MILITARY OPERATIONS IN FEBRUARY.
Impatient as the whole British nation was to hear of a brilliant and
successful termination of the struggle in India, every telegram, every
weekly mail, shewed that the time for this satisfaction was still far
distant. The mutineers were beaten, but not crushed; the rebellious
chieftains were checked, but not extinguished; their deluded followers
were disappointed in the results obtained, but not deterred from making
further efforts. England, with all her delays and waverings of opinion,
had sent over a large, fine, and complete army; the Punjaub had supplied
such a force of reliable troops as no one would have ventured beforehand
to anticipate; generals had been brought into notice by the exigencies
of public affairs who possessed those fine soldierly attributes which a
nation is proud to recognise; the authorities, steady at their posts,
never for a moment doubted that the British ‘raj’ would be established
on a firmer basis than ever—and yet everything was in turmoil in India.
Blood and treasure were being daily expended; but the time had not
arrived when any adequate return was obtained for these losses. January
having passed, men speculated whether Lucknow and Oude—to say nothing of
other cities and provinces—would fall permanently into British hands
during the month of February. What was the response to this much-mooted
question, the present chapter will shew.
The gallant commander-in-chief, Sir Colin Campbell, being the chief
actor in the busy military scenes of the period, it may be well to trace
his movements during the month of February, before noticing the
marchings and battles of other generals.
It will be remembered, from the details given in the last chapter, that
Sir Colin, after the capture of Furruckabad and Futteghur early in
January, remained during the greater part of that month encamped in that
neighbourhood, organising the military arrangements necessary for an
advance into Oude. These arrangements involved the arrival of siege-guns
from Delhi and Agra, and the concentration at one point of different
columns under his brigadiers. Among various subsidiary operations,
Captain Taylor, of the Engineers, was sent to the Alum Bagh, to report
as far as possible on the defensive works thrown up by the enemy in and
near Lucknow, and to gather a strong engineer force to aid the
commander-in-chief. Sir Colin remained nearly stationary during these
preliminary proceedings, elaborating the details of his plan of
strategy, in conjunction with his chief of the staff, General Mansfield.
When his troops and his missiles, his _personnel_ and _matériel_, were
pretty well collected, he returned from Futteghur to Cawnpore on the 4th
of February. Viscount Canning had shortly before gone up from Calcutta
to Allahabad; and Sir Colin started off on the 8th to meet him. What
these two representatives of British power agreed on during their
interview, they of course kept to themselves; but every one felt the
probability that some extensive scheme of policy, military and
political, to be worked out by soldiers and civilians in unison, was
discussed and mutually accepted. Returning again to Cawnpore, the
commander-in-chief made the last arrangements for giving activity to the
force which had been so slowly and with so much difficulty collected.
Fain would many critics have censured the old general for delay; fain
would they have urged that in two months he had only fought two
battles—at Cawnpore and at Furruckabad—while the world was impatiently
waiting to hear of the reconquest of Oude; but as he kept his own
council with remarkable reticence, criticism gave way to a belief that
there must have been good and sufficient cause for the caution which
marked all his proceedings.
On or about the 11th of February, all the preparatory operations were
completed, and an army, larger than any which had up to that time
appeared against the rebels, began to cross the Ganges from Cawnpore
into Oude. It had originally been intended to effect the crossing of a
portion of the army at Futteghur; but Cawnpore was afterwards selected.
The crossing was necessarily a slow and difficult one, on account of the
vast _impedimenta_ of an Indian army. To increase the facilities, a
second bridge of boats was constructed. Even with this addition the
passage across the Ganges lasted several days; for each bullock-cart
carried but little. A small portion only of the ammunition, irrespective
of all other equipage and baggage, required the services of fifteen
hundred carts. The artillery was on an enormous scale; the siege-guns,
the naval-brigade guns, the field-guns, and the horse-artillery guns,
numbered not much less than two hundred in all. After crossing, the army
distributed itself at certain places on the line of route from Cawnpore
to Lucknow. For instance, on the 15th of the month, the head-quarters
were still at Cawnpore; one portion of the army was encamped at Onao,
one march from Cawnpore; another at Busherutgunje, a march and a half
from Cawnpore; a third at Nawabgunge, two marches from Cawnpore; a
fourth, under Outram, at the Alum Bagh; and a fifth at Sheorajpore,
twenty miles from Cawnpore on the Allygurh road. Sir Colin himself still
remained with head-quarters at Cawnpore—partly to provide for the safety
of convoys of ladies and children passing down from Agra through
Cawnpore to Allahabad; partly to await the entry into Oude, from the
east, of the forces under Jung Bahadoor and Brigadier Franks; and partly
to watch the proceedings of a large body of the enemy near Calpee, who
were threatening again to overrun the Doab unless strongly held in
check.
It may here usefully be stated that Sir Colin organised his Oudian army
before any of the regiments began to cross into that province. As a
permanent record of the component elements of that fine force, we give
the details in a note at the end of the present chapter; but a summary
may not be out of place here. The ‘army of Oude,’ as tabulated on the
10th of February, comprised such regiments and corps as were at that
time under the more immediate command of Sir Colin Campbell; and took no
account of the separate forces under Jung Bahadoor, Franks, Seaton,
Macgregor, Windham, Inglis, Van Cortlandt, Rose, Stuart, Steuart, Orr,
Whitlock, Greathed, Penny, M’Causland, Roberts, and other officers whose
services were required elsewhere, or who had not reached the Oudian
frontier at that date. The army of Oude, thus limited in its meaning,
was systematically classified. There were three divisions of infantry,
under Outram, Walpole, and a third general afterwards to be named. These
were subdivided into six brigades, under Hamilton, Russell, Franklyn,
Adrian Hope, Douglas, and Horsford—two brigades to each division. Each
brigade was further divided into three regiments or battalions. The
Queen’s regiments of infantry in the six brigades were the 5th, 23d,
34th, 38th, 42d, 53d, 78th, 79th, 84th, 90th, and 93d, and two
battalions of the Rifle Brigade. The other infantry regiments were
Company’s Europeans, Sikhs, and Punjaubees; the Goorkhas were in corps
not yet incorporated in the army of Oude. A fourth division of infantry,
under Franks, Wroughton, and Puhlwan Singh, was provided for, but did
not at that time form a part of the army of Oude. The cavalry formed one
division, under Hope Grant, and was separated into two brigades, under
William Campbell and Little. The Queen’s cavalry regiments in this
division were the 2d Dragoon Guards, the 7th Hussars, and the 9th
Lancers; the other cavalry were Sikhs, Punjaubees, and a few volunteers
and irregulars of miscellaneous origin. The artillery division, under
Archdale Wilson (the conqueror of Delhi), comprised a field-artillery
brigade under Wood, a siege-artillery brigade under Barker, a naval
brigade under Peel, and an engineer brigade under Napier.
Not until the last day of February did the commander-in-chief cross over
the Ganges, and take command of the army destined to besiege and finally
capture the great city of Lucknow. Meanwhile Sir James Outram, at the
Alum Bagh, had been daily in communication with the other officers, and
had prepared detailed plans of everything relating to Lucknow and its
defences, so far as he was acquainted with them. The engineers, too, had
been busily engaged in preparing that vast store of siege-materials
which is necessary for the attack of strongly defended fortifications.
