GRADUAL PACIFICATION IN THE AUTUMN.
If the events of the three months—July, August, and September, 1858—be
estimated without due consideration, it might appear that the progress
made in India was hardly such as could fairly be called ‘pacification.’
When it is found how frequently the Jugdispore rebels are mentioned in
connection with the affairs of Behar; how numerous were the thalookdars
of Oude still in arms; how large an insurgent force the Begum held under
her command; how fruitless were all the attempts to capture the
miscreant Nena Sahib; how severely the friendly thalookdars and
zemindars of Oude were treated by those in the rebel ranks, as a means
of deterring others from joining the English; how active was Tanteea
Topee in escaping from Roberts and Napier, Smith and Michel, with his
treasure plundered from the Maharajah Scindia; how many petty chieftains
in the Bundelcund and Mahratta territories were endeavouring to raise
themselves in power, during a period of disorder, by violence and
plunder—there may be some justification for regarding the state of India
as far from peaceful during those three months. But notwithstanding
these appearances, the pacification of the empire was unquestionably in
progress. The Bengal sepoys, the real mutineers, were becoming lessened
in number every week, by the sword, the bullet, the gallows, and
privation. The insurgent bands, though many and apparently strong,
consisted more and more exclusively of rabble ruffians, whose chief
motive for action was plunder, and who seldom ventured to stand a
contest even with one-twentieth part their number of English troops. The
regiments and drafts sent out from England, both to the Queen’s and the
Company’s armies, were regularly continued, so as to render it possible
to supply a few British troops to all the points attacked or troubled.
There was a steady increase in the number of Jâts, Goorkhas, Bheels,
Scindians, Beloochees, &c., enlisted in British service, having little
or no sympathy with the high-caste Hindustani Oudians who had been the
authors of so much mischief. There was a re-establishment of civil
government in all the provinces, and (excepting Oude) in nearly all the
districts of each province; attended by a renewal of the revenue
arrangements, and by the maintenance of police bodies who aided in
putting down rebels and marauders. There was an almost total absence of
anything like nationality in the motions of the insurgents, or unity of
purpose in their proceedings; the decrepit Emperor of Delhi, and the
half-witted King of Oude, both of them prisoners, had almost gone out of
the thoughts of the natives—who, so far as they rebelled at all, looked
out for new leaders, new paymasters, new plunder. In short, the British
government had gained the upper hand in every province throughout India;
and preparations were everywhere made to maintain this hold so firmly,
that the discomfiture of the rebels became a matter almost of moral
certainty. Much remained to be done, and much time would be needed for
doing it; but the ‘beginning of the end’ was come, and men could speak
without impropriety of the gradual pacification of India.
The events of these three months will not require any lengthened
treatment; of new mutinies there was only one; and the military and
other operations will admit of rapid recital.
Calcutta saw nothing of Viscount Canning during the spring, summer, and
autumn. His lordship, as governor-general, appreciated the importance of
being near Sir Colin Campbell, to consult with him daily on various
matters affecting the military operations in the disturbed districts.
Both were at Allahabad throughout the period to which this chapter
relates. The supreme council, however, remained at the presidential
capital, giving effect to numerous legislative measures, and carrying on
the regular government of the presidency. Calcutta was now almost
entirely free from those panics which so frequently disturbed it during
the early months of the mutiny; rapine and bloodshed did not approach
the city, and the English residents gradually sobered down. Although the
violent and often absurd opposition to the governor-general had not
quite ceased, it had greatly lessened; the dignified firmness of Lord
Canning made a gradual conquest. Some of the newspapers, here as at
Bombay, invented proclamations and narratives, crimes and accusations,
with a disregard of truth which would hardly have been shewn by any
journals in the mother-country; and those effusions which were not
actually invented, too often received a colour ill calculated to convey
a correct idea of their nature. Many of the journalists never forgot or
forgave the restrictions which the governor-general deemed it prudent to
place on the press in the summer of 1857; the amount of anonymous
slander heaped on him was immense. One circumstance which enabled his
lordship to live down the calumnies, was the discovery, made by the
journalists in the following summer, that Lord Derby’s government was
not more disposed than that of Lord Palmerston to expel Viscount Canning
from office—a matter which will have to be noticed more fully in another
chapter. The more moderate journalists of the Anglo-Indian press, it
must in fairness be stated, did their part towards bringing about a more
healthy state of feeling.
That the authorities at Calcutta were not insensible to the value of
newspapers and journals, in a region so far away from England, was shewn
by an arrangement made in the month of August—which afforded at the same
time a quiet but significant proof of an improved attention towards the
well-being of soldiers. An order was issued that a supply of newspapers
and periodicals should be forwarded to the different military hospitals
in Calcutta at the public expense. Those for the officers’ hospital[184]
comprised some magazines of a higher class than were included in the
list for the men’s hospitals; but such were to be sent afterwards to the
men’s hospitals, when the officers had perused them.
In connection with military matters, in and near the presidential city,
it may be mentioned that the neighbourhood of Calcutta was the scene of
a settlement or colonisation very novel, and as unsatisfactory as it was
novel. It has been the custom to send over a small number of soldiers’
wives with every British regiment sent to our colonies or foreign
territories. During the course of twelve months so many regiments
arrived at Calcutta, that these soldiers’ wives accumulated to eighteen
hundred in number. They were consigned to the station at Dumdum, a few
miles north of Calcutta; and were attended by three or four surgeons and
one Protestant chaplain. The accommodation provided for them was
sufficient for the women themselves, but not for the children, who added
greatly to their number. Many of these women, being of that ignorant and
ill-regulated class from which soldiers too frequently choose their
wives, brought with them dirty habits and drinking tendencies; and
these, when the fierce heat of an Indian summer came, engendered
dysentery and diarrhœa, from which diseases a large number of women and
children died. Other irregularities of conduct appeared, among a mass of
women so strangely separated from all home-ties; and arrangements were
gradually made for breaking up this singular colony.
