A SECOND YEAR OF REBELLION.
When, at the opening of 1858, the stirring events of the preceding year
came to be passed in review, most men admitted that the progress of the
Indian Revolt had outrun their expectations and falsified their hopes.
Some had believed that the fall of Delhi would occur after a few days of
besieging, bringing with it a pacification of the whole country. Some,
allowing that this capture might very probably be retarded several
weeks, did not the less look to a general pacification as a natural
result. Others, relying on the heroic Havelock and the energetic Neill,
prepared to date the termination of the rebellion from the expected
capture of Lucknow. Others, recognising Sir Colin Campbell as ‘the right
man in the right place,’ strengthened themselves in the belief that he
would march at once from Calcutta to Cawnpore, and put down all the
rebels before the summer was well over. Some believed that the sepoys,
lamenting the ill success of their treachery to the British government,
would return to their allegiance without inoculating other portions of
the Indian community with the virus of lawlessness. Others had fondly
hoped that, under the pressure of public opinion in England, such large
numbers of fine troops would have been sent over in the summer and
autumn, as would suffice to quell the mutiny even though the sepoys
remained obstinate.
All these hopes were dashed. The gloomy prophets, on this occasion, were
in the ascendant. The mutiny had spread to almost every native regiment
in the Bengal army. It had been accompanied by an unexpected display of
military organisation among the revolted sepoys. It had incited many
ambitious chieftains to try their chance for an increase of power. It
had been encouraged and extended by the long delay in the conquest of
Delhi. It had further received a certain glow of triumph from the
extraordinary events at Lucknow, which left the rebels perfect masters
of the city at the end of the year. It had been permitted to grow to
unwonted magnitude by the extreme slowness with which British troops
arrived at Indian ports. Lastly, it had become surrounded by very
un-English attributes, in the savage feeling of vengeance engendered in
the minds of English officers and soldiers by the sepoy atrocities.
It is true that Englishmen had much to be proud of, in the achievements
of their countrymen during the past year. They could point to the
sagacity of Sir Henry Lawrence, in quietly fortifying and provisioning
the Residency at Lucknow at a time when less acute observers saw no
storm in the distance. They could admire, and wonder while they admired,
the heroism with which Sir Hugh Wheeler and his companions had so long
maintained a wretchedly weak position against a large army of mutineers
headed by an arch-traitor. They could follow with delight the footsteps
of Sir Henry Havelock, winning victory after victory over forces five or
ten times as strong as his own. They could shew how, in a hot climate,
Neill had advanced from the east and Nicholson from the west, fighting
energetically against all obstacles, and dying like true soldiers at the
head of their columns. They could ask the world whether a garrison was
ever more nobly defended, under circumstances of trying difficulty, than
the Residency under Inglis; and whether a garrison was ever brought away
from the middle of a hostile city under more extraordinary conditions,
and with more complete success, than was achieved in the ‘Exodus from
Lucknow’ under Campbell, Outram, and Havelock. They could point to Sir
John Lawrence for an example of what a civilian could do, maintaining a
large and recently conquered country at peace by the energy of his own
individual character, raising regiment after regiment of trustworthy
native troops, and sending an army to reconquer Delhi before a single
additional soldier could arrive from England. They could point to the
exertions of numerous individuals, any one of whom would have been a
hero if his heroism had not been eclipsed by that of men better known to
fame.
These recollections afforded some consolation under the disappointment
occasioned by the long continuance of the war waged by the mutineers.
Yet were they far from being an adequate reward for the blood and
treasure expended; the prevailing natural feeling was one of
disappointment. Nor were theorists less at fault in their estimate of
causes, than practical men in their expectation of results. Still was
the question put, ‘What was the cause of the mutiny?’ And still were the
answers as diverse as ever. From May to December the theories multiplied
faster than the means of solving them. On the religious side, men banded
themselves chiefly into two parties. One said that the native troops in
India had revolted because we, as a nation, had tampered with their
religion. We had nearly put down infanticide and suttee; we paid less
respect than formerly to their idols and holy places; we had allowed
pious officers to preach to the sepoys in their regiments, and
missionaries to inveigh against brahmins and temples; and we so clumsily
managed a new contrivance in the fabrication and use of cartridges, as
to induce a suspicion in the native mind that a personal insult to their
religious prejudices was intended. On the other hand, religious
Christians contended that the revolt was a mark of God’s anger against
the English nation. They urged that a people possessing the Bible ought
long ago, by government as well as by individual efforts, to have
distributed it throughout the length and breadth of India; that we ought
to have encouraged churches and chapels, ministers and missionaries,
Bible-classes and Scripture-readers; that we ought to have disregarded
caste prejudices, and boldly proclaimed that Hindooism and Moslemism
were worse than mockeries, and that no expectations of happiness in this
life or the next were sound but such as rested on Biblical grounds—in
short, that England had had a magnificent opportunity, and a deep
obligation, to teach with all her power the way of salvation to two
hundred million benighted beings; and that, failing this, the Revolt had
been a consequent and deserved calamity. Another class of reasoners
attributed the outbreak to the want of sympathy between the Europeans
and the natives in the general relations of life. A young man was sent
out to India by the Company, either as a writer in the civil service or
as a cadet in the army; he learned the immediate duties of his office,
studied just so much of the vernacular languages and customs as were
absolutely needed, rose in the middle years of his life to higher
offices and emoluments, and returned to end his days in England. He held
the natives in contempt; he neither knew nor cared what passed in their
inmost hearts; he treated India as a conquered country, held especially
for the benefit of the Company’s servants. Hence, according to the view
now under notice, the natives, having nothing for which to love and
respect the British, were glad to avail themselves of any pretext to
expel the foreign element from their land. Military men, acquainted with
the Bombay and Madras armies, insisted that the mutiny had arisen from
the organisation of that of Bengal; in which the Brahmin sepoys and
Rajpoot sowars had been so pampered and petted, that they began to deem
themselves masters instead of subjects, and to aim at a sort of military
despotism on their own account. Other speculators, pointing to the fact
that Mohammedans have in all ages been intensely fanatical, regarded the
mutiny as only one among many indications of an attempt to revive the
past glories of the Moguls, when the followers of Mahomet were the
rulers in India. Others again, keeping clear of the larger questions of
creed and race, attributed the troubles to the policy of annexation,
which had been pursued to so extraordinary a degree in recent years.
