuance of friendly relations between the British and the Nizam, by
a grand banquet given at Hyderabad on the 2d of July by Salar Jung to
Colonel Davidson. These two officers—the one prime-minister to the
Nizam, the other British resident at the Nizam’s court—had throughout
the mutinies acted in perfect harmony and good faith. All the British
officers and their families at Secunderabad, the cantonment of the
Hyderabad Contingent, were invited. The guests came from Secunderabad to
the Residency at Hyderabad, and thence on elephants and in palanquins to
the minister’s palace. The entertainment was in celebration of the birth
of the Nizam’s son, Meer Akbar Ally, heir to the throne of the Deccan;
and everything was done, by an admixture of oriental magnificence with
European courtesies, to render it worthy of the occasion. It was,
however, not so much the grandeur of the banquet, as the sentiment it
conveyed towards the British at a critical time, that rendered this
proceeding on the part of the Nizam’s prime-minister important. The
Nizam’s dominions were at that time the scene of party struggles between
two sets of politicians—the adherents of Salar Jung, and those of
Shumsul Oomrah; but both of the leaders were fortunately advocates of an
English alliance.
[Illustration:
HYDERABAD.
]
The northwest portion of the Nizam’s dominions, around Aurungabad and
Jaulnah, in near neighbourhood to some of the Mahratta states, was
troubled occasionally by bands of marauders, who hoped to establish a
link of connection between the anarchists of Hindostan and those of the
Deccan. They were, however, kept in check by Colonel Beatson, who
brought his corps of irregulars, ‘Beatson’s Horse,’ to Jaulnah, there to
remain during the rainy season—maintaining order in the surrounding
districts, and holding himself ready to march with his troopers to any
disturbed region where their services might be needed.
-----
Footnote 184:
To the officers’ hospital—_Calcutta Englishman_, _Bengal Hurkaru_,
_Phœnix_, _Illustrated London News_, _Punch_, _Blackwood’s Magazine_,
_Fraser’s Magazine_, _New Monthly Magazine_, _Monthly Army List_, four
copies _Chambers’s Journal_, four copies _Family Herald_. To the men’s
hospitals—two copies _Calcutta Englishman_, two copies _Bengal
Hurkaru_, two copies _Phœnix_, two copies _Illustrated London News_,
two copies _Punch_, two copies _Household Words_, twelve copies
_Chambers’s Journal_, twelve copies _Family Herald_.
Footnote 185:
See Chap. xxvii., pp. 450-461.
Footnote 186:
Ibid, p. 459.
Footnote 187:
‘1. The dispatch condemns in the strongest terms the proclamation
which, on the 3d of March, I directed the chief-commissioner of Oude
to issue from Lucknow.
‘2. Although written in the Secret Committee, the dispatch was made
public in England three weeks before it reached my hands. It will in a
few days be read in every station in Hindostan.
‘3. Before the dispatch was published in England, it had been
announced to parliament by a minister of the Crown as conveying
disapproval in every sense of the policy indicated by the
governor-general’s proclamation. Whether this description was an
accurate one or not I do not inquire. The telegraph has already
carried it over the length and breadth of India.
‘4. I need scarcely tell your honourable committee that the existence
of such a dispatch, even had it never passed out of the records of the
Secret Department, would be deeply mortifying to me, however confident
I might feel that your honourable committee would, upon
reconsideration, relieve me of the censure which it casts upon me.
Still less necessary is it for me to point out that the publication of
the document, preceded as it has been by an authoritative declaration
of its meaning and spirit, is calculated greatly to increase the
difficulties in which the government of India is placed, not only by
weakening the authority of the governor-general, but by encouraging
resistance and delusive hopes in many classes of the population of
Oude.