What the army of Oude effected during the month of March, the next
chapter will shew. Before quitting this part of the February operations,
however, it may be well to notice episodically the remarkable connection
between the newspaper press and the battle-field in recent times. In the
great wars of former days, correspondents residing at the chief cities
in foreign countries were wont to send such items of information as they
could pick up to the editors of English newspapers; and military
officers, cautiously and anonymously, sent occasional criticisms on the
details of the battles in which they were engaged. It was left for the
period of the Crimean war, however, to commence, or at least to perfect,
a system by which a non-military writer is sent out at enormous expense,
to join an army in the field or at a siege, to bear some danger and much
privation, to see with his own eyes everything that can be seen, and to
write such descriptions of the scenes as shall be intelligible to
ordinary newspaper readers. Mr W. H. Russell, of the _Times_, gave an
importance to such communications never before equalled, by the
brilliant style in which he described the military operations in
Bulgaria and the Crimea during the Russian war of 1854-5; and the system
was ably carried out by special correspondents connected with the staff
of some of the other London newspapers. When the Indian mutiny was half
a year old, Mr Russell started from England, to do that for India which
he had before done for the Crimea—mix in the turmoil of war, and
describe battles in a graphic and vivid way. What he saw and what he did
in February initiated him into many of the peculiarities of Indian life,
when scenes of slaughter had not yet come under his notice. Leaving
Calcutta on the 4th of February, he went like other travellers to
Raneegunge by railway, and thence to Benares by gharry dâk—a
four-wheeled, venetian-blinded, oblong vehicle, driven by a native with
‘mail post guard’ inscribed on his brass belt-plate, and drawn at the
rate of seven miles an hour by a single horse, the horse being changed
at post-houses at every few miles’ distance. On the way were troops
going up with great regularity, travelling 35 miles per day in
bullock-carts, and supplied with comfortable meals and sleeping-places
at the dâk-bungalows. Travelling thus by way of Burdwan, Nimeaghat,
Sheergotty, and Noubutpore, he arrived at Benares; this city, ‘long,
straggling, and Turkish looking,’ was completely commanded by a new fort
at Rajghat, built since the troubles of the preceding summer. Thence to
Allahabad the fields were rich with corn, and the roads thronged by
natives and trains of bullock-hackeries laden with cotton for the
Benares and Mirzapore markets. Arrived at Allahabad, Mr Russell
commenced his camp-life, messing generally with some of the officers,
and sleeping under a tent. Viscount Canning and his suite were at that
time living under canvas within the fort; while all around were
evidences of military preparation for the English regiments sent up from
Calcutta. Thence he travelled for fifty miles by the second portion of
the great trunk-railway. The rebels in the preceding June had attacked
the locomotives in an extraordinary way, if his account is to be taken
as anything more than mere raillery: ‘They fired musketry at the engines
for some time at a distance, as if they were living bodies; then
advanced cautiously, and finding that the engines did not stir, began to
belabour them with sticks, all the time calling them names and abusing
them.’ By horse-dâk Mr Russell proceeded through Futtehpoor to Cawnpore,
where he, like all others, was struck with astonishment that poor Sir
Hugh Wheeler’s ‘intrenchment’ could ever have held out so long as it
did. Sir Colin Campbell was then at Cawnpore, living in a small
subaltern’s tent, working incessantly, and provided with an amount of
personal ‘baggage’ so marvellously small as to shew how little the old
soldier regarded luxuries. Mr Russell remained at Cawnpore till the
27th, when he joined the army in the march towards Lucknow. He had
provided, in true Indian fashion, for the carriage of himself and
baggage, a saddle-horse, a horse-gharry, and four camels. His account of
the preparations for his march is not only amusing from the way in which
it is told, but is instructive on matters relating to travelling in
India.[137] The end of February found Mr Russell, a civilian immersed in
all the bustle of an army, ready to see and hear whatever the month of
March should present to his attention.
Leaving for the present the commander-in-chief and his army, we shall
briefly trace the operations, so far as they occurred in the month of
February, of such of his generals as were employed in duties away from
his immediate control and supervision.
Sir James Outram at once presents claims for notice; for though
appointed general of one of the divisions of the army of Oude, he held
an independent command until the month had expired. During more than
three months this distinguished officer had never seen Sir Colin
Campbell; during more than five months he had never once been away from
the vicinity of Lucknow and the Alum Bagh. He marched with Havelock and
Neill from Cawnpore to the capital of Oude in September, and relieved or
rather reinforced Inglis; he commanded the British Residency at Lucknow
during October, with Havelock and Inglis as his subordinates; he aided
Sir Colin to effect the ‘rescue’ in November; and then he commanded at
the Alum Bagh throughout the whole of December, January, and February.
What he did in the first two of these months, we have seen in former
chapters; what were his military proceedings in February, a few lines
will suffice to shew.
Whether the enemy supposed that, by another attack on the Alum Bagh,
they might disturb the extensive plans of the British; whether they were
influenced by a sudden impulse to achieve a limited success; or whether
another motive existed, presently to be mentioned—they fought another
battle with Sir James Outram, and received their usual defeat. On the
morning of the 21st of February, no less than 20,000 of the enemy
attacked the Alum Bagh. Having filled all the trenches with as many men
as they could hold, and placed large masses of infantry in the topes as
a support, they commenced a simultaneous movement round both flanks of
Outram’s position—threatening at the same time the whole length of
front, the northeast corner of the Alum Bagh, and the picket and fort at
Jelalabad. Outram, perceiving at a glance the nature of the attack,
strengthened the several endangered points. At the Alum Bagh and
Jelalabad posts the enemy received a severe check, having come within
range of the grape-shot which the British poured out upon them. He
detached about 250 cavalry, and two field-pieces, under Captain Barrow,
to the rear of Jelalabad; here Barrow came suddenly upon 2000 of the
enemy’s cavalry, and 5000 infantry, whom he kept at bay so effectually
with his two field-guns, that they were quite frustrated in their
intended scheme of attack. The enemy’s attack on Outram’s left flank was
made by no fewer than 5000 cavalry and 8000 infantry. To oppose these he
sent only four field-guns and 120 men of the military train, under Major
Robertson; but this mere handful of men, with the guns, drove away the
enemy. A large convoy was at the time on the road from Cawnpore; and the
escort for this convoy had taken away most of Outram’s cavalry. It is
not surprising that the enemy should select such a time for attacking
the Alum Bagh and endeavouring to intercept the convoy; but it is
certainly a matter for wonder that such a large army should suffer
itself to be beaten by a few hundred men. The casualty-list, too, was as
surprising as anything else; for Outram had only 9 wounded and _none_
killed; whereas the enemy’s loss was adverted to in the following terms:
‘The reports from the city state the enemy to have lost 60 killed and
200 wounded in their attack on the Alum Bagh, and about 80 or 90 killed
in front of Jelalabad. This was exclusive of their loss on the left
flank, and along our front, where our heavy artillery had constant
opportunities of firing shell and shrapnel into the midst of their
moving masses. I consider their loss to have been heavier than on any of
their previous attacks.’ At this very time the bulk of Sir Colin’s army
was approaching the Alum Bagh; the enemy well knew that fact, and had
only been induced to hazard the attack on the 21st by the temporary
absence of some of Outram’s troops. The attack having failed, they
hastened back to strengthen their defensive arrangements at Lucknow.
It may now be well to notice what was doing eastward of Oude. The strong
Goorkha force under Jung Bahadoor, and the effective column of
miscellaneous troops under Brigadier Franks, had greatly improved the
condition of that portion of country which lay between Oude and Lower
Bengal, around the cities and stations of Patna, Dinapoor, Arrah, Buxar,
Ghazeepore, Azimghur, Goruckpore, Jounpoor, Benares, and Mirzapore.
Mutineers there were, and marauders connected with rebel chieftains; but
their audacity, except in the immediate vicinity of Oude, was checked by
the increasing power of the forces brought to bear against them.
Brigadier Franks, one of the most energetic and admired of the officers
whom the wars of the mutiny brought forth, had since the month of
December commanded a column called the Jounpoor Field-force, which had
been employed in chastising and expelling bodies of rebels from the
Azimghur, Allahabad, and Jounpoor districts. During these operations, he
had defeated the enemy at many places. The time was now approaching when
Franks was to join Sir Colin in the final operations against Lucknow;
and when his Jounpoor field-force, losing its individuality, was to form
the fourth division of infantry in the army of Oude, with Franks as its
general of division. That change, however, was not likely to occur until
the month of March had arrived. About the middle of February he was with
his force at Budleepore, a town on the route from Jounpoor to Sultanpore
in Oude. His force comprised H.M. 10th, 20th, and 97th regiments, six
regiments of Goorkhas, and twenty guns. Colonel Puhlwan Singh commanded
the Goorkhas, and Colonel Maberley the artillery. The force was a strong
one, containing 2300 Europeans and 3200 Goorkhas, and an excellent park
of guns. There was one month’s provisions collected; and Franks was
awaiting the orders of Sir Colin for an advance into Oude. Colonel
Wroughton was with him, having no distinct military command, but acting
as a medium of communication between Franks and Puhlwan Singh; being
familiar with the Goorkhas, his services were valuable in giving such
instructions to the Nepaulese auxiliaries as would enable them to
understand and obey the orders of the brigadier.
Although placed in an expectant attitude, until he could receive
instructions from Sir Colin, and until he heard of Jung Bahadoor’s
crossing of the frontier into Oude, Brigadier Franks was quite ripe for
an encounter with the enemy whenever and wherever he could meet with
them. They gave him an opportunity before the month was out, and he made
ample use of it. He crossed the frontier into Oude near Singramow, on
the 19th, and received speedy proof that a very large body of the enemy
was before him—ordered, apparently, by the self-appointed authorities at
Lucknow, to prevent him from approaching that city. Franks, however,
cleverly deceiving the rebel leader, Nazim Mahomed Hossein, attacked his
army in detail, first at Chandah and then at Humeerpoor. The section of
the rebels at Chandah, under Bunda Hossein, comprised among other troops
the mutinous sepoys of the 20th, 28th, 48th, and 71st Bengal native
regiments. Franks attacked them in a strong position. They were in the
fort and intrenchments, and crowning a long row of hillocks in front of
the town; every neighbouring tope and village was full of them.