These reasoners urged that, whatever may have been the faults and
follies of the King of Oude, five million natives unquestionably looked
up to him as their sovereign, and felt their prejudices shocked and
their alarm excited, when, in 1856, he was rudely hurled from his
throne, and made a pensioner dependent on a company of merchants.
Another class of theorists, impressed with a horror of taxation, pitied
the poor Hindoos who had to pay so much to the Company for permission to
live on the soil, so much for the salt monopoly, so much for other dues;
and sought to find a reason for the mutiny in the desire to throw off
these imposts. Commercial men, estimating nations and countries by a
standard familiar to themselves, had long complained that the Company
did not encourage independent commerce in India; and now they said: ‘If
you had acted with English good sense, the revolt would never have
occurred. Afford facilities for the construction of railways, canals,
and docks; build ships and steamers; develop your mineral wealth in coal
and iron; sell or let plots of land to men who will bring English
experience and English machinery to bear on its cultivation; grow tea
and coffee, sugar and cocoa, timber and fruits, cotton and flax, corn
and pulse, on the soils favourable to the respective produce—do all
this, or afford facilities for others to do it, and the natives of India
will then have something more profitable to think of than mutiny and
bloodshed.’
We point to these various theories for the purpose of remarking, that
the controversies relating to them were as warmly conducted at the end
of the year as when the news of the cartridge troubles first reached
England. The higher the position, the more extensive the experience, of
public men, the more chary were they in committing themselves to any
special modes of explanation; it was by those who knew little, that the
boldest assertions were hazarded. An opinion was gradually growing up
among cautious reasoners, that the revolt must have been the composite
resultant of many co-ordinate or coexistent causes, each of which
contributed towards it in a particular way; but such reasoners would
necessarily perceive that a true solution could only be arrived at when
all the separate items were known, and properly estimated. Hence the
authorities, both in England and in India, recommended and followed a
plan that may thus be enunciated—first suppress the mutiny; then collect
gradually evidence of its various predisposing causes; and, finally,
make use of that evidence in remodelling the institutions of British
India on a firmer basis. The NOTES at the end of the last chapter shewed
that the Company took the common-sense view, of inquiring into the
probable causes of the mutiny before planning the reorganisation of
Indian affairs. The candid acknowledgment by the Directors, that the
voluminous documents hitherto produced had ‘entirely failed to satisfy
their minds in regard to the immediate causes of the mutiny,’ was full
of significance, and, it may be added, of caution to others.
So far as concerns the present Chronicle, the treatment will necessarily
be affected by the character of the struggle. At the beginning of 1858,
scarcely any symptoms of further mutiny were presented. The Bengal army
was gone, scattered in anarchy; the armies of Bombay, Madras, and the
Punjaub, were almost wholly sound; and the daily events consisted mainly
of military operations against the revolted sepoy regiments of the
Bengal army, and against such chieftains as had brought their retainers
into the field for selfish purposes. Hence the narrative may march on
more rapidly than before.
All the interest of the military operations in India, at the opening of
the new year, grouped itself around the commander-in-chief. Slow as had
been the arrival of British troops in India, during the months when
Wheeler, Havelock, Neill, Outram, Inglis, Barnard, Wilson, and Nicholson
were struggling against difficulties, the disembarkations were very
numerous in November and December. When the old year gave place to the
new, it was estimated that 23,000 British troops had landed at Calcutta
since the troubles began, besides others put on shore at Bombay, Madras,
and Kurachee.[131] They had advanced into the upper provinces, by those
routes and modes which have so often been adverted to, and were placed
under the brigadiers whom Sir Colin Campbell had appointed to conduct
the various operations planned by him. We have first, therefore, to
notice such of the proceedings of the commander-in-chief as took place
during the month of January; turning attention afterwards to military
proceedings in other quarters.
Sir Colin Campbell, as the last chapter shewed, rescued Cawnpore and
General Windham from trouble at the close of November and the beginning
of the following month. He did not move from the vicinity of that city
till towards the end of December. Writing to Viscount Canning on this
subject, on the 6th of January, he said: ‘I am informed by the civil
authorities that my protracted stay at Cawnpore was of much benefit; and
I am convinced that, apart from any immediate military object, it is
necessary, for the re-establishment of authority, that the march of the
troops should be deliberate. Time is thus afforded to the magistrates
and special commissioners to visit rebellious towns and villages, and
again display to the people in unmistakable manner the resolution of
your lordship’s government to visit punishment on all those who during
the last few months have set aside their allegiance.’ He at the same
time glanced rapidly at the chief military operations which had marked
the month of December in the Gangetic and Jumna regions—such as Outram’s
defence at the Alum Bagh; Adrian Hope’s clean sweep of Nena Sahib’s
property at Bithoor;[132] Walpole’s expedition to Etawah and Minpooree;
Seaton’s energetic movements with a column from Delhi; and Windham’s
expedition to Futtiah.
