CLOSING EVENTS OF THE YEAR.
The expedition of Sir Colin Campbell to Lucknow in November, followed by
the extraordinary rescue of the British residents at that city, formed
an episode in the history of the Indian Revolt well worthy of being
treated singly and separately from other matters. This having been done,
the present chapter may conveniently be devoted to the closing events of
the year in other places, touching only upon such occurrences as
immediately affected the mutiny or the plans for its suppression. As in
the former chapters[124]—relating, the one to July and August, and the
other to September and October—the survey (applicable in this case to
November and December) may usefully begin in the Calcutta provinces, and
thence travel westward.
Calcutta itself, for reasons more than once stated, was not likely to be
materially affected by mutinous proceedings. The interests of the native
towns-people, concerned in supplying the wants of a larger number of
Europeans than resided at any other city in India, led them to prefer
scenes of quiet, even if the Bengalee character had been more warlike
than is its wont; while the frequent landing of British troops from
other shores kept in awe such of the sepoy soldiers as still remained in
arms. A naval squadron anchored in the Hoogly, with sufficient power of
metal to batter the city to ruins if danger arose. The natives, except a
few of fanatical character, were more disposed to seek for holiday than
for war; and holiday occasionally fell to their share, in the
proceedings of the British themselves. On one day, towards the close of
November, there were 4500 British troops temporarily garrisoned at
Calcutta, and 11 ships-of-war anchored in the river. The troops
comprised H.M. 19th, 20th, 42d, 54th, 79th, and 97th regiments of foot,
or portions of them, together with one battalion of the 60th Rifles, and
one of the Rifle brigade. A review of most of these fine troops was held
on the Calcutta volunteers’ parade-ground, before the journey to the
upper provinces commenced. The Calcutta government commenced operations
for reorganising the vast regions which had been thrown into confusion
by the Revolt. A plan was sketched out for separating the divisions of
Delhi and Meerut from the Northwest Provinces, and transferring them to
the government of the Punjaub—in order that they might share in the
peculiar system of executive rule which had been found to work well in
the Punjaub, under the energetic control of Sir John Lawrence. The rest
of the Northwest Provinces could not be permanently reorganised until
the warlike operations had made further advance. Another proceeding on
the part of the government was to send out a commission to the Andaman
Islands, to examine how far they were suited as a penal settlement for
rebels or traitors sentenced to transportation; the commission comprised
naval and medical officers, who were empowered to select a spot healthy
in situation and easily defended.
In the easternmost districts of India, mutiny shewed itself in small
degree. It could hardly be other than slight, however; for the
Hindustani troops were few in number, and the general population not ill
affected. Three companies of the 34th Bengal native infantry, it will be
remembered,[125] were stationed at Chittagong at the very beginning of
the troubles in March and April; they not only remained faithful when
the other companies of the same regiment became mutinous at Berhampore,
but made a very high-flown declaration of their loyalty. After remaining
‘true to their salt’ throughout the whole of the summer and autumn,
these three companies at length yielded to the general mania. They broke
out into mutiny at Chittagong on the 18th of November, burnt their
lines, blew up the magazine, looted the treasury, and commenced a search
for Europeans. These latter escaped, chiefly in boats upon the river.
The mutineers then released the convicts from the jail, and decamped.
They moved northward, apparently tending toward Tipperah, where a petty
rajah held his court. Directly this was known, Major Byng, commanding a
Silhet native regiment, marched down from the hills, and met the
mutineers. A brief conflict ensued, in which the major unfortunately
received a mortal wound; but the misguided men of the 34th, meeting with
no kind of sympathy from the Silhetees, were almost wholly annihilated
within a few days.
There were at that time two companies of the 73d native regiment at
Dacca; and as soon as the authorities received from the magistrate of
Chittagong news of what had occurred at the last-mentioned place, they
resolved to disarm those two companies, as a precaution against
mischief. The sepoys, however, hearing the news from Chittagong more
speedily than the authorities, prepared for resistance. A party of
volunteers disarmed a few scattered sepoys; but as the others had
artillery to assist them, a hundred English sailors, with two or three
howitzers, were told off to deal with them. A sharp contest ensued at
the sepoy barracks, with balls, grape, and musketry; until at length the
sailors, determined on a closer attack, rushed upon the sepoys, drove
them out of the barracks, and killed many on the spot. The rest set off
on a hasty march to Jelpigoree, the head-quarters of the regiment. So
utterly was that part of India denuded of British troops, that there
were none to repel even one or two hundred mutineers; and many villages
were plundered on the road. The check came from a quarter where
apparently the mutineers least expected it—from the men of their own
regiment. The motives of the native troops were as inscrutable now as at
any former time; for although the two companies thus rebelled, fought,
and fled, the bulk of the regiment remained faithful. They had even
quietly permitted two hundred Goorkhas to join the regiment—that step
having been adopted by the authorities to infuse new blood into the
corps. An officer of the 73d, writing from Jelpigoree on the 3d of
December, said: ‘Our men have sworn to their native officers (not to us)
that they will do their duty; and our spies, who have hitherto proved so
trustworthy, declare that we may fully depend on the regiment. Yesterday
the test commenced by our ordering accoutrements and ammunition to be
served out to our two hundred Goorkhas. This was done cheerfully, and is
a very good indication of the prevailing feeling. A strange scene it
was, watching the sepoys doling out ammunition to Goorkhas to fight
against their own (the sepoys’) comrades, and it did one’s heart good to
see it: we are all under arms, and very sanguine.’ These men actually
joined in routing the mutinous companies of their own regiment, and in
driving them towards Bhotan, where they died miserably among an
unsympathising population.—Such discrepancies in conduct between
different regiments and different companies of the same regiment, threw
great difficulties in the way of any logical tracing of the causes of
the Revolt.
In a wide region of Bengal westward of Calcutta, the only incidents
requiring notice were two or three in which the Shekhawuttie battalion
shewed that it still remained faithful to the Company’s raj—almost the
last relic of the once magnificent Bengal army. With this regiment
Colonel Forster put down the recusant Rajah of Pachete, whose domain
touched the grand trunk-road above Raneegunge. After hovering some time
on the verge of treason, this man at length refused to obey the British
resident at Rugonauthpoor, Mr Lushington, who was obliged to intrench
himself in self-defence. Colonel Forster hastened thither; and by his
own boldness of bearing, and the faithfulness of his Shekhawutties, he
captured the rajah, a fort of no inconsiderable strength, much wealth,
and a mass of treasonable correspondence—without firing a shot. Shortly
afterwards, Forster marched to Sumbhulpore, where a band of ruffians,
headed by one of their own class, had commenced a course of violence
that needed and obtained a prompt check.
Let us hasten on to the busier scenes of the northwest, viewing them in
connection with Cawnpore as a central point of strategy, and with Sir
Colin Campbell as leader of all the British operations. This may the
more appropriately be done; because there were no events on the Lower
Ganges, between Calcutta and Benares, requiring notice, so far as
concerned the months of November and December.
Cawnpore was a centre in military matters for the following reasons. On
one side of it was Lucknow, so important in relation to the occupancy of
Oude; Allahabad, on another side, was on the great line of route for
troops from Calcutta; Agra and Delhi, towards the northwest, lay on the
path of approach from the Punjaub; while on the south and southwest were
the roads along which armies or columns of armies might march from the
two southern provinces of Madras and Bombay. Hence Sir Colin Campbell
made earnest endeavours to maintain a good position at Cawnpore, as a
convenient base of operations. Colonel Wilson, as commandant, was
instructed to attend to the wants of Lucknow so far as he could, and to
watch the movements of insurgent troops in the neighbourhood. This
continued throughout October. In November, when Sir Colin went with his
small army to relieve Lucknow, he left General Windham—well known in
Crimean warfare as the ‘hero of the Redan’—in command at Cawnpore, not
to fight, but to keep communication safely open from Lucknow _viâ_
Cawnpore to Allahabad. Sir Colin, it will be remembered,[126] hurried
back to Cawnpore at the end of November on account of events that had
occurred during his absence. What those events were, we have now to
narrate.