The details given in former chapters, especially in the ‘notes,’ will
have shewn how large was the number of regiments conveyed from the
United Kingdom and the colonies to India; and when it is remembered that
far more of these landed at Calcutta than at Madras, Bombay, or
Kurachee, it will easily be understood how military an aspect they gave
to the first-named city. Still, numerous as they were, they were never
equal to the demand. Without making any long stay at Calcutta, they
marched to the scenes of action in the northwest. In the scarcity of
regular troops, the Bengal government derived much valuable services
from naval and marine brigades—men occupying a middle position between
soldiers and sailors. Captain Sir William Peel’s naval brigade has been
often mentioned, in connection with gallant achievements in Oude; and
Captain Sotheby’s naval brigade also won a good name, in the provinces
eastward of Oude. But besides these, there were about a dozen different
bodies in Bengal, each consisting of a commandant, two under-officers, a
hundred men, and two light field-guns. Being well drilled, and
accustomed to active movements, these parties were held in readiness to
march off at short notice to any districts where a few resolute
disciplined men could overawe turbulent towns-people; and thus they held
the eastern districts in quietness without drawing on the regular
military strength of the presidency. The _Shannon_ naval brigade
acquired great fame; the heroic Peel had made himself a universal
favourite, and the brigade became a noted body, not only for their own
services, but for their connection with their late gallant commander.
When the brigade returned down the Ganges, the residents of Calcutta
gave them a public reception and a grand dinner. Sir James Outram was
present at the dinner, and, in a graceful and appropriate way, told of
his own experience of the services of the brigade at Lucknow in the
memorable days of the previous winter. ‘Almost the first white faces I
saw, when the lamented Havelock and I rushed out of our prison to greet
Sir Colin at the head of our deliverers, were the hearty, jolly, smiling
faces of some of you _Shannon_ men, who were pounding away with two big
guns at the palace; and I then, for the first time in my life, had the
opportunity of seeing and admiring the coolness of British sailors under
fire. There you were, working in the open plains, without cover, or
screen, or rampart of any kind, your guns within musket-range of the
enemy, as coolly as if you were practising at the Woolwich target. And
that it was a hot fire you were exposed to, was proved by three of the
small staff that accompanied us (Napier, young Havelock, and Sitwell)
being knocked over by musket-balls in passing to the rear of those guns,
consequently further from the enemy than yourselves.’ Such a speech from
such a man was about the most acceptable compliment that the brigade
could receive, and was well calculated to produce a healthy emulation in
other quarters.
The authorities at all the stations were on the watch for any symptoms
which, though trivial in themselves, might indicate the state of feeling
among the soldiery or the natives generally. Thus, on the 10th of July,
at Barrackpore, a chuprassee happening to go down to a tank near the
lines, saw a bayonet half in and half out of the water. A search was
thereupon ordered; when about a hundred weapons—muskets, sabres, and
bayonets—with balls and other ammunition—were discovered at the bottom
of the tank. These warlike materials were rendered almost valueless by
the action of the water; but their presence in the tank was not the less
a mystery needing to be investigated. The authorities, in this as in
many similar cases, thought it prudent not to divulge the results of
their investigation.
The great jails of India were a source of much trouble and anxiety
during the mutiny. All the large towns contained such places of
incarceration, which were usually full of very desperate characters; and
these men were rejoiced at any opportunity of revenging themselves on
the authorities. Such opportunities were often afforded; for, as we have
many times had occasion to narrate, the mutineers frequently broke open
the jails as a means of strengthening their power by the aid of hundreds
or thousands of budmashes ready for any atrocities. So late as the 31st
of July, at Mymensing, in the eastern part of Bengal, the prisoners in
the jail, six hundred in number, having overpowered the guard, escaped,
seized many tulwars and muskets, and marched off towards Jumalpore. The
Europeans at this place made hurried preparations for defence, and sent
out such town-guards and police as they could muster, to attack the
escaped prisoners outside the station. About half of the number were
killed or recaptured, and the rest escaped to work mischief elsewhere.
It is believed, however, that in this particular case, the prisoners had
no immediate connection with rebels or mutinous sepoys; certain prison
arrangements concerning food excited their anger, and under the
influence of this anger they broke forth.
So far as concerns actual mutiny, the whole province of Bengal was
nearly exempt from that infliction during the period now under
consideration; regular government was maintained, and very few rebels
troubled the course of peaceful industry.
Behar, however, was not so fortunate. Situated between Bengal and Oude,
it was nearer to the scenes of anarchy, and shared in them more fully.
Sir Edward Lugard, as we have seen, was employed there during the spring
months; but having brought the Jugdispore rebels, as he believed, to the
condition of mere bandits and marauders, he did not think it well to
keep his force in active service during the rainy season, when they
would probably suffer more from inclement weather than from the enemy.
He resigned command, on account of his shattered health, and his
Azimghur field-force was broken up. The 10th foot, and the Madras
artillery, went to Dinapoor; the 84th foot and the military train, under
Brigadier Douglas, departed for Benares; the royal artillery were
summoned to Allahabad; the Sikh cavalry and the Madras rifles went to
Sasseram; and the Madras cavalry to Ghazeepore. Captain Rattray, with
his Sikhs, was left at Jugdispore, whence he made frequent excursions to
dislodge small parties of rebels.
A series of minor occurrences took place in this part of Behar, during
July, sufficient to require the notice of a few active officers at the
head of small bodies of reliable troops, but tending on the other hand
to shew that the military power of the rebels was nearly broken down—to
be followed by the predatory excursions of ruffian bands whose chief or
only motive was plunder. On the 8th a body of rebels entered Arrah,
fired some shot, and burnt Mr Victor’s bungalow; the troops at that
station being too few to effectually dislodge them, a reinforcement was
sent from Patna, which drove them away. Brigadier Douglas was placed in
command of the whole of this disturbed portion of Behar, from Dinapoor
to Ghazeepore, including the Arrah and Jugdispore districts; and he so
marshalled and organised the troops placed at his disposal as to enable
him to bring small bodies to act promptly upon any disturbed spots. He
established strong posts at moderate distances in all directions. The
rebels in this quarter having few or no guns left, Douglas felt that
their virtual extinction, though slow, would be certain. He was
constantly on the alert; insomuch that the miscreants could never remain
long to work mischief in one place. Meghur Singh, Joodhur Singh, and
many other ‘Singhs,’ headed small bands at this time. On the 17th,
Captain Rattray had a smart encounter with some of these people at
Dehree, or rather, it was a capture, with scarcely any encounter at all.
His telegram to Allahabad described it very pithily: ‘Sangram Singh
having committed some murders in the neighbourhood of Rotas, and the
road being completely closed by him, I sent out a party of eight picked
men from my regiment, with orders to kill or bring in Sangram Singh.