When the vehicles had returned to Cawnpore, after conveying the Lucknow
fugitives to Allahabad, the commander-in-chief prepared to move his
head-quarters to Furruckabad and Fort Futteghur, near which places many
insurgent chieftains required to be dealt with. He started on the 24th
of December and marched to Chowrepore. After remaining there some time
to organise his force into brigades, &c., he renewed his march on the
28th, and reached Meerun-ke-Serai. At the several halting-places of
himself and his brigadiers, he made arrangements for destroying the
country-boats on the Ganges, in order to prevent molestation of the Doab
from the Oude side of the river when the troops should have moved on. On
the 31st he arrived at Goorsaigunje; Greathed, Windham, and Hope Grant
all being with him. On the first day of the new year, Sir Colin sent
forth two regiments under Adrian Hope to secure the iron
suspension-bridge over the Kallee Nuddee, a very important point on the
road from Cawnpore to Futteghur. A party of sailors were quite delighted
to assist in this work, replacing with ropes some of the ironwork which
the rebels had begun to destroy. On the 2d the enemy, hovering in
villages near the bridge, attacked Sir Colin’s pickets and advanced
columns; but they were speedily defeated and driven across the Ganges
into Rohilcund.[133] Proof was here afforded that the insurgents had not
forgotten the advantages of organisation. ‘The rebels,’ said the
commander-in-chief in his dispatch, ‘who were dispersed on this
occasion, consisted of three or four battalions of the 41st and other
corps of native infantry. In the 41st, the rebels had begun with much
system to organise a second battalion, their recruits being dressed in a
neat uniform.’ On the 3d, Sir Colin reached Futteghur, the old British
station near the city of Furruckabad. Fortunately, the enemy, who had
held Futteghur for at least six months, now retreated so precipitately
that they had not time to destroy the government property within the
place. Sir Colin found a large amount of stores of the most valuable
description, belonging to the gun and clothing agencies. Having secured
these important items of military property, he sent a large stock of
grain to Cawnpore, to lighten the labours of the commissariat for the
supply of Sir James Outram at the Alum Bagh. The Nawab of Furruckabad
had long been among the most ferocious leaders of the insurgents; and
the commander-in-chief now proceeded to such measures as would punish
him severely for his treachery. ‘The destruction of the Nawab’s palaces
is in process. I think it right that not a stone should be left unturned
in all the residences of the rebellious chiefs. They are far more guilty
than their misguided followers.’
On the 6th of January, then, the commander-in-chief was on the banks of
the Ganges at Futteghur. With him were the brigades and columns of Hope
Grant, Adrian Hope, Walpole, Windham, Seaton, Greathed, and Little;
Inglis, with a movable column, was restoring order in a part of the Doab
between Cawnpore and Etawah; while Outram was still at the Alum Bagh.
Sir Colin scarcely moved from that spot during the remainder of the
month. He was waiting for more troops from Calcutta, and for vast stores
of warlike material from the upper provinces. It may here be remarked
that the enormous weight of stores and ammunition required for an army,
and the vast distances to be traversed in India, gave a stupendous
character to some of the convoys occasionally prepared. Thus, on the 22d
of January, about 3000 troops started from Agra for the Cawnpore
regions, having in charge 19 guns of various calibre, and 1500 carts
laden with stores and ammunition. There were 750 rounds of ammunition
for each of 24 guns, and 500 for each of 44 howitzers and mortars—all
required by the commander-in-chief. Several ladies, _en route_ to
Calcutta, took advantage of the protection of this force. The above
numbers give a very imperfect idea of the convoy; for native servants
and camp-followers, together with animals of draught and burden, always
accompany such a train in swarms almost inconceivable.
When the English public found that the whole of the autumn months, and
the winter so far as the end of January, had passed away without any
great achievement except the relief of Lucknow, portions of them began
to complain and to censure. They could not and would not find fault with
Sir Colin, because he was a general favourite; and therefore they rushed
to a conclusion inimical to Viscount Canning, who from the first had
been made to bear the burden of a vast amount of anonymous abuse. A
story arose that the governor-general and the commander-in-chief were at
‘cross-purposes,’ that Campbell was doing nothing because Canning
thwarted him. The Duke of Cambridge and Lord Panmure took occasion, in
the House of Lords, to give authoritative contradictions to these
rumours; and among other evidence adduced was a letter written by Sir
Colin to his royal highness—the one as commander-in-chief in India, the
other as commander-in-chief of all the Queen’s forces generally—just
when he was about to set off to head the military operations at Cawnpore
and Lucknow. ‘Now that I am on the point of leaving Calcutta,’ he said,
‘I would beg, with the greatest respect to the governor-general, to
record the deep sense of the obligation I entertain towards his
lordship. Our intercourse has been most cordial, intimate, and
unreserved. I cannot be sufficiently thankful for his lordship’s
confidence and support, and the kindly manner in which they have been
afforded, to my great personal satisfaction. One at a distance, and
unacquainted with the ordinary mode of transacting business in this
country, could hardly estimate the gain to the public service which has
thus been made. But I allude principally to my own feelings of
gratification.’ Whether or not the governor-general and the
commander-in-chief were divided in opinion touching the best policy to
pursue, it is certain that men in lower though influential positions
differed widely in their views on this point. Some were anxious that
Lucknow should be attacked at once. They urged that that city being the
chief seat of rebellion, a crushing of the force there would dishearten
the rebels elsewhere; whereas every day lost would add to the strength
of Lucknow. Even our victories increased the number and desperation of
its defenders; and, therefore, till this central point was captured, the
revolt would always have a nucleus, a flag around which the discontented
might rally. On the other hand, it was urged that Rohilcund should be
cleared before Lucknow could be profitably seized. Large bands still
roaming over that province might interrupt the commander-in-chief’s
communications, if he left them in his rear while engaged in Oude.