The series of disasters that occurred to General Windham originated in
part in the want of good communication between him and Sir Colin
Campbell. Whether the messengers were stopped by the way, does not
clearly appear; but Sir Colin remained in ignorance that the Gwalior
mutineers were approaching Cawnpore; while Windham received no replies
to letters sent by him, asking for instructions for his guidance. Sir
Colin knew nothing of Windham’s troubles until, on the 27th of November,
he heard at the Alum Bagh the noise of artillery-firing at Cawnpore;
while Windham received no aid or advice until Sir Colin himself appeared
late on the following day. Whether or not there were defective tactics
in the subsequent management of the affair, this uncertainty at the
beginning was unquestionably disadvantageous. Windham knew, about the
middle of the month, that the Gwalior and Indore mutineers, swelled to
20,000 strong by reinforcements of rebels from various quarters, had
reached within about thirty miles of Cawnpore, on the Calpee road; and a
week later he found that they were within twenty miles. As the troops at
his command barely exceeded 2000 men, and as he received no news from
Campbell, he considered how best to maintain his position. He was in an
intrenchment or intrenched fort, far distant from the one formerly
occupied by Sir Hugh Wheeler, and placed close to the Ganges, so as to
command the bridge of boats; there being within the intrenchment the
requisite buildings for the daily necessities of his force. As the city
of Cawnpore lay between him and the Calpee road, he deemed it necessary
to take up a new position. Leaving some of his troops, therefore, in the
intrenchment, he formed with the remainder a new camp at Dhuboulee,
close to the canal westward of the city, at a point where he believed he
would be able to watch and frustrate the enemy.
On the 26th, finding that the mutineers were approaching, he went out to
encounter them. He started at three in the morning with about 1200
infantry (chiefly of the 34th, 82d, 88th, and Rifles, 100 Sikh cavalry
and eight guns), and marched eight or nine miles to Bhowsee, near the
Pandoo Nuddee—leaving his camp-equipage and baggage near the city.
Brigadier Carthew was second in command; and the chief officers under
him were Colonels Walpole, Kelly, and Maxwell. The enemy were found
strongly posted on the opposite side of the dry bed of the Pandoo
Nuddee. The British advanced with a line of skirmishers along the whole
front, with supports on each flank, and a reserve in the centre. The
enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery from siege and field guns; but
such was the eagerness of the British troops to engage, that they
carried the position with a rush, cheering as they went; and a village,
half a mile in the rear of the enemy, was rapidly cleared. The mutineers
hastily took to flight, leaving behind them two howitzers and one gun.
At this point, apparently for the first time, Windham became aware that
he had been engaging the advanced column only of the enemy, and that the
main force was near at hand. Rendered uneasy by his position, he
resolved on retiring to protect the city, camp, cantonment,
intrenchment, and bridge of boats. This he did.
So far, then, the operations of the 26th were to a certain extent
successful. But disaster followed. He encamped for the night on the
Jewee Plain, on the Calpee side of Cawnpore, having the city between him
and the intrenchment. Whether Windham did not know that the enemy were
so near in great force, whether his camping-ground was ill chosen, or
whether he left his flanks unprotected, certain it is that, about noon
on the 27th, when his men were preparing for a camp-dinner, they were
surprised by an onslaught of the enemy in immense force, from behind a
thick cover of trees and brushwood, beginning with an overwhelming
artillery cannonade. For five hours did this attack continue, chiefly
near the point of junction of the Delhi and Calpee roads. Distracted by
an attack on three sides of him, Windham hastened to see what was doing
on the fourth side, towards the city; and here he ascertained that the
mutineers had turned his flanks, got into the city, and were beginning
to attack the intrenchment near the bridge. Retreat was at once resolved
on; and although the general’s dispatch did not state the fact, the
private letters shew that the retreat was _sauve qui peut_. For, in
truth, it became a matter of speed, whether the British could rush back
to the intrenchment in time to save it. They did so; but at the expense
of a large store of tents, saddlery, harness, camp-equipage, and private
property—all of which had to be abandoned in the hasty scamper from the
camp to the intrenchment. This booty the enemy at once seized upon, and
either appropriated or burned according to its degree of usefulness. No
less than five hundred tents fed a bonfire that night—a loss quite
irreparable at that time to the British.
Bitter was the mortification with which the troops contemplated this
day’s work. One of the officers said in a private letter: ‘You will read
the account of this day’s fighting with astonishment; for it tells how
English troops, with their trophies and their mottoes, and their
far-famed bravery, were repulsed and lost their camp, their baggage, and
their position, by [to?] the scouted and degraded natives of India.’ The
beaten ‘Feringhees,’ as the enemy had now a right to call them, did
certainly retreat to their intrenchment amid overturned tents, pillaged
baggage, men’s kits, fleeing camels, elephants, horses, and servants.
Another officer who had just come up from Allahabad, and who was within
the intrenchment on the afternoon of this day, thus described the scene:
‘Saw our troops retreating into the outer intrenchment. A regular panic
followed. Trains of elephants, camels, horses, bullock-wagons, and
coolies came in at the principal gate, laden with stuff. The principal
buildings are the General Hospital, the Sailors’ Hospital, the
Post-office, and the Commissariat-cellars. Around these houses, which
are scattered, crowds of camels, bullocks, and horses were collected,
fastened by ropes to stakes in the ground, and among the animals, piles
of trunks, beds, chairs, and miscellaneous furniture and baggage. There
was scarcely room to move. Met one of the chaplains hastening into the
intrenchment. He had left everything in his tent outside. The servants
almost everywhere abandoned their masters when they heard the guns.
Mounted officers were galloping across the rough ground between the
inner and outer intrenchments, and doolie after doolie, with its red
curtains down, concealing some poor victim, passed on to the hospitals.
The poor fellows were brought in, shot, cut, shattered, and wounded in
every imaginable way; and as they went by, raw stumps might be seen
hanging over the sides of the doolies, literally like torn butcher-meat.
The agonies which I saw some of them endure during the surgical
operations were such as no tongue or pen can describe. The surgeons, who
did their utmost, were so overworked, that many sufferers lay bleeding
for hours before it was possible to attend to them.’ During the hasty
retreat, one of the guns had been overturned in a narrow street in
Cawnpore. The British could not wait to bring it away; but at night
General Windham ordered 100 men of the 64th to aid a few seamen of the
naval brigade in an expedition to secure the gun. It was a delicate
task, in a city crowded with the enemy; how it was done, one of the
officers of the naval brigade has told.[127]
What was next to be done, became an important question. General Windham
assembled his superior officers, and conferred with them. If he could
have obtained reliable information concerning the position of the
enemy’s artillery, he would have proposed a night-attack; but, in
ignorance on this important point, it was resolved to defer operations
till the morrow. Early on the 28th, accordingly, the force was divided
into four sections, thus distributed: One, under Walpole, was to defend
the advanced portion of the town on the left side of the canal; a
second, under Wilson, was to hold the intrenchment, and establish a
strong picket on the extreme right; a third, under Carthew, was to hold
the Bithoor road in advance of the intrenchment, receiving support from
the picket there if needed; while the fourth section, under Windham
himself, was to defend the portion of the town nearest the Ganges on the
left of the canal, and support Walpole if needful. These several
arrangements were especially intended to protect the intrenchment and
the bridge of boats—so important in relation to Sir Colin Campbell’s
operations in Oude. The British position was to be wholly defensive. A
severe struggle ensued. The Gwalior mutineers were now joined by another
force under Nena Sahib, and a third under his brother Bhola Sahib;
altogether the insurgents numbered 21,000. They marched unmolested
towards the city and cantonment; and then were the few British sorely
pressed indeed. Walpole was speedily engaged in very hard fighting; and
it was on his side only that anything like a victory was achieved. Aided
by Colonels Woodford and Watson, and Captain Greene, Walpole repulsed a
vigorous attack made by the enemy, and captured two 18-pounder guns.