This party succeeded most signally. They disguised themselves as
mutinous sepoys, brought in Sangram Singh last night, and killed his
brother (the man who committed the late murders by Sangram Singh’s
orders), his sons, nephew, and grandsons, amounting in all to nine
persons—bringing in their heads. At this capture, all the people of the
south [of the district?] are much rejoiced. The hills for the present
are clear from rebels. I shall try Sangram Singh to-morrow.’ The
trunk-road from Calcutta to the upper provinces, about Sasseram,
Jehanabad, Karumnassa, and other places, was frequently blocked by small
parties of rebels or marauders; and then it became necessary to send out
detachments to disperse them. As it was of immense importance to
maintain this road open for traffic, military and commercial, the
authorities, at Patna, Benares, and elsewhere, were on the alert to hunt
down any predatory bands that might make their appearance.
Although Douglas commanded the district in which Jugdispore is situated,
he did not hold Jugdispore itself. That place had changed hands more
than once, since the day when Koer Singh headed the Dinapoor mutineers;
and it was at the beginning of August held by Ummer Singh, with the
chief body of the Behar rebels. Brigadier Douglas gradually organised
arrangements for another attack on this place. His object was, if
possible, so to surround Ummer Singh that he should only have one outlet
of escape, towards Benares and Mirzapore, where there were sufficient
English troops to bring him to bay. The rebels, however, made so many
separate attacks at various places in the Shahabad district, and moved
about with such surprising celerity, that Douglas was forced to postpone
his main attack for a time, seeing that Jugdispore could not be invested
unless he had most of his troops near that spot. All through the month
of August we hear of partial engagements between small parties of rebels
and much smaller parties of the English—ending, in almost every case, in
the flight of the former, but not the less harassing to the latter. At
one time we read of an appearance of these ubiquitous insurgents at
Rasserah; at another at Arrah; at others at Belowtee, Nowadda,
Jugragunje, Masseegunje, Roopsauguty, Doomraon, Burrarpore, Chowpore,
Pah, Nurreehurgunje, Kuseea, Nissreegunje, and other towns and
villages—mostly south of the Ganges and west of the Sone.
It is unnecessary to trace the operations in this province during
September. There was no rebel army, properly so called; but there were
small bands in various directions—plundering villages, burning
indigo-works, molesting opium-grounds, murdering unprotected persons
known or supposed to be friendly to the British, and committing
atrocities from motives either of personal vengeance or of plunder. Of
patriotism there was nothing; for the peaceful villages suffered as much
from these ruffians as the servants of the state. The state of matters
was well described by an eye-witness, who said that Shahabad (the
district which contains Arrah and Jugdispore) ‘is one of the richest
districts in Behar, and is pillaged from end to end; it is what an Irish
county would be with the Rockites masters of the opportunity.’ It was a
riot rather than a rebellion; a series of disorders produced by
ruffians, rather than a manifestation of patriotism or national
independence. To restore tranquillity, required more troops than
Brigadier Douglas could command at that time; but everything foretold a
gradual suppression of this state of disorder, when October brought him
more troops and cooler weather.
We now pass on to the turbulent province of Oude—that region which, from
the very beginning of the mutiny, was the most difficult to deal with.
It will be remembered, from the details given in the former chapters,
that Lucknow was entirely reconquered by the British; that the line of
communication between that city and Cawnpore was safely in their hands;
that after Sir Colin Campbell, Sir James Outram, and other generals had
taken their departure to other provinces, Sir Hope Grant remained in
military command of Oude; and that Mr Montgomery, who had been
Lawrence’s coadjutor in the Punjaub, undertook, as chief-commissioner of
Oude, the difficult task of re-establishing civil government in that
distracted country.
It may be well here to take some notice of an important state document
relating to Oude and its government, its thalookdars and its zemindars.
During the spring and summer,[185] the two Houses of Parliament were
hotly engaged in a contest concerning Viscount Canning and the Earl of
Ellenborough, which branched off into a contest between Whigs and
Conservatives, marked by great bitterness on both sides. The immediate
cause was a proclamation intended to have been issued (but never
actually issued) by Viscount Canning in Oude, announcing the forfeiture
of all estates belonging to thalookdars and zemindars who had been
guilty of complicity with the rebels. The Earl of Ellenborough, during
his brief tenure of office as president of the Board of Control, wrote
the celebrated ‘secret dispatch’ (dated April 19th),[186] in which he
condemned the proposed proclamation, and haughtily reproved the
governor-general himself. It was a dispatch, of which the following
words were disapproved even by the earl’s own party: ‘We must admit
that, under these circumstances, the hostilities which have been carried
on in Oude have rather the character of legitimate war than that of
rebellion, and that the people of Oude should rather be regarded with
indulgent consideration, than made the objects of a penalty exceeding in
extent and in severity almost any which has been recorded in history as
inflicted upon a subdued nation. Other conquerors, when they have
succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still
deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended
their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted upon a
different principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special
favour, and you have struck with what they will feel as the severest of
punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country. We cannot but
think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to
have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears
in the precedent you have made.’
It was not until the month of October that the English public were made
acquainted with Viscount Canning’s reply to this dispatch. During the
interval of five or six months, speculation was active as to the mode in
which he would view it, and the course he would adopt in relation to it.
His reply was dated ‘Allahabad, June 17th,’ and, when at length publicly
known, attracted general attention for its dignified tone. Even those
who continued to believe that the much-canvassed proclamation would not
have been a just one to issue, admitted (in most instances) the cogency
of the governor-general’s arguments against the Ellenborough
dispatch—especially in relation to the unfairness of making public a
professedly ‘secret’ dispatch. The reply was not addressed to the earl,
whose name was not mentioned in it throughout; its address was to ‘the
Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,’ in accordance with official
rule; but the earl was responsible, and alone responsible, for the
dispatch and the severe language it contained. The personal part of
Viscount Canning’s reply, the calm but indignant allusion to the
ungenerous treatment he had received, was comprised in the first six
clauses, which we give in a foot-note.[187] He proceeded to notice the
strange way in which the Ellenborough dispatch almost justified the
Oudians, as if they were fighting for a righteous cause—quite legitimate
in a member of the legislature, proposing a reconsideration of the
annexation of Oude; but quite unjustifiable in a minister serving Queen
Victoria, who was at that moment, rightly or wrongly, the real Queen of
Oude. Viscount Canning declined to discuss the policy which, two years
earlier, had dictated the annexation; it was not his performance, nor
was he empowered to undo it when once done. But he felt it incumbent on
him to point out the disastrous effects which might follow, if the
Oudians were encouraged by such reasonings as those contained in the
Ellenborough dispatch. Speaking of the Begum, the Moulvie, the Nazim,
and other rebel leaders in Oude, he stated that there was scarcely any
unity of plan or sympathy of purpose among them; ‘but,’ he added, ‘I
cannot think this want of unity will long continue. If it shall once
become manifest that the British government hesitates to declare its
right to possess Oude, and that it regards itself as a wrongful intruder
into the place of the dynasty which the Begum claims to represent, I
believe that this would draw to the side of the Begum many who have
hitherto shewn no sympathy with the late ruling family, and that it is
just what is wanting to give a national character to her cause. An
uncompromising assertion of our authority in Oude is perfectly
compatible with a merciful exercise of it; and I respectfully submit
that if the government of India is not supported in making this
assertion, and in declaring that the recent acts of the people of Oude
are acts of rebellion, and that they may in strict right be treated as
such, a powerful temptation will be offered to them to maintain their
present struggle or to renew it.’