Again, Sir Colin was waiting for more troops. It was asserted that, even
if he could conquer sixty or eighty thousand fighting-men in the streets
of Lucknow, he could not leave a force there while he was endeavouring
to clear out Rohilcund. So far as can be judged from attainable
evidence, it appears that Sir Colin himself held this second
opinion—resolving to clear the outworks before attacking the central
stronghold of rebellion.
Leaving the commander-in-chief for a while, we may suitably direct
attention to the proceedings of other generals in other parts of the
wide field of operations—beginning with those connected with Sir James
Outram.
The Alum Bagh, never once out of English hands since the month of
September, remained a very important stronghold. The reader will perhaps
recall to mind the relation which that fort bore to the operations at
Lucknow; but a short recapitulation may not be misplaced here. When
Havelock and Outram, on the 25th of September, advanced to Lucknow, they
left Colonel M’Intyre, of the 78th Highlanders, in command at the Alum
Bagh, with orders to maintain that post until further instructions
reached him. He had with him 280 English soldiers of various regiments,
a few Sikhs, 4 guns, 128 sick and wounded, between 4000 and 5000 native
camp-followers, large numbers of cattle, and a valuable store of
baggage, ammunition, and other military appliances. His supply of food
for the natives was very scanty, and those poor creatures soon suffered
terribly from hunger. After a few days, they stealthily collected crops
of rice and grain in fields near at hand, under protection of the guns;
but this resource was soon exhausted. It is a familiar occurrence in the
annals of Indian warfare, that the camp-followers and army-servants
exceed by five or ten fold the number of actual combatants; and thus is
to be explained the strange composition of the miscellaneous body
collected within the walls of the Alum Bagh. Unable to receive aid or
even instructions from the Residency, M’Intyre maintained his position
as best he could. A convoy of provisions reached him from Cawnpore on
the 7th of October, under Major Bingham, and another on the 25th under
Major Barnston. Some of the troops remained with him on each occasion,
raising his force altogether to 900 fighting-men and ten guns. Meanwhile
he fortified his position with bastions and other defence-works, and
contended successfully against the enemy, who constructed five batteries
in various parts of the exterior, and brought artillery-fire to bear
against him day after day. They also held the neighbouring fort of
Jelalabad, which formed a sixth base of attack. So steadily and
actively, however, did the colonel maintain his defence, that the
enemy’s fire occasioned him very little loss. Matters continued thus
until the middle of November, when Sir Colin Campbell, conquering
Jelalabad, and reaching Alum Bagh, made a few changes in the garrison.
Then, in the last week of the month, Sir James Outram became master of
the Alum Bagh, with a picked force of 3000 to 4000 men. He easily
maintained his position throughout December, and gave the enemy a severe
defeat on the 22d, at a place called Giulee, three miles from Alum Bagh
on the Dil Koosha road. The opening of the year 1858 found Outram still
at his post, and the enemy still endeavouring or hoping to cut off his
communications and starve him out.[134] Some of his troops were away,
convoying a supply of provisions from Cawnpore; and the enemy, knowing
this, resolved to attack him on the 12th of January in his weakened
state. Fathoming their intentions, he prepared for defence. At sunrise
they appeared, to the immense number of at least 30,000, and formed a
wide semicircle in front and flank of his position. Outram, massing his
troops into two brigades, sent them out to confront the enemy. Then
commenced a very fierce battle; for while the main body of the enemy
attacked these two brigades, a second proceeded to assault the fort of
Jelalabad, while a third by a detour reached the Alum Bagh itself, and
endeavoured to cut off Outram’s communications with it. From sunrise
till four o’clock in the afternoon did the struggle continue, every
British gun being incessantly engaged in repelling the advances of dense
masses of the enemy. Foiled at every point, the insurgents at length
withdrew to the city or to their original positions in the gardens and
villages. It was a very serious struggle, for the enemy fought well and
were in overwhelming numbers; nevertheless, their discomfiture was
complete. Four days afterwards they made another attack, in smaller
numbers, but with greater boldness: the result was the same as
before—complete defeat and severe loss. Thus did this skilful and
watchful commander frustrate every hostile attempt made by the swarms of
insurgents who surrounded him.