Nevertheless he defeated them, and captured six of their guns. Giving
his troops only a very brief rest, he marched on to Humeerpoor, two or
three miles distant, on that same evening, and attacked a still larger
force under the Nazim himself. The defeat was equally significant. ‘Our
Enfield rifles did it all,’ wrote one of the English officers. The enemy
retreated during the night, and Franks and his brave men bivouacked,
after having, in the two engagements, inflicted a loss on their
opponents of six guns and 800 men killed and wounded. The brigadier
himself had been in the saddle fifteen hours on this severe day. After
resting on the 20th, Franks and his opponent the Nazim, the one at
Humeerpoor and the other at Warree, sought which should be the first to
obtain possession of the pass, jungle, and fort of Badshaigunje. By a
forced march, the English brigadier outmanœuvred the Nazim, gained the
fort, and waited till reinforcements could reach him. The two forces
came in sight of each other again on the 23d, by which time the Nazim
and Bunda Hossein had swelled their motley army to no less than 25,000
men, comprising 5000 revolted sepoys, 1100 sowars, and the rest rabble;
having with them 25 guns. The result of this encounter was a severe
battle, fought near Sultanpore. The enemy had taken up a very wide
position; their centre resting on the old cantonment and sepoy lines,
thence extending through villages and topes, and screened in front by
hillocks and nullahs. Franks turned the enemy’s right by a detour, drew
them into a hot struggle, and won a complete victory. No less than 1800
insurgents were killed and wounded, including two or three rebel
chieftains. The victors captured twenty pieces of artillery, and the
whole of the enemy’s standing camp, baggage, ammunition, &c. The result
of this battle was that the enemy were frustrated in the attempt to
check the advance of Franks into Oude; he found the roads to Lucknow and
Fyzabad entirely open to him. If he had had cavalry, he would have
pursued and cut up the enemy in retreat; but 250 horse, long and
anxiously expected from Allahabad, did not arrive at Sultanpore until
the day after the battle. These three actions, two on the 19th and one
on the 23d, were marked by that anomaly which the military operations in
India so often exhibited—the disparity between the losses on the two
sides. Nothing but a full trust in the truthfulness of a gallant officer
would render credible the fact that, after conflicts in which 2600 of
the enemy were killed and wounded, the conqueror could write as follows:
‘I am proud to announce that, through the glorious conduct of the
officers and men of this force, European and Nepaulese, I have been
enabled by manœuvring to achieve these brilliant results with the loss
on our side, in all three actions, of only 2 men killed and 16
wounded’—and this, be it remembered, in contesting against four times
his own numbers.
While this Jounpoor field-force was thus actively engaged, a small body
of English sailors were slowly advancing by another route into Oude.
Ever active to be up and doing, a band of about 250 tars, belonging to
the steam-frigate _Pearl_, were delighted at being formed into a naval
brigade, and offered a chance of meeting and well belabouring the
‘Pandies.’ Under Captain Sotheby, they were sent up the river Gogra in
the Company’s steamer _Jumna_. They embarked near Dinapoor, and
disembarked on the 20th at Nowraine, twenty miles short of Fyzabad. The
enemy had two forts at that place, both of which were speedily taken,
together with guns and ammunition, and the enemy driven away with great
loss. Jung Bahadoor, with his Nepaulese contingent, was at the time not
far distant; and Colonel Rowcroft, with 2000 Goorkhas, aided in the
attack.
The proceedings of the Nepaulese leader must now be noticed. The English
officers frequently, though cautiously, complained of the slowness of
his movements; and Sir Colin Campbell was becoming impatient for his
appearance near the great scene of conflict at Lucknow. He had been many
weeks in the region around Goruckpore, with a fine army of 9000
Goorkhas; and though he had aided in putting down many bands of
insurgents, it was now hoped that he would at once advance towards the
centre of Oude. This he did, but not rapidly, during the month of
February.
On the 26th, while Jung Bahadoor and Brigadier Macgregor were on the
march from Mobarukhpoor to Ukberpoor, on the way to Fyzabad, they
learned that a small body of rebels were in a fort at Berozepoor. A
portion of the body-guard went to the place, and relied on a promise
made by the rebels that they would evacuate the fort in forty minutes.
Instead of departing, the enemy prepared for a defence; and a desperate
fight ensued around a small fort distinguished by much novelty of
construction. The fort was so completely surrounded by an impenetrable
hedge of bamboos, that the besiegers were in much doubt concerning the
nature of the defences within. At one place they were stopped by a
ditch, at another by a high mud-wall and bastion, at another by a row of
lofty bamboo-stakes. The place being very small, an attempt was made to
storm it by assault; but so many were the obstacles, that a clearance by
cannonade became necessary; and it was not until after much artillery
firing, and much loss of life, that the fort was captured. So peculiar
was the construction of the place, that Captain Holland was obliged to
drag a 6-pounder gun through a bamboo-fence and an outer ditch, before
he could breach a mud-wall which had until then been invisible. It was
certainly no small achievement, in a military point of view, for the
enemy to have constructed a fort entirely novel to the besiegers, and
capable of being defended for several hours by less than forty men
against many hundreds. When all was over, Brigadier Macgregor, wishing
to know something more of the nature and construction of this little
fort of Berozepoor, requested Lieutenant Sankey, of the Madras
Engineers, to examine and report thereon—seeing that there might be like
forts elsewhere, with which it would be well to be familiar. Near the
village of Berozepoor, then, the fort was built. It was only sixty feet
square, with circular bastions at the angles, and a banquette just
within the parapet on which musketeers might stand. The mud-rampart was
fifteen feet above the level of the ground, very thick at the bottom and
loopholed for musketry at the top. It was surrounded by a ditch, this
again by a belt of high bamboos, which was in turn encircled by another
ditch ten or twelve feet deep. A row of newly planted bamboo slips,
eight or ten feet high, was placed on the immediate lip of the
counterscarp of the outer ditch. Lieutenant Sankey said in his report:
‘Viewed from the outside, nothing very suspicious or formidable was
discoverable about the place. It had all the appearance of an ordinary
clump of bamboos at the corner of a village; which latter, like all
inhabited places in this part of the country, was very well screened in
foliage.’ He found it, however, ‘a very hedgehog of fortification.
Nothing could be more difficult of approach; every portion bristling
with thorns, and intercepted by ditches and banks.’
A little must now be said concerning a few isolated operations,
belonging to the month of February, near the Jumna and the Ganges, in
which Seaton, Maxwell, and Hope Grant were concerned. Colonel Seaton, at
the close of the month, was at Mahomedabad, a few miles distant from
Futteghur. He had with him a detachment of the 82d foot, 300 of De
Kantzow’s horse, 350 of De Kantzow’s foot, and 40 Sikh troopers. After
waiting for the arrival of the 4th Punjaub infantry, the 3d Europeans,
Alexander’s Horse, and nine guns, he was enabled to organise an
efficient column for chastising the rebels in a number of villages
around Futteghur. Those operations, however, scarcely commenced until
the month of March.
Colonel Maxwell had the gratification of defeating a body of insurgents
who had for a long time given much anxiety to the British
officers—anxiety arising from a doubt concerning the plans and movements
of the insurgents. The Gwalior mutineers are here alluded to. They did
not allow the month to pass away wholly without giving signs of
activity; though those signs were few and unimportant. Colonel Maxwell,
commanding a detachment sent out from Cawnpore, suddenly found himself
attacked on the 4th by the mutineers, who marched from Calpee to his
camp at Bhogneepore. The broken nature of the ground, the cover of the
crops, and the dimness of the light at five o’clock on a winter’s
morning, prevented Maxwell from forming a correct estimate of numbers;
but he had every reason for believing them to be in great strength. He
could only bring against them five companies of H.M. 88th foot, 50
troopers, and 2 guns; yet with this small force he maintained a
running-fight for four hours. The enemy disputed every inch of the
ground, making a stand at Chowra, a place three or four miles distant
from the camp. He pursued them until they retreated across a small
river, keeping up the fire of their skirmishers to the very last. It is
difficult to understand what could have been the nature of the enemy’s
fire; for while, after the battle, the bodies of eighty rebels were
found dead upon the field, Colonel Maxwell recorded only five wounded
(none killed) in his own little force. Among the wounded was Lieutenant
Thompson, one of the few who escaped alive from Cawnpore.