Carthew, who struggled from morning till night against a most formidable
body of the enemy, was at length obliged to retire from his position.
Wilson, eager to render service at an exposed point, led his section of
troops—chiefly consisting of H.M. 64th foot—against four guns planted by
the enemy in front of Carthew’s position. He and his gallant men
advanced in the face of the enemy, and under a murderous fire, for more
than half a mile, up a ravine commanded by high ground in front as well
as on both sides. From the ridge in front, the four 9-pounders played
upon them as they rushed forward. After reaching and almost capturing
the guns, they were encountered by a very large force of the enemy who
had hitherto been hidden; further progress was impossible; they
retreated, and saw their officers falling around them in mournful
number. Colonel Wilson himself was killed; as were also Major Stirling,
Captain M’Crea, and Captain Morphey; while many other officers were
wounded. It was a defeat and a loss, for which no counterbalancing
advantage was gained.
Thus the 28th had increased the humiliation of the preceding day. Tents,
baggage, officers, prestige—all had suffered. The mutineers revelled in
the city as conquerors on the night of the 28th, seizing everything
which had belonged to the British. More than 10,000 rounds of Enfield
cartridges, the mess-plate of four Queen’s regiments, paymasters’
chests, and a large amount of miscellaneous property, fell into their
hands. On the morning of the 29th the insurgents began to bombard the
intrenchment and the bridge of boats. Had not Sir Colin Campbell arrived
at that critical time, it is hard to say what might have been the amount
of disaster; for the enemy were in immense strength; and if the bridge
of boats had been broken, the fate of the refugees from Lucknow might
have been sad indeed. All that day did the firing of the enemy continue.
All that day did the living stream from Lucknow approach the bridge. Sir
Colin immediately assumed command at Cawnpore. Mortifying as it was to
him to leave the enemy in possession of the city and everything west of
it, he had no alternative. One holy duty pressed upon him—to protect the
helpless Lucknow convoy until it could be sent on to Allahabad. He
despatched Hope Grant with a column, to keep open the road from Cawnpore
through Futtehpoor to Allahabad; while he employed all his other troops
in keeping the enemy at bay. The officers in the intrenchment, looking
over their earthworks, could see the six miles’ train of women,
children, sick, wounded, bearers, servants, camp-followers, horses,
oxen, camels, elephants, wagons, carts, palanquins, doolies, advancing
along the road to the bridge; and most narrowly were the movements of
the enemy watched, to prevent any interruption to the passage of the
cavalcade over the frail bridge.
This unfortunate series of events at Cawnpore greatly disconcerted Sir
Colin Campbell. In his first dispatch to government relating to them, he
referred almost without comment to Windham’s own narrative. Three weeks
afterwards a singularly worded dispatch was issued from his camp near
Cawnpore, expressing a regret at an ‘omission’ in his former dispatch;
and adding, ‘I desire to make my acknowledgment of the great
difficulties in which Major-general Windham, C.B., was placed during the
operations he describes in his dispatch; and to recommend him and the
officers whom he notices as having rendered him assistance to your
lordship’s protection and good offices.’ Lord Canning shortly afterwards
issued a general order, containing an echo of Sir Colin’s dispatch.
General Windham continued for a time with the commander-in-chief. If
official dissatisfaction with his management at Cawnpore existed, it was
either hushed up or smoothed away by subsequent explanations.
The month of December opened amid events that caused sufficient anxiety
to Sir Colin Campbell. The convoy of Lucknow fugitives had not yet been
sent away; the Gwalior mutineers had not yet been defeated. He was
compelled to act on the defensive until his helpless non-combatants were
provided for. During one week, from the 26th of November to the 2d of
December, the loss in British officers had been very considerable in and
near Cawnpore; for 10 were reported killed, 32 wounded, and 2 missing.
The commander-in-chief, therefore, while repelling the still audacious
insurgents, had to promote and establish numerous officers, as well as
to reorganise his force.
It was a great relief to Sir Colin when the convoy left Cawnpore on its
march towards Allahabad. He was then free to act as a military
commander; and the enemy did not long delay in giving him an opportunity
of proving his powers of command. On the 5th of December the enemy’s
artillery attacked his left pickets, while their infantry shewed on the
same quarter; they also fired on the British pickets in the
Generalgunje—an old bazaar extending along the canal in front of the
line occupied by the camp. Brigadier Greathed had held this advanced
position supported by Peel’s and Bourchier’s guns. Sir Colin resolved to
take the offensive on the following day. The enemy occupied a strong
position. Their centre was in the city of Cawnpore, and lined the houses
and bazaars overhanging the canal and the barricaded streets; their
right stretched away to a point beyond the crossing of the main
trunk-road over the canal; while their left occupied the old cantonment,
from which General Windham’s post had been principally assailed. The
canal, along which were placed the centre and the right, was thus the
main feature of the enemy’s position, and could only be passed by two
bridges. The enemy’s camp was two miles in rear of their right, on the
Calpee road, which was intended to be their line of advance and retreat.
Sir Colin well studied this position before he formed his plan. ‘It
appeared to me,’ he said in his dispatch, ‘that if the enemy’s right
were vigorously attacked, it would be driven from its position without
assistance being able to come from other parts of the line: the wall of
the town, which gave cover to our attacking columns on the right, being
an effective obstacle to the movement of any portion of the enemy’s
troops from their left to their right.’ In fact, his quick eye saw that
the Gwalior mutineers had placed one-half their force in such a spot
that it could not help the other half, provided the attack were made in
a certain fashion. It was really a large and powerful army to which he
was now confronted; so many other mutinous regiments had joined the
Gwalior Contingent, that their force was now estimated at little short
of 25,000 men, with about 40 pieces of artillery.
[Illustration:
The Battle of Cawnpore, December 6, 1857.