We turn our attention next further eastward. The Nepaulese leader, Jung
Bahadoor, with Brigadier MacGregor as representative of British
interests, entered Goruckpore on the 6th of January, thus taking
possession of a city which for many months had been almost entirely in
the hands of rebels. The force was Goorkha, the officers were Nepaulese
and English. Jung Bahadoor and Brigadier MacGregor being the two
leaders, the brigades were thus commanded—the first by Run Singh and
Captain Plowden, the second by Sunmuck Singh and Captain Edmonstone, the
third by Junga Doge and Lieutenant Foote, and the artillery by Loll
Singh and Major Fitzgerald. This singular combination was made because,
although Jung Bahadoor was entitled to appoint his own native officers,
it was nevertheless desirable that English officers should be at hand to
advise or even control if necessary. The advancing force had first to
effect a passage over a nullah, the bridge of which was broken, and the
banks stoutly defended by the enemy; this was done after a short but
sharp conflict. The enemy fled from the nullah through a jungle towards
the city, pursued by the Goorkhas; but the latter could not equal the
sepoys in running over loose sand, and therefore could not come up with
them. All the baggage having crossed the nullah, Jung Bahadoor steadily
advanced towards the city, attacked by new parties of the enemy in
skirmishing form on both flanks. Many hundreds of the rebels rushed into
the river Ribtee, to effect a safe crossing to the other side, adjacent
to the Oude frontier; but they were shot down or drowned in considerable
numbers in this attempt to escape. Goruckpore was entered, and taken
possession of in the English name. It is curious to trace, in the
military dispatch of Brigadier MacGregor to the Calcutta authorities,
the same conventional ‘mention’ of Nepaulese officers as is customary in
the British army. Colonel Loll Singh ‘proved himself a good artillery
officer;’ Captain Suzan Singh’s ‘very effective fire was much admired;’
Brigadier Junga Doge ‘reaped, conjointly with the artillery, the
principal honours of the day;’ Brigadier Sunmuck Singh’s brigade ‘was
well in advance;’ Brigadier Run Singh’s brigade ‘was most skilfully led
through the forest;’ and Brigadier Jodh Adhikaree was only shut out from
praise by the fact that his brigade was not brought into action. The
names of the British officers were set forth in parallel order, each to
receive praise by the side of his Nepaulese companion. The English
commander of a military force, we may here remark, must often be
embarrassed while writing his dispatches; for unless he mentions the
name of almost every officer, he gives offence; while it taxes his
powers of composition to vary the terms in which encomiums are
expressed. When Goruckpore was once again placed under British control,
the authorities quickly put down the so-called government which had been
introduced by Mahomed Hussein, the self-appointed nazim or chief. Such
of his adherents as had clearly been rebellious were quickly tried, and
many of them executed. All the convicted natives who were not sentenced
to hanging were made to do sweeper’s work, within the church, jail, and
other buildings, without respect to their caste, creed, or former
dignity. Mushurruff Khan, and other rebellious leaders in the district
between Goruckpore and the Oude frontier, were one by one captured, to
the manifest pacification of the country villages and planters’ estates.
In the wide stretch of country between Patna and Allahabad, and between
the Ganges on the south and Nepaul on the north, everything was awaiting
the completion of the commander-in-chief’s plans. In and near Arrah,
Azimghur, Ghazeepore, Jounpoor, Benares, and Mirzapore, there were
bodies of malcontents ready to break out into open rebellion as soon as
any favourable opportunities should occur for so doing, but checked by
the gradually increasing power of the British. On one occasion, towards
the close of the month, Brigadier Franks marched out of Secundra, near
Allahabad, against a body of 500 rebels, who were posted with several
guns at Nussunpore. He totally defeated them, and captured two of their
guns. About the same time, on the 22d of the month, Colonel Rowcroft,
with detachments of H.M. 10th foot, sailors, Sikhs, and Goorkhas,
proceeded from Azimghur towards the Oudian frontier, there to aid in
hemming in the rebels. Indeed, Jung Bahadoor, Franks, and Rowcroft, at
the end of the month, feeling that all was pretty secure on the east of
the frontier, were gradually drawing a cordon round the Oudians, from
Nepaul in the north to the Ganges on the south—ready to concur in any
large scheme of operations which Sir Colin Campbell might be enabled to
initiate.
The brigadiers who were more immediately under the eye of Sir Colin
Campbell were employed during the month of January, as has already been
implied, in clearing away bands of insurgents in the Doab and
neighbouring districts. To detail the various minor contests will be
unnecessary; one or two will suffice as samples of all. On the 27th of
the month, Brigadier Adrian Hope had a smart contest with the enemy at
Shumshabad. Taking with him a small column,[135] he started from
Futteghur on the previous day, and proceeded through Kooshinabad to
Shumshabad, where he found the enemy in considerable force. They
occupied a commanding knoll on the edge of the plateau overlooking the
plain stretching towards the river. On the knoll was a Mussulman tomb,
surrounded by the remains of an old intrenchment, upon which they had
raised a sand-bag battery; their front was defended by a ravine
impassable for cavalry or guns. Hope, having formed his plan of attack,
moved over some broken ground towards the enemy’s camp. They at once
opened with a well-directed fire of round-shot. Silencing these guns by
a flank fire, Hope ordered his infantry to advance out of a hollow where
they had been screened; they did so, rushed upon the camp, and captured
it. Then began a pursuit of the fleeing enemy by Hope’s cavalry, and the
securing of several guns and much ammunition which they had left behind
them. The brigadier believed the insurgents to consist of two of the
mutinied Bareilly regiments, accompanied by a motley group of rebels
anxious for plunder. About the same day, another district near
Furruckabad became the scene of a fierce encounter. A body of rebels
about 5000 strong, with four guns, being heard of at a distance of some
miles from the city, a force was sent out—consisting of H.M. 42d and 53d
foot, the 4th Punjaubees, two squadrons of H.M. 9th Lancers, two of
Hodson’s Horse, a horse-battery, and two troops of horse-artillery. The
enemy’s guns were planted on the site of an old mud-fort on rising
ground, whence they opened fire as soon as the British came in sight.
The morning being densely foggy, the column proceeded cautiously to
prevent a surprise. The action that ensued was chiefly carried on by
artillery and cavalry, and was marked by several deaths on the side of
the British owing to the blowing up of tumbrils. Among the wounded was
the gallant Hodson, whose name had become so well known in connection
with an active and useful body of Punjaub or Sikh irregular cavalry. The
result of this, as of almost all similar contests, was the defeat and
dispersion of the enemy. A glance at a map will shew that at Furruckabad
and Futteghur (the latter a military station near the former), the
commander-in-chief was in an admirable position to send out detachments
on special service. Bareilly, Allygurh, Agra, Muttra, Minpooree,
Gwalior, Etawah, Calpee, Cawnpore, and Lucknow, formed an irregular
circle of which Furruckabad was the centre.