About the middle of February, it became known that bodies of the enemy
were in motion near the fords or ghats on the left bank of the Ganges,
between Futteghur and Cawnpore, ready for any mischief that might
present itself. To clear away these rebels, a movable column was
organised, consisting of H.M. 34th, 38th, and 53d regiments, squadrons
of the 7th Hussars and 9th Lancers, squadrons of Hodson’s Horse and
Watson’s Horse, a company of Sappers and Miners, and a few guns. This
column was to start from the main Lucknow road at a point near Bunnee,
and to proceed on a line inclining towards the Ganges at such an angle
as to sweep the rebels towards the west, where, at present, they would
be less mischievous than if near the banks of the river. Sir Hope Grant
took command of this column, which consisted of 3246 men (2240 infantry,
636 cavalry, 326 artillery, and 44 native Sappers). One of his
achievements with this column consisted in the storming and capture of
the town of Meeangunje or Meagunje, on the 23d of February. In the
course of his various marchings, he learned that a body of the enemy had
taken up a strong position at Meeangunje, a town between Lucknow and
Futteghur. They had 2000 infantry in the town, 300 cavalry outside, and
five or six guns. Hope Grant’s force being stronger than theirs, a
victory was naturally to be expected, although the position was a strong
one. Meeangunje was surrounded by a stone wall fourteen feet high, and
had three strong gates, opening into the Lucknow, Cawnpore, and
Rohilcund roads respectively; there were also numerous bastions on all
sides. At each of the gates the enemy placed guns behind strong
breastworks, and the breastworks themselves were covered by trees. After
a careful reconnoitring, Grant found a weak point on the fourth side of
the town, where he could bring two heavy guns within three or four
hundred yards of the wall, at a place where a postern-gate pierced it.
Telling off part of his force to command the Lucknow road, another part
to the Rohilcund road, and the rest to await behind a village the result
of the cannonading, he opened fire. In less than an hour, the two heavy
guns made a practicable breach in the wall. Grant at once ordered H.M.
53d to advance to the assault. The regiment separated into two wings,
one of which, after entering the breach, proceeded under Colonel English
through the left of the town; while the other, under Major Payne,
penetrated to the right. This work was admirably done; the infantry
advancing through a labyrinth of lanes, and driving the enemy before
them at every yard. The town was captured, and with it six guns. The
enemy, in endeavouring to escape by the several gates, were killed or
captured to the number of nearly a thousand altogether. Here occurred
another of those inexplicable anomalies already adverted to; Sir Hope
Grant, in language too distinct to be misinterpreted, stated that his
loss was only 2 killed and 19 wounded.
The Doab had undergone a wonderful improvement during the winter months.
District after district was gradually falling out of the enemy’s hands,
and into the power of the British. Nevertheless, there was much need for
caution. The insurgents were cunning, and often appeared where little
expected. The commander-in-chief’s operations, in February as in
December, were influenced by the necessity of providing for the safety
of non-combatants escaping from the scenes of strife. In the earlier
month, as we have already seen, Sir Colin could not chastise the Gwalior
mutineers until he had sent off the women, children, sick, and wounded
from Lucknow to Cawnpore, Futtehpoor, and Allahabad; and now, in
February, he had to secure the passage of a convoy from Agra, comprising
a large number of ladies and 140 children. Protected by the 3d Bengal
Europeans, some irregular horse, and two guns, these helpless persons
left Agra on the 11th of February, and proceeded by way of Ferozabad and
Minpooree to Cawnpore—thence to be forwarded to Allahabad. On the way,
the convoy watched narrowly for any indications of the presence of Nena
Sahib, who was reported to be in movement somewhere in that quarter.
Of Delhi, the chief matter here to be noticed, is the trial of the old
imprisoned king, for complicity in the mutiny and its atrocities.
Without formally limiting the account to the month of February, the
general course of the investigation may briefly be traced.
The trial commenced on the 27th of January, in the celebrated imperial
chamber of the Dewani Khas, the ‘Elysium’ where in former days Mogul
power had been displayed in all its gorgeousness. The tribunal was a
court-martial, all the members being military officers. The president
was Colonel Dawes (in lieu of Brigadier Showers, who, though first
appointed, had been obliged to leave for service elsewhere). The other
members were Major Palmer, Major Redmond, Major Sawyers, and Captain
Rothney. Major Harriott, deputy-judge-advocate-general, officiated as
government prosecutor. The charges against the king were set forth under
four headings.[138] It may be doubted whether the wearisome legal
phraseology (’to raise, levy, and make insurrection, rebellion, and
war’—‘treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with,’ &c.) was well
fitted for the purpose; but this may depend on the mode in which the
English was translated into Hindustani.
It was impossible for the spectators to regard without emotion the
appearance of the aged monarch, the last representative of a long line
of Indian potentates, thus brought as a culprit before a tribunal of
English officers. Even those who considered him simply as a hoary-headed
villain were interested by the proceedings. After being in attendance
some time, sitting in a palanquin outside the court, under a guard of
Rifles, he was summoned within at about noon. He appeared very infirm,
and tottered into court supported on one side by his favourite son,
Jumma Bukht, and on the other by a confidential servant. He sat coiled
up on a cushion at the left of the president; and ‘presented such a
picture of helpless imbecility as, under other circumstances, must have
awakened pity.’ His son stood a few yards to the left, and the guard of
Rifles beyond all.
After the members of the court, the prosecutor, and the interpreter, had
taken the usual oaths, the prosecutor proceeded to read the charges
against the prisoner. He next addressed the court in a concise and
explanatory manner; and announced that, though the king would be tried
to ascertain whether he were guilty or not guilty, no capital sentence
could be passed upon him, in consequence of his life having been
guaranteed to him by Sir Archdale Wilson, through Captain Hodson. When
the king was asked, through the interpreter, whether he was guilty or
innocent, he professed to be ignorant of the nature of the charges
against him. This, however, was affected ignorance, for the charges had
long before been presented to him, translated into his own language.
After considerable delay, he pleaded ‘not guilty.’
During several sittings of the court, occupying many weeks, numerous
witnesses were examined. Among them were Jutmull, Mukkhun Lall, Captain
Forrest, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, Hussun Uskeree, Bukhtawar, Kishen,
Chunee, Golam, Essamoola Khan, and other persons, European, Eurasian or
half-caste, and native. The evidence brought against the king was of
very varied character, tending to shew that he both aided in inciting
the mutiny, and in encouraging the atrocities of the mutineers. Some of
the evidence proved that, so long ago as the summer of 1856, the King of
Delhi had been in correspondence with the Shah of Persia, touching an
overturning of the English ‘raj’ in India: in a manner and at a time
corresponding with the advance of the Persians towards Herat. Other
portions confirmed the fact that many of the massacres at Delhi, at the
beginning of the Revolt, were sanctioned by the palace profligates, and
even committed immediately under the king’s own apartments. Sir T.
Metcalfe, in his evidence, stated it as his opinion, derived from an
intimate acquaintance with Delhi and its inhabitants, that the Revolt
was the legitimate fruit of a Mussulman conspiracy; that the courts of
Delhi and Lucknow were concerned in this conspiracy; that the war with
Persia helped to strengthen it; that the Hindoos were used as tools in
the matter by the Mohammedans; and that the affair of the greased
cartridges was regarded as a lucky opportunity for enlisting Hindoo
prejudices.
During the trial the king displayed a mingled silliness and cunning that
revealed much of his character. Sometimes, while the evidence was being
taken, he would coil himself up on his cushion, and appear lost in the
land of dreams. Except when anything particular struck him, he paid, or
appeared to pay, no attention whatever to the proceedings. On one of the
days he was aroused from sleep, to reply to a question put by the court.
Sometimes he would rouse up, as if by some sudden impulse, and make an
exclamation in denial of a witness’s statement. Once, when the intrigues
of Persia were under notice, he asked whether the Persians and the
Russians were the same people. On the twelfth day of the trial, the king
was more animated than usual; he several times declared his innocence of
everything; and amused himself by twisting and untwisting a scarf round
his head.
Without tracing the incidents of the trial day by day, or quoting the
evidence, it may suffice to say that the guilt of the aged sinner was
sufficiently proved, on some if not all of the charges. The safety of
his life being guaranteed, imprisonment became the only probable
punishment. He was sentenced for the rest of his days to
transportation—either to one of the Andaman Islands (a group in the
eastern portion of the Bay of Bengal), or to some other place that might
be selected. It may not be inappropriate to mention that some of the
witnesses proved that Mr Colvin at Agra, and Sir Theophilus Metcalfe at
Delhi, were told of a forthcoming Mohammedan conspiracy many weeks
before the Meerut outbreak; so utterly, however, did these authorities
disregard the rumour, that they did not even report it to the Calcutta
government. There were only a few men in India, in the spring of 1857,
who believed that the British ‘raj’ was ‘on the edge of a volcano.’