]
On the morning of the 6th, the commander-in-chief assigned to all his
several corps and regiments their respective duties.[128] General
Windham opened a heavy bombardment at nine o’clock, from the
intrenchment in the old cantonment, to induce the enemy to believe that
the attack would be in that quarter. For two hours, the rest of the
force was quietly taking up its position—Greathed’s column in front of
the enemy’s centre, and the other columns in rear of the old cavalry
lines, effectually masked from observation. When it was judged that
Windham’s fire had drawn the enemy’s attention away from the real point
of attack, Sir Colin sent his cavalry and horse-artillery by a detour on
the left, to cross the canal a mile and a half higher up, and assail the
enemy’s rear; while the infantry deployed in parallel lines fronting the
canal. Captain Peel was the first man to cross the canal bridge for the
attack on the enemy’s camp; the heavy guns followed him; and in a few
minutes the enemy were astonished at finding themselves in the heat of
battle on a side not at all contemplated by them. Their defeat was equal
to their surprise. Sir Colin’s regiments crossed the canal by various
bridges, reached the enemy’s camp, cut their forces in two, and then
completely routed them—pursuing them for fourteen miles on the Calpee
road, and capturing guns and wagons as they went. In all this work the
sailors of the naval brigade pushed forward with an energy which seems
to have struck even the commander-in-chief, accustomed as he was to
deeds of daring. In his official dispatch he said: ‘I must here draw
attention to the manner in which the heavy 24-pounder guns were impelled
and managed by Captain Peel and his gallant sailors. Through the
extraordinary energy and good-will with which the latter have worked,
their guns have been constantly in advance throughout our late
operations, from the relief of Lucknow till now—as if they were light
field-pieces. The service rendered by them in clearing our front has
been incalculable. On this occasion there was the sight beheld of
24-pounder guns advancing with the first line of skirmishers.’ Before
Sir Colin returned to camp in the evening, the enemy had been driven
entirely and completely away from Cawnpore. The four infantry brigades
engaged in this hot day’s work were headed by Brigadiers Greathed,
Adrian Hope, Walpole, and Inglis. Windham was only employed in masking
the real nature of the attack. Sir Colin mentioned this matter in the
following peculiar terms: ‘Owing to his knowledge of the ground, I
requested Major-general Windham to remain in command of the
intrenchment, the fire of which was a very important feature in the
operations of the 6th of December; although I felt and explained to
General Windham that it was a command hardly worthy of his rank.’
There was a subsidiary operation in this battle of the 6th. After the
capture of the enemy’s camp, in the afternoon, General Mansfield was
sent to occupy a position called the Subadar’s Tank, in rear of the
enemy’s left, and about a mile and a half from the intrenchment. Having
taken measures for the safeguard of the captured camp, and for
maintaining a good post on the Calpee road, Mansfield advanced towards
the Tank—struggling over broken ground and through enclosures, and
driving parties of the enemy before him. After a good deal of
manœuvring, in ground that greatly assisted the rebels, Mansfield
succeeded in securing the position sought, and had the satisfaction of
seeing large bodies of the enemy’s infantry and cavalry move off
westward in full retreat. As it was not practicable to communicate with
Sir Colin after sunset, the position taken up being almost isolated; and
as there were considerable numbers of the enemy still in occupation of
the town and the old cantonment—Mansfield strengthened the pickets all
round his position, and bivouacked his troops for the night, where they
were left undisturbed by the enemy.
The mutineers were so thoroughly worsted in these operations on the 6th,
that they retired from Cawnpore, irresolute touching their future
plans—some marching in one direction, some in another. After securing
and consolidating his position on the 7th, Sir Colin prepared further
work for his lieutenants. On the 8th, he gave orders to Brigadier Hope
Grant to march to Bithoor, and, if it should appear to him desirable, to
advance further to Serai Ghat, a ferry over the Ganges about twenty-five
miles above Cawnpore. This energetic officer set off with a strong
column of 2800 men[129] and 11 guns, and marched through Bithoor to
Soorajpore, three miles short of Serai Ghat. Here he bivouacked for the
night. Early in the morning of the 9th, leaving a portion of his column
to guard the baggage, he advanced with the main body, and found the
enemy assembling on the bank of the river. The opposing forces soon got
engaged in an artillery action, in which Grant’s guns narrowly escaped
being lost in a quicksand at the river-side. After a sharp firing for
half an hour, the enemy’s guns were silenced and then withdrawn. Then
came up a force of the rebels’ cavalry, to endeavour to capture Grant’s
guns; but he promptly sent forward his own cavalry, which advanced upon
them, drove them away, pursued them, and cut up a considerable number.
The nature of the ground, however, was such that most of the enemy
reached the cover of trees and houses before the British could intercept
them. Hope Grant’s infantry was not engaged in this conflict; the
retreat of the enemy taking place before their aid was needed. The enemy
left behind them fourteen brass guns and howitzers, one iron 18-pounder,
together with a large store of wagons and ammunition—all of which were
speedily secured by the conquerors. These trophies were brought away by
the exertions of the infantry, who had much difficulty to contend
against along the quicksands. The troops had been marching and fighting
for thirty hours, with few and short intervals, and had scarcely eaten
for twenty-four hours; so that a supper, a night’s rest, and a quiet day
on the 10th, were very welcome to them. This affair at Serai Ghat
completely succeeded; but the most extraordinary fact relating to it has
yet to be mentioned. Hope Grant’s casualty-list _was a blank_! In his
dispatch he said: ‘I am truly grateful to God, and happy to say, that
though the fire of grape from the enemy was most severe and well placed,
falling among the artillery like hail, I had not a single man even
wounded, and only one horse of Captain Middleton’s battery killed. It
was truly marvellous and providential. Thirteen guns, most of them
9-pounders and 24-pounder howitzers, were playing with grape on the
gallant artillery, and with round-shot upon the cavalry, the former
within about five hundred yards—and his excellency is well aware with
what precision these rebels fire their guns—yet not one single man was
wounded.’ It requires all one’s faith in the honour of a truthful man to
credit such a marvellous announcement.
In the various operations from the 3d to the 8th of December inclusive,
Sir Colin suffered a loss of 13 killed and 86 wounded—a mere trifle
compared with the strength of his force and the kind of enemy with whom
he had to deal. Among the killed were Lieutenants Salmond and Vincent;
and among the wounded, General Mansfield, Lieutenant-colonel Horsford,
Captains Longden, Forbes, and Mansfield, Lieutenants Neill and Stirling,
Ensigns Wrench, Graham, and Dyce. Lieutenant Stirling afterwards died
from the effects of a wound which was at first reputed curable.
The occurrences narrated in the last few pages will have shewn by what
steps Sir Colin Campbell obtained a firm footing at Cawnpore, as a
centre from which he and his officers might operate in various
directions. He had removed the British from Lucknow; he had furnished to
Outram such a force as would enable that general to hold the Alum Bagh
against all assailants; and he had dispersed the formidable rebel army
which so endangered Windham and the British interests at Cawnpore. In
the latter half of December he prepared to start off, with one portion
of his force, towards Furruckabad; while Walpole was to proceed to
Etawah, and Hope Grant to Futtehpoor; leaving Seaton to operate near
Minpooree, Franks near Benares, and other brigadiers and colonels in
various directions as rapidly as small columns could be brought
together. The object appeared to be, to attack and disperse the enemy in
various parts of the Northwest Provinces, and either permit or compel
them to retreat into Oude—where a great effort, made early in the
ensuing year, might possibly crush the rebellion altogether. So much of
these operations as took place in December may briefly be noticed here,
before proceeding to the affairs of Central India.
The whole region around Benares, Mirzapore, Allahabad, Goruckpore, and
Jounpoor was thrown into occasional uneasiness—not so much by rebellious
manifestations at those places, as by temptations thrown out by the
Oudians. Mahomed Hussein was still powerful as a leader near the Oudian
frontier; and he left no means untried to rally numerous insurgents
around his standard. As the British could spare very few troops for
service in this quarter, Mahomed Hussein remained throughout the most of
the year master in and near Goruckpore. Even if the British were enabled
to defeat him occasionally, they had no cavalry wherewith to organise a
pursuit, and he speedily returned to his old quarters. Thus, towards the
close of December, Colonel Rowcroft, with a mixed body of English
sailors, Sikh police, and Goorkha irregulars, defeated this chieftain
near Mujhowlee; but, unable to pursue him without cavalry, the victory
was of little effect. Jung Bahadoor, as we have seen in a former
chapter, sent a strong body of Goorkhas several weeks earlier to aid in
the pacification of this part of India; and the gallant little Nepaulese
warriors enabled the few English officers to effect that which would
have been impracticable without such assistance. Jung Bahadoor himself,
in conformity with an engagement made with Viscount Canning, prepared to
join in the scene in person. He descended with 9000 picked men from his
mountains in December, to attack the Oudian rebels near Goruckpore and
Azimghur, and drive them back to their own country. It was just at the
close of the year that he began to encounter the enemy, and to obtain
successes which left Franks, Rowcroft, Longden, and other officers, free
to engage in such operations as Sir Colin Campbell might plan for them
at the opening of the new year.