The governor-general’s defence of the proclamation itself we need not
notice at any length; the proclamation was never issued in its original
form—the subject being left generally to the discretion of Mr
Montgomery. The tenor of his reply may be thus briefly indicated—That he
went to Allahabad to reside, chiefly that he might be able personally to
investigate the state of Oude; that he soon decided to make a difference
between mutinied sepoys and Oudian rebels; that the latter should not be
put to death for appearing in arms against the authorities, unless they
had committed actual murder; that the general punishment for Oudian
rebellion should be confiscation of estates, a punishment frequently
enforced against rebels in past years, both by the British and by the
native governments; that it is a punishment which in no way affects the
honour of the most sensitive Rajpoot or Brahmin; that it admits of every
gradation, according to the severity or lightness of the offence; that
it would enable the government to reward friendly thalookdars and
zemindars with estates taken from those who had rebelled; that most of
the thalookdars had acquired their estates by spoliation of the village
communities, at a time when they (the thalookdars) were acting under the
native government as ‘nazims’ (governors) or ‘chuckladars’ (collectors
of government rents); that, as a matter of abstract right, it would be
just to give these estates back again to the village communities; but
that, as there would be insuperable difficulties to this course, it
would be better to take the forfeited estates of rebellious thalookdars
as government property, out of which faithful villages and individuals
might be rewarded.
Another reply, written by Viscount Canning on the 7th of July, was to
the dispatch of the Court of Directors dated the 18th of May. In that
dispatch the directors, while expressing full confidence in the
governor-general, courteously requested him to furnish an explanation of
the circumstances and motives which led him to frame the proclamation.
This explanation he most readily gave, in terms equivalent to those
above indicated. He expressed, too, his thankfulness for the tone in
which the directors had written to him. ‘Such an expression of the
sentiments of your honourable court would be to me a source of
gratification and just pride under any circumstances; but the generous
and timely promptitude with which you have been pleased to issue it, and
the fact that it contains approval of the past, as well as trust for the
future, has greatly enhanced its value. Your honourable court have
rightly judged, that in the midst of difficulties no support is so
cheering to a public servant, or so strengthening, as that which is
derived from a declared approval of the spirit by which his past acts
have been guided.’
It may be here remarked that some of the European inhabitants of
Calcutta, who had from the first placed themselves in antagonism with
Viscount Canning, prepared an address to the Earl of Ellenborough,
thanking him for the ‘secret’ dispatch, denouncing the principles and
the policy acted on by the governor-general, lamenting the earl’s
retirement after so brief a tenure of office, denouncing the Whigs, and
expressing a hope that the earl, whether in or out of office, would long
live to ‘uphold the honour and interests of British India.’
We now proceed to a brief narrative of the course of events in Oude
during July, August, and September.
The province, in the first of these three months, was in a remarkable
condition. Mr Montgomery, as chief-commissioner, intrusted with large
powers, gradually felt his way towards a re-establishment of British
influence. Most of the dependants and adherents of the deposed royal
family belonged to Lucknow; and it was hence in that city that they
required most carefully to be watched. In the provinces, the late king’s
power and the present British power were regarded with about equal
indifference or dislike. A sort of feudalism prevailed, inimical to the
recognition of any central authority, except in merely nominal matters.
There were rebel forces under different leaders at different spots; but
it is doubtful whether any of them were fighting for the deposed king;
each leader had an eye to the assumption of power by or for himself.
Even the Begum, one of the king’s wives, was influenced by motives very
far removed from affection to her lord. Great as Montgomery’s
difficulties were, therefore, they were less than would have been
occasioned by a concentration of action, a unity of purpose, among the
malcontents. He reorganised civil tribunals and offices in such
districts as were within his power, and waited for favourable
opportunities to do the like in other districts.
General Sir Hope Grant was Mr Montgomery’s coadjutor in these labours,
bringing military power to bear where civil power was insufficient. In
the early part of the month he remained at Lucknow, keeping together a
small but efficient army, and watching the course of events around him.
Later in the month, however, he deemed it necessary to take the field,
and endeavour to chastise a large body of rebels who were setting up the
Begum in authority at Fyzabad. On the 21st he started off in that
direction, taking with him a force comprising the 1st Madras Europeans,
the 2d battalion of the Rifle Brigade, the 1st Punjaub infantry, the 7th
Hussars, Hodson’s Horse, twelve light guns, and a heavy train. It was
considered probable that, on his way, Grant would relieve Maun Singh,
the powerful thalookdar so often mentioned, who was besieged in his fort
at Shahgunje by many thousand rebels. This cunning time-server had drawn
suspicion upon his acts and motives on many former occasions; but as it
was more desirable to have him as a friend than an enemy, and as he had
unquestionably earned the enmity of the rebels by his refusal to act
openly against the British, it was considered prudent to pay some
attention to his present applications for aid. Grant and Montgomery, the
one as general and the other as commissioner, held possession of the
road from Cawnpore to Lucknow, and the road from Lucknow to Nawabgunge;
it was hoped that Grant’s expedition would obtain command likewise of
the road from Nawabgunge to Fyzabad. These are the three components of
one main road which nearly intersects Oude from west to east; the
possession of it would render practicable the gradual crushing of the
rebel bands in different forts north and south of the road. The rebel
leaders, about the middle of the month, were believed to comprise the
Begum of Oude, her paramour Mummoo Khan, Beni Madhoo, Baboo Rambuksh,
Bihonath Singh, Chandabuksh, Gholab Singh, Nurput Singh, the Shahzada
Feroze Shah, Bhopal Singh, and others of less note; they had under their
command sixty or seventy thousand armed men of various grades, and forty
or fifty guns. More than half of the whole number were supposed to be
with the Begum and Mummoo Khan, at Chowka-Ghât, beyond the river Gogra;
and to these Sir Hope Grant directed his chief attention. Where Nena
Sahib was hiding, the British authorities could never definitely learn;
although it was known that he was near the northern or Nepaul frontier
of Oude. It was believed that he, as well as the Begum, was becoming
straitened for want of funds—appliances without which they could never
hope to keep their rebel forces together.