In connection with the fate of the old king, much attention was
necessarily bestowed on the past conduct of his favourite young wife,
the intriguing Sultana Zeenat Mahal, the ‘dark, fat, shrewd, but
sensual-looking woman,’ whom Mrs Hodson visited in the prison,[139] in
relation to the Revolt. Ever since the year 1853, a feud had existed in
the royal family, arising out of the polygamic troubles so frequent in
oriental countries. The king, instigated by Zeenat Mahal, wished to name
the child of his old age, Mirza Jumma Bukht, heir to the throne of
Akbar; but the British government insisted on recognising the superior
claims of an elder son, Mirza Fukhr-oo-deen. Strife and contest
immediately commenced, and never ceased until one obstacle was removed
from the path. Mirza Fukhr-oo-deen died in 1856, as alleged, of cholera,
but not without suspicion of foul play. From that time till the
beginning of the mutiny in the following year, the imperial palace was a
focus of intriguing. The sultana bent her whole energies towards
obtaining the heirship to the throne of the Moguls for her own son. She
was known to have declared that this object would be persistently and
steadily pursued, and to have opened many communications thereon with
the authorities at Calcutta. When, however, it was announced that a
grandson of the king should, after him, possess all that remained of
imperial power, her plans were at once dashed. It thenceforward became a
question with her whether, by an overturn of the English ‘raj,’ she
could obtain that which was denied to her by the government; and when
other sources of revolt and rebellion appeared, there was an
intelligible reason why she should encourage the insurgents. Nothing
came out at the trial so clear as to fix guilt unquestionably upon her;
but there remained on men’s minds a suspicion to which collateral
circumstances afforded much probability.
Transferring attention from Delhi to Rohilcund and the Hills, it may at
once be explained that little occurred during the month of February
requiring detailed notice. The time had not yet arrived when Sir Colin
Campbell could send strong columns to sweep away the rebels in that
quarter. Bareilly was still the head-quarters of a rebel force, which
ruled almost the whole of Rohilcund. Khan Bahadoor Khan, the
self-appointed chief, had still around him a large body of revolted
sepoys and insurgent retainers; and in the whole region between Oude on
the one side, and Delhi and Meerut on the other, very little was under
British control. The time, however, for making a demonstration in this
quarter was approaching. Among other military arrangements planned about
the middle of February, was the formation of a movable column at Meerut,
to be held in readiness to march anywhere at a short notice. It was to
consist of a squadron of Carabiniers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, a wing
of the Belooch battalion, the 1st Punjaub infantry, the Moultanee horse,
a field-battery, two 18-pounders, and one 8-inch howitzer. There was at
the same time at Looksar, near Roorkee, a small force under Captain
Brind, consisting of a squadron of Carabiniere, Hughes’s irregular
cavalry, detachments of Coke’s Rifles, of the Nusseree battalion, and of
the 3d Punjaub infantry, and a troop of horse-artillery. At Roorkee
another corps was to be formed, under Major Coke, to consist of Punjaub
regiments about to arrive. It was proposed that these three bodies—the
movable column at Meerut, Brind’s corps at Looksar, and Coke’s corps at
Roorkee—should ultimately form a Rohilcund field-force, under General
Penny. What was effected by means of this force, will come for notice in
a future page; little could be achieved until the commander-in-chief had
broken the strength of the enemy in Oude, now the great centre of
rebellion.
The hilly country in and around Kumaon, although too far removed from
the Jumna regions to be frequently engaged in the horrors of war, was
nevertheless occasionally made a battle-ground between hostile forces.
Early in February, Colonel M’Causland, commanding in Kumaon, formed a
camp at Huldwanee, to protect the Kumaon hills, and to clear the Barbur
and Turale districts of rebels. He found two formidable bodies of the
enemy threatening that region. One, under a leader named Fuzul Huq,
consisting of 4000 men and 6 guns, was encamped at Sunda, in a strong
position on the banks of the Sookhee river, about fifteen miles from
Huldwanee, on the Peleebheet road. The other, under Khali Khan,
consisting of 5000 men and 4 guns, was encamped at Churpurah, on the
Paha Nuddee, sixteen miles from Huldwanee, on the Bareilly road. So far
as could be judged, it appeared as if these 9000 men intended to make a
combined attack on Huldwanee, and then to force the hill-passes. To
encounter these enemies, M’Causland’s force was but small, consisting of
700 Goorkha infantry, 200 horse, and 2 field-guns; nevertheless he
resolved to confront them boldly. On the 9th of February he commenced a
movement intended to prevent the junction of the two hostile forces. In
the dead of the night, leaving his tents to be guarded by a few men in a
barricaded square called the Mundee, he marched out as quietly as
possible to the place occupied by Khali Khan’s army. He came up to them
at daybreak on the 10th, and found them encamped in a strong position;
with their rear and left protected by the Paha Nuddee, a small village
filled with infantry on their right flank, their front protected by
rough ground intersected with nullahs and long jungle-grass, and the
road commanded by four pieces of artillery. So completely did he
surprise them, that when his cavalry first appeared, the rebels thought
their allies under Fuzul Huq had arrived. Finding the enemy’s right
flank the best to attack, the colonel sent most of his men to that
point, covered by the fire of his two guns. The contest was sharp and
severe. In about an hour the Goorkhas had captured the enemy’s guns, cut
down every artilleryman serving them, and dislodged the enemy from the
village. Meanwhile the few horse made a gallant charge, repulsing a
superior body of the enemy’s cavalry, and taking a standard. The
colonel’s two guns worked immense execution among the enemy’s cavalry,
‘into which’ (to use the professional language of the commander) ‘they
poured shrapnel with beautiful precision and tremendous effect.’ The
victory was complete. The enemy lost their guns, ammunition,
standing-camp, baggage, 300 killed, and 600 wounded. The colonel, having
thus defeated nearly six times his number, returned to Huldwanee—his
gallant Goorkhas having marched thirty-four miles and fought a severe
battle in thirteen hours. It was deemed necessary to return at once,
lest their prolonged absence from Huldwanee should tempt Fuzul Huq,
whose army was not far distant, to make a dash on the camp and station.
Nynee Tal was deeply interested in all these movements. During February
it was hemmed in by the rebels on one side, and by the hill-snows on the
other. The enemy, deterred by the gallant force at Huldwanee, hoped to
penetrate to the little colony by a detour through the Kulleedongee
Pass. This hope, however, was not worth much to them; for the pass was
long and fatiguing; and near its top was a small body of Goorkhas, who,
with a few guns, were determined to make a stout resistance if any
attack were made.
The Punjaub and Sinde were nearly at peace. The few instances of
turbulence, or of military operation, may pass without record here.
In that vast range of country which has in so many chapters required
attention, comprising Rajpootana, Gujerat, Central India, the Mahratta
States, Bundelcund, and the Saugor territories, the month of February
exhibited the gradual strengthening of British columns sent up from
Bombay and Madras, and the success of numerous small engagements in
which the names of Rose, Roberts, Orr, Whitlock, Stuart, Steuart, and
other officers are concerned. Being small in themselves, these
engagements hardly need separate notice; but taken collectively, they
tended to assist the commander-in-chief’s plans towards the general
pacification of India.
The month of February witnessed the conclusion of a series of services
rendered by a small force under somewhat remarkable circumstances.
Mention has frequently been made of Captain Osborne, political agent at
Rewah, almost the only Englishman within a turbulent district.
Fortunately, the Rajahs of Rewah and Nagode remained faithful to the
British; they, with the aid of Osborne, formed a corps of such of their
native troops as they felt could be trusted; and this corps was placed
under Colonel Hinde for active service. It was November when the corps
was first organised; but, the troops being undisciplined, badly
equipped, and badly armed, and the arrangements for marching and camping
being very defective, it was the middle of December before the corps
started from the town of Rewah. The duty to be performed was to keep
open and safe the road from Rewah to Jubbulpoor (one of the great
highways of India), and to capture such forts by the way as were in
hostile hands. Imperfect as were the materials at his command, Colonel
Hinde nevertheless, between the middle of December and the middle of
February, captured six forts, forty guns, two mortars, and two
standards; rendered the great road to the Deccan secure; re-established
dâk and police bungalows; restored order in the Myhere territory;
annexed the small territory of the rebellious chieftains of
Bijeeragooghar; appointed tehsildars and police therein; and captured a
large number of turbulent rebels. The six forts taken were Kunchunpore,
Goonah, Myhere, Jokai, Khunwara, and Bijeeragooghar. These services
having been rendered, Captain Osborne recalled the corps to Rewah; and
the governor-general thanked both him and Colonel Hinde for what they
had effected in a troubled region, with very limited means. It is
pleasant—amid the treachery of so many ‘Pandies’ and ‘Singhs’—to read
that Osborne and Hinde had a good word to say for Dinbund Pandy, Lullaie
Singh, Sewgobind Pandy, Davy Singh, and Bisseshur Singh—Rewah and Nagode
native officers, who were both faithful and brave in the hour of need.
Brigadier Whitlock, with a Madras column, was rendering service in the
country between Nagpoor and Bundelcund. He had various skirmishes with
bands of rebels at Jubbulpoor and Sleemanabad; and when he had restored
something like order in that region, he moved off towards Cawnpore,
there to take part if necessary in the operations of the army of Oude.