Allahabad and Mirzapore, though often threatened, remained safely in
British hands. In the Rewah district, southwest of those cities, the
rajah still continued faithful, and Captain Osborne still carried on
those energetic operations by which he had so long and so wonderfully
maintained his post in a territory where he was almost the sole
Englishman, and where many of the rajah’s troops were burning with
impatience to join the insurgents elsewhere. Osborne was incessantly on
the watch, and almost incessantly in motion, to keep open the important
line of route between Mirzapore through Rewah to Jubbulpoor—part of the
available postal route between Calcutta and Bombay. There was a nest of
rebels at Myhere that gave him much trouble; but, aided by the faithful
portion of the rajah’s troops, he defeated them at Kunchynpore and
Zorah; and finally, on the 28th of December, stormed and captured Myhere
itself.
In Oude, as the last chapter sufficiently shewed, British power was
represented simply and solely by Sir James Outram and his companions in
the Alum Bagh and at the Bridge of Bunnee. Lucknow was quite in the
hands of the enemy, as were all the provincial districts of Oude. Sir
James maintained his post steadily; not strong enough to make conquests,
but holding the key to a position that might become all-important as
soon as the commander-in-chief should resume operations in that quarter.
So well did he keep watch and guard, that the movements of any insurgent
troops in his vicinity became speedily known to him. On the 22d of
December, the rebels made a clever attempt to obtain possession of the
road to Cawnpore. They posted 1200 men inside a jungle, with a sandy
plain in front and a road close at hand. Sir James, detecting the
intended plan, silently moved out two regiments in the dead of the
night. The soft sand deadened all sound; and dawn found them within the
enemy’s pickets. A rattling volley and a cheer startled the enemy, who,
after one discharge of their muskets, fled, leaving a hundred of their
number dead on the field, besides four guns and several
ammunition-wagons. One good result of this victory was, to induce some
of the villagers to bring supplies for sale to the camp.
In Rohilcund, nothing could at present be effected to wrest the province
from the enemy, until the Doab had been cleared from the host of rebels
and marauders who infested it.
The proceedings of certain columns in the Doab, both before and after
Sir Colin’s victory at Cawnpore, must here be noticed.
Colonel Seaton, during the month of November, was placed in command of a
column—consisting of one wing of the 1st Bengal Europeans, the 7th
Punjaub infantry, a squadron of Carabiniers, Hodson’s Horse, a troop of
horse-artillery, and two companies of Sappers and Miners. Seaton started
from Delhi, and worked his way southeastward, between the Jumna and the
Ganges, clearing off small portions of the enemy as he went. After
picking up at Allygurh a small force from the Agra garrison under Major
Eld, he started again on the 13th of December, towards Etawah and
Minpooree. The self-styled Rajah of Minpooree, who had fled at the
approach of Greathed’s column in October, afterwards returned to his old
haunts, and expelled the officials established there by Greathed. His
palace had been blown up, and his treasury and jewel-house looted; yet
he possessed influence enough to collect a band of retainers in his
service. To punish this rebel was one of the duties intrusted to Colonel
Seaton. On the 14th, he fell in with a body of the insurgents, 4000
strong, at Gunjeree, on a small stream called the Neem Nuddee. His
column suddenly surprised them, disordered them by a brilliant charge of
Carabiniers, and drove them in confusion along the Futteghur
road—capturing several guns on the way. Hodson’s Horse cut down many of
them during a brief pursuit. On the 15th, the column marched to
Khasgunj, and on the 16th to Sahawur—in each case only to learn that the
enemy had just fled. Seaton, determined not to give them up readily,
marched on to Putialah, several miles further on the Furruckabad road,
where he came up with them on the morning of the 17th. They were drawn
up in a good position, with their centre and left posted behind ravines,
and their right abutting on a tope of trees in front of the village.
After having caused this position to be well reconnoitred by Captain
Hodson and Lieutenant Greathed, Colonel Seaton began the contest with a
sharp fire of light artillery, to which the enemy promptly responded. He
then ordered the cavalry round to the right, to avoid the ravines, and
to attack the enemy in flank. While this was being done, the infantry,
deploying into line, advanced boldly on the enemy’s right, charged with
the bayonet, and speedily drove them out of the tope and village. The
rout was complete, the cavalry having got round beyond the ravines, and
reached a point whence they could pursue the fleeing enemy. Thirteen
guns, camp-equipage, baggage, ammunition, and stores fell into the hands
of the conquerors; while no less than 600 of the enemy were computed to
have fallen in the field or during the pursuit. Leaving Furruckabad and
its chieftain to be dealt with by Sir Colin Campbell, Colonel Seaton
moved on towards Minpooree. He found the enemy awaiting him, posted a
mile west of the city, with their front screened by large trees, under
cover of which their guns opened upon the column as it came up. Seaton,
by a flank-movement, disconcerted them, and they commenced a retreat,
which resulted in the loss of six guns and a large number of men. The
colonel at once took possession of Minpooree.
Brigadier Showers, another officer to whom the management of a column
was intrusted, started, like Seaton, from Delhi, and, like him, sought
to regain towns and districts which had long been a prey to misrule.
This column began its operations in October, and during the following
month returned to Delhi, after having retaken Nunoond, Dadree, and other
places southwest of the city, together with many lacs of rupees which
the rebels had looted from the several treasuries of the Company.
Between Delhi and the Sutlej, General Van Cortlandt maintained
tranquillity by the aid of a small force. Colonel Gerrard was the
commander of another small column; consisting of one European regiment
and a miscellaneous body of native troops. With this he marched to
Rewaree, and thence to the town of Narnoul in Jhujjur, where a rebel
chief, Sunnand Khan, had taken post with a number of armed retainers.
Gerrard defeated them, and captured their stronghold, but his own
gallant life was forfeited. Another small force, divided into
detachments according to the services required, took charge of the
triangular space of country included between Agra, Muttra, and Allygurh.
Colonel Riddell and Major Eld moved about actively within this space—now
watching the movements of rebellious chieftains, now cutting off the
advance of mutineers from Rohilcund.
Colonel Walpole of the Rifle Brigade, in the higher capacity of
brigadier, was intrusted by Sir Colin Campbell with the command of a
column, consisting of H.M. 88th foot, two battalions of the Rifle
Brigade, three squadrons of the 9th Lancers, the 1st Punjaub cavalry,
Bourchier’s battery, and Blunt’s troop of horse-artillery. His duty was
to sweep along the western half of the Doab, near the Jumna, and clear
it of rebels. He started from Cawnpore on the 18th of December, and on
the following day reached Akburpore, half-way to Calpee. Here he
remained a few days, settling the surrounding country, which had long
been disturbed by the Gwalior mutineers. From thence he proceeded
towards Etawah, to clear the country in the direction of Agra and
Dholpore.
It will thus be seen that, while Sir Colin was engaged in the larger
operations at Lucknow and Cawnpore, and soon after the completion of
those operations, small columns of troops were marching and fighting in
various parts of the Northwest Provinces, clearing away bands of
insurgents. The mutinied sepoy regiments still kept together in large
bodies, mostly in Oude or on its borders; the insurgents here adverted
to were rather marauders and plunderers, who were influenced very little
either by creed or by nationality in taking up arms; they were retainers
of ambitious petty chieftains, or they were reckless men, who hoped in
the scramble to enrich themselves with plunder.