The general, with his force from Lucknow, experienced no obstruction in
his march towards Fyzabad. He arrived at a point within fourteen miles
of that city by the 28th of July, having passed on his way through
Nawabgunge—leaving the Rajah of Kupoorthulla to keep open his
communications. His advance alarmed the rebel army which was at that
time engaged in besieging Maun Singh in Shahgunje (twelve miles south of
Fyzabad); it broke up into three divisions—one of which fled towards
Gonda; a second marched for Sultanpore on the Goomtee; while a third
made for Tanda on the Gogra. This precipitate flight shewed in a
striking way the dread felt by the insurgents of an encounter with Sir
Hope Grant; for their numbers are supposed to have been at least ten
times as great as his. On the 29th, Grant entered Fyzabad, and there
heard that a large body of rebels were escaping across the Gogra a mile
or two ahead; he pushed on with cavalry and horse-artillery, but was
only in time to send a few round-shot into their rear. On the following
day, Maun Singh, now delivered from beleaguerment, had an interview with
him. On the 2d of August, two of the three divisions of the rebel army
contrived to join in the vicinity of Sultanpore, where they again formed
a compact army of eighteen thousand men, with eleven guns.
Notwithstanding the escape of the rebels, Grant’s undisputed occupation
of Fyzabad made a great impression in the whole province. This place was
a centre of Mohammedan influence; while near it was the very ancient
though decayed city of Ayodha or Oude, one of the most sacred of Hindoo
cities. Religious quarrels had often broken out between the two
communities; and now the British shewed themselves masters alike over
the Mohammedan and the Hindoo cities.
It was a great advantage at this time that Hurdeo Buksh, a powerful
zemindar of Oude, was enabled to give practical efficiency to the
friendly feeling with which he had regarded the English throughout the
mutiny. At his estate of Dhurrenpore, not far from Nawabgunge, he
organised a small force of retainers, which, with two guns, he employed
in fighting against some of the neighbouring thalookdars and zemindars
who were hostile to British interests. Such instances were few in
number, but they were gradually increasing; and to such agency the
ultimate pacification of Oude would necessarily be in considerable part
due.
While Grant was encamped at Fyzabad, he made arrangements for routing
some of the rebel bodies stationed in places to the east and southeast,
whither they had fled on his approach. He made up a column—comprising
the 1st Madras Europeans, the 5th Punjaub Rifles, a detachment of Madras
Sappers, a detachment of the 7th Hussars, 300 of Hodson’s Horse, and a
troop of horse-artillery. With this force, Brigadier Horsford was
directed to proceed to Sultanpore, whither an important section of the
rebels had retreated. Heavy rains prevented the departure of the
brigadier so soon as had been intended; but he set forth on the 9th of
August, and was joined on the way by a small force from Lucknow,
comprising Brasyer’s Sikhs and two horse-artillery guns. On the 13th,
Horsford took possession of Sultanpore, after a tough opposition from
sixteen or eighteen thousand rebels; he not only drove the enemy across
the river Goomtee, but shelled them out of the cantonments on the
opposite banks. The most determined of the combatants among the rebels
were believed to be those regiments of mutinied sepoys which had been
known as the Nuseerabad brigade; they had established three posts to
guard the ghâts or ferries across the river, and held these ghâts for a
time with such obstinacy as to occasion them a severe loss.
Sultanpore occupied an important position in relation to the rest of
Oude; being on the same river (the Goomtee) as Lucknow, and on the high
road from Allahabad to Fyzabad. It was evident that this place, from the
relative positions of the opposing forces, could not long remain at
peace. The rebels endeavoured to regain possession of it after their
defeat; while Sir Hope Grant resolved to prevent them. They returned to
the Goomtee, and occupied many villages nearly opposite the city. On the
24th of August, Grant made preparations for crossing the river and
attacking them. This plan he put in execution on the following day; when
twelve hundred foot and two guns effected the passage, and seized three
villages immediately in front. The rebels, however, maintained a
position from which they could send over shot into the British camp;
this lasted until the 29th, when they were driven from their position,
and compelled to retire towards Sassenpore, where they reassembled about
seven thousand of their number, with eight guns.
The first days of September found this body of rebels separating and
recombining, lessening and augmenting, in a manner that renders it
difficult to trace the actual movements. The real mutinous sepoys, the
‘Pandies’ of the once mighty Bengal army, were now few among them; and
the fluctuating numbers were made up chiefly of the adherents of the
rebellious thalookdars and zemindars of Oude—the vassals of those feudal
barons—together with felons and scoundrels of various kinds. On one day
they appeared likely to retire to Amethee, the stronghold of a rebel
named Lall Madhoo Singh; on another, they shewed symptoms of marching to
Mozuffernugger, a place about ten miles from Sultanpore; while on a
third, some of them made their appearance at a town about twenty miles
from Sultanpore on the Lucknow road.
At this time (September) the position of the British in Oude, so far as
concerned the possession of actual governing power, was very singular.
They held a belt of country right across the centre of the province from
east to west; while the districts north and south of that belt were
either in the possession of rebels, or were greatly troubled by them.
The position was thus clearly described by the Lucknow correspondent of
the _Bombay Gazette_: ‘The districts in our possession lie in a large
ellipse, of which Lucknow and Durriabad are foci, the ends of one
diameter being Cawnpore and Fyzabad. These cities are situated almost
due east and west. Our civil jurisdiction extends, on the average,
twenty-five miles all round Lucknow, and not much less round Durriabad.
Our line of communication is uninterrupted from Cawnpore to Fyzabad,
which latter borders on the Goruckpore district.’ North of this belt or
ellipse were various bodies of rebels under the Begum, Mummoo Khan,
Feroze Shah, Hurdut Singh, and other leaders; while south of the belt
were other bodies under Beni Madhoo, Hunmunt Singh, the Rajah of Gonda,
&c. Irrespective of these, were Nena Sahib and some of his relations
who, though not to be encountered, were known to be still in the
northeast of Oude, near the Nepaul frontier. Sir Hope Grant had
immediate control over both banks of the Goomtee, near Sultanpore, and
was preparing for a decisive advance against the rebels as soon as he
was joined by Brigadier Berkeley, who was sent from Allahabad on an
expedition presently to be noticed.