Few Europeans in India had better reason than those at Saugor to welcome
the approach of some of their countrymen as deliverers. So far back as
the month of June, the officers, their ladies, and the civilians, had
been shut up in the fort by orders of Brigadier Sage, on account of the
suspicious symptoms presented by the 31st, 42d, and other native
regiments. There they remained throughout the whole of the autumn and
part of the winter, too strong to be seriously molested, and too well
supplied with food to suffer those privations which were so sadly
experienced at Lucknow. Sir Hugh Rose arrived with his force at Saugor
on the 3d of February, and liberated those who had so long been confined
within the fort. No battle was needed to effect this; for though the
garrison were almost entirely without reliable troops, they were not
besieged by any considerable force of the enemy. Rose, who had collected
a force with much difficulty from various quarters, prepared after the
relief of Saugor to attack numerous bands of rebels in that part of
India. He assaulted the strong fortress of Garra Kotah, at the
confluence of the Sonah and the Guddarree; he captured it, pursued and
cut up the enemy, and then marched towards Jhansi, where busy work
awaited him in the following month.
General Roberts, towards the close of February, was collecting a force
at and near Nuseerabad, for operations in that part of Rajpootana. He
went with the head-quarters of H.M. 95th from Deesa to Beaur, and thence
to Nuseerabad, where he arrived on the 22d. He was to be joined shortly
afterwards by the 72d Highlanders from Deesa, and by 200 of the Sinde
horse under Major Green; and when strengthened by other regiments,
especially a good body of cavalry, he intended to march towards Kotah, a
very strong fortress which had long been in the hands of a rebel
chieftain.
[Illustration:
Moulvies, or Mohammedan Religious Teachers.
]
The regions forming the central and southern portions of the Bombay
presidency were a little disturbed by fanatical Mohammedans, who, though
unable to bring any very large number of conspirators into their plan of
action, did nevertheless make many attempts to raise the green flag, the
symbol of Moslem supremacy. There were no mutinies of whole regiments,
however, or even companies of regiments. Indeed the instigators of
mischief were rather rioters than soldiers; and the authorities only
regarded these outbreaks seriously as sparks that might possibly kindle
inflammable materials elsewhere.
The Nizam’s country, generally peaceful on account of his fidelity to
the English, became a field of temporary struggle owing to the
insubordination of a minor chieftain, the Rajah of Shorapore. His small
territory, bounded on one side by the river Kistnah, occupied an angle
in the dominions of the Nizam. Wishing, perhaps, to rise from the rank
of a petty chieftain to one of greater power, he had for some time
displayed hostility towards the British. But his career now came to an
end. A force left Belgaum at the end of January, to advance to
Shorapore; another left Kulladghee for the same destination; while a
third advanced from Madras. The Nizam, at the same time, acting in
harmony with his prime minister and Colonel Davidson, issued a
proclamation denouncing as rebels any of his subjects who should assist
the chief of Shorapore. These various measures had the desired result;
the insurgents were dispersed, Shorapore seized, and the chief made
prisoner.
In reference to such occurrences as the one described in the last
paragraph, it may be observed that many of the residents, or British
representatives at the courts of native princes, exhibited a wisdom and
intrepidity which claim for them a rank by the side of the military
heroes whose names are much better known to the world. Such a one was
Colonel Davidson, British resident at the Nizam’s court at Hyderabad in
the Deccau. During many months, he, with a few hundred faithful troops,
maintained English prestige amongst a fanatic Mussulman population of
two or three hundred thousand men, who often threatened the handful of
British in the city. ‘Disaffected persons,’ a well-informed authority
has said, ‘thronged to the Nizam’s palace by day and by night, with
imprecations upon their lips against Europeans. It was impossible to
tell when mutiny might break out among the native soldiers; and it was
certain that the rabble were only awaiting their opportunity to glut
themselves with English blood. Yet amidst all this the British resident
never faltered or wavered; and by mere force of character he preserved
peace in the city and district, and succeeded in securing to our side
the Nizam and his minister Salar Jung. This Salar Jung was a young and
well-educated man, who for his friendship to the British was hated by
the Mussulmans.’ The position of this minister was almost as dangerous
as that of the resident; for if the attack of the 17th of July[140] had
succeeded, he would have shared the common fate of the British. Colonel
Davidson not only secured Hyderabad, but was subsequently enabled to
send a considerable cavalry force for service elsewhere.
Among other political arrangements of the month, was the termination of
a short governorship in the regions around Allahabad. On the 4th of
August, in the preceding year, after the Northwest Provinces had been
thrown into anarchy by the mutiny, a ‘lieutenant governorship of the
Central Provinces’ was established, and placed in the hands of Mr John
Peter Grant, one of the members of the Supreme Council at Calcutta. A
few weeks afterwards, on the 19th of September, some of the other
provinces in the Jumna regions were placed under a ‘chief-commissioner
of the Northwest Provinces.’ Both of these offices were abolished by the
governor-general in council, on the 9th of February; and Viscount
Canning, then at Allahabad, took under his immediate authority and
control the whole of the provinces lately placed under those officers.
He became in fact, though not in name, and for a temporary period,
governor of a presidency of which Allahabad was the capital. At or about
the same time, Meerut and Delhi were handed over to the
chief-commissioner of the Punjaub. Thus, all the political power between
Calcutta and the Afghan frontier being in the hands of Canning and
Lawrence, and all the military power in Sir Colin Campbell, it was hoped
that greater energy and precision would be thrown into the combined
operations.
Notes.
_Sir Colin Campbell’s Army of Oude._—On the 10th of February, as
stated in the text of this chapter, the commander-in-chief made a
formal announcement of the component elements of the army with which
he was about to enter Oude. These particulars we give here in a
note, as a permanent record of an interesting matter in the military
history of the Revolt. It must be clearly borne in mind, however,
that this army of Oude comprised only such troops as were at that
date under the immediate command of Sir Colin. Columns, corps, and
field-forces, under Franks, Seaton, Jung Bahadoor, Macgregor,
Windham, Van Cortlandt, Penny, M’Causland, Greathed, Roberts, Rose,
Steuart, Stuart, Whitlock, and other officers, were rendering active
or defensive services in various parts of India; and it depended on
the course of circumstances whether any and which of these could
assist in the grand operations against Lucknow.
‘_Head-quarters, Camp Cawnpore, Feb. 10._
‘The troops now in Oude, and those advancing into that province, are
formed into divisions and brigades, and staff-officers are attached
us follows; the whole being under the personal command of his
Excellency the Commander-in-chief.
‘Such appointments as now appear for the first time will take effect
from this date.
Artillery Division.
‘Staff.—Major-general Sir A. Wilson, K.C.B., Bengal Artillery,
commanding; Major E. B. Johnson, Bengal Artillery, Assistant
Adjutant-general; Lieutenant R. Biddulph, Royal Artillery,
Deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general; Lieutenant-colonel C. Hogge,
Bengal Artillery, Director of Artillery in the Ordnance Department;
Captain C. H. Barchard, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, Aid-de-camp;
Lieutenant H. G. Deedes, 60th Royal Rifles, Extra Aid-de-camp.
‘Brigade of Field-artillery.—Brigadier D. E. Wood, C.B., Royal
Horse-artillery; Lieutenant J. S. Frith, Bengal Horse-artillery,
Major of Brigade.—E troop Royal Horse-artillery; F Troop Royal
Horse-artillery; 1st Troop 1st Brigade Bengal Artillery; 2d Troop
1st Brigade Bengal Artillery; 2d Troop 3d Brigade Bengal Artillery;
3d Troop 3d Brigade Bengal Artillery; 3d Company 14th Battalion
Royal Artillery, and No. 20, Light Field-battery; 2d Company 3d
Battalion Bengal Artillery, and No. 12 Light Field-battery.
‘Brigade of Siege-artillery.—Brigadier G. R. Barker, C.B., Royal
Artillery; Lieutenant A. Bunny, Bengal Horse-artillery, Major of
Brigade.—3d Company 8th Battalion Royal Artillery; 6th Company 11th
Battalion Royal Artillery; 5th Company 12th Battalion Royal
Artillery; 5th Company 13th Battalion Royal Artillery; 4th Company
1st Battalion Bengal Artillery; 1st Company 5th Battalion Bengal
Artillery; 3d Company 5th Battalion Bengal Artillery; Detachment
Bengal Artillery recruits.
‘The Naval Brigade will form part of the division under Sir Archdale
Wilson, but will be under the immediate command of Captain W. Peel,
C.B., Royal Navy, and independent of the Brigade of Siege-artillery.
‘Engineer Brigade.—Brigadier R. Napier, Bengal Engineers,
Chief-engineer; Major of Brigade, Lieutenant H. Bingham, Veteran
Establishment, Brigade Quartermaster; Lieutenant-colonel H. D.
Harness, Royal Engineers, commanding Royal Engineers; Captain A.
Taylor, Bengal Engineers, commanding Bengal Engineers.—4th Company
Royal Engineers; 23d Company Royal Engineers; Head-quarters Bengal
Sappers and Miners; Punjaub Sappers and Miners; corps of Pioneers.