The commander-in-chief himself took the field just before the close of
the year. Having made arrangements for the security of Cawnpore after
the great victory over the Gwalior mutineers, and having marked out
separate paths of duty to be followed by Seaton, Walpole, Hope Grant,
Franks, Rowcroft, and other officers, he directed his attention towards
Furruckabad, which had long been in hostile hands. This city, near the
point of junction of Oude, Rohilcund, and the Doab, it was important to
place again under British control. Colonel Seaton was ordered to direct
his march towards that point, after other operations in the Doab; and
Sir Colin now arranged to co-operate with him. Leaving Cawnpore in the
last week of December, he marched up the great trunk-road, by way of
Meerun-ke-Serai. It was not, however, until the year 1858 had arrived,
that Campbell, Walpole, and Seaton, meeting from various points,
effected a thorough capture of Furruckabad, and of the long deserted
cantonment at Futteghur. Here, however, as in many other quarters, the
commander-in-chief had to bear the vexation of losing his prey; the
enemy, wonderfully alert in their movements, escaped from those places
just before he reached them; he captured both the towns, but the enemy
were still at large to fight elsewhere.
Let us on to Delhi.
Ever since the conquest in September, the imperial city had gradually
assumed a state somewhat more orderly than was possible immediately
after the siege. Many weeks after the conquest, when the _Delhi Gazette_
had again got into working-order, it contained a graphic account of the
city in its condition at that time. On the road from Kurnaul to Delhi
was an almost continuous line of dead carcasses of camels, horses, and
bullocks, with their skins dried into parchment over the mouldering
bones. Here and there were remains of intrenchments, where battles had
been fought on the road. From Badulla Serai to the Lahore Gate of the
city every tree was either levelled with the ground, or the branches
lopped off with round-shot. The garden-houses of the wealthy citizens
were in almost every instance masses of ruins, with the bleaching
remains of men and beasts around them. Here and there might be seen a
perfectly white skeleton of a human being; while on all sides lay
scattered fragments of red and blue clothing, cartouch-boxes,
round-shot, fragments of shell, and grape-shot. Near the Subzee Mundee
every tree was a mere bare trunk, with the branches and foliage gone,
and shot-marks visible all around. The gaily ornamented residences near
at hand were masses of blackened ruins, with sand-bags and loopholed
screens which told of many a scene of fiery warfare. With the exception
of the Moree Bastion and the Cashmere Gate, the northern wall of the
city did not exhibit much evidence of devastation. The Cashmere Gate
breach had been repaired. The mainguard was wholly destroyed. St James’s
Church was full of shot-holes, even up to the ball and cross. Most of
the houses in this part of the city were utter ruins, some blackened as
if by fire. The Bank, formerly the residence of the Begum Sumroo, had
nothing but the walls and fragments of verandah remaining; and in a like
state was the house of Sir T. Metcalfe. In the narrow street leading
from Skinner’s house to the Chandnee Chowk, every house bore visible
proof of the showers of musket-balls that must have fallen; and every
door was completely riddled. The roads were still cut up with shot and
shell furrows. In many of the streets might be seen the _débris_ of
archways, which had been built up by the city people, but broken into by
our troops. Shop-doors and huge gates lay about in all directions, many
of which were well backed up by heavy stone-work, logs of wood, &c.; and
remains of sand-bag defences were numerous. In short, the city shewed
that it had been obstinately defended, and that its conquest must have
been terrible work for besiegers as well as besieged.
The aged king and his family still continued to be the subjects of
newspaper gossip, mostly in a strain of fierce invective against the
authorities for shewing lenity. It was stated in a former chapter,[130]
that Mrs Hodson, wife to the gallant officer who had captured the king,
made public the result of a visit to the royal captives, as shewing that
no undue luxury marked their prison-life. But still the charges and
insinuations continued. Newspaper paragraphs circulated the news that
Jumma Bukht, son or grandson of the king, was allowed to ride about the
streets of Delhi on an elephant, with an English colonel behind him; and
that indulgence was granted to men whose only desert was speedy hanging.
Captain (Major) Hodson himself made public a refutation of this charge,
shewing the absurd way in which a very trifling incident had been
magnified into a state proceeding. A military commission was appointed
to try such leaders of the mutiny as were captured in or near Delhi. By
sentence of this tribunal, twenty subordinate members of the royal
family were executed on the 18th of November. Shortly afterwards,
various chiefs of Goorgaon, Jhujjur, and Babulgurh were similarly put
upon their trial, and sentenced according to the strength of the
evidence brought against them.
[Illustration:
St James’s Church, Delhi.
]
The subject of prize-money remained for many weeks, or even months,
involved in much controversy in Delhi. Notwithstanding the ruin and
devastation, the amount of property recovered was very large, including
forfeitures declared against those who were convicted of treason. This
wealth reverted to the state, as a slight set-off for the vast expenses
incurred. Some of the officers and soldiers, however, fondly hoped that
it would be regarded as booty for the troops; and were thrown rather
into discontent by an announcement that the reward of the conquerors of
Delhi was to consist of six months’ ‘batta’ or pay. It was just one of
those questions on which much might be said on both sides. By a
subsequent arrangement, much of the personal property lately belonging
to the rebels was set apart, and treated as prize-money to be shared by
the soldiers engaged in the capture.
The leniency question, the prize-money question, and the paucity of
reward to the engineer officers engaged in the siege of Delhi, were
among many subjects made matter for controversy during the later weeks
of the year. But these we may pass over without further comment. Suffice
it to say that the reconquered city remained in British hands, and was
gradually brought under the control of the British authorities. As to
the aged king, preparations were made for subjecting him to a regular
trial, to be commenced shortly after the arrival of the new year.
Of the Punjaub, little need be said. Happily for British interests in
India, the same powerful mind continued to wield the destinies of the
remote province. Sir John Lawrence, watchful over everything that
occurred, not only maintained the Punjaub in quiet, but sent frequent
reinforcements to other provinces. During the summer and autumn, the
number of Sikh and Punjaubee regiments which he raised was something
marvellous. Occasionally some of the wild tribes exhibited signs of
insubordination; but they were met with such a determined front, and
they received so little sympathy from the mass of the people, that their
turbulence fell harmless. John Lawrence saved the Punjaub, and the
Punjaub saved British India.
In all the portion of the empire included within the Saugor territories,
Bundelcund, the Mahratta states, and Rajpootana, the months of November
and December differed from the previous months principally in this
circumstance—that the new mutinies were fewer, because the materials for
mutiny were becoming exhausted; but that the battles were more numerous,
because small armies were gradually being sent up from Madras and
Bombay.
In October and November, many military operations in the Mahratta and
Saugor countries were placed in doubt, so far as concerned the
comprehension of them in England, by a difference of only one letter in
the names of two commanders. The movements of Brigadier Steuart were
often attributed to Brigadier Stuart, and _vice versâ_. Steuart
commanded a column in the Deccan, which marched to Hosungabad, and then
across the Nerbudda to Sehore. His duty was to protect Saugor on the
right, Indore on the left, and Bhopal in the centre. By these movements,
Saugor and Jubbulpoor were rendered tolerably safe. Holkar, at Indore,
was sadly troubled by the mutinous feeling among his own troops. In
order to maintain British influence in that important quarter, the
Bombay government organised a new column, which, strengthened by other
troops, would form a Malwah Field Force, to be placed under the command
of Sir Hugh Rose; while Sir Robert Hamilton was ordered to resume his
old appointment as British resident at Holkar’s court.