The portion of Oude nearest to Rohilcund, where the energetic Moulvie
had lately lost his life, was kept for a long time in a state of anarchy
by a combination of rebel chieftains, who declared hostility against the
Rajah of Powayne for having betrayed and killed the Moulvie. They at
first quarrelled a good deal concerning the possession of the effects of
the deceased leader; but the Begum put in a claim, which seems to have
been acceded to. Although the authorities at Lucknow could not at this
time spare a force to rout out the insurgents on this side of Oude, the
service was rendered from Rohilcund, as will be shewn shortly.
In a district of Oude between Lucknow and the Rohilcund frontier, a
gallant affair was achieved by Mr Cavanagh, who had gained so much
renown by carrying the message from Sir James Outram at Lucknow to Sir
Colin Campbell’s camp. Being appointed chief civil officer of the
Muhiabad district, he arranged with Captain Dawson and Lieutenant French
to defend the district from rebels as well as they could, by the aid of
a few native police and sowars. On the 30th of July a body of 1500
insurgents, with one gun, made a sudden attack on a small out-station
defended only by about 70 men. The place was gallantly held until
Cavanagh and French reached it. One bold charge sent the rebels fleeing
in all directions; and the district was soon pacified. Mr Cavanagh had
the tact to win over several small zemindars to the British cause, by
threatening to punish them if insubordinate, and by undertaking to aid
them if they were attacked by rebel bands; they combined to maintain
four hundred matchlockmen at their own expense in the British cause.
Many of the petty rajahs and zemindars had themselves been more than
suspected; but the civil authorities were empowered to win them over, by
an indulgent forgetfulness of their past conduct.
[Illustration:
Interior of Hindoo Rajah’s House.
]
On another side of Oude, near Allahabad and the apex of the Doab, there
were many bold and reckless thalookdars, who held out threats to all of
their class who dared to profess friendship to the English. A loyal
thalookdar, Baboo Rampursand Singh, was attacked by a number of these
confederated chieftains with their retainers at Soraon; they took him
and his family prisoners, destroyed his house, and sacked the village.
As this course of proceeding would have deterred friendly thalookdars
from a persistence in their loyalty, and still more certainly deterred
waverers from making a choice adverse to the rebel cause, means were
taken to check it. Brigadier Berkeley was placed in command of a ‘Soraon
Field-force,’ hastily collected, comprising 200 of H.M. 32d foot, the
7th Punjaub infantry, about 150 other infantry, two troops of Lahore
light horse, a detachment of Madras cavalry, detachments of horse and
foot artillery, and nine guns and mortars. The brigadier set out for
Allahabad, where the force had been collected, crossed the Ganges,
marched to the Oude frontier, and came in sight of a body of rebels on
the 14th of July, at the fort and village of Dehaign—one of the small
forts in which Oude abounded. The rebels retired into the fort on his
approach, allowing his skirmishers to take easy possession of the
village. He encircled the fort with cavalry, and placed horse-artillery
to watch any outlets of escape. A firing by heavy guns was not
satisfactory to him, owing to the fort being completely hidden by trees
and thick scrubby jungle; and he therefore resolved on storming the
place by his infantry. The assault was speedily and thoroughly
successful. About 250 of the rebels were killed in the fort and ditch;
and about as many more were chased through the jungle and cut down by
the cavalry and horse-artillery. The place was not properly a fort; it
was a large area of jungle surrounded by a dilapidated earthen wall and
ditch, and fenced with a thorny abattis, having a brick house in the
centre. The rebels being driven out, Brigadier Berkeley caused the
jungle to be cut, the walls to be levelled, and the house destroyed.
After resting on the 15th, Berkeley proceeded on the 16th to the fort of
Tiroul, seven miles north of Soraon. He found this fort in the middle of
an impenetrable thorny jungle, through which a few paths were cut in
directions known only to the natives; it was surrounded by a very thick
thorny abattis; and it had walls, bastions, ditches, escarps, like a
miniature fortress, with a stronghold in the centre to which the
garrison could retire when closely pressed. There were only three guns
on the bastions, but the walls were loopholed for musketry. So thick was
the belt of trees and jungle around, that the brigadier could scarcely
obtain a sight of the fort; he therefore deemed it prudent to employ his
mortars and a 24-pounder howitzer before sending in his infantry to
assault. This succeeded; the enemy evacuated the place during the night,
leaving behind them their three guns and gun-ammunition. The infantry
were on the alert to assist, but the enemy left them nothing to do. Fort
Tiroul was then destroyed, as fort Soraon had been. The former was
rather a superior example of an Oudian fort; although the walls and
bastions were only of earth, they were of such considerable thickness,
and were aided so greatly by loopholed parapets, ditches, breastworks,
rifle-pits, thorny abattis, zigzag intrenchments, and thick jungle—that
the enemy might have made a tough resistance to an infantry attack, if
they had not been frightened out by shells and balls. By a somewhat
similar train of operations, Brigadier Berkeley captured and destroyed a
fort at Bhyspoor; and having thus finished the work intrusted to him, he
returned with his temporary ‘Soraon Field-force’ to Allahabad. After a
brief interval, he was again sent forth, to demolish other Oudian forts
at places accessible from Allahabad, of which one was at Pertabghur; and
then to advance to Sultanpore, to aid Sir Hope Grant. The two generals
would then command a semicircle of country, within which most of the
rebels in the eastern half of Oude would be enclosed; and an advance of
other columns from Lucknow would completely hem them in. There were many
symptoms, at the end of the month, that numerous zemindars and
thalookdars were only waiting for a decent pretext, a decisive success
of the British, to give in their adhesion.
The banks of the Ganges nearest to the province of Oude, even so low
down as Allahabad, where the governor-general and the commander-in-chief
were residing, required close watching; they were infested by bands of
rebels, some of whom devastated the villages, while others sought to
cross the Ganges into the Doab; and carry mischief into new districts.