‘5. So far as the dispatch and the mode in which it has been dealt
with affect myself personally, I will trouble your honourable
committee with very few words. No taunts or sarcasms, come from what
quarter they may, will turn me from the path which I believe to be
that of my public duty. I believe that a change in the head of the
government of India at this time, if it took place under the
circumstances which indicated a repudiation on the part of the
government in England of the policy which has hitherto been pursued
towards the rebels of Oude, would seriously retard the pacification of
the country. I believe that that policy has been from the beginning
merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the
dignity of the government. I believe that wherever the authority of
the government has been established, it has become manifest to the
people in Oude, as elsewhere, that the indulgence to those who make
submission, and who are free from atrocious crime, will be large. I
believe that the issue of the proclamation which has been so severely
condemned was thoroughly consistent with that policy, and that it is
so viewed by those to whom it is addressed. I believe that that
policy, if steadily pursued, offers the best and earliest prospect of
restoring peace to Oude upon a stable footing.
‘6. Firm in these convictions, I will not, in a time of unexampled
difficulty, danger, and toil, lay down of my own act the high trust
which I have the honour to hold; but I will, with the permission of
your honourable committee, state the grounds upon which those
convictions rest, and describe the course of policy which I have
pursued in dealing with the rebellion in Oude. If, when I have done
so, it shall be deemed that that policy has been erroneous, or that,
not being erroneous, it has been feebly and ineffectually carried out,
or that for any reason the confidence of those who are responsible for
the administration of Indian affairs in England should be withheld
from me, I make it my respectful but urgent request, through your
honourable committee, that I may be relieved of the office of
governor-general of India with the least possible delay.’
Footnote 188:
It may here be mentioned that, about the date to which these events
refer, the commander-in-chief began to be frequently designated by his
peerage-title. He had been created Baron Clyde of Clydesdale, in
recognition of his valuable military services. To prevent confusion,
however, it may be well, in the remaining pages of this work, to
retain the more familiar appellation, Sir Colin Campbell.
Footnote 189:
‘I advanced my half-troop at a gallop, and engaged the enemy within
easy musket-range. The sponge-man of one of my guns having been shot
during the advance, Gunner Connolly assumed the duties of second
sponge-man; and he had barely assisted in two discharges of his gun,
when a musket-ball through the left thigh felled him to the ground.
Nothing daunted by pain and loss of blood, he was endeavouring to
resume his post, when I ordered a movement in retirement. Though
severely wounded, he was mounted on his horse in the gun-team, rode to
the next position which the guns took up, and manfully declined going
to the rear when the necessity of his so doing was represented to him.
About 11 o’clock A.M., when the guns were still in action, the same
gunner, while sponging, was again knocked down by a musket-ball
striking him on the hip, thereby causing great faintness and partial
unconsciousness; for the pain appeared excessive, and the blood flowed
fast. On seeing this, I gave directions for his removal out of action;
but this brave man, hearing me, staggered to his feet and said: “No,
sir; I’ll not go there while I can work here;” and shortly afterwards
he again resumed his post as sponge-man. Late in the afternoon of the
same day, my three guns were engaged at a hundred yards from the walls
of a village with the defenders—namely, the 14th native infantry,
mutineers—amid a storm of bullets, which did great execution. Gunner
Connolly, though suffering severely from his two previous wounds, was
wielding his sponge with an energy and courage which attracted the
admiration of his comrades; and while cheerfully encouraging a wounded
man to hasten in bringing up ammunition, a musket-ball tore through
the muscles of his right leg. With the most undaunted bravery, he
struggled on; and not till he had loaded six times, did this man give
way, when, through loss of blood, he fell into my arms; I placed him
upon a wagon, which shortly afterwards bore him in a state of
unconsciousness from the fight.’
Footnote 190:
The major-general commanding has sincere pleasure in congratulating
the troops under his command on the great success achieved by them
yesterday. All have shewn most conspicuous gallantry in action; and
the patient unmurmuring endurance of fatigue during the recent forced
marches has enabled them to close with an enemy proverbially active in
movements. The horse-artillery and cavalry (the latter nineteen hours
in the saddle) have by their spirit and alacrity completed the
success, and inflicted a most signal punishment on the rebels. The
major-general tenders his hearty thanks to all, and doubts not but
their brave and earnest devotion will meet with the approval of his
excellency the commander-in-chief.
[Illustration:
Government Buildings, Madras.—From a Drawing by Thomas Daniell.
]