Cavalry Division.
‘Brigadier-general J. H. Grant, C.B., commanding; Captain W.
Hamilton, 9th Lancers, Deputy-assistant-adjutant-general;
Lieutenant F. S. Roberts, Bengal Horse-artillery,
Deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general; Captain the Hon. A. H. A.
Anson, her Majesty’s 84th Regiment, Aid-de-camp.
‘1st Brigade.—Brigadier A. Little, her Majesty’s 9th Lancers;
Captain H. A. Sarel, her Majesty’s 17th Lancers, Major of
Brigade.—Her Majesty’s 9th Lancers; 2d Battalion Military Train; 2d
Punjaub Cavalry; Detachment 5th Punjaub Cavalry; Wale’s Horse.
‘2d Brigade.—Brigadier W. Campbell, her Majesty’s 2d Dragoon Guards;
Captain H. Forbes, 1st Light Cavalry, Major of Brigade.—Her
Majesty’s 2d Dragoon Guards; her Majesty’s 7th (Queen’s Own)
Hussars; Volunteer Cavalry; Detachment 1st Punjaub Cavalry; Hodson’s
Horse.
1st Infantry Division.
‘Major-general Sir J. Outram, G.C.B., Bombay Army, commanding;
Captain D. S. Dodgson, 30th Native Infantry,
Deputy-assistant-adjutant-general; Lieutenant W. R. Moorsom,
her Majesty’s 52d Light Infantry,
Deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general; Lieutenant F. E. A.
Chamier, 34th Native Infantry, Aid-de-camp; Lieutenant
Hargood, 1st Madras Fusiliers, Extra Aid-de-camp.
‘1st Brigade.—Brigadier D. Russell, her Majesty’s 84th Regiment.—Her
Majesty’s 5th Fusiliers; her Majesty’s 84th Regiment; 1st Madras
Fusiliers.
‘2d Brigade.—Brigadier C. Franklyn, her Majesty’s 84th Regiment.—Her
Majesty’s 78th Highlanders; her Majesty’s 90th Light Infantry;
Regiment of Ferozpore.
2d Infantry Division.
‘Captain R. C. Stewart, her Majesty’s 35th Regiment,
Deputy-assistant-adjutant-general; Captain D. C. Shute,
Deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general.
‘3d Brigade.—Brigadier W. Hamilton, her Majesty’s 78th Highlanders,
commanding; Captain G. N. Fendall, her Majesty’s 53d Regiment, Major
of Brigade.—Her Majesty’s 34th Regiment; her Majesty’s 38th
Regiment; her Majesty’s 53d Regiment.
‘4th Brigade.—Brigadier the Hon. A. Hope, her Majesty’s 93d
Highlanders; Captain J. H. Cox, her Majesty’s 75th Regiment, Major
of Brigade.—Her Majesty’s 42d Highlanders; her Majesty’s 93d
Highlanders; 4th Punjaub Rifles.
3d Infantry Division.
‘Brigadier-general R. Walpole, Rifle Brigade, commanding;
Captain C. A. Beerwell, 71st Regiment Native Infantry,
Deputy-assistant-adjutant-general; Captain T. A. Carey, 17th
Regiment Native Infantry, Deputy-assistant-quarter-master-general.
‘5th Brigade.—Brigadier Douglas, her Majesty’s 79th Highlanders.—Her
Majesty’s 23d Fusiliers; her Majesty’s 79th Highlanders; 1st Bengal
Fusiliers.
‘6th Brigade.—Brigadier A. H. Horsford, Rifle Brigade.—2d Battalion
Rifle Brigade; 3d Battalion Rifle Brigade; 2d Punjaub Infantry.
‘Captain C. C. Johnson, Deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general, will
be attached to army head-quarters. Deputy-judge Advocate-general to
the Force.—Captain A. C. Robertson, Her Majesty’s 8th (the King’s)
Regiment. Field Paymaster.—Captain F. C. Tombs, 18th Regiment Native
Infantry. Baggage Master.—Lieutenant J. Morland, 1st Bengal
Fusiliers. Provost Marshal.—Captain A. C. Warner, 7th Light Cavalry.
Postmaster.—Major C. Apthorp, 41st Native Infantry. Superintending
Surgeon.—J. C. Brown, M.B., Bengal Horse-artillery. Field
Surgeon.—Surgeon Wilkie. Medical Storekeeper.—Assistant-surgeon
Corbyn, M.D.
‘All staff appointments connected with Major-general Sir J. Outram’s
force not specified above will hold good until the junction of that
force with army head-quarters.
‘All appointments not filled up in the above order are to be
temporarily provided for under the orders of officers commanding
divisions and brigades.
* * * * *
‘The following is the General Staff of the army advancing into Oude:
‘Commander-in-chief.—His Excellency General Sir Colin Campbell,
G.C.B., Her Majesty’s service.
‘Military Secretary to Commander-in-chief.—Major A. Alison,
her Majesty’s service (wounded). Acting Secretary and
Aid-de-camp.—Colonel A. C. Sterling, C.B., her Majesty’s
service. Aid-de-camp.—Captain Sir D. Baird, 98th foot.
Aid-de-camp.—Lieutenant F. M. Alison, 72d Highlanders.
Aid-de-camp.—Captain W. T. Forster, 18th foot. Commandant at
head-quarters, and interpreter.—Captain J. Metcalfe, Bengal
infantry. Surgeon.—Staff-surgeon J. J. Clifford, M.D., her Majesty’s
service. Chief of the Staff.—Major-general W. R. Mansfield, her
Majesty’s service. Deputy-assistant Adjutant-general to the Chief of
the Staff.—Captain R. J. Hope Johnstone, Bombay infantry.
Aid-de-camp to the Chief of the Staff.—Captain C. Mansfield, 33d
foot (wounded). Acting Aid-de-camp.—Lieutenant D. Murray, 64th foot.
Deputy-adjutant-general of the Army.—Major H. W. Norman, Bengal
infantry. Assistant Adjutant-general of the Army.—Captain D. M.
Stewart, Bengal infantry. Deputy-adjutant-general, her
Majesty’s troops.—Colonel the Hon. W. L. Pakenham, C.B.
Assistant-quartermaster-general of the Army.—Captain G. Allgood,
Bengal infantry. Deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general.—Captain C.
C. Johnson, Bengal infantry. Acting quarter-master-general of her
Majesty’s Forces.—Captain C. F. Seymour, 84th foot. Judge
Advocate-general.—Lieutenant-Colonel K. Young, Bengal infantry.
Deputy Judge Advocate-general.—Captain A. C. Robertson, 8th foot.
Principal Commissariat Officer.—Captain C. M. Fitzgerald Bengal
infantry. Commissary of Ordnance.—Captain W. T. Brown, Bengal
artillery. Field Paymaster.—Captain F. C. Tombs, Bengal infantry.
Provost Marshal.—Captain A. C. Warner, Bengal cavalry. Baggage
Master.—Lieutenant J. Morland, Bengal infantry. Principal Medical
Officer, Queen’s Troops.—Dr J. C. Tice. Superintending
Surgeon.—Surgeon J. C. Brown, Bengal artillery.’
* * * * *
_Mohammedan Rebel Leaders._—Whatever may have been the proximate
causes of the Revolt, it is certain that the rebel leaders were
found relatively more numerous among the Mohammedans than among the
Hindoos. They talked more frequently and fiercely about fighting for
the faith; and they dragged into the meshes of a net many Hindoos
who would otherwise have remained free from treasonable
entanglement. Several native proclamations have been noticed in
earlier chapters of this work; and we now present another,
illustrative of Mussulman intrigues. It purports to come from Prince
Mirza Mahomed Feroze Shah, and was dated the 3d of Rujub 1274,
corresponding to the 17th of February 1858:
‘Be it known to all the Hindoo and Mohammedan inhabitants of India
that to rule over a country is one of the greatest blessings from
Heaven, and it is denied to a tyrant or an oppressor. Within the
last few years the British commenced to oppress the people in India
under different pleas, and contrived to eradicate Hindooism and
Mohammedanism, and to make all the people embrace Christianity. The
Almighty Power observing this, diverted the hearts of the people to
a different course, and now every one has turned to annihilate the
English, and they have nearly done so. Through avarice and ambition,
the British have shewn some resistance, though in vain. Through
Divine mercy, that will in a short time be reduced to nothing. Let
this also be known to all the Hindoos and Mussulmans, that the
English bear the bitterest enmity towards them. Should they again
become predominant in this country—which, God forbid—they will
destroy religion, property, and even the life of every one. A brief
sketch of the views and intentions of the Supreme Court and
Parliament is hereby given, in order to warn the people that they
should get rid of habits of negligence, and strive in unity to
destroy the infidels. When the Indian troops mutinied to save their
religion, and killed all infidels in several places, the wise men of
England were of opinion that had the British authorities in India
kept the following things in view, the mutiny would never have
broken out: 1. They should have destroyed the race of the former
kings and nobles. 2. They should have burnt all books of every other
religion. 3. They should not have left even a biswa of ground to any
of the native rulers. 4. They should have intermarried among the
natives, so that after a short time all would have become one race.