Brigadier Stuart, portions of whose column were engaged in and near
Neemuch, Mundisore, Dhar, Mehidpore, Rampoora, and Kotah in October,
swept off many parties of rebels from the regions bordering on Malwah
and Rajpootana. Nevertheless the state of affairs remained very
unsettled. Many petty chieftains, incited by the numerical weakness of
the British, and by the unexpected stand made by rebels elsewhere,
appeared by tacit agreement to consider this the proper time to set up
as little kings on their own account, each relying on the services of
retainers who probably thought that something good might come to their
share in the scramble.
At a somewhat later date, when Stuart was in command of the Malwah Field
Force, before its name was changed to the ‘First Brigade of the Nerbudda
Field Force,’ he had a contest with the Mundisore rebels. Being joined
by a portion of the Hyderabad Contingent under Major Orr, Stuart
approached within three or four miles of Mundisore on the 21st of
November. This town is a few miles south of Neemuch, on the road to
Indore. The brigadier encamped until a good reconnaissance could be
effected. The rebel enemy at Mundisore, hearing of his approach, had
posted pickets entirely covering the country over which he was
advancing; they also mustered in some force outside the walls, and
appeared inclined to attack. In the afternoon he found that the enemy
were advancing in form, threatening his centre and both flanks at the
same time. They advanced steadily, in great numbers and with banners
flying: and he went forth to meet them. The struggle was a brief one.
Major Orr easily repulsed the enemy’s attack on the left flank; Captain
Orr and Lieutenant Dew checked that on the right; a few rounds of
artillery preserved the centre; and the enemy, giving way at all points,
retreated into the town. Brigadier Stuart had now another matter to
consider. He heard that a rebel army of 5000 men, employed in besieging
Neemuch, intended to raise the siege, and to join their companions at
Mundisore. This he resolved to prevent if possible by intercepting them.
Accordingly, early on the 22d, he marched to such a position as would
command the approaches to Mundisore; and later in the day his cavalry
were engaged with a party of rebel horse under Heera Singh—one of many
Rajpoot chieftains who took up arms at that disturbed period. Keeping a
sharp watch during the night, Stuart prepared on the morning of the 23d
to control the Neemuch and Mundisore road both from the north and the
south. The enemy appeared, and took up a strong position with their
right in and beyond the village of Goraria, their right centre covered
by a date nullah and lines of date-trees, their battery of six guns on
rising ground, with a large mud-hut protecting their gunners, and their
left stretched along the ridge running east from the village. The battle
that ensued was a very severe one. Stuart was obliged to recall a body
of infantry, who charged a village that seemed full of the enemy; the
rebels took possession of the houses, from which they kept up a very
galling fire. The British could doubtless have taken the village; but
the brigadier found his rear attacked by a second body of the enemy,
requiring a new distribution of his troops. The engagements of this day
resulted in a sort of drawn battle. On the 24th, the village was shelled
for three hours; and was then captured by H.M. 86th and a native
regiment, with considerable loss on both sides. During the ensuing night
the enemy evacuated Mundisore and the whole vicinity, dispersing in
flight throughout the country, after having lost at least fifteen
hundred men during the four days. The brigadier then moved his camp to
Mundisore, and made arrangements for dismantling the fort and destroying
the guns before leaving the neighbourhood. By this series of operations,
not only was Mundisore cleared of rebels, but Neemuch was relieved from
a force which pressed very threateningly upon it.
The siege of Neemuch must now be noticed. The small English garrison at
this station had for months been threatened by the Mundisore rebels; but
it was not until the 8th of November that a formidable attack was
actually made. A force of 5000 infantry, with three guns, advanced to
within two miles of the town; and as it was impossible to meet such
numbers in the open field, Captain Simpson prepared for the best defence
he could make within the fort. Intrenchments had been formed some time
before; but unfortunately they were too extensive to be effectively
defended by the few hands in the garrison; and they thus speedily became
occupied by the enemy. On the 9th, the enemy marched in full force into
the bazaar and cantonment, plundering wherever they went. They then
placed their guns at convenient distances, and began playing steadily
against the fort. This cannonading was continued for several days. The
rebels managed to build batteries for their guns in such positions that,
from the foliage and other obstacles, they were unobservable from the
walls of the fort. After about a fortnight of this battering, the rebels
resolved to attempt an escalade. They brought forward huge ladders on
wheels, affording room for four men abreast, and placed them against the
walls of the fort; but here they were met by such steady and continuous
volleys of musketry that not a man could enter. A Beloochee Mohammedan,
belonging to the 12th Bombay native infantry, doing duty in Neemuch,
performed an act of gallantry that won for him much and well-deserved
applause. One of the besiegers, in retreating from the withering
musketry-fire from the fort, dropped a splendid Mussulman green flag on
the ground. The Beloochee at once offered to capture this flag. Under
cover of a tremendous fire of musketry, he and a havildar were lowered
by a rope from one of the enclosures; quick as lightning the flag was
secured, and in a few minutes waved on the walls of Neemuch. The
movements of Brigadier Stuart, recorded in the last paragraph, now
disturbed the rebels; they departed, and Neemuch was for a time spared
further molestation.
This narrative may pass over without particular mention the other
regions of the vast empire of India. Disturbances there were in November
and December, but not of such grave importance as to call for record. At
Saugor and at Jubbulpore, the Europeans cried loudly for more troops,
but they were still able to defend themselves against actual attacks. At
Gwalior and at Bhopal, at Indore and at Mhow, although the vexations
were many, the continued fidelity of Scindia and Holkar lessened the
calamities that might otherwise have befallen the British. In Rajpootana
and Gujerat, petty chieftains would from time to time unfurl the flag of
rebellion, and collect a band of fighting retainers around them; but
these territories were within practicable reach of Bombay, whence
columns marched for the pacification of the upper country. Some portions
of the Nizam’s territory were occasionally troubled by insubordinate
troops belonging to the contingent; as the Nizam and his prime-minister,
however, remained firm in their alliance with the British, and as the
distance was very great to the turbulent regions of the Jumna, serious
danger was averted. In the South Mahratta country, around Kolapore,
Sholapore, Satara, and Poonah, indications once now and then appeared
that fanatic Mohammedans were ready to unfurl the green flag against the
infidel Feringhees; but the near vicinity of the presidential city of
Bombay, and the quiet demeanour of the natives further south, prevented
the intended conspiracies from becoming serious in magnitude. In the
Madras presidency, tranquillity was almost wholly undisturbed.
Thus ended the extraordinary year 1857—the most momentous that the
English had ever experienced in India.
Notes.
_Proposed Re-organisation of the Indian Army._—In closing the
narrative for the year 1857, it may be useful to advert to two
important subjects which occupied the attention of the East India
Company—the state of the army, and the causes of the mutiny. Instead
of rushing to conclusions on imperfect data, the Court of Directors
instructed the governor-general to appoint two commissions of
inquiry, empowered to collect information on those two subjects. The
letters of instruction were both dated the 25th of November; the
first ran as follows:
‘1. We trust that when success, by the blessing of Divine
Providence, shall have attended your efforts to put down the
mutiny of the native army of your presidency, and to re-establish
the authority of the government in the disturbed districts, you
will be enabled to take advantage of the services of select
officers of ability and experience, to assist you, by
investigation and by practical counsel founded thereon, in forming
wise conclusions on the most important subject which must soon
press for decision—namely, the proper organisation of our army in
India.