Towards the close of July—to cite one among many instances—it became
known that the rebels had collected many boats on the Oude side of the
river, ready to cross over into the Doab if the fortune of war should
render this desirable. The authorities at once sent up the _Jumna_
steamer, with a party of 130 Sikhs and two guns. At Manickpore and
Kunkur, some distance up the river, they found more than twenty boats,
which they succeeded in destroying; but the two forts were well armed
with guns and rebels, and could not be safely attacked at that
time—another and stronger expeditionary force was required to effect
this. In August, and again in September, small forces were sent up from
Allahabad by river, which had the desired effect of checking these
insurgents.
Viscount Canning and Sir Colin Campbell both remained at Allahabad
throughout the period to which this chapter relates—where, indeed, they
had long been located. It was convenient for each in his special
capacity, owing to its central situation. Sir Colin needed to be
informed daily of the proceedings of all the brigades, columns, forces,
and detachments which were out on active service. Gladly would he have
kept them all under cover until the rainy season had passed; but the
exigencies of the service prevented this: some troops were necessarily
in the field—in Behar, in Oude, in Rohilcund, in Bundelcund, in the
Mahratta states, in Rajpootana; and these, whether their number were few
or many, were all working to one common end. At no other city could Sir
Colin receive news from all those regions more promptly than at
Allahabad. Again, Viscount Canning found it necessary to be in intimate
communication with the commander-in-chief, in relation to all projects
and arrangements involving military operations, on which the ultimate
pacification of India so much depended. It was desirable, also, that he
should be near Oude, the affairs of which were far more delicate than
those of any other Indian province. Many events were likely to arise,
concerning which the electric telegraph, though instantaneous, might be
too curt and enigmatical, and which would be much better settled by a
personal conference with the chief to whom the government of the
Anglo-Indian empire was consigned.
Orders and dispatches, military and political, were issued in great
number from Allahabad, which was the substitute for Calcutta at that
time. Much progress had been made towards the construction of a new
English town, with houses, hotels, offices, and shops; and much also in
the building of new barracks, for the English troops which must
necessarily continue to be stationed at this important place. The
governor-general and the commander-in-chief were each surrounded with
his staff of officials, for the transaction of business; and both worked
untiringly for the public benefit.
From time to time Viscount Canning gave effect to several
recommendations made by the generals and brigadiers for an
acknowledgment of the fidelity and bravery of native soldiers. At a
period when the treachery of the ‘Pandies’ of the Bengal army had been
productive of such bitter fruit, it was doubly desirable to praise and
reward such native troops as bore up well against the temptations to
which they were exposed. On one day he issued orders for the promotion
of certain officers and men of the Hyderabad Contingent, for conspicuous
gallantry in the action at Banda; and in orders of subsequent dates,
other well-deserving native troops were singled out for reward.
Ressaldars were promoted to be ressaldar-majors, duffadars to be
ressaldars or jemadars, bargheers and silladars to be duffadars, naiks
to be havildars, and so on—these being some of the many designations of
native military officers in India. One of the higher grade of native
officers in the Hyderabad Contingent, Ressaldar-major Meer Dilawar
Hossein, was made a member of the First Class of ‘the Order of British
India,’ with the title of ‘Sirdar Bahadoor.’ Sometimes towns themselves
were complimented, as a mode of gratifying the inhabitants, when good
service had been rendered. Thus Sasseram became the subject of the
following order: ‘As a special mark of the consideration of government
for the loyal services rendered by Shah Koobeeroodeen Ahmed of Sasseram,
and his fellow towns-people, in repelling the mutineers, the Right Hon.
the Governor-general is pleased to confer upon Sasseram the name of
Nasirool Hook-Kusbah, “Sasseram the aider or supporter of the rulers.”’
Sir Colin Campbell’s[188] daily duties of course bore relation chiefly
to military matters. On one occasion, while at Allahabad, he reviewed
the camel-corps as one of the reinforcements which from time to time
arrived at that place. This was towards the close of July. It was a
curious sight to see four hundred camels going through their military
evolutions on the _maîdan_ or plain outside the city. These ungainly
beasts performed almost all the usual cavalry movements. Besides an
armed native driver, each camel carried an English soldier, who occupied
the back seat, and was in a position to use his rifle. The camels had
been trained to the word of command. On a recognised touch of the
guiding-string, they dropped on their knees, the riflemen descended
quickly, went on for a distance in skirmishing order, remounted on the
recall being signalled, and the camels then rose in their wonted clumsy
manner. This corps was likely to render very valuable service, by
rapidly conveying a few skilled riflemen to distances and over tracts
which would be beyond the reach of infantry.
The commander-in-chief, a man indefatigable in the performance of his
duties, acquired for himself the reputation of being a general who
insisted on all the duties of regimental service being properly attended
to by the officers; to the effect that all alike should _work_ for the
common cause, in camps and barracks, as well as in the field. The
following order, issued about the close of August, will shew how
numerous were the duties thus marked out: ‘The commander-in-chief begs
that general officers commanding divisions and brigades will urge
commanding-officers of her Majesty’s regiments, troops, and batteries,
to give their most particular attention to all points of interior
economy; to examine and correct regimental books; to re-enlist soldiers
of limited service willing to renew their engagements; to complete
soldiers’ clothing and necessaries, examine soldiers’ accounts,
soldiers’ claims, and small account-books; to close, and render to the
proper departments, the accounts of deceased officers and soldiers; to
examine arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, and repair deficiencies; to
continue judging-distance drills and musketry-instruction, as far as the
climate will permit; to provide occupation for soldiers without
harassing them by mere routine drills; to consider their comforts, diet,
and amusements; to re-establish the regimental school, and encourage by
every means the study of the Hindustani language, both by officers and
soldiers disposed to study it; to ascertain by inquiry what means exist
in the neighbourhood of their quarters, both in materials and workmen,
to furnish their regiments with boots and clothing, in the event of
failure of the usual supply; finally, to maintain the most exact
discipline, the strict performance of all duties, and proper marks of
respect to officers; which will be much assisted by a proper example on
the part of officers, in dress and deportment, regularity in their
duties, and treatment of native servants and followers.’
This last clause, ‘treatment of native servants and followers,’ related
to a serious matter. Many of the younger officers, chiefly those whose
knowledge of India had extended only over a few months, had acquired the
habit of speaking and writing of the natives as if they were all fiends
alike, to sabre and hang whom was a pleasurable duty. The atrocities of
some were visited on all. The ‘Pandies’ who had begun the mutiny were
now mixed up with others in the common designations of ‘niggers’ and
‘devils;’ and the officers above alluded to were far too prone to use
the stick or the whip on the shoulders of natives, simply because they
were natives, even when inoffensively employed. The observant
correspondents of some of the London journals were too much struck with
this dangerous tendency to allow it to pass unnoticed; they commented on
it with severity. The letters from officers, made public in the journals
published in India, furnished abundant proof of the feelings and
language adverted to, conveyed in their own terms. Unless the mutiny
were to end with general enmity on both sides, it was essential that an
improved tone should prevail in this matter; and to this end, many hints
were given by the authorities, in England as well as in India.