5. They should not have taught the use of artillery to the natives.
6. They should not have left arms among the natives. 7. They should
not have employed any native until he consented to eat and drink
with Europeans. 8. The mosques and Hindoo temples should not have
been allowed to stand. 9. Neither Moulvies nor Brahmins should have
been allowed to preach. 10. The several cases brought into the
courts should have been decided according to English laws. 11.
English priests should have performed all nuptial ceremonies of the
natives according to their English customs. 12. All prescriptions of
the Hindoo and Mussulman physicians should have been prohibited, and
English medicines furnished instead. 13. Neither Hindoo nor
Mussulman fakeers should have been allowed to convert people without
the permission of English missionaries. 14. European doctors only
should have been allowed to assist native women in childbed.—But the
authorities did not take means to introduce these measures. On the
contrary, they encouraged the people: so much so, that they at last
broke out. Had the authorities kept in view the maxims above alluded
to, the natives would have remained quiet for thousands of years.
These are now the real intentions of the English; but all of us must
conjointly exert ourselves for the protection of our lives,
property, and religion, and to root out the English from this
country. Thus we shall, indeed, through Divine mercy, gain a great
victory over them. I (the prince) now draw a brief sketch of my
travels, and I hope the people will pay attention to what I say.
Before the destruction of the English, I went on a pilgrimage to
Mecca, and on my return I observed that the English were in a bad
and hazardous position. I therefore offered thanks to God, because
it is in my nature to follow the principles of my religion and to
promulgate justice. I persuaded many at Delhi to raise a religious
war; I then hastened towards Gwalior, where the majority of the
military officers promised to kill the English and take up my cause.
A small portion of the Gwalior army accompanied me. I had not the
least intention to announce war before I had everything in order;
but the army became very enthusiastic, and commenced fighting with
the enemy (the English). Though our army was then but a handful, and
that of the enemy very large in numbers, still we fought manfully;
and, though apparently we were defeated, in reality we were
victorious over our enemy, for we killed 1000 of them. Since then I
have been collecting as well as exhorting the people. I have exerted
myself in procuring ammunition up to this day, now four months since
the commencement. Thank God, an army of 150,000 old and new men are
now bound by a solemn oath to embrace my cause. I have collected
considerable treasury and munitions of war in many places, and in a
short time I shall clear the country of all infidels. Since the real
purpose of this war is to save religion, let every Hindoo and
Mussulman render assistance to the utmost. Those that are old should
offer their prayers. The rich, but old, should assist our sacred
warriors with money. Those in perfect health, as well as young,
should attend in person. But all those who are in the service of
either Mirza Birjish Kadur Bahadoor in Lucknow and of Khan Bahadoor
Khan at Bareilly should not venture out to join us, for these rulers
are themselves using their best endeavours to clear the country of
all infidels. All who join us should do so solely with a view of
promulgating their religion, not with that of worldly avarice. Thus
victory will certainly smile upon us; then distinguished posts will
be conferred on the people at large. The delay in defeating the
English has been caused by people killing innocent children and
women without any permission whatever from the leaders, whose
commands were not obeyed. Let us all avoid such practices, and then
proclaim a sacred war. Lastly, the great and small in this campaign
will be equal, for we are waging a religious war. I (the prince) do
now proclaim a sacred war, and exhort all, according to the tenets
of their religion, to exert themselves. The rest I leave to God. We
shall certainly conquer the English, consequently I invite the
people again to my assistance.—Printed at Bareilly, by Shaick Nisar
Ally, under the supervision of Moulvie Mahomed Kootoob Shah.’
[Illustration]
-----
Footnote 137:
‘I have not as yet said one word of the two other camels which were
appointed to carry my tent. Under the eaves of that tent had gathered
a strange population—they came as sparrows come to a house, without
the knowledge or consent of the owner; but the analogy fails in other
respects except noise, because the natives require to be paid. There
are two men who belong to the tent-post, as in England certain
gentlemen belong to horses; then there is a man to carry water, who
belongs to a large skin to contain that liquid; next there is a
cleaner or sweeper; then there is a khitmutgar or servant, and there
is his and my master, one Simon, “an assizes man” he says himself, but
he only means that he is a follower of St Francisco d’Assisi; and then
follow camel-keepers, and horse-keepers, and grass-cutters; so that I
feel very much as Sancho did in his government of Barataria. On the
morning of the 27th, soon after midnight, commenced a tumult in camp,
the like of which I never heard before; first began a loud tapping of
all the tent-pegs, as if an army of gigantic woodpeckers were
attacking us. This was caused by the kélassies, or tent-men, loosening
the tent-pegs, so that they might be drawn easily from the ground when
the word to march was given. Then followed a most hideous grumbling,
growling, roaring noise, as if many thousands of aldermen were choking
all at once, only that it was kept up for hours; that was caused by
the camels objecting to the placement of the smallest article on their
backs, and continuing their opposition till they stalked off with
their loads. Then came the trumpeting of elephants, the squeaking of
bullock cart-wheels, the hum and buzz of thousands of voices, and at
last the first bugle-call, which announced that the time for turning
out had arrived. Daylight was still striving with the moonlight for
mastery, and casting a sort of neutral tint over the camping-ground,
on which blazed the flames of many watch-fires, when the heads of our
columns began to cross the bridge of boats at Cawnpore. There was but
a waste of baked earth where, at sunset, had been a camp—only a few
tents belonging to the commander-in-chief and the head-quarters’
staff, were left behind; and for hours the bridge echoed to the tramp
of men and horse, the rumble of artillery, and the tread of
innumerable elephants, and camels, and oxen. The Ganges is at this
season at its lowest, and the bridges are not, I should think, more
than 300 yards long; one is used for the exit, the other for the
entrance of Cawnpore. They lead to a level sandy plain, overflowed by
the Ganges for several hundred yards in the rainy season, on which
there were now moving, as far as the eye could reach, the strings of
baggage animals and the commissariat carts of the army, with their
fantastic followers.’
Footnote 138:
‘COPY OF CHARGES PREFERRED AGAINST MAHOMED BAHADOOR SHAH, EX-KING OF
DELHI.
‘1. For that he, being a pensioner of the British government in India,
did at Delhi, at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of
October 1857, encourage, aid, and abet Mahomed Bukht Khan, Subadar of
the regiment of artillery, and divers others, non-commissioned
officers and soldiers, unknown, of the East India Company’s army, in
the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the state.
‘2. For having, at Delhi, at various times between the 10th of May and
1st of October 1857, encouraged, aided, and abetted Mirza Mogul, his
own son, a subject of the British government in India, and divers
other unknown inhabitants of Delhi and of the Northwest provinces of
India, also subjects of the said British government, to rebel and wage
war against the state.
‘3. For that he, being a subject of the British government in India,
and not regarding the duty of his allegiance, did at Delhi, on the
11th of May 1857, or thereabouts, as a false traitor against the
state, proclaim and declare himself the reigning king and sovereign of
India, and did then and there traitorously seize and take unlawful
possession of the city of Delhi; and did, moreover, at various times
between the 10th of May and 1st of October 1857, as such false traitor
aforesaid, treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirza Mogul,
his son, and with Mahomed Bukht Khan, subadar of the regiment of
artillery, and divers other false traitors unknown, to raise, levy,
and make insurrection, rebellion, and war against the state; and,
further to fulfil and perfect his treasonable design of overthrowing
and destroying the British government in India, did assemble armed
forces at Delhi, and send them forth to fight and wage war against the
said British government.
‘4. For that he, at Delhi, on the 16th of May 1857, or thereabouts,
did, within the precincts of the palace at Delhi, feloniously cause
and become accessory to the murder of 49 persons, chiefly women and
children, of European and mixed European descent; and did, moreover,
between the 10th of May and the 1st of October 1857, encourage and
abet divers soldiers and others in murdering European officers and
other English subjects, including women and children, both by giving
and promising such murderers service, advancement, and distinction;
and further, that he issued orders to different native rulers, having
local authority in India, to slay and murder Christians and English
people whenever and wherever found in their territories; the whole or
any part of such conduct being a heinous offence under the provisions
of Act 16, of 1857, of the Legislative Council of India.
‘FREDERICK J. HARRIOTT, MAJOR,
‘_Deputy judge-advocate-general, Government Prosecutor_.
‘_Jan. 5, 1858._’
Footnote 139:
Chap. xx., p. 357.
Footnote 140:
See chap. xvii., p. 291.
[Illustration:
Goorkhas in their native country, Nepaul.
]