On the first day of the year the little colony at Nynee Tal received one
of the alarms to which it had been so often subjected for six months;
but, as in all the other instances, the danger was promptly averted. The
subsidiary station at Huldwanee, eighteen miles distant, was attacked
early in the morning by a large number of the Bareilly rebels. Some time
previously, a force of about 600 Goorkhas had been sent to that station;
but owing to the absence of the commandant at Almora, and to the neglect
in making any defensive arrangements, the place was not well prepared to
resist a surprise. The enemy opened an artillery fire most unexpectedly,
for their approach was not in the least anticipated. The gallant little
Goorkhas, however, speedily turned out, met the enemy hand to hand,
defeated them, pursued them three or four miles from the station, and
cut down a considerable number of them.
Of the two imperial or once imperial cities, Agra and Delhi, little need
be said in connection with the events of January. Agra, it will be
remembered, was never out of British hands during the turmoils of 1857,
although severely pressed; and when Delhi on the one side, and Cawnpore
on the other, were recovered, there was less chance than ever that Agra
would fall into the hands of the enemy. The citizens resumed their
ordinary employments, and the British authorities re-established their
civil control.[136]
After four months of strict military occupancy, the city of Delhi was
thrown open to natives who during that interval had been excluded. On
the 18th of January an order to this intent came into operation. Each
person availing himself of it had to pay one rupee four annas to the
kotwallee or police authority; for this he was provided with a ticket,
which insured him certain facilities for living and trading within the
city. The Chandnee Chowk began to resume its former lively appearance; a
military band resumed its evening music in the open space fronting the
English church; and, ‘but for the shot-holes all around,’ as an
eye-witness observed, ‘the signs of many sanguinary months were passing
away.’ A formal charge was drawn up, and judicial proceedings commenced,
against the imprisoned king; but as the trial chiefly took place in
February, we may defer for a few pages any notice of the proceedings.
Everything westward of Delhi may happily be dismissed in the same
language which has so often sufficed in former chapters. Sir John
Lawrence, with his able coadjutors Montgomery, Cotton, and Edwardes,
still held the whole length and breadth of the Punjaub at peace or
nearly so. And the same may in like manner be said of Sinde, where Mr
Frere and General Jacob held sway.
Of the state of the widely scattered and diversely governed regions of
Central India and Rajpootana at the beginning of the year, it is
difficult to give a correct picture. Unlike the Hindustani regions, they
were inhabited by a very motley population—Bundelas, Rajpoots, Rohillas,
Mahrattas, Bheels, Jâts, Ghonds, all mingled, and governed by chieftains
who cared much more for their own petty authority than for the kings of
Delhi and Lucknow, or for castes and creeds. Luckily the two principal
Mahratta leaders, Scindia and Holkar, still remained faithful to the
British, and thus rendered possible what would have been impossible
without their assistance. If to Central India and Rajpootana, we add
Bundelcund and the Saugor territories, we shall have a wide sweep of
country approached nearest at one point by the Calcutta presidency, at
another by the Madras presidency, and at a third by that of Bombay. As,
however, Calcutta had no troops to spare for that part of India, Madras
and Bombay sent up columns and ‘field-forces’ as fast as they could be
provided; and thus it is that we read of small military bodies under
Stuart, Steuart, Roberts, Whitlock, Rose, Raines, and other officers.
According to the number of troops composing them, and the districts in
which their services were required, these columns received various
names—such as ‘Rajpootana Field-force,’ ‘Nerbudda Field-force,’ ‘Malwah
Field-force,’ and ‘Central India Field-force.’ The mere naming might be
of small consequence, were it not that confusion arose occasionally by
different appellations being employed at different times for the very
same force. At various periods during the month encounters took place, a
few of which may briefly be noticed.
On the 6th of January, a small force of about 500 miscellaneous troops,
with guns, set out from Camp Muddah in Rajpootana, under Major Raines,
to rout a body of rebels at Rowah. They found the village strongly
fortified by a hedge fronting a deep ditch and breastwork of earth,
thick and loopholed. After a reconnaissance the major advanced; when the
enemy opened fire, bringing down branches of trees with a crash among
the British. When a hot artillery and infantry fire had been maintained
for some time, about 200 men of the 10th Bombay N.I. received orders to
storm the village; they advanced in admirable order, dashed forward,
cleared the hedge, mounted to the opposite side, and compelled the
insurgents to make a precipitate retreat. The village was burned to
ashes, and the force returned to camp—having marched over deep sand in a
thick jungle for twenty-two miles. One of the horrors of war was
illustrated forcibly in a few brief words contained in an officer’s
narrative of this engagement: ‘The villagers were mowed down in sections
by the artillery, as they were entering a cave on the sides of the rock
in rear of the village.’ Nothing perplexed the English officers more
than to determine how far to compassionate the native villagers;
sometimes these poor creatures suffered terribly and undeservedly; but
on other occasions they unquestionably assisted the rebels.’
[Illustration:
Houses in the Chandnee Chowk, Delhi.