A few words will suffice to say all that need be said concerning the
Doab and Rohilcund, the regions in which the mutiny really commenced.
Rohilcund was troubled with nothing beyond trifling disturbances during
the month of July; and these came chiefly from Oude. Rebel leaders, with
small bands of depredators, crossed the frontier, and harried some of
the neighbouring villages. So little, however, was there of an organised
rebel army in the province, that the predatory irruptions were easily
quelled by means of small detachments of troops. At one period in the
month a body of Oudians crossed into the northern part of Rohilcund, and
combined with a rabble under one Nizam Ali in the wild Roodurpore tract
of country. As it was considered possible that an attack on Pileebheet
might be contemplated, the authorities at Bareilly sent a small
force—comprising the Rohilcund Horse, a troop or two of Punjaub cavalry,
and three companies of the Kumaon levies—to Pileebheet; this movement
caused the insurgents to retire quickly. In the neighbourhood of
Mohumdee, where much fighting had taken place during Sir Colin
Campbell’s campaign in the spring, bands of rebels still hovered about,
looking for any chances of success, and requiring to be carefully
watched. One, of about four thousand men, was under Khan Bahadoor Khan
of Bareilly; a second, under Khan Ali Nazim of Oude, numbered five
thousand; and a third, under Wilayut Shah, mustered three thousand.
These, with twenty or thirty guns, might have wrought much mischief if
combined with the Oude rebels; but they were so placed on the frontier
of the two provinces as to be nearly isolated, and afraid of any bold
movements. The authorities, however, were on their guard. A force,
including De Kantzow’s Horse, was sent for the protection of Powayne;
and Rajah Juggernath Singh, of that place, had about two thousand men
who could be depended upon to oppose the rebels. In August, the town and
station of Pileebheet were frequently threatened by one Kala Khan, who
had three thousand budmashes at his beck, with four guns. As it was
deemed necessary to defend Noria, a station about ten miles distant, a
small force was sent out from Pileebheet to effect this. Kala Khan
attacked the force at Sersown, and brought on an engagement in which his
three thousand were opposed to about five hundred. He received a severe
defeat, and lost his guns, three elephants, and a number of bullocks.
This occurred during the last week in August. In September, matters
remained nearly in the same state; the authorities in Rohilcund could
not at once spare troops in sufficient number to put down the insurgents
thoroughly; but the successes of Sir Hope Grant, in the central parts of
Oude, would gradually but necessarily weaken the isolated bands of
rebels on the frontier of the two provinces.
Meerut and Delhi had long been at peace. No symptoms of rebel armies
appeared near those cities. Sir John Lawrence, having had the province
of Delhi attached to his government of the Punjaub, was ruling it with
the same vigour as his other provinces. All the natives, Hindoo and
Mohammedan, saw that he was a man not to be trifled with. Many of the
antiquated usages of the East India Company, in force in other
provinces, he abrogated, and introduced a system more suitable to the
actual condition of the country and its inhabitants. The ‘regulations,’
as they are called, he abolished altogether; and established in their
place a system of government in which summary trial by _vivâ voce_
examination was adopted. A military police was organised; and every
village compelled to pay compensation for any damage done within its
boundaries.
The district around Etawah was occasionally disturbed by a dacoit leader
named Roop Singh, who collected a band of adherents, comprising a few of
the Gwalior Contingent, a few of the mutinied troops from Scindia’s own
army, and numerous matchlockmen from the ravines of the Jumna. With this
motley force he levied contributions from such of the villages as were
not strong enough to resist him. He made his appearance at Ajeetmul and
other places early in July; but was speedily routed out by a small
detachment sent in pursuit. During August, this part of India was
infested by men of the same class as those who troubled so many other
provinces—reckless adventurers and escaped felons, who took advantage of
the state of public affairs to plunder villages, and make exactions on
every side. Some of them were headed by chieftains who could boast of a
few hundred retainers, and who, with retainers and rabble together, gave
more organisation to the plunderers. The principal among them was Roop
Singh, mentioned above, who kept armed possession of a fort at Burhee,
Bhurree, or Burhay, at the junction of the Chumbul with the Jumna, and
occasioned great annoyance by attacking boats and levying toll as they
passed. To keep these several mischief-makers in subjection required
much activity on the part of the troops belonging to the district.
Towards the close of the month, a force was sent out from Etawah
purposely to take this fort and disperse the rebels. This was
effectually accomplished on the 28th. Suspecting what was intended, the
rebels attempted to check the progress of the boats carrying the
detachment, at a place called Gurha Koodor, a fortified village three
miles higher up. So long as the troops were in the boats, the rebels
made a show of determination on shore; but a landing soon scattered them
in all directions. The troops then re-embarked, floated down to Burhee,
landed, took possession of the fort, and compelled Roop Singh to make a
hasty retreat. This done, they collected and secured all the boats in
the neighbouring parts of the rivers Jumna, Chumbul, and Kooraree, as a
measure of precaution, clearing all the rebels from the vicinity of
Dholpore. They then proceeded against the chief of Chuckernuggur,
another leader of rebel bands whom it was necessary to put down. In
September, Etawah, like the other districts around it, was very little
troubled by warlike or mutinous proceedings.
Agra found no difficulty in maintaining order in and near the city.
When, in June, the temporary success of Tanteea Topee and the Gwalior
mutineers gave some cause for alarm, the authorities of Agra sent out
troops to escort Scindia back to the capital of his dominions; and when,
at a later date, those mutineers were fleeing from Gwalior, and were
believed to be on the way to Bhurtpore or Odeypore, a detachment was
sent out to check their approach. This detachment consisted of the 3d
Bengal Europeans and a battery of guns, and was placed in aid of
Brigadier Showers’s force. The demonstration took effect; for (as we
shall see more in detail presently), Tanteea Topee bent his steps
southward, away from the threatened assault; and Showers was enabled to
send back the detachment through Futtehpore Sikri to Agra. From that
time, during the summer and autumn months, Agra and its neighbourhood
were at peace.