‘2. To this end we authorise you to appoint, as soon as
circumstances will permit, a commission, composed of military
officers of the armies of the three presidencies (with whom should
be associated officers of the Queen’s army who have had experience
of Indian service), on whose knowledge, experience, and judgment you
can rely; together with one or more civil servants, whom you may
consider to be specially qualified for such a duty by their
knowledge of the native character and general administrative
experience.
‘3. In framing instructions for the guidance of this commission, we
are desirous that the following heads of inquiry should be
specified, in addition to any others which you may consider to
deserve their attention:
‘1st, Should corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be
recruited there, and there only?
‘2d, Should corps be composed of troops or companies, each of which
shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or
castes be mixed up together in the whole regiment?
‘3d, Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component
part of a native regiment?
‘4th, What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations
relating to tribes and castes, with a view to determine the future
composition of the native army?
‘5th, Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical
countries, equally qualified for service in India, with the natives
of the country; and if so, should they be formed in separate
regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?
‘6th, Whether, in native infantry regiments, the discontinuance of
the grades of native commissioned officers, and the substitution of
a European sergeant and corporal to each company, is advisable; and
if so, whether, in lieu of the prospect of distinction and emolument
arising out of these grades, it would be advisable to establish
graduated scales of good-service pay and retiring pensions,
claimable after specified periods of service?
‘7th, Whether the system of promotion generally, by seniority, to
the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained),
should not be altered and assimilated to the systems in force at
Madras and Bombay?
‘8th, If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police
purposes, what will be the best organisation for each branch
respectively?
‘9th, Have the powers of commanding officers of native corps, and
the powers of officers in charge of companies, been diminished? What
consequences have been the result? Is it desirable that those powers
should be increased, or what other measures should be adopted for
the improvement of discipline?
‘10th, Should cadets be trained and drilled in European regiments
before they are posted to native regiments; or what would be the
best mode of drilling and training cadets before they are posted to
native regiments?
‘11th, Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native
army be retained; or should they be assimilated to the rules which
obtain in the British army; or ought there to be any, and what,
changes in those rules, or in the system of punishment?
‘12th, How can the demands for European officers for staff and
detached employments be best provided for, without injuring the
efficiency of regiments?
‘4. It is to be understood that the inquiries to be made by the
commission, and the opinions to be offered by them, are to have
reference to the several branches of the native army—infantry,
regular and irregular; cavalry, regular and irregular; artillery,
and Sappers and Miners; and, with respect to the artillery, and
Sappers and Miners, whether they should be composed, as heretofore,
of Europeans and natives, or be entirely European?
‘5. To aid your government in forming an opinion as to the
proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of
the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, we
would recommend that your government should call upon the commission
to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can
entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the
members of the Commission will enable them to furnish you with
valuable information on this head.
‘6. Having obtained opinions on all these heads of inquiry, and on
such other heads as you may deem to be essential to the thorough
development of the important questions at issue, you will refer
the views of the commission for the consideration of the
commander-in-chief, and will then furnish us with the results of
your careful deliberation upon the whole of the measures which
should, in your judgment, be taken for the organisation and
maintenance, in the utmost practicable state of efficiency, of
whatever military force you may think it desirable to form.
‘7. The commission itself may be instructed to make to the
governor-general in council any suggestions or recommendations which
occur to them, although not on matters comprised in the specified
heads of inquiry.’
_Proposed Inquiry into the Causes of the Mutiny._—The second letter
adverted to above was in the following terms:
‘1. Although we are well aware that, from the period when the mutiny
of the Bengal army assumed a formidable aspect, your time must
necessarily have been too much engrossed by the pressing exigencies
of the public-service during each passing day, and in taking
provident measures for the future, to admit of your directing much
of your attention to past events, we have no doubt that you have not
omitted to take advantage of all the means and opportunities at your
command for the important purpose of investigating the causes of the
extraordinary disaffection in the ranks of that army, which has,
unhappily, given rise to so much bloodshed and misery.
‘2. In this persuasion, and as a review of the voluminous records
containing the details of the events which have occurred since the
first display of disaffection at Barrackpore, has entirely failed to
satisfy our minds in regard to the immediate causes of the mutiny,
we desire that you will lose no time in reporting to us your
opinions on the subject, embracing the following heads, together
with any others which you may deem it necessary to add, in order to
the full elucidation of the subject:
‘1st, The state of feeling of the sepoy towards the government for
some time preceding the outbreak.
‘2d, Any causes which of late years may be thought likely to have
affected their loyalty and devotion to the service.
‘3d, Whether their loyalty had been affected by the instigations of
emissaries of foreign powers, or native states, or by any general
measures of our administration affecting themselves or any other
classes of our subjects?
‘4th, Whether the proposed use of the new cartridges was to any, and
what, extent the cause of the outbreak?
‘5th, Whether the objects which the mutineers are supposed to have
had in view were directed to the subversion of the British power in
India, or to the attainment of pecuniary or other advantages?
‘6th, Whether the progress of the mutiny can be traced to general
combination or concert, or was the result of separate impulses at
the several stations of regiments; and, if the former, how the
combination was carried on without any knowledge or suspicion of it
on the part of the regimental officers?
‘3. If, however, you should not feel yourselves to be in possession
of information sufficient to form a well-grounded opinion upon the
causes and objects of the mutiny, we authorise you to appoint a
special mixed commission for a preliminary investigation into the
same, to be composed of officers selected from all branches of the
services of India, in whose personal experience and soundness of
judgment you have entire confidence. In that case, you will lose no
time in reporting to us your sentiments upon the conclusions arrived
at by the commission.’
[Illustration]
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Footnote 124:
Chap. xvii., pp. 277-294; chap. xx., pp. 338-358.
Footnote 125:
See p. 103.
Footnote 126:
Chap. xxi., p. 369.
Footnote 127:
‘We marched off under the guidance of a native, who said he would take
us to the spot where the gun lay. We told him he should be well
rewarded if he brought us to the gun, but if he brought us into a
trap, we had a soldier by him “at full cock” ready to blow his brains
out. We passed our outside pickets, and entered the town through very
narrow streets without a single nigger being seen, or a shot fired on
either side. We crept along; not a soul spoke a word, all was still as
death; and after marching in this way into the very heart of the town,
our guide brought us to the very spot into which the gun was capsized.
The soldiers were posted on each side, and then we went to work. Not a
man spoke above his breath, and each stone was laid down quietly. When
we thought we had cleared enough, I ordered the men to put their
shoulders to the wheel and gun, and when all was ready, and every man
had his pound before him, I said “Heave!” and up she righted. We then
limbered up, called the soldiers to follow, and we marched into the
intrenchments with our gun without a shot being fired. When we got in,
the colonel returned us his best thanks, and gave us all an extra
ration of grog; we then returned to our guns in the battery.’
Footnote 128:
The regiments or portions of regiments—made up into four brigades of
infantry, one of cavalry, one of artillery, and one of engineers—were
the following: H.M. 8th, 23d, 32d, 38th, 42d, 53d, 64th, 82d, and 93d
foot; Rifle Brigade; 2d and 4th Punjaub infantry; H.M. 9th Lancers;
1st, 2d, and 5th Punjaub cavalry; Hodson’s Horse; horse-artillery;
light field-battery; heavy field-battery; Naval brigade; Queen’s and
Company’s Engineers; Sappers and Miners.
Footnote 129:
42d Highlanders, 403
53d foot, 413
93d Highlanders, 806
4th Punjaub rifles, 332
9th Lancers, 327
5th Punjaub cavalry, 85
Hodson’s Horse, 109
Horse-artillery, 83
Foot-artillery, 139
Sappers, 100
Footnote 130:
P. 356
[Illustration:
COLONEL E. H. GREATHED.
]