]
Sir Hugh Rose had a short but decisive encounter with a body of rebels
at Ratgurh or Rutgurh towards the close of the month. This was a town in
Central India, between Saugor and Bhopal, in and near which many
chieftains had unfurled the banner of rebellion, at the head of whom was
Nawab Fazil Mahomed Khan. Ratgurh was a strong place, in good repair,
and supplied with a year’s provisions. The rebels intended to have made
a bold stand; but they lost heart when they saw siege-artillery brought
up to a position which they had deemed unattainable, and applied to the
breaching of their fort. Many of the defenders abandoned the fort during
the night, letting themselves down by ropes from the rocks, &c. On the
next day some of their number, aided by many mutinous sepoys, emerged
from the thick jungles in the neighbourhood, attacked the videttes
guarding the rear of Sir Hugh’s camp, and attempted to relieve the fort;
but they were driven across the river Betwah, and the fort securely
captured. It is worthy of note how many of the contests during the wars
of the mutiny partook of the nature of sieges. Mud-forts have been
famous in India for centuries, and the natives exhibit much tact in
defending them. As long as guns attack from a safe distance, such
strongholds may be long defended; but a storming by British bayonets
utterly paralyses the garrisons. Sir Hugh bent his attention towards
Saugor also, which had for many months been invested by a large body of
the enemy. With the second brigade of the Central India Field-force,
reinforced by the 3d Europeans and the 3d native cavalry from the Poonah
division, he laid his plans for an effective relief of that place.
General Whitlock, with a Madras column, was also bound for Saugor; but
it was expected that Rose would reach that place before him.
In another region, much nearer Calcutta, a small military affair
presented itself for notice. Just before the commencement of the new
year, Sumbhulpore was relieved from a trouble that had pressed upon it,
in the presence of a miscellaneous body of rebels. A small force of less
than 300 troops, consisting of Madras native infantry, Ramgurh infantry,
and Nagpoor irregular cavalry, made a forced march from Nagpoor to
Sumbhulpore; and on the 30th of December Captain Wood marched out with
this force to chastise a body of rebels encamped in a gorse-land near
the city. The victory was speedy and decisive, and was rendered more
valuable by the capture of three native chieftains who had been leaders
in the rebellion. The rebels were not sepoys, but escaped convicts.
The large and important regions of Nagpoor and Hyderabad exhibited
nearly the same features at the beginning of the year as they had done
during the summer and autumn. Containing very few pure Hindustanis of
the Brahmin and Rajpoot castes, and being within comparatively easy
reach of the trusty and trusted native troops of the Madras presidency,
they were seldom disturbed by symptoms of mutiny. The British
commissioners or residents had, it is true, much to render them anxious;
but the perils were not so great as those which weighed down their
brother-officials in other regions. The Deccan, or Hyderabad, or the
Nizam’s Country—for it was known by all three names—had from the first
been more troubled by marauders than by regular military mutineers. The
villages of Mugrool, Janappul, Sind Kaid, Rungeenee, and Dawulgaum,
mostly distant about twenty or thirty miles from Jaulnah, were infested
during January by predatory bands of Rohillas and Bheels, who alarmed
the villages by acts of plunder, dacoitee, and cruelty. They even went
so far as to plunder the treasure-chest of a regiment of the Hyderabad
Contingent, while on the way from Aurungabad to Jaulnab, and barely two
miles from the last-named place. The officer commanding at Jaulnah sent
a small force in pursuit; but the marauders, here as elsewhere, were
swift of foot, and made clear off with their booty. These Bheels, a
half-savage mountain tribe, gave annoyance in more districts than one.
Captain Montgomery, superintendent of police at Ahmednuggur, a city
between Jaulnah and Bombay, found it necessary to go out and attack a
strong body of them, who held a position in a jungle twelve miles from
Chandore. He had with him a miscellaneous force of Bombay native troops;
but after three successive attempts he was beaten back from the enemy’s
position, and wounded, as well as three of his officers.
The Nagpoor force, though never very closely in league with the
mutineers further north, contrived to rouse suspicion and bring down
punishment early in the year. The Nagpoor irregulars had been disarmed
by Brigadier Prior very early in the history of the Revolt; but Mr
Plowden, commissioner of the Nagpoor territory, believing that they
might be trusted, advised that their weapons should again be given to
them. The conduct of the men throughout the rest of the year justified
this reliance; but, with the strange inconsistency that so often marked
the proceedings of the natives, they stained the first month of the year
with a deed of violence. On the 18th of January, at Raeepore, a place on
the road between Nagpoor and Cuttack, a party of Mussulman gunners in
the Nagpoor artillery suddenly rose, murdered Sergeant-major Sidwell,
and called on the 3d Nagpoor irregular infantry to assist them in
exterminating the Europeans. Either the 3d were innocent in the matter,
or their hearts failed them; for they not only remained firm, but at
once assisted in disarming the gunners. On the 22d, Lieutenant Elliott,
deputy-commissioner, rode into Raeepore, and immediately brought the
gunners to trial; all but one were found guilty, and were hung that same
evening, amid frantic appeals to their comrades to save them for the
sake of their common faith—an appeal to which the infantry did not
respond.
It may be observed, in relation to all the military operations in the
month of January, that there were certain rebel leaders whose personal
movements were seldom clearly known to the British officers. Nena Sahib
of Bithoor, Koer Singh of Jugdispore, and Mohammed Khan of Bareilly,
were unquestionably urging the sepoys and rebels to continue the
struggle against the Company’s ‘raj;’ but their own marchings and
retreatings from place to place were veiled in much obscurity. There
was, in truth, a very intelligible motive for this; for a price was
placed upon the head of each, and he could not fully know whether any
traitor were at his elbow. Some of the leaders, such as the Rajah of
Minpooree and the Nawab of Furruckabad, were believed to have joined
their fortunes with those of the defenders of Lucknow; while Mahomed
Hussein, as we have seen, was hovering between Oude and Goruckpore,
according to the strength of the Goorkhas sent against him. It was known
that many of the Gwalior mutineers, after their severe defeat in
December, had collected again in Bundelcund; but it was not clearly
ascertained who among them assumed the post of leader.
[Illustration]
-----
Footnote 131:
A return was prepared by order of parliament, of the odds and ends
composing what was called the _sea-kit_ of English soldiers going out
to India, the cost at which they were estimated, and the mode of
paying for them:
Articles. Price.
Two canvas frocks at 3_s._ 3_d._ (jackets substituted for £0 6 6
frocks in the case of sergeants),
One pair canvas trousers, 0 3 4
One neck handkerchief, 0 0 8
One pair of shoes, 0 6 0
Three pounds of marine soap, at 7_d._, 0 1 9
Two pounds of yellow soap, at 7_d._, 0 1 2
Nine balls of pipeclay, 0 0 9
One quart tin-pot, with hook, 0 1 0
One scrubbing-brush, 0 0 8
Three tins of blacking, 0 1 0
One clasp-knife, 0 1 0
One bag in lieu of haversack, 0 0 10
Needles and thread, 0 1 0
Three pounds of tobacco, at 2_s._ 8_d._, 0 8 0
Two flannel-belts, 0 2 0
Two check-shirts, at 2_s._ 6_d._, 0 5 0
—— —— —
£2 0 8
‘The prices,’ as the return tells us, ‘are unavoidably liable to
variation, but those in the above list will serve as a general
standard for guidance. These extra necessaries are paid for by the men
to whom they are issued, out of pay advanced for the purpose. Tobacco
is issued to such men only as are in the habit of using it; and if any
man be provided already with any of the above articles, and such are
in a serviceable condition, a duplicate supply is not given.’
It will at once be understood that the ordinary equipment of the
soldier is not here mentioned; only the extras for the sea-voyage
being included. The ‘nine balls of pipeclay’ constitute perhaps the
worst item in the list.
Footnote 132:
Before the final departure from the neighbourhood of Cawnpore, the
British troops did their best to despoil one who received more
execration than any other man in India. An officer writing at the
close of the year, said: ‘We have made very good use of our delay at
Cawnpore. The Highland brigade was encamped at Bithoor, and employed
in raising all Nena Sahib’s valuables from a well. The operation was a
most difficult one, as the well was deep and full of water. However,
it was very successful; for not including their last day’s work (a
very good one) they raised 75½ pounds of gold in various shapes, and
252 pounds of silver. The last day they got an enormous quantity of
gold and silver, so heavy that a man could just carry it. I hope they
will come upon Bajee Rao’s Jewels. There are two more wells yet to
open. The Nena is “beating his breast” at our well-successes.’
Footnote 133:
One incident of this affair was afterwards thus described by an
officer present: ‘A brigade was sent to repair the suspension-bridge.
They commenced work on the 1st, and by morning of the 2d had finished
it all but one or two planks, which they were laying down, when the
chief saw the villagers come out of the village opposite. He desired
some one to go and tell them not to be afraid, as they would not be
hurt; when all of a sudden bang came a round-shot from amongst them,
which killed four men of the 53d. The enemy were then discovered to be
in force; the naval brigade soon opened on them, pitching into the
village for about two hours, they returning it with an 18-pounder and
a 9-pounder. When the firing commenced, we were all sent for, the
bridge was soon finished, and then the chief with his force crossed,
turned them out of the village, and pursued them with cavalry and
artillery for about eight miles.’
Footnote 134:
Sir James Outram’s total force in and near the Alum Bagh, at the
beginning of the year, was made up of the following elements:
H.M. 5th, 75th, 78th, 84th, and 90th foot.
1st Madras Europeans.
Brasyer’s Ferozpore Sikhs.
12th irregular cavalry.
Hardinge’s corps.
Military train.
Engineer park.
Artillery park.
Madras Sappers and Miners.
Royal artillery, under Eyre and Maude.
Bengal artillery, under Olphert.
Footnote 135:
9th Lancers, two squadrons.
Hodson’s Horse, 200.
Bengal H.A. one troop.
Bengal F.A. 4 guns.
42d Highlanders.
53d foot.
4th Punjaub rifles.
Footnote 136:
The condition of the British quarters in Agra at the beginning of the
year was briefly told by one of the writers in the _Mofussilite_
newspaper, after the severe pressure on the garrison had ceased: ‘The
fort is being abandoned by every one who has a house which can be made
in the least degree habitable; but many people will still be compelled
to remain within its gloomy walls for an indefinite period; as in many
instances the destruction of houses has been so complete, that it will
be a work of time and a matter of considerable expense to place them
in anything like decent repair.... As we are fortunate enough to
possess a good house with a pucka roof, which has been put into
excellent repair, we intend publishing next Tuesday’s paper in that
building—the former printing-office of the _Mofussilite_. We shall all
be put to great straits for furniture, crockery, and such like things;
for although a charpoy (stump-bedstead), a teapoy, and a couple of
broken chairs, were as much as we could find room for in one of our
little cells of the fort, yet we shall soon require rather more when
we dwell in roomier habitations. Our distant friends must know that it
is a rare thing to see two plates of the same pattern on any table,
and that none but those upon whom fortune has smiled indulge in glass
tumblers. Tin pots are the height of our ambition. Port, sherry,
brandy, Allsopp, and Bass, are beverages generally as unknown to this
community as they were to Robinson Crusoe.’
[Illustration:
SIR JAMES OUTRAM.
]